EJERCITO VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN Respecting petitioners claim that the money in his
FACTS:
In the case of People v. Estrada, et al., the Special
Prosecution Panel[1] filed on before the
Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum for the issuance of a subpoena
directing the President of Export and Industry Bank
(EIB, formerly Urban Bank) or his/her authorized
representative to produce the following documents
during the hearings
I. For Trust Account No. 858;
II. For Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9
Of the petitioner and requested for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum directed
to the authorized representative of Equitable-PCI
Bank to produce statements of account pertaining to
certain accounts in the name of Jose Velarde and to
testify thereon.
Sandiganbayan: granted both requests by and
subpoenas were accordingly issued.
Petitioner, unassisted by counsel, thus filed a
Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum claiming that his bank accounts are
covered by R.A. No. 1405 (The Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the
exceptions stated therein. He further claimed that
the specific identification of documents in the
questioned subpoenas, including details on dates
and amounts, could only have been made possible
by an earlier illegal.
The disclosure being illegal, petitioner concluded,
the prosecution in the case may not be allowed to
make use of the information.
The subpoenas prayed for in both requests were
issued by the Sandiganbayan
Petitioner, this time assisted by counsel, filed an
Urgent Motion to Quash Subpoenae Duces
Tecum/Ad Testificandum again. Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion to
Quash.
bank accounts is not the subject matter of the
litigation.
As no plunder case against then President Estrada
had yet been filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted
an investigation, petitioner concludes that the
information about his bank accounts were acquired
illegally, hence, it may not be lawfully used to
facilitate a subsequent inquiry into the same bank
accounts.
ISSUE: WON the extremely-detailed information
contained in the Special Prosecution Panels requests
for subpoena was obtained through a prior illegal
disclosure of petitioner’s bank accounts, in violation
of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
RULING: NO
Petitioners attempt to make the exclusionary rule
applicable to the instant case fails. R.A. 1405, it
bears noting, nowhere provides that an unlawful
examination of bank accounts shall render the
evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in
evidence. Section 5 of R.A. 1405 only states that
[a]ny violation of this law will subject the offender
upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more
than five years or a fine of not more than twenty
thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the
court.
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the
exclusionary rule applies in principle to cases
involving R.A. 1405, the Court finds no reason to
apply the same in this particular case.
Clearly, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
presupposes a violation of law. If there was no
violation of R.A. 1405 in the instant case, then there
would be no poisonous tree to begin with, and, thus,
no reason to apply the doctrine.
IN SUM, the Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did
not commit grave abuse of discretion for the
following reasons:
1. These accounts are no longer protected by the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law, there being two
exceptions to the said law applicable in this case,
namely: (1) the examination of bank accounts is
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery
or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation. Exception (1) applies since the
plunder case pending against former President
Estrada is analogous to bribery or dereliction of
duty, while exception (2) applies because the money
deposited in petitioners bank accounts is said to
form part of the subject matter of the same plunder
case.
2. The fruit of the poisonous tree principle, which
states that once the primary source (the tree) is
shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the fruit) derived
from it is also inadmissible, does not apply in this
case. In the first place, R.A. 1405 does not provide
for the application of this rule. Moreover, there is no
basis for applying the same in this case since the
primary source for the detailed information
regarding petitioners bank accounts the
investigation previously conducted by the
Ombudsman was lawful.
3. At all events, even if the subpoenas issued by the
Sandiganbayan were quashed, the Ombudsman may
conduct on its own the same inquiry into the subject
bank accounts that it earlier conducted last
February-March 2001, there being a plunder case
already pending against former President
Estrada. To quash the challenged subpoenas would,
therefore, be pointless since the Ombudsman may
obtain the same documents by another
route. Upholding the subpoenas avoids an
unnecessary delay in the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
JOSEFA V. MERALCO
FACTS:
A dump truck, a jeepney and a car figured in a
vehicular accident along Ortigas Avenue, Pasig
City.4 As a result of the accident, a 45-foot wooden
electricity post and other electrical line attachments
were damaged.5 Upon investigation, respondent
(Meralco) discovered that it was the truck registered
in Josefa’s name that hit the electricity post.6
Meralco demanded from Josefa reimbursement for
the replacement cost of the electricity post and its
attachments, but Josefa refused to pay.7Meralco
sued Josefa and Pablo Manoco, the truck driver,
before the RTC .8Meralco alleged that Manoco’s
reckless driving resulted in damage to its
properties.
In defense, Josefa denied that Manoco was his
employee when the accident occurred. He also
maintained that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of
all his employees. complaint.10
“Pablo Manoco” was soon dropped as a party
defendant in the case for failure to serve him
summons.12
A. Evidence for Meralco
During trial, Meralco offered the testimonies of six
witnesses as well as documentary evidence to
substantiate its claim for damages against Josefa:
Juan Fernandez, Meralco’s senior legal
investigator, testified that he arrived at the
scene of the accident at around 2:30 p.m. on that
fateful day and saw Meralco employees installing a
new electricity post. He interviewed the people in
the vicinity who told him that it was the truck that
rammed the electricity post.13 He thus proceeded to
the police station and talked to SPO2 Alexander
Galang who informed him that the owner of the
offending vehicle was Josefa.14
Elmer Albio identified himself as the driver of the
jeepney that was involved in the accident. He
testified that a truck suddenly hit the rear of his
jeepney while he was driving along Ortigas Avenue.
He thus lost control of the jeepney and hit a Nissan
car on the other lane of the road. Thereafter, the
truck hit the electricity post.
SPO2 Galang stated that one of his functions as a
traffic accident investigator was to record vehicular
accidents in the police blotter book. He identified
and authenticated a certified true copy of the police
blotter but admitted that he neither saw nor
investigated the accident.19
damages that Meralco allegedly suffered.22
RTC admitted all documentary evidence of
Meralco.
B. Evidence for Josefa
Upon Meralco’s presentment of evidence, Josefa
filed a demurrer to evidence25, but was denied by
the RTC. The RTC eventually declared the case as
submitted for decision without Josefa’s evidence-
in-chief due to the numerous and unreasonable
delays that he incurred in the presentation of
evidence.29
RTC Ruling: dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence. The RTC held that
Meralco failed to establish that it was the truck that
hit the electricity post. SPO2 Galang’s account of
the accident was merely hearsay since he did not
personally witness the incident. It also did not give
probative value to the police blotter entry dated
January 7, 1994 since the accident had long
occurred in 1991.
only narrated to them by other people who were not
presented in court. Hearsay evidence has no
probative value because it is merely the witness’
recitation of what someone else has told him,
whether orally or in writing. A witness can
testify only to those facts which are derived
from his own perception.39
Nonetheless, Meralco has sufficiently established
the direct causal link between the truck and the
electricity post through Abio’s testimony. Abio
categorically stated during trial that he saw the
truck hit the electricity post. We find his first-
hand account of the incident during the direct-
examination frank and straightforward. More
importantly, Josefa failed to impeach the veracity of
Abio’s testimony during the cross-examination.
Abio even reiterated that it was Josefa’s truck
that rammed the electricity post.4

CA Ruling: reversed the RTC ruling and held that Even without Abio’s testimony, it does not
the RTC erred in disregarding the parties’ escape this Court’s attention that
stipulation at the pre-trial that it was the truck Josefa judicially admitted in his motions and
that hit the electricity post. pleading that his truck hit the electricity post.
The CA concluded that the fact that the truck hit the
electricity post was sufficient to hold Josefa “1. This action was commenced by plaintiff to
vicariously liable regardless of whether Bautista recover actual damages resulting from the
was negligent in driving the truck. vehicular mishap along Ortigas Avenue,
Rosario, Pasig City, Metro Manila,
ISSUES: whereby defendant’s dump truck with plate No.
PAK 874 hit and bumped plaintiff’s 45-foot
(1) WON the truck hit the electricity post. wooden pole;41” (emphasis and underline
ours)
(2) WON Bautista exercised due diligence in
driving when the truck hit the electricity post; Josefa further declared in his motion for
reconsideration:
RULING:
[T]he manner who and why the accident occurred
I. Bautista’s negligence was the was not explained. In the absence of any description
proximate cause of the property on such important aspect, fault or
damage caused to Meralco negligence cannot be properly imputed to Pablo
The truck hit the electricity post Manojo Bautista simply because the truck he
was then driving bumped to electric post.
Contrary to the CA’s finding, the parties did not
stipulate that the truck hit the electricity post. Lastly, Josefa pleaded in his petition before this
The pre-trial order shows that the parties merely Court:
agreed that the truck “was involved in an accident. In the absence of any description on such
important aspect, fault or negligence cannot be
We also agree with Josefa that Fernandez and SPO2 properly imputed to petitioner, simply because
Galang’s testimonies regarding the truck hitting his truck bumped into Meralco’s electricity
the electricity post are hearsay and should not be post. The causal connection between the
given credence. Fernandez and SPO2 Galang petitioner’s supposed negligence and the
merely testified and conveyed to the court matters damage was not shown.

These statements constitute deliberate, clear and
unequivocal admissions of the causation in fact
between the truck and the electricity post.
Judicial admissions made by the parties in the
pleadings or in the course of the trial or other
proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do
not require further evidence to prove them. These
admissions cannot be contradicted unless
previously shown to have been made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.44 A party who judicially admits a fact cannot
later challenge this fact for the reason that judicial
admissions remove an admitted fact from the field
of controversy.45
II. Bautista is presumed to be negligent
in driving the truck under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur Contrary to the
CA’s opinion, the finding that it was the truck
that hit the electricity post would not
immediately result in Josefa’s liability. It is a
basic rule that it is essentially the wrongful or
negligent act or omission that creates the vinculum
juris in extra-contractual obligations.46 In turn, the
employee’s negligence established to be the
proximate cause of the damage would give rise
to the disputable presumption that the
employer did not exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of the erring employee.47
injured.
In his pleadings, Josefa raises the possibility that the
fault or negligence of the jeepney and/or the car
drivers may have been the proximate cause of the
damage. As a matter of defense, Josefa should have
substantiated this theory considering that the
burden of evidence has shifted against him after
Meralco had established that it was the truck that
hit the electricity post. However, Josefa did not
adduce any evidence in support of his defense
during trial. Consequently, we sustain the CA’s
finding that there is a direct and proximate
causal link between the truck and the injury that
Meralco suffered.
HEIRS OF GABATAN V. CA
FACTS:
Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of
land, situated Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This
lot was declared for taxation in the name of Juan
Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC,
respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of land,
having inherited the same from her deceased
mother, Hermogena. Respondent further claimed
that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of
Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana. Respondent
alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, the
land was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo and
Teofilos wife for administration. It was also
claimed that prior to her death Hermogena
demanded for the return of the land but to no
avail. After Hermogenas death, respondent also did
the same but petitioners refused to heed the
numerous demands to surrender the subject
property.According to respondent, when Teofilo
and his wife died, petitioners took possession of the
disputed land despite respondents demands for them
to vacate the same.
In their answer, petitioners denied that respondents
mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan
Gabatan Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan
died single without any issue and that Juan was
survived by one brother and two sisters, namely:
Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-in-interest),
Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs,
inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and
have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse,
continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in
the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years
and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon,
to the exclusion of the whole world including
respondent. Finally, petitioners contended that the
complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if
there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or
has been barred by laches.
RTC: in favor of respondent
Declaring them the owner of the land and ordering
the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan
Tumala to RECONVEY OCT in favor of plaintiff
Lourdes Evero Pacana, free of any encumbrance;
CA: Affirms RTC, respondents claim of filiation
with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established
during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of
jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial court
are entitled to great weight and are not disturbed
except for cogent reasons, such as when the findings
of fact are not supported by evidence.

The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of
Absolute Sale[5] executed by Macaria Gabatan de
Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa
Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as an
heir of Juan Gabatan:
To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale containing
such declaration which was signed by Teofilo and
the latters nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a
tangible proof that they acknowledged Hermogenas
status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan.
ISSUES:
(1)WON the lower court erred in failing to
appreciate by preponderance of evidence in favor of
the defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that
they and the heirs of Justa and Macaria both
surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs
of Juan Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit
the land subject matter hereof;
(2)WON the lower court erred in not declaring that
the cause of action of respondent if any, has been
barred by laches and/or prescription.[7]
RULING:
(1)YES, we find insufficient and questionable the
basis of the RTC in conferring upon respondent the
status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
It was incumbent upon the respondent to present
preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.
Here, two conflicting birth certificates[19] of
respondent were presented at the RTC. Respondent,
during her direct testimony, presented and identified
a purported certified true copy of her typewritten
birth certificate which indicated that her mothers
maiden name was Hermogena Clarito Gabatan
Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified
true copy of respondents handwritten birth
certificate which differed from the copy presented
by respondent. Among the differences was
respondents mothers full maiden name which was
indicated as Hermogena Calarito in the handwritten
birth certificate.
We cannot subscribe to the trial courts view that
since the entries in Exhibit 1 were handwritten,
Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious credibility. Verily,
the certified true copies of the handwritten birth
certificate of respondent (petitioners Exhibits 1 and
8) were duly authenticated by two competent
witnesses; namely, (Ms. Vidal), Office of the City
Civil Registrar, and (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of
(NSO). Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, confirmed
that the certified true copy (which was eventually
marked as Exhibit 1) was a faithful reproduction of
the original.[25]Ms. Vidal likewise categorically
testified that no other copy of respondents birth
certificate exists in their records except the
handwritten birth certificate.[26] Ms. Cacho, in turn,
testified that the original of respondents handwritten
birth certificate found in the records of the NSO
Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was photocopied)
was the one officially transmitted to their office by
the Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro.
Thus, between respondents Exhibit A and
petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter documents
deserve to be given greater probative weight.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that
the birth certificate presented by respondent
(Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its
face is insufficient to prove respondents filiation to
her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that
Exhibit A, if it had been credible and authentic,
would have proven was that respondents mother
was a certain Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. It does
not prove that same Hermogena Clarito Gabatan is
the daughter of Juan Gabatan.
To prove the relationship of respondents mother to
Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best
evidence was the record of birth appearing in the
Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final
judgment. In the absence of these, respondent
should have presented proof that her mother
enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child.
However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth
certificate, which would have been the best
evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan
Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC.
Aside from the testimonies of respondents
witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily
on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute
Sale[32] (Exhibit H) presented by respondent.
However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute
Sale, including its contents and the signatures
therein, cannot uphold the admissibility of the
same.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document
itself.[36] Although the best evidence rule admits of
exceptions and there are instances where the
presentation of secondary evidence would be
allowed, such as when the original is lost or the
original is a public record, the basis for the
presentation of secondary evidence must still be
established. Thus, in Department of Education
Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,[37] we held that
a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of
the best or primary evidence before he can resort to
secondary evidence. A party must first present to
the court proof of loss or other satisfactory
explanation for non-production of the original
instrument.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the
testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who
identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute
Sale) plainly shows that she gave no testimony
regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether
it was lost or whether it was recorded in any public
office.
To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented
by respondent that an original of Exhibit H was
registered or exists in the records of the local
assessors office.
Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper
authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same
admissible, it still nonetheless would have only
provided proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan
was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not
show the filiation of respondent to either
Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed
above, the only document that respondent produced
to demonstrate her filiation to Hermogena Gabatan
(respondents Exhibit A) was successfully put in
doubt by contrary evidence presented by petitioners.
(2) NO,
As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to
likewise rule against respondent. According to
respondents own testimony,[42] Juan Gabatan died
sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of action of
the heirs of Juan Gabatan to recover the decedents
property from third parties or to quiet title to their
inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or
her mother Hermogena, if they were truly the legal
heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as
such. It is only in 1978 that respondent filed her first
complaint to recover the subject property, docketed
as Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the
widow of Teofilo Gabatan.[43]However, that case
was dismissed without prejudice for failure to
prosecute.[44] Again, respondent waited until 1989
to refile her cause of action, i.e. the present
case.[45] She claimed that she waited until the death
of Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect
because Rita was then already old.[46]
We cannot accept respondents flimsy reason. It is
precisely because Rita Gabatan and her
contemporaries (who might have personal
knowledge of the matters litigated in this case) were
advancing in age and might soon expire that
respondent should have exerted every effort to
preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her
claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
MARCOS V. HEIRS OF NAVARRO
FACTS:
Spouses Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-
Navarro died. They left behind several parcels of land
including the (subject lot) located in Masbate.3
The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa
Navarro Marcos, herein petitioner, and Lydia
Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son
Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the
respondents herein.4
Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that
respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the
subject lot. Respondents based their claim on the
Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property where Andres,
Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.5
Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters,
through Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos, requested a
handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP
handwriting expert PO2 Alvarez found that Andres,
Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted
standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not
written by one and the same person.6
Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment
of the deed of donation before the (RTC) of Masbate.
After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify
PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the RTC
did not authorize the handwriting examination of the
affidavit. They added that presenting PO2 Alvarez as
a witness will violate their constitutional right to due
process since no notice was given to them before the
examination was conducted.8 Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s
report is a worthless piece of paper and her
testimony would be useless and irrelevant.9
RTC: granted respondents’ motion and disqualified
PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The RTC ruled that
PO2 Alvarez’s supposed testimony would be
hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of
the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr.
CA refused to take judicial notice of the decision of
another CA Division which reinstated Civil Case No.
5215. The CA held that a CA Justice cannot take
judicial notice of decisions or matters pending before
another Division of the appellate court where he or
she is not a member.
ISSUES:
WON CA erred in not ruling that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying PO2
Alvarez as a witness.
RULING: YES
The CA ruling that the dismissal of Civil Case No.
5215 has mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarez’s
disqualification as a witness can no longer be
justified. Hence, we reverse the CA ruling. we are
unable to agree with its refusal to take judicial notice
of the Decision16 of another CA Division which
reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. Subsequent
proceedings were even held in the reinstated Civil
Case No. 5215 per Orders17 issued by the RTC which
were already submitted to the CA.
We also agree with petitioner that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
PO2 Alvarez as a witness. Grave abuse of discretion
defies exact definition, but it generally refers to
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility.18Grave abuse of
discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal
violates the Constitution or grossly disregards the law
or existing jurisprudence.19
we said that a witness must only possess all the
qualifications and none of the
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as
provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome
of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law, shall not be a ground for
disqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided
under Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason
of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22
disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. Section
23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or
insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies
a witness by reason of privileged communication.
The Rules should not be interpreted to include an
exception not embodied therein. We said:
The generosity with which the Rule allows people to
testify is apparent. Interest in the outcome of a case,
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by
law, and religious belief are not grounds for
disqualification.
There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying
parties declared in default from taking the witness
stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not
provide default as an exception. As a general rule,
where there are express exceptions these comprise the
only limitations on the operation of a statute and no
other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules
should not be interpreted to include an exception not
embodied therein. (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted.)
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can
surely perceive and make known her perception to
others.1âwphi1We have no doubt that she is
qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a
witness since she possesses none of the
disqualifications specified under the Rules.
Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have
been denied by the RTC for it was not based on
any of these grounds for disqualification. The
RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness
with the credibility and weight of her testimony.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert
witness may be received in evidence, to wit:
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of
a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he
is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s
testimony would be hearsay. Under Section 49,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is
allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP
document examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the
RTC already ruled at the outset that PO2 Alvarez’s
testimony is hearsay even before her testimony
is offered and she is called to the witness stand.
Under the circumstances, the CA should have issued
a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the RTC
ruling.
True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence signifies that the use of
opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not
mandatory on the part of the courts.23 Jurisprudence
is also replete with instances wherein this Court
dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to
prove forgeries.24 However, we have also recognized
that handwriting experts are often offered as expert
witnesses considering the technical nature of the
procedure in examining forged documents.25 More
important, analysis of the questioned signature in the
deed of donation executed by the late Andres
Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the resolution of the case.
In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02
Alvarez as a witness. She has the qualifications of
witness and possess none of the disqualifications
under the Rules.
LEARNING CHILD, INC V. AYALA
ALABANG VILLAGE
FACTS:
Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to the
spouses Jose and Cristina Yuson. The spouses Yuson
sold the same to the spouses Alfonso. A Deed of
Restrictions was annotated in the TCT, as had been
required by ALI. The Deed of Restrictions indicated
that: The property shall be used exclusively for the
establishment and maintenance thereon of a
preparatory school.
ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the
restrictions on the properties in the Ayala Alabang
Village, to the association of homeowners therein, the
Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA).
The spouses Alfonso opened on the same lot The
Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC), a
preparatory school which initially consisted of nursery
and kindergarten classes. In 1991, TLC was expanded
to include a grade school program, the School of the
Holy Cross, which provided additional grade levels as
the pupils who initially enrolled advanced.
The AAVA filed with the RTC of Makati an action for
injunction against TLC and the spouses Alfonso,
alleging breach of contract by the defendant spouses
of the Deed of Restrictions ordering them to desist
from operating the grade school and from operating
the nursery and kindergarten classes in excess of the
two classrooms allowed by the ordinance.5
It also alleged violation the Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance for the National Capital Region classified
Ayala Alabang Village for zoning purposes as a low-
density residential area thereby limiting the use of the
subject property to the establishment or operation of a
nursery and kindergarten school, which should not
exceed two classrooms.
RTC: Rendered a Decision in favour of AAVA,
emphasizing that the restrictions were in reality an
easement which an owner of a real estate may validly
impose under Article 688 of the Civil Code
TLC and the spouses Alfonso filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Decision. They alleged in
the Motion that with the passage of Muntinlupa
Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 reclassifying the subject
property as "institutional," there ceased to be a legal
basis for the RTC to uphold the Deed of Restrictions
on the title of the spouses Alfonso.
RTC agreed with the spouses Alfonso and set aside its
earlier Decision.1avvphi1
CA: setting aside RTC Resolution. The earlier
decision of the said court is Reinstated.
While the Motion for Reconsideration of TLC and the
spouses Alfonso was still pending the Municipality of
Muntinlupa, through its Sangguniang Bayan, passed
Resolution No. 94-179 correcting an alleged
typographical error in the description of a parcel of
land under the heading "Institutional Zone" in
Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39, adjusting the
description "Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang"
to "Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang." This is
the same ordinance which was used as basis by the
Makati RTC, when it reversed its own Decision on
Motion for Reconsideration.
Municipality of Muntinlupa filed a Petition for the
approval of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 with
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). AAVA and the adjacent property owners
filed an Opposition.
HLURB: the Resolution was not a mere correction of
a typo but an actual rezoning of the property into an
institutional area and would require the conduct of
public hearings.
Office of the President Decision: set aside this
conclusion of the HLURB and declared Resolution
No. 94-179 as a valid corrective issuance. It further
held that the Deed of Restrictions had lost its force and
effect in view of the passage of Ordinance No. 91-39.
CA: rendered its Decision slightly modifying the
Decision of the Office of the President:
being merely a rectifying issuance and not a rezoning
enactment, the questioned Resolution did not have to
comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and
hearing. However, the Court of Appeals found the
Office of the President to have exceeded its authority
when it ruled17 that the Deed of Restrictions had lost
its force and effect in view of the passage of Ordinance
No. 91-39. .
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in
upholding the validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No.
94-179;
2. Whether or not TLC and the spouses Alfonso should
be enjoined from continuing the operation of a grade
school in the subject property.
As regards the third and decisive issue, the parties
further exchanged their views on the following two
sub-issues:
a. Whether or not Muntinlupa Municipal
Ordinance No. 91-39, as allegedly corrected
by Muntinlupa Resolution No. 91-179, has
the effect of nullifying the provisions of the
Deed of Restrictions on the subject property;
and
b. Whether or not AAVA is estopped from
enforcing the Deed of Restrictions.
RULING: (1)YES, being a mere corrective issuance,
it is not invalidated by the lack of notice and hearing
as AAVA contends.
Both the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa and that
of the Ayala Alabang Village show that the subject lot
is classified as “institutional.” The official zoning
map is an indispensable and integral part of a
zoning ordinance, without which said ordinance
would be considered void.
It is clear that there was a typo and the Court is merely
affirming the correction made by the same entity
which committed the error.
The authority of the HLURB is subordinate to that of
the Office of the President and the acts of the former
may be set aside by the latter.
(2a) YES, Injunction against the operation of the
School of the Holy Cross
The contention of TLC and spouses Alfonso:
Reclassification of properties is a valid exercise of the
state’s police power, with which contractual
obligations should be reconciled.
Contention of AAVA: Even where the exercise of
police power is valid, the same does not operate to
automatically negate all other legal relationships in
existence since the better policy is to reconcile the
conflicting rights.
Study of the pertinent documents yields the conclusion
that there is indeed a way to harmonize the seemingly
opposing provisions in the Deed of Restrictions and
the assailed zoning ordinance.
In the case at bar, as observed by the Court of Appeals,
the subject property, though declared as an
institutional lot, nevertheless lies within a residential
subdivision and is surrounded by residential lots.
Verily, the area surrounding TLC did not undergo a
radical change but rather remained purely residential
to this day. Significantly, the lot occupied by TLC is
located along one of the smaller roads (less than eight
meters in width) within the subdivision. It is
understandable why ALI, as the developer, restricted
use of the subject lot to a smaller, preparatory school
that will generate less traffic than bigger schools. With
its operation of both a preparatory and grade school,
TLC’s student population had already swelled to
around 350 students at the time of the filing of this
case. Foreseeably, the greater traffic generated
by TLC’s expanded operations will affect the
adjacent property owners enjoyment and use of their
own properties. AAVA’s and ALI’s insistence on
(1) the enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions or
(2) the obtainment of the approval of the affected
residents for any modification of the Deed of
Restrictions is reasonable. On the other hand, the then
Municipality of Muntinlupa did not appear to have any
special justification for declaring the subject lot as an
institutional property.
(2b) NO, TLC and the spouses Alfonso’s main
argument against the enforcement of the Deed of
Restrictions on their property is the AAVA had
allegedly abrogated said restrictions by its own acts of:
1. AAVA Village Manager Frank Roa admitted before
the trial court that AAVA had previously approved the
proposed construction of a school building with 24
classrooms
2. While the case was submitted for resolution with the
Court of Appeals, AAVA, through its president Jesus
M. Tañedo, authorized through a letter the
construction of a new "school building extension."45
3. ALI itself requested the reclassification of the
subject property as institutional
TLC and the spouses Alfonso point out that the subject
property was considered institutional in the Official
Zoning Map, thereby implying that the submission of
the latter constitutes an intent to have the subject
property reclassified as institutional.
4. ALI assented to the reclassification of the subject
property to institutional, as shown by its letter dated
July 24, 1991, wherein it stated:
We are not convinced.
TLC and the spouses Alfonso failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence the gravity of AAVA’s acts
so as to bar the latter from insisting compliance
with the Deed of Restrictions.
Numbers 3 and 4 are acts allegedly performed by ALI.
AAVA claims that these acts cannot be considered in
the case at bar under the res inter alios acta rule, as ALI
is not a party to the case. Section 28, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court embodies said rule:.
Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. — The act
or declaration of a partner or agent of the party
within the scope of his authority and during the
existence of the partnership or agency, may be given
in evidence against such party after the partnership or
agency is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The same rule applies to the act or
declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other
person jointly interested with the party.53(Emphasis
supplied.)
However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the
position of AAVA. The act in number 1 concerns the
alleged assent of ALI to the reclassification of the
subject property as institutional which, as we have
already ruled, does not amount to a nullification of the
Deed of Restrictions. As regards the act in number 2,
the statement in ALI’s July 24, 1991 letter that it
believes the expansion of TLC is a "worthy
undertaking," it should be pointed out that ALI’s
purported assent came with conditions:
Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of
the school is concerned, we believe that it is a worthy
undertaking that will definitely benefit the community,
and thus interpose no objection to such proposal as
long as the conditions mentioned below are met.
It is true that the Ayala Alabang Village Association
(AAVA) Board does not have the authority on its own
to alter the Deed of Restrictions for Ayala Alabang
Village, and the approval of Ayala is an indispensable
condition precedent to any change in the restrictions.
However, we feel that any change in the restrictions
for Ayala Alabang should be concurred to by the
AAVA Board on the premise that any change in the
restrictions affects the general welfare of the
community which is the primary concern of the
AAVA Board. On this same premise, we have
imposed as an additional condition to our approval of
the change in restrictions, that such change should be
approved by the residents of the Village or by the
residents of the particular district where the school is
situated, at the option of the Board. We feel that the
concurrence of not only the AAVA Board but also of
the residents of the Village or of the affected district
(as the case may be) is fair and reasonable under the
circumstances. 54 (Emphases supplied.)

As previously stated, a majority of AAVA’s

members, voted to ratify the Board of Governors’
resolutions that the Deed of Restrictions should
be implemented. Therefore, the conditions for
ALI’s approval of the alteration of the Deed of
Restrictions, namely the concurrence of the AAVA
Board and the approval of the affected residents of the
village, were clearly not met.

Finally, a thorough examination of the records of the

case furthermore shows that AAVA consistently
insisted upon compliance with the Deed of
Restrictions. From the foregoing, it cannot be said that
AAVA abrogated the Deed of Restrictions. Neither
could it be deemed estopped from seeking the
enforcement of said restrictions.