177 SCRA 668 (1989)

MARCOS V. MAGLAPUS, ET AL.)

Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines
to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time
when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise
and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the
Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim
of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health.
Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process
and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to
Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.

Issue:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Ruling:
The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance national interest. This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The
president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-
day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize
the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence
directed against the state and instigate more chaos. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded
from taking pre-emptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt
to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED

_____________________________________________________________________________________
101 PHIL 155
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

Facts:
The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes the retail trade business, Republic Act No.
1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate theRetail Business,” prohibiting aliens in general to engage in retail trade in
our country. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA No.1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial
declaration that said Act is unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether Congress in enacting R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, the UN Declaration of Human Rights
and the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity.

Held:
The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects, and
the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard
of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Republic of China guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other country. But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all
other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all
prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the
treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail or
restrict the scope of the police power of the State.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
227 SCRA 703 (1993)
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado

FACTS:
This is a petition raised by the members of the lower courts who assails the constitutionality of Section
35 of Republic Act No. 7354 implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28.
It is alleged that the said law is discriminatory per se to withdraw the franking privilege of the Judiciary but not
on other offices of the government, such as: the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the
Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives; the Commission on Elections; former
Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of
complaints against public offices and officers.
However, the respondents contend that there is no discrimination since the law is based on the valid
classification in accordance of the equal protection clause. In addition, not only the Judiciary department will be
affected with it but also other offices like Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the
Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical
Commission; etc.

ISSUE:
-Whether or not Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The Court held Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 unconstitutional, thus violates the equal protection clause.
In Ichong vs. Hernandez, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
The Court finds its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is
superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the
grantees of the franking privilege.
56 SCRA 714 (1974)
ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS

FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application filed in the House of Representatives, was passed on
third reading without amendments. But when the bill was discussed in the Senate, substantial amendments were
introduced by Senator Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. There was also an
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas but this does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as
having been acted upon. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of H.B.9266 containing
the amendments recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones
actually approved by the Senate. The printed copies of the bill were then certified and attested by the Secretary
of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and
the Senate President. Then the President affixed his signature thereto by way of approval. The bill became RA
4065.

Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of H.B. 9266 signed into law by the
President was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the
amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence, the Senate President
invalidated his signature on the bill. Thereafter, the President withdrew his signature on H.B. 9266.

Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court a mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition
with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila. Petitioner
agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory and would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is
pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. Respondents' position is that the so-called
Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries
in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.

ISSUES:
Whether or not RA 4065 remains valid

2. Whether or not the entries in the journal should be consulted

.RULINGS:

1.) No, R.A. 4065 is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses and the certification does
not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it
is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential
. Because the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is not conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.
The Supreme Court recognized the withdrawal of the President and the Senate Presidents' signatures from RA
4065 or House Bill 9266, therefore it did not become a law.Senate President declared that his signature on the
bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he
had signed had never been approved by the Senate. This declaration should be accorded greater respect than the attestation
that it invalidated. Certification that was made by the presiding officer is merely a mode of authentication. The essential
thing is the approval of congress and not the signature of the presiding officers. Function of attestation is
not approval because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both houses. Constitution does not even
provide that the presiding officer should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President
2.) Yes, What evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In such a case the
entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is
no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is
subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked
to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both
Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him

86 SCRA 542 (1978)

People vs. Purisima

FACTS:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined
by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of Samar.Several
informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the accused of Illegal Possession of Deadly
Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the defense filed motions to quash the said
informations after which the respondent-courts passed their own orders quashing the said informations on
common ground that the informations did not allege facts constituting ang offense penalized until PD#9 for
failure to state an essential element of the crime, which is, that the carrying outside of the accused’s residence of
a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with, or related to to
subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to
maintain law and order in the country as well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence.
The non-inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be distinguished from other legislation related to the
illegal possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned that the information must allege
that the purpose of possession of the weapon was intended for the purposes of abetting the conditions of
criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not
necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum or is an action or conduct
that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City Fiscal also added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is
immaterial and that the commission of the act is voluntary is enough.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are sufficient in form and substance to constitute the
offense of “illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under PD No. 9.

HELD:
No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two elements of the offense covered
by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid
charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts are
incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for whatever is within the
spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice and contradictions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview
of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among
others in the preamble or, “whereas" clauses.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
 susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and
injurious consequences.

-------------------------------------------

Agcaoili v. Suguitan
G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926

FACTS:
Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, of the Province of
Ilocos Norte on the 25th day of March, 1916, with authority "to have and to hold the said office with all the
powers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining unto him, subject to the conditions
prescribed by law. The conditions prescribed by law" to which the appointee was "subject" at the time of his
appointment, are found in section 1 of Act No. 2041 which provides that "All justices of the peace and auxiliary
justices shall hold office during good behavior . . . ."
On the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine Legislature adopted Act No. 3107. Said Act in section 203
provides for “ That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years."
On the 9th day of April, 1923, the Undersecretary of Justice sent a to Agcaoili which provides that the former
has the honor to advise the latter that he has ceased to be a justice of the peace by operation of said amendment
of the Administrative Code.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Act. 3107 applies to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior to the
passage of said act.
(2) Whether or not Sec. 216 applies to public officers.

HELD:
(1) No. Attention is called to one of the provisions of section 3 of the Jones Law "That no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
Considering that there is nothing in the title of Act No. 3107 which indicates in the slightest degree that said Act
contains a provision "that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years”, the court is forced to the conclusions that, that provision is illegal, void and
contrary to the mandatory provision of the Jones Law, and that said law cannot be applied to justices and
auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923; and that when Julio
Agcaoili was forcibly, by means of threats and intimidation, ordered to leave his office as justice of the peace,
he was forced to do so illegally, without just cause, and should therefore be restored to his position as justice of
the peace of the municipality of Laoag, without delay.

(2) No. A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a separation in the
relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon must
have relation to the same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a
new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the expression of a thought, a degree greater than
that expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and
semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of the sentences, the only
difference being that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma. The
punctuation used in a law may always be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of a
doubtful statute. It follows therefore that, inasmuch as all of the provisions of said section 216 which precede
the semicolon refer to corporations only, that which follows the semicolon has reference to the same subject
matter, or to officers of a corporation.
The present case is anomalous under American sovereignty. An officer was appointed in accordance with the
law to the judiciary to serve "during good behavior." After he had faithfully and honestly served the
Government for a number of years the legislature adopted a new law which arbitrarily, without giving any
reason therefore, provided that said officer cease to be such when he should reach the age of 65 years. Said law
contained no express provision or method for its enforcement. The Executive Department, through its
Undersecretary of Justice, without any authority given in said law, notified the said officer that he was no longer
an officer in the judicial department of the Government and must vacate his office and turn the same over to
another, who was designated by said Undersecretary. When the officer protested against such arbitrary action,
giving reasons therefor, and without answering said protest, he was threatened with a criminal prosecution if he
did not immediately vacate his office.

95 scra 663 (1980)

People vs. Echavez

FACTS:
Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with
squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before the accused could be arraigned, respondent Judge
Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dismissing the five informations (out of 16 raffled) on the
grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through “stealth and strategy”, whereas under
the decree the entry should be effected “with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the landowner”, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply
to the cultivation of a grazing land. From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic
Act No. 5440.

ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands.

Ruling:
NO. Appeal was devoid of merit.Trial court’s dismissal was affirmed.
The lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that
it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in
squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case.
Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to
illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to
when the legislative intent is uncertain.