Transgressions and Inhabitations: Wittgensteinian Spatial Practices between Architecture and

Philosophy
Author(s): Nana Last
Source: Assemblage, No. 35 (Apr., 1998), pp. 36-47
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3171237 .
Accessed: 19/06/2014 22:36

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Assemblage.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.174 on Thu, 19 Jun 2014 22:36:20 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1. Maurizio Nannucci, Does this image
fill your concept of philosophy? 1995,
detail

Nana Last
and
Transgressions
Inhabitations:
Spatial
Wittgensteinian
Practices between
Architecture and
Philosophy
NanaLastis a Ph.D. candidatein the During a two-and-a-halfyear period beginning in the
History,Theory,andCriticismof Art, autumn of 1926, the Austrianborn philosopherLudwig
and UrbanFormat the
Architecture,
MassachusettsInstituteof Technology. Wittgensteindesigned and built a house in Vienna for his
sisterMargaretheStonborough-Wittgenstein.The history
of the house's production - designed as it is by a philoso-
pher who is nearlyas known for his dramaticentry,depar-
ture, and returnto philosophyas for his philosophical work
- challenges the viewer to decipher within its walls some
affinitybetween Wittgenstein'sarchitectureand his phi-
losophy. In responseto this situation,most of the discus-
sions of the house attemptto define some such link. The
association,however,remainsstrained,based in two largely
separateapproaches:the discussionof the architecture,on
the one hand, and the discussion of the philosophy,on the
other. What seemingly demands interdisciplinarityends up
reinforcinga sort of bidisciplinarity.

Delving into the philosophy-architectureassociation in

Wittgenstein'swork requireslooking beyond ways in
which the philosophy is legible within the architecture.It
necessitates a reciprocal spatial maneuver that shifts the
site of study from within the walls of the house to encom-
pass the pages of the text. This shift accomplishes two
Assemblage 35: 36-47 ? 1998 by the things: it revealsthe primordialrole of spatial and visual
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
thinking in Wittgenstein'sphilosophy and it allows the

37

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.174 on Thu, 19 Jun 2014 22:36:20 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ti

%I

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.174 on Thu, 19 Jun 2014 22:36:20 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

practice of architectureto be considered an integralcom-
ponent ratherthan an isolated digressionof his philo-
sophical development. Wittgenstein'sunderstandingof
philosophy itself mediates between these two disciplines. In
contrastto the belief that epistemology and metaphysics
should be the center of the philosopher'sconcern, Wittgen-
stein viewed philosophy as lacking its own subject matter,
a position that leaves epistemology and metaphysicsboth
empty and bankrupt.Againstthis, he has stated, though
not developed, the idea that aesthetics and ethics have
content and thereforeare productiveareasof concern.
Wittgenstein'stwo main texts,TractatusLogico-Philosophicus
published in 1922 and PhilosophicalInvestigationspublished
in 1953, two yearsafterhis death, suggestverydifferentrela-
tions between philosophyand architecture.In both texts,
Wittgensteinwas concerned with the scope and limits of lan-
guage, but what he believed languagecapable of sensibly
communicatingchanged drasticallyfrom one to the other.
The Tractatushad attemptedto define the limits of "what
cannot be thoughtby workingoutwardsthroughwhat can be
thought"(4.114). Beyond the bounds of the thinkableor say-
able was that which could only be shown. Effectively,this
thinkingsubdividedphilosophy'straditionalterritory,casting
aestheticsand ethics out into the realm of showingand prac-
tice. Logic in the Tractatusheld the privilegedposition of
connecting sayingand showingand therebyallowing lan-
guage to representthe world.
The Investigationsremoved the limits that the Tractatus
had imposed on language and philosophy by rejecting the
Tractatus'sview that language representsthe world in ac-
cordance with the rules of logic. Instead,Wittgenstein saw
that the propertaskof philosophy was to reconnect the
philosophical study of language with the everydaypractice
of language. As he stated in the Investigations,"Whatwe
do is to bring wordsback from their metaphysicalto their
This content downloaded from 195.34.79.174 on Thu, 19 Jun 2014 22:36:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
assemblage 35
everydayuse" (4J116). As a result, the representativefunc-
tion of logic lost its centralityand the everydaypractice of
language replaced logic as the model for philosophical
thinking. This reconceptualizationof both language and
philosophy exposed the Tractatus'sthinking as idealized
and problematic. Ethics and aesthetics, although still
undiscussed, were no longer defined as outside the realm
of the sayable;rather,their realm of practice became the
philosophical basis for studyinglanguage.
While the subtitle of this paper, "WittgensteinianSpatial
Practicesbetween Architectureand Philosophy,"speaksof
a possible mediation between architectureand philosophy,
it might also be understoodas an oscillation between the
two disciplines. As Wittgenstein'slife and workwere them-
selves structuredby a series of breaksand shifts followed
by subsequent returnsand reengagements - with people,
places, ideas, practices, and disciplines - location and
relocation came to lie at the very heart of his attemptsto
position the subject in relation to philosophy and philoso-
phy in relation to other disciplines and everydaylife. These
practices also define the orderof the Investigations,which
Wittgenstein described in the preface to the book as "re-
marks"or "shortparagraphs,of which there is sometimes a
fairlylong chain about the same subject"and sometimes
sudden changes from one topic to another. This, Wittgen-
stein explained, is "connected with the very nature of the
investigation"that "compels us to travelover a wide field
of thought criss-crossin every direction."
The resultingmultitude of associationstakestwo forms.The
first,which I discuss elsewhere, are what I call "imagesof
entanglement"and involve sites in Wittgenstein'swork -
both texturaland architectural- where the enmeshment
of these associationsemerge through a specific image. Ex-
amples of this include Wittgenstein'sdefinition of language
as a labyrinthof paths, his discussion of the philosopher's
38

involvement with philosophical problems as the attemptto
repaira torn spider'sweb with one's fingers,his description
of meaning as akin to the intertwiningof characteristicsthat
produce a family resemblance, and the orderingof the In-
vestigationsitself, with its interwovenconcepts and inter-
rupting interlocutor.These moments of consolidation are
punctuated by Wittgenstein'sconceptual, textual, and his-
torical movements. Chronicling these movements forms the
second of his approaches,and it is these "transgressionsand
inhabitations"that are the focus here. These two approaches
- the snapshot-likeimages of entanglementand the journal-
like chronicling of the ins and outs of the transgressionsand
inhabitationsthat define the later work - emerged together
from within the central space within the sole workof archi-
tecture Wittgenstein designed.
Wittgenstein'sinvolvement with philosophy is a complex
issue to trace. While still studying at Cambridge University
with BertrandRussell and G. E. Moore, Wittgenstein con-
tinually searched for a site to supporthis work. Ultimately,
he decided on a remote village in Norway to provide him
with the solitude that he craved. Several months later,
following the outbreakof World War I, he voluntarilyre-
turned to Austriato enlist in the army as a soldier. Once
there, he insisted on being sent to the front where he was
eventually captured, spending ten months as a prisonerof
war in Italy.The Tractatuswas completed in 1918 while
Wittgenstein was in the army and afterhe had had only a
seven-yearassociation with philosophy. With it Wittgen-
stein declared all philosophical problems solved and his
involvement with philosophy over. Believing no work
remained in the discipline, following the end of the war he
abandoned both philosophy and his family wealth for what
he thought of as a "completely unpretentious vocation."
He then entered the Teacher's Training College in Vienna
to pursue a career as a grammarschool teacher. With the
course completed, he took a position for the summer as an
This content downloaded from 195.34.79.174 on Thu, 19 Jun 2014 22:36:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Last
assistantgardenerin a seminaryoutside of Vienna before
spending the period from 1920 until the spring of 1926
teaching in firstone and then another Austrianvillage
primaryschool. In almost an act of symmetry,Wittgenstein
returned to Vienna and again workedas an assistantgar-
dener until October 1926, when, at his sister'ssuggestion,
he joined the architect Paul Engelmann on the design of
her house, quickly taking over the project.
In January1929, immediately following the completion
of the house, Wittgenstein returnedto Cambridge and to
philosophy. In a letter that he wrote at the time to Moritz
Schlick, the philosopher of the Vienna Circle, he expressed
his desire to remain in Cambridge "fora few terms and
work on visual space [Gesichtsraum]and other things."Al-
though Wittgenstein did not explicitly workon these topics,
they are implicit within his study of the philosophy of lan-
guage. His involvement with problems of vision and space
are inseparablefrom his investigationof language, as the
philosophical problems Wittgenstein focused on were al-
ready spatialones, involving, for example, the mediation
between the subject's interiorityand the publicness of lan-
guage as well as his concern with the scope and limits of
language itself.
Architectureprovidedboth startingpoint and final impetus
for Wittgenstein'sso-called later work,the site of his inter-
ests in visual space. His architectureis not, however, coinci-
dent with the house he designed, but must be understood
within his engagement with the practice of architecture.
Through the workon the house, in the literalization,mani-
festation, and materializationof the architecturalprocess,
both spatialityand language became concretized and, in the
later philosophy, reemergedtransformed.Through architec-
ture, Wittgensteinfound a way to overcome the idealized
solipsism of the Tractatusso as to reintegrateboth the sub-
ject and the practice of philosophy with the wider culture.
39
 assemblage 35

•ri

II
,•o•.
......I !

2. LudwigWittgenstein,
Stonborough House, 1926-28

3. Stonborough House, central

hall

"';~ ??
? :c~
?~
I f:r r ?:?

:-P?,

k?s~
1;.4~?

c.:

??r? ---n I I' II I II

ri
t,

.L-

i~l 1111 1~ I ~C1&E~'

I
.i
,??
.-,
a::

40

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.174 on Thu, 19 Jun 2014 22:36:20 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

The Stonborough house is often associatedwith its austere
exteriorimage of asymmetricallygrouped cubic white
blocks with regularvertical windows. This image of the
house has been taken to parallel the seemingly similar aus-
terityand precision of the writing of the Tractatus.Both of
these are what I define as the view from without. I want to
contrastthis image with one from the interior,with the
view from within, the scene of inhabitation.The central
hall of the house is a scene of quiet conflict in which the
idealized pictorial view of language presented in the
Tractatusis forced to confront the spatialpractice of archi-
tecture. The hall remains poised between the simplicity
and austerityof the exteriorand an almost mazelike series
of reflections formed by the paired glass-and-steeldoors
erupting from all sides and defining the movement through
the hall as that between the practices of vision and of space.
The central hall contains a series of six paired glass-and-
steel doors that lead into the house from the main entry,
out to the southwest terrace, the dining room, the living
room, and to the staircaseand upper floors beyond. Be-
cause of the climate, double exteriorwindows were a nec-
essaryand common practice in Austria.But Wittgenstein
extended this idea to the interior.With the exception of the
doors to the breakfastroom, and those connecting vestibule
and hall, all of the glass-and-steeldoors in the interiorare
bipaneled, double doors that alwaysopen out into the
rooms in both directions. The doors have metal frames with
one vertical division in each glass panel and no horizontal
divisions, except for the doors connecting vestibule and
hall, which are not subdivided. The hall also contains a
pair of plain metal bipaneled doors leading to the salon.
On the exterior,where these double glass-and-steeldoors
occur, the two sides contain the same transparentglass, but
in the interior,this is not alwaysthe case. While the media-
tion between interiorand exterioris equalized and conven-
This content downloaded from 195.34.79.174 on Thu, 19 Jun 2014 22:36:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Last
tionalized, the complexity of relationson the interior
destroysthis singularityof approach.While the doors
connecting the living room and hall repeat the exterior
condition, those between dining room and hall and stair-
case and hall differentiatebetween the two sides. Each of
these doors are clear glass on the hall side and translucent
glass on the other, thus allowing for varyingdegrees of sepa-
ration and privacyprovidedby both the visual coding and
the restrictionof vision depending on which panels are
open and which closed. A similar situation occurs with the
double doors leading from the salon to MargaretheSton-
borough's privateliving room. The twist here is that all of
the interiordoors leading to the salon are plain metal, so
that these doors combine not two types of glass to create the
transparent/translucentpairing, but glass and metal to form
a transparent/opaquecombination.
In each of these cases, the less transparentmaterialis on the
more privateside and the more transparenton the public side
of the doors.This producestwo curiousreversalsof associa-
tion. In the dining room the doorsto the hall are on the same
wall as threesimilarsets of pairedglass-and-steeldoorsthat
lead directlyoutsideto the southwestterrace.This situation
createsa dilemma as to whetherthe dining room to hall doors
should exactlymatch the other threesets along the same wall,
as they do in size and detail, or whetherthey should also
markwhat is on their otherside. To which room and which
wall do the doorsbelong?What boundariesdo they define?
The connection between salon and privateliving room illus-
tratesfurtherthe kind of boundaryclashes Wittgensteinwas
faced with in the design of the house. As with the dining
room-hall connection, the doors in question occur along a
plane that also contains exteriordoors.While the sets of
paired doorsleading out to the terraceare of clear glass, the
interiordoors connecting hall and salon and salon and fam-
ily living room are of plain metal. The connection between
41
 assemblage 35

.T
.!
SCHLARAUM S fL
SI
,;LO
5 M WOHN MMER
SPEZIMMER

TERRASSEI HALLE SAAL

1
L .n t
T•ERRASSE

SOWOHNZIMMEIs

_
_r,
_

4. Stonborough House, ground-

floor plan
..~.-*::
?;~
=~rrS
:r?

r
i?
ij'
.r

,n3il:
~ ?;lr:??
bc
:d C?
I,
k~? ?,.

*? r~E~c
; a a~e .,
t

I
I,
-t

r-

5. Stonborough House, doors

leading to the dining room

42

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.174 on Thu, 19 Jun 2014 22:36:20 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

salon and privateliving room thus had to navigatea series of
three conflicting rules:the continuation of the glass doors
along the wall, the placing of the more opaque materialon
the more privateside, and the fashioningof all interiordoors
to the salon, and only to the salon, from plain metal. All of
these cannot be satisfiedat once. Instead,Wittgensteinopted
to place metal on the salon side and clear glass on the pri-
vate living room side. This allows the metal doors to remain
solely associatedwith the salon but it disruptsthe series of
glass doorsalong the same wall and leaves the privateliving
space with the more transparentmaterial.
My point in this discussion of rules and their accompanying
and almost endless list of exceptions is that what startswith
an apparentsingularand repeated image gives way to a
multitude of possibilities arising from the specifics of site
and the demands of use. What begins as an attempt for ab-
solute clarityand differentiationultimately yields a series of
functioning ambiguities.
This series of doors functions in several other ways to break
down the absolute correlationof place, element, and mean-
ing. The conflicting reflections by each in the other creates
a visual-spatialcollapse. When looked at directly, the two
layerscomposing a pair of the double doors coincide so that
the front metal frame completely obscures the frame be-
yond. Moving off to one side disruptsthe singular image to
reveal a double image emerging as a spatial dislocation.
The importance of this - and of related circumstances that
rely on the visual alignment of architecturalelements in
space - lies in their ability to reveal their dependence on a
fixed observer.Movement through space destroysthe singu-
lar, fixed image and reveals it as an idealized condition that
gives way to the vicissitudes of movement and space.
In contrastto the fixityof the Tractatus'scollapse of language
and logic, in the Investigations,Wittgensteinassociated
movement throughspace with everydaylanguage. He wrote:
This content downloaded from 195.34.79.174 on Thu, 19 Jun 2014 22:36:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Last
The morenarrowlywe examineactuallanguage,the sharper
becomesthe conflictbetweenit and our requirement.(Forthe
crystallinepurityof logic was,of course,not a resultof investiga-
tion:it wasa requirement.)The conflictbecomesintolerable;
the requirementis now in dangerof becomingempty.- We
havegot on to slipperyice wherethereis no frictionand so in a
certainsensethe conditionsare ideal,but also, justbecauseof
that,we areunableto walk.We wantto walk:so we need fric-
tion. Backto the roughground!(?1107)
Similar spatial issues occur with the location and align-
ment of the floor joints (the floor was composed of a
poured artificialstone that allowed for subdivisionsin
nearly unlimited ways),the location of window and door
openings on inside and out, the localized symmetrywithin
the asymmetricplan, as well as with conditions involving
lighting, materials,the variousmechanical systems,and so
on. In contrastto what Wittgenstein had to say about philo-
sophical problems in the Tractatus,these problems do not
dissolve through analysisbut arise from it.
Additionally,these issues must navigatethe move from a
two-dimensional set of drawingsto the three-dimensional
house. This translationdid not alwaysgo smoothly for
Wittgenstein, as variousanecdotes reveal.Afterthe initial
construction, he remained dissatisfiedwith several aspects
of the design, which he then proceeded to alter. These
changes most infamously include his raisingof the ceiling
of the salon by about three inches. At the end, when he was
forced to complete the work,he still remained dissatisfied
with three windows on the rearfaqadealong the staircase.
This situation created the one time Wittgenstein bemoaned
having relinquished his share in the family wealth that
would have allowed him to pay for the cost of furtherre-
construction. As he later confessed, he bought a lottery
ticket in the hope of winning the money to cover the costs.
It is not that these are such profoundor unusual activitiesor
issues arisingfrom the design and constructionprocesses,
but exactlythat they are typical of the experience of design
43

that Wittgensteinencountered. It is this set of problems in-
troduced to Wittgensteinin the practice of architecturethat,
in spatializinghis understandingof limits and practice, liter-
ally defined a place from which he could reconsiderthe
limits and functioning of language and philosophy.The
movement through space and the dispositionof use that fos-
tered the reconsiderationof limits and boundariesrevealed
how spatialconcepts could not be discardedto leave the
philosophical problems intact. This understandinglent itself
towardthe creation of a practice-basedaestheticsby show-
ing that spatialproblems sharedterritorywith traditional
philosophical problems in logic and epistemology.
Locatingthe house within Wittgenstein'sthoughtinvolves
readingthe gapswithin the philosophy,both between the
textsand within them. The ten-yeargap markingWitt-
genstein'sabsence fromphilosophyhas combined with a
coincident shift in his philosophicalthinkingto producethe
early/latedistinctionoften used to classifyhis work.Under-
standingthe philosophyinvolvesmore, however,than looking
acrossthis ten-yearravineand tryingto connect the splintered
edges - either by filling in the gap or by compressingthe
space to force the two sides to meet. Ratherthan tryingto fur-
ther close the space between the Tractatusand the Investiga-
tions, it is the textsthemselvesthat need to be opened up by
the spaceor breakthatseparatesone from the other.
The question of how the two texts can be seen together
without obliteratingor covering over the space between
them - a space that includes Wittgenstein'spractice of
architecture - then becomes another way of asking how
his practices of architectureand philosophy are related.
Wittgenstein had tried to have the texts published together
so as to literallyplace the two worksside by side. As he
wrote in the preface of the Investigations:"Fouryearsago I
had occasion to re-readmy firstbook (the TractatusLogico-
44
This content downloaded from 195.34.79.174 on Thu, 19 Jun 2014 22:36:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
assemblage 35
Philosophicus)and to explain its ideas to someone. It sud-
denly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts
and the new ones together:that the latter could be seen in
the right light only by contrastwith and against the back-
ground of my old way of thinking."While he failed in the
attempt to publish the workstogether (the publisher of the
Tractatuswould not allow it), Wittgenstein did succeed in
bringing together the ideas contained in each in another way,
within the pages of the Investigations,often around spatial
and architecturalconstructs.There they exist not side by side,
but interwovenand overlapping,continuing a process that
was begun within the house. Through this process, the gap
between the worksis not covered over but forms the site from
which the late work emerges.
The fight for space on the page within the text can also be un-
derstoodas a fight waged by space, as it is throughthe spatial
thinking employed by the Investigationsthat the limitationsof
the Tractatus'sthinking are revealed.In the Investigations,
Wittgensteinexplicitlyassociatedthe restrictedvision of the
Tractatuswith its understandingof language. In referringto
the Tractatus'sbelief that the general form of a propositionis,
"This is how things are,"he wrote:"Thatis the kind of propo-
sition that one repeatsto oneself countless times. One thinks
that one is tracingthe outline of the thing'snatureover and
over again, and one is merely tracingthe framethroughwhich
we look at it" (41114).He continued: "Apictureheld us cap-
tive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language
and language seemed to repeatit to us inexorably"(?f115).
In many ways, architectureis exactly what was missing from
Wittgenstein'searly work. At firstglance, the Tractatusseems
more architecturalwith its strictlyordered and structuredsec-
tions. But it representsa purely two-dimensional,visual order
based in a one-to-one-to-onecorrelationof language, mean-
ing, and place. The practice of architecture,however, chal-
lenged those strict associations.Through the introduction of
 Last

I-;:-
r(i*~t.
~Yt II~Y.1)L
~:)t it)k~l n1(114
O illheihk
??
w 1I1PiI~
4.11
A-Y Lrf
hr
Qrll.ltE IrA
ulstl~t1TCr~K Slexht,
inh,!
rrf~rt?*+K'tf
.::?l~lllS. Itrfrl, Iic
~r~s~ttcr?l
' hilSul'1p.211t1 ls
ArrWvc
An
1 sn
uwj?,
!!??ry
tu,-I ir 11pu :o-A!
A4
l."'
r^t% Ir
fltr::
spi: tl:.:i? *::
f, lir• . rr.•.
,ru.,
tr-..•
Chat
o. , . .
. .
_I
.... . ,
. .
.

i.rl, INct
t
nl. tshr:nt
? •,•
c,.J.T,, ....?
.,•
W
. . ..

. .
.. ....i: ,~.??; • ..1~.: ,~I ~-?: ;
..
:?
I the:::Cf - I.
IA
I-WI O r'.
ft.- 0wt4 bw oirr!v api rc, W-vc11 , AV,
2 i:-.c AS
s .
,, . , .

?Ile
-sc'-ta-
;:.•~
IkX
:. ',, ,•:, .. ..
it rl" :?
:,,,,.*i,

4?;A' Q'y 'e"

?;.~ i!,
l-4
:::~ 'j.1 r
IJ.;`?:!t

6. LudwigWittgenstein, 7. LudwigWittgenstein,
TractatusLogico-Philosophicus, Philosophical Investigations,
1922 1953

a new spatialityand the idea of practice, the singularview
within the Tractatuswas destroyed;in its place, the reader
was left with the realization that the absolute correlationof
meaning and place were not a given realitybut a particular
way of seeing, one dependent on a fixed viewer. Three-di-
mensional space dislodged place from the trio of correlations.
Reliance on absolute correspondence was furtherdismantled
in the later philosophy by replacing the strictlystructured
ordering of the Tractatusand institutingan otherwise undif-
ferentiatedand open-ended seriality.
The Tractatus'sunderstandingof language and philosophy
had depended on the positioning of the viewer as if above
and outside of language, looking downwardso as to clearly
discern a particularrelation among language, logic, and phi-
losophy. From this viewpoint, all three seemed to share a co-
incident series of boundaries.The Tractatusdefined these as
a series of spatiallimits: "Thelimits of my language mean the
limits of my world"(5.6); "Logic pervadesthe world: the lim-
its of the world are also its limits" (5.61). Although the sub-
ject shares (nominally) these limits, the philosophy of the
Tractatusmade no room for the subject, finding instead that
"the subject does not belong to the world:rather,it is a limit
of the world"(5.632). The subject "must,"according to the
text, "transcendthese propositions,and then he will see the
world aright. . . . (He must, so to speak, throwaway the ladder
after he has climbed up it.)" (6.54). That is, the subject has
to move beyond what the philosophy of the Tractatushas de-
fined as thinkable. I take this transgressionas an initial and
incomplete act, one that literallyleaves the readersuspended
in midair. Having climbed up the ladder the subject is
stranded,incapable of movement, left solely with vision as
the way of perceiving or interactingwith the world.
The Investigationsresponded to this act of transgressionby
reconceptualizing philosophy as inhabitation. No longer was
Wittgenstein tryingto define the realm of ethics and aesthet-
ics, practice and the subject, as outside of the limits of lan-
guage; instead, the Investigationsoffered an understandingof
language arising from everydaypractices that are then used to
reinvigoratethe discipline of philosophy. It is this shift that
makes the transgressionof philosophy a necessarystage in
Wittgenstein'sdevelopment. This is to say that Wittgenstein's
movement outside of philosophy served to form the basis for
both his reengagement with and reconceptualizationof the
discipline.
The text of the Investigationsbegins with the scene of the
builders. Their simple language is based on a series of four
words:block, pillar, slab, and beam, with an associated series

45

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.174 on Thu, 19 Jun 2014 22:36:20 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 )?
r.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.174 on Thu, 19 Jun 2014 22:36:20 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8. Robert Morris,Untitled
(Slab), 1962
of actions.The builders'languageis the firstmodelforthe
use of languagethe Investigations
offers.It formsthe basis
forthe rejectionof a Tractatus-like
conceptionof language.
By definingthe realmof practiceas withinphilosophy,the
buildersallowforthe simultaneousconstructionand in-
habitationof the spaceof language.AsWittgensteinde-
claredemphatically,"Wearetalkingaboutthe spatialand
temporalphenomenonof language,not aboutsomenon-
spatial,non-temporal phantasm"(4f108).
The creationof habitablespaceled to the constructionof
the viewfromwithin.This viewdiffersdramatically from
the viewfromwithoutin how it positionsthe subjectin re-
lationto languageand to the studyof language.The view
fromwithinis incapable,however,of offeringthe clarity
of thatfromabove,withits implicationthateverythingis
availableto vision.This changealtersthe roleof visionit-
self.Asa result,visionis no longerprivileged,but becomes
one of the manypossiblewaysof interactingwiththe world.
Anotherwayof understanding thisdistinctionis to see the
aerialviewof the Tractatusas havingbeen replacedby
the viewfromthe streets,a viewthatwouldlaterformthe
everydayof HenriLefebvreand Michel de Certeau.
The conceptsof boundary,limit,transgression, so funda-
mentalto Wittgenstein's work,cannot be conceived of
withoutcommittingto certainconceptionsof space.The
Tractatus,in attemptingto definethe limitsof the think-
able, is itselfunthinkableoutsideof the severelyrestricted
understanding of spacethatI havecharacterized as the view
fromabove.The practiceof architecturechallengedthis
understanding of spaceby disruptingthe fixedpointof view
and forcingWittgensteinto confronta seriesof complex
spatialconstructsirreducibleto a singleviewor representa-
tion.The resultingreconceptualized spacerequiredthe
development of a new understandingof philosophyand
language.
This content downloaded from 195.34.79.174 on Thu, 19 Jun 2014 22:36:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Last
One of Wittgenstein'slater criticismsof philosophywas that
it was closed off from the outside or largerculturefromwhich
it presumablyarose.While the earlyphilosophybegan with
those same limitationsand moved inwardso as to reworkand
redefinethe basisof philosophicalproblemsin epistemology
and metaphysicsas problemsof languageand logic, dissolving
the originalproblemsin the process;the laterphilosophyof
the Investigationsmoved outwardfrom those self-imposed
disciplinarylimits to include the realmof everydaypractices.
As Wittgensteinwrotein the Investigations:
One might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with blurred
edges. - 'But is a blurred concept a concept at all?' - Is an in-
distinct photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always
an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one?
Isn't the indistinct one often exactly what we need?
[Gottlob] Frege compares a concept to an area and says that an
area with vague boundaries cannot be called an area at all. This
presumably means that we cannot do anything with it. - But is
it senseless to say: 'Stand roughly there'? Suppose that I were
standing with someone in a city square and said that. As I say it I
do not draw any kind of boundary, but perhaps point with my
hand - as if I were indicating a particularspot. And this is just
how someone might explain to someone what a game is. (?71)
Figure Credits
1. Maurizio Nannucci, AnotherNo- 7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophi-
tion of Possibility, exhibition cata- cal Investigations,trans.G. E. M.
logue (Vienna: Wiener Secession, Anscombe, 3d ed. (New York:
1995). Macmillan, 1958).
2-5. Paul Wijdeveld, Ludwig 8. RobertMorris:The Mind/Body
Wittgenstein,Architect(Cambridge, Problem,exhibition catalogue (New
Mass.: The MIT Press, 1994). York:SolomonR. Guggenheim
6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Museum,1994).
Logico-Philosophicus,trans. D. F.
Pears and B. F. McGuinness (Lon-
don: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1961).
47