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NATO IO Reference PDF
NATO IO Reference PDF
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NATO Bi-SC
Information Operations Reference Book
Version 1
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Foreword
REFERENCES:
B. AJP 3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, 23 Nov 09.
The aim of this reference book is to provide the additional information needed by
Information Operations (Info Ops) practitioners to better understand and implement the
advising and coordinating function of Info Ops in the staffs throughout all levels of
command. The reference book covers the experiences and lessons learned on
principles, procedures, and techniques in current operations as well as some basic
understanding on how to best integrate the Info Ops function in the new evolving
structures (new Peacetime Establishment) and procedures within NATO with respect to
effects based thinking and the new Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.
This reference book must be viewed purely as a living document for informing Info Ops
practitioners on the current understanding of how Info Ops can best support NATO
missions and operations. Thus said, this reference book will have to be reviewed on a
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yearly basis. First revision should be shortly after COPD, KD and Assessment
Handbooks approval.
This reference book has been developed to elaborate on details to further explain and
operationalise references A-K by developing Info Ops related Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures (TTP) and providing examples, checklists, formats/templates and other
tools, as appropriate. This reference book is intended to inform, share awareness and
maintain cohesion across ACO and ACT. It represents the collaborative efforts of the
NATO Info Ops Reference Book Development working group with participants from
throughout ACO and ACT. The JWC Info Ops Handbook (reference D) has been used
to an utmost extent and was a very useful start point for the development of this product,
which focuses on operational issues.
This reference book should not pre-empt or substitute Standing Operating Procedures
(SOP) development, which is necessary to incorporate HQ and mission specific
requirements. In order to understand the application of the Info Ops function in current
staff procedures, this reference book should be read in conjunction with the Operational
Staff Handbook and the ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD).
The knowledge of the content of references A-C is supposed and respective links are
given, wherever appropriate or necessary. Due to classification aspects and frequent
changes in the operational environments, templates and examples are to be found on
the Wise Page of the SHAPE J3 Subject Matter Expert (SME) Info Ops. Respective links
will be found later in the document.
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Table of content
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In the information age, the strategic, operational and tactical levels are more interrelated
than in the past, which demands a different quality of co-ordination and command &
control across the levels of engagement. Today’s military operations to counter the
complex challenges of the global security environment require consideration and
integration of the information factor throughout all processes – analysis, planning,
execution and assessment. This integration demands that all decision-makers at all
times appropriately understand the (possible) effects of their actions in the information
environment; it is not just about deliberate activity using information through means of
communication, it is the combination of words and deeds that delivers the ultimate
effect. A respective systemic understanding of the information environment should result
in a consistent and coherent orchestration of all available means, comparable to the
military concept of '
combined arms combat'or the philosophy of ' jointness'in operational
art. This is a new mind-set, which requires comprehensive education and training rather
than restructuring military organisations.
Information Operations (Info Ops) is a military function to provide advice and co-
ordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will,
understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC
approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives.
The Info Ops function is understood as an integrating process rather than a capability in
its own right. It provides advice to the commander and his1 staff on effects and possible
information activities, and proposes solutions from a generalist's perspective, based on
a comprehensive and systemic understanding of the information environment, including
cross-cultural communication. This includes the preparation, integration, monitoring and
assessment of capability contributions, and the co-ordination of actions to create
synchronised effects considering their relationships and interdependencies and
associated resources as a function of time and space.
The Information Environment is the virtual and physical space in which information is
received, processed and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information
systems.
The Info Ops understanding of ' socio-technical information systems'differs from the
traditional, technical understanding of 'information systems' . The term is used in a
broader context of Systems Theory (where ' systems' basically consist of actors,
processes, structures and supporting technology/tools) in order to introduce the human
factor into communication within modern information societies.
An actor'
s effectiveness is a function of will, understanding and capability. In other
words, actors must have the will to act, an understanding of the situation to act, and
1
Throughout the document, pronouns are to be understood gender-neutral; they should neither reveal nor imply the
gender or sex of a person.
Page 9 of 115
possess the capability to act. If any one of these elements is not in place, their ability to
act as they desire will be affected. Generally conflict-focused, military campaigns have,
in the past, aimed primarily at affecting an adversary’s capability, with the secondary aim
of affecting his will. Activities advised by, and coordinated through, Info Ops addressed
all three dimensions, i.e., influencing will, affecting understanding, and targeting those
capabilities that promote understanding or the application of will – ultimately in order to
change behaviour.
Information Activities are actions designed to affect information and/or information
systems. They can be performed by any actor and include protection measures.
Effects in the information environment can be created by a variety of military activities,
the close co-ordination of which will contribute to the achievement of Information
Objectives. Info Ops advice and co-ordination will integrate military activities to: exploit
information and information systems; protect own information and information systems;
and counter adverse information activities.
'Targets'for kinetic information activities could be within the information infrastructure,
and/or the IT and information-based processes of (potential) adversaries. In addition,
Info Ops will contribute to maintaining the functionality of, and exploiting, own and
friendly information systems. Ultimately, humans may become kinetic targets, if non-
kinetic action is ineffective.
'Audiences'for non-kinetic information activities could be (potential) adversary decision-
makers, supporting opinion leaders and opinion formers, and their followers. However,
to be able to support the full spectrum of possible operations/missions, information
activities may be conducted to reinforce behaviour of friendly audiences and/or to
consolidate and modify behaviour of neutrals – to prevent them from becoming
adversary or hostile.
Communication is a process for the exchange of information between individuals to
convey meaning through a common system of signs (natural, universal), symbols (by
human convention), or behaviour. It may occur verbally and/or non-verbally, consciously
or unconsciously, with the potential to affect change. Messages can be conveyed by a
variety of means, not just by the media; actions and behaviour are capable of delivering
messages as well as the spoken or written word. The observable behaviour of troops
may send an important message to the local populace: e.g., are soldiers perceived as
an occupation force or as humanitarian/ security assistance?
NATO' s approach to Info Ops applies a 'process management philosophy' and stipulates
cooperative arrangements – instead of command relationships and a fixed allocation of
capabilities to Info Ops – with the aim of full scope co-ordination and integration of
options, and better flexibility and adaptability to mission and situation requirements.
Info Ops is neither a continuation of, nor a replacement for Command and Control
Warfare (C2W). A variety of information activities may contribute to C2W. The Info Ops
function is concerned with advice and co-ordination of effects in the information
environment in its broadest sense. These effects may also result from C2W activities. As
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information activities do not equal Info Ops, C2W must not be confused with Info Ops:
C2W is a specific type of operation – Info Ops is a staff function.
As the Strategic Communication (StratCom) function is currently in an evolving process,
it is only mentioned in this reference book when the same practices are shared in the
various headquarters. The more detailed relationship of Info Ops to StratCom will be
included once agreed and explained in policy, doctrine or similar documents.
According to the NATO Strategic Communications Policy the definition of the NATO
Strategic Communications is: “ the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO
communications activities and capabilities – Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs,
Information Operations (InfoOps) and Psychological Operations (PsyOps), as
appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to
advance NATO’s aims.”
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2.1 Scope
Situation Awareness and Knowledge Development normally begins with a review of the
situation including potential risks and threats to NATO’s security interests and
designation of strategic areas of interest. It includes: the development of information
and knowledge requirements; the collection and fusion of information and intelligence
from all available sources; and the analysis, sharing, monitoring and continuous
assessment of the implications of changes in strategic and operational conditions.
Knowledge development is intensified as required to support strategic assessments,
operational planning and execution as well as campaign assessments.
The analysis of the information environment, which is very much dependent on
Knowledge Development and Intelligence products, is essential for the implementation
of the key factor information (additional to time, space and forces) to all planning and
execution of operations. In return, the analysis products will be used to feed and enrich
the Knowledge Development.
It has to be understood, that Info Ops personnel are not responsible for the analysis
process itself, but will use all kinds of products and documents, developed by
Intelligence, Knowledge Development, Psychological Operations (e.g. Target Audience
Analysis), CIMIC (e.g. situation reports of International Organisations (IOs) and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs)), open sources etc. in order to determine the
information environment aspects needed in the development of Info Ops contributions
and products.
2.2 Analysis activities for a systems perspective of the designated area / crisis
region
The main activities in the development of a systems perspective of the designated area /
crisis region are described in the following paragraphs. This work must be done as a
common effort of the entire staff with contribution from all available sources to
understand the crisis from a comprehensive point of view, and subsequently provide the
basis for all stages planning process at each military level. The working bodies to do this
work will be the Strategic Operations Planning Group (SOPG) at SHAPE level, the Joint
Operations Planning Group (JOPG) at the operational or theatre level, and respective
bodies at the Component / tactical level. Info Ops personnel should be included in all of
these planning groups to contribute their special perspective and to identify
requirements for additional information. Once the systems perspective has been
developed, the Info Ops staff officer will use it for their own process of a more detailed
analysis of the information environment (see process under 2.3). The same activities
apply to Info Ops personnel, when newly arrived in their job, and will facilitate immediate
understanding of the situation and assist them in focusing on the crisis / current
operation.
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staff officer, as a customer will be in a position to start the cooperation with other staff
elements to build up the framework for the analysis of the information environment. This
is a time-consuming process and in case of a time-limited preparation it might be
insufficient and require the use of assumptions or rough data.
The Knowledge Development process is depicted in figure 1.
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See Annex 2-A and Appendix 2-A-1, which provide the general taxonomy and some
guiding questions to better understand the information environment. All kinds of sources
(see overview) should be used to collect the necessary data and intelligence / analysis
documents in order to answer these and additional questions. The NATO Intel staffs
provide staff functions related to collection, co-ordination and management of
intelligence requirements and assets, as well as limited analysis and production
capability. The collection efforts and Requests For Information (RFI) in the Political
Military Economic Social Infrastructure Information (PMESII) domains need to be
centrally co-ordinated in an organisation to avoid unintended multiple approaches on the
same source or same subject. This process is guided by the Information Acquisition
Element (where existing) and facilitated by the Commanders Critical Information
Requirement Management (CCIRM) process. This has to be understood as a
continuous, iterative process between the Knowledge Development process or
Intelligence as described and Info Ops as a customer at all times during the mission
planning and execution phase.
Having the knowledge and intelligence products available provided by all the different
disciplines of a staff organisation, the Info Ops staff officer will use them together with
Intel and KD analysts to develop the Info Ops analysis of the information environment.
This analysis includes the identification of potential audiences, main actors, aspects of
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perception management, specific information systems and media. It provides the basis
for the Info Ops support in the development of Centre of Gravity (CoG), Critical
Vulnerabilities (CV), Critical Requirements (CR) of actors, and the determination of
requirements for all kinds of military information activities. In addition, this analysis will
support the best use of resources to deliver relevant information to local populations in
the crisis region. Finally it will be the basis for generating the assessment of status of
own and adversary information activities and possible effects in the information
environment to support the Alliance’s efforts. It has to be understood, that the analysis of
the information environment is a continual, ongoing process from the beginning of a
crisis through NATO deployment to the return to stability / re-deployment of NATO
troops. The process will be the same on each and every level of military hierarchy and
only differ in the scope and level of detail.
Media attitudes may reflect, or influence, public opinion and ultimately could influence
popular and political support of NATO activities and eventual mission success. An Info
Ops staff officer should collaborate with Public Affairs and POLAD in developing an
understanding of the level of media interest amongst different audiences. For the
analysis of the information environment, it is essential to understand how different
audiences are interacting and to what level they are interdependent, disregarding the
fact that some audiences may not be targets of influence or counter command activities.
Audiences can be divided into three main categories, which can be interrelated and
overlapping in some instances:
− Local audiences - covers the wider population, local media, formal and
informal authorities, including the local government(s) and affiliated opinion
leaders and opinion formers, and other actors in the joint operations area
(JOA). Due to Info Ops policy and doctrine, the analysis of the information
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The information environment consists of both information and information systems. The
latter is further sub-divided into social and technical systems, of which the Info Ops staff
officer has to take into consideration both. The social/human systems include
psychological, cultural, and human behavioural attributes that influence decision-
making. The flow of information and the interpretation of information by individuals or
groups at any level must be understood as a system to find who, what and where the
main actors are and how they are interconnected. An analysis to determine the linkages
between individual actors and their level of interdependency is critical for the planning
process of military information activities and has to be as accurate and detailed as
possible. Therefore, the Info Ops staff officer may require the support of cultural
advisors, psychologists, anthropologists, analysts, personnel of organisations already
operating in the crisis region, and even marketing and media experts, to enable the
human factors analysis. As a result, Info Ops personnel have to identify the various
processes of opinion building in the crisis region, and the main ways of communication,
to gain an understanding of perception management in the JOA, which is a prerequisite
for successful military information activities.
Most of the work on the analysis of the main actors in the crisis area will be done in
cooperation with all staff elements, because an understanding of the actors will be
essential to all staff products. Most probably, as a result of this work, the main actors will
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Another important component of the analysis of the information environment will be the
identification of all ongoing information activities in the crisis area. The emphasis of this
analysis will not duplicate 2.2.1.6, but will analyse all available data on information
activities such as the intimidation of population in the crisis region, computer network
operations (CNO), and activities / capabilities to undermine or endanger NATO’s
Operations Security (OPSEC) etc.
Communication and Information Systems (CIS) and Command and Control Systems
(C2S) have to be analysed if they are deemed to have an influence on the crisis or if
could / should be used for the Alliance’s purposes. In most instances, this includes
telephone communication, and the level of access to the Internet and satellite systems.
The analysis should focus on details that aid influencing the will and understanding of
specific actors (includes aspects of Electronic Warfare) and protecting the Alliance’s
freedom of manoeuvre in the information environment (includes aspects of OPSEC and
Information Security).
2
Assets can be official and unofficial, open and covert; used or employed by actors for indirect communication,
information, entertainment, and other related purposes, including traditional communication, new and emerging
media (see Annex A Generic Taxonomy of the Information Environment).
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indicator of whether these media agencies could be used to gain an understanding and
support for NATO' s operations.
2.3.8 Analysis of the use of New Media related to the crisis area
When all the analysis has been done, the Info Ops staff officer element has to produce
documents or contributions to all planning and execution processes. These will be
different at the various military levels, but must be based on a cross-functional and
cross-level understanding of the information environment. The Info Ops staff officer
attending the boards and working groups and contributing to the development of
respective documents has to be aware of all the details of the analysis of the information
environment, which has to be updated on a continuous basis. Chapter 3 (Planning) and
4 (Execution) will provide more details, focussed on these staff activities. In this chapter
Strategic Assessment, Operational Assessment and the contribution to the Mission
Analysis Briefing (MAB) are described. Templates and examples will be found on the
SHAPE J3 JOS INFO OPS Wise Page.
Especially for the contribution to the staff work, the Info Ops staff officer has to identify
the main critical aspects of the crisis from an information environment perspective and
has to provide these for the Commander’s understanding of the key factor information.
3
New Media (i.e. social media networking tools, internet-based technologies, etc)
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The NATO Crisis Response Planning Process4 has three levels: NATO HQ/Political;
SHAPE/Strategic; and JFC/Operational.
At the political level, the NAC Initiating Directive as well as mission-specific, strategic
and political guidance for Alliance information activities is developed.
At the strategic level, political guidance is translated into strategic direction provided
through the Strategic Commander' s campaign plan, including the acknowledgement and
adaptation of Information Objectives from a military perspective.
At the operational level, strategic direction is translated into operations plans, and
effects are developed to support the achievement of Information Objectives.
The overall planning activities at the political, strategic and operational levels are divided
into several stages as depicted below (following the draft Comprehensive Operations
Planning Directive (COPD) :
4
Possibly term will change in the new MC 133
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The Information Strategy also provides Themes and Master Messages for guiding NATO
information activities. Themes are selected topics from the analysis of the information
environment identified at an early stage during the strategic assessment process.
Themes are usually applied to indicate broad lines of persuasion (i.e., rational or
cognitive vs. irrational or emotional modes; type of appeal, etc.). They are also used to
express general permissive or prohibitive guidance (such as taboos). Themes are the
framework for the development of Master Messages.
Master Messages are derived from the assessment of the information environment and
Information Objectives. In order to meet specific in-theatre requirements, Master
Messages will need to be reviewed, adjusted and amended throughout the
campaign/mission. Some Master Messages may be tailored for specific requirements.
Themes and Master Messages contribute to the operationalisation of Information
Objectives. They provide substantive guidance on the informational effect of all activity
or behaviour, which needs to be considered throughout. In particular they provide
guidance on information activities, focused on human audiences, and the desired
perception/understanding to be created. Themes and Master Messages listed in the
Information Strategy (or: Strategic Communication Plan) must not be changed at
subordinate levels; they are not subject to any modification without strategic-political
approval. The Information Strategy will provide limitations (restraints and constraints) for
information activities concerning Themes to stress (emphasize) and Themes to avoid
(taboos), as appropriate. Themes and Master Messages are associated with audiences
and, in certain circumstances, targets. Their further refinement into messages allocated
to specific audiences is subject to operational planning.
The Info Ops staff officers at the various levels will be involved in developing messages
together with Info Ops Coordination Board (IOCB), Information Strategy Meeting (ISM),
7
See Annex 2-A.
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The key organisational element at the operational level will be the Joint Operations
Planning Group (JOPG), which leads the operational planning process to develop the
campaign design and operational plans. The JOPG will essentially focus on military
planning aspects; nevertheless, it plans in close coordination with cooperating non-
military and non-NATO organisations. It includes planners representing all functional
areas and disciplines as required – including an Info Ops planner - depending on the
type and level of operation being conducted taking into account political, economic, civil
and military domains. It is responsible for the coordination and production of contingency
planning throughout a given operation to include the continued development of
CONOPS, OPLAN, SUPLANs, Branches and Sequels.
During the planning phase, the Joint Effects Management Branch (JEMB) will be
included, and during the execution phase they will be responsible to ensure that military
effects are consistent with the political, economic and civil efforts within a
comprehensive approach. The JEMB provides a focal for co-ordination of efforts of
cooperating military and non-military organisations as well as Strategic Communication.
Below is an overview of planning activities and products involving Info Ops contributions:
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•
Initiate 7. Analyse A. Info Ops
operational mission- Estimate
assessment specific
• Develop strategic strategic and
appreciation political
• Appreciate level guidance for
and scope of information
engagement activities
• Analyse end state 8. Develop a
and Strategic common
Objectives understanding
• Analyse, evaluate of the
2 – Strategic
and compare information
Appreciation
strategic environment
/ Operational
response options 9. Integrate
Assessment
• Assess Info Ops staff
operational officer in the
aspects planning
• Provide teams
operational
advice
------------------------------
• Operational
Commander' s
advice
8
SACEUR will have authority to declare pre-authorised CRMs at the beginning of stage 2 of the strategic level
planning.
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9
Consider pre-deployment of Info Ops staff officer as enabling force or member of OLRT
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6–
Operational
Direction
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7–
Transition
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• Provide the Info Ops view (own, neutral, adversary) to war gaming (see
Annex 3-C)
18. Contribute to the development of force/capability requirements
• Refine Info Ops Estimate
• Identify available own capabilities for conducting information activities
• Assess the current state of readiness of capabilities (incl. involvement in
current operations)
• Analyse principle limitations of capabilities (incl. ROE and national
caveats)
• Coordinate assessments with IOCB participants and submit to JOPG
The list below provides an overview of Info Ops-related formats, templates and
examples. They will be included on the SHAPE SME Info Ops Wise Page.
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4.1 Scope
This chapter10 highlights the Execution Phase for Information Operations (Info Ops)
practitioners11, i.e. to describe “how to conduct Information Operations” once the OPLAN
has been approved.
In other words, how to coordinate military information activities, how to control the
execution, how to assess the effectiveness of activities that have been carried-out, and
how to report through the chain of command.
In this chapter, the following aspects of the Execution Phase will be described in detail:
10
To facilitate the understanding of “who is doing what”, the new peacetime establishment (PE) is the
basis for this chapter.
11
The concept of “train as you fight - fight as you train” must not be forgotten when conducting military
information activities, and the need to utilize the same products both in garrison and operational
environments is essential to organizational efficiency and effectiveness. Unforeseen circumstances may
necessitate deviating from doctrine and/or TTP’s; however, the Info Ops practitioner is discouraged from
routinely doing so, to ensure uniformity and facilitate understanding at all levels (strategic, operational,
and tactical).
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4.2 Actors
In the execution of military information activities, the key-actors at joint level and below
are as follows:
The NATO HQ International Military Staff (IMS) Info Ops SME and the SHAPE Info Ops
SME are responsible for “translating” the decisions made by the NAC/SACEUR in terms
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As a significant contributor to the overall execution of the OPLAN the Info Ops
practitioner must understand the commander’s intent and objectives, to be successful in
assessing the situation and providing the necessary products that will support the
commander. To meet this requirement, the best solution is close involvement in the
planning process. That’s why the Info Ops SMEs JEMB, JAB and JSEB (Main)12 have to
actively support the JPB Info Ops SME (Main), and participate in cross-
functional/brainstorming sessions that will serve as “think tanks” for plan development.
4.4.1 Aim
4.4.2 Objectives
4.4.3 Membership
Note, membership of the IOCB is described in accordance with the new PE. The Joint
Effects Management Branch (JEMB) Chief chairs the IOCB. In addition, he is double-
hatted as the StratCom Advisor and is also chairman of the ISM. Note: the JEMB Chief
is the coordinator of all military information activities at the operational level.
The composition of the IOCB is depicted in Figure 6. Representation from JHQ Main
includes all JEMB sections (Info Ops, PsyOps, and CIMIC), JSEB, JPB, JAB, OPOLAD,
12
JCC Info Ops SME (DJSE) input is also required, when deployed
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PAO, LEGAD, EW, CULAD, Knowledge Development (KD), Targeting, FP, Resources
Directorate (CIS, LOG, FIN, ENG), and Component Command LNOs. Through VTC,
attendees from JHQ FE (TEC and JCC) and Component Command Info Ops Chiefs also
participate. Make-up of the IOCB is flexible, but its effectiveness is directly proportional
to the level of engagement of the SMEs who are involved in military information activities
(influence, counter-command, and information protection), from JHQ Main, JHQ FE and
CCs. At the CC level it might be beneficial to have additional expertise, such as civilian
contractors, and NCAGS Rep.
External
External
JHQFE Actors
Actors
Info Ops SME
+ TEC Rep Cultural
Advisor
SEWOC KD POLAD (CULAD)
OPSEC LEGAD
SEWOC PA
JSEB REP SUST
Chairman:
Chairman:
JPB JEMB
JEMB Chief
Chief CIS
DECEPTION
REP COMPONENT
TARGETING CIMIC PSYOPS REPS
Info Ops
REP
DECEPTION NRF CCs
PLANNING
CELL (MCC, ACC, JLSG,
JTCB JEMB
Reps JPOTF, LCC, SOCC)
4.4.4 Function
The IOCB13 is the primary mechanism for coordinating all military information activities,
to facilitate the accomplishment of operational mission objectives. In time-sensitive
situations, coordination of information activities can be done through smaller and less
formal ways such as e-mail, phone, JCHAT, etc.
The IOCB Chairman provides the necessary leadership to assess, progress and/or
initiate information activities related to the operation under discussion. IOCB members
should voluntarily provide inputs regarding their field of expertise, and highlight any
impact these activities may have on the information environment.
13
Reference AJP-3.10 and ACO Directive (AD) 80-70 Part I
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Example:
b. PsyOps Task Force distributes media fliers describing the role of NATO forces in
country.
Report to IOCB how the local leaders and population react when NATO forces enter the
village.
The resulting “effects” of these activities are discussed during the IOCB, and the IOCB
Chairman should be able to refine, adjust or take new initiatives with respect to the
information environment.
14
Private Voluntary Organisation
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The following Agenda slide, Figure 7, as well as the Cross Functional / Component
Commands slide, Figure 9, is an example of what can be done to raise Situational
Awareness and share specific needs for coordination.
IOCB AGENDA
1. Direction and Guidance/ Tasks (5 min)
2. Cross Functional Staff reports (2 min each)
3. Component reports (2 min each)
4. Long-term planning update (2 min)
5. Mid-term update (2 min)
6. J2 Threat Update (5 min)
7. Current Ops update (2 min)
8. Assessment of Military Info Campaign (3 min)
9. Target nominations (5 min)
10. Tasks Update (3 min)
11. Review of Tasks (5 min)
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J2 Assessment G+55
1 De-legitimize and discredit the NIMFOR mission and DJTF force presence
Note 1. In a holistic approach, all activities must be taken into account, including those
carried-out by adversary (RED), neutral (GREEN), and friendly (BLUE) forces.
Note 2. The IOCB Chairman may ask the IOCB INTEL/KD Rep to request assets from
the Daily Assets Reconnaissance Board (DARB) so that IOCB concerns and
requirements are taken into consideration and met.
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PAO G + 52
Current Ops Future Ops (72 – 120 HRS)
• Daily news conference at HQ • Continuous monitoring of media
UNMIKT • Developing MRLs as appropriate
• Establishing Media Response Lines • Exploit media opportunities
(MRLs) to prepare for anticipated • Developing PA plans to support the
media queries. planned operational missions
• Drafting News Releases to highlight
progress being made and to
communicate significant events.
Assessment Co-ordination
• NATO master messages have bee • Continue coordination of activities in
implemented and reflected up the support of MIC objectives
international media • Continue coordination with DJTF
• International and local media PAO and CCs
(TYTAN and LAKUTA) coverage • Qs & As for COM in response to
• Local (KAMON, STELLARIA and negative media reports
PETRACEROS) media’s climate • Letter from COM to CCs to ensure
regarding NATO operations re-briefing of troops with reference
to acceptable behaviour
Especially for Info Ops officers distributed throughout all branches following the new PE
structures, it is necessary to convene Info Ops functional meetings at least once a week.
These meetings should be chaired by the Chief Info Ops and should aim to achieve a
common understanding of the information environment with respect to the different
missions. Following that, it should be assured that the Info Ops officers throughout the
headquarters are sharing the same knowledge and experiences and are thus able to
provide coherent advice and coordination.
Experience has shown, that it is of benefit to conduct a cross military level Info Ops VTC
at least once a month. This VTC should be organised by the Info Ops staff officer of the
operational level headquarters and should include Info Ops staff officer from HQ NATO,
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In order to achieve the information objectives, Military Information Campaigns (MIC) will
be conducted, coordinating all kinds of military information activities including Presence,
Posture and Profile (PPP), reporting and assessment. The MIC must be developed and
coordinated throughout all military levels. There is a need to ensure that military
information activities are proactive so that whenever a major foreseeable incident
occurs, there will be coordinated military information activities immediately available to
mitigate negative consequences or exploit positive opportunities. Following Info Ops
policy and doctrine, these plans have to consist of information activities, focussed and
synchronised to:
• Influence key decision makers and approved audiences,
• Protect NATO freedom of manoeuvre in the information environment, including
aspects of operation security, information security and counter-propaganda,
• Counter command activities of every adversary to NATO operations, if
appropriate.
Audiences and population of those countries connected to the joint operations area have
to be identified and respective NAC approval has to be requested, if not existing. As part
of the MIC, requests for Rules of Engagement (RoE Req) for information activities have
to be identified and approved by the SACEUR/NAC in order to receive the additional
authorisation, if required. Appropriate manning and funding will be a prerequisite for the
successful conduct of the MIC, as well as the determination of effects to be supported
by the MIC and respective measurement of effectiveness. The latter might require
support by other organizations or contractors.
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4.8.1 Aim
4.8.2 Objective
4.8.3 Membership
4.8.4 Function
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MAJOR POINTS
Ensure CFA compliance G
The JCBWG is described in ACO Directive (AD) 80-70 Part I, chapter 2, section III.
Military information activities are only a part of the activities that need coordination and
synchronization at joint level; the IOCB Representative in the JCBWG has a critical role
to play, in order to ensure that IOCB outputs are taken into consideration in the mid-term
planning horizon.
4.9.1 Aim
To generate plans, orders and briefings for submission to/and approval by the JCB,
which provides the necessary leadership and synchronization of component commands
to fulfil operational mission objectives.
4.9.2 Objectives
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JCB
JCBWG
External Decision briefings
4.9.3 Membership
Within the JCBWG, the following sub-groups are represented to provide collaborative
inputs based on their specializations:
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The JCBWG has representation from all staff elements, including Knowledge
Management, Operations, and Resources and the Special Staff of the commander. This
ensures all aspects of the operational/campaign plan are understood and all activities
are synchronised to effectively implement the plan. The various sub-groups also send
their own representatives to the working group.
4.9.4 Function
As a member of the JCBWG, the Info Ops staff officer should provide inputs on the
following topics:
From the JCBWG, the Info Ops staff officer can expect the following outputs for use:
4.10.1 Aim
To synchronize and manage both kinetic and non-kinetic joint targeting efforts during an
operation or exercise.
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4.10.2 Objectives
a. Obtain from SHAPE, the integrated database (IDB) containing a list of potential
targets within the JOA;
b. Select candidate targets from the list that may contribute to mission
accomplishment, using direction and guidance contained in the SHAPE and JFC
OPLANs, and subordinate HQ SUPLANs;
c. Mark those targets that are Restricted and Prohibited, in accordance with
guidance from Higher HQ;
d. Make the Joint Targeting List (JTL) available through the Integrated Command
and Control – Joint Targeting System (ICC-JTS);
e. For each phase of the operation obtain the Target Nomination Lists (TNL) from
the subordinate commands or other nominating agencies;
f. Compile the nominations on ICC, scrutinized by LEGAD and prioritised into a
JPTL;
g. Forward the Draft JPTL to the JCB, for consideration by the COM;
h. Produce and maintain a Draft Time Sensitive Targeting TST;
i. Forward recommendations for additional target sets to the JCB requiring NAC
approval;
j. Provide consolidated battle damage assessment (BDA) for the JCB;
k. Seek JFC/JCB guidance on unsolved targeting conflicts;
l. Participate in IOCB.
4.10.3 Membership
The Targeting and Operations Specialist Section (TOSS) Chief chairs the JTCB. The
TOSS is attributed to the Joint Synchronization and Execution Branch (JSEB). Within
the JTCB, the following sub-groups are represented: IOCB, DARB, LEGAD, POLAD,
Joint Intelligence Cell, CC LNOs, Target Support Cell (TSC) Chief
4.10.4 Function
As a member of the JTCB, the Info Ops SME is an integral participant in the targeting
process. CC representatives, in-conjunction with the IOCB, nominate targets for
inclusion in the Draft JPTL via the CC TNL. The IOCB will de-conflict and harmonise the
theatre Info Ops plan before nomination to the JTCB.
4.10.5 Actions
As the IOCB Rep in the Targeting process, the Info Ops SME has to:
a. Participate in the identification of possible targets, through active coordination
with the KD experts,
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Subsequently, the JTCB with particular emphasis on the IOCB Rep will ensure a
synergy is achieved between lethal and non-lethal targeting, for inclusion in the Draft
JPTL, to achieve the desired effects within the information environment.
The IOCB Rep will also represent all IOCB Members in the JTCB.
The TST process is described in ACO Directive (AD) 80-70 Part II, chapter 1, sections I
and V.
With Dynamic Targeting (same reference, section IV), the TST requires a particular
involvement of IOCB Members, since the servicing of targets “who pose (or will soon
pose) a danger to friendly operations or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of
opportunity” definitely impacts – directly or indirectly - the information environment.
That’s why the IOCB Chairman must be represented in the JTST Cell and the JHQ
Forward Element Group that deals with TST, in order to analyse the situation and
provide sound recommendations for the Decision-Maker (TEA: Target Engagement
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Authority) through the TCE (TST Coordination Element) in full consultation with the other
Experts (principally with POLAD, PA, LEGAD and PsyOps).
Although the ISM is not formalized anywhere (such as AJP-3.10), it has been proven –
in exercises and real operations – to be a useful forum to increase the Joint
Commander’s situational awareness and for the staff to receive direct guidance from the
Joint Commander concerning military information activities/campaign.
4.12.1 Aim
4.12.2 Objectives
a. Provide the Commander with an updated assessment of both the adversary’s and
own military information campaign, while referring to both SACEUR’s Strategic
Communication Guidance and JFC Commander’s plans;
b. Propose the main and supporting efforts for information activities; and
c. Receive Commander’s guidance and direction on the military information
campaign.
4.12.3 Membership
• COM
• StratCom Advisor (JEMB Chief)
• POLAD
• PA
• LEGAD
• JCC Info Ops SME
• PsyOps
• Other Advisors and SMEs, such as MEDAD, CIMIC, KD, etc.
Membership for the ISM should be limited to key decision makers for the information
campaign. The necessity of the ISM is predicated on the commander’s awareness of the
information campaign and how it is affecting (good or bad) the overall operations in the
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joint operations area. Ongoing communication between the Commander and the
StratCom Advisor or Chief Info Ops can also reinforce his awareness and knowledge of
Info Ops plans and activities.
Function – The ISM provides a dedicated forum in which the StratCom Advisor15 (and
IOCB Chairman) directly interacts with the Commander.
As StratCom Advisor, he receives SACEUR’s guidance regarding Strategic
Communications, and then ensures operational Commanders’ plans and activities are
in-line with SACEUR’s objectives.
4.12.4 Actions
During the ISM, the StratCom Advisor integrates the various aspects of military
information activities, as displayed in Figure 12, to ensure the following:
INFORMATION
INFORMATION
STRATEGY
STRATEGY
MEETING
MEETING
IOCB MICAWG
MICAWG
POCM KLE
KLE
POCM JMC
JMC
PSYOPS
PSYOPS
PRODUCT
PRODUCT
APPROVAL
APPROVAL CICOM
CICOM
15
The StratCom Advisor is double-hatted as the JEMB Chief / branch head; whereby he coordinates all
information activities (influence, counter-command, and information protection) at the operational level.
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Commander Commander
LEGAD Assessment & TEC LEGAD TEC
Guidance
PA Recommendations
POLAD PA POLAD
JCC Info Ops SME JCC Info Ops SME
FE StratCom Adv. Rep FE StratComAdv. Rep
DJSE DJSE
IOCB IOCB
Figure 13. A way to support the ISM when the Commander is forward (DJSE)
a. Bilateral talks (BILAT) of senior leaders with military and civilian counterparts at
their level of influence;
b. Speeches held at various occasions in the presence of the media and/or key
decision makers;
c. Featured interviews to selected media with wide influence; and
d. Conferences arranged to discuss specific items of interest with influential
characters.
At minimum, the Info Ops staff officer should understand the various leadership
capacities and extent of influence of decision makers. The Knowledge Development
section will be critical in developing a comprehensive analysis of this decision-making
16
See Chapter 1 for definition of KLE
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matrix and its links to possible courses of action by the adversary. The Info Ops
practitioner will use this matrix as a basis for developing Annex O in the OPLAN as well
as creating the KLE Matrix (KLEM) that will map a summary of engagements to be
conducted.
The analysis of the Key Stakeholders in the AOR (to be placed in the tool dependent on
the level of their assessed influence in the AOR and NATO’s level of interest to engage
with this stakeholder) is an iterative tool to keep an updated overview of the most
important players and targets; to specify the priority of the different stakeholders the
following tool can be used by the KLE planner:
High
Low
High
The outcome of the analysis above indicates current priority of the stakeholder at any
given time and indicates what monitoring means those have to be used:
a. High Interest – High Influence in the AOR => top priority audiences/targets for
influence
b. High Influence – Low Interest => must be monitored and assessed. Contingency
planning for influence
c. High Interest – Low Influence => monitored
d. Low Interest – Low Influence => registration and tracking must be conducted
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The IBP is a summary of all the necessary information that the commander will require
to achieve the desired influence over the key decision maker. The IBP is developed by
the Info Ops staff officer and provides three (3) essential elements: messages for
influence; assessment considerations; and background information on the key decision
maker. All three elements combine to give the commander the essential elements of
how the “influencing” activities are tied to the ongoing operations and the desired
effects.
Example for KLE Briefing Package see Annex 4 A
4.13.5 Debriefing
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A debriefing has to follow every KLE. In the ideal world, the NATO Key-Leader, or
his/her “note-taker” (most likely the POLAD or Military Assistant), will personally share
the information. A downgraded mode is the sharing of written minutes.
Because of the sensitivity of some pieces of information, and because of the personal
tone that is often used in such meetings, the dissemination of the information should be
considered on a “need to know” basis.
The “note-taker” should mainly get his/her inspiration in the “Influence Briefing Package”
(IBP) that is used for the KLE preparatory session. However, he/she is free to bring back
any piece of information that is deemed useful.
At the operational level, the StratCom Advisor or the Chief Info Ops are the best suited
to attend the debriefing and/or read the minutes, from which he/she will extract the
feedback that can be shared within the Staff.
A debrief should include inter alia the following items:
• Experiences in behaviour / cultural background with the KLE subject
• Preferences in talking points of the KLE subject
• Outcome of the KLE or promises given by the KLE subject
• Promises given by own representative at KLE or denials to requests of the KLE
subject
• Personnel background on the KLE subject necessary to know for following KLE
• Organization of the meeting, ornamentation of the office, behaviour of the back-
sitters, etc
All this information (the list is not exclusive and should be added case by case) must be
stored and correlated with other information (e.g. from Intel regarding HUMINT or
SIGINT / EW information on behaviour of the KLE subject after the KLE) in order to be
included / exploited in the following IBP in case of continuing KLE with this KLE subject.
This will help to avoid doing the same mistakes (e.g. in behaviour), to keep promises
given by predecessors, to be aware of former conversation content (statements and
denials etc.), and thus to have a continued, unbroken KLE process after change of own
personnel.
Respective databases must be created and continuously filled with information from all
staff divisions useful to support successful KLE.
Feedback of KLE with political Very Important Persons (VIP) has to be provided to
Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) via SHAPE Intel answering the questions provided at
SHAPE Wise page.
There are, at least, two ways to conduct assessments at the operational level:
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Additional Info Ops SMEs can be requested to participate, especially from the JEMB
and the Joint Assessment Branch (JAB), to support the development of the following
products:
a. Plan’s Main Body and Annex O (OPLAN, CONPLAN, SUPLAN, Sequel Plans,
Branch Plans, etc.)
b. JCO Main Body and Annex C,
c. FRAGOs.
17
Defined in Chapter 3
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behaviour, and will contribute to FRAGOs or Tactical Directives relating to own forces
behaviour.
Personnel participating in a mission, who have regular contact with the local population,
must be trained to perform as both Effectors and Collectors. As an Effector, one must
be able to effectively communicate with the local population, including the delivery of
approved messages and themes. As a Collector, one must be able to interact with the
local population, including in the conduct of standardized interviews, and to receive
feedback, which can then be used for MoE/MoP. This can include the identification of
personal problems that have the potential to escalate into group concerns, major
apprehensions of the population, rising tensions, change of opinion/perception,
appreciation of NATO products and change of NATO image. All of these
observations/feedback must be included in standardized reporting, such as Patrol
Commander Reports, HUMINT, CIMIC, and Liaison Monitoring Team Reports, which will
be reviewed by an Info Ops staff officer.
In support of the requirement for personnel to act as Effectors, Info Ops will coordinate
the development of Soldier Cards to highlight the culture, current issues, themes and
messages that will support PPP and mission objectives.
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5.1 Overview
As of today, there is no approved doctrine for Assessment in NATO, only "best practice"
within each Headquarters but not shared between them. The following chapter provides
an example in order to support the Info Ops staff officer in understanding aspects of the
process and to identify his role within this process. This chapter does not substitute or
supersede any NATO or Headquarters internal directive or guideline for the assessment
process and will be reviewed once NATO has standardized procedures.
a. The assessment plan, including the MoE data collection and reporting plan and
the MoP criteria must be defined during the planning process.
b. At different levels of command, purpose-driven assessment cycles that match the
required timeline and level of the operation are conducted. Through these cycles,
the accomplishment of actions, creation of effects, and progress toward the
attainment of objective(s) and NATO end-state is assessed.
c. Assessment results are reviewed by Planning and Execution Staff to determine if
plan adaptations are required. Respective recommendations will be decided-on
by the Commander.
d. Collaboration or close cooperation with non-Military actors to gain a better
understanding of the engagement space should be considered.
There are two basic criteria used for assessment of the engagement space:
MoP – “are we doing things right”, and MoE – “are we doing the right things”
18
Should be reviewed based on the new COPD and the Assessment Handbook
19
Full definition in chapter 8, part 1
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MoE is a criterion used to evaluate how system behaviour or capabilities have been
affected by actions. Essentially, MoE are indicators of system state, used to help answer
the question “Was the intended new system state—the desired effect—created?”
Multiple MoE may be required to fully capture the changes in system states. The MoE
should be written during the development of military objective and effects.
Collection methods must be a key consideration during MoE development to ensure that
the desired metric can be measured:
MoE must:
Each MoE must also include threshold(s) of change for a system element or relationship
that indicates effect status, with one key point: The threshold value, whether used as a
boundary for failure, success, or simply indication of status, is not the MoE, and may be
changed during different phases of an operation without changing the MoE.
A MoP is defined as the criteria used to evaluate the execution of (own) actions. Each
level (operational and subordinate levels) will normally develop MoP for the actions they
will execute.
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During the initial stages of planning for an operation, an analysis of the NATO end-state
must be conducted. The goal or end result of this analysis must include refinement of
the objective(s).
Prior to commencement of the operation, all levels of command must start the
assessment process. Since the operational environment is a changing, dynamic system,
even before own forces arrive in the region, a continuous assessment process must
monitor for changes in the system prior to execution. It is possible the situation will
change between plan initiation and plan execution; the assessment process should
identify those changes to highlight any necessary plan revisions. This monitoring
process will continue until the operation starts. The last evaluation of system status prior
to any attempt by own forces to modify the system becomes the “baseline”, a reference
for assessment during the operation.
Planning for the assessment process must occur at the following levels during
Operational Planning:
a. The NAC should decide on MoE to measure strategic political level effects
retained at the NAC level and thus progress toward achieving the NATO end-
state;
c. At the operational level, MoP are written in concert with action development, and
are used to evaluate performance of actions. MoE are crafted by the planning
and assessment staff during effects development, and after approval by the
Commander, will be used to measure achievement of effects;
d. At the tactical level, MoP are written and related to the tasks based on the actions
given by the operational level. They are used to evaluate task accomplishment.
Sharing the assessments of MoP/MoE across all levels of command may improve
situational awareness. In appropriate cases, the data required to assess high-level MoE
may be incorporated into the OPLAN data collection plan. If not, a separate data
collection plan must be drafted to ensure appropriate information is available. In some
circumstances, actions whose sole purpose is data collection may be required.
There will be multiple related assessment cycles during execution of the plan, varied
both in command level and assessment cycle time. In all cases, the assessment cycle
time must depend on the tempo of operations and the required time scale of the effect.
Figure 17 depicts these cycles.
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5.6.1 Purpose
5.6.2 Sequence
5.6.4 Preconditions
SHAPE will provide an approved plan for assessment including criteria for success, MoE
and requirements for collection and reporting. This plan will determine the procedures
for the conduct of the strategic campaign assessment and operational campaign
assessments. The entire PMR / Campaign Assessment process will rely on continuous
strategic data collection and reports.
SHAPE SOPG or responsible lead divisions will initiate the entire assessment process
following political guidance. This process will be based on the conduct of continuous
Campaign Assessments. Objective of this process is the update of strategic estimates,
which will provide guidance for campaign synchronization or changes in the strategic
framework. Finally this process will contribute to NAC periodic mission review.
5.6.6 Products
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5.7.1 Purpose
At the operational level, the Operational Commander has his own Campaign
Assessment processes. The Campaign Assessment assesses the operational
effectiveness in achieving military objectives (MoE) and progress towards the military
end-state. Consequently it determines future direction and guidance on new planning
process / changes in operational framework or adjusts campaign synchronization. As
progress towards the military end-state is achieved, the Campaign Assessment will
provide advice and recommendations on the transition process towards a return to
stability and therewith decreasing of troop numbers and redeployment.
5.7.2 Preconditions
Collection and Reporting requirements have been implemented into the Collection Plan.
MoE have been implemented and are executed to fulfil the requirements, to assess the
situation from a comprehensive perspective. Info Ops, in close cooperation with PA, has
contributed with appropriate MoE from an information perspective. Criteria for Success20
have been determined in order to provide indicators to which degree the situation is
deteriorating / ameliorating towards the end-state.
There will be three related cycles concerning the Campaign Assessment: action MoP
assessment, effect MoE assessment and objective MoE assessment. The assessment
staff will use MoE to measure status of the system, and thus achievement of the desired
effects. The operational commander’s assessment report to superior headquarters
should include his assessment of effects and data related to MoE for the military
objective.
Commanders and staff must remember that assessment may require the creation of
teams/groups within the staff to facilitate assessment, perhaps requiring the formation of
an Assessment Working Group (AWG). Along these same lines, the battle rhythm may
also need to be adjusted or new ones created to accommodate daily, weekly, or monthly
effects assessments. The ever-changing situation and the type of actions and effects
being employed will ultimately determine the frequency of assessments required by the
staff. Care must be taken when creating the assessment plan to focus the staff on the
relevant information for assessing an effect against becoming overloaded with useless
information.
20
Criteria for Success
• Essential physical, cybernetic or moral conditions or effects that must be achieved
• Any conditions or effects that cannot exist
• Must be measurable or observable
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In order to fulfil all these requirements, the current development of the assessment
process has identified the necessity of two different working bodies to ensure the
implementation of all assessment contributions required.
In both, the Campaign Assessment Working Group and the Command Assessment
Board, Info Ops staff officer officers will be included and provide their contributions from
the information environment’s perspective. These contributions will be based on results
from the IOCB regarding campaign and component assessment issues and will be an
outcome of the MoE.
The composition of the Campaign Assessment Working Group is depicted on figure 19.
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JX Cell Chief
Analysis OA Plans Plan status
The assessment of effects through MoE provides feedback to the planning staff. Again,
this feedback can be positive – the plan is achieving the desired effects and thus should
continue, negative – the plan is not achieving the desired effects and revisions must be
considered, or neutral – the situation is remaining static. A consideration for negative
feedback may include two other aspects: the expected timeline was incorrect – the plan
is working, just slower than anticipated, or the threshold in use is incorrect. Neutral
feedback may mean lack of progress, if change was desired, or it could mean success if
the MoE is measuring a node where change is not desired or intended.
The assessment of the military objective through MoE will provide both insight to the
overall plan accomplishment and valuable input to superior headquarters. The Info Ops
staff officer will contribute with the MoE developed and coordinated in the IOCB.
The Campaign Assessment format will follow the Operational Commanders’ rules and
formats or strategic direction and guidance. The Info Ops contribution will be included in
this document and, in principle, will cover the same aspects as already described in the
Strategic Assessment.
To be relevant, the Info Ops part of the assessment needs time and appropriate effort:
the analysts have to consider all aspects of the assessment and thoroughly understand
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the target system. While the conventional battle damage indicators are obvious, those of
Info Ops may not be. They can range from the complete destruction of the target to
subtle changes in normal operating status or behaviour. Therefore analysts should make
assessments of change, functional damage and the target system to determine the
effectiveness of the weapons and tactics employed to achieve the stated objective.
Recognition of change is based on the observed or interpreted battle damage indicators
at selected monitoring points. Post action intelligence must be analysed to identify and
assess changes associated with the target based upon a systemic understanding of that
target system. It may be necessary to measure effects on linked systems to justify the
assessment made on the target (i.e. System of Systems Analysis). Moreover the
analysis must deal with desired and undesired effects.
The Info Ops staff officer must conduct a regular review of the information objectives laid
out in the OPLAN. This must reflect the progress made towards each of the objectives
and recording this progress over time should show trends in this progress as well as the
status of each objective. One method to capture the progress is a traffic light system for
the overall status and an up/neutral/down arrow for the trend.
5.9 Reporting
The Info Ops practitioner must understand that reporting and information collection from
all sources, as depicted in Figure 20, is essential for the Info Ops contribution to the
different level assessments. Additionally to those items depicted, the reporting of patrol
commanders, CIMIC, Liaison Monitoring Teams (LMT) or Liaison Observation Teams
(LOT) and other NATO Liaison Elements to host nation organisations are essential
contributors and have to be included in the Info Ops assessment. In order to receive
useful and valid results, it will be necessary to provide guiding questions from the Info
Ops perspective to these reporting elements and into the CCIRM / Knowledge
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Requirement process. Only in that way will it be possible for Info Ops personnel to
reliably determine changes in behaviour / opinion and contribute to MoE.
Roles of the Info Ops staff officer at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical Level (advice
and co-ordination function).
Info Ops roles and responsibilities in NATO do not change at the different levels of
command, whether strategic, operational or tactical level. The Info Ops role remains to
provide advice and coordination of military information activities. The distinction between
activities conducted by forces at the different military levels is clear, but the effects of
political, strategic, operational and tactical levels will seldom remain only at one level.
Therefore, it is essential that information activities are coordinated from strategic to
tactical level and that each level is aware of the other’s roles and restrictions.
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A CMTF, composed of designated representatives from the IS and the IMS, may be
activated by the Secretary General at the start of a crisis in accordance with HQ NATO
own crisis management procedures. It provides an executive level forum for cross-
functional coordination. HQ NATO IMS/Ops SME Info Ops may be a participant in the
CMTF.
A decision-making body that meets fortnightly at the working level, chaired by SHAPE
Chief Strategic Communications (CSC) to oversee, agree and implement StratCom
policy. The SHAPE Info Ops staff officer is a permanent member of this SCWG. The
results/products of the SCWG will provide guidance for all ACO StratCom activities. At
the operational level an SCWG might be established as well to coordinate strategic and
operational level activities.
21
Review of the Reference Book in 2010 according to the new PE structure, e.g. DCOS Cap., Pl. & Pol
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from a designated JFC, the NATO CIS Support Agency (NCSA) and the Civil
Emergency Planning Directorate (CEPD) as well as other organisations as required and
authorised. It may be a standing or on-call organisation activated in response to a
specific planning requirement.
At the operational level, Info Ops staff officers in the Joint Planning Branch (JPB) identify
and establish the operational level information objectives necessary to achieve the
strategic objectives. They establish Info Ops priorities and provide guidance for
allocating forces and resources to tactical level commanders in order to accomplish
specific operational information objectives. Info Ops staff officers at this level also
contribute to Campaign assessments and provide advice to the strategic level.
Info Ops planners are key members of the JOPG and participate in the OPP from the
very beginning to include drafting of the main OP Plan body or specific annexes. For
more detail, refer to Chapter 3. The Info Ops staff officer in the JPB will be a permanent
member of the JOPG and will be supported by other branches when required.
See Chapter 4
These two WGs support the ISM, and only differ in titular nomenclature. The
Engagement Working Group (EWG) is a coordinating function to prepare
recommendations regarding information activities for COM approval. Note the EWG is a
precursor to the ISM at JFCNP. The role of StratCom Advisor to the Commander is
currently evolving and is regarded differently in the various headquarters. This role will
be addressed in the next revision of this document.
Following staff procedures there should be either a permanent Info Ops SO assigned to
the JOC or an on-call Info Ops SO to support the JOC. In conjunction, Info Ops provides
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a daily contribution to the JOC for the Situational Awareness Brief. Details are provided
in Chapter 4.
See Chapter 5.
See Chapter 5.
Info Ops at the tactical level contributes to achieving strategic and operational
information objectives. At this level, the Info Ops staff officer focuses their effort on
creating an effect on key local decision-makers and groups to affect their will, decision-
making and capabilities. Info Ops targets an adversary’s use of information and
information systems, as well as protecting their own. It is vital that information activities
conducted at the tactical level are synchronized and integrated with adjacent units
and/or agencies and higher headquarters.
6.4 Roles of the Info Ops staff officer in coordinating military and civilian
information activities, and the relationship with CIMIC/J9 and LNOs
CIMIC develops working relations with civil organisations which can be used to achieve
information objectives. It is the coordination and cooperation between military and civil
actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international,
national and non-governmental organizations and agencies. CIMIC is important as an
effector and collector of information that involves interfacing with essential organizations
and individuals within the JOA and with NGOs such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross. It supports and assists the Info Ops function by enhancing the
relationship between the overall force and the civilian populace. However, due care
must be taken to ensure that CIMIC activities are not perceived as intelligence
gathering. A CIMIC database is established for each mission, which comprises cultural
and other information related to the JOA. This is an excellent source of information for
cultural awareness and detailed knowledge of social networks.
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During a mission, the Info Ops staff officer may have to cooperate with different
organizations to achieve common goals. In the JOA, Info Ops officers may need to work
with NGO, UN, EU representatives, local government, police and security organizations,
tribal leaders, etc.
Different organization may have different capabilities in different areas at different times.
Therefore, it is important that Info Ops officers try to track and be aware of different
organizations capabilities. This will aid a better understanding of their restrictions and
their potential opportunities.
Info Ops staff officer must understand that most non-military organizations do not have
an operational level structure. Most non-military organizations only have tactical and
strategic levels. Consequently, Info Ops officers must be very careful when working with
them.
When dealing with NGOs and non-military organisations, Info Ops practitioners must be
aware of the classification and releasability of own information whilst cooperating with
these actors.
6.5 Relationship of the Info Ops staff officer with functional capability staffs
See AJP 3.10 for the relationship of Info Ops with functional capability staffs. Added to
these, here you can find those not listed in AJP 3.10.
The KD element directly supports the SOPG/JOPG in understanding the nature of the
crisis as well as the actions, capabilities and behaviour of the main actors/systems and
influencing factors that account for the current situation and its development. Info Ops
practitioners from all branches must liaise closely with KD staff to ensure a detailed
understanding of the PMESII analysis of the JOA.
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Info Ops staff officer will work closely together with this element, once established. This
element will provide all necessary data to conduct the analysis of the information
environment and will fulfil all requirements for daily contribution to situational awareness,
and support the various Info Ops activities.
7 STAFF ORGANISATION
This chapter deals with headquarters and commands that do not currently employ an
effects based organisation. Detailed information regarding organisational set-up of the
Info Ops staff officer within the J-structure is available in AJP 3.10, and this chapter will
highlight modifications and recommendations for improvement of the current structure.
The commander’s personal involvement drives Info Ops, and exercises control over all
Info Ops activity within a framework of timely decision-making and consultation up and
down the chain of command; AJP 3.10 shows 3 possible scenarios for the placement of
Info Ops within the C2 structure.
Practice, in KFOR, ISAF and a multitude of NATO exercises, has shown that Chief Info
Ops should have direct access to the Chief of Staff (COS), as Info Ops will, in today’s
war fighting environment, be a significant part of the campaign.
On the other hand, a core Info Ops cell is essential for coordinating all information
related activities throughout all military levels.
Although it is essential to have a dedicated Info Ops Cell, it is also important to have Info
Ops representation in the cross-functional staffs, including J2, J3, J5 and Targeting. This
will provide Info Ops staff officer access to all information available to ensure
maintenance of awareness and currency in all issues and disciplines.
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The structure, number and rank of Info Ops staff officers will depend on the size, type
and complexity of the operation being undertaken. However, identifying Info Ops
manning requirements should be based on experience gained from ongoing operations.
See the list below for an example taken from a recent operation. Be aware that you
might not get any additional manpower support!
If dedicated personnel do not fill any of the above positions, then the duties associated
with unfilled positions must be assigned to other staff personnel in the organization as
secondary duties. If the above duties are not assigned to anyone then there will be a risk
that all information activities will not be achieved.
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BACKGROUND
1. Introduction.
Example:
This SOP describes the role and functions of Information Operations (Info Ops)
within the JHQ. It is consistent with, and amplifies the direction provided in, AJP-
3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Information Operations, and current
established procedures with regards to the Information Operations Coordination
Board (IOCB). It prescribes the default setting and is subject to change pending
mission specific solutions identified during OPLAN development.
1. Concept
Explain concept of HQ’s way of conducting Info Ops
Example:
Planning of the various military information activities and functions will be
accomplished through operational planning in the HQ, and the Info Ops SME is a
standing part of the OPLAN development and synchronisation of the operation.
Example:
The role of Info Ops is to advise and coordinate all military information activities,
internal and external to the JOA. Following COM’s D&G.
3. Outputs
The example below may be adjusted according to HQ needs
Example:
a. Contribution to the development of OPLAN and ANNEXES, specifically Annex O and
Branch Plans/Sequels.
b. Coordination of Info OPS activities during execution:
(1) Short-term: FRAGOs.
(2) Mid-term: JCO.
(3) Long-term: adjustment of OPLAN and ANNEXES.
Conduct IOCB
e. In coordination with POLAD, PAO, PsyOps and Knowledge Development (KD), plan,
synchronise and prepare Individual Briefing Packages (IBP) for Operational Key Leader
Engagements.
• Explain the authority of Chief Info Ops for the distributed Info Ops staff officers
and IOCB members
• Explain the Location of the distributed Info Ops staff officers and their roles and
coordination needs.
• A summary of the Info Ops organisation
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• Explain the working practices between the Chief Info Ops and distributed Info
Ops staff officers
• Explain BR
General. The IOCB is the forum for the implementation of Info Ops collective co-
ordination and advice, chaired by the Chief Info Ops22. It will convene as necessary in
the HQ decision cycle and as required during non-operational activities.
Membership. The IOCB should involve expertise from all staff elements, determined by
mission and situation requirements. A possible composition of the IOCB is described in
para 4.4. This composition is not fixed and the Chief Info Ops will invite other parties,
which may include other agencies and departments, as required, to contribute to the
mission and the role of Info Ops in accomplishing the commander' s objectives. IOCB
member responsibilities are outlined later in this paragraph.
AIM. To ensure that activities in the information environment are coherent and
synchronized in accordance with Commander’s guidance.
a. Roll Call
b. Opening remarks
22
This can be the Chief Info Ops of the J-structure or the Branch Head JEMB with the ‘double-hat’ functions
StratCom Advisor and Chief Info Ops
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e. Review of Comd’s:
(i) Mission
(iii) CCIRs
j. Review of tasks
k. Outlook
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Note: A seating plan is strongly advised to set a degree of organization to the meeting
and allow location of individuals when required.
OBSERVATIONS. The IOCB requires the full participation from the SMEs relevant to
the current mission who are involved in military information activities (influence, counter-
command, information protection) from all levels.
The IOCB is the only staff officer level meeting where overall issues about the Military
Information Campaign are discussed and coordinated. To keep it as short as possible
and manageable, all IOCB members have to send their inputs in advance with the
issues necessary to be incorporated into the agenda. The IOCB nucleus uses these
inputs as source information to prepare and coordinate staff products to present during
the IOCB, last adjustment will be done during IOCB any emerging new issues will be
discussed in a small relevant IOWG after IOCB and be prepared as a topic for next
IOCB.
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x. Chief Medical / Theatre Surgeon (J-MED). Medical support and assistance may
have an enormous psychological impact on local/regional audiences. The Chief
Medical advises on capabilities and assessments that support Information
Objectives.
Implementing procedures
The IOCB convenes during the Initiation Phase of the Operational Planning Process
(OPP) and continues to meet throughout planning and execution. During the initial
phase of an operation, or during a compressed planning cycle, meetings may be
required daily or on alternating days. During an ongoing operation, the IOCB is normally
a weekly meeting.
In a HQ generic BR for a particular Operation, the following order of meetings could be
used to increase effectiveness: Assessment Board Working Group (ABWG),
Assessment Board (AB), IOCB, Targeting Board, DARB, CICOM, JCBWG, JCB.
To have the Commander’s guidance and to incorporate the outputs from the IOCB into
the targeting list, JCO and FRAGOS, the IOCB should meet after the AB, and before the
Targeting Board and JCBWG.
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8 Lexicon
Audience
Audiences (for information activities) can be individuals, groups, or populations.
A specified group or persons to whom NATO public affairs efforts are directed. (MC
457/1 – Military Decision, 19 Sep 07)
Campaign
A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective
within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air
forces. (AAP-6(2009))
Capability
A combination of ways and means to perform tasks or create an effect under specified
conditions. (USJFCOM-Joint Experimentation Directorate/EBO Prototyping Team:
Effects-Based Approach to Multinational Operations, CONOPS Version 0.90, 19
December 2005)
Military capabilities provide the ability to create a desired effect in a specific operational
environment. Capabilities can be people, assets, means and methods, as well as
structures, systems and specific characteristics of these.
Chief Info Ops
The Chief Info Ops position in the new NATO effects-based Peacetime Establishment
structure is no longer a functional position. Currently it is agreed that the Branch Head
Joint Effects Management Branch (JEMB) has double functions as the Strategic
Communication Advisor to the Commander and as the Chief Info Ops. This might be
changed dependent on respective experience and will be considered in further revisions
of this document.
Command and Control Warfare
The integrated use of all military capabilities including operations security (OPSEC),
deception, psychological operations (PsyOps), electronic warfare (EW) and physical
destruction, supported by all source intelligence and Communication and Information
Systems (CIS), to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy an adversary' s C2
capabilities while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against similar actions. Also called
C2W. (MC 348 – Final, 12 Oct 95; AAP-6(2009))
Communication
An information transfer according to agreed conventions. (AAP-31(A), Nov 01)
23
Terms and Definitions have to be reviewed yearly according to official documents.
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Communications
The science and practice of the conveyance of information of any kind from one person
or place to another except by direct unassisted conversation or correspondence. (AAP-
31(A), Nov 01; AComP-01 Ed. 3 (2005))
Communication Systems
An assembly of equipment, methods and procedures, and if necessary personnel,
organized to accomplish information transfer functions. [Notes: 1. A communication
system provides communication between its users and may embrace transmission
systems, switching systems and user systems. 2. A communication system may also
include storage or processing functions in support of information transfer.] (AAP-31(A),
Nov 01; AAP-6(2009))
Communication and Information Systems
A collective term for communication systems and information systems. (AAP-31(A), Nov
01; AAP-6(2009))
Community Relations
One of the three pillars of NATO military PA. Refers to the relationship between military
and civilian communities in proximity to NATO installations in the Alliance' s member
nations, including the general public, business, service organisations, and other non-
media entities. (MC 457/1 – Military Decision, 19 Sep 07)
Coordinating Authority
The assigned responsibility for coordinating specific capabilities, functions or activities
involving two or more agencies (organisations or commands). The individual with
assigned Coordinating Authority has the authority to require consultation between the
agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel
agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he/she should
attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he/she is unable to
obtain essential agreement he/she shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.
(Based on: AAP-6(2009))
Co-ordination
Consultation in order to forge common action or harmonisation in a concerted manner.
Co-ordination activities can involve both subordinates as well as those organisations
over which the commander has no authority. Co-ordination results in carefully planned
and executed activity in which the various elements involved in an operation – military
and civil – are harmonised in such a manner as to provide the greatest advantage to the
overall mission. Co-ordination does not require command relationships (subordination)
but active participation of all involved. The co-ordination process usually is organised by
the assignment of Coordinating Authority.
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Counter-Propaganda
Activities designed to nullify propaganda or mitigate its effects.
Cyberspace
A digital world, generated by computers and computer networks, in which people and
computers coexist and which includes all aspects of online activity. (AC/322(SC/2-
NC3TS)L(2007)0002, Cyberwar Related Definitions, 11 Apr 07; MC 571 – NATO Cyber
Defence Concept. 21 Feb 08)
The notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over computer
networks. (USA JP1-02 – DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 09 Nov 06)
Cyber War(fare)
Actions taken to achieve a goal by influencing and controlling the information, computer
processes and information systems of an adversary, while protecting one' s own
information, computer processes and information systems. (AC/322(SC/2-
NC3TS)L(2007)0002, Cyberwar Related Definitions, 11 Apr 07; MC 571 – NATO Cyber
Defence Concept. 21 Feb 08)
Cyber warfare (also known as cybernetic war, or cyberwar) is the use of computers and
the Internet in conducting warfare in cyberspace.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyber_warfare)
Effect
The cumulative consequence of one or more actions across the engagement space that
leads to a change in the situation in one or more domains. Aggregation of desired
effects leads to the achievement of objectives. (MCM0052-2006, 06 Jun 06.)
A change in the behavioural or physical state of a system (or system elements), that
results from one or more actions, or other causes. (COPD, Draft Sep 09)
Influence
The act or power of producing an effect without apparent exertion of force or direct
exercise of command. The power or capacity of causing an effect in intangible or indirect
ways. (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/influence)
The capacity to have an effect on the character or behaviour of someone or something,
or the effect itself. (Concise Oxford English Dictionary)
Influence Activity
Influence Activities affect the character or behaviour of an individual, group or
organisation; they realise cognitive effects. Whilst activities in the physical domain will
undoubtedly have such effects (through expressive Fires, for example), the focus of
Influence Activity is in the information domain. ... Influence Activities alter understanding
either of a situation by manipulating the information ahead of receipt or perceptions of
that information once received. A lack or diminution of accurate situational
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understanding impacts upon the effective use of an actor’s capability, and together
these may affect his will to act. (GBR JDN 1/07 – Joint Action. Feb 07)
Influence Operations
The term ‘Influence Operations’ is not used in NATO policy or doctrine, but it is used by
some nations.
Influence operations are focused on affecting the perceptions and behaviours of leaders,
groups, or entire populations. Influence operations employ capabilities to affect
behaviours, protect operations, communicate commander’s intent, and project accurate
information to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain. These effects should
result in differing behaviour or a change in the adversary’s decision cycle, which aligns
with the commander’s objectives. The military capabilities of influence operations are
Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception (MILDEC), Operations Security
(OPSEC), Counter-Intelligence (CI) operations, counterpropaganda operations and
Public Affairs (PA) operations. Public Affairs, while a component of influence operations,
is predicated on its ability to project truthful information to a variety of audiences. These
activities of influence operations allow the commander to prepare and shape the
operational battlespace by conveying selected information and indicators to target
audiences, shaping the perceptions of decision-makers, securing critical friendly
information, defending against sabotage, protecting against espionage, gathering
intelligence, and communicating selected information about military activities to the
global audience. (USA AFDD 2-5 – Information Operations, 11 Jan 05)
Influence operations are operations focused on affecting the perceptions and behaviours
of leaders, groups, or entire populations by protecting operations, communicating
military perspective, and projecting information to achieve desired effects across the
cognitive domain. These effects should result in modified behaviour or a change in an
adversary’s decision cycles that will align with the commander’s objectives. Public affairs
operations are an important and necessary military capability of influence operations.
(USA AFDD 2-5.3 – Public Affairs Operations, 24 Jun 05)
Information
The intelligence or knowledge capable of being represented in forms suitable for
communication, storage or processing. [Notes: 1. Information may be represented for
example by signs, symbols, pictures or sounds (AComP-1/IEC-701). 2. In the context of
the IEC definition '
intelligence'should be taken in the broader meaning of the word. 3.
Information may exist in the human mind, in document form and in electronic form.]
(AAP-31(A), Nov 01)
In information processing: The knowledge concerning objects, such as facts, events,
things, processes or ideas including concepts, that within a certain context has a
particular meaning. (ADatP-2/ISO-01)
Unprocessed data of every description which may be used in the production of
intelligence. (AAP-6(2009))
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Information Activities
Actions designed to affect information and/or information systems, performed by any
actor. (MC 457/1 – Military Decision, 19 Sep 07)
Actions designed to affect information and/or information systems. They can be
performed by any actor and include protection measures. (AJP-3.10, Final, 23 Nov 09)
Information Campaign24
A series of coordinated, combined and synchronised information activities conducted by
different interagency actors, scheduled for a given period of time and related by
common Information Objectives. ... An Information Campaign should constitute the
overall, large-scale implementation of an Information Strategy. Ideally, each succeeding
element in the campaign adds to the cumulative impact and centres on a theme
featuring the major benefit of the respective information activity.
Information Environment
The virtual and physical space, in which information is received, processed and
conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information systems. (MC 422/3 –
Final, 08 Jul 08)
Information Factor
The actuality of information pervading societies, such that actors and audiences have
become increasingly indistinguishable: 'to observe is to be part'. Every action sends a
message, intended or not: 'one cannot not communicate'. In the military, information is
meanwhile recognised as a decisive factor per se that will increasingly affect the
operational factors force, space and time.
Information Management
The means through which an organization maximizes the efficiency with which it plans,
collects, organizes, controls, disseminates, uses and disposes of its information, and
through which it ensures that the actual value and the potential value of that information
is identified and exploited to the fullest extent. (AAP-31(A), Nov 01)
Information Objective
A desired condition to be created in the information environment. Information Objectives
should be measurable to enable analysis, planning, execution/ management and
assessment/evaluation of related actions and/or effects.
Information Objectives provide statements of measurable response that reflect the
aspired conditions in the information environment as a result of information activities.
24
The term 'information campaign'is not mentioned in NATO policy and doctrine for Info Ops. However, it is
considered useful to present to the commander a comprehensive view on information activities performed by his
organisation and co-ordinated by his Info Ops staff officer.
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Strategy provides mission-specific strategic and political guidance for civil and military
information activities in support of mission objectives.
Mission-specific strategic and political guidance as agreed by the North Atlantic Council
(NAC), is required to maximise the effects of all information-related aspects of NATO' s
operations and activities. ... Info Ops co-ordination requires strategic direction as this
forms the basis for coordinating military information activities. An outline of Info Ops
objectives should be developed to be included as part of a mission-specific guidance to
the Strategic Commands (SCs). It should be issued at the earliest opportunity and
should include mission objectives and desired end state related to the information
environment. ... Military information activities must be consistent with the mission
specific NATO guidance. (MC 422/3 – Final, 08 Jul 08)
[ ] the NAC will provide overall guidance and direction for NATO public diplomacy
efforts, as well as mission-specific strategic and political guidance for NATO military
information activities. (AJP-3.10, Final, 23 Nov 09)
Information Superiority
The state of a relative superior ability of an actor to collect, process, and disseminate
information compared to competitors in the same arena and to draw an operational
advantage from it.
Information System
A socio-technical system for the collection, processing and dissemination of information.
It comprises personnel, technical components, organisational structures, and processes
that create, collect, perceive, analyse, assess, structure, manipulate, store, retrieve,
display, share, transmit and disseminate information.
Information systems are socio-technical systems for the collection, processing and
dissemination of information. They comprise personnel, technical components,
organisational structures and processes that create, collect, perceive, analyse, assess,
structure, manipulate, store, retrieve, display, share, transmit and disseminate
information. (AJP-3.10, Final, 23 Nov 09)
An assembly of equipment, methods and procedures and if necessary personnel,
organized to accomplish information processing functions. [Notes: 1. Examples of
information system are: command and control information system, management
information system, office automation system. 2. An information system may also
transfer information in support of the processing functions, for example, over a local
area network interconnecting a number of computers, which are part of the information
system.] (AAP-31(A), Nov 01; ADatP-2-01; AAP-6(2007))
Information Technology
All forms of technology used to create, store, exchange, and use information in its
various forms (business data, voice conversations, still images, motion pictures,
multimedia presentations, and other forms, including those not yet conceived). It is a
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convenient term for including both electronic communications and computer technology
in the same word.
Art and applied sciences that deal with operations on data and information. [Note: Fields
of expertise include information theory, arithmetic and logic operations, data
organization, representation, transfer, interchange and processing, operating
techniques, equipment technology, system development and maintainability, security
and interoperability, open systems interconnection, office automation, artificial
intelligence, multimedia and hypermedia.] (AAP-31(A), Nov 01)
Information Warfare
Information warfare is the use and management of information in pursuit of a
competitive advantage over an opponent. Information warfare may involve collection of
tactical information, assurance(s) that one's own information is valid, spreading of
propaganda or disinformation to demoralize the enemy and the public, undermining the
quality of opposing force information and denial of information-collection opportunities to
opposing forces. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Warfare)
Internal Information
One of the three pillars of NATO PA. Organisational communication with NATO
members, civilian employees and family members of those serving with or affiliated to
NATO. It does not include activities of officers or managers for the purpose of informing
their staffs of unit or section developments or communications that provide
administrative direction. Also referred to as Command Information. (MC 457/1 – Military
Decision, 19 Sep 07)
Key Leaders Engagement
The planned and coordinated use of the senior leadership of the friendly force to
influence key decision-makers / opinion shapers / influencers / leaders in the assigned
area of operations in support of the commander's objectives.
Knowledge Development
Knowledge Development (KD) is a continuous, adaptive and networked activity carried
out at strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. It provides commanders
and their staff with a comprehensive understanding of complex environments, including
the relationships and interactions between systems and actors within the engagement
space. (COPD, Draft Sep 09)
Knowledge Development is a process that collects and analyses information, integrates
isolated data into a useable body of information, and makes it available so it can be
shared. (NATO Bi-SC Knowledge Development Concept, 31July 2008)
Master Media Messages
Overarching, key 3-5 points developed by a higher political or military authority and
incorporated into the products and activities of subordinate organisations. Ultimately,
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reduces even the most complex of issues into a manageable number of remarks of
soundbite-length. (MC 457/1 – Military Decision, 19 Sep 07)
Measures of Effectiveness
A Measure of Effectiveness is defined as a metric used to measure a current system
state. The MOE will help answer the question “Are we on track to achieve the intended
new system state within the planned timescale?” This may require multiple MOE per
intended system state to fully capture the changes. MOE must be repeatedly measured
across time to determine changes in system states. It is important to note that MOE will
be drafted to measure the creation of Effects, the achievement of Objectives, and the
attainment of the End State. (COPD, Draft Sep 09)
MOE typically describe predicted benchmark changes in physical, cybernetic or moral
conditions or effects that indicate progress toward accomplishment of the objective.
MOE should allow the commander to evaluate whether the operation is achieving
desired conditions and effects, as well as any undesired consequences that might
jeopardise accomplishment of his objective or mission. MOE are critical because their
use in evaluating progress may influence decisions regarding the conduct of operations
and the allocation of resources. (NATO ACO – Guidelines for Operational Planning
(GOP) Rev 1. 18 July 2005)
Measures of Performance
The MOP are focused on task/action accomplishment: "Was the action performed as
the commander intended?" "Regardless of effect, did the assigned force produce the
fires, manoeuvre, or information as required by the specified task?" These MOP are
what the commander uses to assess whether his directives are understood by
subordinate units and/or the units are capable of consummating the specified action.
Typical measures would include delivery of ordnance on a target, the occupation of a
town, the distribution of PsyOps pamphlets on enemy positions, etc. (W. McDaniel:
White Paper Ver 2.0 – Effects-Based Operations (EBO), 11 February 2003)
The Measures of Performance (MOP) are directly tied to the Action – not to the other
elements of the plan. An MOP is defined as the criteria used to evaluate the
accomplishment of own force actions. The MOP enables a more rigorous execution
analysis, intending to answer “Are the actions being executed as planned?” If, during
execution, progress towards the achievement of desired effects is not made as
expected, one possibility is that actions are not being carried out as planned. (COPD,
Draft Sep 09)
Media
Those organisations or persons who gather and disseminate news; also refers to the
mediums by which news is transmitted (newspapers, TV, radio, Internet, etc). (MC 457/1
– Military Decision, 19 Sep 07)
Media Lines
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The totality of measures and means to inform, communicate and cooperate with a broad
range of target audiences world-wide, with the aim to raise the level of awareness and
understanding about NATO, promoting its policies and activities, thereby fostering
support for the Alliance and developing trust and confidence in it. (SG(2003)0876(INV),
quoted in MC 457/1 – Military Decision, 19 Sep 07)
NATO civilian communication[ ] activities responsible for promoting awareness,
understanding and support for NATO' s policies, operations and activities, in
complementarity with the national efforts of Allies. (SG(2008)0802 – NATO Strategic
Communication[ ] Policy, Draft, 24 Oct 08)
Strategic Communication
NATO Strategic Communications: the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO
communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA),
Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (InfoOps) and Psychological Operations
(PsyOps), as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and
in order to advance NATO’s aims. (PO(2009)O141 NATO Strategic Communications
Policy, dated 29 Sep 09, ACO Directive 95-2, 13 Nov 09)
25
This terminology only applies to legitimate military targets.
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(13) vulnerability, addressing those issues that directly affect cognition and emotion of
the actors and can be exploited by own actions to create desired effects; assessment is
based on results of present social research and refers to anxieties/fears and needs
rather than to attitudes.
2. Topics
Topics are subjects, which characterise the crisis and are of concern to relevant actors,
e.g., regarding the causes and the consequences of the situation:
a. Issues of main concern for relevant actors.
b. Actors’ perceptions of / opinions on these issues.
c. Level of information / depth of knowledge about these issues.
3. Specific Information Systems
In general, two particular types of information systems can be identified as playing an
important role in both the military and the civil world:
a. Communication and Information Systems (CIS): equipment, methods and
procedures and, if necessary, personnel, organised to accomplish information
processing and transfer functions.
b. Command and Control Systems (C2S): equipment, methods and procedures
– including planning and decision-making tools –, and personnel that enable
leaders/commanders and their staffs to exercise command and control.
c. Relevant characteristics and components of CIS/C2S include:
(1) personnel (including actors in the above sense);
(2) command and control philosophy, in terms of decision-making processes,
organisation, and communication and information flow patterns (including
aspects such as censorship and freedom of opinion);
(3) technical equipment, techniques, platforms, and organisations used,
established, and required to receive, process, and transmit data and information,
including their functionality, detailed features, capacity, and level of interoperability,
robustness, redundancy, and reliability; this includes system elements and components
from (human and technical) sensors throughout the loop to shooters (e.g., IT in weapons
systems);
(4) infrastructure (official and unofficial), including commercial facilities and installations
related to telecommunication companies and networks, postal and courier services,
broadcast or media dissemination facilities such as fixed and mobile radio stations,
platforms;
(5) supply dependencies, such as related to energy, water, transportation, and
maintenance.
4. Media
a. Personnel (e.g., management, owners, financers, stakeholders, publishers, editors,
journalists, employees).
b. Assets (official and unofficial, open and covert; used or employed by actors for
indirect communication, information, entertainment, and other related purposes,
including traditional communication, new and emerging media:
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This appendix provides a set of questions as guidance for assessing the information
environment based on a systemic understanding.
BACKGROUND
Did comparable crisis situations appear in the same region previously?
What were the origins of these crisis situations? Who were the main actors relevant to
the information environment then? Do there still exist main actors relevant to the
information environment, which may be used as point of contact/ "door openers"?
What lessons were identified/learned regarding the role and relevance of the
information environment in previous conflicts with respect to the situation, its
assessment, solutions, and results?
Was any possible coalition partner involved in a previous crisis in the region of
concern? Could this involvement still have an (positive or negative) impact on the
current crisis?
What are the major changes since previous conflicts with regard to the information
environment?
ACTORS
How do the actors see themselves and other actors? How do the actors want to be
seen?
How do actors see the International Community and the Coalition and its (potential)
engagement?
How do actors see themselves being perceived by the international community and
other actors?
Who are the actors that are affecting/exploiting the information environment to shape
the situation?
What are the actors’ intent, means and capabilities to affect/exploit the information
environment?
What activities conducted by what actors are currently affecting the information
environment?
Which attitudes, opinions and motivations are linked to certain actors? On the other
hand, which attitudes, opinions and motivations are common sense?
To what extent are the actors informed about these issues? Why?
What are the local perceptions on the situation? How do the actors perceive these
issues? What are the actors’ opinions on these issues? Why do the actors have
these opinions?
What are the consequences related to the actors’ perceptions/opinions on these
issues?
What is the relevance of these consequences to the situation?
What are topics/issues to be avoided (taboos)? Why?
Are there topics/issues, which are linked to certain media?
To what extent are rumours relevant to public opinion?
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Is access to information limited to relevant actors? Are there media that can only
reach certain actors or groups of actors?
What are the consequences relevant to the crisis?
What role does access to information play in this scenario?
Which media are continuously accessible? Are there temporal, infrastructural, cultural
or other kinds of limitations or regulations?
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To what extent are international media able to penetrate cultural and religious
information? Are international media able to overcome cultural/religious
boundaries?
How robust/redundant are the means, capabilities to access information and
communicate? How to influence/deter the communication means?
What kind of information / communication infrastructure is in place?
What is the infrastructure (including supply) critical to the media, information and
communication system?
What kind of command and control system is used by the actors? What is the
philosophy behind this system? What are the (technical and human) means?
What kind of equipment is used? Examples: Commercial/military? From foreign
countries/own development?
How is the electromagnetic spectrum used? By which means?
What kind of information or news has the ability/chance to activate certain actors?
What reaction towards different types of rumour can one expect from certain
actors?
Are there cultural/religious events and processes that enable certain information
flows? What kind of knowledge is being transferred in traditional ways of
education (e.g., initiation ceremony)?
What is the impact of regional or cultural connatural media on the information flow /
opinion building / decision making processes?
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
To what extent is freedom of expression guaranteed by constitution?
To what extent and how is freedom of expression restricted in practice?
To what degree is actors’ freedom of expression relevant to the crisis?
How does the cultural/religious background shape the understanding of the concept of
freedom of expression?
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
What languages and dialects are used in the region?
How are these languages/dialects distributed in the region
Is there a common language? Which local languages and dialects are reflected in
media?
What is the level of literacy and education – define regional flavours?
What is the main method/tradition of communication (oral, text or visual) – are there
regional variations?
What are the primary means of transport and distribution? What is the degree of
mobility of the local population?
Are there any seasonal weather patterns that hamper communication?
Are there any geographical issues hampering communication?
Are there impenetrable areas (jungle/mountains etc)?
What is the normal basic diet and need for services?
What are the accessibility to children's care and education?
Is the population self-sufficient?
How are basic life-support measures provided?
Who is providing security to whom? What are the agendas of the various security
providers? What is the local perception of the security situation?
Is there any potential of natural and/or technological hazard in the region?
Annex 3-A
Illustrative Examples
Annex 3-B
Themes
Themes provide the unifying subject or idea of a message or set of messages and
information activities. Themes express the context for messages to be conveyed to
audiences and activities to affect targets. Themes are not subject to any modification
without strategic-political approval. They are phrased as ' headlines'that indicate the
issue of concern for associated master messages. They may include qualitative
elements if that can be done concisely within a phrase rather than a full sentence.
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NATO / PfP UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASABLE TO EU / NATO PARTNER NATIONS / ISAF / KFOR / OAE / OOS
THEME: "Favourable Conditions for Development" (There are certain conditions that
have to be met as a prerequisite for effective Alliance activity. Most of these
require collective effort.)
MASTER MESSAGES:
− The military component is in XYZ to provide security and logistics for the Alliance
and humanitarian organisations to allow them to do their job.
− Violence is the wrong way to solve your problems and might lead to reduced
international support.
− We will support the development of an open and accessible information
environment, which will allow a constructive dialogue between all sides.
MESSAGES:
• xx
• xx
− We are encouraging the local communities to accept refugees/IDPs on a
temporary basis. We will support their return as soon as the situation allows. (…)
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NATO / PfP UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASABLE TO EU / NATO PARTNER NATIONS / ISAF / KFOR / OAE / OOS
MASTER MESSAGES:
− Substantial improvements in life conditions can only be achieved if the XYZ
people mobilise and utilise their resources, capabilities, and abilities.
MESSAGES:
• xx
• xx
− The XYZ Government and people are capable to substantially contribute to
overcoming present problems and creating better conditions. (…)
THEME: "Local and Regional Dialogue and Cooperation" (The international mission
should empower self-help. An important factor to enable this ambition is a
sense of commonality and interdependence.)
MASTER MESSAGES:
− All actors are called upon to cooperate with relevant institutions that comply with
the XYZ constitution.
− We will support the development of an open and accessible information
environment, which will allow a constructive dialogue between all sides.
MESSAGES:
• xx
• xx
− We encourage all sides of the conflict to start and continue a dialogue concerning
the reconciliation process. (…)
REFERENCES TO BE AVOIDED:
− Religious text.
− Religious or ethnic affiliation.
− Ethnic or religious innuendo.
− Judgements about the role of women.
− Any discord in the Alliance.
− Any sexual theme and picture.
− Inadvertently raising expectations (e.g., concerning the duration of the Alliance's
commitment.
− Specialist vocabulary and acronyms (e.g., military).
− Internally-held information that might be exploited, if divulged, to the detriment of
the safety of supportive actors.
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NATO / PfP UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASABLE TO EU / NATO PARTNER NATIONS / ISAF / KFOR / OAE / OOS
CONTRADICTIONS
By supporting the host government as the legitimate framework for change, the
credibility of other messages reassuring the local population that the Alliance is
actively seeking change and does not support corrupt or unconstitutional
practices will be threatened. Both messages are necessary, but are potentially
mutually destructive. Particular care will need to be taken in managing the use of
these messages and monitoring their impact.
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Annex 3-C
(Basics)
Visualization of the Flow of an Operation
Analytical attempt to foresee dynamics of friendly COA vs. enemy COA
• Action,
• Reaction, and
• Counteraction
Why is it important?
• Develops shared vision of the operation
• Validates assumptions
• Determines conditions & resources required for success
• Identifies strengths & weaknesses of a COA
• Determines a COA' s risk
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• Identifies coordination requirements
• Validates and/or refines Centre of gravity
• Validates force allocation
• Validates & refines shaping, manoeuvre support, force protection concepts
• Refines/validates CCIRs
• Refines C2 measures & relationships
• Provides time estimates
• Identifies branches & sequels for further planning
(War Gaming26 )
War gaming is necessary to evaluate the potential of the COA to accomplish the mission
against all types of opposition as well as to identify and correct deficiencies. It readily
identifies advantages and disadvantages as well as key actions that must be
synchronised if a COA is to successfully achieve the essential tasks and purpose of the
mission. The war game should also help identify potential risks and opportunities as well
as decision points for the commander to take action to counter or exploit such situations.
A Branch Plan may be required the deal with the situation within the parameters of the
basic operational design. As a minimum, each own-force COA should be war-gamed
against the ' most likely'and ' most dangerous'opposing COAs. However, when time
permits, additional potential opposing COAs should be war-gamed.
Broadly speaking, there are three possibilities for war gaming:
• to war-game the phases (play out critical joint tasks by phase against the
objectives of each phase),
• to war-game Decisive Points (play out critical joint tasks at Decisive Points), and
• to war-game segments of the battle space (play out critical joint actions of specific
areas of the battle space).
26
GOP/COPD
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h. Preparing the operational situation.
(2) Conducting War Games. The conduct of the war game is determined largely by
the desired outcomes, selected method and the scope. Typically, war games will
include:
a. Setting Conditions. An introduction to set the strategic and operational
conditions effecting the operation, including political considerations, threat
conditions, environmental conditions, civil conditions, information and
media conditions etc.
b. Game Turns. A series of “game turns” considering the action - reaction -
counter-action of opponents, starting with the opponent deemed to have
the initiative.
c. Assessment. An assessment of probable results and outcomes typically
follows each game turn and is used to set conditions for the succeeding
game turns.
(3) Recording Results. Observations and conclusions drawn from the war game
should be recorded in line with the purpose. Typically, these include:
a. Advantages and disadvantages.
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b. Deficiencies to be corrected.
c. Additional force/capability requirements.
d. Synchronisation requirements.
e. Significant risks and opportunities encountered against (most likely and
most dangerous) opposing COAs.
f. Decision points and supporting Commander' s Essential Information
Requirements (CEIR).
g. Branch Plan requirements.
(Effects Thinking)
Compare BLUE actions against RED effects and actions and GREEN potential impacts
Purpose: To go through several iterations of an action-reaction-counteraction cycle to
inform the Commander’s selection of a preferred option.
Input:
• Understanding of additional risks and hazards in the operational environment
• Several options (COAs)
• Potential RED effects and actions
• Potential GREEN impacts on the operation
Procedures:
• Review input from previous steps
• Determine criteria to evaluate options (COAs)
• Follow an ' action-reaction-counteraction'cycle
o Engage appropriate representatives from other government organisations,
either directly or through a coordination function, to understand any non
military (including host nation, NO, IO and NGOs) concerns about potential
military actions
o The staff may have to go through several iterations of this cycle before
agreeing to coherent options for presentation to the Commander
• Commander selects preferred option (COA) for amendment and/or further
development
Output: Commander' s preferred option (COA). This may require modification of output
from effects development. To development of the Synchronisation Matrix.
Staff Participation:
• Planning staff
• RED team representatives
• GREEN team representatives
• Knowledge Development staff representatives
• Subordinate organisation representatives
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Annex 4 A
Include some instructions on what an Info Ops officer should direct his attention when
attending a Key Leader Engagement event (additional KLE report)
Message #2:
a. Topics to be avoided
b.
c.
3. Assessment Points.
Message #1:
Message #2 :
5. Information to Pick-up
a.
b.
c.
6. Requested feedback
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Annex 4 B
Reference: A.
1. SITUATION
i.
2. MISSION
3. EXECUTION
Intent:
a. Concept of Operations
i.
b. Tasks
i.
c. Coordinating Instructions
i.
4. ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS
ACKNOWLEDGE:
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