Gatmaytan Oposa Article

15 GEOIELR 457 FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY Page 1
15 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 457

(Cite as: 15 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 457)


Georgetown International Environmental Law Review

2003

Article

*457 THE ILLUSION OF INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY: OPOSA v. FACTORAN AS PYRRHIC
VICTORY

Dante B. Gatmaytan [FNa1]

Copyright Copr. 2003 by Georgetown International Environmental Law Review and

Georgetown University; Dante B. Gatmaytan

CONTENTS

I. Introduction ........................................................ 457

II. The Case ............................................................ 460

A. The Trial Court Decision ........................................ 460

B. The Supreme Court Decision ...................................... 461

1. Did the Plaintiffs Have a Cause of Action? .................. 462

2. Were the Issues Raised Political Questions? ................. 464

3. Are TLAs Protected by the Non-Impairment Clause of the

Constitution? ............................................. 464

C. The Separate Opinion ............................................ 465

III. Understanding Oposa ................................................. 466

A. Timber License Agreements Were Not Cancelled .................... 466

B. The Supreme Court Did Not Rule on Standing to Sue ............... 468
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.




C. Philippine Rules on Standing Are Lenient ........................ 472

1. Standing to Sue May Be Assumed .............................. 472

2. Lack of Standing May Be Waived .............................. 473

D. Intergenerational Equity Has No Practical Effect ................ 475

E. Intergenerational Equity Is Already Law in the Philippines ...... 476

1. The Constitution Was Intended to Protect the Rights of

Future Generations ........................................ 476

2. Statutes and Case Law ....................................... 479

F. The Potential Uses of Oposa ..................................... 480

IV. Conclusion .......................................................... 484

I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most famous and celebrated cases in the history of the Philippine

Supreme Court is Oposa v. Factoran. [FN1] For almost a decade now, Oposa has
continued to earn praises as a significant decision in environmental protection.
The case was unorthodox even in its inception: children from all over the country
filed a case to compel the Secretary of the Department of Environment and *458
Natural Resources (DENR) to cancel all existing Timber License Agreements (TLA)
and to prevent him from renewing or processing any new applications. The suit was
based on the novel theory of "intergenerational justice" -- the children claimed
that they represented not only their generation, but also "generations yet

unborn." [FN2]

Oposa has attained what might be called celebrity status. It is cited as a
"significant," "innovative" case, "likely to become something of a landmark in

the jurisprudence of sustainable development." [FN3] According to one author, the
Philippines Supreme Court "announced a powerful and influential exposition of

intergenerational rights in the context of environmental protection." [FN4] Oposa

is virtually a staple of international environmental law scholarship, [FN5] which

is rarely *459 critical of the case. [FN6]

This interest, however, is actually generated only in the international arena
and not in the Philippines. Antonio Oposa, Jr., the Counsel for the petitioners
in the case, acknowledged as much when he presented his assessment of impact of

the case:
Although hardly known in the country's legal community, the case has been the
subject of extensive citation, analysis, and comment in international law
circles. Perhaps because it is the first case decided by the highest court of a
country which discussed and implemented what had heretofore been a rhetorical




call for responsibility to future generations for the world's natural resources.
Furthermore, it brings to the fore -- in the personal voice of our children --
the imminent likelihood that our generation's wanton use of the earth's resources
will inevitably adversely impact our children's generation and generations yet

unborn. [FN7]

The incongruent reception of Oposa may be due to the fact that the
international legal community misunderstands the case. In contrast to this
dominant interpretation, this Article will show that Oposa adds barely anything
new either to Philippine jurisprudence or to the cause of environmental
protection, and that it has faded from the practice of law because it does not
strengthen the legal arsenal for environmental protection. In this Article, I
wish to show that Oposa is overrated for several reasons.

First, Oposa, for all the praise it has earned, did not affect government
conduct in the protection of the environment. The Supreme Court did not order the
cancellation of the TLAs, but ordered the case to be remanded for trial. Because

the petitioners did not pursue the case after it was remanded, no TLA was
cancelled.

Second, while many point to the case as one that recognizes standing to sue for

future generations, [FN8] the Court's statement to that effect is obiter dictum
-- therefore, not binding as precedent. Only a few correctly point out that the

case recognizes a cause of action for environmental protection. [FN9]

*460 Third, even if "standing" had been an issue before the Supreme Court,
Philippine case law has always adopted a liberal approach to questions pertaining
to standing to sue. The Supreme Court, by relying on case law, could have either
assumed the existence of the children's standing to sue or waived the requirement
completely.

Fourth, the use of "intergenerational equity" -- invoking the rights of future
generations -- while intellectually titillating, is ultimately useless in the
resolution of the case. The Philippine Supreme Court would have decided Oposa
exactly the same way had the children filed the case solely on their own behalf.
In cases involving the protection of the environment, the distinction between
present and future generations is inconsequential -- we cannot protect the rights
of future generations without protecting the rights of the present.

Fifth, the protection of the rights of future generations was already inscribed
in Philippine law and jurisprudence even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and the promulgation of Oposa.

Finally, I want to show that despite these shortcomings, Oposa should
ultimately be celebrated, not because of the Supreme Court's remarks about
intergenerational responsibility and standing to sue for future generations, but
because it held that the constitutional provision on the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is an actionable right that is superior to the Bill of Rights.
Oposa remains a potential tool, although its possible uses seem to elude
advocates of environmental protection.




II. THE CASE

A. THE TRIAL COURT DECISION
Oposa v. Factoran was a taxpayers' class suit originally filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. The petitioners were minors represented and
joined by their parents and the Philippine Environmental Network, Inc., a
non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of concerted action geared for
the protection of the environment and natural resources. The children claimed
that they were "entitled to the full benefit, use, and enjoyment of the natural

resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests." [FN10] As
such, they prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources, his agents, representatives, and other persons acting on

his behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements [FN11] in the country
and to desist from *461 receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or approving

new timber license agreements. [FN12]

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that (a)
the plaintiffs had no cause of action against him; and (b) the issue raised by
the plaintiffs was a political question that should be addressed to the
legislative or executive branch of the Government.

The trial court granted the motion and held that:
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the complaint, the Court cannot
help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that the plaintiffs
have but the noblest of all intentions, it [sic] fell short of alleging, with
sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and
protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec.
1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine,
plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its [sic] complaint against the
herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not
be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred
principle of 'Separation of Powers' of the three (3) co-equal branches of the

Government. [FN13]

The trial court added that to grant the relief prayed for would amount to an
"impairment of contracts," in the belief that TLAs are contracts, which are

protected under the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. [FN14]

The children then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court asking

it to set aside the trial court's order dismissing the case. [FN15] In essence,
the petition raised three issues before the Supreme Court: (a) whether the
plaintiffs had a cause of action; (b) whether the issue involved a political
question over which the Supreme Court could not assume jurisdiction; and (c)
whether a timber license agreement is a contract protected by the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution.





B. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
Before the Supreme Court addressed these issues, it decided to "focus on some

procedural matters," [FN16] despite the fact that the respondents "did not take

issue with this matter." [FN17] Nevertheless, the Court stated that the
children's case *462 satisfied the requisites of a valid class suit under the

Rules of Court. [FN18]

The Court then proceeded to discuss a "special and novel" [FN19] element of the
suit: the plaintiffs' assertion that they represented their generation, as well
as generations yet unborn.

The Court accommodated this position, stating:
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of
their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas
and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

[FN20]

The Supreme Court said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology also
created an obligation for every person to preserve the environment. It is this

obligation that is the basis of any citizen's standing to sue.

In short, the Supreme Court said that the petitioners' suit was a valid class
suit, and that the petitioners had standing to sue for themselves and future
generations, although the petitioners' case raised neither issue. Only then did

the Court "proceed to the merits of the petition." [FN21]

1. Did The Plaintiffs Have a Cause of Action?
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court and stated that the complaint
focused on the right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The *463 Constitution
provides that "[t]he State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."

[FN22] The Court explained that while this provision is found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, and not the Bill of Rights,
it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation
and self-perpetuation -- aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners -- the




advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written

in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of

humankind. [FN23]

The Court went on to explain that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The
right implies the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

[FN24]

The Court further observed that provisions of Executive Order No. 192, series

of 1987, (creating the DENR) [FN25] and the Administrative Code of 1987 declare
it to be the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development,

management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest. [FN26] Both laws,
said the Court, set these objectives, which provide the basis of policy

formulation. [FN27] It also pointed out that decrees issued prior to the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, such as the Philippine Environmental

Policy [FN28] and the Philippine Environment Code, [FN29] already paid attention

to the environmental rights of present and future generations. [FN30]

After a reading of these laws, the Court concluded that the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty to protect and advance said
right. It found that a denial or violation of that right by the party who has the
*464 correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to
cause of action. [FN31]
a

2. Were the Issues Raised Political Questions?
The Supreme Court likewise disagreed with the trial court's finding that the
issue in this case involved a political question, which would have been beyond
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It said: "Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right

vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation." [FN32] The
Court also pointed out that even if the matter were a political question,
judicial power has been expanded under the 1987 Constitution to include:
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

[FN33]

Citing jurisprudence, the Supreme Court pointed out that the present

Constitution expands judicial review to cover "political questions." [FN34]

3. Are TLAs Protected by the Non-Impairment Clause of the Constitution?
The Court also said that the timber license agreements were not contracts
within the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution, but were

only licenses that could be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public

interest or public welfare. [FN35] It further pointed out that even if TLAs were
considered contracts, the due process clause could not be invoked because the




case did "not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the

cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses." [FN36] The Court went
on to say that even if a law mandated the cancellation of timber license

agreements, it would be justified as a police power measure. [FN37]

*465 The Supreme Court set aside the order of the trial court granting
Secretary Factoran's motion to dismiss. The Court remanded the case for trial,
stating that "[t]he petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements."

[FN38]

C. THE SEPARATE OPINION
Ten justices concurred with the majority decision written by Justice Hilario G.

Davide, Jr., [FN39] and three justices took no part in the deliberations. [FN40]
In a separate opinion, Justice Florentino Feliciano maintained that Oposa was one

of the most important cases decided by the Court in the last few years [FN41] and
that the principles laid down in the decision were "likely to influence
profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the

environment ...." [FN42] Nevertheless, he took issue with the majority on several
points.

The gist of his opinion was that neither the petitioners nor the Court had
identified a right upon which the petitioners could base their claim. In his
view, the constitutional provision on the right to a balanced and healthful

ecology may be fundamental, but it is not specific. [FN43] According to Justice
Feliciano, all the laws cited by the Court to show the existence of a cause of
action, such as Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, the Administrative Code,
and the Philippine Environmental Policy, "all appear to be formulations of
policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy

in Article II, Sections 16 ... and 15 ...." [FN44]

On the other hand, he pointed out, the Philippine Environment Code was merely
"a compendious collection of more 'specific environment management policies' and
'environment quality standards' .... [N]either petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the ... Code which
give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce."

[FN45] He added that the Code does not "appear to contemplate action on the part
of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code," as it
only identifies the government agencies charged with the formulation and
implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with air, water, land use, and

natural resources management. [FN46] In his view, such a specific right might
exist in *466 Philippine law, and the plaintiffs should have been afforded an
opportunity to identify it, rather than being denied such an opportunity by the

trial court granting defendant's motion to dismiss. [FN47]

Furthermore, Justice Feliciano pointed out that the Court's approach --
combining the substantive standards of the Constitution with the remedy sought by
the children (petition for certiorari) -- would hurl the Supreme Court into
social and economic policy-making. He warned that the Court is not prepared to
undertake this task because of its lack of special technical competence,




experience, and professional qualification in the area of environmental

protection and management. [FN48]

He also concurred in the result of the decision, but added that "[t]he
doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be

subjected to closer examination." [FN49] Justice Feliciano's opinion was prompted
by an attempt to clarify to himself, "what the Court appear[ed] to be saying."

[FN50]

Apart from his disagreement regarding the legal basis for the children's
petition, Justice Feliciano raised two questions that the Supreme Court had
created by its decision: First, since the Court seemed to be recognizing a
beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, it is
unclear whether such a right of action "may be found under any and all

circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part

of the governmental agency concerned must be shown." [FN51] The Court failed to
discuss, he pointed out, whether there must be an exhaustion of all
administrative remedies before a case may be filed in court for redress of one's
environmental rights. Second, since the Court remanded the case to the trial
court with an order to implead the holders of TLAs, what then were the holders to

litigate about? [FN52]

I understand the Separate Opinion to be a polite reminder to the rest of the
Court that the ruling they were promulgating could not be easily implemented. But
how exactly would Oposa play out in environmental litigation? As I attempt to
show here, Oposa barely creased the legal landscape, raising questions as to why
it generates excitement elsewhere in the world but remains obscure in the
Philippines. We must, therefore, exert effort to understand what exactly the
Court said.

III. UNDERSTANDING OPOSA

A. TIMBER LICENSE AGREEMENTS WERE NOT CANCELLED
It should be stressed that the children wanted the Secretary of the DENR to
cancel all TLAs and to desist from processing new applications. My review of *467

Oposa shows that the Supreme Court did not order the cancellation of existing
TLAs or issue an order to the DENR to desist from renewing or processing any
applications. The case revolved around a procedural question: whether the case
was properly dismissed by the regional trial court for petitioners' failure to
establish a cause of action. To quote, the Court held:
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing
Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend
their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the

questioned timber license agreements. [FN53]

The Court remanded the case to the trial court and ordered the plaintiffs to
implead all holders of TLAs as indispensable parties in such further proceedings.
The Supreme Court's decision, therefore, was merely an initial step toward the
resolution of the case. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision to




dismiss the case because the children had a cause of action, the issues raised
were not "political questions," and TLAs were not contracts under the contracts
clause of the Constitution.

As Justice Feliciano pointed out, however, it is not even clear what would have
been litigated in the lower court. Even if we knew what they would have
litigated, the magnitude of the work required to implead all TLA holders cannot
be overstated because this would entail bringing dozens of defendants to court.

One might even wonder why persons holding TLAs should be impleaded. If, the Court
stated, TLAs are only licenses that could be validly withdrawn whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare, then the Secretary should be allowed to
cancel them without impairing their due process rights.

In any case, the children did not pursue the case after it was remanded to the
trial court. No TLA was ever cancelled pursuant to the Court's ruling in Oposa.
Commercial logging continues in the Philippines, and there is nothing that will
prevent the DENR from renewing or processing applications for TLAs. Neither the
Supreme Court nor the trial court ordered the Secretary to desist from doing so.

Put simply, the children initially wanted to stop the practice of issuing TLAs
because it impaired their right to a balanced ecology. Since the practice
continues, it is difficult to see how Oposa can be construed as a victory for the
environment.

The most recent data from the DENR's Forest Management Bureau show that as of
December 31, 2001, there are still eighteen active TLAs all over the Philippines,
covering 813,949 hectares of forestland. There are also two inactive TLAs
covering 96,066 hectares, and another eleven suspended TLAs covering *468 another

432,958 hectares. [FN54] Technically, a total of 1,342,962 hectares of forestland
are still covered by TLAs. There is nothing to show that the Philippine

environment has improved. [FN55]

It might be argued that this is still a significant drop in the number of TLAs

issued by the DENR, [FN56] but there is no evidence that this reduction is a
consequence of the Court's decision in Oposa. In fact, when Fulgencio Factoran
served as the Secretary of the DENR, from 1987 to 1992, he did not want to issue
any new TLAs and also sought the cancellation of TLAs of companies that failed to

comply with government regulations. [FN57] The reduction in the number of TLAs,
therefore, was among the thrusts of Factoran's turn at the helm of the DENR even
before Oposa was decided.

B. THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT RULE ON STANDING TO SUE
As I pointed out at the beginning of this Article, Oposa is often cited for the
Court's alleged recognition of the rights of future generations. Strangely, the
Supreme Court never made a ruling on this issue, although it did make a ruling on
the existence of the children's cause of action. Thus, everything the Court said
about standing to sue for future generations is obiter dictum.

Perhaps international interest in Oposa may be explained by the fact that
"standing to sue" is a huge obstacle for environmental protection advocates in




some jurisdictions. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has tightened the rules
on standing by requiring strict compliance with the "case or controversy"
requirement of the Constitution. To be accorded standing, first and foremost,
there must be alleged (and ultimately proven) an "injury in fact" -- a harm
suffered by the plaintiff that is "concrete" and "actual or imminent," and not

merely "conjectural" or "hypothetical." Second, there must be causation -- a
fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff's injury and the complained-of
conduct of the defendant. And third, there must be redressability -- the

likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury. [FN58]

In contrast, the rules on standing in the Philippines are less stringent. As I
will *469 illustrate below, standing in Philippine litigation may either be
assumed to exist or may be waived completely under certain circumstances. In the
latter case, one does not need standing to litigate.

"Standing" and "cause of action" are two different concepts that are governed
by separate provisions of the Rules of Court. Standing to sue revolves around the
question of who the proper parties are in a suit. The "proper party" requirement
is satisfied if it is alleged that petitioners and intervenors have sustained or
are in danger of sustaining immediate injury resulting from the acts or measures

complained of. [FN59] One who is directly affected by and whose interest is
immediate and substantial in the controversy has standing to sue. A party must
show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can
be redressed by a favorable decision, so as to warrant an invocation of the
court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers

on his behalf. [FN60] The Rules of Court provide:
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be

prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. [FN61]

In contrast, the Rules of Court define a "cause of action" as "the act or

omission by which a party violates a right of another." [FN62] For a cause of
action to exist, there must be: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff, by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation
on the part of the defendant to respect, or not to violate, such right; and (c)
an act or omission on the part of said defendant constituting a violation of the
plaintiff's right or a breach of the defendant's obligation to the plaintiff.

[FN63]

Secretary Factoran never challenged petitioners' standing to sue. In his motion
to dismiss, he did not allege that the parties had no legal interest in the case
or that they were not the proper parties to the suit. Rather, he alleged that
petitioners had not identified a specific right that he had allegedly impaired,
so as to entitle the children to relief from the courts. The defendant, in short,
merely questioned the existence of a cause of action.

Even the Supreme Court was aware of this. In the introductory portions of its
decision, the Court explained that the case "touches on the issue of whether the
said petitioners have a cause of action to 'prevent the misappropriation or *470




impairment' of Philippine rainforests and 'arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the

country's vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."' [FN64]
In fact, the Court's entire discussion of standing to sue was preceded by an

admission that the respondents "did not take issue with this matter." [FN65]

The distinction between standing to sue and cause of action is also emphasized
by the fact that the Court resolved both questions on different grounds. The
children had standing because they had an obligation "to ensure the protection of

that right for the generations to come." [FN66] They had a cause of action
because the DENR had a duty to protect and advance their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and the Secretary of the DENR had allegedly violated this right

with the continued issuance of TLAs. [FN67] The violation of this right gave rise

to a cause of action. [FN68]

Had Oposa implicated standing, then the decision would have been significant.
Oposa broadens earlier rulings on who are "proper parties" in a suit. In
Philippine law, the real party in interest has been restricted to:
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule
means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere

incidental interest .... [FN69]

Oposa overruled the more restrictive ruling of the Supreme Court in Lozada v.

Commission on Elections. [FN70] In that case, the Court denied a petition to

review a decision of the Commission on Elections, which had refused to call an
election to fill vacancies in the Batasang Pambansa (National Legislature). The
Court held that:
Petitioners' standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the
kind alleged here, which is held in common by all members of the public because
of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury supposedly shared by all
citizens. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable
element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally
capable of judicial resolution. When the asserted harm is a "generalized
grievance" shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of
citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant the exercise of jurisdiction
....
....
*471 Even his plea as a voter is predicated on an interest held in common by
all members of the public and does not demonstrate any injury specially directed

to him in particular. [FN71]

Oposa recognized standing in the broadest possible sense by including even
those who are not yet born -- even future citizens who are not persons under

Philippine law. [FN72] But the Supreme Court did not have to discuss "standing"
because it was never raised as an issue.

The pronouncement on standing is obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter that
was not raised expressly by the petitioner, and therefore, it was not a

prerequisite in disposing of the case. [FN73] In other cases, the Supreme Court




has ruled that a remark made or opinion expressed by a judge in a decision upon a
cause, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before
the court, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the
cause, is obiter dictum, lacks the force of an adjudication, and is not to be

regarded as such. [FN74] Obiter dicta are opinions "entirely unnecessary for the

decision of the case" and thus "are not binding as precedent." [FN75] Of course,
the Philippine Supreme Court has also held that dictum is generally not binding
as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule but may be followed if

sufficiently persuasive. [FN76] But until that happens, Oposa's rule on standing

has no binding effect on any Philippine court. [FN77]

*472 Even if standing to sue for future generations becomes standard legal
doctrine, it will not necessarily lead to the protection of the environment. The
courts will still have to rule on whether the challenged acts -- in this case,
the issuance of TLAs -- impair the right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The
petitioners in Oposa wanted the cancellation of TLAs and a ban on any further
processing of TLA applications. If the case had been pursued in the regional
trial court, the only way that the children could have prevailed was by

convincing the court that the practice of issuing TLAs violates their
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology. I doubt that the courts
would enjoin certain economic activity simply because the environment is somehow
impaired, and I suspect that they would be at a loss to determine what standard
to use before any such action can prevail. In fact, a defendant in such a case
might remind the courts that Article XII of the Constitution provides for the
exploitation of the country's natural resources.

C. PHILIPPINE RULES ON STANDING ARE LENIENT
Even if "standing" had been an issue, Philippine case law is consistent in
holding that in similar cases standing may either be assumed or entirely waived
by courts.

1. Standing to Sue May Be Assumed
Perhaps the respondent did not take issue with the question of standing because
it would have been difficult if not impossible to defend such an assertion.
Indeed, under the facts of Oposa, the issue of standing could have been simply
assumed by the Supreme Court.

It will be recalled that the Court concluded that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology "is as clear as the DENR's duty ... to protect and advance the

said right." [FN78] The constitutional provision recognized a right and imposed a

duty. The petitioners, therefore, could have filed a special civil action for
mandamus to restrain the defendant from further parceling out what is left of the
Philippine forests. There are cases in the Philippines that recognize a citizen's
interest and personality to procure the enforcement of a public duty and to bring

an action to compel the performance of that duty. [FN79] In Tanada v. Tuvera, a
case filed to compel publication of Presidential Decrees issued by then-President
Ferdinand Marcos, the Court held:
[W]hile the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only on those cases where he has some private or particular
*473 interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected,




independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and that "it is for
the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to
be subserved [Mitchell v. Boardmen, 79 M.E., 469 J.]," nevertheless, "when the
question is one of a public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure
the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution

of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., § 431]." [FN80]

Further, the Court said:
Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public

right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners
were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to
conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has

entered his appearance for the respondents in this case. [FN81]

In another case, the Court explained, "[w]hen a mandamus proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part

of the general "public" which possesses the right." [FN82]

The situation in Tanada was mirrored in Oposa. The petitioners in Oposa sought
the enforcement of a public right recognized by the Constitution -- the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology -- and the performance of a public duty on the
part of the DENR. Likewise, the Solicitor General entered his appearance for the
government. The petitioners were all Filipino citizens and part of the general
public. The facts of Oposa, therefore, fit precisely into these established
rules, and as such the petitioners could have filed a special civil action for
mandamus and cleared the "standing requirement" with ease.

2. Lack of Standing May Be Waived
The Philippine Supreme Court adheres to a liberal policy with regards to locus
standi. In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, the Court said, "[a] party's standing
... is a procedural technicality which the Court may, in the exercise of its

discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised." [FN83]
Standing may be brushed aside when the "transcendental importance to the public
of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing

aside, if we must, *474 technicalities of procedure." [FN84] In taxpayers' suits,
such as Oposa, the Court "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not [the

issue of standing] should be entertained." [FN85]

The cases reiterating the Court's leniency are legion. [FN86] In Kapatiran ng
mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaang Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, the Court once more
stated that:
Objections to taxpayers' suits for lack of sufficient personality, standing
or interest are, in the main, procedural matters. Considering the importance to
the public of the cases at bar ... this Court has brushed aside technicalities of

procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions. [FN87]




In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, the Court said:
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the
case before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and

intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an
immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. [Ex Parte
Levitt, 303 US 633]. And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the
definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the

serious constitutional questions raised. [FN88]

Again, in Kilosbayan, the Court pointed out that ordinary citizens and
taxpayers have already been allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders issued by the President, "although they were invoking only an

indirect and general interest shared in common with the public." [FN89] It added:
In line with this liberal policy, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress,
and even associations of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were
allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the
constitutionality *475 or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders

of various government agencies or instrumentalities. [FN90]

In essence, under Philippine law the Supreme Court does not dismiss a case
simply because the parties do not have standing to sue. It may completely
disregard the rule on standing, "even when there is no direct injury to the party

claiming the right to judicial review," [FN91] and it may entertain a suit "which

does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is

involved." [FN92]

Thus, even if standing had been the central issue in Oposa, the Supreme Court
could have similarly waived the technicality. In the Court's own words, the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology "concerns nothing less than self-preservation

and self-perpetuation." [FN93] The Supreme Court has ruled that the regulation of

rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings, [FN94] gambling, [
FN95]

and rate-fixing in violation of the Public Service Act [FN96] are all of
transcendental importance sufficient to disregard the procedural requirement of
standing. It is difficult to imagine how anything could be more transcendental
than the preservation of the human species. Given the magnitude of the issues
raised in Oposa, the Court could have waived the "standing" requirement.

D. INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY HAS NO PRACTICAL EFFECT
Others might claim that even if the weight of the case law suggests that the
Court would have waived the standing requirement, the fact is that all these
decisions refer to present but not future generations. But would this have
mattered? A judicial declaration on "intergenerational equity" does not serve any
practical purpose. At most, "standing to sue for future generations" is quaint or
intellectually stimulating. However, there was no need to invoke the rights of

future generations because the present generation can always file a case to
enjoin any action that impairs its right to a balanced and healthful ecology.





If Oposa was designed to stop the practice of issuing TLAs, then any person
could have simply filed the case on her own behalf and the result would have been
the same: the petitioner would still have had a cause of action and standing to
sue. The issues raised would still have been recognizable by the Supreme Court.
TLAs would still be beyond the protection of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court would have granted the petition and *476 remanded
the case for trial on the merits all the same. In short, petitioners still would
have won their Supreme Court case and would have landed right back in the
regional trial court where the case started, even without invoking the rights of
future generations. Does the Supreme Court's pronouncement on standing to sue for
future generations really make any difference?

E. INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY IS ALREADY LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES
It cannot even be said that, at the very least, intergenerational equity is now
part of Philippine law because of Oposa. The Court's "recognition" of the rights
of future generations is not novel. It was already law even before this case was
decided. Many Philippine laws already mandate the conservation of the country's

resources for the benefit of future generations. The Constitution, statutes, and
case law together mandate the use of natural resources without impairing the
needs of future generations. This was the law even before Oposa. Would a judicial
declaration on intergenerational equity carry more weight than those repeatedly
made by the legislature?

1. The Constitution Was Intended to Protect the Rights of Future Generations
The constitutional provision on the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is new; it has no parallel in the previous constitutions of the Philippines. The
original proposal for the constitutional provision was worded thus:
Section 18. The State recognizes the human right to a healthy environment and
the singular demand of nature to follow its own rhythm and harmony. The State
shall therefore maintain ecological balance even as it harnesses our natural

resources for the common good and the sustenance of future generations. [FN97]

Significantly, the framers intended to incorporate the concept of
intergenerational equity into the fundamental law of the land. The deletion of
the reference to "future generations" is not significant because the Commission
agreed that the provision comprehends future generations, as the following
exchange shows:
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready now for the final formulation?
MR. AZCUNA. May I read it once more, Madam President: "THE STATE SHALL

PROTECT AND ADVANCE THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE AND THEIR POSTERITY TO A BALANCED AND
HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY IN ACCORD WITH THE RHYTHM AND HARMONY OF NATURE."
*477 MR. ROMULO. Madam President, may I suggest the deletion of "POSTERITY"
for the sake of economy of words, because I think Commissioner Padilla is right.
What we pass here is for now and the future.
MR. AZCUNA. "THE PEOPLE" means the present and future generations; we agree.
MR. ROMULO. Yes. [FN98]

From this exchange alone, it is clear that the provision already mandates the
protection of the rights of future generations.





The Records of the Constitutional Commission reveal, however, that the
introduction of the right to a balanced and healthful ecology into the
Constitution was met with some skepticism. There was an attempt to simply combine
this provision with another on the right to health. Commissioner Blas Ople
crushed the attempt to fuse the two provisions. He said:
To be sure, we ought to have a strong and powerful statement in the
Declaration of Principles concerning the ecology in terms of its impact on
health, but also for other equally humane and noble purposes and having in mind
the danger of the exhaustion of resources. In the case of forests, this can mean

eternal flooding .... [FN99]

There were also observations made to the effect that the entire provision is in

fact "within the inherent power of the State under its police power," [FN100] or
that the new formulation contains "beautiful words, but they have no substantial

meaning." [FN101] It was proposed that the poetry be eliminated in favor of
simpler prose. *478 Again, Ople objected and emphasized that the provision was
meant to be more than rhetoric:
I believe this is far from being meaningless or a hollow statement. It
conveys a powerful sense of the very real problems that we face. Having violated
the rhythm and harmony of nature with the rape of our forests and lakes, we have
to take seriously the admonition of many experts that if nothing drastic is done
by the government and the people in 50 years, we can be a desert [sic], Madam

President .... [FN102]

The discussion that followed, however, suggests that the Commission intended to
promote more government action against persons engaged in environmentally
destructive acts, rather than action against the government. To quote further:
MR. VILLACORTA. Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions
against all forms of pollution? Air, water, and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, Madam President. The right to a healthful environment
necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and
therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance.
MR. VILLACORTA. Correspondingly, does this mean that under this section there
will be protection provided to human communities surrounding airports, military
bases, and factories?
MR. AZCUNA. There may be insofar as such mentioned matters contribute to
harming the environment or the quality of the human environment.
MR. VILLACORTA. In other words, it is protection not only to the life and
limb of these human communities but to their psychological welfare as well.
MR. ASCUNA. Insofar as it related to causes from the environment such as
noise, for example, which is considered as a form of pollution. This may be

controlled or regulated under this provision, Madam President. [FN103]

Interestingly, it would seem that the framers intended that by enshrining the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology, the government would be saddled with
the responsibility of protecting the right by regulating the use of resources and
sanctioning violations. Fortunately, the Court did not construe the provision to
also preclude actions against government agents. It would indeed be foolish to
believe that damage to the environment cannot be initiated by the government, or
that the fundamental law of the land was designed to protect government agents




*479 from legal reprisals for destroying the environment. If the right can be
enforced against any private person, there is no reason why such a right is not
also enforceable against the government.

2. Statutes and Case Law
Concern for the environmental rights of "future generations" is not new under
Philippine law -- many laws, some of which were passed prior to the ratification

of the 1987 Constitution, recognize this right. [FN104] The laws need not be
discussed separately here, but they do illustrate one thing: it is not a
pronouncement of intergenerational equity -- whether by the executive,
legislative, or judicial branch -- that compels people to preserve the
environment for future generations. Both the constitutional and statutory
mandates to protect the rights of future generations need to be enforced. Oposa,
therefore, merely adds judicial imprimatur to what is already increasingly
commonplace in Philippine legislation.

Nor is Oposa the first time that the Supreme Court stressed the importance of
Article II, Section 16 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court linked the
provision with the interests of future generations in Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v.
Deputy Executive Secretary:
While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to
meet the country's immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to
ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment
demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check further
denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is expected of

the government in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a balanced

and healthful ecology. [FN105]

Thus, three years before Oposa was decided, the Supreme Court already had
interpreted the constitutional provision on the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology to be a constitutional command for government to check the denudation of
forestlands.

In the meantime, Oposa remains largely ignored. In the last decade, Oposa was
cited with significance only once. In Tano v. Socrates, the Supreme Court upheld
the power of the local government units to enact laws to protect the environment
pursuant to the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code of 1991

(LGC). [FN106] The Court pointed out that the LGC seeks "to give flesh and blood

to *480 the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology." [FN107]
Moreover, the general welfare provisions of the LGC "shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in accelerating
economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the

community." [FN108] Oposa was not even necessary in that case, because there were
sufficient legal bases for the challenged ordinances under the LGC. The Court
mentioned Oposa only to point out that there is a state policy on the protection
of the environment.

Tano is even more significant than Oposa because it gives local governments a
concrete avenue for the protection of the environment. Furthermore, advocates of

environmental protection may lobby their local governments for such ordinances.




In either case, the outcome is clear. The same cannot be said of Oposa.

F. THE POTENTIAL USES OF OPOSA
I am not, of course, in any way suggesting that we disregard the environmental
rights of future generations. The present generation could deplete resources,
often with irreversible consequences -- by depleting higher quality resources,
leading to higher real prices of resources for future generations; by consuming
potentially valuable resources; and by exhausting resources, resulting in the

narrowing of the range of available natural resources. [FN109] Philippine law
already protects against these outcomes by mandating protection of the rights of
future generations, and Oposa adds nothing to the constitutional and legislative
mandates. What then does Oposa contribute to environmental protection?

There is reason enough to celebrate Oposa. Unfortunately, environmental rights
advocates have focused their attention on the decision's colorful dictum and have
altogether ignored the pronouncements that make it a genuine landmark decision.
The decision is important because Article II, Section 16 of the Constitution is
no longer merely a policy declaration, but an actionable right; it no longer
requires enabling legislation to be invoked by an aggrieved party. Of course,

Oposa fails to clarify if this right may be invoked immediately, or whether a
petitioner must first exhaust all administrative remedies available.
Nevertheless, environmental rights advocates should be exploring this opening,
rather than dwelling on a non-binding judicial declaration on standing to sue for
future generations.

Oposa breaks new ground insofar as it holds that the constitutional provision
on the right to a balanced environment is an actionable right, even absent any
further legislation. The importance of Oposa, thus, is not so much its *481
pronouncement on standing. Rather, as one author pointed out, Oposa is a
statement to the effect that:
the right to a sound environment is a self-executory constitutional policy.
By itself, independent of specific statutory rights, this right is actionable.
And it is actionable against the DENR Secretary who is tasked with carrying out
the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

[FN110]

This statement is groundbreaking in that constitutional authorities in the
Philippines have always believed otherwise. The Principles and State Policies of
the Constitution are the political creed of the nation, which sets out the
fundamental obligations of the government. "It is incumbent upon the people to
demand fulfillment of these governmental duties through the exercise of the right
suffrage." [FN111] These principles may aid the courts in their determination
of

of the validity of statutes or executive acts in justiciable cases, [FN112] but
Joaquin Bernas maintains that they were not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are, rather, directives
addressed to the executive and to the legislative branches of the government. If
there was a failure on their part to heed the directives, the people's remedy

would be political and not judicial. [FN113] State Policies and Principles under
Article II of the Constitution and the separate Social Justice and Human Rights




provisions under Article XIII of the Constitution are mere policy declarations
and generally require enabling legislation before they can be invoked in courts.

[FN114]

The task at hand now seems to be to test the potential of this decision. Oposa
need not be confined to forest protection. It may be invoked to prevent other

*482 forms of environmental degradation. Mining activities, [FN115] the change of

land use to industrial or commercial purposes, [FN116] quarrying operations,

[FN117] and the emission of toxic medical wastes [FN118] are only some of the
environmental problems facing the country today.

Oposa also might be used to address the forced displacement of communities
caused by infrastructure and development projects. Small landowners have been
literally bulldozed out of their lands to make way for export processing zones.

[FN119] Thousands of families are under the threat of displacement because of the

construction of government projects such as commercial [FN120] and sports

complexes, [FN121] cement plants, [FN122] dams, [FN123] geothermal plants,

[FN124] mining operations, [FN125] and the commercial development of land.

[FN126] All these activities necessarily threaten the environment. May Oposa be
used to stop any of these activities? May a citizen, invoking the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology, ask the courts to stop the issuance of
all Financial and Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAAs) under the Mining Act of
1995? May a citizen challenge all land use conversions as a violation of this
right? Again, such relief might run against the constitutional provisions on the
exploitation of natural resources. It is highly unlikely that the courts will
sanction suits that seek blanket prohibitions against the issuance of natural
resources access instruments such as TLAs or FTAAs. The courts may, instead, find
it necessary to fashion a standard under which the challenged action may be
declared unconstitutional.

Oposa might be potent for another reason. In 2000, Congress enacted Republic
Act No. 8975 to "ensure the expeditious and efficient implementation and
completion of government infrastructure projects to avoid unnecessary increase in
construction, maintenance and/or repair costs and to immediately enjoy the *483

social and economic benefits therefrom." [FN127] While seemingly noble in its

objectives, the law may become an agent of environmental degradation because it
bars courts from temporarily stopping these projects pending litigation. The law
provides:
SECTION 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders,
Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. -- No court,
except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the
government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity,
whether public or private, acting under the government's direction, to restrain,
prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or
location of any national government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as
defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any




such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary
for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies
instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed by
bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such

contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary
restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which
bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide
that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null
and void, the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the
contract *484 to the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the
same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under

existing laws. [FN128]

This law could pose a problem for environmental protection advocates because
courts are enjoined from temporarily halting government projects that could be
impairing the environment. Because Oposa established the right to environment as
a constitutional right that may be immediately invoked, it could be argued that
environmental protection falls under the exemption of the law -- "extreme urgency
involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order

is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise." [FN129] Proponents
of environmental protection may invoke Oposa as falling within the exemption of
Republic Act No. 8975.

IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have hoped to explain why Oposa excites environmental
advocates everywhere except in the Philippines. The answer is simple: we have
misunderstood what the Philippine Supreme Court actually said in the case. Even
in the Philippines, Oposa did not inspire litigation to protect the environment

and the Supreme Court's environmental docket remains sparse. [FN130] No one in
the Philippines would say that the environment has improved in the last ten

years, despite the enactment of a spate of new environment-related laws. [FN131]

To summarize, no TLA has ever been cancelled pursuant to the Court's ruling in
Oposa and the DENR may issue TLAs so long as there are forests to fell. At the
last count, 1.3 million hectares of Philippine forestland are still covered by
these instruments.

The Court's spectacular pronouncement that the children had standing to sue
even on behalf of those generations not yet born is merely dictum. In fact, the
Court could have assumed the existence of standing, because the petitioners were
seeking the enforcement of a public right and the performance of a public duty.
The Court could also have waived the issue of standing entirely because of the
magnitude of the issues that were raised. Worse, the pronouncement on standing to
sue for future generations is useless, because the same results could have been




achieved had the petitioners filed the case to protect only their own right to a
balanced and healthful ecology. Moreover, the protection of the rights of future
*485 generations is already mandated by the Constitution and several Philippine
laws. The Philippine Supreme Court did not craft anything new but merely
reiterated the directives of the Constitution and Congress.

Yet Oposa should be celebrated for another reason: the Court's ruling that the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful environment is a specific,
self-executory, and actionable right, superior to the Bill of Rights. This part
of the case has been overlooked and should be exploited by environmental
protection advocates to further their cause. Indeed, without any concrete results
from Oposa, the case has been reduced to what the counsel for petitioners was
hoping to avoid: another "rhetorical call for responsibility to future

generations for the world's natural resources." [FN132]

[FNa1] . Assistant Professor, University of the Philippines, College of Law.
LL.B., University of the Philippines, 1991; M.S.E.L., Vermont Law School, 1995;
LL.M., University of California, Los Angeles, 1996. I wish to thank Ms. Claudette
de la Cerna (LL.B., University of the Philippines, 2005, expected) for her
research assistance.

[FN1] . Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993); reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 173 (1994).

[FN2] . Id. at 802.

[FN3] . Ben Boer, The Rise of Environmental Law in the Asian Region, 32 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1503, 1534-37 (1999).

[FN4] . Neil A.F. Popovic, In Pursuit of Environmental Human Rights: Commentary on
the Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, 27
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 513 (1996). Oposa was also referred to as a seminal
decision that implements the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development's
components on a right to a healthy and decent environment, and intergenerational
equity and responsibility. See Alfred Rest, Preliminary Efforts in Implementing
the Rio Targets, 55 ATENEO L.J. 1, 10- 11 (1996).

[FN5] . See, e.g., Sumudu Atapattu, Sustainable Development, Myth or Reality?: A
Survey of Sustainable Development Under International Law and Sri Lankan Law, 14
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 293 n.98 (2001); Dr. Ibibia Lucky Worika,
Deprivation, Despoilation and Destitution: Whither Environment and Human Rights

in Nigeria's Niger Delta?, 8 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 21 (2001); Peggy Rodgers
Kalas, International Environmental Dispute Resolution and the Need for Access by
Non-State Entities, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 191, 206 n.55; Janelle P.
Eurick, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment: Enforcing
Environmental Protection through State and Federal Constitutions, 11 INT'L LEGAL
PERSP. 185, 200 (2001); Carl Bruch, Wole Coker & Chris VanArsdale, Constitutional
Environmental Law: Giving Force to Fundamental Principles In Africa, 26 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 131, 148 (2001); Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or the Fall of
International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 370 n.94 (2000); John Lee, The
Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a Healthy




Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
283, 317-18 (2000); Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Right of the Child to a Clean
Environment, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 611, 618 (1999); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Environmental
Ethics and our Moral Relationship to Future Generations: Future Rights and
Present Virtue, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 249, 263 n.37 (1999); Bruce Ledewitz,
Establishing a Federal Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment in US and in
Our Posterity, 68 MISS. L.J. 565, 604-05 (1998); John C. Dernbach, Sustainable
Development as a Framework for National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 66
n.332 (1998); Nicholas A. Robinson, Comparative Environmental Law Perspectives on
Legal Regimes for Sustainable Development, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 247, 261 n.56

(1998) ; J. Martin Wagner & Neil A.F. Popovic, Environmental Injustice on United
States Bases in Panama: International Law and the Right to Land Free From
Contamination and Explosives, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 401, 493 (1998); Prudence E.
Taylor, From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in
International Law?, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 353 n.174 (1998); Paul A.
Barresi, Beyond Fairness to Future Generations: An Intragenerational Alternative
To Intergenerational Equity in the International Environmental Arena, 11 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 59, 82 (1997); Hari M. Osofsky, Environmental Human Rights Under the
Alien Tort Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims of Multinational Corporations,
20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 335, 376 (1997); Ellen Hey, The World Bank
Inspection Panel: Towards the Recognition of a New Legally Relevant Relationship
in International Law, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 61, 61 n.2 (1997); Neil A.F.
Popovic, Pursuing Environmental Justice with International Human Rights and State
Constitutions, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 338, 340 n.4 (1996); Christopher D. Stone,
Locale and Legitimacy in International Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1279,
1281 n.12 (1996); Mark Allan Gray, The International Crime of Ecocide, 26 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 215, 240 (1996); and James C. Wood, Intergenerational Equity and
Climate Change, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 324 (1996).

[FN6] . For a rare critical look at the case, see Vaughan Lowe, Sustainable
Development and Unsustainable Arguments, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT 19, 27-28 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone eds., 1999).

[FN7] . Antonio A. Oposa, Jr., The Power to Protect the Environment, at
http://www.oposa.com/oposa_family/environment2.htm (Aug. 30, 1997) (excerpts of a
paper presented before the LAWASIA Conference in Manila).

[FN8] . See Ted Allen, Note, The Philippine Children's Case: Recognizing Legal
Standing for Future Generations, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 713 (1994); see also
Matthew Tuchband, The Systemic Environmental Externalities of Free Trade: A Call
for Wiser Trade Decisionmaking, 83 GEO. L.J. 2099, 2106 n.34 (1995); J. William
Futrell, Efforts to Improve Environmental Programs: NGOs, C990 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 299,
331-32 (1995); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, From Green to Global: Toward the Transformation
of International Environmental Law, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 291 n.196
(1995).

[FN9] . See Richard Desgangne, Integrating Environmental Values into the European
Convention on Human Rights, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 263, 263, n.7 (1995); David A.
Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Two Steps Forward and
One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599, 652, n.51 (1995).




[FN10] . Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792, 796 (1993).

[FN11] . Pres. Decree No. 705 (1975), § 3(ee) defines a timber license agreement
thus:
License agreement is a privilege granted by the State to a person to utilize
forest resources within any forest land with the right of possession and
occupation thereof to the exclusion of others, except the government, but with
the corresponding obligation to develop, protect and rehabilitate the same in
accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in said agreement.

[FN12] . Oposa, 224 SCRA at 797.

[FN13] . Id. at 803-04.

[FN14] . PHIL. CONST. art. III, § 10 (1987).

[FN15] . Oposa, 224 SCRA at 800-01.

[FN16] . Id. at 802.

[FN17] . Id.

[FN18] . Phil. R. Civ. P. 3, § 12 (1997). The Court said that:
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to
bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs
therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of
all concerned interests.
Oposa, 224 SCRA at 802.


[FN20] . Id. at 802-03.

[FN21] . Id. at 803.

[FN22] . PHIL. CONST. art. II, § 16 (1987).

[FN23] . Oposa, 224 SCRA at 804-05.

[FN24] . Id. at 805.

[FN25] . Section 3 of the Executive Order in part provides:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy.--It is hereby declared the policy of the State
to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal and conservation
of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to




the development and use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well ....
Exec. Order No. 192, s. 1987, § 3.

[FN26] . See Exec. Order No. 292, s. 1987, § 3.


[FN28] . Pres. Decree No. 1151 (1977).

[FN29] . Pres. Decree No. 1152 (1977).


[FN31] . Citing jurisprudence, the Supreme Court defined a cause of action as "an
act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right." Oposa, 224 SCRA at 808.

[FN32] . Id. at 809.

[FN33] . Id. (quoting PHIL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1987)).

[FN34] . Id. at 810.

[FN35] . Id. at 812; PHIL. CONST. art. III, § 10 (1987) (providing that "[n]o
law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed").


[FN37] . Id. at 812-13.


[FN39] . The majority consisted of Associate Justices Cruz, Padilla, Bidin,
Grino-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and Quiason.

[FN40] . Those justices taking no part in this case were Chief Justice Narvasa and
Associate Justices Puno and Vitug.

[FN41] . Oposa, 224 SCRA at 814 (Feliciano J., concurring).

[FN42] . Id.

[FN43] . Id. at 815.

[FN44] . Id.

[FN45] . Id.




[FN46] . Id. (emphasis in original).

[FN47] . Id. at 817.

[FN48] . Id. at 818.

[FN49] . Id.

[FN50] . Id. at 814.

[FN51] . Id. at 815.

[FN52] . Id. at 818.

[FN53] . Id. at 814.

[FN54] . Status Report of Timber License Agreements (TLAs) as of December 31,
2001, Forest Management Bureau, Phil. Dept. of Environment and Natural Resources
33-34 (2001).

[FN55] . The state of the Philippine environment cannot be adequately discussed
here, but for an overview of the problems, see Danilo C. Israel, The Quest for a
Better Environment: Past Experiences and Future Challenges, at 2 (Phil. Inst. for
Dev. Stud., Discussion Paper Series No. 2002-14 (Nov. 2002)).

[FN56] . There were 75 TLAs still in force in 1990. See Therese Desiree Perez,
Philippine Forests: A Case of Disappearance, 3 PHIL. NAT. RES. L.J. 18, 23
(1990). One can only imagine the amount of evidence that must be adduced against
each TLA holder. As of June 1996, 34 TLAs covering 1,515,033 hectares remain in
effect. See ENVTL. MGMT.M BUREAU, PHIL. ENVTL. QUALITY REP., 1990- 1995 at 321
(1996).

[FN57] . Marites Danguilan Vitug, Forest Policy and National Policy, in FOREST
POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE PHILIPPINES: THE DYNAMICS OF PARTICIPATORY
CONSERVATION 11, 16 (Peter Utting ed., 2000).

[FN58] . Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); see also
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

[FN59] . Phil. Ass'n. of Service Exps., Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 98472, Aug. 19,
1993 (citing Ass'n. of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Sec'y of Agrarian
Reforms, G.R. No. 78742 and companion cases, July 14, 1989; 175 SCRA 343, 364).

[FN60] . Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Ctr. v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 115381, Dec. 2,
1994.

[FN61] . Phil. R. Civ. P. 3, § 2 (1997).

[FN62] . Id. at 2, § 2 (1997).




[FN63] . Rava Dev. Corp. v. Ct. App., G.R. No. 96825, 211 SCRA 144, 153 (1992);
Heirs of Ildefonso Cosolluela, Sr., Inc. v. Rico Gen. Ins. Corp, G.R. No. 84628,
179 SCRA 511, 517 (1989).

[FN64] . See Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792, 796 (1993) (emphasis added).

[FN65] . Id. at 802.

[FN66] . Id. at 803.

[FN67] . Id. at 808.

[FN68] . Id.

[FN69] . Gan Hock v. Ct. App., G.R. No. L-60848, May 20, 1991, 197 SCRA 223, 230
(1991). See also Sustiguer v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 29341, 176 SCRA 579, 587 (1989).

[FN70] . G.R. No. L-59068, 120 SCRA 337, 340 (1983).

[FN71] . Id. at 341-42.

[FN72] . See Rep. Act No. 386 (1949), art. 40.

[FN73] . Delta Motors Corp. v. Ct. App., G.R. No. 121075, July 24, 1997.

[FN74] . City of Manila v. Entote, G.R. No. L-24776, June 28, 1974.

[FN75] . Equatorial Realty Dev., Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., G.R. No. 16063,
Nov. 21, 1996, citing Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition, 1990; see also Morales
v. Paredes, 55 Phil. 565 (1930); Reagan v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
L-26379, Dec. 27, 1969; Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Comm'n,
G.R. No. 120043, July 24, 1996.

[FN76] . Lee v. Ct. App. and De Simeon, G.R. No. L-28126, Nov. 28, 1975.

[FN77] . Curiously, even members of the Supreme Court suggest that Oposa did in

fact rule on the children's standing to sue. See Flerida Ruth P. Romero, The Role
of the Judiciary in Promoting the Rule of Law in the Area of Environmental
Protection, in THE COURT SYSTEMS J. 94, 96 (Special Edition, Apr. 1999) (Justice
Romero said, "we recognized the concept of intergenerational responsibility by
ruling that petitioner children can file a class suit for themselves, for others
of their generation, and for succeeding generations, to preserve the country's
rainforests."). Chief Justice Hilario Davide himself recently said:
In fact, in a frequently cited case, Oposa et al. vs. Secretary Factoran,
(G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993) I even sustained the standing of minors to bring
suit, not only in their behalf, but also in behalf of generations yet unborn, to
shield the country's dwindling natural resources from farther degradation. I
believe it is far more preferable to allow an issue of urgency of transcendental
importance to be argued before and passed upon by the courts than to leave




aggrieved parties with the feeling of helplessness born out of a strict and
unrelenting application of traditional, if not outmoded, concepts of standing and
personality.
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., The Judicial Response To Terrorism: National Venues,
Speech delivered at the 10th International Judicial Conference in Strasbourg, May
23-24, 2002, at http://www.coe.int/t/e/communication_and_
research/press/events/5.-ministerial_conferences/2002/2002-05_international_
judicial_conference__strasbourg/panel1_hilariogdavidejr.asp. These remarks

notwithstanding, the fact remains that "standing" was not an issue in Oposa no
matter how many times one reads the case.


[FN79] . Garcia v. Bd. of Inv., G.R. No. 88637, 177 SCRA 374, 383-84 (1989).

[FN80] . G.R. No. 63915, 136 SCRA 27 (1985).

[FN81] . Id. at 37.

[FN82] . Legaspi v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA
530, 536 (1987).

[FN83] . Kilosbayan Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110, 134 (1994).

[FN84] . Id. citing Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821, Mar. 4, 1949.

[FN85] . Id. citing Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 (1972).

[FN86] . See PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Sec'y, 194 SCRA 317 (1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991);
Osmena v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 100308, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Carpio v.
Executive Sec'y, 206 SCRA 290 (1992); Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Ass'n, Inc.
v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965); Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Laurel
v. Garcia, G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 797 (1990); Garcia v. Bd. of
Inv., 177 SCRA 374 (1989) and 191 SCRA 288 (1990); Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA
771 (1991); Garcia v. Executive Sec'y, 211 SCRA 219 (1992); De Guia v. COMELEC,
208 SCRA 420 (1992); Pasay Law and Consciousness Union, Inc. v. Cuneta, 101 SCRA
662 (1980).

[FN87] . 163 SCRA 371, 378 (1988); see also Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming
Corp., 197 SCRA 52, 60 (1991).

[FN88] . G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, 79777, 175 SCRA 343 (1989).

[FN89] . Citing Araneta v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2044, Aug. 26, 1949; Araneta v.
Angeles, G.R. No. L-2756; Rodriguez v. Tesorero de Filipinas, G.R. No. L-3054;
Guerrero v. Comm'r of Customs, G.R. No. L-3055; Baredo v. Comm'n on Elections,
G.R. No. L-3056, 84 Phil. 968 (1949).

[FN90] . Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110, 137 (1994).




[FN91] . BAYAN v. Executive Sec'y, 342 SCRA 449, 481 (2001).

[FN92] . Integrated Bar of the Phil. v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81, 101 (2001).


[FN94] . Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949).

[FN95] . Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Teofisto Guingona Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994.

[FN96] . Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 115381, Dec. 23,
1994.

[FN97] . Proposed Res. No. 537, RESOLUTION TO INCORPORATE IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION
AN ARTICLE ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, 4 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION [hereinafter RECORD] 579 (1986).

[FN98] . 4 RECORD 915-16. All emphases in the records of the Constitutional

Commission are in the original.

[FN99] . 4 RECORD 907.

[FN100] . 4 RECORD 914.

[FN101] . 4 RECORD 914. Commissioner Padilla opined that the provision did not
serve any purpose:
MR. PADILLA. If we were writing a poem, that phrase "rhythm and harmony" may
have some place, but not in a Constitution, and much less in the Declaration of
Principles. Madam President, in fact, this Section 17 is within the inherent
power of the State under its police power. In fact, the Civil Code has provisions
on nuisances under Article 6, line 4, which provides that a nuisance is any act,
commission, establishment, business, condition or property or anything else
which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or
offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4)
obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street or
any body of water; and (5) hinders or impairs the use of property ....
So if we must be prevailed upon to include a provision in the Declaration of

Principles, to which I do not exactly concur, let us make it simple, similar to
what was suggested by Commissioner Suarez. Or if we want to preserve some of the
wordings of the Committee report, let us just simply say: "THE STATE RECOGNIZES
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTHFUL ENVIRONMENT AND TO ECOLOGICAL BALANCE OF NATURE" or
adopt what Commissioner Suarez suggested because it is not necessary to say "FOR
THIS AND FUTURE GENERATIONS" or "FOR NOW AND POSTERITY." It is understood that
whatever we do here is intended for the general welfare of all the peoples now
and tomorrow ....
And so, I am against the new formulation, especially when it mentions "THE
SINGULAR DEMAND OF NATURE FOR RHYTHM AND HARMONY." These may be beautiful words,
but they have no substantial meaning.





[FN102] . 4 RECORD 914.

[FN103] . 4 RECORD 913 (emphasis added).

[FN104] . See Rep. Act No. 826 (1952); Pres. Decree No. 330 (1972); Pres. Decree
No. 389 (1974); Pres. Decree No. 705 (1975); Pres. Decree No. 1151 (1977); Pres.
Decree No. 1152 (1977); Pres. Decree No. 1160 (1977); Pres. Decree No. 1305
(1978); Pres. Decree No. 1559 (1978); Exec. Order No. 192 (1987); Exec. Order No.
277 (1987); Exec. Order No. 292 (1987); Rep. Act No. 7394 (1992); Rep. Act No.
7586 (1992); Rep. Act No. 7611 (1992).

[FN105] . Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Sec'y, G.R. No. 79538, Oct.
18, 1990.

[FN106] . See Tano v. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997).

[FN107] . Rep. Act No. 7160, § 16 (1991).

[FN108] . Rep. Act No. 7160, § 5(c) (1991).

[FN109] . Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future Generations: A
Proposal for a "Republican" Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 444, 450-51 (1996).

[FN110] . Antonio G.M. La Vina, The Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology: The
Odyssey of a Constitutional Policy, 6 PHIL. NAT. RES. L.J. 3, 10 (1994).

[FN111] . VICENTE SINCO, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS, 118-19
(1962).

[FN112] . Id.

[FN113] . 2 JOAQUIN BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
COMMENTARY 2 (1988).

[FN114] . See Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corp., G.R. No. 91649, May
14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52, 68 (art. XIII, § 13, among others, "are merely statement
of principles and policies. As such they are basically not self-executing,
meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such
principles."); Tolentino v. Sec'y of Fin., G.R. No. 115455, Aug. 25, 1994, 235
SCRA 630,685, (art. XIII, § 1, among others, "are put in the Constitution as
moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights."). The one
exception seems to be Section 3 of Article XIII, which the Court cites to support
employees' right to security of tenure. See Lopez v. Javier, G.R. No. 102874,
Jan. 22, 1996, 252 SCRA 68, 76. The fact that Article XIII lays down principles
and policies does not diminish its importance. As the Supreme Court explained in
Aris (Phil.) Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Comm'n, G.R. No. 90501, Aug. 5, 1991,
Article XIII establishes the strong foundations of a truly just and humane
society. This Article addresses itself to specified areas of concern - labor,
agrarian and natural resources reform, urban land reform and housing, health,

working women, and people's organizations and reaches out to the underprivileged




sector of society, for which reason the President of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, former Associate Justice of this Court Cecilia Munoz-Palma,
aptly describes this Article as the "heart of the new Charter."

[FN115] . See Chay Florentino-Hofilena, Searching for Gold in B'laan Country, in
PATRIMONY: 6 CASE STUDIES ON LOCAL POLITICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE
PHILIPPINES 98 (Shiela S. Coronel, ed., 1996).

[FN116] . See Carlito Pablo & Cathy Caflares, Farmers Protest Expulsion from
Ejercito Land, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Sept. 15, 1998.

[FN117] . See Carlito Pablo, Gov't Asks Quarry Firms to Shut Down, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Sept. 15, 1998. See also Babes Montana, Turning Mountains into Deserts,
PHIL, J., Sept. 25, 1998; Babes Montana, Disaster Looms at Quarry Site, PHIL. J.,
Sept. 26, 1998.

[FN118] . See Joel San Juan, MMDA to Inspect Again 40 Hospitals on Waste Disposal,
TODAY, Sept. 23, 1998.

[FN119] . See Shiela S. Coronel, The Killing Fields of Commerce, in BOSS: 5 CASE
STUDIES OF LOCAL POLITICS IN THE PHILIPPINES 3 (Jose F. Lacaba, ed., 1995).

[FN120] . See Atienza Backs Bilibid Project, TODAY, Aug. 11, 1998; Bong Cabagbag,
Venders Sue Baguio Officials, TODAY, Dec. 4, 1997.

[FN121] . See Erap, Jinggoy Asked to Stop Demolitions, TODAY, Apr. 24, 1998.

[FN122] . See J. Vicente, Deny Agno an ECC -Farmers, TODAY, June 25, 1998.

[FN123] . See Maurice Malanes, International Action Against Dams Held, TODAY, Mar.
16, 1998.

[FN124] . See Malou Talosig, Leyte to Host Biggest Geothermal Plants, TODAY, Feb.
7, 1998.

[FN125] . See Maurice Malanes, Bontoc Folk to Govt: Stop Miners, or Else, TODAY,
Aug. 18, 1998 at 4; Jaime Espina, Negros Solon Vows to Fight Mining, Urges
Strengthening of Antimining Opposition, TODAY, Aug. 18, 1998; Nereo C. Lujan,
Coal Mining Exacts Heavy Toll on Island, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Aug. 21, 1998.

[FN126] . See Ric Puod, Agrarian Reform Farm Threatened, TODAY, Sept. 3, 1997.

[FN127] . Rep. Act No. 8975, § 1 (2000). Section 2 of the law provides the
following definitions:
(a) "National government projects" shall refer to all current and future
national government infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts,
including projects undertaken by government-owned and -controlled corporations,
all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No.
7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related
and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of




equipment and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation,
maintenance, improvement, repair and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of
funding.
(b) "Service contracts" shall refer to infrastructure contracts entered into
by any department, office or agency of the national government with private
entities and nongovernment organizations for services related or incidental to
the functions and operations of the department, office or agency concerned.

[FN128] . Id. § 3 (emphasis added).

[FN129] . Id.

[FN130] . For a summary of the Supreme Court's decisions on the environment, see
Romero, supra note 77, at 94-101.

[FN131] . See, e.g., Philippine Plant Variety Protection Act of 2002, Rep. Act No.
9168 (2002); Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act, Rep. Act No.
9147 (2001); National Caves and Cave Resources Management and Protection Act,
Rep. Act No. 9072 (2001); Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, Rep. Act
No. 9003 (2000); Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999, Rep. Act No. 8749 (1999);
Animal Welfare Act of 1998, Rep. Act No. 8485 (1998).

[FN132] . Oposa, Jr., supra note 7.

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15 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 457

Georgetown International Environmental Law Review

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