On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation

Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD
be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

he provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of
an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an “associative”
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted
by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as
a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not
merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of
a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit
animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary
to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation
and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an
autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, REPRESENTED BY ITS GOVERNOR ISIDRO P.

ZAYCO v. THE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010
Carpio, J.:

Doctrine:
The President’s power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer to see to it that
subordinates perform their functions according to law. This is distinguished from the President’s power of
control which is the power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the President over that of the subordinate
officer. Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the President’s
authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed.

Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed a resolution allocating P4,000,000 of its
retained earnings for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and
employees of the province. The Committee on Awards granted the insurance coverage to Philam Care
Health System Incorporated (Philam Care). Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental, and Philam Care
entered into a Group Health Care Agreement. After a post-audit investigation, the Provincial Auditor
issued Notice of Suspension suspending the premium payment because of lack of approval from the
Office of the President as provided under Administrative Order No. 103 (AO 103). Then President Joseph
E. Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension but only in the amount ofP100,000. The Provincial
Auditor ignored the directive of the President. The COA ruled that under AO 103, no government entity,
including a local government unit, is exempt from securing prior approval from the President granting
additional benefits to its personnel. This is in conformity with the policy of standardization of
compensation laid down in RA 6758.

Issue:
Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of P3,760,000 for
premium paid for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by the Province of
Negros Occidental to its 1,949 officials and employees.

Ruling:
Yes. It is clear from Section 1 of AO 103 that the President authorized all agencies of the national
government as well as LGUs to grant the maximum amount of P2,000 productivity incentive benefit to
each employee who has rendered at least one year of service as of 31 December 1993. In Section 2, the
President enjoined all heads of government offices and agencies from granting productivity incentive
benefits or any and all similar forms of allowances and benefits without the President’s prior approval.
From a close reading of the provisions of AO 103, petitioner did not violate the rule of prior approval from
the President since Section 2 states that the prohibition applies only to “government offices/agencies,
including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing
boards.” Nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to LGUs. The President may
only point out that rules have not been followed but the President cannot lay down the rules, neither does
he have the discretion to modify or replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the present case does not need the approval of the
President to be valid.