G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang
Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325,
326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574,
594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165,
1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192,
193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-
283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385,
386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610,
611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-
1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-
1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807,
1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860,
1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-
2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532,
536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703,
705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said
petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to
be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that
while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some
private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the
public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs.
Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus
proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of
Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
 We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper
party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America
were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always
dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because,
if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and
reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent.
The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the
relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the
duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the
present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any
other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent
the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for
their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this
Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a
public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or
classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at
this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people
are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word
"shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of
the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what
should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what
must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government
repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may
know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force
and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts
done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put
the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their
publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set
forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry.
Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions
of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted
upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention
of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law,
albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact
which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ...
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have
not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that
"publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until
the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide
that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable,
however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished
"presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party
who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such
publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and
under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any
binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette.
There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies
only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as
to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is
the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur
in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in
the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some
form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is
unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it
must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of
its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in
accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then
serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters
deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where
such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character
becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a
showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power,
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing
to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a
question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of
a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided."
Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force
of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts
not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too
far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes
a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they
can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public
is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially
and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code,
there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the
provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the
law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity
[date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil
Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been
duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain
respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official
Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier
effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the
Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would
like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes
effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect
to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions
elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.
Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws
already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law
with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different
period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the
Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette."
Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the
Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and
"all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said
law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all
statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act
No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take
effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by
publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective,
until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable,
however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished
"presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party
who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such
publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and
under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any
binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette.
There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies
only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as
to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is
the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur
in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in
the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some
form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is
unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it
must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of
its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in
accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then
serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters
deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where
such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character
becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a
showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power,
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing
to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a
question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of
a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided."
Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force
of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts
not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too
far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes
a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they
can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public
is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially
and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code,
there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the
provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the
law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity
[date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil
Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been
duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain
respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official
Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier
effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the
Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would
like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes
effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect
to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions
elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.
Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws
already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law
with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different
period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the
Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette."
Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the
Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and
"all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all
legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said
law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all
statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act
No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take
effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by
publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective,
until due publication thereof.

Footnotes
 1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag be recognized, access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shag be
afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs. City Mayor, 16
SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.
3 16 Phil. 366, 378.
4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of the
Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17 SCRA
1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.
5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.
6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.
7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.
8 308 U.S. 371, 374.
9 93 Phil.. 68,.
10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the Government
Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding the respective dates of publication in the Official
Gazette of the presidential issuances listed therein. No report has been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to
the publication or non-publication of other presidential issuances.
11 129 SCRA 174.
Fernando, CJ.:
1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection Article 7, Sec. 21 of the
Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the Constitution of
Indiana, U.S.A
2 Ibid, closing paragraph.
3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).
4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).
5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.
6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.
Teehankee, J.:
1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras.
2 Notes in brackets supplied.
3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.
Plana, J.:
* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide publication of all statute laws ...
and no general law shall be in force until published." See also S ate ex rel. White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71
ALR 1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed
had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon
their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these
decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1Specifically, they ask the
following questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in
the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding.
This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor
General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he
submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have
to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under
reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we
have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original
decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year
after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the
legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after
an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they
would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not
true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has
been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill
of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others,
and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people
in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect
the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest
which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In
fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act
of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also
to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and
directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made
in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel
or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government
Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree,
its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the
General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by
the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and
that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his
vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore
necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision
supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases
and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws
to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is
that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made
of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does,
it obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not
our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved
by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but
to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as
a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the
said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable
by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do
not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the
least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the
government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain
democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or
reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the
legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed
by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded
saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few
observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which
the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc.
Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and
caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad
spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case
of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon
the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further
exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey
Moore and Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks prevent abuses on
the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on
matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a
few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming
into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in
other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and
without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due
process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has
been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a
negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other
medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The
statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638
and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication
may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent
statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country.
Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official
Gazette and not in any other medium.

Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few
observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which
the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc.
Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and
caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad
spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case
of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon
the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further
exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey
Moore and Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks prevent abuses on
the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on
matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a
few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming
into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in
other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and
without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due
process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has
been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a
negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other
medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The
statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638
and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication
may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent
statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country.
Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official
Gazette and not in any other medium.

Footnotes
1 Rollo pp. 242-250.
2 Ibid, pp. 244-248.
3 Id, pp. 271-280.
4 Id, pp. 288-299.
5 Id, pp. 320-322.
6 136 SCRA 27,46.
7 Rollo, p. 24,6.
8 Justices Venicio Escolin (ponente), Claudio Teehankee. Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, and Lorenzo Relova.
9 Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Vicente Abad-Santos, Efren 1. Plana Serafin P.
Cuevas. and Nestor B. Alampay.
10 Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
11 Justice B. S. de la Fuente.

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely,
GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of
Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution
promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed
entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of
Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would
still resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa
Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened
wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch
XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding
damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision
promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last
day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied
the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort,
which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA
643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the prospective application of
said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's
Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions
of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period,
which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the
expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the
length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987,
petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in
active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision
holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if
only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since
the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 179579 February 1, 2012

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC, Petitioners,
vs.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,1 assailing the Decision2 and the Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
nullified the Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-20034 on the tariff classification of wheat issued by petitioner
Commissioner of Customs.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes,
wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. 5 The
regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending
on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was
3%, for feed grade, 7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification Review Committee (VCRC)
cases. Under this procedure, the release of the articles that were the subject of protest required the importer to post a cash bond to
cover the tariff differential.6

A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief 7 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. It anticipated the implementation of the regulation on its imported and perishable
Chinese milling wheat in transit from China.8 Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of
the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the
Philippines Law Center.

Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior
assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival
of the shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more than was proper.

Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated when the regulation treated non-
flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.

Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.

On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty (20) days from notice.9

Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss.10 They alleged that: (1) the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case, because respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the classification of wheat; (2) an action for declaratory
relief was improper; (3) CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of
respondent were speculative and premature, because the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondent’s products.
They likewise opposed the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that they had not inflicted any injury through
the issuance of the regulation; and that the action would be contrary to the rule that administrative issuances are assumed valid until
declared otherwise.

On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to
Dismiss would just be resolved together in the main case. Thus, on 10 March 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision 11 without having
to resolve the application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss.

The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the subject Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003 is
declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT. Respondents Commissioner of Customs, the District Collector of Subic or
anyone acting in their behalf are to immediately cease and desist from enforcing the said Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003.

SO ORDERED.12

The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the issue raised by respondent concerned the quasi-
legislative powers of petitioners. It likewise stated that a petition for declaratory relief was the proper remedy, and that respondent
was the proper party to file it. The court considered that respondent was a regular importer, and that the latter would be subjected to
the application of the regulation in future transactions.

With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had not followed the basic requirements of hearing
and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. It likewise held that petitioners had "substituted the quasi-judicial determination of
the commodity by a quasi-legislative predetermination."13 The lower court pointed out that a classification based on importers and
ports of discharge were violative of the due process rights of respondent.

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-
2003.14 The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. It held that, since the regulation affected substantial rights of petitioners
and other importers, petitioners should have observed the requirements of notice, hearing and publication.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of this Court:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW
AND PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE.

The Petition has no merit.

We shall first discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.

Rule 63, Section 1 provides:

Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof,
bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. 15 We find that the Petition filed by respondent before
the lower court meets these requirements.

First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs. In Smart
Communications v. NTC,16 we held:

The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the
constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the
courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance Secretary,17 we said:

xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details
thereof. xxx

In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which
the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.

Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated
authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But
the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of
administrative judgment, has committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the case of an
interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court,
when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and
substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule. (Emphasis supplied)

Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are summarily imposing a tariff rate that
respondent is refusing to pay.

Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation of CMO 27-2003. Respondent has
adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has actually made shipments of wheat from China to
Subic. The shipment was set to arrive in December 2003. Upon its arrival, it would be subjected to the conditions of CMO 27-2003.
The regulation calls for the imposition of different tariff rates, depending on the factors enumerated therein. Thus, respondent
alleged that it would be made to pay the 7% tariff applied to feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In
addition, respondent would have to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which would undoubtedly toll its time and
resources. The lower court correctly pointed out as follows:

xxx As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely into the business of importing wheat, each and every importation will be
subjected to constant disputes which will result into (sic) delays in the delivery, setting aside of funds as cash bond required in the
CMO as well as the resulting expenses thereof. It is easy to see that business uncertainty will be a constant occurrence for
petitioner. That the sums involved are not minimal is shown by the discussions during the hearings conducted as well as in the
pleadings filed. It may be that the petitioner can later on get a refund but such has been foreclosed because the Collector of
Customs and the Commissioner of Customs are bound by their own CMO. Petitioner cannot get its refund with the said agency. We
believe and so find that Petitioner has presented such a stake in the outcome of this controversy as to vest it with standing to file this
petition.18 (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation is inevitable 19 for the simple and
uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the enumeration of flour millers classified as food grade wheat importers.
Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to file a protest case each time it imports food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7%
tariff.

It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the circumstances of the case.

Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent as explained above, it therefore follows
that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, to wit:

Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not
thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate
notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it
gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule
goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance
to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. 20
Likewise, in Tañada v. Tuvera,21 we held:

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at
this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people
are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa – and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records – no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. (Emphasis supplied)

Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must
be struck down.

Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by
other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not
violated if there is a reasonable classification. For a classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all
members of the same class.22

Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the quality of wheat is affected by who imports
it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.

Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food grade wheat, the product would still
be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers listed under
CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due.
The regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.

It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely wheat importations and thus prevent their misclassification." A
careful study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not only fails to achieve this end, but results in the opposite. The application of the
regulation forecloses the possibility that other corporations that are excluded from the list import food grade wheat; at the same time,
it creates an assumption that those who meet the criteria do not import feed grade wheat. In the first case, importers are
unnecessarily burdened to prove the classification of their wheat imports; while in the second, the state carries that burden.

Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation limited the customs officer’s duties
mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended. The law provides:

Section 1403. – Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and Appraise Imported Articles. – The customs officer
tasked to examine, classify, and appraise imported articles shall determine whether the packages designated for examination and
their contents are in accordance with the declaration in the entry, invoice and other pertinent documents and shall make return in
such a manner as to indicate whether the articles have been truly and correctly declared in the entry as regard their quantity,
measurement, weight, and tariff classification and not imported contrary to law. He shall submit samples to the laboratory for
analysis when feasible to do so and when such analysis is necessary for the proper classification, appraisal, and/or admission into
the Philippines of imported articles.

Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity in which they are usually bought and sold, and appraise the
imported articles in accordance with Section 201 of this Code.

Failure on the part of the customs officer to comply with his duties shall subject him to the penalties prescribed under Section 3604
of this Code.1âwphi1

The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of the imported article before
tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even before the customs officer had the
chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code
with regard to wheat importation when it no longer required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of the proper
classification of the wheat.

It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions
that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but
in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.23

In summary, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to observe the
requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise violated respondent’s right to equal protection of laws
when they provided for an unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner of
Customs went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to examine
and assess imported articles.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATT E STAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 124-142.
2
Id. at 33-46.
3
Id. at 47.
4
Records, pp. 16-18.
5
SUBJECT: Tariff Classification of Wheat
In order to monitor more closely wheat importations and thus prevent their misclassification, the following are
hereby prescribed:
1. For tariff purposes, wheat shall be classified as follows:
1.1 Under HS 1001.9090 (Food Grade) when all the following elements are present:
1.1.1 the importer/consignee of the imported wheat is a flour miller as per attached list (Annex ‘A’), which shall
form as integral part of this Order
1.1.2 the wheat importation consists of any of those listed in Annex ‘A’ according to the country of origin
indicated therein
1.1.3 the wheat importation is entered/unloaded in the Port of Discharge indicated opposite the name of the
flour miller, as per Annex ‘A’
1.2 Under HS 1001.9010 (Feed Grade)
1.2.1 When any or all of the elements prescribed under 1.1 above is not present.
1.2.2 All other wheat importations by non-flour millers, i.e., importers/consignees NOT listed in Annex ‘A’
6
SUBJECT: Tariff Classification of Wheat
xxx xxx xxx
2. Any issue arising from this Order shall be resolved in an appropriate protest or VCRC case.
3. In case of a VCRC case, the following applies:
3.1 The shipment may qualify for Tentative Release upon payment of the taxes and duties as per declaration
and the posting of cash bond to cover the tariff differential.
3.2 The Tentative Release granted by the VCRC shall, prior to the release of the shipment from Customs
custody, be subject to representative. For this purpose, the District/Port Collector concerned shall forward to the
Office of the Commissioner the Tentative Release papers, together with all pertinent shipping and supporting
documents, including, but not limited to, contract of sale, phytosanitary certificate and certificate of quality.
In the case of Outports, the required documents shall be faxed to the Office of the Commissioner of Customs to
any of these numbers: 527-1953/527-4573.
3.3 In resolving the classification issue, the VCRC shall consider the import/consignee, type/source of wheat
and port of discharge of the wheat importation, as indicated in Annex ‘A’, and require the proofs/evidences (sic),
including, but not limited to, proofs of sale or consumption of said wheat importation, certificate of quality issued
by manufacturing country and contract of sale.
3.4 Any VCRC decision adverse to the government shall be subject to automatic review by the Commissioner of
Customs.
7
Rollo¸ pp. 158-168.
8
Records, p. 12.
9
Rollo, pp. 58-59.
10
Id. at 60-78.
11
Id. at 108-114; penned by Judge Romeo C. De Leon.
12
Id. at 114.
13
Id. at 112.
14
Id. at 117-122.
15
Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phil. 83 (1951).
16
456 Phil. 145 (2003).
17
G.R. No. 108524, 10 November 1994, 238 SCRA 63, 69-70.
18
Rollo, p. 112.
19
Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, 416 Phil. 659 (2001).
20
CIR v. Michel J. Lhuiller Pawnshop Inc., 453 Phil. 1043 (2003).
21
220 Phil. 422 (1985).
22
Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. v. DILG, 451 Phil. 683 (2003).
23
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles v. Home Development Mutual Fund, 389 Phil. 296 (2000).
G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 187654

WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Board of Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 1promulgated on 29 April
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.

THE FACTS

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of
Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort
William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).

On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No.
423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as
Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which
excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it
open for disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:

"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette 3 on 3 February 1986, without
the above-quoted addendum.

Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially
reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.

Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to
prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.

On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed
for the following: (1) the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from
public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director
of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide
occupants.4

On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention
substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied covering
Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan.5

Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and declaring the portions of land in question
alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting. 7

The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was
therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further,
considering that Proclamation
No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be amended, repealed or superseded,
by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No.
2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.

In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code,
publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that
there is no occasion for the court to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the
published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.

Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 which was denied by the COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24
January 2007.10

MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24
January 2007.

Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and
January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of
merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by respondents are likewise

DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)

Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.

THE ISSUES

Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO.
2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT
MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172
LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS
BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY
VARIOUS LAND CASES.14

On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS
NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN
ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS
NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15

Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable
and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not
included in the publication of the said law.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.

Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were anchored on the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all
Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation just below
the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.

However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
Official Gazette.

The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the determination of whether the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly
provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has
otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following
the completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be
dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, 16 in
which we had the occasion to rule thus:

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision,
is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely,
if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced
as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence.
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

xxxx

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people
in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect
the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest
which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In
fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act
of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to
a valid delegation.

xxxx

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and
directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce.

xxxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree,
its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in
which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

xxxx

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed
by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded
saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No.
2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other official
documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to
include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of
the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently,
there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean,
however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative
of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly
where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The
remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners'
lots in the reclassification.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order
dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been
rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Penned by Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this
Court) and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring, rollo (G.R. No. 187587). pp. 62-82.
2
CA rollo, p. 664.
3
Vol. 82, No. 5, pp. 801-805.
4
Supra note 2, at 68-69.
5
Id. at 72-76.
6
Id. at 205-212.
7
Id. at 213-218.
8
Insular Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 192 Phil. 221, 231 (1981).
9
CA rollo, pp. 112-113.
10
Id. at pp. 219-222.
11
Id. at 1285.
12
Rollo (G.R. No. 187587), pp. 39-61.
13
Rollo (G.R. No. 187654), pp. 3-26.
14
Rollo (G.R. No. 187587), p. 47.
15
Rollo (G.R. No. 187654 ), pp. 15-16.
16
230 Phil. 528, 533-538 (1986).
17
Aparri v. CA, 212 Phil. 215.224 (1984).
18
369 Phil. 617. 626 ( 1999).

G.R. No. 187378 September 30, 2013

RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M. ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO
BULAWIN, Petitioners,
vs.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B. BONALOS, in her capacity as Municipal
Engineer and Building Official-Designate, both of Lopez Jaena Municipality, Misamis Occidental,Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution3 dated March 9, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN which reversed and set aside the Decision 4 dated November 26, 2004 of
the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 2 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 4684 for injunction.

The Facts

Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a non-governmental organization, founded by petitioner
Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis
Occidental.5 In line with its objectives, PETAL built some cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square
meter islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar cottage in 20016which it rented out to the public and became the source of livelihood of its
beneficiaries,7 among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.

On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and Building Official Marietes B.
Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the
construction of its buildings in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1096,8 otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the
Philippines," ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply with the requirements
for the issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice of Illegal Construction was issued by respondents against it on July 8,
2002,9 but still the same remained unheeded.
It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of
200210 (subject ordinance) which prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or organization inside
the sanctuaries;11 and (b) the construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the
local government.12 On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at
the designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and prohibiting ingress and egress
thereto.13

On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the structures it built on
Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited was its violation of the subject ordinance. A similar notice was also served against
individual petitioners on October 25, 2002.

On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, injunction and
damages15 against respondents before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 4684, alleging that they have prior vested rights to
occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession thereof since 1961,
with whom it entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the operation of the said island as a camping, tourism, and recreational
resort; thus, the issuance of the subject ordinance was prejudicial to their interest as they were deprived of their livelihood.
Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds: (a) it was adopted without public
consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province as required by Republic Act
No.7160,16 otherwise known as "The Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC);and (c) it was not approved by the SP. Therefore, its
implementation should be enjoined.17

In their Answer,18 respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them since they are not the lawful owners or
lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland and property belonging to the public domain. Further, they
maintained that they have complied with all the publication and hearing requirements for the passage of the subject ordinance,
which was deemed approved by operation of law for failure of the SP to take any positive action thereon as provided under the LGC.
As such, it is valid and enforceable.

The RTC Ruling

On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision19 declaring the subject ordinance as invalid/void based on the following
grounds: (a) PETAL’s protest has not been resolved and that the subject ordinance was not duly approved by the SP; (b) the said
ordinance was not published in a newspaper of general circulation nor was it posted in public places; (c) Capayas Island is classified
as timberland, hence, not suited to be a bird or fish sanctuary; and (d) the authority and control over timberlands belong to the
national government, through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 20 Based on the foregoing,
respondents were ordered, among others, to desist from closing Capayas Island to the public.21 However, the petitioners were
ordered to remove the structures they built thereon without valid building permits 22 since they were found to have no title over the
disputed property.23

Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing pronouncement before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN.

The Proceedings Before the CA

On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision24 granting respondents’ appeal.

Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the SP to declare the same
invalid within30 days after its submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC.25 It also gave credence to Azcuna’s testimony
that the subject ordinance was posted and published in conspicuous places in their municipality, and in the bulletin
board.26 Moreover, public consultations were conducted with various groups before the subject ordinance was passed.27 The CA
further ruled that the Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to pass and adopt the subject
ordinance under Section 447 in relation to Section 16 of the LGC.28 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that could create and
administer sanctuaries.29 Having enacted the subject ordinance within its powers as a municipality and in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.30

On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding that petitioner shave no proprietary rights over the Capayas Island, thereby
rendering their action for injunction improper.31

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration32 therefrom was denied by the CA in a Resolution33 dated March 9, 2009. Hence, the instant
petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners. 34

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Section 56 of the LGC provides:

SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. – (a) Within three
(3) days after approval, the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public
investment programs formulated by the local development councils.

(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall
examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for
prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of
the documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his comments or recommendations, which may be
considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its decision.
 (c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole
or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or
municipal authorities of the action it has taken.

(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an
ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.

In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the mere passage of time
considering that the same is still pending with the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the SP. 35 It, however, bears to
note that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the said ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the
SB;36 hence, it should be deemed approved and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above. As properly observed by the CA:

Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the meaning of the disputed word, "action." It is clear, based
on the foregoing provision, that the action that must be entered in the minutes of the sangguniang panlalawigan is the declaration of
the sangguniang panlalawigan that the ordinance is invalid in whole or in part. x x x.

This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory construction that the parts of a statute must be read
together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not be construed as contradicting each other. x x
x laws are given a reasonable construction such that apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by
reconciling them, reference being had to the moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute.37

Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that the subject ordinance was not published nor posted in
accordance with the provisions of the LGC.38 It is noteworthy that petitioners’ own evidence reveals that a public hearing 39 was
conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Moreover, other than their bare allegations, petitioners failed to
present any evidence to show that no publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made. In contrast, Azcuna had testified
that they have complied with the publication and posting requirements. 40 While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other
evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should
be upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment.
Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. In the similar case of
Figuerres v. CA,41 citing United States v. Cristobal,42 the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein despite the
lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local government to show that public hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the
oppositor’s equal lack of controverting evidence to demonstrate the local government’s non-compliance with the said public hearing;
and (b) the fact that the local government’s non-compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositor’s cause of action:

However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show that no
public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other hand, the Municipality of
Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise
failed to submit any evidence to establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by
law was not observed in their enactment. In an analogous case, United States v. Cristobal, it was alleged that the ordinance making
it a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had not been submitted by the provincial board as required by §§2232-2233 of the
Administrative Code. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:

From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court upon the theory that the ordinance in question
was adopted without authority on the part of the municipality and was therefore unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there
was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause showing that said ordinance had been approved by the provincial board.
Considering the provisions of law that it is the duty of the provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances adopted by the
municipal councils of the different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the law has been
complied with.

We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the absence of positive proof to the
contrary.

Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner's cause of action in the present case. Hence,
as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor
of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment
thereof, we are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality. 43 (Emphases supplied, citation omitted)

All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the validity of the subject ordinance.

In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title44 to the property in dispute to be entitled to its possession. Besides, the
RTC’s order directing the removal of the structures built by petitioners on Capayas Island without building permits was not appealed.
As such, the same should now be deemed as final and conclusive upon them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

ATT E STAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,

I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 9-22.
2
Id. at 31-46. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson, with Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Michael P.
Elbinias, concurring.
3
Id. at 25-29.
4
Id. at 55-71. Penned by Judge Bernadette S. Paredes-Encinareal.
5
Id. at 32.
6
Id. at 11.
7
Id. at 32-33.
8
"ADOPTING A NATIONAL BUILDING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (NBCP) THEREBY REVISING REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED SIXTY-FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-ONE (R.A. NO. 6541)."
9
Rollo , p. 34.
10
Records, pp. 28-29. Entitled "AN ORDINANCE ESTABLISHING CAPAYAS ISLAND AND ITS SURROUNDINGS,
MANSABAY BAJO AND SIBULA AS BIRDS, FISH AND SHELLS SANCTUARY LOCATED WITHIN THE MUNICIPAL
WATERS OF LOPEZ JAENA WITH A TOTAL AREA OF SIXTY THREE POINT ONE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN (63.197)
HECTARES, THREE (3) HECTARES AND THREE (3) HECTARES RESPECTIVELY."
11
Rollo, pp. 33-34.
12
Records, p. 28. See subject ordinance.
13
Rollo, pp. 34-35.
14
Id. at 35.
15
Id. at 36.
16
"AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991."
17
Records, p. 5.
18
Id. at 76-81.
19
Rollo , pp. 55-71.
20
Id. at 67-68.
21
Id. at 71.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 70.
24
Id. at 31-46.
25
Id. at 39-40.
26
Id. at 40-41.
27
Id. at 43.
28
Id. at 42.
29
Id. at 43.
30
Id. at 42-43.
31
Id. at 45.
32
Id. at 47-53.
33
Id. at 25-29.
34
Id. at 13.
35
See id. at 14-15.
36
Id. at 14.
37
Id. at 38-39.
38
SEC. 511. Posting and Publication of Ordinances with Penal Sanctions. – (a) ordinances with penal sanctions shall be
posted at prominent places in the provincial capitol, city, municipal or Barangay hall, as the case may be, for a minimum
period of three (3) consecutive weeks. Such ordinances shall also be published in a newspaper of general circulation,
where available, within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned, except in the case of Barangay
ordinances. Unless otherwise provided therein, said ordinances shall take effect on the day following its publication, or at
the end of the period of posting, whichever occurs later.
xxxx
39
Records, p. 60. A "dialogue-consultation" was conducted by the SB on June 13, 2002.
40
Rollo, pp. 40-41.
41
364 Phil. 683(1999).
42
34 Phil. 825 (1916).
43
Figuerres v. CA, supra note 41, at 692-693.
44
Rollo, p. 70.

G.R. No. 191787 June 22, 2015

MACARIO CATIPON, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
JEROME JAPSON, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the December 11, 2009 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 94426 affirming the July 6, 2005 Decision3 of the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR) in
CAR-05-034DC, as well as its March 17, 2010 Resolution4 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.5

Factual Antecedents

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Macario U. Catipon, Jr. is the holder of a Bachelor's Degree in Commerce from the Baguio Colleges Foundation. When
applying for graduation, he was allowed to join the graduation ceremonies despite a deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science,
pursuant to a school policy allowing students with deficiencies of not more than 12 units to be included in the list of graduates.
However, a restriction came after, which is, that the deficiency must be cured before the student can be considered a graduate.

In 1985, petitioner found employment with the Social Security System (SSS) in Bangued, Abra. Sometime in September 1993, the
personnel head of the SSS in Bangued, Abra informed petitioner that the Civil Service Commission was conducting a Career
Service Professional Examination (CSPE) in October of the same year. Petitioner filed an application to take the examination,
believing that the CSC still allowed CSPE applicants to substitute the length of their government service for any academic deficiency
which they may have. However, the above-mentioned policy of the CSC had been discontinued since January 1993 pursuant to Civil
Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991 and Office Memo. No. 63, Series of 1992.

Nevertheless, petitioner took the CSPE tests on October 17, 1993 and obtained a rating of 80.52%. Eventually, petitioner was
promoted to Senior Analyst and Officer-in-Charge Branch Head of the SSS at Bangued, Abra. In October 1995, he finally eliminated
his deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science.

On March 10, 2003, respondent Jerome Japson, a former Senior Member Services Representative of SSS Bangued, filed a letter-
complaint with the Civil Service Commission-CAR Regional Director, alleging that petitioner made deliberate false entries in his
CSPE application, specifically, that he obtained his college degree in 1993 when actually he graduated in 1995 only, after removing
his deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Education. Also, that petitioner was not qualified to take the CSPE examination in 1993 since he
was not yet then a graduate of a four-year college course, contrary to the entry in his application form.

After preliminary investigation, petitioner was charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of Official documents, Grave Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service by the CSC-CAR.6

Respondent’s Letter-Complaint7 against petitioner was docketed as CSC Disciplinary Administrative Case No. BB-03-006.

In his Answer,8 petitioner essentially pleaded good faith, lack of malice, and honest mistake. He maintained that at the time of his
application to take the CSPE, he was of the honest belief that the policy of the CSC – that any deficiency in the applicant’s
educational requirement may be substituted by his length of service – was still subsisting.

On July 6, 2005, the CSC-CAR, through Director IV Atty. Lorenzo S. Danipog, rendered a Decision 9 containing the following
pronouncements:

Clearly, respondent Catipon is not without any fault under the foregoing circumstances. The only issue now left is with respect to the
particular offense for which Catipon may be held responsible. Respondent Catipon is charged (with) four offenses: Dishonesty,
Falsification of Official Documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

The key document allegedly falsified in this case is the Application Form x x x of respondent Catipon for the purpose of taking the
CS Professional Examination scheduled on October 17, 1993. Close and careful perusal of the said application form reveals that
most of the entries filled up by respondent are typewritten. The only entries handwritten by respondent are those corresponding to
"Year Graduated" and "School Where Graduated" which were answered by Macario with "1984" and "BCF" respectively. Another
handwritten entry is with respect to "Degree Finished", the handwritten "BSC" entry, however, was just superimposed on the
typewritten "Commerce".

The fact that majority of the entries or data in the application form is typewritten suggests that the said application form was
consciously drafted and meticulously prepared before its actual submission to the CSC for processing. They are relevant and
material entries or data sought from respondent. It is worth emphasizing however that the pre-drafted application form, considering
the typewritten entries, shows respondent’s confusion on how to make entries thereat. Respondent answered both the IF YES
column and IF NO column corresponding to the question "Are you a college graduate" in Item 8. x x x

xxxx

The manner that Item 8 was filled up by respondent Catipon shows lack of deliberate intent to defraud the government. He
manifested in his application his uncertainty on how to take the fact that he only lacks 1.5 units Military Science to be conferred a
graduate status, vis-à-vis the CSC policy on educational requirement. Though the entry "undergrad" was erased, the CSC employee
who processed the application would have doubted the truthfulness and authenticity of respondent’s entries in Item 8 of the
Application Form, and thus the educational status of Macario. x x x

xxxx

Catipon had tried to show the real state of the matter regarding his educational attainment as can be deduced from the manner he
answered Item No. 8 in the application form. This may be taken as good faith, which will serve to mitigate any liability incurred by
respondent Catipon. The premeditated intent to deceive or willfully distort the facts in this case is not present. The acts of Catipon
do not even show blatant disregard of an established rule or a clear intent to violate the law if at all, there was attempt to reveal the
truth to the examination division processing the application.

xxxx

With [regard] to the eligibility earned by respondent Macario in view of his passing the October 17, 1993 Career Service
Professional Examination, the same needs to be revoked being the fruit of a poisonous tree, so to speak. Paragraph 2 of Sec. 6,
Rule II, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 states:

Provided that when an applica[nt] for examination is found to have x x x intentionally made any false statement of any material fact
in his application, x x x the Commission shall invalidate such examination x x x.

With the foregoing, respondent Macario U. Catipon, Jr., Senior Analyst and OIC Branch Head, Social Security System, Bangued,
Abra, is hereby exonerated of the charges Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Grave Misconduct. However,
respondent is found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the imposable penalty on the first offense of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service is suspension of six months and one day to one year.

Under Section 53 of the same Rules, good faith is enumerated as one mitigating circumstance. Thus, respondent Macario Catipon,
Jr. is hereby meted a penalty of six months and one day suspension, without pay, which is the minimum period of the penalty
attached to the offense committed. The Career Service Professional eligibility of respondent is also ordered revoked, without
prejudice however to retaking of the said examination. Thus, Catipon, after serving suspension herein provided should not be
allowed to go back to his current position without CS Professional eligibility. Consequently, in case respondent Catipon fails to
retake or pass CSPE, after serving his suspension, he may be demoted to any available position that fits his subprofessional
eligibility.10

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,11 but the CSC-CAR sustained its judgment in a March 23, 2006 Decision,12which contained the
following pronouncement:

Catipon also asserted that in view of his exoneration of Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Grave Misconduct, there
is no longer any basis to hold respondent guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. This contention is without
legal basis. In the case of Philippine Retirement Authority vs. Rupa 363 SCRA 480, the Honorable Supreme Court held as follows:

Under the Civil Service laws and rules, there is no description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

As alluded to previously in Decision No. CAR-05-034DC, Catipon is not without fault under the circumstances. To completely
exonerate respondent would be inequitable and iniquitous considering the totality of events surrounding this case. Though there was
no deliberate intent to falsify or to make dishonest entry in the Application Form as deduced from the manner that the said form was
accomplished, the fact that there was indeed such dishonest or false entry in the CSPE Application Form is undisputedly
established. In view of such an established fact, the integrity of the Civil Service Examination, particularly the CSPE has been
blemished which is sufficient to constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service.13

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Petition for Review docketed with the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 94426, petitioner prayed for injunctive relief and the reversal of the
above CSC-CAR decision. He argued that the CSC-CAR incorrectly found him guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service when he has been declared innocent of the charges of dishonesty, falsification of official documents, and grave misconduct;
that while the Supreme Court has held that making false entries in public documents may be considered as conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, such act must be accompanied by deliberate intent or a willful desire to defy or disregard established
rules or norms in the service;14 and that with the finding that he merely committed an innocent mistake in filling up the application
form for the CSPE, he may not be found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

On December 11, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition, decreeing thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision [sic] of the Civil Service
Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region dated July 6, 2005 and March 23, 2006 is [sic] AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.15

The CA held that instead of filing a petition for review directly with it, petitioner should have interposed an appeal with the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), pursuant to Sections 5(A)(1),43 and 49 of the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases; 16 that by
filing a petition directly with it, petitioner violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; that petitioner’s case is not
exceptional as would exempt it from the application of the doctrine; that per the ruling in Bayaca v. Judge Ramos, 17 the absence of
deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard established rules or norms in the service does not preclude a finding of guilt for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and that petitioner did not act with prudence and care, but instead was
negligent, in the filling up of his CSPE application form and in failing to verify beforehand the requirements for the examination.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant recourse. Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

(A)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE THAT GIVEN THE
IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE SUSPENSION IMPOSED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION-CORDILLERA
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION AGAINST THE PETITIONER, HE WAS JUSTIFIED IN SEEKING JUDICIAL RECOURSE BEFORE
(THE COURT OF APPEALS);
 (B)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT MISAPPLIEDIN THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED CASE THE RULE ON PRIOR EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;

(C)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
PETITIONER ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND THIS NEGATES GUILT FOR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF
THE SERVICE.18

Petitioner’s Arguments

In his Petition and Reply19 seeking a reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and, consequently, exoneration from the charge of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, petitioner argues that he was constrained to file the petition for review with the
CA as his decreed six-month suspension was imminent as a consequence of the executory nature of the CSC-CAR decision; that
immediate judicial intervention was necessary to "prevent serious injury and damage" to him, which is why his CA petition included a
prayer for injunctive relief; that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should not have been applied strictly in his
case, given the special circumstance that his suspension would mean loss of his only source of income; 20 that he should be
completely exonerated from the charges against him, since conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service must be
accompanied by deliberate intent or a willful desire to defy or disregard established rules or norms in the service – which is absent in
his case; and that his career service professional eligibility should not be revoked in the interest of justice and in the spirit of the
policy which promotes and preserves civil service eligibility.

Respondent’s Arguments

In his Comment21 seeking denial of the petition, respondent counters that completion of all the academic requirements – and not
merely attendance at graduation rites – confers the necessary degree which qualifies a student to take the CSPE; that petitioner’s
claim that he is a graduate as of 1984 is belied by his Transcript of Records22 and other pieces of evidence submitted, which reflect
the date of his graduation as October 1995 – or after completion of his 1.5-unit deficiency in Military Science; that petitioner cannot
claim to suffer irreparable injury or damage as a result of the CSC-CAR’s Decision, which is valid and binding; that the revocation of
petitioner’s eligibility is only proper, since he was then not qualified when he took the CSPE; that the CSC-CAR was correct in
finding that petitioner’s act compromised the image and integrity of the civil service, which justified the imposition of a corresponding
penalty; that this Court in the Rupa case made it clear that the act of making false entries in public documents constitutes conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, a grave offense punishable by suspension for six months and one day to one year for
the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense; and that indeed, petitioner violated the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies when he proceeded directly to the CA, instead of filing an appeal with the CSC.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

Our fundamental law, particularly Sections 2 (1) and 3 of Article IX-B, state that –

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall
strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an
annual report on its personnel programs.

Thus, "the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and
separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service." 23

In line with the above provisions of the Constitution and its mandate as the central personnel agency of government and sole arbiter
of controversies relating to the civil service, the CSC adopted Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999 (MC 19), or the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which the CA cited as the basis for its pronouncement. Section 4 thereof
provides:

Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. — The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of
its offices and of the agencies attached to it.

Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon
the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the
conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.

As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of MC 19, the Civil Service Commission Proper, or Commission Proper, shall
have jurisdiction over decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review. And under Section 43,
"decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty
exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper
within a period of fifteen days from receipt thereof."24 "Commission Proper" refers to the Civil Service Commission-Central Office.25

It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on petition for review, under Section 50 of MC 19,
which provides thus:
Section 50. Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. – A party may elevate a decision of the Commission before the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. 26

Thus, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that in filing his petition for review directly with it from the CSC-CAR Regional Director,
petitioner failed to observe the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As correctly stated by the appellate court, non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies renders petitioner’s CA petition premature and thus dismissible.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that "before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court,
he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to
a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial
power can be sought.1âwphi1 The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity
and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so
as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case." 27 Indeed, the
administrative agency concerned – in this case the Commission Proper – is in the "best position to correct any previous error
committed in its forum."28

The CA is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the petition for review, as "[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence."29 When petitioner’s recourse lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in MC 19, the CA may not be faulted for refusing to acknowledge petitioner before it.

We likewise affirm the CA’s pronouncement that petitioner was negligent in filling up his CSPE application form and in failing to
verify beforehand the specific requirements for the CSPE examination. Petitioner’s claim of good faith and absence of deliberate
intent or willful desire to defy or disregard the rules relative to the CSPE is not a defense as to exonerate him from the charge of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.30 Moreover, petitioner – as mere applicant for acceptance into the professional service through the CSPE – cannot expect
to be served on a silver platter; the obligation to know what is required for the examination falls on him, and not the CSC or his
colleagues in office. As aptly ruled by the appellate court:

In Bacaya31 v. Ramos, the Supreme Court found respondent judge guilty of both negligence and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service when he issued an arrest warrant despite the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment imposed on an accused
in a particular criminal case. Respondent judge in the said case claimed that the issuance of the warrant was a mistake, done in
good faith and that it has been a practice in his office for the Clerk of Court to study motions and that he would simply sign the
prepared order. The Supreme Court rejected his defense and stated that negligence is the failure to observe such care as a
reasonably prudent and careful person would use under ordinary circumstances. An act of the will is necessary for deliberate intent
to exist; such is not necessary in an act of negligence.

Here, petitioner failed to verify the requirements before filing his application to take the CSPE exam. He simply relied on his prior
knowledge of the rules, particularly, that he could substitute his deficiency in Military Science with the length of his government
service. He cannot lay blame on the personnel head of the SSS-Bangued, Abra, who allegedly did not inform him of the pertinent
rules contained in Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991. For, [if] he were truly a reasonably prudent and
careful person, petitioner himself should have verified from the CSC the requirements imposed on prospective examinees. In so
doing, he would certainly have been informed of the new CSC policy disallowing substitution of one’s length of government service
for academic deficiencies. Neither should petitioner have relied on an unnamed Civil Service employee’s advice since it was not
shown that the latter was authorized to give information regarding the examination nor that said employee was competent and
capable of giving correct information. His failure to verify the actual CSPE requirements which a reasonably prudent and careful
person would have done constitutes negligence. Though his failure was not a deliberate act of the will, such is not necessary in an
act of negligence and, as in Bacaya, negligence is not inconsistent with a finding of guilt for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.32

The corresponding penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service may be imposed upon an erring public officer as
long as the questioned act or conduct taints the image and integrity of the office; and the act need not be related to or connected
with the public officer’s official functions. Under our civil service laws, there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the following acts or omissions have been treated as such:
misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to safe keep public
records and property; making false entries in public documents; falsification of court orders; a judge’s act of brandishing a gun, and
threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation; a court interpreter’s participation in the execution of a document conveying
complainant’s property which resulted in a quarrel in the latter’s family; selling fake Unified Vehicular Volume Program exemption
cards to his officemates during office hours; a CA employee’s forging of receipts to avoid her private contractual obligations; a
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) employee’s act of repeatedly changing his IP address, which caused network
problems within his office and allowed him to gain access to the entire GSIS network, thus putting the system in a vulnerable state
of security;33 a public prosecutor’s act of signing a motion to dismiss that was not prepared by him, but by a judge;34 and a teacher’s
act of directly selling a book to her students in violation of the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers. 35 In petitioner’s case, his act
of making false entries in his CSPE application undoubtedly constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; the
absence of a willful or deliberate intent to falsify or make dishonest entries in his application is immaterial, for conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service "may or may not be characterized by corruption or a willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules."36

Finally, the Court cannot consider petitioner's plea that "in the interest of justice and in the spirit of the policy which promotes and
preserves civil service eligibility," his career service professional eligibility should not be revoked. The act of using a fake or spurious
civil service eligibility for one's benefit not only amounts to violation of the civil service examinations or CSPE; it also results in
prejudice to the government and the public in general. It is a transgression of the law which has no place in the public
service.37 "Assumption of public office is impressed with the paramount public interest that requires the highest standards of ethical
conduct. A person aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor, and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is
expected."38

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 11, 2009 Decision and March 17, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 94426 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ** JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA*
Associate Justice

ATT E STAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
Per Special Order No. 2067 dated June 22, 2015.
**
Per Special Order No. 2056 dated June 10, 2015.
1
Rollo, pp. 9-30.
2
Id. at 35-47; penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L.
Reyes (now a member of this Court) and Japar B. Dimaampao.
3
Id. at 19-28.
4
Id. at 32-33.
5
Id. at 48-56.
6
Id. at 36-37.
7
CA rollo, pp. 50-52.
8
Id. at 68-71.
9
Id. at 19-28.
10
Id. at 25-28.
11
Id. at 29-37.
12
Id. at 39-44.
13
Id. at 43.
14
Citing Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa, 415 Phil. 713 (2001).
15
Rollo, p. 46.
16
Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. – The Civil Service Commission Proper shall have
jurisdiction over the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review;
xxxx
Section 43. Filing of Appeals. – Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities
and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof.
In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be
initially appealed to the department head and finally to the Commission Proper. Pending appeal, the same shall
be executory except where the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
A notice of appeal including the appeal memorandum shall be filed with the appellate authority, copy furnished
the disciplining office. The latter shall submit the records of the case, which shall be systematically and
chronologically arranged, paged and securely bound to prevent loss, with its comment, within fifteen (15) days,
to the appellate authority.
Section 49. Petition for Review. – A complainant may elevate the decision of the Civil Service Regional Office
dismissing a complaint for lack of a prima facie case before the Commission Proper through a Petition for
Review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of said decision.
17
597 Phil. 86 (2009).
18
Rollo, p. 22.
19
Id. at 242-249.
20
Citing Pagara v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 66 (1996).
21
Rollo, pp. 98-115.
22
CA rollo, pp. 79-81.
23
Cabungcal v. Mayor Lorenzo, 623 Phil. 329, 338-339 (2009).
24
It will be observed that the enumeration in Section 43 failed to include "Regional Offices". Under Section 49, "a
complainant may elevate the decision of the Civil Service Regional Office dismissing a complaint for lack of a prima facie
case before the Commission Proper through a Petition for Review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of said
decision." Such section mentions only "complainant". Going by these two sections, it would appear that a respondent in a
decision rendered by a Regional Office would have no recourse, because MC 19 has not given him one. It is, however,
absurd to assume that decisions of Regional Offices may not be appealed at all, for then they would be superior to the
 Commission Proper, or the courts for that matter. Thus, it must be said that Section 43 should necessarily include the
decisions of Regional Offices as appealable to the Commission Proper and, in turn, ultimately subject to judicial review.
25
MC 19, Section 2(c), on Coverage and Definition of Terms.
26
Should be "1997 Rules of Civil Procedure".
27
Maglalang v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013, 712
SCRA 472, 482-483.
28
PO2 Montoya v. Police Director Varilla, 595 Phil. 507, 528 (2008).
29
Vidad v. Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 42, G.R. No. 98084, October 18, 1993, 227 SCRA 271, 276.
30
CIVIL CODE, Article 3.
31
Should be Bayaca.
32
Rollo, pp. 44-46.
33
See Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Mayordomo, G.R. No. 191218, May 31, 2011, 649 SCRA 667.
34
Espiña v. Cerujano, 573 Phil. 254 (2008).
35
Pia v. Gervacio, Jr., G.R. No. 172334, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 220.
36
Espiña v. Cerujano, supra note 32 at 263.
37
See Re: Complaint of the Civil Service Commission, Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio City Against Chulyao,
MCTC-Barlig, Mountain Province, 646 Phil. 34, 44 (2010).
38
Id.

G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated November 25, 1990, stating
that:

x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was pronounced dead on
arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.

Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and
Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14 th floor of the Tower D,
Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide
with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when
suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing
the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building
under construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety.

It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and performing
work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to
the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock. 1

On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the
deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits
from the State Insurance Fund.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:

1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.

2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.

3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity.

4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.

5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.2

On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR[sic] IS
APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.
  THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER
ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM
RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3

Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled otherwise. It held
that said report, being an entry in official records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.

The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which
are derived from his perception.4 A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was
told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.

Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well
as oral statements.6

The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness, which
lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-
examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by cross-examination.8

The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9 among which are entries in official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:

Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of
the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facieevidence of the facts
therein stated.

In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran, enumerated the requisites for
admissibility under the above rule:

(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;

(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information.

The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last requisite is not present.

The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial court. In Rodriguez vs. Court
of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire report also testified before the trial court. This
Court held that the report was inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained in the report but
admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the officer who executed the report.

x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-examination, the portions of the
report which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The
rest of the report, such as the summary of the statements of the parties based on their sworn statements (which were
annexed to the Report) as well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of the testimony
of Major Enriquez], may then be considered as independently relevant statements which were gathered in the course of
the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:

"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay
rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as
to the existence of such a fact."

When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made himself available for cross-
examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain utterances were made (but not their truth),
was effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section
does away with the testimony in open court of the officer who made the official record, considers the matter as an
exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as
explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.

The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the officials
would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The public officers are
few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed from official sources. Were
there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part of their time
to attending as witnesses in court or delivering deposition before an officer. The work of administration of
government and the interest of the public having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence. For
these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not extended to
private documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).

The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several trusts
with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their duty may be given in
evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as to the nature and circumstances of
each case may appear to require.
 It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report. In that case the
applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for determination, and this Court would have agreed with the
Court of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The
statements given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information," there being no
showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the statements for record.

Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained therein but is
admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of PO3 Villanueva.

In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which were of his personal knowledge suffice to prove that
Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juego’s remains at the morgue, 12 making the
latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises of the building the day after the
incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He observed that the platform was crushed15 and that it was totally damaged.16 PO3
Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the
chain was detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt.17

What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the cause of the fall of the platform was the
loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain
exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible.19

Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the
doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the
instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.20

The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not
generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or
instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is
charged with negligence.

x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things
would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as
sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was
caused by the defendant’s want of care.21

One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available. 22

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which
causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff
has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the
happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the
fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but
inaccessible to the injured person.

It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the
cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the
defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is
a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is
applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of
defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for the
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must
appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party
to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident. 23

The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:

There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while he was
working with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The construction site is within the exclusive control
and management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are
in complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what
caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily
available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x.

No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction site
unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As
explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under
the exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No contributory
negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites
for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s
negligence arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the presumption or
inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s
husband."

Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed
or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. 26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or
overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence,
may outweigh the inference.27 It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from
arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine
has been established.1âwphi1.nêt

In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police investigator as
evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn statement, the company enacted rules and regulations for the safety and
security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use.

It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing that private respondent failed to
prove negligence on the part of petitioner’s employees, also assails the same statement for being hearsay.

Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under the
hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. 28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based
not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known
fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the
affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. 29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said
statement as proof of its due care any more than private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husband’s death.
Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the
application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.

Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided under the Labor Code and is,
therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil Code.

Article 173 of the Labor Code states:

Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled
to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall not
bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered
Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered
Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System or by other
agencies of the government.

The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, provided that:

Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a
personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because
of said injury x x x.

Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well as under the Civil Code used to be
the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which involved a
cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of
government rules and regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the employees, the heirs of the
deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the
CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.

Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaña vs.
Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.

WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of
selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the
employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both
actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in
the regular courts.

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured
worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or
to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]

Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code despite having
availed of the benefits provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:

With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the
court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla
and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of
Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that
they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to
dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the
accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the
Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
 WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such my
not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex
has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act.
Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for
compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it
was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However,
should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. [Underscoring supplied.]

The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda.
De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again recognized that a
claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said:

In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be
filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In Floresca, this
doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that the claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or
the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that
the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other
remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still
sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the
first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.)

Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner’s
negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for
damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal
complaint against petitioner’s personnel. While stating that there was no negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint,
the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception
in Floresca:

x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as early as November 25, 1990,
the date of the police investigator’s report. The appellee merely executed her sworn statement before the police
investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the accident. She did
not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellant’s employees. It was the investigator
who recommended the filing of said case and his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor’s office. This is a
standard operating procedure for police investigators which appellee may not have even known. This may explain why no
complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6,
1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to
Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance to appear before the public prosecutor as can be
inferred from the following statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who were notified pursuant to Law waived their
rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was no reason for the public prosecutor to summon the appellee.
Hence, notice of appellant’s negligence cannot be imputed on appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC
or before she received the first payment therefrom. Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed
on May 9, 1991 may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the
Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The death of the
victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at all and as shown by the records this case is
civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellee’s allegation
that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after she applied for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a
mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35

The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well:

x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her educational attainment; that
she did not know what damages could be recovered from the death of her husband; and that she did not know that she
may also recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36

Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in her complaint that her application
and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial,
the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."

Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as early as November 28, 1990,
private respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against petitioner’s
employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of the action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a
resolution finding that, although there was insufficient evidence against petitioner’s employees, the case was "civil in nature." These
purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private
respondent also knew of the two choices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the
ECC.

When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any
action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election
acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It
rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent
any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong. 38

The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that a claimant
cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The
claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39

[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It
must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the
time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they
depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a
 material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of
fact.

A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge
upon which to make an intelligent decision.

Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its
consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. 40

That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca.

It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s contentions.

Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had availed of
benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the
contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is
waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner
itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.

Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husband’s death and the rights pertaining to a
choice of remedies?

It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that served as a basis
for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after the
prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability. In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and
its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter,
however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until
the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been
misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when on November 15,
1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10
days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed.
On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights.

Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code),
private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.

The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. 42 This may be deduced from the
language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The
rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance
thereof cannot be held against her.

Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the total amount private respondent
ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the
accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97
and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than the
sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court
for such determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already received by
private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial court'’ award of damages. Consistent with our ruling
in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its
decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC,
payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnote
1
Exhibit "A," Records, pp. 60-61.
2
Rollo, pp. 79-80.
3
Id., at 19.
4
Sec. 36, Rule 130.
5
People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312 (1983).
6
31A C.J.S. Evidence § 194. See also Philippine Home Assurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 479 (1996).
7
5 J. H. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 3 (3rdEd.).
8
San Sebastian College vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 138 (1991).
9
See Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sections 37-47.
10
16 SCRA 448 (1966). See also People vs. San Gabriel, 253 SCRA 84 (1996).
11
273 SCRA 607 (1997).
12
TSN, December 20, 1991, p. 9.
13
Id., at 28; TSN, January 6, 1992, p. 29.
14
Id., at 29; Ibid.
15
Id., at 33.
16
Id., at 34.
17
Id., at 24 and 28.
 18
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sections 49-50.
19
Id., Sec. 48.
20
Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 (1988). See also Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA
334 (1996); Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 657 (1986).
21
57B Am Jur 2d, Negligence § 1819.
22
Id., at 1824.
23
Id., at 1914.
24
Rollo, pp. 87-88.
25
Whether the doctrine raises a presumption or merely an inference is subject to debate. See 57B Am Jur 2d, Negligence
§§ 1925-1928.
26
Id., at 1920.
27
Id., at 1947.
28
People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 (1984); People vs. Quidato, 297 SCRA 1 (1998).
29
People vs. Ramos, supra.
30
136 SCRA 141 (1985).
31
Justices Aquino, Melencio-Herrera, and Gutierrez dissented.
32
151 SCRA 333 (1987).
33
157 SCRA 446 (1988).
34
164 SCRA 317 (1988).
35
Rollo, pp. 90-91. Underscoring by the Court of Appeals.
36
Id., at 90. Underscoring by the Court of Appeals.
37
Id., at § 5.
38
Id., at § 2.
39
Castro vs. Del Rosario, et al., 19 SCRA 196 (1967).
40
28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 202.
41
Records, pp. 17-18.
42
I Tolentino, A.M. Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 19 (1995).
43
Records, p. 100.

G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011

HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners,

vs.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and
punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).

Antecedents

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information
charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v.
Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion reads:

That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December
26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of ₱336,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account
Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or to
make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for
the collection of the principal amount of ₱336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as
Civil Case No. 915-00).2 He alleged in his complaint the following:

xxx

2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation encashed a check dated
December 26, 1996 in the amount of ₱336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the latter that the check is duly funded and that
he had an existing account with the Land Bank of the Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached as
Annex "A";

3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored on the ground that the account of the
defendant with the Land Bank of the Philippines has been closed contrary to his representation that he has an existing
account with the said bank and that the said check was duly funded and will be honored when presented for payment;

4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the payment of the value of the check, xerox copy of
the letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex "B", but despite such demand defendant refused and continues to refuse
to comply with plaintiff’s valid demand;

5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the plaintiff’s valid demands, plaintiff has been compelled to
retain the services of counsel for which he agreed to pay as reasonable attorney’s fees the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus
additional amount of ₱2,000.00 per appearance.
 ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation upon which this action is
brought and that there is no sufficient security for the claims sought in this action which fraud consist in the
misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing account and sufficient funds to cover the check when in fact
his account was already closed at the time he issued a check;

7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one which falls under Section 1, sub-paragraph (d),
Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and the amount due the plaintiff is as much as the sum for which
the plaintiff seeks the writ of preliminary attachment;

8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon the payment of damages should it be finally found
out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. 3

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000
through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.4

On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for
damages,5 pertinently averring:

xxx

On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action between the instant parties for the
same cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon",
docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-CR, the instant action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, xxx

xxx

While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the basis of the instant civil action is the herein plaintiff’s criminal complaint
against defendant arising from a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged dishonor in
plaintiff’s hands upon presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in the
amount of ₱336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the accused in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal
information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto attached and made integral part hereof as
Annex "1".

It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, "when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil
action or reserves his right to institute it separately xxx.

On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for
damages, stating:

1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint is the alleged pendency of another action
between the same parties for the same cause, contending among others that the pendency of Criminal Case No. 275381-
CR entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon" renders this case dismissable;

2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the filing of the criminal
action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action which the plaintiff does not contest; however, it is the submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation of the
right to file a civil action has already been made, first, by the fact that the information for violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal
Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any allegation of damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for
recovery of damages; on top of this the plaintiff as private complainant in the criminal case, during the presentation of the
prosecution evidence was not represented at all by a private prosecutor such that no evidence has been adduced by the
prosecution on the criminal case to prove damages; all of these we respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied
reservation of the right of the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for damages;

3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which mandates that after
a criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action; however, the defendant overlooks and conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule 111
which provides as follows:

In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of
criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as it is based on fraud, this action
therefore may be prosecuted independently of the criminal action;

4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any reservation at all of the right to file a separate civil action
still the plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case because the plaintiff seeks to enforce an obligation which the
defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to
enforce his liability as drawer in favor of the plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of the defendant of
the alleged circumstances relative to the issuance of the check, still when he delivered the check payable to bearer to that
certain Pedro Domingo, as it was payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by delivery by who ever was the bearer of
the check and such negotiation was valid and effective against the drawer;
 5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding the circumstances relative to the issuance of the
check it would be entirely impossible for the plaintiff to have been aware that such check was intended only for a definite
person and was not negotiable considering that the said check was payable to bearer and was not even crossed;

6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the criminal case without a reservation is a civil
action arising from the criminal offense charged. However, in this instant case since the liability of the defendant are
imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are created by the negotiable instruments law, even without any reservation at all
this instant action may still be prosecuted;

7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiff’s complaint the application for damages against the bond is totally without any
legal support and perforce should be dismissed outright.6

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s
attachment bond for damages,7 dismissing the complaint of Chan because:

xxx

After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and the application to charge
plaintiff’s bond for damages.

For "litis pendentia" to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties or at
least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. xxx

A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as "Sum of Money" and the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 would
readily show that the parties are not only identical but also the cause of action being asserted, which is the recovery of the value of
Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the amount of ₱336,000.00. In both civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts, are identical.

Plaintiff’s claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case owing to the fact that there was no
allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no private prosecutor during the presentation of prosecution evidence
is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint or criminal Information is filed, even without any allegation of damages and the
intention to prove and claim them, the offended party has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or reservation is
made or unless in the meantime, the offended party has instituted a separate civil action. xxx The over-all import of the said
provision conveys that the waiver which includes indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages arising under Articles 32,
33, and 34 of the Civil Code must be both clear and express. And this must be logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule is
to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.

Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation as to his right to pursue the civil branch of the
criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the defendant herein. To the considered view of this court, the filing of the instant
complaint for sum of money is indeed legally barred. The right to institute a separate civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation. xxx

Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiff’s submission that the herein case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence
falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required by the Rules, to wit:

"In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the
right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:

1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of "litis pendentia";

2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14, 2000;

3. Charge the plaintiff’s bond the amount of ₱336,000.00 in favor of the defendant for the damages sustained by the latter
by virtue of the implementation of the writ of attachment;

4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the defendant’s physical possession the
vehicle seized from him on August 16, 2000; and

5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of ₱5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.

Chan’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000,8 viz:

Considering that the plaintiff’s arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his previous submissions, and which submissions this
court have already passed upon; and taking into account the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case
which the plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the plaintiff therein expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action, the
Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chan’s complaint, disposing: 9

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review, 10 challenging the propriety of the
dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.

In his comment, 11 Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a
manner that caused him (Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the dismissal of the civil case because of
the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.

On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,12 overturning the RTC, viz:

xxx

As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is
sought to be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim
of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus, "every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable."

The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since
the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.

Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Rule 111, Section 2 further states:

After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment
has been entered in the criminal action.

However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the
same act or omission, the rule has been changed.

In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced that only the civil liability arising from the offense
charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:

"There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability
arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately without a reservation".

Rule 111, Section 3 reads:

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective on
December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no
vested rights in the rules of procedure. xxx

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent
Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing."

It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The complaint was also brought on allegation of fraud
under Article 33 of the Civil Code and committed by the respondent in the issuance of the check which later bounced. It was filed
before the trial court, despite the pendency of the criminal case for violation of BP 22 against the respondent. While it may be true
that the changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil action became effective on December
1, 2000, the same may be given retroactive application and may be made to apply to the case at bench, since procedural rules may
be given retroactive application. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.

In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge damages in favor of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 108 affirming the dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simon’s motion for reconsideration.13

Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its decision on the assessment that the civil
case was an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code; that the CA’s reliance on the ruling in
DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez14 stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding the
application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 15

In his comment,16 Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied because the petitioners used the wrong mode of
appeal; that his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an independent civil action; and that the appearance of a private
prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the filing of his separate civil action.

Issue

The lone issue is whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an
independent civil action.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the

Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22

The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo,
Jr.,17 holding:

xxx

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of
the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is
sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals,
22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the
punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the
losses (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).

xxx

Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for
which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party
defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results
in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face
value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law
seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.

xxx

However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is
clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence
and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on
the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be
paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action
which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.18

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of
the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to
recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the
filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of the Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August
3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.19 Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the
time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, 20 except that in criminal
cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required
at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post factounder the
Constitution.21

Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any assumed vested right, because the new rule was
adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines shall henceforth be
observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making or drawing
and issuance of a check without funds or credit:

1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding
civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. 22

2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based
upon the amount of the check involved which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed, in accordance with the
schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last amended by Administrative
Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1, 1994. Where the offended party further seeks to enforce against the accused civil
liability by way of liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing fees
therefor based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in the complaint or information. If not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the
trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111
governing the proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.

4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on November 1, 1997.

The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix
Corporation,23 thus:

xxx

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the
recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. The Rules provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —

(a) x x x

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of
the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to
recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the
filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.1avvphi1

The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that the criminal action for violation of B.P.
22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on
the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil
action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule
was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors.
Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal
charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the
civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on
dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for
criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is
to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means
that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate
proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the
consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering
the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would
further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners’ rights may be fully
adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In
view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to
the case at bar.24

The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez25 to give due course to the civil action of Chan independently and
separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all
fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing
check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22,26 the procedures for the recovery of the civil
liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party
may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article
33 of the Civil Code,27 as DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a
policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the
bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.

To repeat, Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22
could not be independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.

Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action

on the ground of litis pendentia

Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil
Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia?

For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary, namely:
(a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such
that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of
the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil.28

A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements of litis pendentia are
attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan
and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both
alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth ₱336,000.00 payable to "cash," thereby indicating that the
rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all
respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be
recovering twice upon the same claim.

It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through
its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.

Wherefore, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the
Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
45, in Pasay City.

Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION**
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
 ROBERTO A. ABAD*** MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

ATT E STAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Misspelled as Elven in the caption of the petition and in the rollo.
** Acting Chairperson in lieu of Justice Conchita Carpio Morales who is on leave per Special Order No. 925 dated January
24, 2011.
*** Additional member per Special Order No. 926 dated January 24, 2011.
1
Rollo, p. 31.
2
Id., pp. 35-37.
3
Id., pp. 35-36.
4
Id., p. 24.
5
Id., pp. 38-46.
6
Id., pp. 47-49.
7
Id., pp. 50-54.
8
Id., p. 56.
9
Id., pp. 76-79.
10
Id., pp. 80-88.
11
Id., pp. 89-97.
12
Id., pp. 23-27; penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona (retired), and concurred in by Associate Justice
Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired) and Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña.
13
Id., pp. 29-30.
14
G.R. No. 129282, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 72.
15
See note 19, p.16.
16
Rollo, pp. 105-109.
17
G.R. No. L-78911, December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 325.
18
Bold emphasis supplied.
19
Cheng v.Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 155, 164-165.
20
Aldeguer v. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. 502; Ayala de Roxas v. Case, 8 Phil. 197.
21
Sec. 22, Art. III, 1987 Constitution; Cooley’s Principle of Constitutional Law, p. 313.
22
Bold emphasis supplied.
23
G.R. No. 163597, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 454, 459-461.
24
Bold emphasis supplied.
25
Supra, note 14.
26
E.g., Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, G.R. Nos.155531-34, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 338, 343.
27
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
28
Taningco v. Taningco, G.R. No. 153481, August 10, 2007, 529 SCRA 735.

G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993

ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the people.

NARVASA, C.J.:

In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — and in payment of his share of the expenses of the
salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn
against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00.1 The check was deposited on
January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 222 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a
term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.

Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial
Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que
v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987)3 — i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless
covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior
to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. Peopleon September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as
guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of
Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows:

2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation,
whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res.
No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs.
Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November
17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).

This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) — almost
one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12,
after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the
deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize
the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows:4

Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority may reverse its
administration interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury
Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a
guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid
defense.

Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the
Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was merely a construction or
interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.

From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration under date of
October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its comment
dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that
proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the
parties' arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and adjudicate the
same on its merits.

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who
is not a habitual criminal . . .5

The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961
2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept
back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado
v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior
courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga
v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could
have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular
No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A.,
104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil,
and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and
regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal
cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for
retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded
retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see
also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not
be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez v.COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the
Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197
SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle
to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"

So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and
Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid
down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958).6 Our decision in People
 v. Mapa,7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should
appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in
view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and
this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis
interpretation legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the
law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and where he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the
punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97973)
and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528:8

We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24,
1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the
petitioners on September 29, 1979.

At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated
in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by
these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the
law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit,
non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations
of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).

The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new
doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited case of Chicot County
Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take
account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity.

Thus, in this Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera,9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 — which declared "that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published,shall have no force and effect," and as regards which declaration some
members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done
in reliance on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." — the Court said:

. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had taken the pragmatic and
realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having found to be unconstitutional,
was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis
for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228
U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those who have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act No. 342, the
moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmeña, suspending the
enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held
in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute
longer . . ." — the Court made substantially the same observations, to wit:11

. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal
rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once
judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is understandable
why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to
its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not however be sufficiently
realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive
act must have been in force and had to be compiled with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate
 case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may
have changed theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to
what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all
respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence is a fact must be reckoned
with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which
has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time may have
elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior
to such adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as
to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308
US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil.
1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent
instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov.
28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).

Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No 34, 12 — declaring invalid
criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had resulted in the conviction and
incarceration of numerous persons — this Court, in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:

In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only
to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should
be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts
against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed
by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious
denial of constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be
ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a
retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since judgment against him is null on account of
the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.

xxx xxx xxx

The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and commissions during the
ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President
Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated
declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their
consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us
from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27
SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order
wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished. 13

It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of September 21,
1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons
situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar doctrine that in
crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been
violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official issuance
by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among
others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid
defense. In the present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private lawyer but
upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though
not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct
interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of
the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation.17 Senarillos vs.Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the
respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation
antedated the contrary construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.

This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the
accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the
principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside, and the
criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes
1 As found by the Court of Appeals, the agreement was between Co, representing Mayflower Shipping
Corporation, and Geronimo B. Bella, representing Tans-Pacific Towage, Inc. The expenses for refloating were
apportioned chiefly between FGU Insurance and Development Bank of the Philippines, which respectively
contributed P2,329,022.00 and P1,579,000.00. SEE Rollo, pp. 9, 20-21.
2 Otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".
3 The ruling is contained in an extended resolution on a motion for reconsideration, promulgated by the Special
Former Second Division of the Court on September 21, 1987, written for the division by Paras,J., with whom
concurred Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ. In that resolution, the Court gave its "stamp of
 approval" on the decision of the Court of Appeals holding inter alia that "It is now settled that Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a
guarantee."
4 Emphasis supplied.
5 Exceptions to the rule of prospectivity are collated, e.g., in the textbook of retired Justice Edgardo A. Paras
(Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1984 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 22-23) viz : 1) laws remedial in nature; 2) penal
law favorable to accused, if ; after not habitual delinquent; 3) laws of emergency nature under police power :
e.g., tenancy relations (Vda. de Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 47 O.G. 4259, Valencia et al. v. Surtida et al., May 31,
1961); 4) curative laws; 5) substantive right declared for first time unless vested rights impaired (Unson v. del
Rosario, Jan. 29, 1953; Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997; Peo v. Alejaga, 49 OG 2833).
6 106 Phil. 713 and 103 Phil. 500, respectively, both involving prosecutions for illegal possession of firearms,
and both holding that appointment by the Provincial Governor or Provincial Commander of a person as a
"secret agent" or "confidential agent" "sufficiently placed him under the category of a 'peace officer' . . . who
under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code is exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearm.
7 SEE Ilagan v. People, Jan. 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 361.
8 The title of the cited Monge case is Monge, et al. v. Angeles, et al., and is reported in 101 Phil., 563 [1957],
while that of the cited Tupas case is Tupas v. Damasco, et al., reported in 132 SCRA 593 [1984].
9 136 SCRA 27, 40-41.
10 And several other rulings set forth in a corresponding footnote in the text of the decision.
11 SEE also Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987) (Citing Municipality of Malabang v.
Benito, 27 SCRA 533 where the question arose as to whether the judicial nullification of an executive order
creating a municipality wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished); Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686
(1990); Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 (1991); Union of Filipino Employees v. Vivar, Jr., 205 SCRA
200 (1992); Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425.
12 150 SCRA 144 (1987).
13 SEE also Cruz v. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700 [1988] and Res. of February 26, 1991; and Drilon v. Court of
Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 [1991].
14 SEE footnote 3, supra.
15 Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission punishing any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be
exposed, to public view . . . any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in the
Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, . . .
16 14 Phil. 128, 133-134.
17 Estrella vs. Orendain, 37 SCRA 640; Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47.

G.R. No. 125539 July 27, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS, accused-appellants.

MELO, J.:

Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr, were charged before Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of the 6th
Judicial Region stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime of robbery.* The Amended information dated October 11, 1985 charged:

That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above named two (2) accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with
three (3) others whose identities are still unknown and who are still at large, armed with bladed weapons by
means of force, violence and intimidation, taking advantage of the nighttime to better realize their purpose, and
in the dwelling of the offended party, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away, with intent to gain, cash amount of Three Hundred (P300,00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the
victim Corazon Aliman and the following personal property: one (1) adjustable wrench, one (l) vise grip, one (1)
screw driver, one (1) pair of levis pants, one (1) travelling bag and one (1) wallet containing ten (P10,00) pesos,
with a total value of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victims Reynaldo
Aliman and Josephine Belesario, the over all total of cash and personal property being SEVEN HUNDRED
(P700.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, without the consent of the above-mentioned offended parties and to
their damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount; that by reason or on the occasion of said Robbery, the
above named two (2) accused did then and there hack victim Reynaldo Aliman twice hitting him and inflicting
wounds which required medical attendance of more than thirty (30) days, as well as inflict physical injuries to
the other victims Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belesario causing them to sustain injuries requiring medical
attendance for several number of days.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 18305, accused-appellants Alex
Mijaque, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were charged before the same court with the crime of robbery with multiple rape,
thusly:

That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named three (3) accused, with deliberate intent, and without any justifiable
motive, conspiring, confederating and working together with Richard Doe, Philip Doe and Robert Doe who are
still at large, all armed with firearms and other deadly weapons, thereby performing [sic] themselves into a
band, entered the dwelling of Jesusa Carcillar, and once inside, with intent to gain and with violence against,
and/or intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos in cash, one (1) ring worth Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, one (1) pair of
earrings worth One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, and one (1) Seiko wrist watch worth Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos, making a total of Six Thousand Five Hundred (P6,500.00) Pesos, against the will and/or
consent of the owner; that on the occasion thereof, the above-named three (3) accused, conspiring and working
together with their companions who are still at large, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Perpetua Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia
Carcillar, and Josephine Belesario, against their will and consent.1âwphi1.nêt
 CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment on November 12, 1985, accused-appellants entered a plea of "not guilty" to both crimes charged (p. 103, II
Record).

After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered, disposing:

Wherefore, premises considered there being sufficient and satisfactory proof showing that the accused in these
two cases are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed against them, they are hereby sentenced as
follows:

a) In Crim. Case No. 18376 for Robbery with Physical Injuries, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex Mijaque
are penalized to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10) years, and One (1) day of Prision
Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, to
indemnify Corazon Aliman the amount of P700.00 representing the value of her property robbed from her and
also to indemnify Reynaldo Aliman the amount of P8,000.00 representing the expenses he incurred for his
medication and hospitalization due to the wounds he suffered.

b) In Criminal Case No. 18305 for Robbery with Multiple Rapes, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr. Alex Mijaque and
Nestor Ras are sentenced to a death penalty and to indemnify the members of the Carcillar family the amount
of P6,500.00 representing the cash and articles taken from them.

In both cases the accused are also ordained to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

The trial court arrived at the aforestated conclusion based on the following findings:

Criminal Case No. 18376

The crime of robbery (with physical injuries) was indeed committed by accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex Mijaque, as
well as by their unidentified companions, based on the positive identification made by complaining witness Corazon Aliman, and
corroborated by her son Reynaldo and the latter's half-sister Josephine Belisario (p. 77, Rollo).

Criminal Case No. 18305

Accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque, and Nestor Ras, as well as an unidentified companion, acted in concert to
commit the crime of robbery with multiple rape. They were positively identified by the following witnesses. Juliana Carcillar who was
raped twice by Alex Mijaque; Josephine Belisario who was raped once by Alex Mijaque; Rogelia Carcillar who was raped by Alex
Mijaque; and Perpetua Carcillar, who was raped by Nestor Ras, after Alfonso Patalin, Jr. failed in his attempt to rape her. Accused-
appellant Patalin was likewise identified by Reynaldo Aliman who personally knew him as former barangay-mate for a long time, as
well as by Corazon Aliman, mother of Reynaldo. The identification of accused-appellants was facilitated and aided by a bright full
moon and due to the fact that they tarried in the crime scene for a long period of time, thus allowing their victims to imprint in their
memory the countenance or visage of accused-appellants. Said positive and clear identification by the complaining witnesses, who
were not shown to have ill motive to falsify the truth and to implicate accused-appellants, prevail over the latter's defense of denial.
Band, nocturnity, and dwelling, were likewise appreciated against accused-appellant (pp. 78-79, Rollo).

The errors assigned by the accused-appellant in their individual briefs are summarized as follows: (1) The trial court erred in finding
that accused-appellants are responsible for the crimes charged; (2) The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant Patalin
notwithstanding the fact that the latter was arrested without a warrant; (3) Assuming without conceding that accused-appellants
(Patalin and Ras) committed the crimes charged, the trial court in erred in imposing the penalty of death as the same was
suspended upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution (pp. 86, 146, 204, Rollo).

The prosecution's version of the August 11, 1984 incident, based on the testimony of prosecution witnesses Dr. Edgardo Carmelo,
Dra. Leticia Sitchon Santiago, Reynaldo Aliman, Josephine Belisario, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Perpetua Carcillar, is
summarized in the Solicitor General's consolidated Brief, as follows:

At about 7:30 in the evening of August 11, 1984, while Reynaldo Aliman, his half sister Josephine Belisario, and
their mother Corazon Aliman were having a conversation inside their house at Barangay Lumanay, municipality
of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., who was outside the fenced perimeter of said
house, called out Reynaldo Aliman by his nickname and asked the latter to let him and the other persons with
him in (pp. 5-6, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986).

Reynaldo Aliman opened the window and, because of the moonlight, saw appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. with (2)
other persons. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. asked again Reynaldo Aliman to let them in (pp. 7-8, ibid.).
Reynaldo Aliman opened the gate and Alfonso Patalin together with his companions, one of whom is appellant
Alex Mijaque, entered the premises (pp. 8, 10-11, ibid.). Immediately upon entering, appellant Alfonso Patalin,
Jr. pointed the beam of his flashlight at Reynaldo Aliman. At this juncture, appellant Alex Mijaque hacked
Reynaldo Aliman twice with a bolo hitting the latter at the neck, right arm, and the chest (pp. 14-16, ibid.).
Thereupon, Reynaldo Aliman immediately ran away (p. 17, ibid.).

Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario, who went to the balcony of their house, witnessed the hacking
incident and the former shouted for help (p. 6, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, June 30, 1988). Two of the
assailants, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, pushed Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario inside their
house, covered their mouth and told them not to make any noise. Later, appellant Alex Mijaque dragged
Josephine Belisario to the house of the latter's aunt (sister of Corazon Aliman) which is beside their house. The
other man stayed put and while holding a double-bladed knife, threatened to kill Corazon Aliman if the latter will
not give him money. After Corazon Aliman gave him three hundred pesos (P300.00) cash, he ransacked the
house and took one (1) wrist watch, one (1) vise grip, one (1) screw driver one, (1) pair of Levis trousers, one
(1) travelling bag, and one (1) wallet containing ten pesos (P10.00); the total value thereof is seven hundred
pesos (P700.00) inclusive of the three hundred pesos (P300.00) cash. Thereafter, the man also dragged
Corazon Aliman to her sister's house (pp. 6-8, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 11-12, TSN, June 30, 1988).

Josephine Belisario, who was dragged by Alex Mijaque to her aunt's house which is just twenty (20) meters
away, saw six (6) persons, one of whom is appellant, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., outside the house of her aunt.
Josephine Belisario was forced to call out her aunt's name and ask that the door be opened for her. While the
door was being opened, it was kicked by one of the six (6) persons. Alfonso Patalin immediately went in, boxed
the aunt of Josephine Belisario on the body and announced that they are staging a hold-up. The other
companions of appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., including appellant Alex Mijaque, who were armed with knive's a
bolo and a gun also went in and restrained Josephine Belisario's cousins, namely Rogelio, Juliana, Perpetua,
Roy, and Victoriano, who are all surnamed Carcillar, (pp. 11-15, TSN, June 30, 1988; p. 11, TSN, June 29,
1989). Josephine Belisario together with her aunt and cousins were all forced to lie face down on the floor of the
sala (p. 15, TSN, June 30, 1998; p. 7, TSN, Feb. 15, 1990). Appellant Alfonso Patalin got hold of Mrs. Carcillar
(Josephine Belisario's aunt and the mother of her cousins), kicked and boxed the latter and exclaimed: "Money,
money". "It is money we want." Appellant Alfonso Patalin forced Mrs. Carcillar into a room where the latter gave
him money (p. 16, TSN, June 30, 1988; pp. 7-8, February 15, 1990.). Then, appellants and their companions
seized the following personalities of the Carcillars: (1) one Seiko 5 wristwatch worth three thousand pesos
(P3,000.00), (2) two (2) pairs of lady's rings worth two thousand (P2,000.00), (3) one (1) pair of earrings, and
(4) two (2) travelling bags (p. 9, TSN, February 15, 1990).

Rogelia Carcillar was brought outside their house by appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a butcher's
knife and threatened to kill her if she will not lie down. Because of fear, she did as she was told (pp. 10, 16-17,
TSN, February 15, 1990). Appellant Alex Mijaque forcibly removed her underwear and placed himself on top of
Rogelia. She tried to resist but appellant Alex Mijaque pressed the tip of his knife at the former's neck and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 11-12, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant Alex Mijaque brought
her inside the house and ordered her to lie face down on the floor again (pp. 13-14, ibid.). Then, one of the
companions of appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a gun took her outside and brought her to a place
not far from where she was raped (p. 14, ibid.). This man, at the point of a gun, threatened to kill her if she will
not obey his orders. Rogelia Carcillar, who feared for her life, was left with no choice but to obey the man's
orders. There, she was raped for the second time by this gun-wielding man (pp. 15-16, ibid.). While Rogelia
Carcillar was being raped, appellant Alfonso Patalin was also outside the house standing on guard (p. 18, ibid.).

Juliana Carcillar was likewise brought outside the house by appellant Alex Mijaque who, with his knife, tried to
rape her but he initially failed because of her resistance. This angered appellant Alex Mijaque and he tried to kill
Juliana Carcillar by stabbing the latter but was prevailed upon not to do so by one of his companions (pp. 12-15,
TSN, June 29, 1989).

Appellant Alex Mijaque, after delivering fist blows on the body of Juliana Carcillar, turned her over to one of his
companions who was in the garden outside the house and armed with a gun. This man threatened her with the
gun and mauled her. She was overpowered and he undressed her. He inserted his finger on her sex organ and
eventually succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 15-17, ibid.). Then, this companion of appellant
Alex Mijaque brought Juliana Carcillar back inside the house and ordered to look for money. When she told him
that they have no more money, he kept on harming her. In the course thereof, he found and took a Seiko
wristwatch owned by Perpetua Carcillar. Then, he brought her outside the house again where he had a brief
conversation with appellants Nestor Ras and Alfonso Patalin. She was then brought back inside the house and
ordered to lie face down on the floor again. While at this position, appellant Alex Mijaque approached her and
brought her outside the house. She refused to obey appellant Alex Mijaque's order to lie down on the ground so
he pushed her downwards. Her strength gave out and he succeeded in raping her twice. She was then brought
back inside the house (pp. 18-21, TSN, June 29, 1989).

Josephine Belisario, while laying face down on the floor of the sala, was dragged by appellant Alex Mijaque
inside one of the rooms. He threatened her with his knife and was able to undress her. He fondled her breasts,
pulled her pubic hair and eventually succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She was then left inside
the room. Two companions of appellant Alex Mijaque came in bringing with them her cousins Rogelia and
Perpetua Carcillar. One of them saw Josephine Belisario and brought her to another room. The man demanded
money from her but she was not able to give him money. The man was also carrying a knife and threatened her
with the same. She resisted when he was forcing her to lie down on the bed but her strength finally gave out .
He likewise succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After raping her, the man took a piggy bank which
was at the foot of the bed and brought her back to the room where she was first raped. Her aunt and cousins
were also inside the said room (pp. 17-25, TSN, June 30, 1988).

Perpetua Carcillar suffered the same fate. While laying face down on the floor of the living room, she was pulled
by the hair by appellant Alfonso Patalin and ordered to stand up. When she stood up, she realized that her
sister were no longer there. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, armed with a double-bladed knife, brought her outside
the house, ordered her to undress and lie down. Because of fear, Perpetua Carcillar, who was then only thirteen
(13) years old, obeyed appellant Alfonso Patalin. He tried to force his penis into her vagina but did not succeed.
Then, appellant Alfonso Patalin handed her over to appellant Nestor Ras, a member of their group who was
only about two (2) arms length away. Appellant Nestor Ras, armed with a double-bladed knife which he was
pointing at Perpetua Carcillar, ordered her to lie down. He fondled her breasts, kissed her, and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her. After raping her, appellant Nestor Ras brought her back inside the house.
When she was returned inside the house, the intruders were still demanding for money from her mother and
were taking turns in beating the latter (pp.4, 15-23, TSN, July 12, 1990).

Appellants left, together with the other assailants, taking with them the valuables stated earlier after threatening
them not to report the matter to the police or else they will return and kill all of them (p.19, TSN, February 15,
1990).

Reynaldo Aliman was brought to Ricardo Ladrido Memorial Hospital where he received first aid. He was then
brought to West Visayas Medical Center located in Manduriao, Iloilo (pp. 18-20, TSN, December 16, 1986) and
was treated by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo (p. 4, TSN, May 14, 1986). Reynaldo Aliman sustained the following
injuries: (1) hackwound, mid forearm, area ulnar side middle third forearm, and (2) hack wound, left side of neck
(pp. 5-6, ibid; Exhibit A). Reynaldo Aliman was confined in the hospital for almost three (3) months and he spent
more than eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) for medicines, food and other expenditures (p. 19, TSN,
December 16, 1986).
 Dr. Leticia Sitchon Santiago examined and treated Josephine Belisario two days after she was raped. A
hematoma, about 3x4 inches in diameter, was found on the left shoulder of Josephine Belisario which could
have been caused by forcing the latter to lie down on the ground. Josephine Belisario "vagina admits two (2)
fingers". Further, hematoma was noted in the hymen at nine o'clock and three o'clock positions and fresh
lacerations was also noted at nine, eleven, and three o'clock positions. These are indications that a foreign
object, which could be a human penis, was inserted in the vagina and caused the lacerations of the hymen (pp.
6-9, TSN, September 3, 1986).1âwphi1.nêt

Rogelia Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar and Perpetua Carcillar were also examined and treated by Dr. Leticia
Santiago but such was conducted three days after the incident (p. 17, ibid).

A hematoma was noted in the occipital region of the head of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 18, ibid). Her vagina admits
two fingers snugly and the perineum has a lacerated wound which is one centimeter in length (pp. 18-19, ibid;
pp. 2-3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Fresh lacerations were likewise noted in her hymen at eight, eleven and
three o'clock positions (p. 3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Dr. Santiago further testified that a foreign object was
inserted in the vagina of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 19, TSN, September 3, 1986; p. 3, TSN, November 10, 1986).

Juliana Carcillar, 22 years old, sustained a hematoma in the forehead, left and right side of the face, upper right
arm, uppermost and lower portions of the left thigh, occipital region of the head and left side of the mouth. She
also sustained the following injuries: (1) 1/2 cm. lacerated wound on the left side of the lower lip, (2) bite mark
with hematoma on the left shoulder, (3) 1 cm. incised wounds on the right index finger and right thumb, (4) 4
inches incised wound on the right forearm, and (5) multiple abrasions at the back including the portion below
the waistline, her vagina admits two fingers and fresh lacerations in the hymen were noted at eight, eleven, and
four o'clock positions (pp. 10-15, TSN, November 10, 1986).

Perpetua Carcillar, 13 years old, sustained a centimeter lacerated wound on the perineum which was also
swollen. Her vagina admits two fingers snugly (pp. 8-9, ibid). A fresh laceration at six o'clock position and a
hematoma also at six o'clock position were noted on her hymen (Exhibit C, p. 15, Record).

Denial and alibi were set up by accused-appellants based on their testimony and that of their witnesses, Alejandro Tabucan,
Felizardo Lebona, Rhodora Losaria, and Cristina Gumban. The denials, together with other arguments, are summarized as follows:

Alfonso Patalin

Accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin alleges that his name was only included by Jesus Larang, whom he described as the land lord of
Jesusa Carcillar and the Carcillar sisters, to force him to reveal the names of the persons who staged the robbery and rape. Verily,
he declared on the stand that when the victims saw him at the police station, two of them (Josephine Belisario and Reynaldo
Aliman) even smiled at him (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 10-11, 19-20).

In his brief, he argues that he was not positively identified, rationalizing that when prosecution witness Josephine Belisario was
asked on the stand if she recognized "the person who called [her] brother Reynaldo," said witness responded that she did not know
the person who called her brother, and that she only recognized the caller's voice (tsn, August 11, 1988, pp. 30-31). Further,
accused-appellant Patalin also alleges that he was arrested without a warrant.

Alex Mijaque

Accused-appellant Alex Mijaque argues that in the sworn statement of Reynaldo Aliman (p. 3, II Record), there is no mention of his
name nor that of accused-appellant Patalin as the perpetrators of the crimes charged. Moreover, during the preliminary examination
in the lower court, accused-appellant Mijaque was also not named as one of the malefactors. He likewise points out that in the
police blotter, the first report mentioned that the alleged offenders were unknown persons. No rape was reported. In the second
report, it was blottered that the alleged offenders were four unidentified persons. Again, no rape was reported. Accused-appellant
Mijaque likewise takes note of the report given by Rogelia Carcillar who merely narrated the robbery but did not report any rape.

According to this accused-appellant, the police authorities of Iloilo, Manduriao (also referred to in the record as "Mandurriao")
received a complaint from a resident thereat that his television set was stolen previous to the incidents herein involved. Accused-
appellant Mijaque was suspected as the thief and was picked up by the agents of the Manduriao Police Station without any warrant
of arrest and was thence detained for three days without any complaint (p. 93, Rollo). Meanwhile, the robbery at Lambunao, Iloilo
was being flashed at all police stations in Iloilo. The arresting officers of the Manduriao Police Station, so accused-appellant Mijaque
contends, in order to save themselves from charges of arbitrary detention, immediately referred him for custodial investigation in
regard to the Lambunao robbery. Consequently, three days after his confinement, a criminal complaint for robbery with physical
injuries and another for robbery with rape was filed against him by the Chief of Police of Lambunao, Iloilo.

Nestor Pas

The third accused-appellant, Nestor Pas, argues that his name was never mentioned by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, and that Josephine
Belisario was merely led by the public prosecutor into mentioning his name. He also states that the witnesses' declarations as
regards his identification are confusing and inconsistent (pp. 208-210, Rollo).

Further, it is contended that Rogelio Carcillar himself, when asked by the public prosecutor about what happened to his sister
Perpetua Carcillar, testified that "Nothing happened to them" (p. 210, id). And when Perpetua Carcillar and the other female
prosecution witnesses reported the alleged incident to the police authorities, they never mentioned that they were raped.

As mentioned, all three accused-appellants, aside from denying the charges, also presented their respective alibis. Accused-
appellant Patalin testified that he was at home with his parents, wife, and children, at Pandan, Lambunao (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp.
16-17) at the time of the incident. As corroborative witness, he presented Felizardo Lebona, the person in charge of the plantation
where he was working, who testified that accused-appellant Patalin did not leave the plantation house from August 9 to 12, 1984
(tsn, October 15, 1993, pp. 4-5).

For his part, accused-appellant Mijaque insists that he had no opportunity to get out of the farm where he was working which was
located in Manduriao, Iloilo (tsn, May 6, 1993, p. 6). In July, 1985, he was arrested for theft of a television set and detained in the
Lambunao jail for investigation. Although three of the herein complainants were brought in front of his detention cell, he was not
identified. Instead, the policemen pointed to him and said, "That is Alex Mijaque who raped you. If you will not include him, he will
file a case against you." Moreover, he testified that he was mauled in jail (tsn, July 29, 1993, pp. 10-13). Defense witness, Alejandro
Tabucan, neighbor of accused-appellant Mijaque, corroborated the latter's alibi that on August 11, 1984, they had a drinking spree
from 6 o'clock in the evening to 12 o'clock midnight, and accused-appellant Mijaque was not able to leave the premises in
Manduriao. Tabucan also said that he saw Mijaque still asleep the following morning (tsn, August 6, 1993, pp. 4-5, 10).

Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras declared that he was in the province of Antique (particularly, in Igbangkal, Dao) on August 11,
1984 (tsn, December 17, 1993, p. 4). As corroborative witness, he presented Cristina Gumban, a vendor who testified that on
August 11, 1984, she bought cassava and sweet potatoes from accused-appellant Ras in Igbangkal, Dao, Antique from 3 o'clock to
5 o'clock in the afternoon, and that he saw Ras put the purchased items in a sack (tan, March 4, 1994, p. 4).

We are not persuaded by the above posturing and are compelled to affirm.

Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the legal principle that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to
note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination (People vs. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93 [1997]). We generally
uphold and respect this appraisal since, as an appellate court, we do not deal with live witnesses but only with the cold pages of a
written record (People vs. Herbieto, 269 SCRA 472 [1997]).

A close examination of the record convinces us of the prosecution witnesses' credibility, particularly the ravished victims, who, for
approximately two agonizing hours, were subjected to a hellish nightmare occurring in the very privacy of their own homes.

As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its consolidated brief, the defense was not able to prove any motive on the
part of the private complainants to falsely testify that they were robbed and raped by accused-appellants. In fact, two of the rape
victims, Josephine Belisario and Rogelia Carcillar, were even married to first cousins of accused-appellant Patalin (pp. 327-
328, Rollo), and would not ordinarily turn against a relative although this be by mere affinity unless they really suffered the fate they
narrated.

Accused-appellants rely on the delay or vacillation on the part of the complaining witnesses. As discussed above in their individual
defenses, they emphasize that Reynaldo Aliman failed to mention the names of the perpetrators in his sworn statement; that on
August 11, 1984, Reynaldo instructed a relative, Jesus Larang, to report the hacking and robbery incidents at the Lambunao Police
Department, as well as the robbery committed in the Carcillar household, and that the police blotter stated that the alleged offenders
were unknown persons but contained no report of any rape; and that Rogelia Carcillar's report did not mention that she was raped.

Time and again, we have ruled that delay in lodging a criminal accusation does not impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is
satisfactorily explained (People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 [1997]). An examination of Reynaldo Aliman's sworn statement (p. 3, I
Record) shows that he clearly identified one of the callers as accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin. Anent his failure to mention
accused-appellant Mijaque's name, he explained on cross-examination that he did not know yet the name of the person who
attacked him with the bolo at the time he executed his sworn statement (tsn, Dec. 16, 1986, pp. 35, 38-39). It was only later that he
found out that the name of his assailant was Alex Mijaque. As regards Jesus Larang, the fact that he mentioned "unknown persons"
in his report does not affect Reynaldo's categorical and positive identification of accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque as the
perpetrators of the hacking and robbery incidents at his home.

Anent the rape victims, it was clearly explained that their assailants told them not to report the matter to the police, otherwise, the
assailants will return and kill them (tsn, Feb. 15, 1990, p. 19). The victims were overcome by fear and shame (ibid., p. 31). Besides,
the delay in reporting the multiple rapes was not procrastination as this was only 3 days from the date of the incident (tsn, June 30,
1988, p. 22), a far shorter period than those mentioned in People vs. Gecomo (254 SCRA 82 [1996]) where we held that a delay of
17 or 35 days, or even 6 months, by a victim of rape in reporting the attack on her honor, does not detract from the veracity of her
charge.

The defense also notes certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the complaining witnesses, as follows: (1) Juliana Carcillar
testified earlier that the only light in the house came from a kerosene lamp placed on a small table which was extinguished as a
result of it being knocked down, thus placing the house in darkness, while on the other hand, Perpetua Carcillar, earlier said that
although there was no more light in the house coming from the lamp, yet she could still see because the light of the moon still
illuminated their house, allegedly through the plastic roofing; and (2) the prosecution witnesses could not agree concerning the date
they went to San Dionisio, Iloilo to identify accused-appellant Nestor Ras, as well as the date when Ras was arrested.

Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the
substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony, and do not impair the credibility of such witnesses
where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant (Sumalpong vs. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997]). In fact, honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy
the credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so when the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses
(People vs. Agunias, 279 SCRA 52 [1997]).

With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi, significantly, these defenses, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
are negative and self-serving, deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People vs. Gayon, 269 SCRA 587 [1997]). Positive identification, where categorical
and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
denial (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]). Verily, even if the defense of denial is supported by the testimony of friends of the
accused, it deserves the barest consideration (People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995]). It will be given weight only if it would
preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of
commission (People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314 [1995]; People vs. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995]; People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA
709 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]; People vs. Dela Iglesia, 241 SCRA 718 [1995]; People vs. Umali, 242 SCRA 17
[1995]; People vs. Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 [1995]; People vs. Espinosa, Jr. 243 SCRA 7 [1995]; People vs. Parica, 243 SCRA 557
[1995]; People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87 [1995]).

Accused-appellant Mijaque testified that on August 11, 1984, he was in Manduriao, Iloilo. The overland travel time from the town of
Manduriao to Lambunao is approximately one hour and twenty minutes. Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was in Barangay
Pandan, which is merely adjacent to Lambunao. Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras testified that he was in Antique, a province
neighboring Iloilo, which is approximately two hours away therefrom via overland transportation. The defense tried to corroborate
these alibis by presenting witnesses who testified on details which happened ten years prior to the date their testimony was given,
and hence of naturally doubtful credibility.
Mutatis mutandi People vs. Queliza (279 SCRA 145 [1997]), considering that the places where accused-appellants alleged they
were at could be traversed by motorized vehicles, it was not impossible that accused-appellants could not have been at the crime
scene by 7 o'clock or 7:30 o'clock in the evening on August 11, 1984. More importantly and damning yet is the positive identification
of their presence thereat by the victims.

The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling in Criminal Case No. 18376
considering that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime and the evidence shows that accused-appellants took advantage
of the darkness to successfully consummate their plans (People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 798 [1968]). Dwelling is clear from the
abuse of confidence which the victims reposed in the offenders by opening the door to them, as well as the violation of the sanctity
of privacy in the victims' homes. He who goes to another's house to slander him, hurt him, or do him wrong, is more guilty than he
who offends him elsewhere (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code — Criminal Law, Vol. I, 1993 ed., citing the dissenting opinion of
Justice Villareal in People vs. Ambis, 68 Phil. 635 [1939] and Viada, 5th ed., Vol. II, pp. 323-324). We further affirm the trial court's
finding on the presence of the aggravating circumstance of band considering that Reynaldo Aliman testified that accused-appellants
Patalin and two other companions (one of whom was later identified as accused-appellant Mijaque) entered his home (tsn, p. 7,
Dec. 16, 1986). This was corroborated by Josephine Belisario who even saw four (4) persons enter their gate, one of whom was
accused-appellant Patalin (tsn, p.10, June 30, 1988). These same aggravating circumstances likewise attended the commission of
the crime of robbery with multiple rape in Criminal Case No. 18305 and this was clearly testified to by the victims thereof who stated
that five persons, including accused-appellant Patalin, armed with a bolo, a knife, and a long gun, entered their dwelling that
unfortunate night (tsn, June 29, 1989, p. 10; February 15, 1990, p. 5).

With respect to accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque's defense that they were arrested without warrants, suffice it to say that any
objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea (Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402
[1997]). As correctly pointed out in the People's consolidated brief, the record shows no objection was ever interposed prior to
arraignment and trial (p. 324, Rollo).

It is indubitable that there was conspiracy in the commission of the crimes in both Criminal Cases No. 18376 and 18305. In the first
criminal case, the evidence clearly shows that accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque, together with unidentified companions,
committed the crime charged. Said culprits shared the common criminal objective of robbing the victims and inflicting wounds upon
Reynaldo Aliman on the occasion of the robbery. In the second case, all three accused-appellants (together with unidentified
companions), who were positively identified by the victims themselves, undoubtedly had the common criminal design of robbing the
household of Jesusa Carcillar, and of committing multiple rape on the occasion of the robbery. Accused-appellant Mijaque dragged
Josephine Belisario to her aunt's house and the other culprits followed suit. Accused-appellant Patalin boxed Jesusa Carcillar and
announced that they were staging a hold-up. After robbing the household, they proceeded in ravishing the four young female
victims, Rogelia, Juliana, Josephine, and Perpetua, one after the other, thus truly exhibiting their concerted acts.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons came to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it
(People vs. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39 [1995]). It cannot be merely presumed. Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the
elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In the case at bar, although there was no proof of previous actual agreement among accused-appellants adduced at the trial —

. . . direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came together
and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The existence of the assent of minds
which is involved in a conspiracy maybe, and from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the
court from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts
of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy maybe inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert
means is proved (People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868; See also People vs. Viray, 147 SCRA 146; People vs.
Balignasay, G.R. No. 76743, May 22, 1992; People vs. Galit, 230 SCRA 486). . .

( People vs. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620 [1995]).

Verily, the participation of each of the accused-appellants was exhibited by the straightforward testimony of the victims themselves.

This brings us to the crucial issue raised by accused-appellants on the death penalty. At the time the crimes charged were
committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death (Art. 294, Revised Penal Code). However, by virtue of the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution, specifically Paragraph (1), Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death penalty was abolished. Hence, the
argument that it could not be imposed upon accused-appellants. Said provision reads as follows:

Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. However, said
provision left the matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its discretion, "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." Simply stated, it did not prevent the legislature from reimposing the death penalty at some future time (Bernas, The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., pp. 507-508).

Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law which took effect on
January 1, 1994.

Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitution's abolition of the death penalty had retroactive effect, being
beneficial to the accused, the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on January 1, 1994 would no longer cover them
notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered by the trial court on June 14, 1995, when the Death Penalty Law had
already taken effect.

Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission. At the time of the commission of the crime in 1984, as held by the trial court, robbery with rape, if committed with the
use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, was punishable by reclusion perpetua to death (Article 294[2], Revised Penal
Code [as amended by Presidential Decree No. 767]).
True, in 1987, the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to Congress' future restoration thereof "for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes." At the time of such ratification, the instant case was still at its trial stage. No penalty had as yet then been
imposed. Considering that the provision provides that "[a]ny death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua,"
it is clear that the framers intended said provision to have a retroactive effect on cases pending without any penalty of death having
been imposed yet. Consequently, upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution, any death penalty already imposed is automatically —
without need for any executive action — commuted (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508).

The instant case poses the following issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to herein
accused-appellants, did they gain a vested right thereto so that any future act restoring the death penalty would no longer cover
them? An affirmative answer would free accused-appellants from the fatal clutches of the death penalty.

Ours is a government of laws and not of men. The idea that an individual may be compelled to hold his life (or lose it), or the means
of living, at the mere will of another, is intolerable in any country where freedom prevails (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778
[1919]). Before us is a heinous crime indeed where people were harmed, robbed, ravished, and abused in the defaced sanctity of
their own homes. It is but human nature to feel some measure of loathing, disgust, and hatred for the offenders considering the
inhuman aspect of the crime committed. However, the ascendancy of the law is axiomatic in our type of government. Every official
act must be based on and must conform to the authority of a valid law, lacking which the act must be rejected (Cruz, Phil. Political
Law, 1996 ed., p. 51). The nobility of our intention is insufficient.

There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected and benefited accused-appellants. Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same."

A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I,
1987 ed., p. 5). The above-cited provision of the Constitution is penal in character since it deals with the penalty to be imposed for
capital crimes. This penal provision may be given retroactive effect during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: (a) when
the crime has been committed and the prosecution began; (b) when sentence has been passed but the service has not begun; and
(c) when the sentence is being carried out (Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1988 ed., p. 167, citing Escalante vs.
Santos, 56 Phil. 483 [1932]).

In the light of the discussion above, there is no question that the abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused-appellants.
Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will not affect them. The framers of the Constitution themselves state that
the law to be passed by Congress reimposing the death penalty (Republic Act 7659) can only have prospective application (Bernas,
The 1987 Constitution the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508, citing I RECORD, p. 748; Bernas, The
Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 227, citing I Record, p. 747-748).

There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to insist that it shall remain unchanged
for his benefit, nor has he a vested right in the continued existence of a statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any
omission to legislate on a particular matter. However, a subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a right
that accrued under the old law (Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 264, citing Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs.
Pineda, 98 Phil. 711 [1956]; Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 [1946]). Courts have thus given statutes strict construction to prevent their
retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with vested or existing rights. Clearly, accused-
appellants' right to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty accrued or attached by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code. This benefit cannot be taken away from them.

Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested (Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals,
205 SCRA 515 [1992]), the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used (Balatbat vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 419 [1992]).

By analogy, we apply the rule in labor law which provides that benefits accruing to workmen under the old law cannot be taken away
from them by a succeeding law. In the case at bar, there is greater reason to apply this principle since the very taking of life is
involved and is at issue.

As regards accused-appellant's civil liability, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 18376, correctly awarded P700.00 to Corazon
Aliman representing the total value of the cash and personal property forcibly taken, and P8,000.00 to Reynaldo Aliman
representing expenses incurred for medication and hospitalization. However, in Criminal Case No. 18305, the trial court failed to
order indemnification for the multiple rapes. Thus, in line with the pronouncement in People vs. Victor (G.R. No. 127903, July 9,
1998) wherein we said:

One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated and the legislative
response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the
jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if
the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount
of not less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and
the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of
heinous crimes against chastity.

accused-appellants should be made to pay P375,000.00 as indemnification for five counts of rape (considering that Juliana Carcillar
was twice raped by accused-appellant Mijaque) in addition to the sum of P6,500.00 representing the value of the cash and articles
that were taken from the victims. In line with the recent ruling in People vs. Prades(G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998), moral damages
in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, or a total of P250,000.00 is likewise awarded. Lastly, so that the instant case
may serve as an object lesson to the public, exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000 per count of rape is further awarded
(People vs. Burce, 269 SCRA 293 [1997]).

Because of the findings of conspiracy, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally liable for the amounts
awarded in Criminal Case No. 18376; whereas all three accused-appellants are solidarily liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal
Case No. 18305.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS said
judgment, with the following modifications:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 18376, for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, considering that the aggravating circumstances of
band, nighttime, and dwelling attended the commission of the crime, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are hereby sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months,
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum;

(b) Accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally held liable for the amounts awarded by the trial court in said
criminal case, particularly, the amount of P700.00 representing the total value of the cash and articles taken from Corazon Aliman,
and P8,000.00 representing the expenses incurred by Reynaldo Aliman for medication and hospitalization;

(c) In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and

(d) Aside from the amount of P6,500.00 already awarded by the trial court to the Carcillar family representing the value of the cash
and articles taken, the victims in Criminal Case No. 18305 are hereby awarded an additional P75,000 as indemnity for each count of
rape, P50,000.00 for each count of rape as moral damages, and P10,000 for each count of rape as exemplary damages, for which
amounts all the three accused-appellant are jointly and severally liable.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and
Ynarez-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., is on leave.

Footnotes

* On January 21, 1985, an Information for robbery with multiple rape was filed against Alfonso Patalin and was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 18305. Said criminal case was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 18376 based on an Information
for robbery with physical injuries against the same accused and was heard by Branch 25, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City
(pp. 1-2, 53-55, 11 Record).

On July 1, 1985, a motion for consolidation was filed by private prosecutor Rodolfo Valera Cabado manifesting
that another information was filed against Nestor Ras for robbery in band with multiple rape, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 18835, which was founded on the same facts presented in the first two criminal cases.
Eventually, the three cases were consolidated. Later, Alex Mijaque was identified and apprehended as an
additional conspirator in the aforesaid Criminal Cases No. 18305 and 18835. Subsequently, a motion to admit
Amended Information and to dismiss Criminal Case No. 18835 was filed by the prosecution. As a result, two
cases were jointly tried by the lower court, namely, Criminal Case No. 18305 entitled "The People of the Phils. v.
Alfonso Patalin, Alias "Alpoc", Nestor Ras, and Alex Mijaque, Alias "Aprik" for Robbery in band with rape, and
Criminal Case No. 18376 entitled "The People of the Phils, v. Alfonso Patalin, Jr. Alias "Alpoc", and Alex
Mijaque, Alias "Aprik" for robbery with physical injuries (pp 74-76, 86, 88-93, 11 Record).