Vbjanfeb 19 LD

Resolved: The United States ought not provide military aid
to authoritarian regimes.
January/February 2019 LD Brief*
*Published by Victory Briefs, PO Box 803338 #40503, Chicago, IL 60680-3338. Edited by

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Contents
1 Topic Analysis by Nina Potischman 6

1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Topicality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.1 Military Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.2 Authoritarian Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Aff Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.1 Efficacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.2 Rights Abuses/Structural Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 Neg Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.5.1 US Political Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.5.2 Civilian Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 Topic Analysis by Marshall Thompson 16

2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Affirmative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.1 Complicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.2 Democracy Affirmatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 Negative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3 Topic Analysis by Pacy Yan 25

3.1 Topicality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1.1 Actor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1.2 Ought not . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1.3 Military Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1.4 Authoritarian regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Affirmative positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.1 Libertarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Contents
3.2.2 Policy Affs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

3.3 Negative Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.1 Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.2 Hegemony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.3 Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4 Topic Analysis by Brianna Aaron 36

4.1 Aff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.2 Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.3 Militarism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4 Negs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.4.1 Peacekeeper Masculinity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5 Definition Cards 44
5.1 Military Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.1.1 FMF and IMET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.1.2 Weapons and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1.3 Equipment, Training, and PKOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.1.4 Financing is Most Typical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.1.5 AT: Joint Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
6 Aff Cards 49
6.1 Solvency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.1.1 AT: Shift to Other Sellers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.1.2 Fungibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.2 Shunning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.2.1 Moral Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.2.2 Complicity Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.2.3 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.2.4 Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.2.5 Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
6.3 HR Abuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.3.1 Democracies Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.3.2 Arms Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.3.3 Coup d’etat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.3.4 Not Factored In (AT: Cingranelli) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.3.5 AT: Legal Under ILaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Contents
6.4 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

6.4.1 Saudi Rels Low Now . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.4.2 AT: Jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.4.3 AT: Saudi Prolif . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.5 PKOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.5.1 Public Opinion Constrains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.5.2 PTSD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.5.3 Impartiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.6 Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.6.1 Arms Cause War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.6.2 Aid Hurts Soft Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.7 Democracy Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.7.1 War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.7.2 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.7.3 Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.7.4 Kant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.7.5 Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7 Neg Cards 106

7.1 Solvency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.1.1 Alt Cause: Non-Military Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.1.2 Context Dependent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
7.1.3 Democracy Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.2 PKOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7.2.1 Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7.2.2 AT: Imperialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
7.2.3 AT: Public Opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7.2.4 AT: Lu wak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.3 Soft Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.3.1 Aid Increases Soft Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.3.2 Studies Confirm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.3.3 Prefer Neg Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.4 HR Abuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.4.1 HR Factored In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.4.2 Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.4.3 International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Contents
7.5 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

7.5.1 Aid Key to Saudi Rels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.5.2 Saudi Rels Important . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.5.3 Saudi Rels Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.5.4 AT: SA Can’t Prolif . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.5.5 Saudi Backlash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.6 Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.6.1 Domestic Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.7 Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
7.7.1 Host Nation Abe ing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
7.7.2 Prefer Neg Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
7.7.3 Empirics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.8 AT: Democracy Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.8.1 AT: Solves War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.8.2 Causes War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.8.3 AT: Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
7.8.4 AT: Econ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.8.5 AT: Kant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.8.6 AT: Right to Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.8.7 AT: Democratic Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
1 Topic Analysis by Nina Potischman
Nina Potischman debated for Hunter College High School, earning 11 TOC bids
throughout her career. Her senior year, she reached finals of the TOC, where she
was the top seed and top speaker. She won the Yale Invitational, the Mid-America
Cup Round Robin, the Harrison Round Robin, the Lexington Invitational, the Penn
Round Robin, the Harvard Invitational, and was a two-time champion of the Mid-
America Cup. She was a finalist of the Big Apple Round Robin, a semifinalist of
the Princeton invitational, and the top speaker of the Lexington Invitational and
Harrison Round Robin. She is currently a sophomore at Pomona College.
1.1 Introduction
This is a very interesting and rich topic that explores a complex foreign policy issue.
Given that the United States gives military aid to 73% of existing dictatorships, this
topic is incredibly pressing and relevant.¹ A orney and politician Rich Whitney writes
in an article for Global Research of the continuing relevance of this issue throughout the
history of American politics:
For decades, the American people have been repeatedly told by their govern-
ment and corporate-run media that acts of war ordered by their president
have been largely motivated by the need to counter acts of aggression or
oppression by “evil dictators.” We were told we had to invade Iraq because
Saddam Hussein was an evil dictator. We had to bomb Libya because Muam-
mar Gaddafi was an evil dictator, bent on unleashing a “bloodbath” on his
own people. Today, of course, we are told that we should support insurgents
in Syria because Bashar al-Assad is an evil dictator, and we must repeatedly
ra le our sabers at North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and Russia’s Vladimir Putin
¹Whitney, Rich. ”US Provides Military Assistance to 73 Percent of the World’s Dictatorships.”
h ps://www.globalresearch.ca/us-provides-military-assistance-to-73-percent-of-the-worlds-
dictatorships/5611021. September 23, 2017.
because they, too, are evil dictators … Does the US government actually op-
pose dictatorships and champion democracy around the world, as we are
repeatedly told? … No. According to Freedom House’s rating system of po-
litical rights around the world, there were 49 nations in the world, as of 2015,
that can be fairly categorized as “dictatorships.” As of fiscal year 2015, the
last year for which we have publicly available data, the federal government
of the United States had been providing military assistance to 36 of them,
courtesy of your tax dollars. The United States currently supports over 73
percent of the world’s dictatorships!²
This topic embodies a central conflict within United States foreign policy: many coun-
terterrorism and national security efforts currently rely on partnerships with authori-
tarian leaders. Yet at the same time, military assistance supports regimes that often per-
petuate significant human rights abuses, opposing a supposedly key American value.
As you begin researching this topic, there are a number of important questions to keep
in mind. What responsibilities does the United States have on a global level? This issue
is very interesting, especially given the limitations of many ethical theories read within
debate to explain political responsibilities beyond national borders. You should also
consider: where does military aid end up? Is it used according to its intended purpose?
Given the transparency issues of many authoritarian regimes, it is important that your
positions analyze how aid is actually used, as governments may not be fully transpar-
ent. You should also think about military aid within the context of other foreign policy
options: what other kinds of policies to handle national security crises are foreclosed by
provision of military aid? What is the ideal form of intervention?
I will begin my topic analysis by providing some background, then will move on to
define key terms in the resolution, and discussing a few important theory/topicality
issues. I will then move into a discussion of the key arguments on both sides of the
resolution, providing evidence that should guide you in your construction and research
of these positions.
²Whitney, Rich. ”US Provides Military Assistance to 73 Percent of the World’s Dictatorships.”
h ps://www.globalresearch.ca/us-provides-military-assistance-to-73-percent-of-the-worlds-
dictatorships/5611021. September 23, 2017.
1.2 Background
Military aid is a common form of defense spending, that alleviates the responsibility to
allocate money elsewhere. The Gale Group Inc., provides some background here on the
allocation of foreign military assistance:
Foreign military credits and grants have greatly eased the burden of defense
spending for many Middle East countries. The region is the largest arms
market in developing countries, accounting for 56 percent of all agreements
from 1990 to 1993. With an average of some 30 percent of government expen-
ditures for the military, the Middle East ranked ahead of any other region.
In terms of the percentage of gross domestic product devoted to arms ex-
penditures over the last two decades, nine of the top twelve countries—Iraq,
Israel, Jordan, Oman, Syria, Egypt, Libya, the Yemen Arab Republic, and
the Yemen People’s Democratic Republic—have been in the Middle East.
Among the leading recipients of major conventional weapons in the last
decade are Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Syria, Israel, and Iran. The
major suppliers of arms to the region were the United States, the Soviet
Union, France, Britain, and China.³
Much of military aid ends up in the Middle East and is allocated to the provision of
arms.
1.3 Topicality
1.3.1 Military Aid
Military aid can take a number of forms, including loans or grants that support the
military in recipient countries, to training programs that work with soldiers in foreign
countries.
Report Advertisement U.S. military sales have been based in large part on a
loan program set up in 1975 under which the U.S. Treasury, bypassing the
³The Gale Group, Inc. 2004. Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa.
h ps://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/economic-
and-military-aid
U.S. Congress, provides credits from a special fund at prevailing commer-

cial interest rates. Since most commercial lenders are reluctant to finance
weapons purchases, these credits represent a form of foreign assistance. Sev-
eral countries in the Middle East also received some or all of their arms from
the United States on concessionary-loan terms or as outright grants. Benefi-
ciaries include Turkey, Morocco, and Jordan, but Egypt and Israel virtually
monopolize the most favorable military-assistance programs. From 2001 to
2003 the United States extended to Middle East countries foreign military
assistance worth $10.2 billion, nearly all of which went to Egypt and Israel.
The annual value of Russian arms to the Middle East, having fallen to only
$400 to $500 million in 1997 to 2001, had been running at more than $15 bil-
lion annually during the 1980s.⁴
Military assistance can thus take on a number of forms, including both loans and grants.
In finding definitions for military assistance, I recommend looking into particular in-
stances of policy classified as military assistance, given the breadth and diversity of
options.
An article by Consultant Sean Ross adds one condition to the definition of military as-
sistance:
Military aid can be considered a type of bilateral aid, with one twist. It nor-
mally requires one nation to either purchase arms or sign defense contracts
directly with the United States. In some cases, the federal government pur-
chases the arms and uses the military to transport them to the recipient coun-
try. The country that receives the most military aid from the United States,
and the most aid in general, is Israel. The American government effectively
bankrolls the Israeli military to the tune of $3 billion per year.
Military assistance thus requires direct interaction with the United States in some ca-
pacity, either requiring the purchase of arms from the U.S., or signing of U.S. defense
contracts.
⁴The Gale Group, Inc. 2004. Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa.
h ps://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/economic-
and-military-aid
1.3.2 Authoritarian Regime
Merriam Webster provides a pre y general definition of authoritarianism:** “**of, relat-

ing to, or favoring a concentration of power in a leader or an elite not constitutionally
responsible to the people.“⁵ While this definition is helpful in giving a general idea of
what is meant by authoritarian regimes, it will probably not be that helpful, given that
this definition will likely only come into relevance in determining which countries the
affirmative would apply to. You will want prep on a clear definition of authoritarian,
too, in case you debate plans that are questionably topical.
Freedom House provides a more comprehensive definition of authoritarianism, high-

lighting many different components of authoritarian regimes.⁶ For example, they argue
that modern authoritarian states have a handful of defining characteristics: “An illusion
of pluralism that masks state control over key political institutions, with co-opted or
otherwise defanged opposition parties allowed to participate in regular elections. State
or oligarchic control over key elements of the national economy, which is otherwise
open to the global economy and private investment, to ensure loyalty to the regime and
bolster regime claims of legitimacy based on economic prosperity.”⁷ While cu ing top-
icality, I would recommend looking further into this article, as they include a number
of other definitions of authoritarianism. I would also recommend looking into regime
classification – articles that provide lists of countries and determine if they are demo-
cratic/authoritarian – when cu ing topicality violations. While I usually think that a
singular comprehensive definition is preferable – it is often easier to compare with your
opponent’s definition – the complexity of regime classification can justify topicality def-
initions that solely address whether a specific country is authoritarian.
This definition of regime from Oxford Dictionaries seems particularly fi ing: “A gov-
ernment, especially an authoritarian one. ‘ideological opponents of the regime.’”⁸ This
definition implies that affirmatives must address aid that goes directly to an authoritar-
ian government. While I wouldn’t be surprised if people did not follow this definition,
it seems to be one of the more clear-cut T issues on this topic.
⁵h ps://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authoritarian
⁶h ps://freedomhouse.org/report/modern-authoritarianism-origins-anatomy-outlook
⁷h ps://freedomhouse.org/report/modern-authoritarianism-origins-anatomy-outlook
⁸h ps://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/regime
10
1.4 Aff Arguments
1.4.1 Efficacy
One of the crucial affirmative arguments on this topic will address the efficacy of devel-
opment assistance. Development assistance has often failed to accomplish its objectives,
only escalating violence. For example, the United States provision of military assistance
in both Iraq and Syria ultimately backfired:
ON OCTOBER 16, 2017, Baghdad dispatched troops to the oil-rich city of

Kirkuk with the goal of retaking it from Iraq’s Kurds, who had plans of cre-
ating an independent state in the northern part of the country. Not only did
Iraq’s security forces, trained and equipped by Washington, assault a crucial
U.S. ally in the fight against the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), they did it
with the help of Qassim Suleimani, Tehran’s top operative in the Middle East,
who reveled in seeing Iraqi militias under his control use American Abrams
tanks and Humvees in pursuit of their mission. This wasn’t the first time
that something had gone terribly wrong in U.S. security assistance to Mid-
dle Eastern partners. In Syria, the United States spent four years and burned
through more than a billion dollars trying to create a rebel force that would
be able to rein in the influence of the country’s jihadists. The result was noth-
ing short of disastrous. A minuscule number of Syrians ultimately made it
through several U.S. training programs, and many who had received mili-
tary support from Washington made a devil’s bargain with Al Qaeda and
transferred U.S. equipment to the terrorist group.⁹
This narrative is not unique: many US a empts to train insurgents have gone poorly,
escalating rather than preventing violence.
United States military aid to Colombia reveals similar conclusions. Analysis of military
assistance within the region associated assistance with increase in a acks.
Using highly disaggregated contact data from 1988-2005, we found that in-
creases in U.S. military aid increased a acks by paramilitary groups differ-
ently in municipalities containing military bases. In contrast, we found no
significant effect on guerilla a acks. We interpret this finding as consistent
⁹Saab, Bilal Y. ”What does America get for its military aid?” Middle East Institute.
education.mei.edu/content/what-does-america-get-its-military-aid
11
with the well-documented collusion that takes place between the Colombian
military and paramilitaries in fighting the guerillas. These results are robust
to specifications, sub-samples, and an instrumental variables strategy based
on worldwide increases in U.S. military aid (outside of Latin America). The
coeficient estimates imply that the average annual increase of 92% in U.S.
military aid to Colombia is associated with 138% more paramilitary a acks
per year in base regions, relative to non-base regions during this period.¹⁰
As military assistance increases, the risk of a ack increases as well. This is one of the
strongest affirmative arguments, since it is hard to imagine a reason we should assist
regimes violating human rights if assistance only increases violence.
1.4.2 Rights Abuses/Structural Violence
Another key affirmative argument addresses U.S. complicity in human rights abuses
within authoritarian regimes. For example, in Egypt:
The Egyptian government has civil society by the throat, choking all crit-
icism; we’re close to the death of dissent,” says Brian Dooley, a senior re-
searcher at the Washington, D.C.-based advocacy group Human Rights First.
Government repression in Egypt has grown since the military overthrew the
country’s first elected leader in 2013 and Gen. Abdel-Fa ah el-Sissi later be-
came president. ”Under Sissi’s reign, thousands of political dissidents have
been killed, tens of thousands imprisoned and hundreds of thousands ex-
iled,” Soltan says. ”Lately, we have seen a spike in death sentences being
handed down in internationally condemned mass trials.” The latest mass
trial, at the end of July, included 739 defendants. The court handed 75 peo-
ple death sentences for their involvement in a 2013 sit-in. The more than 600
remaining defendants reportedly will be sentenced in September. They in-
clude U.S. citizen Mustafa Kassem and Egyptian photographer Mahmoud
Abou Zeid. Both deny the charges against them, which include Muslim
Brotherhood membership, illegal assembly at a political protest in 2013, pos-
session of weapons and murder. Soltan says, by resuming military aid, the
U.S. is relinquishing leverage it once had to influence policy and possibly
¹⁰Dube, Oeindrilla. Suresh, Naidu. November 2010. ”Bases, Bullets and Ballots: the E§ect of U.S. Military
Aid on Political Conáict in Colombia”
12
the fate of prisoners in Egypt.¹¹
While the United States could intervene to prevent mass violations of rights, particu-
larly by withholding aid until rights violations stop, they remain complicit and give up
leverage that could protect human rights.
This position could be read with a number of different frameworks: you could read
a utilitarian/structural violence position that argues that human rights would be pro-
tected absent military aid. I’m also interested in more philosophical positions, which
argue for the inherent immorality of profiting off of injustice. For example, Professor
Malmqvist argues that it is not virtuous to take advantage of structural injustice:
To take advantage of structural injustices is to risk contributing to their

perpetuation—even when those taken advantage of consent to and benefit
from the exchange, and even when they are not exploited … I have also
suggested that recognizing complicity as a distinct wrong alongside that of
exploitation makes it easier—though hardly trivial—to justify third-party
interference with exchanges that prey on structural injustice. My analysis
has admi edly focused rather narrowly on one type of human interaction,
yet I hope it might contribute to the much broader task of clarifying how we
should respond, individually and institutionally, to the pervasive injustices
that surround us.48¹²
By participating in authoritarian regime’s violation of rights, the U.S. becomes partly

responsible.
1.5 Neg Arguments
1.5.1 US Political Interests
One of the crucial negative arguments claims that military aid gives the United States
leverage that allows them to accomplish political objectives.
¹¹Al-Arian 18, Lama. ”U.S. Military Aid To Egypt Gives A ’Green Light’ To Repression, Say Rights
Advocates” h ps://www.npr.org/2018/08/08/635381440/u-s-military-aid-to-egypt-gives-a-green-light-
to-repression-say-rights-advocates August 8, 2018.
¹²Taking Advantage of Injustice Author(s): Erik Malmqvist Source: Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 39,
No. 4 (October 2013), pp. 557-580 Published by: Florida State University Department of Philosophy
Stable URL: h ps://www.jstor.org/stable/23558695
13
The model and empirical test demonstrate that military aid prolongs terror-
ist campaigns largely because the promise of such aid can make the business
of fighting terrorism profitable. However, the model demonstrates that the
USA is not completely foolish in continuing to provide military aid despite
this set of incentives. The model demonstrates that without military aid,
hosts would likely negotiate with terrorists in order to reach an efficient,
peaceful solution to their disputes. If the issue in dispute is related to US
strategic interests, such a negotiated se lement would likely involve change
that is unfavorable to the USA. However, if the USA provides military aid
to the host, the gains from military aid give the host no incentive to accom-
modate the terrorists, and may keep the host loyal to the USA. Therefore, if
we evaluate the effectiveness of military aid, we can see that while it is inef-
fective in that it prolongs campaigns by giving hosts disincentives to disarm
their terrorists, it is effective at preventing terrorists from altering a host’s
foreign policy. In that sense, military aid can be effective at accomplishing
US objectives.¹³
Given that authoritarian regimes could likely find military assistance elsewhere, contin-
ued US involvement is an integral part of the US’ ability to maintain influence in the
region. Many of the effects of military aid may additionally be moot if countries can
gain assistance elsewhere.
1.5.2 Civilian Casualties
Another core negative argument defends military aid as the best available form of mili-
tary intervention, as it reduces civilian casualties.
Broadly, as indicated in the Findings section, the programs, which are grant
based and include elements of military training and exchange, are negatively
associated with civilian deaths in situations of political conflict. The magni-
tude of these programs—that is, the total number of foreign officers brought
for training in the U.S. military establishments or trained oversees or the
dollar value of military equipment supplied to foreign governments—varies
considerably from year to year and is contingent on annual budget appro-
priations in the United States. In other words, while some financial support
¹³Navin A Bapat. “Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent University
of North Carolina – Chapel Hill” h ps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343310394472
14
from the states that are recipients of grant-based foreign military programs
is expected, the programs are largely funded by the U.S. government.¹⁴
Some United States military aid programs have been effective, in part by increasing
training and funding. This suggests that problems in past programs might have resulted
from program deficiencies, rather than an inherent issue with military aid. Military aid
is an essential foreign policy tool, as it fulfills one of the primary goals of conflict: to
reduce civilian deaths.
¹⁴Omelicheva, Mariya. Cartner, Bri nee. Campbell, Luke B. ”Military Aid

and Human Rights:Assessing the Impact of U.S. SecurityAssistance Programs”
h ps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/polq.12575
15
2 Topic Analysis by Marshall Thompson
Marshall Thompson is pursuing a PhD in philosophy at Florida State University

and is the Director of Curriculum for the Victory Briefs Institute. As a debater
he won several major tournaments, including the Greenhill Invitational and the
Montgomery Bell Academy Round Robin. As a coach he has coached students to win
or reach late elimination rounds at many major national tournaments, including
twice coaching a student to finals of the TOC.
2.1 Introduction
So as always, I am going to talk about this topic from the perspective of philosophical
casing. However, unlike most topic analysis, I’m going to suggest that the best affirma-
tives and negatives on this topic will not be super philosophically focused. I don’t know
that there are any compelling philosophical NC’s (though I will do my best to suggest
ways you might try to write one), and because there are not any particularly compelling
NCs the affirmative need not spend as much time on the philosophical portions of the af-
firmative case. I expect the most compelling affirmatives will be affirmatives that delve
deeply into the studies and empirical literature on this topic and show how military aid
to authoritarian regimes has failed historically.
However, my expertise is in the realm of principles and philosophy, so I will do my best

to try and show how you could take a principled or philosophically focused approach
to this topic.
When you think about this topic philosophically, I think its helpful to try and divide
it up into two questions. First, there is the question of if the U.S. should be giving any
aid to authoritarian regimes? Second is the question of when the U.S. should be giving
military aid? When you divide the resolution up this way, you should notice that the
affirmative is in an enviable position. A compelling philosophical affirmative could ar-
gue that we should never cooperative with dictators, and that as such, any aid given
16
to authoritarian regimes is bad. Or a compelling affirmative could argue that given

the nature of violence, we should never give weapons to other nations. Both are com-
pelling principles. The affirmative only needs to win either one, and indeed can make
an even more compelling argument when the two are combined, and so can argue that
one should not militarily cooperate with dictators!
What will the best affirmatives do? The best philosophical affirmatives will both have
arguments about the evils of military aid, as well as arguments about the wrongness
of engaging with dictators. It is easy to combine these into one argument by talking
about the evil of giving military aid as a mode of engagement with dictators. Then, the
affirmative will be able to spin their position in the 1ar and the 2ar in one of these two
ways, emphasizing either the evils of military aid, or the evils of cooperation, based on
what you think interacts best with the arguments the negative has made. This can give
you an incredibly strategic and flexible affirmative case.
The negative, in contrast, will need to both defend that it is good to give military aid,
and that it does not ma er that the regime we are giving that aid to is authoritarian.
This functionally creates a double burden on the negative, and as such it can be par-
ticularly difficult to decide how to write a philosophical NC. While some empirically
based, consequence focused arguments would explain why it is particularly suitable
to give weapons to dictatorships (such as the claim that it will create economic trade
which may encourage democratization), I do not know of any plausible philosophical
arguments that explain why it is required to give weapons to dictators in particular.
Thus, philosophical negatives will need to split their time between both halves of the
resolution, and you want to make sure you are ready with arguments on each half.
2.2 Affirmative Arguments
I’ve already discussed what I take to be essential to a strategic affirmative on this topic.
So, I’ll jump straight into discussion affirmative arguments.
2.2.1 Complicity
There is an old ethical principle which maintains that one can share in guilt, not only by
doing something wrong yourself, but indirectly through complicity with the wrongdo-
ing of others. There are lots of ways that one can be complicit, Aquinas in the Summa
17
Theologiae discusses several central ones:
Hence whoever is cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This hap-

pens in two ways, directly and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces an-
other to take . . .. Indirectly, when a man does not prevent another from evil-
doing (provided he be able and bound to prevent him), either by omi ing
the command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or robbing,
or by omi ing to do what would have hindered him, or by sheltering him
after the deed. All these are expressed as follows: ”By command, by coun-
sel, by consent, by fla ery, by receiving, by participation, by silence, by not
preventing, by not denouncing.” It must be observed, however, that in five
of these cases the cooperator is always bound to restitution. First, in the case
of command: because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he
is bound to restitution principally. Secondly, in the case of consent; namely
of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place. Thirdly, in
the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is a receiver of thieves, and gives
them assistance. Fourthly, in the case of participation; when a man takes
part in the theft and in the booty. Fifthly, he who does not prevent the theft,
whereas he is bound to do so; for instance, persons in authority who are
bound to safeguard justice on earth, are bound to restitution, if by their ne-
glect thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them in payment of
their preserving justice here below.¹
Several of these conditions of indirect action are involved in the giving of military aid.
The clearest one is that military aid is a form of assistance. Thus, because those who
assist others in doing evil share in the guilt, we have good reason not to provide military
assistance to nations that oppress their own people.
Is the complicity point focused more on the problem with giving aid to authoritarian
regimes, or giving weapons broadly? The nice thing is that you can use complicity
language to frame both problems. It is wrong to give weapons, because you become
complicit when those weapons are used poorly. It is wrong to give aid to dictatorships,
because you become complicit with those dictatorships act poorly. In both cases, com-
plicity talk helps you move from the evil done out in the world to the evil of giving
military aid in the first place.
¹Thomas Aquinas (the greatest philosopher of the medieval period) Summa Theologiae. Second
Part of the Second Part, Question 62 Article 7. Translation by the Order of the Dominican Friars.
h p://www.newadvent.org/summa/3062.htm#article7
18
The nice thing about arguments that discuss complicity, is that you are able to sidestep
a lot of the empirical questions of if aid actually leads to greater repression. Even if
giving the weapons will not lead to any more killing than otherwise would occur, still
we have reasons to not be involved in the killing. Consider, for example, the choice to
allow a murderer to plan their murder in your house. The fact that the person will plan
their murder either way, would not make it ok for you to give the would be murderer
your room for planning purposes. Giving them that room would involve you in their
criminal activity in a way that is bad, and thus you have reason not to participate even
indirectly.
While this argument will work even if giving aid does not make the situation worse, it is
even more powerful when giving aid does strengthen the authoritarian regime. There
is plenty of empirical literature which suggests that aid does have this effect, and thus
you will be well-served to try and cut some of that literature to supplement your case
with. For some examples of places to look for these arguments see: “Negative Returns:
U.S. Military Policy and Anti-American Terrorism” by Dimant, Krieger, and Meierrieks;
“With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies? Aiding the World’s Worst Dictators”
by Coyne, and Ryan; and “Interests or Norms? How Military Aid and Arms Transfers
Undermine the Democratic Peace” by Luan.
2.2.2 Democracy Affirmatives
Another way to approach this topic is to focus on the necessity of democracy for pur-
poses of governmental legitimacy. There can be two types of affirmatives that a empt
this. One set of affirmatives will a empt to use the empirical literature which suggests
that military aid can help solidify institutions, and argue that because democracy is
good, we should not solidify non-democratic institutions. This is a compelling affirma-
tive, but it is not the philosophically focused one I wish to discuss here.
Another democracy based affirmative would argue that authoritarian nations are, by
their nature, illegitimate governments and that as such the United States should not give
the tools of exercising legitimate governmental power to illegitimate states. The thought
here is that military power is the sort of thing that should only be owned by legitimate
governments. The Victory Briefs Institute should not be allowed to purchase a military
bomber, not because of what bad things we will do with the bomber, but simply because
properly military weaponry should be restricted to legitimate governments.
However, what makes it legitimate that the U.S. government can own bombers and
19
Victory Briefs cannot? A plausible answer is that the democratic legitimacy of the U.S.
government is what makes the difference. Democracies govern with the consent of the
people, thus it is reasonable that the government possess the military power of the peo-
ple. A democracy can make decisions for the public defense because there is a real sense
in which the government speaks for the public.
The same cannot be said for autocracies. A dictatorial government is not one that can
meaningfully speak for the people. The people do not have the right sorts of influences
over the government to adequately exercise their voice. As such, autocracies cannot
claim the role of public defender, because they do not represent the public. If this is
right, though, then the United States should not provide military aid to an organization
that cannot rightfully maintain a military. Just as the U.S. should not give me a military
bomber, not because I would use it badly, but just because of who I am. So you might
think the same is true of autocratic governments.
To develop this argument well, you will want to do in-depth research on democratic
theories of governmental legitimacy. In particular, I suggest using the key phrases
‘monopoly of force’ and ‘monopoly on violence’. That way you can get people who
talk about what right the government has to be the established defender of the public.
Once you have the key claim that democracy is necessary to the legitimate possession
of military force, the rest of the case falls into position fairly nicely.
2.3 Negative Arguments
I have already mentioned that the negative is difficult to defend philosophically on this
topic. As such, I’ve only been able to come up with one philosophical NC that I think
has any degree of philosophical plausibility, and that really shows why it might be good
for the U.S. to continue to give military aid (note, that I don’t consider political theories
like prescriptive realism to have the necessary philosophical plausibility to be viable
negative strategies against talented opponents).
The most compelling philosophical arguments on the negative side of this topic seem to
focus on what right the United States has to rightly decide which nations are sufficiently
legitimate to receive military aid. Afterall, while most people in the United States find
it obvious that democracy is the only acceptable form of government, that is also an
assumption deeply imbedded within a monolithic western culture. In general, reports
on how authoritarian various nations are tend to rank predominately Islamic nations as
20
more authoritarian than predominately Christian or secular nations. This may suggest
that even if democracy really is the only legitimate form of government, it may be that
our government is not in the moral position to make that decision.
Now, this argument on its own would not negate the resolution. This shows that it is bad
to give weapons to Christian nations and not Muslim nations, but the affirmative could
just say ‘your right, the US is a bad judge of who should and should not get weapons,
so they should not give military aid to anyone.’ And this does seem plausible in a lot
of ways. If I know some kids in my class have a peanut allergy, but can’t tell which, we
don’t conclude that I give peanuts to all of them. We conclude I give peanuts to none of
them!
Thus, for this argument to work, it will need to be combined with a default rule. If
our default rule is ‘don’t give weapons unless we know a nation is legitimate’ then the
fact the U.S. is not in a position to judge means we should give weapons to no one.
But, if we reverse the default so it reads ‘give weapons to countries unless we know a
nation is illegitimate’ then the fact the U.S. is not in a position to judge means we should
give weapons in general. To motivate this idea, imagine you are unable to tell which
homeless people will use your money well, and which will not. The following seems
like a very good argument:
1. Food and resources are necessary for human good.
2. Because food is necessary for human good, I should give those in need money,
unless I have a very good reason to think they will use it poorly (the default rule).
3. I am unable to tell if someone will use my money well or poorly (perhaps because
of implicit biases, perhaps because of the information I have available etc.).
Conclusion: For any given person I should give them money if I can afford
to spare it.
The above seems like a good argument, and it would not be hard to substitute the reso-
lution into that structure.
1. Weaponry and force are necessary for societies’ good.
2. Because military resources are necessary for social good, the U.S. should give na-
tions in need aid unless it has a very good reason to think the other nation is ille-
gitimate (the default rule).
21
3. The U.S. is unable to tell if other nations are legitimate (for the reasons discussed
at the beginning of this sections, and others you come up with).
Conclusion: For any given nation the U.S. should give them military aid if
the U.S. can afford to spare it.
That conclusion would seem to negate the resolution, and the argument structure seems
easy enough to use in LD.
I have already talked about how to defend part 3 of the argument. How about part
1? Here I think you will need to make arguments about how human good depends on
the presence of governmental institutions, even non-democratic ones. This can often be
hard to recognize given how ubiquitous democracy is in our lives in the United States.
But remember for thousands of years governments that we would consider autocratic
were the norm, and they still in general seemed like a net good. Elizabeth Anscombe
makes an argument along these lines in the beginning of her article “War and Murder”.
I will here quote it at some length:
Since there are always thieves and frauds and men who commit violent at-
tacks on their neighbours and murderers, and since without law backed by
adequate force there are usually gangs of bandits; and since there are in most
places laws administered by people who command violence to enforce the
laws against law-breakers; the question arises: what is a just a itude to this
exercise of violent coercive power on the part of rulers and their subordinate
officers? Two a itudes are possible: one, that the world is an absolute jun-
gle and that the exercise of coercive power by rulers is only a manifestation
of this; and the other, that it is both necessary and right that there should
be this exercise of power, that through it the world is much less of a jungle
than it could possibly be without it, so that one should in principle be glad
of the existence of such power, and only take exception to its unjust exercise.
It is so clear that the world is less of a jungle because of rulers and laws, and
that the exercise of coercive power is essential to these institutions as they
are now--all this is so obvious, that probably only Tennysonian conceptions
of progress enable people who do not wish to separate themselves from the
world to think that nevertheless such violence is objectionable, that some
day, in this present dispensation, we shall do without it, and that the paci-
fist is the man who sees and tries to follow the ideal course, which future
civilization must one day pursue. It is an illusion, which would be fantastic
22
if it were not so familiar. In a peaceful and law abiding country such as Eng-
land, it may not be immediately obvious that the rulers need to command
violence to the point of fighting to the death those that would oppose it; but
brief reflection shows that this is so. For those who oppose the force that
backs law will not always stop short of fighting to the death and cannot al-
ways be put down short of fighting to the death. Then only if it is in itself
evil violently to coerce resistant wills, can the exercise of coercive power by
rulers be bad as such. Against such a conception, if it were true, the necessity
and advantage of the exercise of such power would indeed be a useless plea.
But that conception is one that makes no sense unless it is accompanied by
a theory of withdrawal from the world as man’s only salvation; and it is in
any case a false one. . . . To think that society’s coercive authority is evil
is akin to thinking the flesh evil and family life evil. These things belong to
the present constitution of mankind; and if the exercise of coercive power is
a manifestation of evil, and not the just means of restraining it, then human
nature is totally depraved in a manner never taught by Christianity. For
society is essential to human good; and society without coercive power is
generally impossible. The same authority which puts down internal dissen-
sion, which promulgates laws and restrains those who break them if it can,
must equally oppose external enemies, These do not merely comprise those
who a ack the borders of the people ruled by the authority; but also, for
example, pirates and desert bandits, and, generally, those beyond the con-
fines of the country ruled whose activities are viciously harmful to it, The
Romans, once their rule in Gaul was stablished, were eminently justified in
a acking Britain, where were nurtured the Druids whose pupils infested
northern Gaul and whose practices struck the Romans themselves as ”dira
immanitas” . . ..²
I said at the beginning of this topic analysis that the negative had a double burden on this
resolution. The negative must show that we should be giving weapons to people, and
then show that it is fine to give those weapons to authoritarian nations. The default rule
argument structure is designed to meet that double burden in the most strategic way
possible. You start by establishing that it is good that nations have weapons and powers
of violence. Then you show that we should not deviate from that default based on the
²G.E.M. Anscombe (one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century and the person the author of this
topic analysis spends most of his time studying). “War and Murder” From Walter Stein (ed.), Nuclear
Weapons: A Catholic Response (London and New York, 1961).
23
U.S. government’s judgement that a nation is authoritarian. I personally recommend

using an argument like Anscombe’s because it provides an explanation of the value of
force which is not specific to democracy, indeed Anscombe would think it applies to
most historical non-democratic governments, and thus it becomes even easier to argue
being authoritarian is, by itself, not enough to make military aid wrong.
Finally, to defend this position you want to be clear that you are not saying always
give weapons to every nation. If a nation is engaged in an unjust war or is commi ing
genocide then we should not give it weapons. There are clear signs of evil which we
can judge. The claim is instead that the mere fact a nation is authoritarian is not enough
to signal that radical evil that makes military cooperation wrong.
2.4 Conclusion
Good luck and happy researching. Also, all of those who are reading this topic analysis
before your school break, have a Merry Christmas!
24
3 Topic Analysis by Pacy Yan
Pacy Yan debated in Lincoln-Douglas debate for four years at Stuyvesant High
School. She qualified to the TOC her senior year and reached the bid round at mul-
tiple tournaments including Blake, Harvard, Emory, and the Glenbrooks. She also
earned speaker awards at Yale, Blake, Newark, Columbia, and Lexington among oth-
ers. She is now a coach for Victory Briefs squads where her students have earned
speaker awards and bids at multiple tournaments. She was an instructor at the 2018
Victory Briefs Institute and is returning as an instructor in 2019.
3.1 Topicality
3.1.1 Actor
The resolution finally has an actor! It’s been a long time coming. Does this mean affir-
matives will finally stop hi ing the actor-specificity shell? Possibly, but not necessarily
– it seems like most affirmatives would defend that the United States federal govern-
ment/Congress not provide aid to authoritarian regimes. Negative shells might forward
the argument that defending the general statement is insufficient and instead require
specification of one actor. The question that this leads to is whether specifying an actor
is topical.
Specifying an actor probably still pragmatically affirms as long as it’s a part of the gov-
ernment that represents us internationally (e.g. if I personally donated my manpower
to join an authoritarian regime’s defense, that probably would not count) – if a subset
of the United States government (e.g. congress or the federal government) were to do
something in terms of its foreign affairs, it can probably be safe for us to consider that
the United States is doing it. One could not plausibly say “the federal government is
about talking trade deals with the Russians, but the United States is not!” since these
actors are representative of the United States in foreign affairs. If the affirmative were
25
to specify a certain actor, the pragmatic debate is more likely to be on the question of
whether the actor is representative of the United States doing something internationally
rather than the legitimacy of specifying an actor at all. However, I will also make the
case against specifying an actor beyond the United States.
Since it is the burden of the affirmatives to prove that the United States ought not pro-
vide aid, it seems to be the case that specification does not necessarily achieve this bur-
den. Should all of the United States or some of the United States not provide military
aid? The answer is that the resolution implies neither – a lack of a quantifier seems to
imply a more generic interpretation of “United States.” If I said “People ought not pro-
vide cookies to children”, that does not imply “Lawrence ought not provide cookies to
children.” Lawrence could be an exception to the general rule. Similarly, “Lawrence
ought to provide cookies to children” does not disprove that “people ought not pro-
vide cookies to children” and “Lawrence ought not provide cookies to children” does
not prove that “people ought not provide cookies to children.” Specifying an actor is
also illegitimate considering possible contradictions. What happens if the government
is doing different things? For example, x part of the government is sending aid while
y is not. Is saying “Y ought not provide military aid to authoritarian regimes” enough
to prove the resolution, especially if x continues to send aid? It seems like it is unfeasi-
ble for us to say that meets any reasonable affirmative burden in terms of proving the
resolution true. Similarly, saying “X ought not provide military aid to authoritarian
regimes” seems insufficient as well – Y and other parts of the government could still
provide authoritarian regimes with military aid post-plan. Having just x not provide
military aid seems to not prove that the United States ought not do it, since other parts
of the government were not given a stance. This potentially leads to the question of
whether we should interpret the resolution temporally – which I will discuss in the next
section.
3.1.2 Ought not
Ought, like in all other LD resolutions, implies some sort of moral obligation. In the
case of “ought not,” this implies a negative obligation, or one that entails we have an
obligation not to do something. Similar judgements include things like “one ought not
steal from others” or “one ought not murder others in cold blood.” Something that is
relevant in terms of our interpretation of the resolution is whether we have a temporal
or non-temporal interpretation of it; that is, does the resolution apply to the present
26
or in general? It seems like the most pragmatic interpretation is the temporal one, at
least for questions of implementation and policy. This interpretation would imply that
the United States stop providing (if it is currently providing any) and won’t provide
military aid for an unspecified period of time. Like any normal policy affirmative, it
doesn’t need to take a stance on judgements as to whether or not it will happen in the
future, but just makes commentary on the status quo. The non-temporal interpretation
is a bit different. If the resolution is true non-temporally, then it implies that the United
States ought never provide aid to authoritarian regimes.
Ought not has different implications; it could mean we ought not do something now, we
ought not do something anymore, we ought not ever have done something, and/or we
ought not ever do something. Ought also has the same implications; it could mean we
ought do something now, we ought do something more, we ought to always have done
something, and/or we ought to always do something. This discussion can be extensive
and it seems to be the case that the resolution, absent specification, indicates that we
ought not ever provide military aid to authoritarian regimes since there’s no reason to
believe there’s any time specified. For example, if I said that “one ought not steal from
others” or “one ought not murder others in cold blood”, those both seem to indicate a
normative obligation not to do x, not an individualistic interpretation about the general
principle. It doesn’t just say “one ought not murder others for the time being” or “one
ought not murder others for now”, but rather “one ought not murder others in cold
blood” in general. This interpretation seems pragmatically infeasible (mostly for policy
affirmatives), as the affirmative burden seems difficult in that case since it would cover
such a huge range of time. This is further problematized by the fact that there are excep-
tions to lots of general rules that don’t necessarily answer the general rule e.g. murder
is bad but not in the case of self-defense. This would imply that affirmatives that prove
that we should stop providing military aid now or in the future don’t prove the resolution
true – they’re just one particularity to a possible general rule.
3.1.3 Military Aid
Military aid is defined¹ as usually having a “…stated aim is usually to help allies or
poor countries fight terrorism, counter-insurgencies or to help fight drug wars.” This
definition is relatively vague, meaning that it potentially encompasses a lot of different
kinds of aid funding, food rations, manpower, arming, technology beyond arms, etc.
¹h p://www.globalissues.org/article/785/military-aid
27
Most definitions are relatively vague and it seems difficult to find a more formalized
term to describe it. This debate could potentially be very interesting – and for both
specifying and not specifying. For specification, the question of whether certain things
count as topical could be pre y straightforward, since aid encompasses a varied area.
The bigger question is probably whether or not affirmatives that specify a certain kind of
aid are extra-topical – for example, an affirmative that says we should curtail funding to a
certain country potentially applies to the topic area, but could easily also be extra-topical
since that funding doesn’t necessarily go to just military aid efforts. To accommodate
funding, the definition of military aid would need to be something that applies to aid
given to countries in times of militant need.
Is specifying a type of military aid legitimate? Semantically speaking, the resolution

seems to be a generic. There isn’t a quantification of what military aid is – if there were,
it would be something like “Resolved: The United States ought not provide any military
aid to authoritarian regimes” or “Resoled: The United States ought not provide some
military aid to authoritarian regimes.” For example, if the resolution were “Lawrence
ought not provide cookies to children” a specifying of a type of cookies, “Lawrence
ought not provide ginger snaps to children” does not seem to imply the former state-
ment. If the United States ought not provide manpower to authoritarian regimes, that
doesn’t necessarily mean they ought not provide military aid generally. Just like how
Lawrence could provide other cookies or cookies in general, the United States can pro-
vide things other than manpower. The truth of the resolution is unable to be proven by
simply one instance of military aid.
What if the specified statement is opposite? If it is the case that Lawrence ought to
provide ginger snaps, does that disprove that Lawrence ought not provide cookies? It
seems like yes – if Lawrence ought to provide a kind of cookie, that probably disproves
that Lawrence ought not provide cookies. The exception in this instance appears to be
large enough such that the generic statement is disproved by this smaller claim. This
might come in contradiction – but I do think that because ginger snaps are a kind of
cookie (as opposed to a specific cookie) that this would mean it negates. This would
seem to imply that plan-inclusive counterplans could negate e.g. proving we should
provide manpower proves “The United States ought not provide military aid to au-
thoritarian regimes” to be a false statement. Although this might negate (proving the
affirmative statement false), it doesn’t prove the negation of the affirmative – which
would be that “Lawrence ought provide cookies to children” – since it does not mean
that Lawrence ought generally provide cookies to children, even if he ought to provide
28
ginger snaps. It proves that he ought to provide some kind of cookie to children, but
not cookies in general – it could still be the case that he ought not provide sugar cookies
to children, even if he ought to provide ginger snaps.
3.1.4 Authoritarian regimes
Regime implies a mode of rule or management, government in power, or a period of

rule². The first question (depending on the definition of military aid you found, might
be something along the lines of whether or not counterinsurgency efforts or specific
subsets of people within countries that are authoritarian are legitimate advantage ar-
eas. It seems like the answer is no, which is to say that the aid that the United States
would stop providing has to be directly towards the government, not fighting the gov-
ernment. I would hazard to guess that is also the intention behind the wording of the
topic; it heavily implies a debate about support for authoritarian regimes, not move-
ments within those regimes.
The Encyclopedia Britannica³ defines authoritarianism as the following:
“Authoritarianism, principle of blind submission to authority, as opposed to

individual freedom of thought and action. In government, authoritarianism
denotes any political system that concentrates power in the hands of a leader
or a small elite that is not constitutionally responsible to the body of the
people. Authoritarian leaders often exercise power arbitrarily and without
regard to existing bodies of law, and they usually cannot be replaced by cit-
izens choosing freely among various competitors in elections. The freedom
to create opposition political parties or other alternative political groupings
with which to compete for power with the ruling group is either limited or
nonexistent in authoritarian regimes.
Authoritarianism thus stands in fundamental contrast to democracy. It also

differs from totalitarianism, however, since authoritarian governments usu-
ally have no highly developed guiding ideology, tolerate some pluralism
in social organization, lack the power to mobilize the entire population in
pursuit of national goals, and exercise power within relatively predictable
limits. Examples of authoritarian regimes, according to some scholars, in-
²h ps://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/regime
³h ps://www.britannica.com/topic/authoritarianism
29
clude the pro-Western military dictatorships that existed in Latin America

and elsewhere in the second half of the 20th century.”
This definition is relatively vague and vacuous – it doesn’t really tell us what specific
things governments have to do in order to be considered an authoritarian regime. There
is a Democracy Index that is used by the Economist Intelligence Unit where countries
are rated on how authoritarian they are. Debaters could potentially use their this index
to determine which regimes are authoritarian⁴.
Is a specification of an authoritarian regime legitimate? It seems like the answer is no,

for two reasons. First is plurality – authoritarian regimes heavily implies multiple au-
thoritarian regimes rather than just one. Second –
Let’s use the Lawrence example again.
Whole Res: Lawrence ought not provide cookies to children. Does “Lawrence ought
not provide cookies to Marshall Thompson (assuming Marshall is a child)” imply that
the whole resolution? It does not – Lawrence could (and should!) still be obligated to
give cookies to me or any other child besides Marshall. This implies affs that do not
defend all authoritarian regimes would not be topical. What about the opposite?
Does proving “Lawrence ought provide cookies to Marshall Thompson” disprove the
claim that “Lawrence ought not provide cookies to children.” On face, it seems like the
answer is no – even if Lawrence ought to give cookies to Marshall, it does not disprove
the generic obligation for him to not give cookies to children. This is an example of a
common generic – such as one dog having three legs doesn’t mean “dogs have four legs”
is a false statement. Plan inclusive counterplans, therefore, don’t appear to negate. I
think the difference in comparisons between the example used in the military aid section
(Lawrence ought provide ginger snaps to children) and this example is at least slightly
different, mostly because specifying a child is a small exception to the generic and refers
to a specific subset rather than a subset that denotes a kind of that thing. So, for example,
“Lawrence ought provide cookies to children above the age of five” is probably not an
exception that the generic avoids.
⁴h ps://www.businessinsider.com/economist-intelligence-unit-2017-democracy-index-worst-countries-
2018-1
30
3.2 Affirmative positions
3.2.1 Libertarianism
One of the most default affirmatives on this topic for philosophy is probably the libertar-
ianism affirmative. It would argue two things most likely – first that interference with
other state governments is a violation of their autonomy. It values your own values over
their values and subjects them to aid. This is a good argument, mainly because I think it
is not really capable of being turned. For example, most negative positions would likely
argue one or more of the following: United States hegemony good, shifting causes other
governments to intervene, the states consented to this trade so therefore it is legitimate,
and intervention is good since it allows for democracies which are key to freedom. Be-
yond these arguments being mostly consequentialist, I believe most of them either flow
aff or aren’t offense under the aff:
The first argument – United States hegemony good – under the affirmative framework,
this is offense since libertarians would argue that big government is bad since it is co-
ercive and doesn’t allow for the freedom of individuals within that state. This is made
worse by the fact that hegemony would be an intervention in other states so expansion
causes us to intervene in places where we don’t even have a right to be.
The second argument – shift – under the affirmative framework, this isn’t offense at all.
Shift would nonunique affirmative offense if the affirmative cared about consequences
or anything beyond what the United States does, which it doesn’t really. The libertar-
ian framework doesn’t advocate that you necessarily care about the well-being of these
states, just more so their autonomy. Of course, caring about well-being could be nice
but it should not and cannot come at the cost of interfering with the affairs within those
states themselves. And the “others are doing it too” argument does not respond at all;
if others were murdering people for fun, you should still abstain from doing so.
The third argument – consent – this is probably the best argument against the aff, but
is probably answered by provision and aid; that is to say, even if there is a transfer of
money or goods between the two states, that doesn’t answer the fact that it is still a form
of intervention and altering of the state itself. That means that economic trade could be
justified since it only affects the economy, but things like military aid or assistance are
not since it intervenes with the affairs of the state itself.
The fourth argument – democracies – is not offense under the aff since it requires that
the governments care about people outside of its borders, which it doesn’t according
31
to the aff framework. This could be combined with an argument that says we have an
obligation to help others – but the aff framework would argue that this is outside of the
government’s jurisdiction meaning we don’t have an absolute right to help others.
The second argument is that the taxpaying argument, which is pre y straight forward
– aid requires that the citizens be taxed in order to fund them. The only answer that
responds to this is that the citizens also benefit, but the difference is that the people
under the government did not consent to it being used for things outside of the country,
not a question of how much they are harmed.
3.2.2 Policy Affs
The topic has a lot of policy aff ground and it has a pre y big advantage area. Policy affs
can be very strategic, mainly because the advantage area is so large. Negatives have to
do a substantial amount of work against a lot of more specific policy affs since they have
to prep out links to every disadvantage e.g. links to specific countries and aid. Here are
some ideas that can be floating around:
The Saudi Arabia arm sales: This will probably be one of the common affs on the topic.
They contribute to the United States economy, but is hotly contested over the Yemen
War. This makes a good soft left aff, especially since there are a lot of sketchy things the
United States has been doing to Yemen as a result of arm sales and aid to Saudi Arabia.
It could also make a good policy aff with warring and otherwise scenarios. The main
answer to this aff will probably be the econ disad and advantage counterplans since a
reduction could substantially affect the United States economy.
Soft left affs: arguments that are anti-militarism, anti-US heg, etc. could have good inter-
nal links into capitalism, se ler-colonialism, and humanism kritiks. The main argument
these affs have to worry about answering are disad scenarios that turn the aff (e.g. heg
arguments like shift, econ arguments, etc). Another point of concern is specificity – if
the aff evidence isn’t specific to military aid and modern day scenarios, it should very
easily lose debates since it might not be applicable to the modern era of international
relations e.g. colonialism has to have an impact to more specific countries like Saudi
Arabia or Chad.
Chad is potentially a good aff on this topic too. There is a good bit of literature on the
United States mentoring Chad’s military and providing aid toward it. This process has
led to United States military expansion in Africa, making it vulnerable to other countries
32
and caused violence there⁵.
There are more policy affs, but substantial research and general exploration of the topic
should make cu ing these affs relatively straight-forward.
3.3 Negative Positions
3.3.1 Democracy
One of the core neg positions on this topic could potentially be about using foreign aid
as a mechanism to promote democracies in authoritarian countries. One of the objec-
tives of United States intervention globally is for democracy promotion, which includes
military aid. This could also easily seep into a soft-left/policy neg ground and there’s
a lot of good literature that talks about the way United States intervention has been
used to help (historically) promote democracy in less-democratic nations. This is also a
very prevalent in the modern day – many counterterror movements are centered around
democracy promotion. I also do think that this still applies to the topic and doesn’t land
outside providing aid to authoritarian regimes, since most movements for democrati-
zation seek reform, not completely overthrowing the regime. This could also link turn
a lot of affirmative positions, primarily one that says authoritarianism is bad and we
shouldn’t endorse a lot of those positions, particularly soft-left/policy affirmatives and
potential philosophy affirmatives that say endorsement of a certain authoritarianism
state is bad. A strategic 1NC could read democratization along with reform and other
advantage counterplans, since the affirmatives have a burden to defend a complete end
towards military aid. A civic republicanism framework along with any other democ-
racy good framework could be read with this position, particularly frameworks with
more international relations spins on it.
I think the main issue this position has to deal with is specificity and recency – simply
saying military aid has been used for democracy promotion might be insufficient under
a lot of frameworks. Instead, proving that the United States is currently providing aid as
an effort to specific places to promote democracy is most effective as opposed to vacuous
and vague questions about aid in general. It is also the case that this argument requires
people to say that military aid is key as opposed to saying foreign aid is key, otherwise
affirmatives could easily say that other foreign aid solves.
⁵h ps://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/11/you-might-not-know-where-chad-us-military-has-big-
plans-it/
33
3.3.2 Hegemony
The hegemony good-bad debate is certainly to be one of the core topic controversies, and
a very relevant area of the topic literature. Most arguments would propose that military
aid is key United States hegemony worldwide and that the complete termination of
military aid would spill over into a lot of different areas and cause problems for the
United States and globally.
More specific arguments are that United States withdrawal of military aid will lead to
authoritarian backlash and fail to help us stay allies with certain countries. Authori-
tarian backlash could potentially lead to things like warring with the United States or
an imbalance of power in certain regions. Imbalance of power can lead to multiple im-
pacts – for example, instability, disunity in states, in increased in terrorism, and the lack
of United States intervention leaving a gap in power to be filled by other countries. The
Freedom House in an article called “Undermining Democracy: 21 ᵗ Century Authoritari-
ans”⁶ write the following
“Authoritarian Foreign Aid: These regimes are using soft-power methods

to advance their interests internationally, particularly through billions of
dollars in no-strings a ached development aid. Chinese leaders enunciate
a doctrine of win-win foreign relationships, encouraging Latin American,
African, Asian, and Arab states to form mutually beneficial arrangements
with China based on the principle of noninterference. As part of this
strategy, the win-win philosophy is implicitly contrasted with that of the
West, which Beijing portrays as pushing a self-serving and alien”democracy
agenda” onto developing nations. The Chinese aid program appears to
a ract willing recipients; the World Bank estimates that China is now
the largest lender to Africa. Russia, Iran, and Venezuela have similarly
used their oil wealth to build foreign alliances and bankroll clients abroad,
particularly in their home regions. This unconditional assistance—devoid
of the human rights riders and financial safeguards required by democratic
donors, international institutions, and private lenders—is tilting the scales
toward less accountable and more corrupt governance across a wide swath
of the developing world”
This can be extremely problematic for affirmatives since they must defend a complete
removal of United States aid as opposed to just a reduction. This probably means that
⁶h ps://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/UnderminingDemocracy_Full.pdf
34
the affirmative could easily be resolved by a variety different advantage counterplans,

but will almost certainly link into a generic disadvantage. As indicated in this excerpt,
it could also affect democratization, making certain states become even more tyrannical
and authoritarian than before. It could also cause other country’s (e.g. China) to gain
more hegemony states, causing aggression between the United States and China.
I think this is a good negative strategy, since most of the links probably turn a lot of affir-
matives. However, since there will probably be a huge influx of debaters reading plan
affirmatives that specify regimes, negative disadvantages need to cut scenarios related
to every kind of affirmative in order to be truly effective. Additionally, the evidence
needs to be specific to military aid, not just foreign aid which is the case for a lot of the
literature base, so cu ing even disadvantages in general might be slightly difficult.
3.3.3 Economy
Another generic negative position could be that military aid is a sufficient part of the
United States economy such that a lack of military aid transactions would lead an eco-
nomic collapse within the country. Economy collapse could lead to a lot of things – such
as politics scenarios and warring. Saudi Arabia, for example, is the number one buyer
of arms from the United States and has put forth to $14.5 billion to buy from the United
States⁷.
Like the hegemony disadvantage, this one also needs links specific to countries due to
the variety in affirmative positions along with evidence specific to things such as arms
deals and other military aid in order to be effective.
⁷h ps://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/15/saudi-arabia-top-us-weapons-buyer-but-doesnt-spend-as-much-as-
trump-boasts.html
35
4 Topic Analysis by Brianna Aaron
Brianna Aaron debated for Newark Science (NJ) for six years and has participated
in a variety of different debate formats ranging from Policy to Lincoln-Douglas to
Worlds School. Over her two-and-a-half-year participation in Lincoln-Douglas, she
has amassed 10 LD TOC bids and has reached elims and finals of various national
tournaments. Her most notable achievements are championing the 2017 Glenbrooks
Invitational and round robin, the 2016 Holy Cross round robin, the 2017 Blake
Invitational, reaching quarterfinals of TOC as a junior, a aining Top 12 at the
2017 NSDA nationals, and being ranked as one of the top 3 debaters her senior year.
She has also reached semifinals of NDCA, octafinals of TOC, and has obtained the
Dukes and Bailey cup for yearlong excellence. She currently debates for Wake Forest.
She was an instructor at the 2018 Victory Briefs Institute and will be an instructor
at the 2019 Victory Briefs Institute.
4.1 Aff
This LD season, in the midst of back to back topics that were mediocre at best, the mili-
tary aid topic seems to be a glimmer of hope for debaters. Not only is it an international
relations topic which opens up the gateway to unique affs, but it also provides core Aff
and Neg ground for debaters interested in a variety of positions whether that be Kritiks,
LARP, or even philosophy. Now, much of the theory and topicality debates will be cen-
tered around the two terms “military aid” and “authoritarian regimes” which will also
be the point of contention for Kritikal debaters when trying to establish specific links to
the topic. Neither are actually terms of art and, as you are doing your research, you will
notice that much of the topic literature conflates foreign aid, military aid, military as-
sistance programs, etcetera even though none of these terms fully mean the other. The
same goes for the term “authoritarian regime” as there is no specific brightline for what
is authoritarian an authoritarian regime vs what is totalitarian/dictatorial/controlling.
Even the divide between an authoritarian government and a democratic one is hard to
36
fully tell because there is no metric to really differentiate between the two as even the
countries that are self-prescribed democracies do not quite behave like that. This will
probably be a side constraint on a lot of the literature that Kritikal kids produce.
4.2 Corruption
As the country that houses one of the top economies in the world and also one of the
largest military bases, it is not hard to picture that the United States also has a heavy
commitment to involving itself with other countries militarily. As such, one would
expect that the United States to be able to provide substantial amounts of money and
resources to countries abroad so that they could improve their nation and effectively
democratize, if they are not a democracy already. To a certain extent, those expectations
are met. The United States does provide a large amount of military aid to countries
abroad. For instance, Egypt has received around $47 billion in U.S. foreign aid and their
military still is not adequately prepared to deal with the probable issues of terrorism
and possible civil conflict. Scholars Andrew Miller and Richard Sokolsky further on
this idea by noting:
U.S. military aid programs are a case in point. According to data compiled
by the Security Assistance Monitor, this year the United States is provid-
ing over $8 billion in arms and training to 50 of the 63 nations that Trans-
parency International has identified as being at “high” or “critical” risk of
corruption in their defense sectors. The major cases of corruption in mili-
tary assistance are well known. For example, in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
military commanders have pocketed salaries of “ghost soldiers”—personnel
who are listed as being on active duty but either don’t exist or aren’t in the
armed forces at all. This not only leads to undermanned security forces, but
it undermines morale among soldiers who are serving…All too often, cor-
ruption is the rule, not the exception. Widespread corruption poses other
serious challenges to providers of military assistance. There is a danger that
tilting aid too heavily toward the defense sector can strengthen it at the ex-
pensive of civilian institutions, undermining civilian control of the military.
There is a significant risk that this may be occurring among key recipients
of U.S. security assistance. The Security Assistance Monitor’s assessment of
dependence on U.S. military aid demonstrates that, for 2014, U.S. military
37
aid accounted anywhere from 15% to 20% of defense expenditures of recip-

ient countries like Egypt, Pakistan, and Burundi; over 50% in Liberia; and
over 90% in Afghanistan.¹
In this passage, they note that most of the countries that it appears the United States is
helping are high risk countries. These are countries that are deemed lacking in suitable
governmental transparency and that are also at high risk for corruption. Mlitary com-
manders were known to fake the amount of soldiers that they had on duty and pocket
the money that was supposed to go towards these fake personas. This type of corrup-
tion is only bolstered when that aid is given at the expense of the civilians. Too much aid
allocated towards the military and not civilian lifestyle bolsters desperate conditions as
it justifies a military state that doesn’t actually care about the citizens of the nation.
Furthermore, these statements have a couple of implications for Affirmatives seeking

to construct their positions whether it be a soft left aff or a Kritikal aff. It implicates that
Affirmatives can construct a variety of arguments from different lit bases that center
around corruption. If not only the idea of authoritarian regimes breed authoritarianism
but also the fact that the military aid is corrupt in that it supports the military above
the lives of the people then it would prove that many human rights abuses are pos-
sibly being carried out. It also means that much of the Kritik links on the topic will
probably still stand. Capitalism kritiks can obviously be linked to not only the idea of
military aid but also to the idea of corruption within the military producing problems
such as neoliberalism. This is proven by the example above where the military leaders
pocketed money from ghost soldiers. Kritiks centered around how the military helps to
strengthen states with high sexism issues (like Afghanistan) can center around corrup-
tion. People can argue that focus on military aid trades off with a focus on protecting
and shielding away from human rights abuses, such as comba ing sexism within these
authoritarian regimes.
¹Andrew Miller is a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program and Richard Sokol-
sky is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program. His work focuses
on U.S. policy toward Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis., 02-27-2018, ”What Has $49 Bil-
lion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not Much,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, h ps://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/27/what-has-49-billion-in-foreign-military-aid-bought-
us-not-much-pub-75657
38
4.3 Militarism
One of the more obvious Kritikal sides of the topic would be to explore the power dy-
namics that occur when a donor country like the United States gives another country
military aid to use. There is not only a type of control that that occurs because the re-
cipient country is on the “receiving end” of the relationship and, thus, is expected to
owe something back but there is also a problem that occurs when that military aid is
given. More often than not, that military aid is expected to be used to bolster a nation’s
military by way of providing it more money for technology or manpower. As argued
by scholar M.V Naidu:
Military trade implies arms manufacture through military R&D, science-

technology, special labour force, capital investment, and through
sales…Military aid is another name for military sales; some ratio of
military aid may be supplied free bv military allies, but the recipient state
has to pay indirect costs on the preparation tor the receiving and the use of
such weapons, and for the diplomatic subservience to the supplying ”pro-
tector” or ”ally.” While the army supplier gains a dominant relationship,
the arms receiver ends up in a subordinate position. But both military aid
and trade are obvious tools of militarization for both the supplier and the
receiver. 4) Militarization in terms of arms, troops, trade and aid involves
huge investments of raw materials, industrial capacity, energy, labour,
science technology, R and D, and capital; absence or inadequacy of any of
these resources means buying them from abroad at heavy costs. Such heavy
militarization cost, of course, necessitates cu ing down national budgets
on other non-military expenditures of the state. The above four elements
of military build-up reveal the economic, technological, organizational
and operational aspects of militarization. In contrast, militarism involves
psychological and ideological aspects. More often than not, militarism leads
to militarization and vice versa…such militarization means that a country is
simply increasing its military capability without involving military hysteria
or jingoism in the name of some internal or external enemies or factors.
I call this ”passive militarization.” Into this category fall countries like
Swi erland and Sweden, that are today highly militarized without being
militaristic in their policies. But these are exceptional cases that are peculiar
products of their particular geography, demography, history, culture and
39
politics. The fact remains that even ”passive militarization” is both the
cause and the consequence of industrialization.²
Military aid is synonymous to military sales in that some aspect of whatever aid is pro-
vided to the consumer is always returned either through direct or indirect means. By
this, I mean that there is always a certain expectation that the money that is given to
said country isn’t done out of any kindness by the donor country. This has a few im-
plications for Kritikal debaters as there are a variety of arguments that one could make
from this idea.
First, the idea of providing military aid is seen as a gift that gets exploited by the donor
country. That donor country provides the gift in expectation that it can extract some-
thing from its recipient. To clarify, by way of example, if the United States were to
provide a country like Saudi Arabia military aid (which they already do by the way),
then there is a certain expectation that Saudi Arabia would provide something in re-
turn to the United. Historically, this “something” has either been democratizing one’s
country—this was especially predominant in the Cold War era—or providing some type
of essential resource. Seemingly good, this idea can produce some bad results, however,
as it forces countries like Saudi Arabia to now have to owe something back to recom-
pense the U.S. This idea produces a type of dependency where the recipient is now seen
as reliant on the Untied States and the United States is seen as expecting something in
return.
Secondly, providing military aid can produce militarism within the country. Even
though this topic is about authoritarian regimes and the idea of militarism is seemingly
already occurring for them, the United States providing more money definitely doesn’t
help the situation. It is like adding fuel to the fire where, the more money the United
States provides to authoritarian regimes, the more it seems like it is legitimizing said
country’s behavior. This produces a culture of militarism, as described in the excerpt
above, which can produce series of violence. Militarism in other countries becomes
justified by the United States and, also becomes the root cause of a multitude of other
violence.
²NAIDU, M. V. “MILITARY POWER, MILITARISM AND MILITARIZATION: AN ATTEMPT AT CLAR-

IFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION.” Peace Research, vol. 17, no. 1, 1985, pp. 2–10. JSTOR, JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/23609698.
40
4.4 Negs
In regards to the Negative, most debaters’ immediate reaction is to think that most of
the Kritkal literature flows Affirmative. This is a narrowed viewpoint on the topic, how-
ever, as there are some unique perspectives that people can take when on the Negative.
The topic is large so there will definitely be a lot of PIC/DA ground as people struggle
to construct a true definition of military aid, so much of the Kritikal debaters need to
take advantage of this when writing their Ks. People will have to think strategically in
constructing their positions as much of the arguments will probably not be the most
readily available or intuitive on the topic literature.
As a result, Kritikal debaters should be poking holes in more in depth parts of the topic.
They should question how the term “authoritarian regimes” was constructed and the
ideas of power that devolve there. Who does the constructing when it comes to issues
of what is authoritarian vs what is not? How do those countries become authoritarian
in the first place? Other ways of engagement should tackle the nuance behind military
aid. As this term is broad, much of the K debaters don’t have to engage with the issue
broadly but rather they could discuss peacekeeping operations, military training, mil-
itary education, funding, etc. Links could be premised around these areas broadly or
specifically.
4.4.1 Peacekeeper Masculinity
If anyone pays a ention to how militaries like the United States situate their dealings
abroad, most would understand that it is at the behest of many feminine and minority
bodies. Yet, this viewpoint isn’t unique to just the states but rather many countries in-
ternationally like Iraq, China, etcetera all situate a very violent relationship with femme
bodies through their military. For instance, in Bosnia, the soldiers that were stationed
there were often seen as having to deal with the inflicting violence through conflict or
typical military training. One will find many feminist Affirmatives that will discuss the
rise of hegemonic power in many states through the military and how that oftentimes
justifies violence to femme bodies. They will a empt to use deconstructing military aid
as a starting point for deconstructing these systems of power. What goes unnoticed is
the other side of the topic literature, however, that deals with the way in which that
power dynamic can be manipulated for the benefit of the people. According to Senior
Lecturer in International Relations Claire Duncanson,
41
…hegemonic masculinity can be positive: ‘the conceptualization of hege-

monic masculinity should explicitly acknowledge the possibility of democ-
ratizing gender relations, of abolishing power differentials, not just of repro-
ducing hierarchy’. Of course, the construction of peacekeeper masculinity
through a feminized ‘Other’ raises serious doubts over the extent to which
it can be said to be abolishing all power differentials, but that should not
blind us to what is progressive. Soldiers who portray negotiating for peace
and reconstructing schools as masculine are worth taking seriously, not just
because they are not prioritizing combat, but because they are challenging
traditional gender dichotomies. They are challenging both the privileging of
the masculine over the feminine and the association of masculinity with war
and femininity with peace, an association which has made it so hard for both
women and men to challenge militarism and war (Enloe 1993, 2000; Tickner
1999: 8; Kovi 2003: 6). Moreover, there is evidence that a peacekeeper mas-
culinity which democratizes gender relations – which embodies the best of
both ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ qualities and is available to both women and
men (Cockburn and Hubic 2002: 117) – would be welcomed by women in
countries experiencing conflict. Cockburn and Hubic (2002: 116) conclude
from their finding that women’s organizations in the Balkans wanted peace-
keepers to be both more militarily assertive and more gender sensitive and
inclusive: The women are clearly not saying ‘feminize the military’. On the
other hand, they are just as clearly not admirers of Rambo. They are not say-
ing ‘we love your macho ways’. ... Rather, we would suggest, the women
are implicitly asking for a regendered notion of the soldier.³
What Duncanson is suggesting here is that many people—particularly women—are not

calling for the total absence of the military or to even get rid of the notion of the soldier.
They wanted a notion of the soldier that can be rendered as something that is both pos-
itive and progressive for the women on their lands. In order to truly call for peace and
challenge the notion that masculinity should prevail over the feminine subject, the no-
tion of hegemonic masculinity should be flipped on its head. Rather than shunning the
act or abolishing military aid to get rid of patriarchy completely, Negatives could call
for a reframing on the masculine nature of the military. Duncanson also acknowledges
that not all of the instances of the military is bad. For instance, peacekeeping operations
³Duncanson, Claire. “Forces for Good? Narratives of Military Masculinity in Peacekeeping Opera-
tions.” International Feminist Journal of Politics, vol. 11, no. 1, Mar. 2009, pp. 63–80. EBSCOhost,
doi:10.1080/14616740802567808.
42
(a subset of where the United States’ military aid is directed) could be desirous to main-
tain as not only does it protect a community from potential threats but it also initiates
democratic thoughts in countries that are otherwise authoritarian.
Furthermore, keeping the military aid would have many benefits. First, people could
make substantial arguments about the benefits of having the military keep its power
while, at the same time, critiquing the military. This argument would essentially func-
tion as a Plan Inclusive Counterplan and/or a critique of the Affirmative’s representa-
tions around the military. By this, I mean Negatives can defend that the military is bad
in the instance of patriarchal oppression and, instead, call for a reframing of the mil-
itary that takes into account a gendered analysis. The net benefit would be that coun-
tries should be allowed to have funds keep trickling into Peacekeeper operations (which
would not only help the citizens but also ensure that no international conflict arose) and
also tackle some of the gendered issues that the Aff is talking about.
Additionally, reading arguments that say Peacekeeping operations (and other organi-
zations that can promote democratic thinking) can be useful functionally operates as an
impact turn. It opens up the gateway for Negatives to say that peacekeeping operations
is the be er methodology to address violence in these countries because not only does
it protect the people, it also listens to the concerns of the women in the region. Many of
them as exemplified by the Bosnian women might not want the military aid and soldiers
to go away. Rather, they would just like the situation to be structurally fixed.
Now, this argument isn’t just limited to Peacekeeping operations. If the Negative were
to find any other program that fits under the definition of military aid, they could just
find a reason why that program can be beneficial to the people and critique the assump-
tions behind the Aff that say otherwise. This is especially true for Affs that don’t talk
about ge ing rid of military aid as a starting point for deconstructing militaries and au-
thoritarian regimes abroad. If it is true that these countries will remain post the world
of the Aff, then all of the Negative would have to do is prove a be er counter method-
ology of helping these citizens deal with not only instances of potential threats but also
the military structures that their authoritarian regime has.
43
5 Definition Cards
5.1 Military Aid
5.1.1 FMF and IMET
“Military” aid only includes aid given through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
program or the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program
Meyer 17
Peter J. Meyer (Analyst in Latin American Affairs). “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean: Trends and FY2017 Appropriations.” Congressional Re-
search Service Report. 8 February 2017. JDN. h ps://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44647.pdf
Figure 3. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Aid Category:
FY2011-FY2017 (as a percentage of total U.S. assistance appropriated/requested
for the region) Source: CRS analysis of data from the U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2013-FY2017 at
h p://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/index.htm; and “FY2016 653(a) Allocations— Fi-
nal,” provided to CRS in August 2016. Notes: “Military” includes FMF and IMET;
“Civilian Security” includes INCLE and NADR; “Political/Strategic” includes ESF; and
“Development” includes DA, GHP, and P.L. 480. The FY2016 estimate does not include
$145.5 million in supplemental global health funds appropriated in P.L. 114-223 to
address the Zika virus outbreak in the region.
44
5 Definition Cards
5.1.2 Weapons and Training
“Military Aid” includes weapons grants, direct transfers, and training.
Bapat 11
Navin Bapat (Professor in Political Science and the Curriculum of Peace, War, and De-
fense at the University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill). “Transnational Terrorism, US
Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent.” Journal of Peace Research 48(3):303-
318 · May 2011. JDN. h ps://www.researchgate.net/publication/227574734_ Transna-
tional_Terrorism_US_Military_Aid_and_the_Incentive_to_Misrepresent
Let us first specifically define what is meant by the term “military aid.” According to the
U.S. Greenbook, military aid consists of either loans or grants that are intended to pur-
chase American weapons, direct military transfers, or training of the military personnel
of the recipient country.2 From the period from 1946-2008, the U.S. Greenbook iden-
tifies several types of aid granted to states under this program, including the counter-
narcotics assistance provided to Colombia and the provision of helicopters to Pakistanís
military to bolster its internal security. Several policymakers in the U.S. argue that this
type of military aid can be effective in inducing states to adhere to U.S. foreign pol-
icy objectives (Alesina & Dollar 2000; Palmer & Morgan 2006; Palmer, Wohlander &
Morgan 2002). In exchange for military equipment, training, or cash, the U.S. could re-
quire recipient states to liberalize or support U.S. foreign policy objectives (Cingranelli
& Pasquarello 1985; Meernik, Krueger & Poe 1998). A classic example of this is the mil-
itary aid provided to both Egypt and Israel in exchange for their compliance with the
Camp David Peace Accords. In exchange for making peace, both states were promised
billions of dollars in military aid, and to date, both states have not engaged in armed con-
flict with each other. Observations such as Camp David led several policymakers and
scholars to argue that the use of foreign aid could be an effective substitute for costlier
change seeking policies, such as economic sanctions or military force.
45
5 Definition Cards
5.1.3 Equipment, Training, and PKOs
“Military aid” includes equipment, training, and peacekeeping
McBride 18
James McBride (Deputy Editor for the Council of Foreign Affairs; master’s from
Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service). “How Does
the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid?” Council of Foreign Affairs. 1 October 2018. JDN.
h ps://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spend-its-foreign-aid
How is the money spent? U.S. aid policy seeks to achieve its aims through a diverse
array of programs, which can be organized into several major categories. According
to CRS calculations, foreign aid spending as of 2016 can be broken down as follows:
Long-term development aid (42 percent) provides ongoing funding for projects to pro-
mote broad-based economic growth and general prosperity in the world’s poorest coun-
tries. More than half of this goes to bilateral health programs, including treatment of
HIV/AIDS, maternal and family health, and support for government health-care sys-
tems, mostly in Africa. This also includes funding to multilateral institutions such as the
World Bank and the UN Development Program. Military and security aid (33 percent)
primarily goes toward helping allies purchase U.S. military equipment, training foreign
military personnel, and funding peacekeeping missions. A smaller slice goes to “non-
military security assistance,” which includes counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan,
Colombia, Peru, and elsewhere, as well as nonproliferation and counterterrorism ef-
forts.
46
5 Definition Cards
5.1.4 Financing is Most Typical
The majority of all aid is financing the procurement of US goods and services
Tarnoff and Nowels 5
Curt Tarnoff (Specialist in Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs and National Defense)
and Larry Nowels (Specialist in Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs and National
Defense). “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Pol-
icy.” Congressional Research Service report for Congress. 19 January 2005. JDN.
h ps://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a457380.pdf
Most U.S. foreign aid is used for procurement of U.S. goods and services, although
amounts of aid coming back to the United States differ by program. No exact figure
is available due to difficulties in tracking procurement item by item, but some general
estimates are possible for individual programs, though these may differ year to year.
CRS-21 15 World Bank Annual Report, 2003. Volume 2. Pages 132-140. 16 The USAID
figures, however, do not take into account that the U.S.-based contractor or grantee may
spend some project funds in other countries. Because of this, actual procurement of U.S.
goods and services may be much lower than indicated. In FY2004, roughly 87% or $3.7
billion of military aid financing was used for procurement of U.S. military equipment
and training. The remaining 13% were funds allocated to Israel for procurement within
that country
47
5 Definition Cards
5.1.5 AT: Joint Training
Joint training is distinct—it’s primarily directed at US forces, not the host state
Meyer 17
Peter J. Meyer (Analyst in Latin American Affairs). “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean: Trends and FY2017 Appropriations.” Congressional Re-
search Service Report. 8 February 2017. JDN. h ps://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44647.pdf
Historically, Congress has authorized most security assistance programs under Title
22 of the U.S. Code (Foreign Relations) and appropriated funding for these programs
through State Department accounts in annual Department of State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs appropriations legislation. Since the 1980s, however, Congress
has provided numerous security assistance authorities to the Department of Defense
(DOD) under Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Armed Services) and the annual National De-
fense Authorization Act (NDAA) and has appropriated funding for the new activities
(referred to as “security cooperation” by DOD) through annual DOD appropriations.24
As a result, many Latin American and Caribbean nations receive training, equipment,
and other support from DOD in addition to the assistance provided through the tradi-
tional U.S. foreign aid budget examined in this report. The vast majority of DOD secu-
rity cooperation activities in the region are conducted under DOD’s counternarcotics
authorities.25 In FY2016, DOD expended $230.1 million to support counternarcotics ef-
forts in 22 Latin American and Caribbean nations. This figure includes $78.8 million
in Colombia, $56.5 million in Mexico, and a combined $56.3 million in the northern tri-
angle of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras).26 DOD also has
carried out a growing number of joint training programs, exercises, and other military-
to-military exchanges in the region, which benefit partner countries but often have the
primary purpose of training U.S. forces. The number of U.S. Special Operations Forces
training missions conducted under the Joint Combined Exchange Training Program,27
for example, reportedly tripled between 2007 and 2014, from 12 missions involving 560
foreign personnel to 36 missions involving 2,300 foreign personnel.28
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6 Aff Cards
6.1 Solvency
6.1.1 AT: Shift to Other Sellers
States won’t shift to other sellers; it’s not feasible
Guay 18
Terrence Guay (Clinical Professor of International Business, Pennsylvania State Univer-

sity). “Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi
affair.” The Conversation. 19 October 2018. JDN. h ps://theconversation.com/arms-
sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998
In defending this course of action, Trump claimed that “if they don’t buy [weapons]
from us, they’re going to buy it from Russia or they’re going to buy it from China or
they’re going to buy it from other countries.” While it’s true that Russia and China
are indeed major exporters of armaments, the claim that U.S. weapons can easily be re-
placed by other suppliers is not – at least not in the short term. First, once a country
is “locked in” to a specific kind of weapons system, such as planes, tanks or naval ves-
sels, the cost to switch to a different supplier can be huge. Military personnel must be
retrained on new equipment, spare parts need to be replaced, and operational changes
may be necessary. After being so reliant on U.S. weapons systems for decades, the tran-
sition costs to buy from another country could be prohibitive even for oil-rich Saudi
Arabia.
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6 Aff Cards
Other nations’ weapons are inferior to the US
Guay 18
Terrence Guay (Clinical Professor of International Business, Pennsylvania State Univer-

sity). “Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi
affair.” The Conversation. 19 October 2018. JDN. h ps://theconversation.com/arms-
sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998
The second problem with Trump’s argument is that armaments from Russia, China or
elsewhere are simply not as sophisticated as U.S. weapons, which is why they are usu-
ally cheaper – though the quality gap is quickly decreasing. To maintain its military
superiority in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase virtually all of its
weapons from American and European companies. That is why the U.S. has significant
leverage in this aspect of the relationship. Any Saudi threat to retaliate against a ban on
U.S. arms sales by buying weapons from countries that have not raised concerns about
the Khashoggi disappearance would not be credible. And is probably why, despite
worries in the White House, such a threat has not yet been made.
50
6 Aff Cards
6.1.2 Fungibility
Studies show aid is highly fungible—recipients will just channel the money
elsewhere
Khilji and Zampelli 94
Nasir M. Khilji (Assumption College) and Ernest M. Zampelli (The Catholic Uniuersity
of America). “The fungibility of U.S. military and nonmilitary assistance and the im-
pacts on expenditures of major aid recipients.” Journal of Development Economics 43
(1994) 345-362. JDN. h ps://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/deveco/v43y1994i2p345-362.html
Generally given the high predictive ability of the expenditure equations (as measured
by the R2 values) and the statistical significance of many important parameter estimates,
the results suggest a surprising regularity in the expenditure behavior of a widely di-
verse group of countries. Our estimates suggest that U.S. military aid is perfectly fun-
gible. On the other hand, U.S. non-military assistance is highly fungible but less than
previous estimates have implied. Moreover, since the results imply the absence of a fly-
paper effect, a major portion of fungible U.S. aid is channeled to the private sector via
some tax relief mechanism. The finding for U.S. military assistance is consistent with
Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1990) who find that much of bilateral aid is returned to the
private sector and has li le impact on public sector expenditures. Out of the fungible
aid leaked to the private sector, a greater percentage is channeled to private consump-
tion than to private investment. This suggests that a cutback in U.S. aid would have a
larger impact on current consumption than on capital formation and the long term rate
of growth.
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6 Aff Cards
6.2 Shunning
6.2.1 Moral Obligation
Shunning immoral practices is necessary for the preservation of the moral order
Beversluis 89
Eric H. Beversluis (Professor, Aquinas College). “On Shunning Undesirable Regimes:
Ethics and Economic Sanctions.” Public Affairs Quarterly, April, vol. 3, no. 2. 1989.
JDN. h ps://www.jstor.org/stable/40435708
A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the
same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying
”mine” and ”thine.” If in anger I want to smash your face, ethics indicates that your
face’s being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over
my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals
when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view
of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well
have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but
whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no ”rights” that are
protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will
change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not
bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what
grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions? We find the answer when we
note that there is another ”level” of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of ”reinforcing
. . . morality,” he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting
people’s rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the
rights of others than not violating them by one’s actions. For if there is such a thing
as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a
duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one’s
actions but also to support that moral order. Consider that the moral order itself con-
tributes significantly to people’s rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and
reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In
this moral community people mutually reinforce each other’s moral behavior and thus
raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people
to stop reinforcing each other’s moral behavior, there would be much more violation
of people’s rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly
52
6 Aff Cards
affects people’s rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior
constitute a direct a ack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is
flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the
moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if
tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the
moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior
into an a ack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is ”extremely
or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking.” Etymologically the word means
”burning” or ”blazing.” The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses
require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort
to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions ”blaze forth” as an a ack on
the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent.
We do not consider the actions of the ”backslider,” the weak-willed, the one-time
offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentent
sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others
publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly
violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the
moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral
order. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such
a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement
with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the
shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shul in
effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early
days of 1986.) Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even
if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned
person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make
clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior
in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved
by ”force.” Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose
appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person’s behavior, but on
whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment than
can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of ”purifying the community”
after it has been made ”unclean,” as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not
every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world.
None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with
anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reduction of the very notion of shunning.
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6 Aff Cards
To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the ”silent treatment,” is a serious thing.
Nothing strikes at a person’s wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism.
Furthermore, not every immoral act is an a ack on the moral order. Actions which
are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but
do not a ack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is
defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to a acks on
the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. We can
also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity.
But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity.
Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail
to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent,
and flagrant immorality.
The obligation to shun immoral practices extends to nation-states
Beversluis 89
Eric H. Beversluis (Professor, Aquinas College). “On Shunning Undesirable Regimes:

Ethics and Economic Sanctions.” Public Affairs Quarterly, April, vol. 3, no. 2. 1989.
JDN. h ps://www.jstor.org/stable/40435708
1. Many maintain that there are no moral rights or duties among nations. Others hold
that nations have a right to self-determination which obligates other nations not to in-
terfere in their internal affairs. On what grounds can we say that nations as well as
individuals can be obligated to shun and be liable to be shunned? As I see it, nations
are agents in the sense that they do things that affect people’s interests - ”do things”
in the sense in which people do things and not in the sense in which the wind does
things - for they have both the power to affect people’s interests and the ability to de-
cide whether or not to do so. But being an agent in this sense is a sufficient condition for
having moral responsibility. And the argument for the duty to shun is perfectly general,
applying to all morally responsible agents. Institutions such as the state can act in ways
which directly a ack and undermine the moral order, and individuals and institutions
can sanction such offenders as a witness to the moral order. As moral agents states
are also obligated to support the moral order and hence to shun when the situation de-
mands. (For more detailed analysis of the arguments that morality applies to nations see
Cohen (1985) and Bei (1979).) But perhaps Thompson’s pragmatic argument against
interfering in the affairs of other states rules out national shunning: Respect for domes-
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6 Aff Cards
tic jurisdiction causes diplomatists to question a crusading approach to human rights.

Routine interference in the essential conduct of the affairs of one government (that is,
in its definition of its rights and duties) by another is a recipe for disaster in political
relationships. Furthermore, history offers li le support for the assumption that moral
intervention changes institutions and practices elsewhere; sometimes such intervention
can even make the situation worse. Given the realities of national sovereignty, methods
such as quiet diplomacy, the private offering of incentives and rewards, and sustained
individual contacts are more likely to yield results. Workability is a companion princi-
ple to respect for domestic jurisdiction. Together they provide the diplomatists’ main
guidelines for action in human rights as in other spheres of foreign policy. (Thompson,
1980, pp. 91-92) As a general caution against our desire to ”do something” when we do
not like the policies of another country, Thompson’s pragmatic approach is sound. But
shunning represents a special situation in which, persuasion and direct pressure hav-
ing been tried and having failed, the objective is not to change behavior but to witness
against it. ”Workability” has been tried and has failed; the flagrant, persistent, and will-
ful violation of human rights continues and must be confronted publicly. A frequent
objection to ”human rights” policies may also be raised to shunning: By what right does
one nation impose its values on another? The argument may proceed by noting that
shunning represents the reaction of a community to those who reject its standards in
particularly serious way. But, it will continue, surely there is no such moral community
among nations, since there is no world-wide agreement on basic moral standards. José
Zalaque addresses these questions in his lecture on ”Human Rights and Moral Dimen-
sions of International Conduct.” His thesis is that there is a world-wide consensus on
basic human rights, as is evidenced by the fact that the world’s nations have signed the
United Nations Charter (Zalaque , 1983). Thus besides general arguments for moral
obligations among nations, the explicit recognition of certain duties by the nations of
the world supports the claim that there is a world moral order which ought to be pro-
tected. So, as moral agents, agents who can be responsible for violating people’s rights,
nations as well as individuals (and presumably other institutions, such as corporations -
although we have not examined these cases separately) have a prima facie duty to shun
under certain circumstances and ought to be shunned under certain circumstances.
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6 Aff Cards
6.2.2 Complicity Impact
Complicity makes the US responsible for violence commi ed as a result of its aid
Lanovoy 16
Vladyslav Lanovoy (Associate Legal Officer at the International Court of Justice; former
Assistant Legal Counsel at the Permanent Court of Arbitration; admi ed as a Solici-
tor in England & Wales; holds a PhD in International Law from the Graduate Institute
of International and Development Studies in Geneva). “Complicity and its Limits in
the Law of International Responsibility.” Hart Publishing (September 22, 2016). JDN.
h ps://media.bloomsburyprofessional.com/rep/files/9781782259404sample.pdf
Complicity in the commission of an internationally wrongful act is typically described

as a form of ancillary, derivative or indirect responsibility. 28 While there may be nu-
anced differences between these adjectives, they all base the responsibility for complic-
ity upon the actual commission of the principal wrongful act. At a technical level, it
is easy to understand why complicity is derivative, as the responsibility for the accom-
plice arises after the commission of the wrongful act by the principal. However, the
qualification of responsibility for complicity as ancillary, derivative or indirect may be
regarded as undermining the sanctity of an international obligation, and the legal sys-
tem as a whole. First, the qualification of responsibility for complicity as derivative
diminishes the reprimand associated with it. However, as a ma er of principle, there is
nothing less reprehensible of complicity than of the principal wrongdoing it occasions.
Second, this qualification fosters the idea of responsibility as a purely remedial mech-
anism, dependent on the commission of the principal wrongful act, and allowing for
the responsibility of the accomplice to be a mere afterthought. Third, while complic-
ity is indeed derivative at the level of the origins of responsibility (ie triggering or fait
générateur ), it would be misleading to qualify the content of responsibility for com-
plicity (ie the legal consequences) as derivative. This may result in an undue burden
of reparation on weaker principal actors and the provision of a safe haven for stronger
complicit actors. Complicity in the internationally wrongful act should rather be con-
ceived of as a form of shared responsibility, involving a factual relationship of at least
two conducts and three actors. 29 The advantage of framing complicity as a form of
shared responsibility is to avoid the diminished reprimand a ached to complicit con-
duct vis- à -vis the principal wrongful act. Moreover, the theoretical construction of
complicity as a form of shared responsibility permits a more balanced approach to the
allocation of responsibility between the accomplice and the principal. It also enhances
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the prospects for the injured State or international organisation to seek reparation from
both the principal and the accomplice. More generally, responsibility for complicity is
a conceptually rare and complex object of analysis for a host of reasons. First, responsi-
bility for complicity contains elements of primary and secondary norms, appearing as a
structural or meta-rule in the legal order. 30 Second, complicity puts into question the
objective character of responsibility through its cognitive requirement. Third, it raises
complex issues regarding the nature of obligations in international law, and the legal
interests of the international community in their observance. The phenomenon of com-
plicity in a wrongful act makes it ‘more essential than ever that the rules developed to
ensure the ordered progress of relations between its members should be constantly and
scrupulously respected’ . 31
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6.2.3 Saudi Arabia
Current US military aid to Saudi Arabia shows our tacitcomplicity with genocide
Sawyer 18
Jim Sawyer (Writer for The Daily Herald). “Saudis guilty of genocide in Yemen, with
U.S. assistance.” The Daily Herald. 5 November 2018. JDN. h ps://www.heraldnet.com/
opinion/saudis-guilty-of-genocide-in-yemen-with-u-s-assistance/
The regime of Saudi Arabia is rightly and understandably receiving worldwide con-
demnation for its pre-meditated butchering of a Saudis journalist in a Turkish embassy.
A cursory review of the details outlines the level of ugliness and criminality the Saudis
will resort to in silencing critical dissent. However this tale of evil is nothing but a nurs-
ery rhyme when contrasted with what the Saudis — and, yes, the United States — are
doing to the country of Yemen. Yemen, a small country of 29 million is facing what can
only be called a genocidal starvation orchestrated by the Saudis with full support and
complicity from the United States. Approximately 13 million people are facing starva-
tion in Yemen. This is one of the greatest human rights crimes in world history and it
has scarcely drawn any a ention at all. We need to as a nation come to terms with what
our endless arm sales and give a-ays to the Saudis means in terms of human suffering,
terrorism, torture and murder. The evidence and brutality of the Saudis human rights
record is there on full display if one simply looks. This is a nation that our political lead-
ership respects and reveres and honors without hesitation. The Saudis could not lay
ruin to surrounding lands and engage in unspeakable human rights atrocities without
our tacit approval and endless military aid. We owe it to ourselves and the world and
yes the people of Yemen to say enough is enough. We need to make our voices heard.
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6.2.4 Egypt
Military aid to Egypt has historically made the US complicit in mass rights
violations
Mohamed 11
Feisal G. Mohamed (Professor at the CUNY Graduate Center). “Human Rights Watch
on Suspending Military Aid to Egypt.” Dissent Magazine. 3 February 2011. JDN.
h ps://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/human-rights-watch-on-suspending-military-
aid-to-egypt
A statement released today by Human Rights Watch takes this violent turn as potentially
justifying withdrawal of Western military support. It makes two major claims. First, it
suggests what every undeluded observer must know: that the government likely or-
ganized the violence of February 2. As director Kenneth Roth puts it, “It boggles the
imagination that armed pro-Mubarak demonstrators on camels and horseback could
have assembled themselves and passed through army checkpoints without government
complicity and coordination.” But the release from Human Rights Watch also argues
that the army was inexcusably negligent in protecting peaceful protesters. Even if we
suppose that Mubarak did not summon the thugs and bullies of the sort that he em-
ploys regularly during elections, we must acknowledge that the army took no active
steps to protect unarmed citizens exercising their right of protest: The United States
and the European Union should use their leverage with the Egyptian government to
ensure that there is no further violence against peaceful protesters…They should tell
President Hosni Mubarak and Egypt’s military commanders that the army’s actions
on February 2 raised serious doubts about its willingness to protect pro-democracy
protestors from violent a acks, and that their failure to uphold fundamental human
rights, including prohibitions on extrajudicial killings, torture and enforced disappear-
ances, will prompt an immediate suspension of all military assistance. Those who equip
and train an army complicit in the murder and intimidation of its citizens, this argu-
ment runs, are themselves complicit in that murder and intimidation. The simple fact
that the Egyptian military stood passively by, and indeed left Tahrir Square overnight,
while peaceful protesters were whipped, stoned, and shot is reason enough to cut off
the military funding that is the chief form of life support for this octogenarian autocrat.
It is an argument that should lay to rest the sort of feigned neutrality emerging from the
White House. (Saying that future leadership can only be decided by the Egyptian peo-
ple sounds reasonable enough, but doesn’t stand up to scrutiny when American tanks
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are rolling through every major city in Egypt.) That the United States is playing an ac-
tive hand in these events is undeniable. We shall see how bloody it allows that hand to
become.
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6.2.5 Latin America
US military aid in Latin America has supported human rights abuses
ICIJ 12
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (international independent

non-profit organization). “U.S. Military Aid to Latin America Linked to Human Rights
Abuses.” 26 September 2012. JDN. h ps://www.icij.org/investigations/us-aid-latin-
america/us-military-aid-latin-america-linked-human-rights-abuses/
Few Americans know it, but the United States is currently embroiled in the biggest
guerrilla war since Vietnam. Hundreds of American troops, spies and civilian contract
employees are on the ground in Colombia and neighboring lands, helping to coordi-
nate a $1.3 billion counterdrug program that will probably continue for many years. It
is a bigger U.S. commitment—in personnel, cash and risk—than the previous leading
post-Vietnam counterinsurgency campaign, the 1980s war in El Salvador. In light of
the growing U.S. military involvement in Latin America—building even as a 1999 truth
commission report concluded that the United States had given money and training to
a Guatemalan military that commi ed “acts of genocide” during that country’s 36-year
civil war—the Center for Public Integrity set out to examine U.S. military aid to Latin
America in the 1990s. The yearlong investigation by the Center’s International Consor-
tium of Investigative Journalists found, among other things, that in three of the four
Latin American countries examined, U.S. military and intelligence aid was implicated
in human rights abuses. In Colombia, as in El Salvador, the United States has found
its moral flanks exposed by alliances with corrupt and brutal military institutions. In
El Salvador, the purpose of that questionable alliance was at least well-defined: to con-
tain a Marxist rebel army. In Colombia, a nominally Marxist rebel army is again the
main target of U.S. aid, but Washington’s motivations are multiple and, at times, murky.
In Peru, the CIA paid millions of dollars to a shadowy government official, Vladimiro
Montesinos, who allegedly used his influence to arrange an arms deal with the left-wing
Colombian guerrillas, in an affront to his patrons reminiscent of Panama’s Manuel Nor-
iega.
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6.3 HR Abuse
6.3.1 Democracies Only
Military aid must be restricted to democracies only to avoid complicity with human
rights abuse
Doyle 16
Kate Doyle (senior analyst of U.S. policy in Latin America at the National Security
Archive, a private research institute based at George Washington University). “A
Wretched Record of Military Cooperation.” New York Times. 15 September 2016.
JDN. h ps://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/07/a-lesson-in-futilty-for-the-
pentagon/a-wretched-record-of-military-cooperation
During the cold war, the United States poured millions of dollars into arming and
training militaries in Central America to serve U.S. strategic goals – in El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua before the 1979 Sandinista revolution. Washing-
ton wanted to stop what it perceived to be the threat of communist domination in its
own “backyard.” As a result, the United States supported the armed forces of brutal au-
thoritarian governments that shared the same vehement anti-communist ideology. But
the policy ignored the regimes’ complicity in murdering tens of thousands of their own
citizens. The most infamous among the training centers was the School of the Americas
(created in Panama and moved in 1984 to Fort Benning, Ga.), which graduated hundreds
of officers who went on to become documented human rights abusers. But visiting offi-
cers a ended dozens of other institutions as well, including the Command and General
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School at Fort Bragg, N.C., and the intelligence school at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. The
courses they took were not directed toward protecting national borders but crushing an
“internal enemy” that sought to compel political and economic change through armed
revolution. The concept of “internal enemy,” as defined in U.S. doctrine and training
manuals from the era, included civilian political opponents as well as armed guerrilla
forces. Politicians, indigenous farmers, labor leaders, lawyers, students and human
rights activists were considered equally legitimate targets by U.S. military allies. The
death tolls were staggering. In El Salvador, the army killed an estimated 75,000 unarmed
civilians during its 12-year civil war. Guatemala’s security forces were responsible for
93 percent of more than 200,000 civilians murdered between 1960 and 1996, according
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to a United Nations truth commission. Instead of helping secure just democratic insti-
tutions, U.S. aid left countries with a legacy of repression and violence that the region
still struggles to overcome today. One of Washington’s closest Central American allies,
General Efraín Ríos Mon – a graduate of the School of the Americas, who took power
in Guatemala in a military coup in 1982 and proceeded to unleash a savage counterin-
surgency campaign against a small guerrilla army and its perceived civilian supporters
– is now standing trial for genocide and crimes against humanity in a Guatemalan court-
room. Using foreign armies as proxies for advancing U.S. security interests can’t work
if the support flows to undemocratic or authoritarian governments. U.S. assistance for
foreign militaries should take place only within a democratic context, and only with
strict controls on how the aid is used, what units it flows to and how it is monitored by
the United States.
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6.3.2 Arms Imports
Studies show arms acquisition increases internal violence
Blanton 99
Shannon Lindsey Blanton (Department of Political Science, Southern Illinois Univer-

sity). “Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms Imports and Human
Rights Conditions in Developing Countries.” 1999 Journal of Peace Research vol 36,
no.2, 1999, pp. 233–244. JDN. h ps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00223433990360
02006
Scholars traditionally have focused on arms as a means of deterring, initiating, maintain-

ing, or terminating international war. Indeed, based on the assumption that a coercive
military response is required if security is to be preserved, arms are widely viewed as
an instrument of defense from external threat. In the developing world, however, inter-
nal threats are far more common. Yet the role of arms in facilitating domestic political
violence has received far less scholarly a ention. This article endeavors to expand upon
both our understanding of arms as a source of conflict and our knowledge of the corre-
lates of human rights repression. To this end, this study tests the relationship between
the importation of arms and the repression of personal integrity rights. Employing a
pooled time-series cross-sectional design, the pa erns of arms acquisitions behavior
and human rights violations are examined for developing countries for the years 1982
through 1992. The results indicate that arms imports by developing countries are linked
to poor human rights conditions. Thus, arms acquisitions appear to contribute to repres-
sion by making violent political acts more feasible.
Internal violence outweighs foreign conflict
Blanton 99

02006
However, the role of arms in facilitating internal political violence has received far less
a ention. This is somewhat surprising given the current preponderance of internal con-
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flict. For example, between 1989 and 1997, only six of the 103 armed conflicts were
between states; the rest were internal (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 1998). Such a state
of affairs supports the contention that in developing countries, threats ‘which emanate
from indigenous sources are often of more immediate concern than those threats ema-
nating from external sources’ (Ross, 1988: 152).
Arms both directly and indirectly increase human rights abuse
Blanton 99

02006
In accounting for human rights violations, arms can thus be considered a contributing
factor which provides the capability for carrying out repressive policies. As Gurr &
Moore (1997: 1085) contend, ‘repression is driven by internal challenges . . . successful
past uses of coercion, and coercive capabilities’. Alone, arms may not directly lead to re-
pression. However, when governments fear instability and loss of power, they may take
advantage of arms supplies to repress and solidify their hold on power. In states where
a national security mentality prevails, the control of political order is of paramount im-
portance, even at the expense of individual liberties (Comblin, 1980; Lopez, 1986). Un-
der these circumstances, government forces often seek arms to achieve and maintain
control of the state and to combat popular dissent. To this end, weapons acquisitions
function as tools of repression that may be used directly to violate human rights (Klare
& Arnson, 1981) or indirectly by enhancing the strength or professionalization of the
military and exacerbating internal instability (Davenport, 1995a; Maniruzzaman, 1992).
The risk is higher in autocracies
Blanton 99
Shannon Lindsey Blanton (Department of Political Science, Southern Illinois Uni-

versity). “Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms Imports and
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Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries.” 1999 Journal of Peace Re-

search vol 36, no.2, 1999, pp. 233–244. JDN. h ps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/
0022343399036002006
Democratic regimes are less likely to engage in repressive actions against their citizenry
than are authoritarian or totalitarian ones (Henderson, 1991; Poe & Tate, 1994; Rummel,
1995). While democracies have been known to use repression under stressful condi-
tions, such as those induced by war or internal conflict, the democratic emphasis on
bargaining and compromise provides a peaceful alternative for resolving conflict. As
Rummel (1995: 4) contends, ‘through democratic institutions, social conflicts that might
become violent are resolved by voting, negotiation, compromise, and mediation’. Thus,
the more democratic a country, the less the likelihood of repression of human rights.
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6.3.3 Coup d’etat
Studies show arms transfers increase coups and lengthen military rule—the impact
is mass death
Maniruzzaman 92
Talukder Maniruzzaman (University of Dhaka, Bangladesh). “Arms Transfers, Military

Coups, and Military Rule in Developing States.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.
36, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 733-755. JDN. h ps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002792036004006
Scholarly studies on arms transfers, a critical aspect of present-day international poli-

tics, abound. These studies are almost all done from the perspectives of big and super
powers. There is virtually no systematic and comparative study of the impact of arms
transfers on developing states. Through the use of cross-national aggregate data anal-
ysis as well as case-by-case studies, we have examined the impact of arms transfers on
civil-military relations in developing states. This analysis suggests that arms transfer
facilitates the occurrence of coup d’etat and lengthens the period of military rule. The
study also indicates that large-scale deaths from political violence might be the result
rather than the cause of military rule. We explain these relationships in sociopolitical
terms.
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6.3.4 Not Factored In (AT: Cingranelli)
Studies show human rights are not an important factor in US military aid allocation
McCormick and Mitchell 88
James M. McCormick (Iowa State University) and Neil Mitchell (University of New
Mexico). “Is U.S. Aid Really Linked to Human Rights in Latin America?” Ameri-
can Journal of Political Science. Vol. 32, No. 1 (February 1988), pp. 231-239. JDN.
h ps://www.jstor.org/stable/2111319
In their recent article on U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America, Cingranelli and
Pasquarello (i985) report that ”human rights considerations have become a more
important determinant of the distribution of U.S. foreign aid in this region during
the same period that U.S. dominance has been severely threatened” (p. 562). While
such a conclusion is normatively appealing and applies more to economic assistance
than to military aid, it stands in sharp contrast to the results reported by Carleton
and Stohl (i985), Schoul (X98i), Chomsky and Herman (1979), and to the expected
priorities of the Reagan administration. Cingranelli and Pasquarello draw a ention
to the distinctive character of their results and defend them. They point to their
research design which employed a systematic measure of human rights and which
simultaneously evaluated several alternative explanations for U.S. foreign aid policy.
Despite the evident rigor of their research, several important problems raise doubts
about their major conclusion. One involves the decision on what Latin American states
to include in the analysis; another involves the operationalization of human rights.
As we shall show, reanalysis of the data with a different design decision undermines
confidence in their results for the positive relationship between respect for human
rights within Latin American countries and the level of economic assistance.
Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s study has numerous flaws and should be rejected
McCormick and Mitchell 88
James M. McCormick (Iowa State University) and Neil Mitchell (University of New
Mexico). “Is U.S. Aid Really Linked to Human Rights in Latin America?” Ameri-
can Journal of Political Science. Vol. 32, No. 1 (February 1988), pp. 231-239. JDN.
h ps://www.jstor.org/stable/2111319
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One further issue on the question of country inclusion occurs when one looks at the op-
erationalization of the human rights concept. Cingranelli and Pasquarello go to some
lengths to defend the use of State Department reports for developing their human rights
measures. Yet they mention ”major discrepancies” between these reports and those by
Amnesty International in the cases of Nicaragua and Honduras in terms of the integrity
of the person.6 Given the questionable reliability of the human rights measure in these
instances, the exclusion of these countries probably would be easier to justify than was
the exclusion of El Salvador. Because these countries carry a disproportionate weight of
Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s argument (Nicaragua scores very poorly on human rights
and very low on aid, and Honduras does well on human rights and receives a lot of aid),
they substantially affect the results. Thus, excluding them makes the relationship with
economic assistance even weaker, only 8 percent of the variance is explained, and the
negative relationship with military aid is now significant and explains 27 percent of
the variance.7 Another problem with the Cingranelli and Pasquarello analysis is their
failing to specify the kind of respect for human rights that is related to the level of for-
eign assistance. While their measure of human rights had two dimensions (”civil and
political rights” and the ”integrity of the person”), they do not separately present the
results of the level of assistance analyses for these two dimensions.8 This shortcoming
is particularly unfortunate, since they (I985, p. 556) report that the Reagan administra-
tion had redefined human rights to emphasize civil and political rights rather than the
integrity of the person which the Carter administration had emphasized. Moreover,
we would argue that the ”integrity of the person” is the usual standard for evaluat-
ing human rights-both in terms of congressional legislation, past presidential practices,
and previous research.’ Only if the different dimensions of human rights are analyzed
separately is it possible to make meaningful comparisons with past administrations or
earlier research. When this analysis is reported for military assistance with El Salvador
excluded, the role of human rights defined as civil and political liberties seems to do bet-
ter than human rights defined as the integrity of the person. When all Latin American
military recipients are analyzed, the integrity of the person is more potent, but negative
in direction. For economic assistance, civil and political liberties seem to do be er, too,
with or without El Salvador. Compare the size of the regression coefficients in rows 2
and 3 in Table i (all Latin American recipient states) and rows 5 and 6 (El Salvador ex-
cluded). One anomaly exists for the economic analysis with El Salvador excluded. Al-
though the regression coefficient is smaller for the integrity of the person equation than
for the civil and political liberties equation, the former equation explains 46 percent of
the variance while the la er explains only 40 percent. It turns out in this instance-and
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probably because of the small number of cases-that these differences, however, are not
significant. (In fact, when we compared the human rights dimensions in the military
assistance analyses, we also found no significant differences.) 10 Yet such information
should be presented, since it is reasonable to expect that different operationalizations
of human rights may lead us to different conclusions about the relationship between
human rights and U.S. aid. Finally, Cingranelli and Pasquarello, in describing the im-
portance of their research, claim that theirs is the first study to examine human rights at
more than one point in time. We would agree that over time analysis is highly desirable,
particularly with so few cases. But two points in time (1979 and I980 for human rights)
is not very long, and more than one year’s aid needs to be considered, especially when
evaluating ”routine” aid decisions. To underline the potency of year-to-year change
with a small number of cases, consider the case of Guatemala recently. Guatemala, a
country with a very bad human rights record, will now be a recipient of military assis-
tance and even will receive training and equipment for its police, if Congress concurs.
A ban, introduced in 1974 after an outcry over allegations that this type of aid to police
forces contributed to the use of torture, has been lifted this year. Or, to return to El Sal-
vador, it now routinely gets a lion’s share of U.S. aid to the region. Of $251 million in
military aid authorized for El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Panama
for FY 1986, more than one-half will go to El Salvador (Christian, I985, p. 6). In short,
without a tighter (and probably more extensive) research design, we can have li le con-
fidence in Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s optimistic conclusion about the importance of
human rights in affecting levels of U.S. aid policy toward Latin America.”
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6.3.5 AT: Legal Under ILaw
Current legal standards are biased in favor large states that get away with
irresponsible aid policies
Lanovoy 16
Vladyslav Lanovoy (Associate Legal Officer at the International Court of Justice; former
Assistant Legal Counsel at the Permanent Court of Arbitration; admi ed as a Solici-
tor in England & Wales; holds a PhD in International Law from the Graduate Institute
of International and Development Studies in Geneva). “Complicity and its Limits in
the Law of International Responsibility.” Hart Publishing (September 22, 2016). JDN.
h ps://media.bloomsburyprofessional.com/rep/files/9781782259404sample.pdf
Fourth, as most instances of international responsibility are se led bilaterally and pri-
vately between the injured party and the principal wrongdoer, the injured State or inter-
national organisation is not always able or willing to invoke responsibility of accomplice
actors due to legal and political considerations. A review of the practice of complicity
shows that it is usually the stronger actors in international affairs that provide aid or
assistance for the commission of an internationally wrongful act by another. This of
course presents a difficult balancing exercise for the injured entity as to the way and
forum in which to protest or bring a claim.
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6.4 Saudi Arabia
6.4.1 Saudi Rels Low Now
Saudi relations are already dead—the Khashoggi murder was just the final nail in
the coffin
Fuchs 18
Michael H Fuchs (Senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and a former
deputy assistant secretary of state for east Asian and Pacific affairs). “Khashoggi’s
fate is proof the US-Saudi relationship is over.” The Guardian. 19 October 2018. JDN.
h ps://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/19/khashoggi-fate-us-saudi-
relationship
The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia was broken long before the
apparent murder of Jamal Khashoggi. It’s far past time for a fundamental break in the
relationship. The United States must view the Saudis not as flawed partners, but rather
as malign actors undermining US interests. Khashoggi’s presumed murder in Turkey
– where he disappeared after entering a Saudi consulate – has shocked the world. But
no one should have been surprised. Saudi Arabia is a monarchy that rules through re-
pression. Freedom House ranked Saudi Arabia as “not free” in 2018, while the 2017
US Human Rights report on Saudi Arabia detailed abuses by government including,
“unlawful killings, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention,violence and official gender
discrimination against women”. And yet, specious arguments for a robust US-Saudi
partnership have dominated policy circles and government. We need Saudi Arabia to
combat terrorism, we are told. Mere whispers of the words “but, terrorism coopera-
tion” have long won debates in Washington over the need to work with the Saudis. But
is Saudi Arabia a real partner? Fifteen of the 19 men who a acked America on 9/11
were Saudis. And according to a leaked US government memo from 2009, “donors in
Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups
worldwide”. Another argument claims the United States needs Saudi Arabia for re-
gional stability. But the facts tell a different story. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia has been
waging a war – with US support – for more than three years, causing one of the world’s
worst humanitarian disasters. With thousands of Yemenis dead and millions displaced,
the United Nations is now warning that up to 13 million Yemenis are at risk of starvation.
And while Iran is also to blame for backing violence in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has esca-
lated significantly. Ah, yes, Iran! Comba ing Iran’s malign influence is another magic
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end that supposedly justifies the means of the United States working with Saudi Arabia.
But what has the relationship achieved for the United States? Saudi Arabia tried to pre-
vent the United States from negotiating a deal that verifiably stopped Iran’s pursuit of a
nuclear weapon, and then encouraged the Trump administration to withdraw despite
the fact that the deal was working. Iran is no doubt a destabilizing actor, funding terror-
ism and threatening Israel. But Saudi Arabia is also a destabilizing actor, and by taking
Saudi Arabia’s side against Iran it is entirely possible that the United States helps fuel
the deadly regional rivalry. One more recent justification for the US-Saudi relationship
has been Israel. With the quietly growing ties between Israel and Gulf states, Saudi Ara-
bia no longer plays a lead role in condemning Israel. And while lower tensions between
Israel and its neighbors is a good thing, their improving relationship is not about the
United States – it’s about increasingly shared anti-Iran views. The United States can con-
tinue to support Israel’s security without supporting Saudi Arabia. But don’t we need
Saudi Arabia for oil? Not as much as we once did. And Saudi Arabia has its own inter-
est in continuing to pump oil, which is the country’s sole stream of revenue. Further-
more, the world must rapidly transition to clean energy to avert the most cataclysmic
effects of climate change, so this can help provide a kickstart. Which brings us back to
Khashoggi. The fate of one man illustrates how destructive the US-Saudi relationship
has become. It is now widely believed that Saudi Arabia felt emboldened enough to
kill a US resident with impunity in another country. And Trump’s response? Help the
Saudis cover up the reported murder. Trump has given Crown Prince Mohammad bin
Salman (MBS) a blank check in the Middle East. The result has been an emboldened
Saudi Arabia, which under MBS’s leadership reportedly kidnapped the prime minis-
ter of Lebanon and downgraded the Canada-Saudi Arabia relationship over Canadian
criticism of Saudi Arabia’s human rights abuses. Trump has supported MBS’s danger-
ous policies, from the blockade of Qatar to the devastating war in Yemen. Trump even
refused to back America’s ally Canada in its dispute with Saudi Arabia. The reported
murder of Khashoggi is a byproduct of this morally bankrupt relationship. Khashoggi’s
blood is also on Trump’s hands. Why would Trump assist Saudi Arabia in policies so
damaging to US interests? Perhaps it is because of Trump’s blatant disregard for human
rights at home and abroad. Or perhaps it is because of longstanding personal financial
ties between Trump and Saudi Arabia, including a massive jump in Saudi patronage of
Trump hotels since Trump became president. With reports that the Trump administra-
tion may have known in advance of an alleged Saudi plot against Khashoggi and did
nothing to warn him, we need answers as to what the Trump administration knew and
when they knew it. The US-Saudi relationship as we know it is over, and Khashoggi’s
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apparent murder is helping wake everyone up to a relationship that soured long ago.
It’s time to finally ground any engagement with Saudi Arabia solely on genuine US in-
terests in regional peace and human rights. That means no more arms sales. No more
taking sides in a regional war between fundamentalist, repressive regimes. No more
support for the war in Yemen. US officials should trigger the Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability Act to impose sanctions on MBS and Saudi leadership for human
rights violations. And when we need cooperation on counter-terrorism, be transactional
– and sanction Saudi officials if they don’t target terrorist funding coming from within
their country. At the end of the day, this is about more than the US-Saudi relationship.
It’s about whether or not America will stand up for democratic values and human rights,
including against the growing brazenness of autocracies like Russia and China to reach
beyond their borders to murder and abduct critics. The United States must take a stand.
Resolved: The United States ought not provide military aid to authoritarian regimes.
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6.4.2 AT: Jobs
Arms deals do not significantly affect employment or the economy
Caverley 18
Jonathan D. Caverley (Expert in the global arms trade and American military aid; as-
sociate professor at the United States Naval War College; research scientist at M.I.T.).
“Want to Punish Saudi Arabia? Cut Off Its Weapons Supply.” New York Times. 12
October 2018. JDN. h ps://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-
sales.html
Despite recent increases, Saudi arms orders remain a manageably small part of the
United States’ exports. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in 2017,
a near-record year for annual purchases, the United States delivered $5.5 billion worth of
arms, 20 percent of all foreign military sales. That may sound like a lot, but the United
States exports only 25 to 30 percent of its defense industry production, so exports to
Saudi Arabia clearly remain a relatively small slice of the enormous defense industrial
pie.
And contrary to President Trump’s statement, exports to Saudi Arabia create relatively
few American jobs. Based on Commerce Department figures, releasing the billion dol-
lars of munitions currently on hold in the Senate would “create or sustain” fewer than
4,000 jobs. Here’s a more specific example: Publicizing a recent $6 billion helicopter deal
with Saudi Arabia, Lockheed Martin predicted that it would “support” 450 American
jobs.
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6.4.3 AT: Saudi Prolif
Saudi Arabia is highly unlikely to proliferate
Lippman 11
Thomas W. Lippman (senior adjunct scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations in

Washington. His career in journalism at the Washington Post included four years as
the Washington Post’s Middle East bureau chief, three years as the Post’s oil and energy
reporter and a decade as the newspaper’s national security and diplomatic correspon-
dent, he traveled extensively to Saudi Arabia.), “Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Policy,” 5 Au-
gust 2011. JDN. h p://www.susris.com/2011/08/05/saudi-arabia%E2%80%99s-nuclear-
policy-lippman/
It is highly unlikely, however, that Saudi Arabia would wish to acquire its own nu-
clear arsenal or that it is capable of doing so. King Abdullah’s comments should not
be taken as a dispositive statement of considered policy. There are compelling reasons
why Saudi Arabia would not undertake an effort to develop or acquire nuclear weapons,
even in the unlikely event that Iran achieves a stockpile and uses this arsenal to threaten
the Kingdom. Money is not an issue — if destitute North Korea can develop nuclear
weapons, Saudi Arabia surely has the resources to pursue such a program. With oil
prices above $90 a barrel, Riyadh is flush with cash. But the acquisition or development
of nuclear weapons would be provocative, destabilizing, controversial and extremely
difficult for Saudi Arabia, and ultimately would be more likely to weaken the king-
dom than strengthen it. The kingdom has commi ed itself to an industrialization and
economic development program that depends on open access to global markets and
materials; becoming a nuclear outlaw would be fatal to those plans. Pursuing nuclear
weapons would be a flagrant violation of Saudi Arabia’s commitments under the Nu-
clear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and would surely cause a serious breach with the
United States. Saudi Arabia lacks the industrial and technological base to develop such
weapons on its own. An a empt to acquire nuclear weapons by purchasing them, per-
haps from Pakistan, would launch Saudi Arabia on a dangerously inflammatory trajec-
tory that could destabilize the entire region, which Saudi Arabia’s leaders know would
not be in their country’s best interests. The Saudis always prefer stability to turmoil.
Their often-stated official position is that the entire Middle East should become an in-
ternationally supervised region free of all weapons of mass destruction.
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6.5 PKOs
6.5.1 Public Opinion Constrains
Threat of humanitarian intervention is no longer effective—the public is too

opposed to sustained troop deployment
Lu wak 94
Edward N. Lu wak (Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
in Washington, D.C). “Where Are the Great Powers? At Home with the Kids.” For-
eign Affairs. July/August 1994. JDN. h ps://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1994-07-
01/where-are-great-powers-home-kids
During the Cold War as before it, local and regional conflicts were often instigated or
at least encouraged and materially supported by rival great powers. Now, by contrast,
the absence of functioning great powers is the cause of the world’s inability to cope
with all manner of violent disorders. The result is that not only groups of secessionists
and aggressive small powers, such as Serbia, but even mere armed bands can now im-
pose their will or simply rampage, unchecked by any greater force from without. Today
there is neither the danger of great power wars nor the relative tranquility once imposed
by each great power within its own sphere of influence. By the traditional definition,
great powers were states strong enough to successfully wage war without calling on
allies. But that distinction is now outdated, because the issue today is not whether war
can be made with or without allies, but whether war can be made at all. Historically,
there have been tacit preconditions to great power status: a readiness to use force when-
ever it was advantageous to do so and an acceptance of the resulting combat casualties
with equanimity, as long as the number was not disproportionate. In the past, those
preconditions were too blatantly obvious and too easily satisfied to deserve a mention
by either practitioners or theoreticians. Great powers normally relied on intimidation
rather than combat, but only because a willingness to use force was assumed. Moreover,
they would use force undeterred by the prospect of the ensuing casualties, within lim-
its of course. The Somalia debacle, precipitated by the loss of 18 U.S. soldiers, and the
Haiti fiasco, caused by the fear that a handful of U.S. troops might be killed while defeat-
ing that country’s military dictator ship, sufficiently exposed the current unreality of the
great power concept. In pride or shame, Americans might dispute any wider conclusion
from those events. They would like to reserve for themselves the special sensitivity that
forces policy to change completely because 18 professional soldiers are killed (soldiers,
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one might add, who come from a country in which gun-related deaths were last clocked
at one every 14 minutes). But in fact the virtue or malady, as the case may be, is far from
exclusively American. Most recently, Britain and France (not to mention that other pu-
tative great power, Germany) flatly refused to risk their ground troops in combat to
resist aggression in the former Yugoslavia. Overcoming the fear of reprisals against
their own troops, it was only with great reluctance, after almost two years of horrific
outrages, that the two countries finally consented to the carefully circumscribed threat
of NATO air strikes issued in February 1994. To be sure, neither Britain nor France nor
any other European power has any vital interests at stake in the former Yugoslavia. But
that is the very essence of the ma er: the great powers of history would have viewed
the disintegration of Yugoslavia not as a noxious problem to be avoided but as an op-
portunity to be exploited. Using the need to protect populations under a ack as their
propaganda excuse and with the restoration of law and order as their ostensible mo-
tive, they would have intervened to establish zones of influence for themselves, just as
the genuine great powers did in their time (even distant Russia disputed the Austro
Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908). Thus the power vacuum would
have been filled, to the disappointment of local small power ambitions, and to the great
advantage of local populations and peace. As for why nothing of the kind happened in
the former Yugoslavia in the face of atrocities not seen since the Second World War, the
reason is not in dispute: no European government was any more willing than the U.S.
government to risk its soldiers in combat. Of Japan, literally nothing need be said on
this score.
Demographic changes have increased public opposition to troop deploymeny,

undermining its effectiveness
Lu wak 94
Edward N. Lu wak (Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
in Washington, D.C). “Where Are the Great Powers? At Home with the Kids.” For-
eign Affairs. July/August 1994. JDN. h ps://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1994-07-
01/where-are-great-powers-home-kids
If the significance of the new family demographics is accepted, it follows that no ad-
vanced low-birth-rate countries can play the role of a classic great power any more, not
the United States or Russia, not Britain, France or, least of all, Germany or Japan. They
may still possess the physical a ributes of military strength or the eco nomic base to
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develop such strength even on a great scale, but their societies are so allergic to casu-
alties that they are effectively debellicized, or nearly so. Aside from self-defense and
exceptional cases a la the Persian Gulf War, only such conflict as can take place with-
out soldiers is likely to be tolerated. Much can be done by air power, with few lives at
risk, especially if bureaucratic resistance to the use of air power alone can be overcome.
Sea power too can be useful at times, and robotic weapons will be used increasingly.
But Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti remind us that the typical great power business of restor-
ing order still requires ground forces. In the end, the infantry, albeit mechanized, is
still indispensable, although now mostly withheld by the fear of casualties. It is true of
course that high-birth-rate countries can still fight wars by choice, and several have in
recent years. But even those very few among them that have competent armed forces
lack other key great power a ributes, including any significant strategic reach. In the
absence of functioning great powers, the entire character of world politics has changed.
Under the old machtpolitik rules, for example, the United States should have been ea-
ger to extend its military influence to the Russian border by granting full NATO mem-
bership to Poland and other former Warsaw Pact countries. Instead the United States
opposed NATO’s expansion. In the central arena of world affairs, only the commer-
cial and industrial policies that I have elsewhere labeled ”geo-economic” still have a
recognizably conflictual flavor. Unless the world is content to cohabit with chronic dis-
order and widespread violence, a synthetic version of law-and order interventionism
by great powers will have to be invented. The remedies we already have are certainly
inadequate. To keep the armed forces of the United States as powerful as possible—the
preferred military option, of course—Is ineffectual when intimidation will not do it, yet
the United States refuses to fight. And U.S. ability to intimidate cannot but decline as
the word spreads.
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6.5.2 PTSD
Peacekeeping troops empirically experience high rats of PTSD
Li et al. 97
Bre T. Li , Ph.D., Susan M. Orsillo, Ph.D., Ma hew Friedman, M.D., Ph.D., Peter
Ehlich, and Alfonso Batres, Ph.D. “Pos raumatic Stress Disorder Associated With Peace-
keeping Duty in Somalia for U.S. Military Personnel.” American Journal of Psychiatry
154:2, February 1997. JDN. h ps://www.researchgate.net/profile/Susan_Orsillo/publication
/14193220_Pos raumatic_stress_disorder_associated_with_peacekeeping_duty_in_Somalia_for_US_milit
The end of the Cold War has marked a period when the U.S. military is asked to secure
peace under conditions in which peace is tenuous, yet the need for resolution of the
conflict is great. Combat-trained soldiers are highly visible and are exposed to threats
to their lives, yet are asked to exhibit restraint and neutrality. The psychiatric conse-
quences of peacekeeping duty under these conflicting and volatile conditions have been
underresearched. The authors examined the prevalence of pos raumatic stress disor-
der (PTSD) associated with exposure to peacekeeping duty in Somalia. Method: A large
cohort of active duty personnel deployed to Somalia (N=3,461) were surveyed approx-
imately 5 months after their return to the United States. A variety of military service
characteristics and exposure variables and PTSD symptoms were examined. Results:
Eight percent of peacekeepers were found to meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD. PTSD
symptom severity was best predicted by the rewards of military service, war zone stress,
and frustrations with peacekeeping (e.g., restrictive rules of engagement). Conclusions:
It is likely that the mission in Somalia represents a new paradigm of dangerous military
operations for the United States. These data suggest that peacekeeping may be difficult
to reconcile for some combat-trained soldiers and can create a risk for PTSD.
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6.5.3 Impartiality
Peacekeeping rests on the false presumption that the US can intervene while still
remaining impartial
Be s 94
Richard K. Be s (Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Policy

Program at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs). “The
Delusion of Impartial Intervention.” Foreign Affairs. November/December 1994. JDN.
h p://users.metu.edu.tr/utuba/Be s.pdf
Physicians have a mo o that peacemakers would do well to adopt: ”First, do no harm.”

Neither the United States nor the United Nations have quite grasped this. Since the
end of the Cold War unleashed them to intervene in civil conflicts around the world,
they have done reasonably well in some cases, but in others they have unwi ingly pro-
longed suffering where they meant to relieve it. How does this happen? By following
a principle that sounds like common sense: that intervention should be both limited
and impartial, because weighing in on one side of a local struggle undermines the legiti-
macy and effectiveness of outside involvement. This Olympian presumption resonates
with respect for law and international cooperation. It has the ring of prudence, fairness,
and restraint. It makes sense in old-fashioned U.N. peacekeeping operations, where the
outsiders’ role is not to make peace, but to bless and monitor a cease-fire that all parties
have decided to accept. But it becomes a destructive misconception when carried over
to the messier realm of ”peace enforcement,” where the belligerents have yet to decide
that they have nothing more to gain by fighting. Limited intervention may end a war
if the intervenor takes sides, tilts the local balance of power, and helps one of the rivals
to win— that is, if it is not impartial. Impartial intervention may end a war if the out-
siders take complete command of the situation, overawe all the local competitors, and
impose a peace se lement—that is, if it is not limited. Trying to have it both ways usu-
ally blocks peace by doing enough to keep either belligerent from defeating the other,
but not enough to make them stop trying. And the a empt to have it both ways has
brought the United Nations and the United States—and those whom they sought to
help—to varying degrees of grief in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti.
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6.6 Conflict
6.6.1 Arms Cause War
Arms acquisition increases both willingness and opportunity for war
Blanton 99

02006
In the literature on arms and war, there is a dearth of empirical studies on the rela-
tionship between arms acquisitions and repression. Nevertheless, studies of war and
internal conflict do provide some clues. A country’s participation in conflict may be
based on opportunity and willingness (Siverson & Starr, 1991). Without willingness,
arms acquisitions by themselves are unlikely to be sufficient to induce a country to en-
gage in warfare. However, arms are likely to be a contributing factor to conflict as they
enhance opportunity by providing the capability to engage in violent confrontation. In
other words, in response to both external and internal threats, arms acquisitions may
be a proximate or permissive factor that aggravates the likelihood of conflict as it makes
‘the recourse to military means easy and more likely’ (Spear, 1996: 380). By providing
the means for violence, arms enable groups to choose brutal forms of political action.
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6.6.2 Aid Hurts Soft Power
Studies show aid backfires—states become less compliant with US interests
Sullivan et al. 11
Patricia L. Sullivan (University of Georgia), Brock F. Tessman (University of Georgia),

and Xiaojun Li (Stanford University). “US Military Aid and Recipient State Coopera-
tion.” Foreign Policy Analysis (2011) 7, 275–294. JDN. h ps://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
bf4e/e4125c4d788098a9fc326cb32856b49df5b7.pdf
What can states expect to receive in return for the military aid they provide to other
states? Can military aid buy recipient state compliance with donor objectives? In this
study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military assistance on recipient
state behavior toward the United States. We build on existing literature by creating
three explicit theoretical models, employing a new measure of cooperation generated
from events data, and controlling for preference similarity, so that our results capture
the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic
predisposition toward cooperation or conflict. We test seven hypotheses using a com-
bination of simultaneous equation, cross-sectional time series, and Heckman selection
models. We find that, with limited exceptions, increasing levels of US military aid signif-
icantly reduce cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction
to recipient state behavior is also counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick
approach to military aid allocations, our results show that recipient state cooperation is
likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance.
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6.7 Democracy Good
6.7.1 War
Studies prove democracy reduces war
McAllister 16
Gerald L. McAllister (University of North Texas). “Beyond Dyads: Regional Democratic

Strength’s Influence on Dyadic Conflict.” International Interactions. 12 January 2016.
JDN. h p://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2015.1069292
Over the history of modern international relations research, we have moved from sys-
temic and regional studies to empirical explorations of dyadic interactions. However,
our statistical models have put the details of dyadic interactions under a microscope at
the expense of ignoring the relevant regional context that these dyads interact in. This
development has been in part due to computational limitations, but do we really be-
lieve that decision makers interact with one another while ignoring the regional power
balance and the wishes of regional powers? In this paper, I take a look at the well-
researched relationship between democracy and peace by using a multilevel approach
to dyadic interactions and the regions they are embedded in. The findings suggest
that when the regional power balance favors democracies, it influences conflict between
dyads, especially mixed dyads, by increasing the costs of aggression by autocracies, and
establishing regional norms of cooperation and compromise.
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6.7.2 Environment
Democracies be er respect the environment
Policardo 14
Laura Policardo (Università degli Studi di Siena, Siena with expertise in Development
Economics). “Is Democracy Good for the Environment? Quasi-Experimental Evidence
from Regime Transitions.” Environmental and Resource Economics. pp 1-26. 30 De-
cember 2014. JDN. h p://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10640-014-9870-0
At present, however, there is a growing empirical research on the possible affinities be-
tween democracy and ecology. There are several reasons for such a positive relationship.
basically: (1) democracies respect individual rights and so environmentalists are free to
market their ideas and transform them into environmental legislation; (2) the necessity
of democratic government to be elected (or reelected) makes them more responsive to
their citizens; (3) open political systems are more likely to learn from scientists and other
concerned citizens than are autocracies: (4) democratic states tend to cooperate with
each other within international environmental agencies, and finally, (5) because democ-
racies all have free market economies, business in the market can be subject both to en-
vironmental incentives and sanctions (Dasgupta and Maler 1995; Schul and Crocke
1990; Payne 1995). Furthermore, democracies respect human life more than autocracies
and therefore they are more responsive to life-threatening environmental degradation
(Gleditsch and Sverdrup 2003).
Studies show democracies protect the environment
Policardo 14
Laura Policardo (Università degli Studi di Siena, Siena with expertise in Development
Economics). “Is Democracy Good for the Environment? Quasi-Experimental Evidence
from Regime Transitions.” Environmental and Resource Economics. pp 1-26. 30 De-
cember 2014. JDN. h p://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10640-014-9870-0
Despite the different views about the effect of democracy on the environmental man-
agement, in this paper I show that democracy and environmental quality are positively
correlated. To show that, I use the powerful approach of ITS design in cointegration
analysis to show that democratic countries and autocratic ones have two different tar-
gets of environmental quality, with those for democracy higher than those for autoc-
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racies. Previous works on democracy and environmental quality were indeed unable
to assert that democracy is really good for the environment because they did not show
that non-democracies are not. Segmented regression analysis of ITS allows not only to
see the effect of democracy through time, but also if this effect differs from the effect of
autocracy. The weakness of the previous works in this field was therefore that not com-
paring the results with those for dictatorships, the positive effect of democracy on the
environment might not be due to democracy per se, but from other effects, like matura-
tion, or technological progress, common to both regimes. In this panel of 47 transition
countries, this approach shows that democratisation is consistently associated to a re-
duction of CO2 emissions and PM10 concentrations, but this process may be quite slow
because—at least in the ECM relative to CO2 emissions—it is detectable only in the long
run. Due to the fact that democratic institutions tend to be slower than autocratic ones
in taking decisions and acting, in the short run we do not observe a negative effect of
democracy on the level of emissions, while the positive effect of dictatorship is quite con-
sistent. Inequality has two different effects depending on the incumbent regime: in any
case it counterbalances the global effect of the regime. In democracy, increased inequal-
ity means that the decisive citizen is poorer and so less willing to pay for environmental
protection. This however assuming perfect democracy only and full participation to the
poll. From another point of view, it is reasonable to think that democratic institutions
work worse when inequality is high, due to the scarce participation of the poor to the
electoral processes, and therefore democracies with high income inequality resemble
more to a dictatorship than a democracy itself, because decisions are taken by a small
(and usually strongly interested) group of people. Inequality during periods of autoc-
racy, under the assumption that this inequality favors the dictator at the expense of the
rest of the citizens, it may retain the negative effect of the regime since it increases the dic-
tator’s income and so it increases his demand for environmental quality, which may be
driven by a limited (although high) opportunity to substitute environment with private
consumption. The overall effect, however, is that dictatorships tend to be associated to
a worse environment than democracies.
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6.7.3 Economics
Democracy is the only way to achieve long-term economic growth in the Middle
East, and US democracy promotion is key.
Lagon 11
Mark P. Lagon, (Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights). “Promoting Democracy:
The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International Community.” Council
on Foreign Relations. February 2011. JDN. h p://www.cfr.org/democratization/promoting-
democracy-whys-hows-united-states-international-community/p24090
Furthering democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or

mere lip service to build support for strategic policies. Yet there are tangible stakes for
the United States and indeed the world in the spread of democracy—namely, greater
peace, prosperity, and pluralism. Controversial means for promoting democracy
and frequent mismatches between deeds and words have clouded appreciation of
this truth. Democracies often have conflicting priorities, and democracy promotion
is not a panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations
is that established democracies never go to war with one another. Foreign policy
“realists” advocate working with other governments on the basis of interests, irre-
spective of character, and suggest that this approach best preserves stability in the
world. However, durable stability flows from a domestic politics built on consensus
and peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes similar international
conduct for governments. There has long been controversy about whether democracy
enhances economic development. The dramatic growth of China certainly challenges
this notion. Still, history will likely show that democracy yields the most prosperity.
Notwithstanding the global financial turbulence of the past three years, democracy’s
elements facilitate long-term economic growth. These elements include above all
freedom of expression and learning to promote innovation, and rule of law to foster
predictability for investors and stop corruption from stunting growth. It is for that
reason that the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the 2002 UN Financing
for Development Conference in Monterey, Mexico, embraced good governance as the
enabler of development. These elements have unleashed new emerging powers such
as India and Brazil and raised the quality of life for impoverished peoples. Those who
argue that economic development will eventually yield political freedoms may be
reversing the order of influences—or at least discounting the reciprocal relationship
between political and economic liberalization. Finally, democracy affords all groups
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equal access to justice—and equal opportunity to shine as assets in a country’s economy.

Democracy’s support for pluralism prevents human assets—including religious and
ethnic minorities, women, and migrants—from being squandered. Indeed, a shortage
of economic opportunities and outlets for grievances has contributed significantly to
the ongoing upheaval in the Middle East. Pluralism is also precisely what is needed to
stop violent extremism from wreaking havoc on the world. Evolving U.S. Policy To say
there are major interests in democracy’s “enlargement”—that central concept in both
national security strategy blueprints of the Clinton presidency—does not se le what
role the United States should play and what policy tools are appropriate. These are
the questions not of why but of how. A look at waves of U.S. policy since World War
II offers apt lessons. After World War II, the United States played a significant role in
deepening and widening democracy in Western Europe. The United States encouraged
European integration to stabilize the West European democracies, and NATO was a
bulwark within which Italy, West Germany, Portugal, and Spain democratized. Later,
after the Cold War, the twin institutions of NATO and an integrated Europe together
created powerful incentives for emerging East European democracies to join Western
multilateral institutions.
Inclusive political institutions are a pre-requisite to successful economic institutions
Acemoglu and Robinson 12
Darron Acemoglu (The Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics at MIT) and
James Robinson (Formerly, professor of economics at Harvard University; University
Professor at the Harris School of Public Policy Studies of the University of Chicago).
“Why Nations Fail.” Crown Business Publishing. 20 March 2012. JDN.
The reason that Nogales, Arizona, is much richer than Nogales, Sonora, is simple; it
is because of the very different institutions on the two sides of the border, which cre-
ate very different incentives for the inhabitants of Nogales, Arizona, versus Nogales,
Sonora. The United States is also far richer today than either Mexico or Peru because of
the way its institutions, both economic and political, shape the incentives of businesses,
individuals, and politicians. Each society functions with a set of economic and political
rules created and enforced by the state and the citizens collectively. Economic institu-
tions shape economic incentives: the incentives to become educated, to save and invest,
to innovate and adopt new technologies, and so on. It is the political process that deter-
mines what economic institutions people live under, and it is the political institutions
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that determine how this process works. For example, it is the political institutions of a
nation that determine the ability of citizens to control politicians and influence how they
behave. This in turn determines whether politicians are agents of the citizens, albeit im-
perfect, or are able to abuse the power entrusted to them, or that they have usurped, to
amass their own fortunes and to pursue their own agendas, ones detrimental to those
of the citizens. Political institutions include but are not limited to wri en constitutions
and to whether the society is a democracy. They include the power and capacity of the
state to regulate and govern society. It is also necessary to consider more broadly the fac-
tors that determine how political power is distributed in society, particularly the ability
of different groups to act collectively to pursue their objectives or to stop other people
from pursuing theirs. As institutions influence behavior and incentives in real life, they
forge the success or failure of nations. Individual talent ma ers at every level of soci-
ety, but even that needs an institutional framework to transform it into a positive force.
Bill Gates, like other legendary figures in the information technology industry (such
as Paul Allen, Steve Ballmer, Steve Jobs, Larry Page, Sergey Brin, and Jeff Bezos), had
immense talent and ambition. But he ultimately responded to incentives. The school-
ing system in the United States enabled Gates and others like him to acquire a unique
set of skills to complement their talents. The economic institutions in the United States
enabled these men to start companies with ease, without facing insurmountable barri-
ers. Those institutions also made the financing of their projects feasible. The U.S. labor
markets enabled them to hire qualified personnel, and the relatively competitive mar-
ket environment enabled them to expand their companies and market their products.
These entrepreneurs were confident from the beginning that their dream projects could
be implemented: they trusted the institutions and the rule of law that these generated
and they did not worry about the security of their property rights. Finally, the polit-
ical institutions ensured stability and continuity. For one thing, they made sure that
there was no risk of a dictator taking power and changing the rules of the game, ex-
propriating their wealth, imprisoning them, or threatening their lives and livelihoods.
They also made sure that no particular interest in society could warp the government
in an economically disastrous direction, because political power was both limited and
distributed sufficiently broadly that a set of economic institutions that created the incen-
tives for prosperity could emerge. This book will show that while economic institutions
are critical for determining whether a country is poor or prosperous, it is politics and po-
litical institutions that determine what economic institutions a country has. Ultimately
the good economic institutions of the United States resulted from the political institu-
tions that gradually emerged after 1619. Our theory for world inequality shows how
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political and economic institutions interact in causing poverty or prosperity, and how
different parts of the world ended up with such different sets of institutions. Our brief
review of the history of the Americas begins to give a sense of the forces that shape
political and economic institutions. Different pa erns of institutions today are deeply
rooted in the past because once society gets organized in a particular way, this tends to
persist. We’ll show that this fact comes from the way that political and economic insti-
tutions interact. This persistence and the forces that create it also explain why it is so
difficult to remove world inequality and to make poor countries prosperous. Though in-
stitutions are the key to the differences between the two Nogaleses and between Mexico
and the United States, that doesn’t mean there will be a consensus in Mexico to change
institutions. There is no necessity for a society to develop or adopt the institutions that
are best for economic growth or the welfare of its citizens, because other institutions
may be even be er for those who control politics and political institutions. The pow-
erful and the rest of society will often disagree about which set of institutions should
remain in place and which ones should be changed. Carlos Slim would not have been
happy to see his political connections disappear and the entry barriers protecting his
businesses fizzle—no ma er that the entry of new businesses would enrich millions of
Mexicans. Because there is no such consensus, what rules society ends up with is deter-
mined by politics: who has power and how this power can be exercised. Carlos Slim has
the power to get what he wants. Bill Gates’s power is far more limited. That’s why our
theory is about not just economics but also politics. It is about the effects of institutions
on the success and failure of nations—thus the economics of poverty and prosperity; it
is also about how institutions are determined and change over time, and how they fail
to change even when they create poverty and misery for millions—thus the politics of
poverty and prosperity.
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6.7.4 Kant
Democracy is a moral imperative separate from cost benefit analysis
Gauba 96
Kurt Taylor Gauba , assistant professor of political science at Stanford University,

Peace Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford researching the intersection of
democratic politics and international relations, 1996, “Kant, Democracy, and History,”
Journal of Democracy, National Endowment for Democracy, Johns Hopkins University
Press, h ps://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v007/7.4gauba .html
In the end, we find ourselves in a quintessentially Kantian position. Humanity must

take responsibility for its own moral advancement. Yet the foregoing analysis provides
li le solace to those who have shared Kant’s hope that states would be forced into liberal
social reorganization by the practical benefits of democracy in meeting the challenges
of international competition. Even the argument that democracy would prove essential
as a means to the moral goal of peace is weakened by the historical connection between
democratization and war. Thus democracy may have to be pursued as a moral goal in
and of itself, rather than as a means to an end. Kant offers the foundation for such an
approach in his concept of the ”civil” or ”lawful” state. In ”Perpetual Peace,” he advises
states as follows: Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteous-
ness, and your object (the blessing of perpetual peace) will be added unto you. . . .
Whatever the physical consequences may be, the political maxims adopted must not be
influenced by the prospect of any benefit or happiness which might accrue to the state
if it followed them . . . they should be influenced only by the pure concept of right-
ful duty. 19 To use Kant’s famous terminology, the moral argument for the expansion
of democracy is dependent on a philosophical approach that makes democracy itself a
categorical imperative. That republicanism has not advanced relentlessly over the past
two centuries does not mean that it will not in the next two. Kant himself warns us of the
folly of projecting observed trends into the future: Even if it were found that the human
race as a whole had been moving forward and progressing for an indefinitely long time,
no-one could guarantee that its era of decline was not beginning at that very moment,
by virtue of the physical character of our race. And conversely, if it is regressing and de-
teriorating at an accelerating pace, there are no grounds for giving up hope that we are
just about to reach the turning point (punctum flexus contrarii) at which our affairs will
take a turn for the be er, by virtue of the moral character of our race. 20 The collapse of
the Soviet empire may have opened a window of opportunity for democratization. If so,
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the force of recent trends may [End Page 147] reside more in new dynamics and percep-
tions than in the continuation of the dynamics of the past two centuries. It may be that
democracy is increasingly bound up with state legitimacy. Another possibility is that
the information age has created demands for individual freedom that the industrial age
did not. State power may yet become hostage to the entrepreneurial spirit and the un-
hindered exchange of information. The practical benefits of democracy may then work
to accelerate the pace of democratization. Former U.S. secretary of state George Shul
has dressed the Kantian logic in these modern clothes: This new information age has
the potential to be our age--a period which plays to the great strengths of the West. The
productivity and competitiveness of a nation will be far more dependent on how freely
knowledge can be used and shared. And unlike oil or mineral wealth, knowledge is a
resource that does not diminish but, rather, increases with its use. In this sort of environ-
ment, open societies such as our own will thrive; closed societies will fall behind. What
is more, this lesson--that freedom and openness are the wellspring of technological cre-
ativity and economic dynamism--is increasingly well understood throughout the world.
21 Whether or not the practical benefits of democracy are more evident in the future than
they have been in the past, the ultimate lesson Kant offers is that the moral duty to de-
velop political institutions that can enhance individual freedom is independent of such
benefits. The apparent failure of the industrial age to make democracy’s competitive
advantage obvious should serve as a warning to those who may place too much trust
in the forces of nature and modernization to propel the expansion of democracy. Kant
warns that we cannot actually observe the workings of providence in history. ” Mod-
esty,” he says, ”forbids us to speak of providence as something we can recognize.” 22
Such modesty should come naturally, for this analysis of the historical record suggests
that ”nature’s secret design” remains just that.
Democracy is necessary for a Kantian rightful condition
Delahunty and Yoo 10
Robert J. Delahunty (Associate Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School of Law) and John
Yoo (Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School of Law; Visiting Scholar, American Enter-
prise Institute.) “KANT, HABERMAS AND DEMOCRATIC PEACE.” Chicago Journal
of International Law (forthcoming 2010). University of St. Thomas School of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 10-01. 2010. JDN. h p://papers.ssrn.com/abstract= 1544063
Kant’s Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch is probably his most widely read and
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influential work on international law and relations. It was originally published in 1795,
between the 1793 essay On the Common Saying, and The Metaphysic of Morals in 1797.
In Perpetual Peace, Kant sketched out a solution to the problem of war that marks a real
advance over his other formulations—a solution that proposes neither a unitary world-
state like the Chinese or Roman Empires, nor a loose alliance like the Hague Congresses,
nor even a global government modeled on American federalism. Here, in place of the
―positive idea of a world republic, Kant offered the ―negative substitute of an endur-
ing and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war.38 While this ―negative
substitute falls short of the ideal of a ―world republic or unitary, federal global gov-
ernment, it provides the basis for a feasible program of action that can, over time, foster
the conditions for a lasting global peace. In Perpetual Peace, Kant repudiated the anal-
ogy on which he relied elsewhere between individual men in the state of nature and
individual nations in the state of international anarchy. Thus, he wrote: [W]hile natural
right allows us to say of men living in a lawless condition that they ought to abandon
it, the right of nations does not allow us to say the same of states. For as states, they al-
ready have a lawful internal constitution, and thus have outgrown the coercive right of
others to subject them to a wider legal constitution in accordance with their conception
of right.39 Yet, as he did elsewhere, he also insisted here on the necessity of a general
agreement between nations that would establish a permanent (rather than a merely pro-
visional) peace: ―reason, as the highest legislative moral power, absolutely condemns
war as a test of rights and sets up peace as an immediate duty. But peace can neither
be inaugurated nor secured without a general agreement between the nations.‖40 Here
that agreement is to establish ―a particular kind of league, which we might call a pa-
cific federation (foedus pacificum).‖41 Significantly, though, this ―league‖ or ―fed-
eration‖ is to be neither a loose-jointed treaty alliance, nor a world state, nor a federal
union along the lines of the US. This federation does not aim to acquire any power like
that of a state, but merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each state in itself, along
with that of the other confederated states, although this does not mean that they need
to submit to public laws and to a coercive power which enforces them, as men do in
a state of nature.42 The sovereignty of the member states of such a league is thus pre-
served and no supra-state necessarily emerges from their union.43 Yet the bonds that
link the member states together are far stronger and more cohesive than those that unite
the members of a defensive alliance, and the outcome of their association is not merely
a provisional end to any hostilities between them, but the makings of a durable peace.
How is that possible? Kant’s insight is to see that the internal or civil constitutions of
the member states of such a federation can make a decisive difference. Kant has argued
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that states with republican civil constitutions have an innate predisposition to peace.
So ―if by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic,‖ that
nation can provide ―a focal point for federal association among other states.‖44 Other
states, not feeling threatened by that powerful but peaceable republican state, will be
drawn to establish friendly relations with it. Peaceful relations will tend to promote
prosperity, as the states involved shed the burdens of preparing for, waging, and re-
covering from wars with each other.45 Furthermore, peaceful relations between states
will open the door to commerce and trade among them, creating interdependencies that
Kant believes will also deter them from going to war with one another.46 And the suc-
cess of their alliance will in turn draw still other states into association with them. A
crucial step in this argument is, obviously, the claim that ―republics‖ will be naturally
disposed to peace.47 In defending that claim, Kant maintained that a republican form
of government would introduce political and legal controls not found in monarchies or
other non-republican constitutions that would greatly reduce the likelihood of (aggres-
sive) war. If, as is inevitably the case under this [republican] constitution, the consent
of citizens is required to decide whether or not war is to be declared, it is very natural
that they will have a great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For
this would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war . . . . 48 Citizens of
republics, Kant argued, would be most reluctant to assume the burden of fighting them-
selves, paying for the costs of war out of their own resources, facing the risks of devas-
tation to their property, and saddling themselves with onerous war debts. By contrast,
in constitutional systems in which the subject is not a citizen, the rulers can force the
burdens of warfare onto the subject while capturing its gains for themselves.49 Indeed,
as Kenneth Wal has noted, Kant argues that the inner dynamics of war, including the
competition among different groups of economically predatory rulers, will itself enable
subjects to wrest liberty from those rulers, and thus serve to bring about ―republican‖
government.50 C. Kant’s Central Insights Kant’s central insights were to link a state’s
(liberal-democratic) civil constitution to the type of policies it will espouse with respect
to war and peace, and then to explain how associations of like-minded free states will
tend to form zones of peace. These insights have rightly been acclaimed as ―a revolu-
tionary step forward in political philosophy.‖51 To be sure, Kant does not quite advo-
cate the ―democratic peace thesis,‖ if only because he does not insist that the members
of his ―pacific federations‖ must all be republics. Nonetheless, he supplies the core of
the democratic peace idea. By his reasoning, a league of republics would be more likely
to promote peace among its members than a league that included non-republics (be-
cause the la er would retain their propensity for war, even if to a lesser degree). More-
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over, careful students of Kant (including Habermas52) read him to be contemplating a

―liberal pacific union‖ or a ‗―pacific union’ of liberal republics‖53—in other words,
a league whose members are all (or predominantly) ―republican.‖ Thus, even though
later writers provide much deeper and fuller accounts than Kant’s as to why the polit-
ical and constitutional structures of mature liberal democracies tend to produce peace
among them,54 Kant can properly be credited with anticipating the democratic peace
thesis.55
Kantianism justifies foreign intervention to promote democracy
Delahunty and Yoo 10
Robert J. Delahunty (Associate Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School of Law) and John
Yoo (Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School of Law; Visiting Scholar, American Enter-
prise Institute.) “KANT, HABERMAS AND DEMOCRATIC PEACE.” Chicago Journal
of International Law (forthcoming 2010). University of St. Thomas School of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 10-01. 2010. JDN. h p://papers.ssrn.com/abstract= 1544063
III. PERPETUAL PEACE AND DEMOCRACYPROMOTION Democracy promotion in

particular states presents a way forward that does not rely on the utopian vision of a
world republic or federation founded on a cosmopolitan international constitution. As
we have argued here and elsewhere, the notion of a supranational global government
exercising sovereign powers simply does not describe a reality where neither the UN
nor international courts have any enforcement mechanisms of their own. If current
international institutions were to somehow develop into a supranational government,
as we suggested in Section II, they would rest upon anti-democratic foundations that
would make impossible republican government.102 A government strong enough to
exercise sovereign authority throughout the world would have to receive the consent
of democracies and autocracies. The la er would only allow such a world government
if it could not threaten their régimes. Our argument is not based on the notion, which
remains controversial among political philosophers and legal scholars, that a universal
set of human rights exists and that this package includes the right to democratic govern-
ment.103 We disagree, therefore, with the views of President George W. Bush, insofar
as he argued that the primary objective of the US in promoting democracy should be to
uphold the individual right of self-determination. One may well argue instead that for-
eign policy should aim to increase overall human welfare rather than individual human
rights104 or that global security and stability must come first before economic devel-
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opment and human rights can improve.105 Furthermore, democracy might eventually
emerge in, for example, the Islamic world in a form that is different from its histori-
cal forms in the West.106 Instead, we identify democracy as a point of agreement be-
tween Kantians and those who view international politics through a more instrumental
lens. Because of the democratic peace thesis, and explanations for its empirical find-
ings, nations such as the US and its allies may pursue a policy that is in their security
interests, but which has the benefit of drawing the world closer toward the league of
republics as sketched by Kant. Such an outcome would operate like the invisible hand
of the market, in that democracies pursuing their own self-interest in an anarchic inter-
national system will produce gains for global welfare. Welfare will increase through
the maintenance of a peaceful, stable international system that will allow for economic
development and trade, and individuals within the states will enjoy a certain level of
freedom and maintain their cultural identities. If the world becomes Kantian, it will
be by the pursuit of national self-interest, an irony that might well have pleased Kant.
But before we reach any conclusion on whether American foreign policy ought to pro-
mote democracy—even to the point of using force to achieve régime change—we need
to understand the roots of the democratic peace. If the peace is only a statistical regular-
ity explained by factors other than domestic political systems, then spreading democ-
racy will not advance American national security and could well be counter-productive.
Defining democracy in a narrow way in order to fit the data might make the lessons for
real world security more tenuous and even impractical. We need to understand the
causal mechanism that makes democracies less warlike with each other before we can
link the national security policy of individual states to Kant’s larger goal of a league
of democratic republics. The ―empirical regularity‖ of the democratic peace thesis is
critical to our argument. Rigorous statistical analysis shows that democracies do not
wage war with other democracies.107 There are several other important observations
linked to this fundamental finding. Democracies commonly fight wars with nondemoc-
racies. Democracies win a disproportionate share of the conflicts with non-democracies.
Democracies se le disputes through peaceful dispute se lement processes more often
than others. Democracies are more likely to initiate wars against non-democracies than
vice-versa. Democracies fight shorter wars with lower costs when they begin the wars.
Transitional democracies are more likely to fight, and larger democracies are less likely
to go to war than smaller ones.108 Critics have questioned whether the findings are sta-
tistically robust, or have argued that omi ed variables such as the stability of the Cold
War are the true explanations.109 Yet it appears that the democratic peace is as close to a
statistical law as anything will be in international politics. Dispute continues, however,
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over the explanation for the democratic peace. Some of the explanations bear directly
on the relevance of the arguments of Kant and Habermas. One school of thought ar-
gues that democracies share certain norms for resolving conflicts domestically that they
also bring to international politics. Since democracies internally se le their disputes
peacefully, they will only use force in self-defense or, at times, to stop human rights vi-
olators in other countries.110 The leading scholar behind this argument, Michael Doyle,
drew his argument explicitly from Kant in his well-known article, Kant, Liberal Lega-
cies, and Foreign Affairs.111 However, that form of Kantian explanation does not work
because it is not at all clear that democracies direct their peaceful norms outwards as
well as inwards. As noted, democracies have often fought non-democracies, and many
of these wars have not been conflicts of self-defense—in fact, democracies appear to
initiate wars against non-democracies more often than the other way round.112 This
appears to be the case even when the opponent is not an autocracy, but instead is a
colony.113 Nineteenth-century imperialism in Asia and Africa was not an experiment
in exporting democracy. Another claim based on norms is that the leaders of democra-
cies are more likely to trust and respect each other to such an extent that they will avoid
the use of threats and force and instead rely on negotiation and peaceful dispute se le-
ment. Again, it is not clear whether the empirical evidence supports this mechanism.
Democracies have used covert action and force against other democracies—witness the
US’ interventions against Iran in 1953 and Chile in 1973—even when they have been
great powers. Crises between the US, Britain and France have been resolved without
war, but not because they were unwilling to approach the brink of war.114 Institutional
accounts for the democratic peace begin to draw us closer to a confluence of national
self-interest and international public good, though several of them contain their own
faults. However, they still depend, in part, on a Kantian approach because they assume
that democracies will contain certain constitutional or political structures that will make
them more peaceful by nature. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, for example, argue that
democratic régimes make their leaders more accountable to groups in society that will
oppose war more often than not.115 Elected leaders will not undertake costly, unpopu-
lar, or dangerous wars because they will be ousted if they lose. Different variations of
this approach maintain that other features of democratic government will make offen-
sive war difficult. The importance of public opinion places constraints on democratic
leaders, because the public does not want to suffer the costs of war116 while at the same
time, interest groups that benefit from peace and trade will also oppose war.117 Au-
tocrats are responsible, at best, to a much narrower electorate. Separate institutional
features of democracies, which depend on their constitutional structure, also may ex-
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plain the democratic peace. Democracies make decisions in a slower, more transparent
manner because of public discussion in legislatures and multiple checks on authority.
This makes democracies slower to mobilize and less likely to launch successful surprise
a acks.118 These explanations, however, suffer from the same problem that besets the
argument that democracies apply the same norms to their external affairs as to their
internal ones. Institutional features of democracies should be present regardless of the
régime type of their opponent. These arguments tend to claim that democracies are in-
herently more peaceful than non-democracies, and hence when two democracies face
off against each other, these characteristics will interact to lower the chances of war vir-
tually to zero.119 But the empirical evidence does not appear to support the claim that
democracies are more pacifistic; they have no difficulty waging war against autocracies,
and appear to do so more often than autocracies start wars against democracies.120 A
more promising direction is suggested by asking how the democratic peace thesis fits
into theories of why interstate wars occur in the first place. Here, we make use of the
political science literature on crisis bargaining.121 Because war is so destructive, a point
emphasized by Kant, rational nations with complete information should prefer a negoti-
ated se lement to war. Imagine, for example, that the US and China have a dispute over
the control of Taiwan. China issues a threat to the US that it is willing to use force unless
the US removes its protections from Taiwan and allows its absorption by the mainland.
The US must decide whether to accede to China’s demand or to resist with force. Both
the US and China have an expected value for going to war, which is a function of the
probability that each will win a war and the value of controlling Taiwan minus the ex-
pected cost of fighting the conflict. If the US knows that the expected value of controlling
Taiwan is lower for China than the likely cost of any US-China conflict, the US will not
back down because it knows that a rational China would not wage war. Likewise, if
the US knows that the expected value of controlling Taiwan’s independence is higher
to China than the likely cost of war, it will give up its protection or reach some other ne-
gotiated se lement. In both cases, both the US and China avoid the deadweight loss of
warfare, the only change being whether Taiwan remains within the sphere of American
protection or becomes part of China. Several assumptions underlay this model. There
must be a real probability that either the US or China will win, and that both nations
can estimate this probability. Neither China nor the US is risk-seeking, in the sense that
they would gamble to win a low-probability victory. Additionally, Taiwan or the as-
set in dispute can be bargained over and divided, rather than transferred as a whole,
though side payments, linked deals, or different spheres of influence. This noncoop-
erative bargaining model identifies two factors that can produce war, even when both
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sides to the dispute are acting rationally. First, incomplete information can cause na-
tions to estimate important variables incorrectly. For example, China may not know the
US’ expected value of going to war. China may have an understanding of the value of
Taiwan’s independence to the US, but the probability that the US would prevail in a con-
flict will depend on several factors—its military and political capabilities, its diplomatic
support, the nature of Taiwan’s armed forces—that could well be private information
known to the US. China might not know, for example, how many submarines the US
has deployed near Taiwan and how much damage it could inflict on any invasion fleet.
Conversely, the US may also have li le information on the true capability of Chinese
armed forces in Taiwan, its abilities to control the sea and air, and how much political
support will exist for the invasion. Democracies may do a be er job of overcoming this
information deficit than autocracies by providing ways to send more costly signals to
each other.122 Nations can reveal private information to each other so as to reduce the
chances of conflict. A few problems stand in the way. A nation might feed misleading
information in the hopes of exaggerating its probability of winning (that is, engage in
strategic bluffing), or there may be so much publicly available information in a democ-
racy that it is too difficult to filter out the noise.123 To reveal private information cred-
ibly, nations can send a costly signal. A democratic leader who issues a threat—say if
President Obama were to declare that the US would defend Taiwan with armed force—
sends that signal more credibly because he will incur domestic political costs if he does
not follow through. Elements of constitutional design can provide a method for making
signals even more credible. An executive branch that works for legislative enactment
of a war authorization bill can send a more credible signal than simply opinion polls
or speeches by opposition politicians supporting the President. There is a significant
challenge for this theory, however. Just as critics have argued that the norms-based and
political constraints approaches do not seem to hold in wars between democracies and
non-democracies, the informational theory we raise should also lead to reductions in
wars between democracies and opponents regardless of régime type. In the two Amer-
ican wars against Iraq in 1991 and 2003, the President went to Congress and received
authorizations to use force.124 The 1991 bill was particularly costly because it barely
passed the Senate, fifty-two to forty-seven, when Congress was under the control of
the opposition party. Yet, it does not seem that these signals convinced Saddam Hus-
sein to come back to the negotiating table to resolve his outstanding disputes with the
US. Autocrats may have difficulty filtering through all of the information produced by
the political system of a democratic opponent, and may instead only pick and choose
the information that supports their preconceived views.125 Democracies might prove
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able to cut through the noise, but primarily only with other democracies. Democratic
leaders might be be er able to filter through the information produced by an oppos-
ing democracy because they operate in similar political systems. They can distinguish
between general data involving military capabilities, opinion pieces by journalists and
commentators, and specific signals revealing private information sent by responsible
government officials.126 This explanation is different from the norms theory. It is not
that democratic leaders extend their norms of behavior to other nations, but that their
democratic culture and upbringing allow them to understand the signals that emerge
from other democracies in a way that autocracies cannot. These messages, once under-
stood, can help avoid war by revealing private information about the expected value
of war. Commitment problems pose a second obstacle to nations seeking a bargain to
resolve a dispute. Even if nations have full information about their opponent’s prob-
ability of prevailing in conflict, they still may be unable to reach a bargain to head off
war. Full information allows each party to identify the acceptable range of outcomes for
the other, and hence reach a resolution and a distribution of the surplus. Instead, the
problem is that neither party has confidence that the other will perform its obligations
without a supragovernmental enforcement mechanism.127 This is especially the case if
the division of the asset in dispute will give one side an advantage in resources in any
future conflict. Suppose, for example, that the US and China could se le the Taiwan
question by agreeing to a division of the island. Division would give China a distinct
military advantage in any future conflict by providing it with additional resources and
by lessening the tactical advantage of American naval and air forces. The US cannot
rely on China to take advantage of a relative shift in resources in the future and wage
war to take over the rest of the island. The lack of an enforcement mechanism prevents
the two nations from reaching a negotiated se lement, even though they might have
complete information about the other side’s expected value from conflict. Democracies
might be able to overcome this problem by using their domestic constitutions to make
credible commitments. The constitution could divide authority over the international
agreement, in which the participation of other branches would be required to begin or
end cooperation. The participation of more than one branch in the making of the agree-
ment would signal a greater level of commitment by the political system. Requirement
of approval by more than one branch in termination reveals commitment by showing
that higher costs would accrue to end the agreement. If the US, for example, were to
undertake an international arms control agreement, Congress would have to partici-
pate by authorizing the destruction of American weapons systems. Likewise, the other
nation would have more confidence that the US would not breach the agreement be-
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cause Congress would have to authorize any construction of new weapons systems that
might go beyond agreed upon levels. As with signaling, democracies might be be er
able to understand whether the domestic constitutions of other democratic nations may
be able to produce meaningful commitment. An autocrat, for example, may be unable
to navigate the alien constitutional design of a democratic opponent, or may simply
be unwilling to believe that the other branches of government could really block the
democracy’s executive policy. Democratic leaders, by contrast, may be er understand
another country’s constitutional requirement of legislative appropriations for military
expansion or parliamentary approval for treaty formation or termination. It is impor-
tant to understand how this mechanism for the democratic peace is at odds with Kant’s.
Kant argued that democracies would be less likely to make war because, as republics,
they depended on popular consent for their foreign policies. The people, in contrast
to hereditary rulers, would be wary of conflict because of the high costs in lives and
fortunes, the destruction resulting from and the rebuilding necessitated by the conflict,
and the national debts incurred. This, however, does not explain the higher rate of
wars between democracies and autocracies, especially the fact that democracies tend to
launch wars against non-democracies rather than vice versa.128 Our explanation relies
on two different mechanisms, both rooted in the theory that war arises because of a
bargaining failure between two nations in a dispute. The first is that democracies may
have the ability, because of their republican constitutions, to send costly signals that
provide reliable information to their opponents about their capabilities and willingness
to fight. The second is that democracies may be able to make more credible commit-
ments by requiring the consent of more than one branch of government before termi-
nating an international agreement. These mechanisms may function more effectively
in democracy-democracy dyads than democracy-autocracy dyads because democratic
leaders may be be er able to interpret the signals sent, and commitments made, by
another democracy. A democracy may not make its leaders more pacifistic than auto-
crats, but it may allow them to be er understand the abilities of democratic opponents,
including their ability to disable themselves from going to war. If these arguments accu-
rately explain the mechanisms behind the democratic peace, then there may be firmer
grounds for making democracy promotion part of the national security strategies of
the US and its Western allies. We are not arguing that democracy promotion will auto-
matically produce a more peaceful world. If the democratic peace holds true, as well
as its corollary that democracies wage wars with autocracies at a regular pace, then
whether the world becomes more peaceful with the spread of democracy will depend,
in part, on the number of non-democracies in the world. If there are relatively few
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democracies and many autocracies, war might well increase because the former wage
war against the la er more regularly. Nor does our argument here depend on the claim,
to which we are sympathetic, that the spread of democracy will increase global welfare
by spreading freedom and creating the conditions for successful economic growth. In-
stead, the democratic peace suggests that so long as the US remains a democracy, it can
successfully reduce threats to its security by promoting régime change in its enemies.
The great example remains, of course, the post-Second World War experience with Ger-
many, Japan and Italy. These nations formed the Axis threat during the war, but the US
and its allies transformed them into democracies during the postwar period and they
have remained trusted allies ever since. At the time, the US had a selfish motive for its
transformation of the three nations. The start of the Cold War made it imperative that
the US secure allies in Europe and East Asia to help contain Soviet (and later, Chinese)
communism. The US not only promoted democracy on Germany and Italy, but it rec-
ognized West German sovereignty and rearmament as part of the North Atlantic Treaty
Alliance—which also had the effect of containing Germany too.129 When North Korea
invaded the South, Japan became the forward base of operations for the US military ef-
fort.130 The US promoted democracy in Germany, Italy and Japan, not because it was
interested in the Kantian ideal of creating a league of republics, but because it needed
stable, friendly nations in Europe and East Asia. Kant’s league of republics thus be-
comes a welcome by-product of the pursuit of security by democratic nations. The US
and its allies have an interest in promoting democracies because this type of régime
is less likely to pose a national security threat to them in the future. They follow this
policy for selfinterested reasons, not because they seek to add to global welfare gener-
ally. As democracies spread, however, they will create a space of peace in their own
relations that will approximate Kant’s league. That result, not necessarily intended by
the spreaders of democracy, will enhance global welfare. Our account of the mecha-
nisms behind the democratic peace has two implications worth mentioning here. First,
contrary to the account of Habermas, international institutions may well hinder rather
than help this process. Habermas’ mistaken extension of Kant grounds the spread of a
Kantian peace on the strengthening of international institutions such as the UN, which
he hopes will follow the growth pa ern of the EU. Earlier, we argued that the UN and
other international institutions, as currently constructed, could not advance the idea of
a Kantian peace because of the powerful positions held by autocratic (or at least ques-
tionably democratic) states in their governing structures. Nondemocracies hold two of
the five permanent seats on the UN Security Council and are well-represented on other
international bodies such as the International Court of Justice. Indeed, the democratic
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peace has gone on for long periods without any meaningful international organizations
at all (1814-1919, for example), and we are unaware of any empirical studies that show
that the existence of the League of Nations or the UN has done anything to affect the
democratic peace. International organizations may not just represent barren ground
for a democratic peace. They may even affirmatively retard progress toward Kant’s
goal. One reason is the UN Charter’s strict regulation of the use of force. Article 2(4) of
the Charter prohibits nations ―from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.‖131 Article 51 conditions the complete ban on the
use of force against another state in cases of selfdefense: ―Nothing in the present Char-
ter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
a ack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.‖132 Thus, the
Charter creates a system in which nations cannot use force except in self-defense or as
authorized by the Security Council. As one of us has observed earlier, these provisions
seek to drive the amount of force in international politics to zero, and a empt to create
a monopoly on violence in the supranational government of the Security Council, much
as the domestic legal system does with national governments.133 The problem with this
system is that the Charter’s formal rules exclude uses of force that would contribute to
the spread of democracy and, hence, the growth of a zone of peace among republics.
To be sure, a coalition of nations has supported a broader ―responsibility to protect‖
doctrine to create a legal basis for humanitarian intervention.134 That principle would
allow intervention in cases where a government is commi ing systematic human rights
abuses. In 2006, the Security Council even endorsed the responsibility to protect in a res-
olution.135 Nonetheless, the member nations of the UN have not amended Articles 2(4)
or 51 to recognize this new responsibility, which is therefore in tension with the guaran-
tee of territorial sovereignty at the heart of the Charter. Perhaps more importantly, it is
unclear that the UN can live up to its new responsibility. The Security Council Resolu-
tion itself acknowledges that the responsibility to protect will be enforced by collective
action as authorized through the regular channel of the Security Council. In any event,
the responsibility to protect does not address itself to whether a régime is democratic
or not, and would allow autocratic governments to rule so long as humanitarian abuses
ended. An international system that took account of the working mechanisms behind
the democratic peace should expand the grounds for legitimate intervention. It should
also recognize greater flexibility for régime change during the occupation of another
country in the course of intervention. As currently conceived, the international law of
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occupation does not permit an occupying country to change the governmental form or
the laws of the occupied nation. Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, which
formed one of the earliest treaties on the laws of war, declares that an occupying power
―shall take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public
order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country.‖136 As further articulated in Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949, this principle allows an occupying power to alter domestic laws—which would
extend to governmental forms, we assume—when necessary to maintain public order
or protect the occupying power’s own security.137 Unless change in the governmen-
tal form meets these conditions, generally an intervening power cannot engage in the
régime change of a defeated nation to favor democracy. The US and its allies, however,
were able to change the governing structure of Iraq because the régime of Saddam Hus-
sein, as then constituted, posed an ongoing threat to the safety of the occupying forces,
and UN Security Council resolutions encouraged the US and Britain to promote ―repre-
sentative government‖ there.138 But Iraq represents the exception, rather than the rule.
If a Kantian peace is to be spread by democracies acting in their own interests, interna-
tional law should give them more freedom to plant the seeds of republican government
in nations that they occupy.
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6.7.5 Freedom
Democracies are key to respecting freedom
Lynn Jones 98
Lynn-Jones, Sean M. ”Why the United States Should Spread Democracy.” Discussion
Paper 98-07, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, March
1998.
The first way in which the spread of democracy enhances the lives of those who live in
democracies is by promoting individual liberty, including freedom of expression, free-
dom of conscience, and freedom to own private property. Respect for the liberty of indi-
viduals is an inherent feature of democratic politics. As Samuel Huntington has wri en,
liberty is ”the peculiar virtue of democracy.” A democratic political process based on
electoral competition depends on freedom of expression of political views and freedom
to make electoral choices. Moreover, governments that are accountable to the public are
less likely to deprive their citizens of human rights. The global spread of democracy is
likely to bring greater individual liberty to more and more people. Even imperfect and
illiberal democracies tend to offer more liberty than autocracies, and liberal democra-
cies are very likely to promote liberty. Freedom House”s 1997 survey of ”Freedom in
the World” found that 79 out of 118 democracies could be classified as ”free” and 39
were ”partly free” and, of those, 29 qualified as ”high partly free.” In contrast, only 20
of the world”s 73 nondemocracies were ”partly free” and 53 were ”not free.”
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7.1 Solvency
7.1.1 Alt Cause: Non-Military Aid
Exclusively cu ing military aid won’t solve—aid is fungible, so states will funnel
other types of aid to the military
Kono and Montinola 12
Daniel Yuichi Kono (University of California-Davis) and Gabriella R. Montinola

(University of California-Davis). “The Uses and Abuses of Foreign Aid: Development
Aid and Military Spending.” Political Research Quarterly 66(3) 615–629. 2012. JDN.
h ps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1065912912456097
Between 1960 and 2010, rich countries gave poor ones more than three trillion dollars in
development aid.1 The return on this investment has been poor: on average, foreign aid
has failed to promote savings, investment, and growth in recipient countries (Doucou-
liagos and Paldam 2009). For example, while sub-Saharan Africa received $714 billion
in development aid from 1960 to 2006 (Easterly 2008, 14), its per capita income grew by
less than 1 percent per year over this period,2 and its poverty rate has scarcely changed
(Chen and Ravallion 2004). These grim statistics beg the question: Why has develop-
ment aid failed to achieve its goals? One possible answer is that it is simply not used for
its intended purpose. Research shows that aid is fungible (Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu
1998): that is, aid given for one purpose allows governments to shift resources to other
uses. If these other uses do not encourage economic growth or development, neither
will aid. A recent New York Times article on Uganda illustrates this point.3 Although
Uganda has received considerable foreign aid designated for health care, its hospitals
remain starved for resources. This is because foreign aid has allowed the government
to cut its own health care spending: specifically, for each additional aid dollar received,
Uganda cut its health care spending by 57 cents (IHME 2010). Although it is not clear
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where the budgetary savings went, a concurrent rise in military spending suggests that
Uganda exploited its development aid to reallocate funds from health care to the mili-
tary. If so, it is no surprise that this aid did li le to improve the lives of Uganda’s people.
The Uganda example suggests that governments may, more generally, divert aid funds
from developmental uses to military spending. This would be disturbing in at least two
ways. First, military spending does not promote development: studies show that its
impact on growth is nonexistent at best and negative at worst (Dunne and Uye 2009).
Second, military resources are often used to repress domestic dissent. For example, in
the “Arab Spring” of 2011, governments across the Middle East and North Africa used
their armed forces to intimidate prodemocracy protesters. If development aid is gener-
ally diverted to military spending, it could thus have pernicious economic and political
effects.
Autocracies are the most likely regimes to funnel other types of aid to compensate
Kono and Montinola 12
Daniel Yuichi Kono (University of California-Davis) and Gabriella R. Montinola

(University of California-Davis). “The Uses and Abuses of Foreign Aid: Development
Aid and Military Spending.” Political Research Quarterly 66(3) 615–629. 2012. JDN.
h ps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1065912912456097
We argue that these inconclusive results reflect the fact that some governments are more
likely than others to divert development aid to military spending. Because foreign aid
increases government revenue, it also boosts societal demands for a revenue share. Dif-
ferent governments respond to these demands in different ways. Autocratic govern-
ments maintain power by channeling resources to a small group of supporters while
repressing popular demands. Because repression requires costly coercive forces, this
strategy requires autocrats to spend foreign aid on the military. In contrast, democratic
governments stay in power by accommodating popular demands. This requires them
to spend aid, not on the military, but on programs that benefit mass publics. Both types
of government use aid to maintain power, but their different institutional constraints
lead them to do this in different ways. Autocrats divert development aid to the military,
while democrats do not
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7.1.2 Context Dependent
Aid is context dependent and works when used to target the correct
autocracies—those with domestic legitimacy
Wright 9
Joseph Wright (Pennsylvania State University). “How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democra-
tization in Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science Vol. 53, No. 3
(July 2009), pp. 552-571. JDN. h ps://www.jstor.org/stable/25548137
Donors in recent years have made some foreign aid conditional on progress toward
democracy. This study investigates whether and how such conditionality works in prac-
tice. The promise of higher aid if the country democratizes only provides an incentive
for democratization for political leaders who expect to remain in office after democrati-
zation occurs. I show that dictators with large distributional coalitions, who have a good
chance of winning fair elections, tend to respond to aid by democratizing. In contrast,
aid helps dictators with the smallest distributional coalitions hang on to power. I present
a model that shows a dictator’s decision calculus, given different a priori support coali-
tions and varying degrees of aid conditionality, and test the model implications with
data from 190 authoritarian regimes in 101 countries from 1960 to 2002.
The aff’s generalizations are overbroad—aid is effective when targeted at the correct
regime types
Wright 9
Joseph Wright (Pennsylvania State University). “How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democra-
tization in Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science Vol. 53, No. 3
(July 2009), pp. 552-571. JDN. h ps://www.jstor.org/stable/25548137
From Friedman (1958) and Bauer (1971) to recent World Bank policy briefs (Harford
and Klein 2005; Islam and Coviello 2006; Kenny 2006), critics of foreign aid have argued
that aid impedes democratization because it keeps in power dictators who, without aid,
would presumably fail, or be er yet, democratize. Critics of foreign aid have long cited
Joseph Desire Mobutu’s regime in the former Zaire as a prominent example of a brutal
dictator kept in power with Western aid.40 There is li le doubt that Mobutu received
large sums of aid; that he stayed in power for many years after economic crisis beset
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the country in the early 1990s; and that he personally confiscated much of the coun-
try’s wealth, which was funded in part by foreign aid (Scha berg 1988; Wrong 2000).
However, if for every long-lived dictator who receives generous foreign aid there are
many short-lived dictators who receive equally generous amounts of aid, then it be-
comes more difficult to point to aid as the cause of durable dictatorships. For example,
during the 33 years of Mobutu’s rule (1965– 97), the former Zaire received, on average,
3.6% of GNI in aid. The even more durable, but certainly less brutal one-party state in
Botswana received over 10% of GNI per year during that same period. In contrast, the
series of short-lived military regimes that ruled Benin from independence until 1972,
when Kerekou solidified power, received over 5% of GNI in aid per year.41 Put in the
context of other dictatorships, the assertion that Mobutu’s aid dependency was instru-
mental to his survival does not look so obvious. In this article, I have looked at nearly
every dictatorship in the developing world since 1960— capturing both the durable dic-
tators and the short-lived regimes. By considering all dictatorships, and not just the
most prominent or the most durable, we get a different answer than by simply looking
at the few Mobutus of the world. To understand whether foreign aid helps or hinders
democratization, I modeled the dictator’s decision calculus with regard to democrati-
zation. In doing so, I have largely ignored a key component of the aid game—namely
the donor’s objectives. Concerning these objectives, scholars of foreign aid have come
to some fairly robust conclusions about which countries get foreign aid and why. In
short, we know that bilateral donors are more likely to give aid to trade partners, for-
mer colonies, and strategic allies (Alesina and Dollar 2000), while multilateral donors
are more likely to give aid to countries with a good history of growth and political stabil-
ity (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998). Recently, scholars have shown that donors also
favor politically salient recipients, particularly countries that sit as rotating members
of the U.N. Security Council (Kuziemko and Werker 2006). However, other scholars
find that aid distribution follows a more altruistic, or at least a more competent, pa ern:
aid to poorly governed countries mostly takes the form of disaster relief, while aid to
be er-governed countries is predominantly development aid (Bermeo 2008). Further,
there is evidence from the 1990s that bilateral donors decrease aid in response to an-
tidemocratic behavior in recipient countries (Hyde and Boulding 2008). These findings
concerning donor motivations, however, do not challenge my results. For the results of
the theoretical model in this article to hold, I need only assume a minimal level of aid
conditionality on the part of donors. The fact that the empirical results are stronger dur-
ing the post–Cold War period, when presumably conditionality was more meaningful,
suggests that the theoretical implications of the model are quite plausible. In addition,
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while one might argue that the empirical results in this article are potentially biased be-
cause I have not explicitly modeled selection into the sample of aid recipients, or the
sample of highly aid-dependent countries (Vreeland 2003), the two-stage models can
account for potential selection bias. The fact that the two-stage models produce even
stronger results than the naive models suggests that if selection biases the results, it ac-
tually works to strengthen the implications of the theoretical model. I do not take this
to mean that modeling donor behavior is unimportant. However, the two-stage mod-
els and the subperiod results indicate that the implications of the theoretical model are
robust. This brings us to perhaps the most important limitation of this present study:
the fact that the aid data are from Western donors. During the Cold War period, both
Western and communist donors often gave aid precisely to counter the aid given by
the other superpower bloc. Sometimes Western aid was delivered simultaneously with
communist aid, as in Tanzania, and in other cases, the aid was given sequentially by
each of the superpower blocs, as in Ethiopia. Fully modeling donor behavior would re-
quire an aid game that accounts for the strategies of two rival donors and the recipient
country— that is, at least three distinct players. Empirically testing a model of donor
behavior would thus require, at a minimum, systematic time-series, cross-section data
on Soviet and Chinese aid. Unfortunately, collecting Soviet and Chinese aid data that
are consistent over time and with measures of Western aid is beyond the scope of this
study. From a policy perspective, though, the insights from this study are still impor-
tant because ultimately they are based on the experience of Western aid. Knowing, for
example, that foreign aid to single-party regimes may not deter democratization, but in
fact encourage it, while aid to military regimes is likely to entrench their rule, can help
donors decipher which countries should be eligible for foreign aid. It also puts an onus
on donors not to simply use democracy as a hard constraint for entering the pool of
potential aid recipients, since aid to some types of dictators may actually be persuasive.
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7.1.3 Democracy Aid
Non-democracy aid enhances the effectiveness of democracy aid—it increases

incentives for regime compliance
Sco and Steele 11
James M. Sco (Oklahoma State University) and Carie A. Steele (University of

Illinois). “Sponsoring Democracy: The United States and Democracy Aid to the
Developing World, 1988–20011.” International Studies Quarterly (2011) 55, 47–69. JDN.
h p://www.ucdc.edu/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Academic/Courses/V12SB/
demostatistical.pdf
Moreover, as the Cambodia example suggests, like other forms of foreign assistance,
democratization grants frequently include both formal and informal elements of condi-
tionality. Democratic sponsor states expect to see results and often require evidence of
progress to renew the assistance. As democracy aid is targeted and the objective of the
grants is specific and detailed, there is incentive for recipients to put the money to good
use, and monitoring the funded programs is simplified. Sponsor states can therefore
strategically shift these funds to more fertile targets, either within the recipient state
(to be er promote democracy there) or between recipients. The overall consequence
of donor-centered anticipated reactions is that such targeting and tailoring results in
greater likelihood for these democracy aid packages to contribute to democratization.
At the same time, recipients are also driven by anticipated reactions that, combined with
the calculations of sponsor states, heighten the likelihood of impact. Provision of democ-
racy aid by a sponsor state is a clear signal of preference that recipients must consider.
States eligible for democracy assistance are also potential recipients of other forms of
foreign aid. Recipients recognize that continued receipt of such aid depends in part
on progress. Moreover, they also recognize that other forms of assistance (for example,
general economic aid) are more likely to be provided by democratic sponsor states if
their democracy aid packages are effective. Hence, recipients are more likely to receive
other forms of foreign assistance and more likely to retain it for multiple years if the
democracy aid packages work. Therefore, recipient states not only have incentive not
to hinder democratic progress, they also have reason to encourage, or at the very least
accommodate, improvements toward democracy, especially when they are not required
to fund the programs themselves.
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Democracy aid empirically increases democratization
Sco and Steele 11
James M. Sco (Oklahoma State University) and Carie A. Steele (University of

Illinois). “Sponsoring Democracy: The United States and Democracy Aid to the
Developing World, 1988–20011.” International Studies Quarterly (2011) 55, 47–69. JDN.
h p://www.ucdc.edu/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Academic/Courses/V12SB/
demostatistical.pdf
However, as Table 1 shows, countries receiving democracy aid experienced greater im-
provement in their Polity scores from 1988 to 2003 (5.54 points) than those who did
not (2.40 points). This difference is statistically significant at the .01 level. Hence, the
descriptive data provide initial—if limited—evidence that democracy aid is associated
with progress toward democracy, with recipients outpacing non-recipients by more
than twice the rate of improvement. In combination, these two pa erns in the data lend
support to our theorized link and our guiding hypothesis. Table 2 presents the results
of the simultaneous equation model testing the reciprocal aid-democratization relation-
ship, with democracy aid results in the first two columns, and general economic aid re-
sults in next two columns. These results provide evidence in support of the democracy
promotion hypothesis: even when controlling for the simultaneous impact of democra-
tization of aid decisions and other relevant factors, democracy aid exerts a significant
and positive impact on democratization.
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7.2 PKOs
7.2.1 Conflict
Peacekeeping operations dramatically reduce conflict and violence—statistics

confirm
Pinker 11
Stephen Pinker (Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology at Har-
vard University; two time Puli er Prize finalist; winner of the Early Career Award (1984)
and Boyd McCandless Award (1986) from the American Psychological Association, the
Troland Research Award (1993) from the National Academy of Sciences, the Henry Dale
Prize (2004) from the Royal Institution of Great Britain, and the George Miller Prize
(2010) from the Cognitive Neuroscience Society; received honorary doctorates from the
universities of Newcastle, Surrey, Tel Aviv, McGill, Simon Fraser University and the
University of Tromsø, Norway; more of a light red shade than other Stephens). “The
Be er Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined.” Viking Books. 2011. JDN.
Print.
The theory of the Kantian Peace places the weight of peace on three legs, the third of
which is international organizations. One type of international organization in particu-
lar can claim much of the credit for driving down civil wars: international peacekeeping
forces.54 In the postcolonial decades civil wars piled up not so much because they broke
out at an increasing rate but because they broke out at a higher rate than they ended (2.2
outbreaks a year compared to 1.8 terminations), and thus began to accumulate.55 By
1999 an average civil war had been going on for fifteen years! That began to change in
the late 1990s and 2000s, when civil wars started to fizzle out faster than new ones took
their place. They also tended to end in negotiated se lements, without a clear victor,
rather than being fought to the bi er end. Formerly these embers would smolder for a
couple of years and then flare up again, but now they were more likely to die out for
good. This burst of peace coincides with a burst of peacekeepers. Figure 6–6 shows that
beginning in the late 1980s the international community stepped up its peacekeeping
operations and, more importantly, staffed them with increasing numbers of peacekeep-
ers so they could do their job properly. The end of the Cold War was a turning point,
because at last the great powers were more interested in seeing a conflict end than in
seeing their proxy win.56 The rise of peacekeeping is also a sign of the humanist times.
War is increasingly seen as repugnant, and that includes wars that kill black and brown
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people. Peacekeeping is one of the things that the United Nations, for all its foibles, does
well. (It doesn’t do so well at preventing wars in the first place.) In Does Peacekeeping
Work? the political scientist Virginia Page Fortna answers the question in her title with
“a clear and resounding yes.”57 Fortna assembled a dataset of 115 cease-fires in civil
wars from 1944 to 1997 and examined whether the presence of a peacekeeping mission
lowered the chances that the war would reignite. The dataset included missions by the
UN, by permanent organizations such as NATO and the African Union, and by ad hoc
coalitions of states. She found that the presence of peacekeepers reduced the risk of
recidivism into another war by 80 percent. This doesn’t mean that peacekeeping mis-
sions are always successful—the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda are two conspicuous
failures—just that they prevent wars from restarting on average. Peacekeepers need
not be substantial armies. Just as scrawny referees can pull apart brawling hockey play-
ers, lightly armed and even unarmed missions can get in between militias and induce
them to lay down their weapons. And even when they don’t succeed at that, they can
serve as a tripwire for bringing in the bigger guns. Nor do peacekeepers have to be
bluehelmeted soldiers. Functionaries who scrutinize elections, reform the police, mon-
itor human rights, and oversee the functioning of bad governments also make a differ-
ence. FIGURE 6–6. Growth of peacekeeping, 1948–2008 Source: Graph from Gleditsch,
2008, based on research by Siri Rustad. Why does peacekeeping work? The first reason
comes right out of Leviathan: the larger and be er-armed missions can retaliate directly
against violators of a peace agreement on either side, raising the costs of aggression. The
imposed costs and benefits can be reputational as well as material. A member of a mis-
sion commented on what led Afonso Dhlakama and his RENAMO rebel force to sign a
peace agreement with the government of Mozambique: “For Dhlakama, it meant a great
deal to be taken seriously, to go to cocktail parties and be treated with respect. Through
the UN he got the government to stop calling RENAMO ‘armed bandits.’ It felt good
to be wooed.”58 Even small missions can be effective at keeping a peace because they
can free the adversaries from a Hobbesian trap in which each side is tempted to a ack
out of fear of being a acked first. The very act of accepting intrusive peacekeepers is
a costly (hence credible) signal that each side is serious about not a acking. Once the
peacekeepers are in place, they can reinforce this security by monitoring compliance
with the agreement, which allows them to credibly reassure each side that the other is
not secretly rearming. They can also assume everyday policing activities, which deter
the small acts of violence that can escalate into cycles of revenge. And they can identify
the hotheads and spoilers who want to subvert the agreement. Even if a spoiler does
launch a provocative a ack, the peacekeepers can credibly reassure the target that it was
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a rogue act rather than the opening shot in a resumption of aggression. Peacekeeping
initiatives have other levers of influence. They can try to stamp out the trade in contra-
band that finances rebels and warlords, who are often the same people. They can dangle
pork-barrel funding as an incentive to leaders who abide by the peace, enhancing their
power and electoral popularity. As one Sierra Leonean said of a presidential candidate,
“If Kabbah go, white man go, UN go, money go.”59 Also, since thirdworld soldiers (like
premodern soldiers) are often paid in opportunities to plunder, the money can be ap-
plied to “demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration” programs that aim to draw
General Bu Naked and his comrades back into civil society. With guerrillas who have
more of an ideological agenda, the fact that the bribes come from a neutral party rather
than a despised enemy allows them to feel they have not sold out. Leverage can also be
applied to force political leaders to open their governments to rival political or ethnic
groups. As with the financial sweeteners, the fact that the concessions are made to a
neutral party rather than to the hated foe provides the conceder with an opportunity to
save face. Desmond Malloy, a UN worker in Sierra Leone, observed that “peacekeepers
create an atmosphere for negotiations. [Concessions] become a point of pride—it’s a
human trait. So you need a mechanism that allows negotiations without losing dignity
and pride.”60
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7.2.2 AT: Imperialism
Sweeping criticisms of intervention are mistaken—US failure to act causes more

violence, not less
Mallaby 02
Sebastian Mallaby (Editorial writer and columnist for The Washington Post).
“The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for Ameri-
can Empire.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2002), pp. 2-7. JDN.
h p://www.jstor.org/stable/20033079
Lawrence Summers, the dominant professor-politician of the Clinton years, used to say
that the United States is history’s only non-imperialist superpower. But is this claim any-
thing to boast about today? The war on terrorism has focused a ention on the chaotic
states that provide profit and sanctuary to nihilist outlaws, from Sudan and Afghanistan
to Sierra Leone and Somalia. When such power vacuums threatened great powers in the
past, they had a ready solution: imperial ism. But since World War II, that option has
been ruled out. After more than two millennia of empire, orderly societies now refuse
to impose their own institutions on disorderly ones. This anti-imperialist restraint is be-
coming harder to sustain, however, as the disorder in poor countries grows more threat-
ening. Civil wars have grown nastier and longer. In a study of 52 conflicts since 1960,
a recent World Bank study found that wars started after 1980 lasted three times longer
than those beginning in the preceding two decades. Because wars last longer, the num-
ber of countries embroiled in them is growing. And the trend toward violent disorder
may prove self-sustaining, for war breeds the conditions that make fresh conflict likely.
Once a nation descends into violence, its people focus on immediate survival rather
than on the longer term. Saving, investment, and wealth creation taper off; government
officials seek spoils for their cronies rather than designing policies that might build long-
term prosperity. A cycle of poverty, instability, and violence emerges. There is another
reason why state failures may multiply. Violence and social disorder are linked to rapid
population growth, and this demographic pressure shows no sign of abating. In the
next 20 years, the world’s population is projected to grow from around six billion to
eight billion, with nearly all of the increase concentrated in poor countries. Some of the
sharpest demographic stresses will be concentrated in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Ara-
bia, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories-all Islamic societies with powerful currents of
anti-Western extremism. Only sub-Saharan Africa faces a demographic challenge even
sharper than that of the Muslim world. There, an excruciating combination of high birth
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rates and widespread AIDS infection threatens social disintegration and governmental
collapse-which in turn offer opportunities for terrorists to find sanctuary. Terrorism
is only one of the threats that dysfunctional states pose. Much of the world’s illegal
drug supply comes from such countries, whether opium from Afghanistan or cocaine
from Colombia. Other kinds of criminal business flourish under the cover of conflict as
well. Sierra Leone’s black-market diamonds have benefited a rogues’ gallery of thugs,
including President Charles Taylor of Liberia and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Failed states
also challenge orderly ones by boosting immigration pressures. And those pressures
create a lucrative traffic in illegal workers, filling the war chests of criminals. None of
these threats would conjure up an imperialist revival if the West had other ways of re-
sponding. But experience has shown that non-imperialist options notably, foreign aid
and various nation building efforts-are not altogether reliable.
Multilateral solutions will fail unless combined with US leadership—that requires

willingness to commit funds and troops
Mallaby 02
Sebastian Mallaby (Editorial writer and columnist for The Washington Post).
“The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for Ameri-
can Empire.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2002), pp. 2-7. JDN.
The second obstacle to facing the imperial challenge is the stale choice between unilat-
eralism and multilateralism. Neither option, as currently understood, provides a ro-
bust basis for responding to failed states. Unilateralists rightly argue that weak allies
and cumbersome multilateral arrangements undercut international engagement. Yet a
purely unilateral imperialism is no more likely to work than the sometimes muddled
multilateral efforts assembled in the past. Unilateralists need to accept that chaotic coun-
tries are more inclined to accept foreign nation builders if they have international legit-
imacy. And U.S. opinion surveys suggest that international legitimacy ma ers domes-
tically as well. The American public’s support for the Persian Gulf War and the Afghan
conflict reflected the perception that each operation was led by the United States but
backed by the court of world opinion. The best hope of grappling with failed states
lies in institutionalizing this mix of U.S. leadership and international legitimacy. Fortu-
nately, one does not have to look far to see how this could be accomplished. The World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) already embody the same hybrid for-
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mula: both institutions reflect American thinking and priorities yet are simultaneously
multinational. The mixed record of both institutions-notably the World Bank’s failure
on failed states-should not obscure their organizational strengths: they are more pro-
fessional and less driven by national patronage than are U.N. agencies. A new inter-
national body with the same governing structure could be set up to deal with nation
building. It would be subject neither to the frustrations of the U.N. Security Council,
with its Chinese and Russian vetoes, nor to those of the U.N. General Assembly, with
its grid locked one-country-one-vote system. A new international reconstruction fund
might be financed by the rich countries belonging to the Organization for Eco nomic
Cooperation and Development and the other countries that currently contribute to the
World Banks subsidized lending program to the poorest nations. It would assemble
nation-building muscle and expertise and could be deployed wherever its American-
led board decided, thus replacing the ad hoc begging and arm-twisting characteristic
of current peace keeping efforts. Its creation would not amount to an imperial revival.
But it would fill the security void that empires left much as the system of mandates
did after World War I ended the O oman Empire. The new fund would need money,
troops, and a new kind of commitment from the rich powers-and it could be established
only with strong U.S. leadership. Summoning such leadership is immensely difficult,
but America and its allies have no easy options in confronting failed states. They cannot
wish away the problem that chaotic power vacuums can pose. They cannot fix it with
international institutions as they currently exist. And they cannot sensibly wish for a
unilateral American imperium. They must either mold the international machinery to
address the problems of their times, as their predecessors did in creating the U.N., the
World Bank, and the IMF after World War II. Or they can muddle along until some
future collection of leaders rises to the challenge.
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7.2.3 AT: Public Opinion
Empirics show that the impact of public opinion on PKOs is overstated
Burk 99
James Burk (Professor of sociology at Texas A & M University). “Public Support

for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothe-
sis.” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 53-78. JDN.
We began by asking whether there was reliable evidence to support the central claims
of the casualties hypothesis. These were, first, that the public will not support military
deployments which result in casualties; second, that public support for a deployment
would be abruptly withdrawn if casualties unexpectedly occurred; and, finally, that
public opinion on this issue is so powerful that it constrains the use of force by-indeed,
effectively debellicizes-great powers. Based on this article’s analysis of public and elite
opinion during U.S. peacekeeping deployments to Lebanon and Somalia, we may con-
clude with confidence that evidence for this hypothesis is lacking. While public opinion
was not insensitive to the deaths of American soldiers, public approval or disapproval
of both missions was, in fact, largely determined before casualties occurred. Opinions
about the missions did change. The changes were sometimes large and abrupt. In the
case of Lebanon, public opinion fluctuated back and forth in response to the terrorist
bombing that killed so many Marines. But when opinion fluctuated about the bombing,
it moved in a direction opposite to what the casualties hypothesis predicts. It moved
to continue rather than end the deployment. In Somalia, support for the mission had
withered already in response to the changing mission before the firefight in Mogadishu.
Stating the ma er strongly, pa erns of public support for peacekeeping missions re-
veal no irrational or knee-jerk reactions based on a putative unwillingness to tolerate
casualties. They reveal no immature demand for a casualty-free security policy, both
wrong to promise and impossible to deliver. They reveal a public prudently cautious
about what to expect from the use of force. They are willing to risk it for humanitarian
purposes, but they are risk averse with respect to the more complex and often partisan
peace enforcement missions.
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7.2.4 AT: Lu wak
Lu wak’s analysis of public opinion rests on multiple flaws
Burk 99
James Burk (Professor of sociology at Texas A & M University). “Public Support

for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothe-
sis.” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 53-78. JDN.
There are at least three difficulties with the logic of this argument. First, we must sup-
pose, if Lu wak is right, that earlier generations were more tolerant of casualties than
ours. Is that really the case? It may be true that great powers incurred more casualties
in earlier times. But that is not evidence for his argument. Perhaps the chief differ-
ence between then and now is that the public today is be er able than it was to hold
elites to account for the consequences of their security policy. If so, their ability might
stem from an earlier intolerance of casualties. It is not improbable that public revulsion
and unrest over the casualties incurred during World War I forced political and mili-
tary elites since then to take greater care of the lives of soldiers in their command. We
know with certainty that soldiers objected to being thrown into ba le without regard for
their survival; it was not only Russian soldiers who engaged in mutiny.19 Jay Winter’s
recent study of that war documents the extensive grief that civilians felt for the death
of loved ones and strangers. A empts by government officials to assuage or channel
those feelings in support of their policies were not always successful. Tellingly, while
war memorial art recognized the sacrifice by citizens, the message was ”expressed in
terms of sacrifice that must never be allowed to happen again.”20 Birth rates in Britain,
France, and Germany were on average much higher from 1910 to 1920 than they are
today. Second, Lu wak a ributes a complex change in the pa ern of public opinion to
just one factor, the decline in birth rates with all that implies for family structure and
the emotional economy of family life. But single factor theories, for all their luster, dim
as we imagine how many other factors might explain the same result. Lu wak does
briefly consider and dismiss the possibility that the changed a itude toward casualties
is explained by the growth of democracy or the publicity of mass media.21 Even if we ac-
cept these dismissals, other possibilities remain. A major conclusion of Winter’s study,
for example, is that our traditional language for justifying death and consoling the be-
reaved, revived during World War I, lost its persuasive power after that war and has not
been replaced by any other. The modernist culture dominant since then, as shown in
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the work of Paul Fussell, can express anger and despair at war’s casualties, but it does
not console or heal. Military actions may still be justified, but there is no shared theod-
icy to explain away the losses.22 Unwillingness to endure casualties may also rest on
the perception that there are alternatives to pu ing armed forces at risk.23 In his study
of public opinion and the Persian Gulf War, John Mueller suggests that before the war
began, support for it was divided, in part because many believed sanctions could force
Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. Public willingness to support resort to force weakens
when a range of nonmilitary options are available.24 Third, turning from causes to con-
sequences, Lu wak argues that in consequence of the public’s intolerance of casualties,
great powers now avoid resort to force; they are effectively ”debellicized.” It may be
true that public tolerance of casualties is low and that great powers are reluctant to use
force in pursuit of foreign policy. It remains to be said how these states of the world are
linked. Is there evidence that public intolerance has the causal power to affect (to debel-
licize) great power policy? Surely, it is a plausible hypothesis. But that is not enough.
The causal process must be specified and evidence must be provided to show that it pro-
duces the predicted effect. Failing to do that, Lu wak’s predicament is formally similar
to the one Arnold Toynbee faced when he argued that war weariness causes peace. His
”evidence” was the ”long peace” that followed the Napoleonic Wars. But, as Geoffrey
Blainey asks, what caused the ”long peace” from 1870 to 1914, when there was no war
weary generation? Or what caused the outbreak of World War II, which war weariness
should have prevented?25 The problem, however, is not only a formal omission to state
the causal mechanism at work. It is substantive as well.
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7.3 Soft Power
7.3.1 Aid Increases Soft Power
Autocracies are the most likely regime type to comply with US interests in response
to aid
Lai and Morey 6

Brian Lai (University of Iowa) and Daniel S. Morey (Univerrsity of Kentucky). “Impact
of Regime Type on the Influence of U.S. Foreign Aid.” Foreign Policy Analysis (2006) 2,
385–404. JDN. h ps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2006.00037.x
In addition to differences between the aid’s influence on private versus public goods pro-
vision, differences in regime legitimacy make aid more important for nondemocratic
leaders. Democratic leaders are generally more legitimate than their nondemocratic
counterparts as elections confer some degree of popular support on the regime (Win-
trobe 1998; Brooker 2000). Nondemocratic leaders generally suffer from the problem of
how to maintain their legitimacy, relying often on military or party-based mechanisms
to legitimize their rule (Brooker 2000). Most nondemocratic leaders lack the popular
support of the people and require coercive institutions in order to maintain their rule
(Wintrobe 1988; Brooker 2000). This reliance on coercion makes these states more sen-
sitive than their democratic counterparts to reductions in military and economic assis-
tance. Military aid dependence should strongly influence nondemocracies as the safety
of the regime relies on a state’s coercive ability. Military aid provides the leader the
ability to maintain order, suppress dissent internally, and engage in foreign operations
as may be required by her supporters. Thus, we should expect to see military aid-
dependent nondemocracies cooperate more with the U.S. than nondemocracies who are
not dependent on the U.S. for aid. A reduction in aid can potentially cause the former to
lose power as compared with less dependent nondemocracies. For example, looking at
all nondemocratic states6 from 1950 to 1991, the average level of total aid dependence
(aid/Gross Domestic Product [GDP]) is 0.8%. However, the 95% confidence interval
around this mean is quite large, ranging from 0% to 6.8% dependence. States whose
total aid is 6.8% of their entire GNP are likely to rely on aid for their regime mainte-
nance. As a comparison, total U.S. military expenditures for fiscal year 2003 were 4.06%
of U.S. GNP, highlighting the importance of U.S. aid for some regimes.7 Once again,
democratic leaders are less likely to suffer from this problem as their government’s le-
gitimacy is based on popular support and not instruments of coercion. Thus, reductions
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in aid for democratic leaders are less likely to threaten their tenure as their rule does not
require buying off supporters or repressing internal dissent.8 Thus, democracies will
vote with or against the U.S. based on their preference similarity over issues with the
U.S. and not on their aid relationship. Conversely, nondemocratic states that receive
aid will vote differently from those that do not receive aid. Those not receiving aid will
vote depending on their preference similarity with the U.S. However, those that receive
aid are more likely to vote with the U.S. regardless of their true preferences.9 This leads
to our main hypothesis.
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7.3.2 Studies Confirm
Studies of UN vote pa erns confirm that military aid causes states to align with US
interests
Lai and Morey 6
This article analyzes how the regime type of a state influences when U.S. foreign aid
is likely to lead to greater cooperation with the U.S. in the UNGA. We find empirical
support for our argument that the more dependent a nondemocracy is on the U.S. for
military or economic aid, the higher its UN voting similarity. For democracies, the ef-
fect is reversed. Higher levels of dependence actually lead to lower levels of similarity.
These findings are significant for a number of reasons. First, it helps to clarify when
preferences or influence determine how states vote together in the UN. Although both
play a role, their impact is mediated by the domestic incentives of a leader. Thus, coop-
eration is not just about preference similarity or inducements; rather, a state’s domestic
political institutions play an important role. A state’s regime type structures how aid
influences its decision to vote with or against the U.S. in the UN. Also, this finding helps
to clarify when the U.S. is likely to be able to influence states with aid. Aid is a useful
tool of influence when the target is a nondemocratic government because of its domestic
incentives to comply with U.S. objectives. Democratic governments are harder to influ-
ence because their domestic incentives do not lead them to comply with U.S. objectives.
Thus, nondemocratic governments are likely to be easier states to buy cooperation than
democracies. This finding has substantive importance for U.S. foreign policy because it
means that the weak autocratic governments are likely to be open to cooperating with
the U.S. in exchange for aid. Also, this finding might imply that if cooperation is over
an important issue (i.e., anti-terrorism), the U.S. might seek to bolster a nondemocratic
leader and avoid openly criticizing that leader’s democratic record, a policy some argue
the U.S. is currently implementing in Pakistan and other frontline antiterrorism states.
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7.3.3 Prefer Neg Study
UN vote pa erns are the best proxy for state allegiance
Lai and Morey 6
Voting in the UNGA is a unique and important measure of state behavior. Instead of
making general statements of support on an issue, a state is forced to take a recorded
stance in front of a global audience. When a resolution comes to a vote, vague policy
pronouncements are transformed into clear state actions, and because these actions can
have important consequences (see the strain on American–Arab relations over U.S. sup-
port of Israel), one can assume the states weight their votes carefully. Specifically, states
like the U.S. are interested in increasing their level of international support because of
the special role that the UNGA plays. The importance of the UNGA is usually derived
from the moral authority of the institution (Baehr and Gordenker 1994:54). The UNGA
is the only body that can claim to be universal in nature, a representative assembly of the
world. As such ’‘. . . most governments will still try to avoid a direct confrontation with,
or condemnation by, the General Assembly’‘(Baehr and Gordenker 1994:54). Lack of
support or a condemnation from the UNGA can remove legitimacy from a state’s actions
and damage its international prestige. Along with encouraging international resistance,
a loss of legitimacy can have high domestic political costs, particularly in democratic so-
cieties (Claude 1966; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Thus, securing UNGA support is
an important, if sometimes indirect, part of a successful foreign policy. Along with pro-
viding moral authority, the UNGA possesses important decision-making power inside
the UN system, including the election of the nonpermanent members of the Security
Council, and final acceptance to Security Council nominations for Secretary General
and new member states. The UNGA can also exercise a procedure known as’‘Uniting
for Peace” (see Hiscocks 1973:290). Under Uniting for Peace, if the Security Council be-
comes gridlocked, the UNGA can assume control over an outbreak of hostilities and
establish directives for resolving the situation, including the deployment of troops. The
importance of the UNGA, combined with its immunity from state veto, makes it an
important arena for examining interstate competition and cooperation.
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7.4 HR Abuse
7.4.1 HR Factored In
Studies show that the US factors human rights into military aid decisions
Cingnarelli and Pasquarello 85
David L. Cingranelli (Binghamton University) and Thomas E. Pasquarello (Binghamton

University). “Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin
American Countries.” American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 29, No. 3 (August
1985), pp. 539-563. JDN. h ps://www.jstor.org/stable/2111142
We found that decisions regarding the distribution of foreign aid to Latin America were
made in two stages. Table 7 summarizes our findings concerning the role of human
rights considerations during both stages of decisions pertaining to the distribution of
U.S. economic and military aid. During the gatekeeping stage of economic aid deci-
sions, more developed nations were excluded, and human rights records were not a
consideration in determining which nations received economic assistance. When U.S.
policymakers decided upon amounts of economic assistance, however, higher levels of
economic assistance were provided to nations with relatively enlightened human rights
practices. For military aid, nations with poor human rights records often were excluded
at the gatekeeping stage, but once the decision had been made to provide military as-
sistance, the level of assistance could not be explained by the human rights practices of
the recipients. No simple generalizations about the role of human rights in the making
of all U.S. foreign aid policies are possible.
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7.4.2 Guatemala
US military aid does not indiscriminately support human rights abuse—Guatemala

proves
Slate 17
James Slate. “No, America was not Complicit in Human Rights Abuses in Guatemala.”
Medium. 24 October 2017. JDN. h ps://medium.com/@JSlate__/no-was-america-
complicit-in-human-rights-abuses-in-guatemala-bc20f674388a
The United States did not diplomatically nor militarily support Mass Murder/Genocide.
American administration officials issued strong statements deploring political violence
in Guatemala. Lethal US Military Assistance did not continue until the George H.W
Bush Administration in 1989. Non Lethal Military Assistance did not occur until 1985
when the Human Rights Situation Drastically improved and Guatemala held a demo-
cratic election. The Mayan Genocide occurred from the years 1981–1983. US military
aid came after. The Bush Administration also in 1990 suspended military aid and com-
mercial arms sales to Guatemala on human rights grounds. The notion the United States
Government did not care about Human Rights in Guatemala at all is false, anyone pay-
ing a ention to the situation in the 80s can tell you that.
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7.4.3 International Law
Military aid doesn’t violate international law
De Wet 18
Erika de Wet (Professor of International Constitutional Law, University of Pretoria,

South Africa; Honorary Professor, University of Bonn, Germany). “Complicity
in Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law by Incumbent Govern-
ments Through Direct Military Assistance on Request.” Volume 67, Issue 2 April
2018, pp. 287-313. JDN. h ps://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-
and-comparative-law-quarterly/article/complicity-in-violations-of-human-rights-and-
humanitarian-law-by-incumbent-governments-through-direct-military-assistance-on-
request/599E6FE5855334CBD5BBD45E60561CB6
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is fair to conclude that any claim according to which
direct military assistance is prohibited if it aids or assists violations of international hu-
man rights and humanitarian law by the incumbent government does not (yet) find
support in general international law. Therefore, if the statement in Article 3 of the IDI
2011 Resolution, according to which direct military support on request would be prohib-
ited if it violated ‘generally accepted standards of human rights’, 170 also encompasses
direct military support that aided and assisted such violations by the requesting gov-
ernment,171 it would be merely aspirational. First, the triggering of the responsibility
framework in Article 16 ASR in situations where direct military assistance is provided
to incumbent governments accused of continued violations of international humanitar-
ian and human rights law is fraught with uncertainty. Moreover, even if it can be as-
sumed that Article 16 ASR was triggered in all the situations of forcible intervention by
invitation outlined in section II, this does not in and of itself imply that the intervening
States have to terminate their direct military support. State practice does not yet sup-
port the conclusion that such withdrawal is required by general international law. This
remains the case even where such violations amounted to serious violations of peremp-
tory norms of international law in terms of Article 40 ASR.
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Historical examples confirm that aid isn’t treated as a violation of international law
De Wet 18

It is striking that in none of the above-mentioned cases did the human rights track record
of the inviting State prevent the invited States from accepting the request for military
assistance. In addition, criticism by third States relating to such military assistance was
limited to the manner in which the military assistance was exercised and/or its impli-
cations for a political se lement. This is exemplified by the reaction of Western States
to Russia’s intervention in Syria, which accused Russia of direct violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law, as well as aiding and assisting such violations by the Syrian
government.53 Even so, the criticism stopped short of suggesting that the invitation for
direct military support (or the acceptance of the invitation) as such was illegal under in-
ternational law. Stated differently, State practice at first sight does not support the con-
clusion that the human rights record of the inviting government (or that of the invited
State) would in and of itself form a legal barrier under international law to extending or
accepting an invitation for forcible intervention.
States aren’t responsible for other states using their weapons illegally
De Wet 18

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As a general rule, the principle of good faith in international law implies that a State
may provide aid or assistance to another in the belief that it would be used for legal
purposes.91 States may assume that other subjects of international law with whom they
interact in the course of events will act in accordance with good faith.92 Accordingly,
there is no general obligation on States to keep themselves informed of legislative and
constitutional developments in other States with which they have dealings.93 Nor does
a State have to stay abreast of the international obligations of other States with which it
maintains relations (something which in practice also would be very difficult to do).94
As a result, it is unlikely that the knowledge requirement would be fulfilled if an inter-
vening State is unaware that intelligence or operational support provided to the terri-
torial State in the course of the military intervention will be abused to target innocent
civilians who, for example, happen to be related to or acquainted with members of the
rebel group.9
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7.5 Saudi Arabia
7.5.1 Aid Key to Saudi Rels
Military aid is the backbone of US-Saudi ties
Hennigan 18
William J. Hennigan (journalist; Hennigan has earned awards from the National Press
Club and the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Foundation). “What Makes the U.S.-Saudi
Relationship So Special? Weapons, Oil and ’An Army of Lobbyists’.” Time. 18 October
2018. JDN. h p://time.com/5428669/saudi-arabia-military-relationship/
The 75-year alliance between the two nations has been built on a simple arrangement:
American demand for Saudi oil and Saudi demand for American firepower. It is a re-
lationship that is not easily unwound as a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators found out
earlier this year when they moved to cut off military assistance to the Saudis in their
war against Houthi rebels in Yemen. The United Nations has said that more half of
the more than 10,000 people who have been killed in the three-year old war are civil-
ians, and the lives of millions are potentially at risk from famine. The U.S. government
has provided intelligence, munitions and midair refueling to Saudi warplanes since op-
erations kicked off in 2015. A empts by American lawmakers to stop that aid have
thus far failed. Saudi Arabia has spent at least $5.8 million on lobbying Congress this
year, according to data compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics, a government
watchdog. But recently filed documents detailing expenses and reimbursements put
the actual number closer to $9 million, said Lydia Denne , investigator with the Project
on Government Oversight. “The Kingdom has a veritable army of lobbyists and PR
firms working to promote their interests in a wide variety of ways,” she said. The For-
eign Influence Transparency Initiative, a left-leaning think tank in Washington, recently
compiled records filed under Foreign Agents Registration Act that show in 2017 Saudi
lobbyists contacted over 200 members of Congress, including every Senator. The data
also found the Saudi agents contacted officials in the State Department, which oversees
foreign military sales, nearly 100 times. The Saudi-U.S. relationship is peerless when it
comes to arms sales. The kingdom buys more American weapons than any other na-
tion. Saudi Arabia accounted for nearly one-fifth of American of all weapons exports
over the past five years, according to a recent report by the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute. The Pentagon has a team of U.S. service members based out
of the capital Riyadh wholly dedicated the “management and administration of Saudi
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Arabian Foreign Military Sales.” It serves as a direct pipeline to move weapons from
U.S. arms manufacturers into the arms of the Saudi military. The U.S. military’s Joint
Advisory Division works alongside commanders in each branch of the Saudi military
to help fill their weapons needs. Once the Saudis commit to what they want — tanks, at-
tack helicopters, missiles, ships, laser-guided bombs — the arms packages must be OK’d
by the U.S. Defense and State Departments, and approved by Congress. The arrange-
ment falls under the U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia, which is led by a
two-star American general. The mission is primarily designed to bolster Saudi Arabia
against arch-rival Iran in order to assert power and influence in the Middle East. “We
have other very good allies in the Middle East, but if you look at Saudi Arabia: They’re
an ally and they’re a tremendous purchaser of not only military equipment, but other
things,” Trump said Wednesday in the Oval Office.
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7.5.2 Saudi Rels Important
Saudi relations remain vital for US interests in the Middle East
Cowen 18
Tyler Cowen (professor of economics at George Mason University). “The U.S.

Needs Saudi Arabia, and Vice Versa.” Bloomberg. 22 October 2018. JDN.
h ps://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-22/jamal-khashoggi-killing-
u-s-and-saudis-still-need-each-other
Following the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, there have been many calls for reexamining
the U.S.-Saudi relationship, even for imposing sanctions. As an economist, I understand
there are diplomatic fine points to this relationship that lie beyond my expertise, but
still: It is worth reviewing the economic and exchange-based reasons why U.S.-Saudi
relations have been so robust. First, trade between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is currently
about $24 billion per year. You might think that the U.S. is now energy-independent,
but many U.S. allies, most notably Japan, rely on oil imports. Part of the larger U.S.
foreign policy stance is promising those allies freedom from major supply disruptions.
The Saudis typically have recycled their petrodollar surpluses, investing them in Amer-
ican enterprises. As for the other major regional powers: Turkey doesn’t have the oil,
and Iran, with its much larger population, is more likely to invest surplus revenue at
home (and furthermore is afraid of confiscation, given its longstanding pariah status).
Whether you like it or not, the Saudis are America’s natural business ally. The con-
nections between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia run much deeper than the import-export
ledger, however. One feature of the geography of Saudi Arabia is that its major oil fields
stand apart and can be taken over without controlling the major Saudi cities. That is one
reason why the Saudis were so wary of Saddam Hussein. That risk means the Saudis are
especially dependent on American military protection. In turn, the U.S. knows it has a
lot of leverage over the Saudis, and therefore making deals with the Saudis involves eas-
ier enforcement and lower transaction costs. The same cannot be said of deals with Iran.
So in the Saudi-Iran rivalry, the U.S. ends up siding with the Saudis. Historically, Iran
has been a very difficult country to capture or control, and the population has fought
fiercely to defend Iranian territorial integrity. Iran doesn’t need American protection to
the same degree as do the Saudis, and so Iran is more willing to be prickly or openly
hostile to the U.S. Iran shared a border with the former Soviet Union (though not Rus-
sia) and shares Caspian Sea rights with Russia, and the two countries often have had
close and cordial relations. Iran also is easier than Saudi Arabia for China to reach with
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its One Belt, One Road initiative, which aims to build close ties with the countries to its
west. In sum, Iran is going to diversify its geopolitical bets, which pulls it away from the
U.S., even if the issues surrounding nuclear weapons and support for terrorism some-
how were resolved. When it comes to the Saudis, America has strongly encouraged the
government to take what is effectively a fairly pro-Israel stance, including in security
and military cooperation. There is no comparable deal to be had with the less depen-
dent Iran or Turkey, and so this also leads to a relatively close relationship with the
Saudis. Whether for reasons of geography, military power or economics, Israel and
Saudi Arabia are America’s natural partners in the region.
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7.5.3 Saudi Rels Impact
Loss of Saudi-US relations causes Middle East instability, proliferation, and

economic recession
Hannah 13
John Hannah (senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on
U.S. strategy, During the presidency of George W. Bush, he served for eight years on the
staff of Vice President Cheney). “Fear and Loathing in the Kingdom,” Foreign Policy.
29 November 2013. JDN. h p://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/29/fear-and-loathing-in-the-
kingdom/
Driven into a corner, feeling largely abandoned by their traditional superpower patron,
no one should doubt that the Saudis will do what they believe is necessary to ensure
their survival. It would be a mistake to underestimate their capacity to deliver some
very unpleasant surprises: from the groups they feel compelled to support in their esca-
lating proxy war with Iran, to the price of oil, to their sponsorship (and bankrolling) of
a much expanded regional role for Russia and China at America’s expense. Convincing
ourselves that the Saudis will bitch and moan, but in the end prove powerless to act
in ways that harm key U.S. interests would be a very risky strategy. Which brings us
to the question of the Saudi bomb. King Abdullah has been unequivocal with a series
of high-level interlocutors going back several years: If Iran gets the bomb, we get the
bomb. There’s not much artifice to the man. He’s been clear. He’s been consistent. He’s
not known to bluff. And I believe him. Whether or not all the stories about the long-
standing arrangements with the Pakistani nuclear program are true, there’s enough of
a link there that no one should be too shocked if we wake up next week, next month, or
next year to discover that a small nuclear arsenal has suddenly shown up in the Saudi
order of ba le. If the prospect of an Israel-Iran nuclear standoff doesn’t quite get your
pulse to racing, how do you feel about adding a Saudi-Iran standoff to the mix? Think
of two nuclear powers eyeball to eyeball across the Strait of Hormuz — with religious
hatreds boiling over, ballistic missile flight times measured in minutes, and command
and control protocols, well, less than robust. Even short of a nuclear exchange, what
do you think that would do to the price premium on a barrel of oil? Can anyone say
”instant global recession”?
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7.5.4 AT: SA Can’t Prolif
Saudi Arabia has the motive and means for fast timeframe proliferation
Tanzeem 15
Ayesha Tanzeem (Reporter). “Pakistan Has Complicated Nuclear Relationship With

Saudi Arabia, Iran.” VOA News. 4/7/2015. JDN. h p://www.voanews.com/content/
pakistan-has-complicated-nuclear-relationship-with-saudi-arabia-iran/2710343.html)
6/3/15
ISLAMABAD— Iran’s foreign minister visits Pakistan Wednesday to discuss the conflict
in Yemen, which many see as a fight for influence between regional rivals Iran and Saudi
Arabia. Iran also has recently reached a framework nuclear agreement with six world
powers to possibly curb the weapons potential of its nuclear program. Saudi Arabia, in
the past, has reportedly sought to form its own nuclear alliances to counter a perceived
Iranian threat. A member of the Saudi royal family and the kingdom’s former intelli-
gence chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal, warned a few months ago that the kingdom would
seek the same nuclear capabilities that Tehran is allowed to maintain under any deal. In
this regard, Pakistan’s relationship with the kingdom is unusual. On one hand, it has
sold nuclear secrets to Iran in the past through a network run by former chief Pakistani
nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan. The network also sold nuclear technology or know-how
to Libya and North Korea. On the other, it has faced allegations of promising Saudi
Arabia a nuclear umbrella against Iran. ’Unacknowledged nuclear partnership’ Bruce
Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project of the Washington-based Brookings Institute,
wrote in 2008 that Pakistan has “an unacknowledged nuclear partnership to provide the
kingdom with a nuclear deterrent on short notice if ever needed.” A BBC Newsnight
story in 2013 declared that Saudi nuclear weapons were practically “on order” from Pak-
istan. “Saudi Arabia has invested in Pakistani nuclear weapons projects, and believes
it could obtain atomic bombs at will,” the story said based on sources. As late as last
month, a Wall Street Journal story on Saudi nuclear ambitions declared: “Saudi officials
have told successive U.S. administrations they expect to have Pakistan’s support in the
nuclear field, if called upon, because of the kingdom’s massive financial support for
the South Asian country.” While Pakistan denies all of these allegations - and unlike
Pakistan’s nuclear dealings with Iran, Libya and North Korea, the Saudi connection has
never been officially proven - its past behavior makes people suspicious. “We know that
Pakistan’s nuclear program was heavily subsidized by outsiders, financed by outsiders,”
Pakistani nuclear physicist Abdul Hameed Nayyer said. Some of those, such as Libya,
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who helped finance the program, received help with their nuclear programs in return.
Evidence of Pakistan’s involvement was discovered when Libya abandoned its nuclear
program and turned over its equipment to the United States. “If Saudi Arabia also fi-
nanced Pakistan’s nuclear program, it is possible that Saudi Arabia would also demand
such a thing from Pakistan,” Nayyer said. While there is no concrete evidence of Saudi
financing of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, critics point to ancillary support.
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7.5.5 Saudi Backlash
Backlash from Saudi Arabia undermines democracy promotion
Hassan 15
Oz Hassan (Politics and International Studies, The University of Warwick, UK). “Under-
mining the transatlantic democracy agenda? The Arab Spring and Saudi Arabia’s coun-
teracting democracy strategy.” Eds: Nelli Babayan & Thomas Risse. Democratization.
Volume 22, Issue 3. 24 Mar 2015. h p://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347
.2014.981161
The transatlantic emphasis on democratization through economic modernization is

deeply significant with regard to Saudi Arabia’s ability to counter democracy promo-
tion efforts in Egypt. Whilst the US and EU both have a plethora of programmes on
the ground supporting civil society and providing political party and election assis-
tance, Saudi Arabia does not need to challenge these directly to undermine the wider
transatlantic approach to external democracy promotion. The US and EU envisage
democracy promotion in the MENA as a long-term objective that can be socially and
economically engineered. Within this context there are programmes that emphasize
the importance of elections, political liberalization, and the role of civil society, but at
the core of the strategy is economic liberalization. 20 It is through the la er that external
democracy promotion strategies seek to create an independent middle class, which
in turn sets into motion wider political and economic modernization processes. With
this form of modernization thesis underlying both the US and EU external democracy
promotion strategies in the MENA, Saudi Arabia’s willingness to financially support
the Egyptian state can be seen to undercut these efforts. That is to say, that to stymie
transatlantic democracy promotion’s long-term efforts of promoting democracy, Saudi
Arabia targets these modernization processes. In turn, this also undermines the US and
EU’s leverage over Egypt’s political elites; effectively undermining transatlantic efforts
to institutionalize their competitive liberalization strategies. Saudi Arabia’s ability to
undercut the US and EU’s economic leverage, and plans to promote modernization, are
therefore a direct challenge to the transatlantic external democracy promotion agenda.
For example, how can the EU institutionalize conditionality and “more for more” if
Egypt is more financially reliant on Saudi Arabia for immediate economic support?
With the US and EU facing fiscal constraints, it is Saudi Arabia that has provided a
less conditional financial “carrot” to Egyptian elites willing to act as a bulwark against
the Muslim Brotherhood and align themselves with the Kingdom’s national interests.
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Undertaking such a task has been central to the development of Saudi Arabia’s bilateral
relationship with Egypt following the 2011 revolution, and the Kingdom has found
a willing partner in Egypt’s military elites following their 2013 counter-revolution
against the Muslim Brotherhood.
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7.6 Conflict
7.6.1 Domestic Security
Domestic security requires targeting global instability at the source through

weapons, peacekeepers, and training
Daalder and Goldgeier 06
Ivo Daalder (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution) and James Goldgeier (Professor
of Political Science at George Washington University and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at
the Council on Foreign Relations). “Global NATO.” Foreign Affairs, September/October
2006. JDN. h ps://www.researchgate.net/profile/James_Goldgeier/publication/265024
172_Global_NATO/links/584d9e5e08aecb6bd8c9aeb0/Global-NATO.pdf
NATO’s expanded ambit is a result of the new global politics that emerged after the
Cold War. Today, terrorists born in Riyadh and trained in Kandahar hatch deadly plots
in Hamburg to fly airplanes into buildings in New York. Such interconnection means
that developments in one place affect the security, prosperity, and well-being of citi-
zens everywhere. NATO has recognized that the best (and at times the only) defense
against such remote dangers is to tackle them at their source. Such forward defense
often requires a global military reach: helicopters to deliver supplies to disaster zones
and evacuate the injured; command, control, and reconnaissance capabilities to sustain
peacekeeping missions; and experienced military officers to train local security forces.
As the world’s premier multinational military organization, comprising many prosper-
ous nations with a vested interest in maintaining global stability, NATO is uniquely
suited to meeting such demands.
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7.7 Terrorism
7.7.1 Host Nation Abe ing
Aid reduces the incentive for host states to abet terrorists even if it doesn’t defeat
terrorists directly
Bapat 11
This study proposes a strategic explanation for why the U.S. continues to provide mil-
itary aid to host states with problems of terrorism, despite its poor empirical record.
Using a game theoretic model, I demonstrate that U.S. military aid creates a moral haz-
ard problem. If host states are provided with the tools to pacify their territory only if
terrorist campaigns are ongoing, but will lose this aid once the problem of terrorism
ceases, host states have li le incentive to accelerate the demise of terrorist groups. In-
stead, host governments have incentives to play up the threat of terrorism and demand
U.S. military support to pay the cost of keeping terrorists at bay. However, the model
demonstrates that this strategy can be quite dangerous for host states. Although terror-
ists may not initially pose significant threats to host states, these groups may substan-
tially increase in power if a host state is unable to quickly defeat them. Host states will
then become dependent on U.S. military aid to defend themselves against their terrorist
groups. This suggests that while U.S. military aid is likely to be unsuccessful at short-
ening terrorist campaigns, military aid can be seen as a useful anti-terrorist instrument
in that it prevents host states from accommodating anti-American terrorist groups.
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7.7.2 Prefer Neg Evidence
Aff authors have overly narrow definitions of success—military aid has numerous

indirect benefits
Bapat 11
These observations raise the question: why do policymakers continue to use military
aid if 3Please see Freedom House’s publication Freedom in the World 1978-2010 and
Amnesty International’s annual State of the World’s Human Rights 1962-2010. 4 there
is such an abundance of evidence that it is unlikely to reduce the problem of terrorism?
One possible answer to this question may be that scholars have a relatively narrow defi-
nition of what constitutes success against terrorism. Typically, scholars view a policy as
a successful anti-terrorist instrument if it either reduces the number of terrorist a acks,
decreases the number of groups that are operational, or contributes to the collapse of a
terrorist group (Azam & Thelen 2010; Azam & Delacroix 2006; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler
& Younas 2009). While these are certainly reasonable and sound metrics, it is possible
that an additional goal of military aid is to simply prevent terrorists from accomplishing
their objectives. For example, military aid may not be successful in preventing terror-
ists from engaging in a acks, but may be successful in preventing a government from
pursuing conciliatory policies toward these groups. Military aid might also increase
the length of time that terrorist groups must fight in order to accomplish their strategic
objectives. Since most terrorist groups collapse quickly, this increase in duration may
make it impossible for terrorist groups to accomplish their goals (Bapat 2005; Cronin
2009; Jones & Libicki 2008). It is therefore possible that if we expand our definition of
success to include not only a reduction in terrorist a acks, we may see that military aid
gives host states the power to both resist the demands of terrorists and endure the cost
of conflict. To illustrate with an example, consider the case of the U.S./Yemeni relation-
ship. In 2000, al Qaeda launched an a ack against the U.S.S. Cole. This a ack, while not
particularly crippling, demonstrated that al Qaeda was becoming increasingly brazen
in its activities, and willing to a ack U.S. targets. In response, the U.S. increased its
military and economic support for the Yemeni government.4 If we examine the effect of
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this policy after ten years, the fact that al Qaeda still appears to be operational within
Yemen might lead to the conclusion that the military aid provided to the Yemeni gov-
ernment was a failure. However, if we consider that Yemen is not a particularly strong
state, whereas al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to be a relatively stronger group, an
alternative policy for Yemen might have been to negotiate a deal with al Qaeda in which
it allowed the group to conduct anti-American a acks from its territory. However, with
U.S. military support, Yemen continues to profess its support for U.S. policy objectives.
In this case, even though al Qaeda has not been disarmed, one might consider the fact
that Yemen remained loyal to the U.S. as a policy success.
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7.7.3 Empirics
Empirical models show that aid prevents terrorists from gaining a foothold in local
governments
Bapat 11
The conclusions from the theoretical model and subsequent empirical test demonstrate
that military aid prolongs terrorist campaigns largely because the promise of such aid
can make the business of fighting terrorism profitable. However, the model demon-
strates that the U.S. is not completely foolish in continuing to provide military aid de-
spite this set of incentives. The model demonstrates that without military aid, hosts
would likely negotiate with terrorists in order to reach an efficient, peaceful solution to
their disputes. If the issue in dispute for these groups is hostility toward U.S. foreign
policy, such a negotiated se lement would likely involve change that is unfavorable to
U.S. interests. However, if the U.S. provides military aid to the host, the gains from mili-
tary aid give the host no incentive to accommodate the terrorists, and may keep the host
loyal to the U.S. Therefore, if we evaluate the effectiveness of military aid, we can see
that while it is ineffective in that it prolongs campaigns by giving host states disincen-
tives to disarm their terrorists, it is effective at keeping stopping terrorists from altering
a host states foreign policy in any meaningful way. In that sense, military aid can be
effective at accomplishing U.S. foreign 22 policy objectives. Unfortunately, the delay
in negotiation may prolong the violence of a terrorist campaign, and may eventually
make the task of negotiation impossible for host states. The results presented in this
study are consistent with many other studies examining the link between foreign aid
and terrorism. Many of these studies argue that foreign aid has no effect on the level of
terrorist violence, or actually contributes to an increase in terrorist a acks. The model
presented here would suggest that military aid would indeed prevent a host from nego-
tiating, which may contribute to an increase in terrorist violence. However, military aid
may effectively prevent terrorists from doing much more than engaging in greater at-
tacks.. Military aid can therefore be seen as a tool for the U.S. to prevent terrorists from
entering into the legitimate governments of host states, thereby preventing terrorists
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from contributing to changes that would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy
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7.8 AT: Democracy Impacts
7.8.1 AT: Solves War
No statistical correlation between democracy and peace
Jenke and Gelpi 16

Elizabeth Jenke (Duke) and Christopher Gelpi (Duke). “Theme and Variations: His-
torical Contingencies in the Causal Model of Inter-State Conflict.” Journal of Conflict
Resolution. 2016. JDN. h p://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/gelpi.10/JenkeGelpiCOW
Forecast.pdf
Perhaps most importantly, our results show that the impact of joint democracy seems to
vary substantially across historical eras. Benne and Stam have an unusual and complex
specification of the impact of democracy on conflict that involves multiple interaction
terms. But two coefficients appear to be most appropriate for evaluating their claim
that joint democracy has a strong impact on conflict. First, they include a regime sim-
ilarity measure that calculates the absolute value of the difference between the polity
regime scores for the two states in the dyad. This variable simultaneously tests (and
conflates) arguments both about the democratic peace and the so-called “dictatorial
peace” (Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez- Terry 2002). Second, Benne and Stam include the
polity scores of the initiator and target states along with their interaction and the square
of their interaction. The core proposition of the democratic peace is that increases in
democracy within the potential initiator will reduce the probability that the state will
initiate a dispute when the polity score of the potential target state is high (Rousseau et.
al. 1996). So we also examine the robustness of the democratic peace by estimating the
coefficient for the initiator’s polity regime score when the target state’s polity score is at
its maximum. This effect is the central prediction from the democratic peace literature
(Maoz and Russe 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Rousseau et. al. 1996;
Ray 1998). Figure 6 displays the estimated coefficients for these two measures of the
impact of joint democracy. The regime similarity measure is negative and statistically
significant in the post-WWII era. However, the coefficient is positive and does not ap-
proach statistical significance in the inter-war and pre-WWI eras. Consequently, both
of these coefficients fall outside the 95% confidence interval for the post-WWII era. This
result is consistent with those who have argued that the democratic peace phenomenon
is limited to the Cold War era (Farber and Gowa 1995). Our analysis of the impact of
the initiator’s democracy level also reveals inconsistent effects, although its pa ern is
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somewhat different. In this case, we find that democracy has essentially no effect on
conflict in the post-WWII and pre-WWI eras but has a negative and statistically signifi-
cant impact on conflict during the inter-war period. This la er coefficient is outside the
95% confidence interval for the Cold War era.
Robust evidence disproves democratic peace theory
Mousseau 16
Michael Mousseau (University of Central Florida). “Grasping the scientific evidence:

The contractualist peace supersedes the democratic peace.” Conflict Management and
Peace Science. January 28, 2016. JDN. h p://cmp.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/01/28
/0738894215616408
This article draws on new data and analyses to investigate whether the contractualist
peace supersedes the democratic peace. A series of studies have shown that contrac-
tualist economy accounts for the democratic peace, but defenders of the democratic
peace claim that these studies contain measurement errors, that democracy correlates
with peace at least in interaction with contractualist economy, and that the causation is
reversed from democracy to contractualist economy and peace. Results are consistent
across all tests: there is no support for democracy as a cause of peace. The democratic
peace is a statistical artifact explained by contractualist economy.
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7.8.2 Causes War
Democracy increases interstate war
Carmignani and Kler 13
Fabrizio Carmignani (Griffith University) and Parvinder Kler (Griffith University).

“Surrounded by wars: quantifying the role of spatial conflict.” Discussion Papers in Eco-
nomics from Griffith University. No. 2013-03. JDN. h ps://www120.secure.griffith.edu.au
/research/items/92a5623a-2 1-48f4-b2c7-f58ac15028 /1/2013-03-surrounded-by-wars-
quantifying-the-role-of-spatial-conflict-spillovers.pdf
Yet the voluminous research dedicated to studying the determinants of wars and/or its
impact on national incomes has largely been unable to test for the outcome of conflict
spillover. This has been due to a lack of available data as well as a focus on other causes
and consequences of war. Fortunately, there is now a recent but growing literature
on conflict spillovers, which we utilise in order to expand our knowledge and under-
standing of this phenomenon. Specifically, in this paper we study how the incidence
of war (civil and insterstate) in neighbourhood countries affects the incidence of war
in the domestic country. Our results can be summarised as follows. Firstly, we find
that neighbourhood wars are significant predictors of spatial conflict spillovers, even
after controlling for a number of geographic, economic, and institutional characteristics
of the home country. Secondly, we find that democracy asymmetrically affects the in-
cidence of different types of war: more democracy reduces the incidence of civil war
and increases the incidence of interstate war. Thirdly, the effect of per-capita income on
the incidence of war is inverted U-shaped; that is, an increase in income increases the
incidence of war at initially early stages of economic development and then reduces the
incidence of war once countries have reached a threshold stage of development. Finally,
greater societal fractionalization, a rougher terrain, and less abundant natural resources
tend to increase the incidence of war.
Statistics show democratization is a cause of war
Carmignani and Kler 13
Fabrizio Carmignani (Griffith University) and Parvinder Kler (Griffith University).

“Surrounded by wars: quantifying the role of spatial conflict.” Discussion Papers in Eco-
nomics from Griffith University. No. 2013-03. JDN. h ps://www120.secure.griffith.edu
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.au/research/items/92a5623a-2 1-48f4-b2c7-f58ac15028 /1/2013-03-surrounded-by-

wars-quantifying-the-role-of-spatial-conflict-spillovers.pdf
However, there are also some interesting differences relative to the results in the pre-
vious column. The quantitative impact of societal fragmentation is much stronger in
the civil war regression, as probably one would expect given that fragmentation is here
measured within a country and not between countries.4 A wider land area increases
the incidence of international wars, but not the incidence of civil wars. Perhaps more
importantly, democratization now increases the incidence of war. Statistically, both the
linear and the squared term are positive in Column II. This suggests some sort of ex-
ponential effect by which mature democracies tend to be more involved in interstate
war than young democracies.5 This result could be rationalized by observing that in
the post WWII era, highly democratic countries have sometimes engaged in interstate
war in the a empt to “export” democracy. For instance, the broad international coali-
tions built around NATO and/or acting on UN mandate to intervene in localized conflict
(e.g. Somalia, Yugoslavia, Middle-East) all classify as interstate war, thus increasing the
incidence of this type of conflict for countries like the US and the EU members.
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7.8.3 AT: Environment
Democracy doesn’t increase environmental protection
Scruggs 9
Lyle Scruggs (University of Connecticut). “Democracy and Environmental Protection:

An Empirical Analysis.” Presented at the Midwest Political Science Assoc. Meeting in
Chicago, April 2009. JDN. h p://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/mpsa09e.pdf
Over the years, there have been a surprisingly large number of studies that have ex-
amined, in one way or another, the effect of democratic institutions on environmental
policy. However, most of these studies have not done a very good job of evaluating the
evidence in light of prevailing explanations. Our paper has a empted to correct some
of these. The results indicate that there is not much evidence to support the impact of
democracy on overall national environmental performance. Whether one examines in-
dividual indicators of environmental progress, or a conglomeration of them, we find al-
most no evidence to suggest that democratic countries, particularly the long-established
democracies that the theoretical literature suggests are most likely to perform be er, do,
in fact, perform be er. These “non-results” hold for both unconditional and conditional
(i.e., controlling for other factors) performance. The results do suggest that economics
is the dominant driver of performance in the period we are examining.
Other studies are flawed
Scruggs 9
Lyle Scruggs (University of Connecticut). “Democracy and Environmental Protection:

An Empirical Analysis.” Presented at the Midwest Political Science Assoc. Meeting in
Chicago, April 2009. JDN. h p://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/mpsa09e.pdf
The more sanguine view of democracy expressed past research can be traced to several
problems. First, previous cross-national work may have ignored outliers and distribu-
tional anomalies in their pollution variables that undermine conventional tests of pa-
rameter significance. Second, most previous estimates have looked at the recent levels
of pollution in democracies vis-à-vis non-democracies, not at progress in reducing en-
vironmental stresses. Our results suggest that the effects of democracy are likely due
to the fact that most good performing democracies are rich, and wealth is what ma ers
most. Third, previous work has often estimated the effects of democracy as if they were
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simultaneous, which seems highly implausible. Actual explanations of the way that
democracy works hinge on the idea that democratic institutions are the long-standing
rules of the game. Democracies work rather slowly. Fourth, and intimately tied to the
previous point, recent research has implicitly given democracy the credit for the envi-
ronmental improvements in Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
While a number of post-Communist countries became democracies, it is hard to sustain
the argument that this coincidence was primarily the result of popular demands for
environmental protection. Among other things, these countries experienced contempo-
raneous economic liberalization and restructuring brought on by the creation of market
economies that were as much or more responsible for those changes. Once we control
for the unique features of this geo-political anomaly, we cannot sustain the claim that
democracy, or democratization improvements environmental performance.
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7.8.4 AT: Econ
Democracies aren’t sufficient for economic equality
Bermeo 16
Nancy Bermeo (The Nuffield Chair of Comparative Politics at Oxford University and PI-
IRS Senior Scholar at Princeton University). “Does Electoral Democracy Boost Economic
Equality?” Journal of Democracy, Volume 20, Number 4, October 2009, pp. 21-35. JDN.
h p://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.gsu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v020/20.4.bermeo.html
A great deal of important scholarship suggests that the rise of democracy should lead
to a fall in economic inequality. Since at least the time of Aristotle, scholars and po-
litical actors have associated the extension of political rights with the redistribution of
material resources. In the nineteenth century, foes of extending the right to vote often
warned that the newly enfranchised poorer classes would use their ballots to pillage
the rich. Scholars have shown that the expansion of the franchise was, in fact, accom-
panied by a decrease in material inequalities,6 and more recent and highly influential
work has framed democratization itself as a redistribution game. Acemoglu and Robin-
son argue that because “democracy is pro-majority” and “even possibly pro-poor,” its
“redistributive nature” constitutes its “main threat.” They assert that there is a “greater
tendency for redistributive policies in democracies” than in nondemocracies, and even
that “new democracies appear to have been more redistributive than mature democra-
cies throughout the 20th century.”7 How have young democracies behaved in terms of
redistribution since the 1990s? Overall, the long-term trends appear disappointing from
an egalitarian perspective. The term “appear” deserves emphasis because figures mea-
suring economic inequality are notoriously problematic. Cross-country comparisons
and aggregations can be misleading because countries use different means of assess-
ment.8 Even within the same country, time trends are often difficult to trace because
inequality is not assessed on a regular basis and because the assessments that do exist
often reflect a geographic (usually urban) bias. Finally, scholars debate not only how
economic inequality should be measured but which forms of inequality ma er most for
the way that people live. Measurements of economic inequality might be based on in-
dividual or household income, gross or disposable income, land tenure, land-to-wage
ratios, rent-to-wage ratios, or daily caloric intake. They might include or exclude pen-
sioners, the unemployed, the homeless, those who work in the informal sector, and
those without any earnings. Despite these complexities, there seems to be fairly wide
agreement that economic inequality has increased in most countries since the 1990s.
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How does the seemingly immutable persistence of economic inequality affect young
democratic regimes in developing and postcommunist countries? This question has no
single or definitive answer because the effects of economic inequality vary from one
country to the next, depending on a wide range of factors, including the qualities of po-
litical leadership which, of course, cannot be predicted. Nevertheless, experience and
current research suggest two conclusions. The first is that persistently high economic
inequality harms the quality of democracy in profound ways. The second is that even
persistent economic inequality does not, in itself, constitute an insurmountable barrier
to democratic durability. Economic inequality is a potential threat to the durability of
democratic institutions, but the conditions needed to actualize its threat potential are
not often present. Although there is reason to think that advances toward economic
equality increase the probability of democratic survival,9 democracies do not require
advances in economic equality to endure. On the contrary, electoral democracies have
endured despite extremes in economic inequality lasting for generations.
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7.8.5 AT: Kant
Kant is wrong—liberal states don’t guarantee peaceful relations
McKillop 9
Kirsten McKillop (Boston University, PhD student). “The Philosopher’s Peace: Last-
ing or Final? Kant and Democratic Peace Theory.” In Human Ends and the Ends of
Politics, eds. M. Black and K. McKillop, Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows’ Confer-
ences, Vol. 23. 2009. JDN. h p://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-
conferences/vol-xxiii/kirsten-mckillop/
What is curious about Kant’s claim is his suggestion that peace is not only practically
inevitable, but is also a moral imperative. Indeed, Kant thinks that peace would not be
practically possible, let alone practically necessary, if this were not so. The moral basis
of peace is, however, ambiguous, since it emerges from the practical argument about
the possibility and desirability of an end to all wars. This paper aims to investigate this
relation between the moral imperative and the practical possibility of ending all wars. It
does so by arguing that this ambiguity between the practical and moral claims of Kant’s
proposal is a deep problem that cannot resolve the fact that our liberal hatred of war
leads us ineluctably into war. To take just one case, many liberal democratic theorists
give credence to the observation, which has been made at least since Hume, that the
peaceableness of liberal states towards one another seems to be accompanied by a hos-
tility towards non-liberal states, which hostility is the cause of the emergence of ‘total
war.’ This horrifying development seems to emerge from the notion that waging war
for the sake of peace is moral. Kant rejects this implication just as he rejects the notion
that peace is an ultimate end that justifies any means. However, Kant accepts this con-
sequence on different grounds – namely, on the grounds that the practical prerequisite
for lasting peace (i.e., the universal spread of republican society) requires the histori-
cally necessary continuance of war. I will argue that this may prove that the concept
of peace in Kant is philosophically doubtful or worthless. The purpose of doing so is
to show to what extent liberal democratic theories of peace depart from and improve
upon traditional social contract models.
Kant’s account of international peace is historically inaccurate
McKillop 9
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Kirsten McKillop (Boston University, PhD student). “The Philosopher’s Peace: Last-
ing or Final? Kant and Democratic Peace Theory.” In Human Ends and the Ends of
Politics, eds. M. Black and K. McKillop, Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows’ Confer-
ences, Vol. 23. 2009. JDN. h p://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-
conferences/vol-xxiii/kirsten-mckillop/
In short, modern political philosophy bases itself on the claim that society can provide
a solution to the problem of man’s natural state because it is possible to artificially insti-
tute a state of peace among humans.[20] The reason why it is prudent to enter a social
contract is because society provides security. This guarantee involves the recognition
that war between states is possible and must be prepared for, which in turn entails that
peace becomes aligned with security. Kant a empts to alter this situation by driving
the traditional state of nature or contract theories to the extreme in order to make the
case that peace is necessary as a cure to the problem of man’s nature. “Man’s antago-
nistic nature,” Kant writes, “must be capable of solution,” and this is what guarantees
the correctness of the rule of law, as well as the necessity of a practical orientation in
philosophy.[21] The problem is that the solution only works as a guarantee for peace if
it is true that peace is really the basis for this relationship; that is, that the true state of
things is peaceful. This, however, is just what is to be proved by the unity of science. If
Kant’s point is that this cannot be proved in theory, but can only be demanded in prac-
tice, then the unity of theory and practice dissolves. At the beginning of this paper I said
that the notion of peace might be philosophically doubtful or worthless, and our earlier
discussion of the circularity of peace is the main reason for this. We saw how society
may be considered to be good if it is peaceful, but that its peacefulness is also something
that is desired. It is only secure in so far as everyone desires it. Peacefulness is thus it-
self a ma er of the will, or of the good will in Kant’s vocabulary. The trouble with this
picture is that it is not obvious that the good will is actually peaceful. There is no doubt
that “peace” – our belief and hope in this possibility – has enormous psychological and
political importance, but this is not what is at issue. Our passion for peace has been
proved to be a strong ingredient in the motive for war. The nut of Kant’s belief that
peace is possible is his belief that our individual ideas of goodness and happiness will
remain uncontested because of an agreement that we make on the basis of our knowl-
edge that it is good to avoid war. Closer examination shows however, that this is not
the only, and not a sufficient, basis for this agreement. Rather the agreement regard-
ing the disadvantage of war stands on the claim that individual ideas of goodness and
happiness are not politically functional. Thus, the practical conception of politics and
of peace involves, as we noticed before, that we reject the idea that the aim of society is
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human happiness. This result in turn guarantees that the genuine ends of politics are
conceived as being achievable because the ends that are sought are determined before-
hand as goals that are practically possible. The main advantage of this measure is that
it becomes possible to claim that our individual ends may be chosen freely. When such
ends are accompanied by such promises as peace, they become hard to relinquish. This
is the basis of Kant’s claim that the good will is politically salient. It is the dearness of
peace and individual freedom that is the reason why they are politically important and
politically effective. There are two problems here that must suffice for our conclusion.
The first is that because peace is a principle that is so fundamental to our practically
oriented understanding of political theory, it escapes our philosophical compass, and
carries no theoretical import. It is, as was suggested, theoretically useless. The other
problem is that it also might be practically useless too. The wish for peace is not peace,
nor does our hope for peace refute the Realist contention that there are some ma ers
that cannot be solved peacefully. So long as this continues to be true, it is difficult to see
how peace is necessarily more moral than conflict. Kant’s point is that this will no longer
continue to be true once the political conditions for peaceful agreement are put in place,
but this requires that states refrain from pursuing interests that cannot be achieved by
peaceful means, which is hardly a solution if those interests involve ma ers of justice
and survival.
156
7 Neg Cards
7.8.6 AT: Right to Democracy
There is no basis for a right to democracy
Miller 15
David Miller (trained in philosophy at Selwyn College, Cambridge and in politics
at Balliol College, Oxford; Faculty of Philosophy @ Nuffield College). “Is there
a human right to democracy?” University of Oxford Department of Politics and
International Relations. CSSJ Working Papers Series, SJ032, April 2015, Pages 15-16
h p://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/publications/13731/sj032is-there-a-human-
right-to-democracy-final-version.pdf
As I noted above, it is unhelpful to stretch ‘democracy’ so that it means any system
that gives ordinary citizens some political rights; it should be distinguished from the
broader concept of representative government. So what, in conclusion, are the main
reasons for rejecting a human right to democracy? The first is that it would have the
effect of foreclosing investigations into how human rights should best be protected in
societies of different kinds, in favour of a single model which works very successfully
in some places but would work less well, or not work at all, in others. And this is dan-
gerous: it encourages rash interventions under the heading of ‘democracy promotion’
of the kind that we have witnessed in recent decades. The second is that it misleads
us about the value of democracy itself. Human rights, let us recall, are supposed to be
the moral bedrock, conditions that are needed for any decent human life to be possible.
Democracy takes us well beyond that. It is a valuable political achievement, to be sought
after and treasured when the conditions for its existence are favourable. It involves a
particular way of associating together politically, on terms of equality, and where it ex-
ists it has the effect of promoting egalitarian norms in society generally. Nothing I have
said is meant to detract from this value. But we should recognize democracy for what
it is, a form of political association that has social preconditions and embodies particu-
lar values, rather than a universal prescription for achieving the conditions of a decent
human life
7.8.7 AT: Democratic Peace
Democratic peace theory is incorrect
Gar ke and Weisiger 12
157
7 Neg Cards
Erik Gar ke (associate professor of political science at UC San Diego) and Alex Weisiger
(Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania). “Permanent
Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace” International Studies Quar-
terly, 2012, h p://dss.ucsd.edu/~egar ke/publications/gar ke_weisiger_isq_2013.pdf
The “autocratic peace” involves a class of arguments about the conflictual consequences
of regime similarity and difference. Theories disagree over whether democratic and
autocratic relations are distinct or equivalent. Early studies of the autocratic peace
typically focused on certain geographic regions. Despite having li le democracy, low
levels of economic development, arbitrary national borders, and widespread civil
conflict, Africa experiences surprisingly li le interstate war. Several studies a ribute
the “African peace” to historical norms and to the strategic behavior of insecure leaders
who recognize that challenging existing borders invites continental war while encour-
aging secessionist movements risks reciprocal meddling in the country’s own domestic
affairs (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989, 1990).6 However, these arguments
fail to address tensions between individual (state, leader) interests and social goods.
The security dilemma implies precisely that leaders act aggressively despite lacking
revisionist objectives (Jervis 1978). Initial statistical evidence of an autocratic peace
emerged in a negative form with the observation that mixed democratic–autocratic
dyads are more conflict prone than either jointly democratic or jointly autocratic dyads
(Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre 1997). Studies have sought systematic
evidence for or against an autocratic peace. Oren and Hays (1997) evaluate several
data sets, finding that autocracies are less war prone than democracy–autocracy pairs.
Indeed, they find that socialist countries with advanced industrialized economies are
more peaceful than democracies. Werner (2000) finds an effect of political similarity
that coexists with the widely recognized effect of joint democracy. She a ributes the
result to shared preferences arising from a reduced likelihood of disputes over domes-
tic politics. Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) break down the broad category
of autocracy into multiple subgroups and find evidence that shared autocratic type
(personalistic dictatorships, single-party regimes, or military juntas) reduces conflict,
although the observed effects are less pronounced than for joint democracy. Henderson
(2002) goes further by arguing that there is no empirically verifiable democratic peace.
Instead, political dissimilarity causes conflict. Souva (2004) argues and finds that
similarity of both political and economic institutions encourages peace. In the most
sophisticated analysis to date, Benne (2006) finds a robust autocratic peace, though
the effect is smaller than for joint democracy and limited to coherent autocratic regimes.
Petersen (2004), in contrast, uses an alternate categorization of autocracy and finds
158
7 Neg Cards
no support for the claim that similarity prevents or limits conflict. Still, the bulk of
evidence suggests that similar polities are associated with relative peace, even among
nondemocracies. The autocratic peace poses unique challenges for democratic peace
theories. Given that the democratic peace highlights apparently unique characteris-
tics of joint democracy, many explanations are predicated on a ributes found only
in democratic regimes. An autocratic peace implies that scholars should focus on
corollaries or consequences of shared regime type, in addition to, or perhaps even
instead of democracy. In this context, arguments about democratic norms (Maoz and
Russe 1993; Dixon 1994), improved democratic signaling ability (Fearon 1994; Schul
1998, 1999, 2001), the peculiar incentives imposed on leaders by democratic institutions
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003), and democratic learning (Cederman 2001a) all
invite additional scrutiny. While it is theoretically possible that a democratic peace and
an autocratic peace could arise from independent causal processes, logical elegance
and the empirical similarities inherent in shared regime type provide cause to explore
theoretical arguments that spring from regime similarity in general.
159

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Resolved: The United States ought not provide military aid

January/February 2019 LD Brief*

*Published by Victory Briefs, PO Box 803338 #40503, Chicago, IL 60680-3338. Edited by

1 Topic Analysis by Nina Potischman 6

2 Topic Analysis by Marshall Thompson 16

3 Topic Analysis by Pacy Yan 25

3.2.2 Policy Aﬀs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

4 Topic Analysis by Brianna Aaron 36

6.4 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

7 Neg Cards 106

7.5 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

1.3.1 Military Aid

U.S. Congress, provides credits from a special fund at prevailing commer-

1.3.2 Authoritarian Regime

Merriam Webster provides a pre y general deﬁnition of authoritarianism:** “**of, relat-

Freedom House provides a more comprehensive deﬁnition of authoritarianism, high-

ON OCTOBER 16, 2017, Baghdad dispatched troops to the oil-rich city of

1.4.2 Rights Abuses/Structural Violence

the fate of prisoners in Egypt.¹¹

To take advantage of structural injustices is to risk contributing to their

By participating in authoritarian regime’s violation of rights, the U.S. becomes partly

1.5 Neg Arguments

1.5.1 US Political Interests

1.5.2 Civilian Casualties

¹⁴Omelicheva, Mariya. Cartner, Bri nee. Campbell, Luke B. ”Military Aid

Marshall Thompson is pursuing a PhD in philosophy at Florida State University

However, my expertise is in the realm of principles and philosophy, so I will do my best

to authoritarian regimes is bad. Or a compelling aﬃrmative could argue that given

2.2 Aﬃrmative Arguments

Theologiae discusses several central ones:

Hence whoever is cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This hap-

2.2.2 Democracy Aﬃrmatives

2.3 Negative Arguments

1. Food and resources are necessary for human good.

1. Weaponry and force are necessary for societies’ good.

U.S. government’s judgement that a nation is authoritarian. I personally recommend

3.1.2 Ought not

3.1.3 Military Aid

Is specifying a type of military aid legitimate? Semantically speaking, the resolution

3.1.4 Authoritarian regimes

Regime implies a mode of rule or management, government in power, or a period of

The Encyclopedia Britannica³ deﬁnes authoritarianism as the following:

“Authoritarianism, principle of blind submission to authority, as opposed to

Authoritarianism thus stands in fundamental contrast to democracy. It also

clude the pro-Western military dictatorships that existed in Latin America

Is a speciﬁcation of an authoritarian regime legitimate? It seems like the answer is no,

Let’s use the Lawrence example again.

3.2 Aﬃrmative positions

3.2.2 Policy Aﬀs

and caused violence there⁵.

3.3 Negative Positions

“Authoritarian Foreign Aid: These regimes are using soft-power methods

the aﬃrmative could easily be resolved by a variety diﬀerent advantage counterplans,

aid accounted anywhere from 15% to 20% of defense expenditures of recip-

Furthermore, these statements have a couple of implications for Aﬃrmatives seeking

Military trade implies arms manufacture through military R&D, science-

²NAIDU, M. V. “MILITARY POWER, MILITARISM AND MILITARIZATION: AN ATTEMPT AT CLAR-

4.4.1 Peacekeeper Masculinity

…hegemonic masculinity can be positive: ‘the conceptualization of hege-

What Duncanson is suggesting here is that many people—particularly women—are not

5.1 Military Aid

5.1.1 FMF and IMET

5.1.2 Weapons and Training

Merriam Webster provides a pre y general deﬁnition of authoritarianism: “of, relat-