I.

Admissibility of Evidence

1. People vs. Lauga Case Digest

Facts:

Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old daughter. One of the witnesses
for the prosecution was Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay. Banting testified that after his
assistance was sought, he proceeded to Lauga's house and found the latter wearing only his underwear. He
invited Lauga to the police station, to which Lauga obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga admitted to him that he
raped his daughter AAA because he was unable to control himself. Lauga contested the admissibility in
evidence of his alleged confession with Banting. He argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy
Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer
and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.

Issue:

Is the extrajudicial confession made before a bantay bayan without the assistance of a lawyer admissible in
evidence?

Held:

No. Bantay bayan is a group of male residents living in the area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in
their community. Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the
“bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of
peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy
Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Therefore, the
extrajudicial confession of appellant taken without counsel was inadmissible in evidence. [People vs Antonio
Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010]

II. Judicial Notice and Judicial Admissions

2. Sps. Latip v Chua

Respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building,
located at Baclaran, Paraaque City.
 On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against Sps, Spouses
Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two
cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.

Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over
two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they
readily accepted Rosalies offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction
at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of P2,570,000.00 would be used to finish
construction of the building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.

Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied
them without waiting for the completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of
lease they signed had been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were
surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalies counsel and the subsequent filing of a complaint against
them. The MeTC ruled in favor of Chua

The RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other
substantial aspects, incomplete. Further on this point, the RTC noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the
signature of Ferdinand Chua, Rosalies husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses Latip on the first page thereof;
(3) the specific dates for the term of the contract which only stated that the lease is for six (6) y[ea]rs only
starting from December 1999 or up to December 2005; (4) the exact date of execution of the document, albeit
the month of December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of deposit or
advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.

In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision
of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not
notarized, remained a complete and valid contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the alleged
defects in the contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount
of P2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common
practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court,
this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that
they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat.

Issue:
WON court should give judicial notice to the practice of payment of goodwill money for rent.
Held:
NO. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is
mandatory or discretionary on the courts.
 I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The
power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be
taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject
should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter
must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled
and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed
to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is
limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.

But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge
is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his
action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are commonly known.

Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to
the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may
be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided
they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as
forming part of the common knowledge of every person.[11]

From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the
appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA
took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither
the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of
common knowledge or notoriously known.

We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to
prove her claim that the amount of P2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money.
Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint
declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie
as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that
need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual
form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.

However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary
evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged
practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court What need not be proved.
 Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill
money in the Baclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded
that the power to take judicial notice.

3. ATCI v. Echin October 11, 2010 G.R. No. 178551

FACTS:
Josefina Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the
Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract,
denominated as a MOA.
Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one year.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001,
she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.
Respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI as the local recruitment
agency, represented by Amalia Ikdal, and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
The Labor Arbiter held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her
US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of her contract.
The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government
agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly
dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwaits
Civil Service Laws.
The CA affirmed the NLRC Resolution

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for the illegal dismissal of respondent.

RULING:
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of OFWs
which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency
clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principals liability must first be established before it, as
agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the
plight of the working class. Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign
principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principals liability before petitioner can be
held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it
was expressly provided in respondents employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms
of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact
POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not
substantiated.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of
proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to
discharge.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must
be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with the
Rules of Court.
These documents submitted by petitioners do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as
a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws.
Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too following the
express provision of R.A. 8042:
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this
section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment
and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that
may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers
and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
The petition is DENIED

4. Chingkoe v Chingkoe

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the 3 July 2008 Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) annulling the 30 March 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City.1 The RTC affirmed2 the Metropolitan Trial Court's (MTC) dismissal3 of the Complaint for
unlawful detainer filed by herein respondents.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Respondents are the registered owners of a real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8283 4 of
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. They claim that sometime in 1990, out of tolerance and permission,
they allowed respondent Faustino’s brother, Felix, and his wife, Rosita, to inhabit the subject property situated
at No. 58 Lopez Jaena Street, Ayala Heights, Quezon City. Due to the intercession of their mother, Tan Po
Chu, Faustino agreed to sell the property to Felix on condition that the title shall be delivered only after Felix
and Rosita’s payment of the full purchase price, and after respondents’ settlement of their mortgage
obligations with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). After further prodding from their
mother, however, and at Felix’s request, Faustino agreed to deliver in advance an incomplete draft of a Deed
of Absolute Sale, which had not yet been notarized. While respondents themselves drafted the deed, the
parties again agreed that the document would only be completed after full payment.5

On 24 July 2001, respondents sent a demand letter6 to petitioners asking them to vacate the premises. To this
date, petitioners have refused to do so, prompting respondents to file a complaint 7 for unlawful detainer with
the MTC of Quezon City. In their Answer, petitioners presented a copy of a completed Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 10 October 1994, claiming that respondents had sold the property for ₱3,130,000, which petitioners had
paid in full and in cash on the same day. Due to respondents’ adamant refusal to surrender the title to them as
buyers, petitioners were allegedly constrained to file an action for specific performance with Branch 96 of the
Quezon City RTC on 31 January 1995.8

The MTC gave weight to the Deed of Sale presented by petitioners and dismissed the Complaint, as follows:

The defendants herein assert that "since October 1994, when they bought their property in CASH, their stay
thereat is by virtue of their absolute ownership thereof as provided for in the Absolute Deed of Sale," x x x.
The foregoing would right away tell us that this Court is barred from ordering the ejectment of the defendants
from the premises in question so much so that what is at stake only in cases of this nature as above stated is as
regards possession only.

With the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale whereby the Vendors never reserved their rights and interests
over the property after the sale, and the transfer appears to be absolute, beside the fact that the property is now
under the control and custody of the defendants, we could conclude that instant case unlawful detainer (sic) is
destined to fail,9

x x x.

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC in toto, reasoning thus:

x x x (T)here exists a Deed presented in evidence on the sale of the subject property entered into by the herein
parties. The Deed of Sale renders weak the claim of tolerance or permission.

Although the plaintiffs-appellants questioned the validity and authenticity of the Deed of Sale, this will not
change the nature of the action as an unlawful detainer, in the light of our premise of the principal issue in
unlawful detainer – possession de facto.10

The CA reversed the findings of the lower courts and ruled that a mere plea of title over disputed land by the
defendant cannot be used as sound basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession. Citing Refugia v.
Court of Appeals, the appellate court found that petitioners’ stay on the property was merely a tolerated
possession, which they were no longer entitled to continue. The deed they presented was not one of sale, but a
"document preparatory to an actual sale, prepared by the petitioners upon the insistence and prodding of their
mother to soothe in temper respondent Felix Chingkoe."11

Petitioners now come before this Court, raising the following arguments:

a. The CA committed reversible error when it admitted and gave weight to testimony given in a different
proceeding (action for specific performance) pending before the Regional Trial Court in resolving the issue
herein (unlawful detainer); and

b. The CA committed reversible error when it ruled on the validity of a notarized Deed of Sale in a summary
ejectment action.

We deny the petition.

Anent the first argument, petitioners fault the CA for citing and giving credence to the testimony of Tan Po
Chu, who was presented as a witness in another case, the action for specific performance filed by petitioners.
The CA stated:
In the case instituted by the respondents against herein petitioner for Specific Performance entitled "Felix
Chingkoe and Rosita Chingkoe v. Faustino Chingkoe and Gloria Chingkoe," docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-95-22865 pending before Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Tan Po Chu testified on
25 November 1999 to shed light on the matter once and for all, to wit:

xxxx

Atty. Nicolas:

Q You mentioned that this is the second copy of the deed of absolute sale, you identified the signature
appearing here as the signature of Felix, how do you know that this is the signature of Felix?

A Well, he is my son. I am familiar with his signature and besides that he signed it in my presence.

Q And this is the very document and not as photocopy (sic) of the second document which you brought to
Felix?

Atty. Flores:

Again, Your Honor, very leading.

Court:

I will allow.

A I am not very sure now but I think this is the real one, I think this is the one because I saw him signed (sic)
this.

Atty. Nicolas:

May I request that this be marked as Exhibit "1" and the signature of Felix be signed as Exhibit "1-A"?

Court:

Mark.

Atty. Flores:

Just a moment, no basis, Your Honor, please.

Atty. Nicolas:

Your Honor, the witness said that there was a deed of absolute sale,

I was asking if she knows how much Felix paid for the property when she delivered the document.

Court:

She never testified that there was a sale, she only said that there was a deed of sale.
Atty. Nicolas:

I will reform, Your Honor.

Q When you delivered this document to Felix, what did he give you in return, if any?

A He did not give me anything, he had never paid me any single cent.

Q When you delivered the deed of sale?

A There was no payment whatsoever.

Q As far as you know, Ms. Witness, was the property paid for by Felix to Faustino?

A I swear to God, no payment, there was no payment at all, I swear.

xxxx

As clearly shown in the testimony given in open court which was above-quoted, petitioners merely delivered
to their mother a draft of the deed, which they signed to appease her and respondent Felix
Chingkoe.12 (Emphases supplied.)

The CA indeed quoted at length from the testimony of Tan Po Chu, and culled therefrom the factual finding
that the purported contract of sale had never been consummated between the parties. The CA cited as basis her
testimony from Civil Case No. Q-95-22865: that she witnessed Felix signing the blank deed, and that upon its
signing, there was no payment for the property. This account directly contradicts petitioners’ claim that
payment was made simultaneously with the perfection of the contract.

Petitioners claim that the CA erroneously considered this testimony in Civil Case No. Q-95-22865. They cite
the general rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. As early as United States v. Claveria, this Court has stated:
"In the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience, a court may properly treat all or part of the
original record of a former case filed in its archives, as read into the record of a case pending before it, when,
with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated."13

We reiterated this stance in Adiarte v. Domingo,14 in which the trial court decided the action pending before it
by taking judicial notice of the records of a prior case for a sum of money. The Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court’s dismissal of the Complaint, after it considered evidence clearly showing that the subject matter
thereof was the same as that in the prior litigation. In a 1993 case, Occidental Land Transportation Company,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled:

The reasons advanced by the respondent court in taking judicial notice of Civil Case No. 3156 are valid and
not contrary to law. As a general rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of
cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried
or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are
actually pending before the same judge." The general rule admits of exceptions as enumerated in Tabuena v.
Court of Appeals, the Court, citing U.S. v. Claveria, which We quote:
x x x (I)n the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all
or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before
it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and
number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the
former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or
with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.

It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, ‘in the absence of objection,’ ‘with the
knowledge of the opposing party,’ or ‘at the request or with the consent of the parties’ the case is clearly
referred to or ‘the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives' and
'admitted as part of the record of the case then pending.’

xxxx

And unlike the factual situation in Tabuena v. CA, the decision in Civil Case No. 3156 formed part of the
records of the instant case (Civil Case No. 2728) with the knowledge of the parties and in the absence of their
objection. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted).15

This doctrine was restated in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, viz: "As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a
court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the
record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse
party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn
from the archives at the court’s direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a
part of the record of the case then pending."16(Underscoring supplied)

In the case at bar, as the CA rightly points out in its Resolution dated 28 November 2008,17 petitioners never
objected to the introduction of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes containing the testimony of Tan Po Chu,
which were records of Civil Case No. Q-95-22865. As shown by the records and as petitioners admitted in
their Reply, the testimony was already introduced on appeal before the RTC. In fact, it was petitioners
themselves who specifically cited Civil Case No. Q-95-22865, referring to it both by name and number,
purportedly to bolster the claim that they were constrained to sue, in order to compel delivery of the title. 18

Given these facts, the CA committed no reversible error in taking judicial notice of the records of Civil Case
No. Q-95-22865. In any case, the said testimony was not the only basis for reversing the RTC’s Decision.
Independent of the testimony, the CA – through its perusal and assessment of other pieces of evidence,
specifically the Deed of Absolute Sale – concluded that petitioners’ stay on the premises had become
unlawful.

Concerning the second issue, petitioners object to the assessment of the Deed of Sale by the CA, claiming
such a determination is improper in summary proceedings. It should be noted that it was petitioners who
introduced the Deed of Sale in evidence before the MTC and the RTC, as evidence of their claimed right to
possession over the property.1âwphi1 They attached the deed to their Answer as Annex "1."19 The CA
discovered that they falsified their copy of the document denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale in this wise:

Said draft of the deed was undated and bears the signature of one witness, as can be clearly noticed upon its
very careful perusal. Notably, respondents made it appear in the draft of the Deed of Absolute Sale that there
indeed was a valid and consummated sale when in truth and in fact, there was none. The document
accomplished by the respondents (herein petitioners) gave them some semblance, albeit highly questionable,
of ownership over the property by affixing their signatures, affixing the signature of one Cora Hizon as
witness and superimposing the signature of Jane Chan with that of one Noralyn Collado.20

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 states that when the defendant raises the question of ownership in unlawful detainer
cases and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.21 This Court has repeatedly ruled that
although the issue in unlawful detainer cases is physical possession over a property, trial courts may
provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of
possession.22 "These actions are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law
in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession. In these cases, the issue is pure
physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in
nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality." 23

Trial courts must necessarily delve into and weigh the evidence of the parties in order to rule on the right of
possession, as we have discussed in Sps. Esmaquel and Sordevilla v. Coprada:

In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was
permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. However, defendant's
possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject property due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such
demand.

The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised
by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the
property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between
the same parties involving title to the property. Since the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful
detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of the parties' respective evidence deserves more
weight.24 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100008 (dated 3 July 2008) is AFFIRMED.

We make no pronouncement as to attorney's fees for lack of evidence.

5. Dela Llano v. Biong

ery case essentially turns on two basic questions: questions of fact and questions of law. Questions of fact are
the parties and their counsel to respond to, based on what supporting facts the legal questions require; the
court can only draw conclusion from the facts or evidence adduced. When the facts are lacking because of the
deficiency of presented evidence, then the court can only draw one conclusion: that the cause must fail for
lack of evidentiary support.

The present case is one such case as Dra. Leila A dela Llana’s(petitioner) petition for review on
certorari1challenging the February 11, 2008 Decision2 and the March 31, 2008 resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89163.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North
Avenue, Quezon City.4

His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the
backseat.5

Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds
after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently
pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered.
Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not
appear to have suffered from any other visible physical injuries.6

The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that
Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck.7

Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and style
of "Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand business.8

In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck
and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health
deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr.
Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she
suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and
hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llana’s
condition did not improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy.9

She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in search
for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release
the compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her spine and neck, between the
C5 and the C6 vertebrae.10

The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of
her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery.11

Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca
refused to pay.12

Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and claimed
₱150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and an average monthly income of
₱30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees.13

In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no reasonable
relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury. She pointed out that Dra. dela
Llana’s illness became manifest one month and one week from the date of the vehicular accident. As a
counterclaim, she demanded the payment of attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.14

At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness15 and Joel as a hostile witness.16
Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. To prove her
claim, she identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla.
The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury. It also chronicled her
clinical history and physical examinations.17

Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the truck’s brakes got stuck.18

In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they met several days
after the vehicular accident. She also asserted that she observed the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of Joel. She pointed out that she required Joel to submit a certification of good
moral character as well as barangay, police, and NBI clearances prior to his employment. She also stressed
that she only hired Primero after he successfully passed the driving skills test conducted by Alberto Marcelo, a
licensed driver-mechanic.19

Alberto also took the witness stand. He testified that he checked the truck in the morning of March 30, 2000.
He affirmed that the truck was in good condition prior to the vehicular accident. He opined that the cause of
the vehicular accident was a damaged compressor. According to him, the absence of air inside the tank
damaged the compressor.20

RTC Ruling

The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash
injury to be Joel’s reckless driving.21

It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the sudden jerking of the spine in the neck area. It
pointed out that the massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was over-speeding. It
maintained that Joel should have driven at a slower pace because road visibility diminishes at night. He should
have blown his horn and warned the car that his brake was stuck and could have prevented the collision by
swerving the truck off the road. It also concluded that Joel was probably sleeping when the collision occurred
as Joel had been driving for fifteen hours on that fateful day. The RTC further declared that Joel’s negligence
gave rise to the presumption that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in Joel's
selection and supervision of Joel. Rebecca was vicariously liable because she was the employer and she
personally chose him to drive the truck. On the day of the collision, she ordered him to deliver gravel and sand
to Muñoz Market, Quezon City. The Court concluded that the three elements necessary to establish Rebecca’s
liability were present: (1) that the employee was chosen by the employer, personally or through another; (2)
that the services were to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer had the authority to give
at all times; and (3) that the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions
entrusted to him. The RTC thus awarded Dra. dela Llana the amounts of ₱570,000.00 as actual damages,
₱250,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of the suit.22

CA Ruling

In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to
establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of
evidence. Citing Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. Court of Appeals,23 it declared that courts will not hesitate to rule in
favor of the other party if there is no evidence or the evidence is too slight to warrant an inference establishing
the fact in issue. It noted that the interval between the date of the collision and the date when Dra. dela Llana
began to suffer the symptoms of her illness was lengthy. It concluded that this interval raised doubts on
whether Joel’s reckless driving and the resulting collision in fact caused Dra. dela Llana’s injury. It also
declared that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. It observed
that Dra. dela Llana did not immediately visit a hospital to check if she sustained internal injuries after the
accident. Moreover, her failure to present expert witnesses was fatal to her claim. It also gave no weight to the
medical certificate. The medical certificate did not explain how and why the vehicular accident caused the
injury.24

The Petition

Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition before this Court that Nutrimix is inapplicable in the present case.
She stresses that Nutrimix involved the application of Article 1561 and 1566 of the Civil Code, provisions
governing hidden defects. Furthermore, there was absolutely no evidence in Nutrimix that showed that
poisonous animal feeds were sold to the respondents in that case. As opposed to the respondents in Nutrimix,
Dra. dela Llana asserts that she has established by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s egligent act was the
proximate cause of her whiplash injury. First, pictures of her damaged car show that the collision was strong.
She posits that it can be reasonably inferred from these pictures that the massive impact resulted in her
whiplash injury. Second, Dr. Milla categorically stated in the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana suffered
from whiplash injury. Third, her testimony that the vehicular accident caused the injury is credible because
she was a surgeon.

Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate has probative value. Citing several cases, she posits
that an uncorroborated medical certificate is credible if uncontroverted.25

She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary if the opinion merely relates to matters of common
knowledge. She maintains that a judge is qualified as an expert to determine the causation between Joel’s
reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Trial judges are aware of the fact that whiplash injuries are common
in vehicular collisions.

The Respondent’s Position

In her Comment,26 Rebecca points out that Dra. dela Llana raises a factual issue which is beyond the scope of
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She maintains that the CA’s findings
of fact are final and conclusive. Moreover, she stresses that Dra. dela Llana’s arguments are not substantial to
merit this Court’s consideration.

The Issue

The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of
Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury.

Our Ruling We find the petition unmeritorious.

The Supreme Court may review questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari when the findings of
fact by the lower courts are conflicting

The issue before us involves a question of fact and this Court is not a trier of facts. As a general rule, the CA’s
findings of fact are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal. It is not the function of
this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. We can only review the presented evidence, by way of exception, when the conflict exists
in findings of the RTC and the CA.27
We see this exceptional situation here and thus accordingly examine the relevant evidence presented before
the trial court.

Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision, the elements
necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:

(1) damages to the plaintiff;

(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must
respond, was guilty; and

(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.28

These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict case is the breach or omission of mutual
duties that civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from non-contractual relations of
certain members of society to others.29

Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three
elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s employer.

She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash injury.

Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.30

Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can then proceed with
the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.31

Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, "an action
predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the
negligent act or omission committed by his employee."32

The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations.33

In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.

He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of
credible evidence.34

The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.

In short, mere allegations are not evidence.35

In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela
Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s
negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her
whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.36

Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:

(1) the pictures of her damaged car,

(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and

(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the
vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other words,

Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum
probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed below.37

A.

The pictures of the damaged

car only demonstrate the
impact of the collision

Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the damaged car show that the massive impact of the collision
caused her whiplash injury. We are not persuaded by this bare claim. Her insistence that these pictures show
the causation grossly belies common logic. These pictures indeed demonstrate the impact of the collision.
However, it is a far-fetched assumption that the whiplash injury can also be inferred from these pictures.

B.

The medical certificate cannot be

considered because it was
not admitted in evidence

Furthermore, the medical certificate, marked as Exhibit "H" during trial, should not be considered in resolving
this case for the reason that it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC in an order dated September 23,
2004.38

Thus, the CA erred in even considering this documentary evidence in its resolution of the case. It is a basic
rule that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their
judgments.

However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical certificate has
no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay
if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another
person who is not on the witness stand.39

Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence40 except in very unusual circumstance
that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight
of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular
item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.41

During trial, Dra. dela Llana testified:

"Q: Did your physician tell you, more or less, what was the reason why you were feeling that pain in your left
arm?

A: Well, I got a certificate from her and in that certificate, she stated that my condition was due to a
compression of the nerve, which supplied my left arm and my left hand.

Court: By the way, what is the name of this physician, Dra.?

Witness: Her name is Dra. Rosalinda Milla. She is a Rehabilitation Medicine Specialist. Atty. Yusingco: You
mentioned that this Dra. Rosalinda Milla made or issued a medical certificate. What relation does this medical
certificate, marked as Exhibit H have to do with that certificate, you said was made by Dra. Milla?

Witness: This is the medical certificate that Dra. Milla made out for me.

Atty. Yusingco: Your Honor, this has been marked as Exhibit H.

Atty. Yusingco: What other medical services were done on you, Dra. dela Llana, as a result of that feeling,
that pain that you felt in your left arm?

Witness: Well, aside from the medications and physical therapy, a re-evaluation of my condition after three
months indicated that I needed surgery.

Atty. Yusingco: Did you undergo this surgery?

Witness: So, on October 19, I underwent surgery on my neck, on my spine.

Atty. Yusingco: And, what was the result of that surgical operation?

Witness: Well, the operation was to relieve the compression on my nerve, which did not resolve by the
extensive and prolonged physical therapy that I underwent for more than three months." 42(emphasis ours)

Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical
certificate.1âwphi1 However, she was not presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify and
affirm the contents of the medical certificate. Furthermore, Rebecca was deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her findings. We also point out in this respect that the
medical certificate nonetheless did not explain the chain of causation in fact between Joel’s reckless driving
and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury. It did not categorically state that the whiplash injury was a result of the
vehicular accident. A perusal of the medical certificate shows that it only attested to her medical condition, i.e.,
that she was suffering from whiplash injury. However, the medical certificate failed to substantially relate the
vehicular accident to Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury. Rather, the medical certificate only chronicled her
medical history and physical examinations.

C.
 Dra. dela Llana’s opinion that
Joel’s negligence caused her
whiplash injury has no probative value

Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra. dela Llana, as the plaintiff in this quasi-delict
case, was the lone physician-witness during trial. Significantly, she merely testified as an ordinary witness
before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana essentially claimed in her testimony that Joel’s reckless driving caused
her whiplash injury. Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even assuming that she is an
expert in neurology, we cannot give weight to her opinion that Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash
injury without violating the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference
between an ordinary witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in
evidence regarding:

(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and

(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.1âwphi1 Furthermore, the witness
may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.43

On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess.44

However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted expert testimony, much less to an
unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that the probative value of an
expert testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the expert's opinion. Rather, its weight lies in the
assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for
his opinion and the reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is founded.45

In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason that she
was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify on the nature,
and the cause and effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial,
nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of whiplash
injury in her testimony.

The Supreme Court cannot take

judicial notice that vehicular
accidents cause whiplash injuries.

Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before the trial court shows that Dra. Dela
Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation
between the vehicular accident and Dra. Dela Llana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s negligence causes her
whiplash injury was not established because of the deficiency of the presented evidence during trial. We point
out in this respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular ccidents cause whiplash injuries. This
proportion is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions.46 We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and judges
are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and their
corresponding legal arguments.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause by preponderance of evidence. While we
commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the case binds us
to rule against Dra. dela Llana’s favor. Her claim, unsupported by prepondernace of evidence, is merely a bare
assertion and has no leg to stand on.

WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2008 and Resolution dated
March 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.

III. Burden of Proof and Burden of Evidence

6. Ermitano v. Paglas, 23 January 2013

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 dated September 8, 2004 and August 16, 2006, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77617.

On November 5, 1999, herein respondent and petitioner, through her representative, lsabelo R. Ermitaño,
executed a Contract of Lease wherein petitioner leased in favor of respondent a 336 square meter residential
lot and a house standing thereon located at No. 20 Columbia St., Phase l, Doña Vicenta Village, Davao City.
The contract period is one (1) year, which commenced on November 4, 1999, with a monthly rental rate of
₱13,500.00. Pursuant to the contract, respondent paid petitioner ₱2,000.00 as security deposit to answer for
unpaid rentals and damage that may be cause to the leased unit.

Subsequent to the execution of the lease contract, respondent received information that sometime in March
1999, petitioner mortgaged the subject property in favor of a certain Charlie Yap (Yap) and that the same was
already foreclosed with Yap as the purchaser of the disputed lot in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale which
was registered on February 22, 2000. Yap's brother later offered to sell the subject property to respondent.
Respondent entertained the said offer and negotiations ensued. On June 1, 2000, respondent bought the
subject property from Yap for ₱950,000.00. A Deed of Sale of Real Property was executed by the parties as
evidence of the contract. However, it was made clear in the said Deed that the property was still subject to
petitioner's right of redemption.

Prior to respondent's purchase of the subject property, petitioner filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of the
mortgage in favor of Yap as well as the sheriff's provisional certificate of sale which was issued after the
disputed house and lot were sold on foreclosure.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 2000, petitioner sent a letter demanding respondent to pay the rentals which are due
and to vacate the leased premises. A second demand letter was sent on March 25, 2001. Respondent ignored
both letters.

On August 13, 2001, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City, a case of
unlawful detainer against respondent.

In its Decision dated November 26, 2001, the MTCC, Branch 6, Davao City dismissed the case filed by
petitioner and awarded respondent the amounts of ₱25,000.00 as attorney's fees and ₱2,000.00 as appearance
fee.

Petitioner filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City.
On February 14, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed the case for unlawful detainer but modified in that the award of attorney's
fees in defendant's herein respondent's favor is deleted and that the defendant respondent is ordered to pay
plaintiff herein petitioner the equivalent of ten months unpaid rentals on the property or the total sum of
₱135,000.00.

SO ORDERED.3

The RTC held that herein respondent possesses the right to redeem the subject property and that, pending
expiration of the redemption period, she is entitled to receive the rents, earnings and income derived from the
property.

Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA.

On September 8, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, 11th
Judicial Region, Davao City is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS as follows:

(a) Private respondent's obligation to pay the petitioner the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (₱135,000.00) equivalent of ten (10) months is hereby DELETED;

(b) Attorney's fees and litigation expenses were correctly awarded by the trial court having compelled the
private respondent to litigate and incur expenses to protect her interests by reason of the unjustified act of
petitioner (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 365 SCRA 326), Thus: litigation expenses
of only TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) not TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱25,000.00);
and

(c) Attorney's fees REI NSTAT ED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) instead of only
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱2,000.00).

SO ORDERED.4

Quoting extensively from the decision of the MTCC as well as on respondent's comment on the petition for
review, the CA ruled that respondent did not act in bad faith when she bought the property in question because
she had every right to rely on the validity of the documents evidencing the mortgage and the foreclosure
proceedings.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated August 16, 2006.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following assignment of errors:

A.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE UNLAWFUL

DETAINER CASE BY RULING THAT A SHERIFF'S FINAL CERTIFICATE OF SALE WAS ALREADY
ISSUED WHICH DECISION IS NOT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT WAS A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH EVEN IF SHE WAS INFORMED BY PETITIONER
THROUGH A LETTER ADVISING HER THAT THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE CONTRACT WAS
SHAM, FICTITIOUS AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF FORGERY BECAUSE PETITIONER'S PURPORTED
SIGNATURE APPEARING THEREIN WAS SIGNED AND FALSIFIED BY A CERTAIN ANGELA
CELOSIA.

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES
WHICH WAS DELETED BY RTC-BRANCH 16 OF DAVAO CITY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY
EXPLANATION AND/OR JUSTIFICATION IN THE BODY OF THE DECISION.5

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts resolve in ejectment
proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto
and not to the possession de jure.6 It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. 7 In
an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants.8 Where the issue of ownership
is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to
possess the property.9The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the property.10

In the instant case, pending final resolution of the suit filed by petitioner for the declaration of nullity of the
real estate mortgage in favor of Yap, the MTCC, the RTC and the CA were unanimous in sustaining the
presumption of validity of the real estate mortgage over the subject property in favor of Yap as well as the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of the public officers who subsequently conducted
its foreclosure sale and issued a provisional certificate of sale. Based on the presumed validity of the mortgage
and the subsequent foreclosure sale, the MTCC, the RTC and the CA also sustained the validity of
respondent's purchase of the disputed property from Yap. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from
these rulings of the MTCC, RTC and CA. Thus, for purposes of resolving the issue as to who between
petitioner and respondent is entitled to possess the subject property, this presumption stands.

Going to the main issue in the instant petition, it is settled that in unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds
possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied.11 In such case, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration
or termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the
defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right
to continue in possession.12

In the instant petition, petitioner's basic postulate in her first and second assigned errors is that she remains the
owner of the subject property. Based on her contract of lease with respondent, petitioner insists that
respondent is not permitted to deny her title over the said property in accordance with the provisions of
Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

The Court does not agree.

The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, known as estoppel against
tenants, provides as follows:

Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

xxxx
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation
of landlord and tenant between them. (Emphasis supplied).

It is clear from the abovequoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his
landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation.13 If the title asserted is one that is
alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not
apply.14 Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord's title has expired or been conveyed to another or
himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title
paramount.15 In the present case, what respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject property
which she acquired subsequent to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and
petitioner. Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply.

The foregoing notwithstanding, even if respondent is not estopped from denying petitioner's claim for rent,
her basis for such denial, which is her subsequent acquisition of ownership of the disputed property, is
nonetheless, an insufficient excuse from refusing to pay the rentals due to petitioner.

There is no dispute that at the time that respondent purchased Yap's rights over the subject property,
petitioner's right of redemption as a mortgagor has not yet expired. It is settled that during the period of
redemption, it cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property, since the
rule up to now is that the right of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of
redemption has expired without the right being exercised.16 The title to land sold under mortgage foreclosure
remains in the mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration of the redemption period and conveyance by the
master's deed.17 Indeed, the rule has always been that it is only upon the expiration of the redemption period,
without the judgment debtor having made use of his right of redemption, that the ownership of the land sold
becomes consolidated in the purchaser.18

Stated differently, under Act. No. 3135, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale has, during the redemption period,
only an inchoate right and not the absolute right to the property with all the accompanying incidents. 19 He
only becomes an absolute owner of the property if it is not redeemed during the redemption period.20

Pending expiration of the period of redemption, Section 7 of Act No. 3135,21 as amended, provides:

Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First
Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession
thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a
period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating
the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath
and filed in [the] form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is
registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under
section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered
with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and
in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph
eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act
Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a
writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall
execute said order immediately.

Thus, it is clear from the abovequoted provision of law that, as a consequence of the inchoate character of the
purchaser's right during the redemption period, Act. No. 3135, as amended, allows the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale to take possession of the property only upon the filing of a bond, in an amount equivalent to
the use of the property for a period of twelve (12) months, to indemnify the mortgagor in case it be shown that
the sale was made in violation of the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of the law. In Cua
Lai Chu v. Laqui,22 this Court reiterated the rule earlier pronounced in Navarra v. Court of Appeals23 that the
purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale has a right to the possession of the property even during the
one-year redemption period provided the purchaser files an indemnity bond. That bond, nonetheless, is not
required after the purchaser has consolidated his title to the property following the mortgagor's failure to
exercise his right of redemption for in such a case, the former has become the absolute owner thereof.24

It, thus, clearly follows from the foregoing that, during the period of redemption, the mortgagor, being still the
owner of the foreclosed property, remains entitled to the physical possession thereof subject to the purchaser's
right to petition the court to give him possession and to file a bond pursuant to the provisions of Section 7 of
Act No. 3135, as amended. The mere purchase and certificate of sale alone do not confer any right to the
possession or beneficial use of the premises.25

In the instant case, there is neither evidence nor allegation that respondent, as purchaser of the disputed
property, filed a petition and bond in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135. In addition,
respondent defaulted in the payment of her rents. Thus, absent respondent's filing of such petition and bond
prior to the expiration of the period of redemption, coupled with her failure to pay her rent, she did not have
the right to possess the subject property.

On the other hand, petitioner, as mortgagor and owner, was entitled not only to the possession of the disputed
house and lot but also to the rents, earnings and income derived therefrom. In this regard, the RTC correctly
cited Section 32, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows:

Sec. 32. Rents, earnings and income of property pending redemption. – The purchaser or a redemptioner shall
not be entitled to receive the rents, earnings and income of the property sold on execution, or the value of the
use and occupation thereof when such property is in the possession of a tenant. All rents, earnings and income
derived from the property pending redemption shall belong to the judgment obligor until the expiration of his
period of redemption. (Emphasis supplied)

While the above rule refers to execution sales, the Court finds no cogent reason not to apply the same
principle to a foreclosure sale, as in this case.

The situation became different, however, after the expiration of the redemption period on February 23, 2001.
Since there is no allegation, much less evidence, that petitioner redeemed the subject property within one year
from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, respondent became the owner thereof. Consolidation of
title becomes a right upon the expiration of the redemption period.26 Having become the owner of the disputed
property, respondent is then entitled to its possession.

As a consequence, petitioner's ejectment suit filed against respondent was rendered moot when the period of
redemption expired on February 23, 2001 without petitioner having redeemed the subject property, for upon
expiration of such period petitioner lost his possessory right over the same. Hence, the only remaining right
that petitioner can enforce is his right to the rentals during the time that he was still entitled to physical
possession of the subject property – that is from May 2000 until February 23, 2001.1âwphi1

In this regard, this Court agrees with the findings of the MTCC that, based on the evidence and the pleadings
filed by petitioner, respondent is liable for payment of rentals beginning May 2000 until February 2001, or for
a period of ten (10) months. However, it is not disputed that respondent already gave to petitioner the sum of
₱27,000.00, which is equivalent to two (2) months’ rental, as deposit to cover for any unpaid rentals. It is only
proper to deduct this amount from the rentals due to petitioner, thus leaving ₱108,000.00 unpaid rentals.
As to attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, the Court agrees with the RTC that since petitioner is, in entitled
to unpaid rentals, her complaint which, among others, prays for the payment of unpaid rentals, is justified.
Thus, the award of attorney'’ and litigation expenses to respondent should be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77617, dated
September 8, 2004 and August 16, 2006, respectively, are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner ₱108,000.00 as and for unpaid rentals; (2) the award of
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to respondent is DELETED.

IV. Quantum of Evidence

7. Raymundo v. Lunaria, G.R. No. 171036, October 17, 2008

Assailed in this petition for review are the Court of Appeals Decision[1] dated October 10, 2005 and the
Resolution[2] dated January 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75593.

The facts in this case are as follows:

Sometime in May 1996, petitioners approached respondent Lunaria to help them find a buyer for their property
situated at Marilao, Bulacan with an area of 12,126 square meters for the amount of P60,630,000. Respondent
Lunaria was promised a 5% agents commission in the event that he finds a buyer. After respondents found a buyer,
Cecilio Hipolito, an Exclusive Authority to Sell[3] was executed embodying the agreement made by the
parties. After the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property[4] was registered in the Registry of Deeds,
a copy thereof was given to the Far East Bank and Trust Co., which was then holding in escrow the amount
of P50,000,000 to be disbursed or paid against the total consideration or price of the property.

On February 14, 1997, Ceferino G. Raymundo, one of the co-owners, advised respondents to go to the bank to
receive the amount of P1,196,000 as partial payment of their total commission. Also, respondents were
instructed to return after seven days to get the balance of the commission due them.

On February 21, 1997, respondents returned to the bank. However, the check covering the balance of
their commission was already given by the bank manager to Lourdes R. Raymundo, the representative of the
petitioners. Respondents tried to get the check from the petitioners, however, they were told that there is
nothing more due them by way of commission as they have already divided and distributed the balance of the
commissions among their nephews and nieces.

For their part, petitioners counter that there was a subsequent verbal agreement entered into by the parties
after the execution of the written agreement. Said verbal agreement provides that the 5% agents commission shall
be divided as follows: 2/5 for the agents, 2/5 for Lourdes Raymundo, and 1/5 for the buyer, Hipolito. The share
given to Lourdes Raymundo shall be in consideration for the help she would extend in the processing of documents
of sale of the property, the payment of the capital gains tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and in securing an
order from the court. The 1/5 commission given to Hipolito, on the other hand, will be used by him for the payment
of realty taxes.

Hence, for failure of the respondents to receive the balance of their agents commission, they filed an action for
the collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Courtof Valenzuela City, Branch 172. On January
22, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision[5] in favor of the respondents. The dispositive portion of said
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P1,834,900.00, representing the unpaid commission, plus interest thereon at the legal rate
from the filing of this case until fully paid;

2) Ordering the defendants to, jointly and severally, pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P200,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

3) Ordering the defendants [to], jointly and severally, pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P150,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed. In a Decision dated October 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court with the modification that the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded to
respondents shall be reduced. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated January 22, 2002 is affirmed, subject to
the modification that the award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages to P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On October 28, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[8] However, it was denied in a
Resolution dated January 10, 2006. Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PAROLE

EVIDENCE RULE IN THIS CASE (DECISION, PAGE 7, PARAGRAPH 1). THIS
PRINCIPLE HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE.

II.
 FURTHER, IT ERRED IN REQUIRING, ALBEIT IMPLICITLY, THE PETITIONERS TO
ESTABLISH THE VERBAL AGREEMENT MODIFYING THE EARLIER WRITTEN
AGREEMENT (THE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO SELL) BY MORE THAN A
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (DECISION, PAGE 8). THIS IS PLAINLY
CONTRARY TO LAW THAT MERELY REQUIRES PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
IN CIVIL CASES.

III.

FINALLY, EVEN CONCEDING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT

PETITIONERS STILL OWE THE RESPONDENTS THE BALANCE OF THEIR
COMMISSION, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THE PETITIONERS
ARE EACH JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY [LIABLE] FOR THE PAYMENT OF
THE ENTIRE BROKERS FEES. THIS RULING HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND IS
CONTRARY TO ART. 1207 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.[9]

Plainly stated, the issues for resolution are: Did the Court of Appeals err (1) in applying the parol
evidence rule; (2) in requiring petitioners to establish their case by more than a preponderance of evidence;
and (3) in holding petitioners jointly and severally liable for the payment of the entire brokers fees?

Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the parol
evidence rule to the facts of the case because the verbal agreement was entered into subsequent to the written
agreement. Further, they aver that there is no rule that requires an agreement modifying an earlier agreement
to be in the same form as the earlier agreement in order for such modification or amendment to be valid.

Conversely, respondents argue that the Court of Appeals did not apply the parol evidence rule in this
case. Although the appellate court stated and emphasized the general legal principle and rule on parol
evidence, it did not apply the parol evidence rule with regard to the evidence adduced by the petitioners.

We rule for the respondents. To begin with, we agree with petitioners claim that the parol evidence
rule does not apply to the facts of this case. First, the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or
contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at
or before the execution of the parties written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the
parties, varying the purport of the written contract.[10] Notably, the claimed verbal agreement was agreed upon
not prior to but subsequent to the written agreement. Second, the validity of the written agreement is not the
matter which is being put in issue here. What is questioned is the validity of the claim that a subsequent verbal
agreement was agreed upon by the parties after the execution of the written agreement which substantially
modified their earlier written agreement.

Nonetheless, even if we apply the parol evidence rule in this case, the evidence presented by the
petitioners fell short in proving that a subsequent verbal agreement was in fact entered into by the parties. We
subscribe to the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that the evidence presented by
petitioners did not establish the existence of the alleged subsequent verbal agreement. As pointed out by the
trial court:

Note that no written evidence was presented by the defendants to show that the
plaintiffs [herein respondents] agreed to the above-sharing of the commission. The fact is that
the plaintiffs are denying having ever entered into such sharing agreement. For if the plaintiffs
as sales agents indeed agreed to share the commission they are entitled to receive by virtue of
the Exclusive Authority to Sell with Lourdes G. Raymundo and Hipolito, it passes
understanding why no written agreement to that effect was ever made. The absence of such
written agreement is mute but telling testimony that no such sharing arrangement was ever
made.[11]

As to the second issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in requiring them to prove the
existence of the subsequent verbal agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence since no rule of
evidence requires them to do so. In support of this allegation, petitioners presented petitioner Lourdes
Raymundo who testified that she was given 2/5 share of the commission pursuant to the verbal sharing
scheme because she took care of the payment of the capital gains tax, the preparation of the documents of sale
and of securing an authority from the court to sell the property.

For their part, respondents counter that the appellate court did not require petitioners to prove the
existence of the subsequent oral agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence. What the
appellate court said is that the petitioners failed to prove and establish the alleged subsequent verbal
agreement even by mere preponderance of evidence.

Petitioners abovecited allegation has no merit. By preponderance of evidence is meant that the
evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.[12]It refers to the weight, credit and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
greater weight of evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[13]

Both the appellate court and trial court ruled that the evidence presented by the petitioners is not
sufficient to support their allegation that a subsequent verbal agreement was entered into by the parties. In fact,
both courts correctly observed that if Lourdes Raymundo was in reality offered the 2/5 share of the agents
commission for the purpose of assisting respondent Lunaria in the documentation requirement, then why did
the petitioners not present any written court order on her authority, tax receipt or sales document to support
her self-serving testimony? Moreover, even the worksheet allegedly reflecting the commission sharing was
unilaterally prepared by petitioner Lourdes Raymundo without any showing that respondents participated in
the preparation thereof or gave their assent thereto. Even the alleged payment of 1/5 of the commission to the
buyer to be used in the payment of the realty taxes cannot be given credence since the payment of realty taxes
is the obligation of the owners, and not the buyer. Lastly, if the said sharing agreement was entered into
pursuant to the wishes of the buyer, then he should have been presented as witness to corroborate the claim of
the petitioners. However, he was not.

As to the third issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in holding that the petitioners
were each jointly and severally liable for the payment of the brokers fees. They contend that the Civil Code
provides that unless the parties have expressly agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the entire brokers
fees, each of the petitioners should only be held liable to the extent of their pro-indiviso share in the property
sold.

For their part, respondents argue that the appellate court did not err in affirming the joint and
several liability of the petitioners. They aver that if there was error on the part of the trial court, it was not
raised or assigned as error by petitioners in their appeal. It was also not included in the Statement of Issues in
their brief which they submitted for resolution by the Court of Appeals. In fact, the same was never mentioned,
much less questioned, by petitioners in their brief.

On this score, we agree with respondents. The general rule is that once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid
final judgment of a competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to
rest.[14] In this case, petitioners failed to address the issue on their solidary liability when they appealed to the
Court of Appeals. They are now estopped to question that ruling. As to them, the issue on their liability is
already valid and binding.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October 10, 2005 and
the Resolution dated January 10, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75593
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

8. People v. Quizon
A decision, dated 27 March 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 29, found
appellant Johnny M. Quizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. He was sentenced by the trial court to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The Information charging him with the offense, to which he pled not guilty, read:

That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with grave abuse of confidence, with intent of
gain, and by means of violence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away,
against the consent of the owners thereof, a cash money amounting to P17,000.00 and assorted jewelry,
belonging to the Suarez Travel Agency and/or Conchita M. Pasquin, with a total value of no less than
P17,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the owners thereof in the said total sum; that on the occasion of
the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take, steal and carry away the said articles and money,
the herein accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and
taking advantage of his superior strength, and with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault, and with the use
of personal violence upon said Conchita M. Pasquin, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries after
accused stuffed her mouth with a clothing an outcry, and as a direct result of which,
said Conchita Pasquin died.[1]

The case for the prosecution was pieced together by the trial court from the testimony of a number of
witnesses.
Conchita Magpantay Pasquin was associated with Suarez Travel Services in Angeles City. She used the
offices of the travel agency as also her residence. Although she was separated from her
husband, Bonifacio Pasquin, her relationship with him, nevertheless, remained cordial. On 05 September 1997,
around nine o clock in the morning, Conchita went to the adjacent Quitalig Law Office and lent a magazine to
a friend, Rowena Abril, a secretary in the law firm. In the afternoon of that day, between one and two oclock,
Rowena heard loud noises coming from Conchitas office, but she did not pay too much attention to the
incident. Twenty-five minutes later, a man passed by Rowena as she was leaving her office to go to a nearby
store. Rowena had the impression that the man, who was walking hurriedly, came from the office of Suarez
Travel Services. At about four-fifty in the afternoon, Rowena went to see Conchita to return the magazine.
She noticed that the door leading to Conchitas office was open but the main door was closed. Since nobody
opened the door for her, Rowena decided to leave.
At lunch time on 05 September 1997, Myla Miclat and her live-in partner Roel Sicangco went to
see Conchita to hand over the amount of P17,000.00 in payment for Mylas round trip plane fare to Guam.
While they were inside Conchitas office, Johnny Quizon, whom Conchita introduced as her nephew, came
in. Conchita asked her nephew if he already had taken his lunch. Conchita told Myla that her nephew was a
former drug addict, and that she was helping him mend his ways. Quizon was present when Myla gave the
money to Conchita. Conchitatold Myla that she was going to purchase the ticket and instructed her to return
later that day to pick it up. It was approximately seven oclock in the evening when Myla, accompanied by a
friend, returned to Suarez Travel Services. She knocked at the door but nobody answered although she could
see that there was still light inside the work place. Myla tried calling up Conchita but the telephone just kept
on ringing. The following day of 06 September 1997, around five-thirty in the morning, Myla returned
to Conchitas office. Again, nobody was in sight. Myla went to the agencys neighbor to inquire if there was
someone inside the office. The neighbor climbed, peeped inside and saw a body covered with a blanket.
Marietta Suarez, the owner of Suarez Travel Services, received a call at six-thirty in the morning of 06
September 1997 to inform her that something bad had happened to Conchita. She did not go to the office the
day previous as she had to accompany her husband to a social function. Marietta and her husband forthwith
proceeded to the agency. A number of police officers and some people were by then at the scene. Apparently,
the policemen forced open the door and found the body of Conchita wrapped with a white
blanket. Conchitas jewelry box and the money paid by Myla were missing.
On the evening of 06 September 1997, Conchitas husband, Bonifacio Pasquin, who was then
in Bataan received a call from his brother-in-law Jose Servidal informing him of Conchitasdeath. The
following morning, on his way to Angeles City, Pasquin chanced upon Conchitas eldest brother,
Jose Magpantay, who was also bound for the city. Magpantay informed Pasquinthat on 05 September 1997, he
received a call from Conchita who told him that she was going to Manila to bring an undetermined sum of
money. Conchita happened to mention that her nephew, Johnny Quizon, was in her office at that time. Later,
during the investigation, Pasquin showed Rowena a picture of Quizon and she identified him to be the same
person who passed by her in haste that afternoon of 05 September 1997.
Dr. Proceso Mejia, a City Health Officer of Angeles City, conducted an autopsy on the remains
of Conchita at half past noon on 06 September 1997. The body showed discoloration on the face, neck, back
and upper extremities, contusion on the right side of the face and abrasions on her right and left side of the
neck, right elbow, right forearm and the palm. Dr. Mejia concluded that at the time of his
examination, Conchita must have been dead for more than twelve, but not beyond twenty-four, hours. Dr.
Mejia did not find any abnormalities on the body of the victim and decided to send the vital organs to the
Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for toxicological
and histopath examination.
Dr. Noel Minay, a medical specialist of the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted a pathological
examination on the vital organs of Conchita, particularly, her brain, heart, lungs and pancreas. He concluded
that Conchita could have died of cardiac arrest, asphyxiation or ingestion of a considerable amount of
poisonous substance.
The case was referred for investigation to SPO2 Danilo Cruz of the Angeles City Detective Group. After
reading the initial report, SPO2 Cruz, accompanied by SPO2 Alfredo Quiambaoand a brother of Conchita,
went to Quizons house at 174 Isarog St., La Loma, Quezon City. Johnnys relatives were not aware of his
whereabouts but could only say that on the morning of 06 September 1997, Johnny and his live-in partner
Fe Coronel went to Tondo, Manila. The trio decided to go to Fes house in Paraaque City, arriving thereat at
around ten oclock in the evening. Fes mother told them that Fe had left on 05 September 1997 and had not
returned since. In the course of their investigation, SPO2 Cruz interviewed one Rodolfo Cueva, a mailman at
the Angeles City Post Office, who told him that he (Cueva) went to Conchitas office between two and
two-thirty in the afternoon of 05 September 1997 to deliver an express mail. Cueva left when nobody would
open the door. Returning in the morning, he learned that the addressee was already dead.
Johnny Quizon was arrested at his house in Quezon City by police operatives a week
after Conchitas burial.
The defense gave its version of the incident.
Nimfa Quizon married the father of Johnny Quizon in 1980, three years following the death of his first
wife, Imelda, a sister of Nimfa. Nimfa took care of Johnny since he was barely five years old. On the evening
of 04 September 1997, Nimfa asked Johnny to go and visit his aunt Conchita in Angeles City whose television
set needed repair. Johnny left La Loma, QuezonCity, at about ten oclock the following morning of 05
September 1997. He arrived in Angeles City between twelve-thirty and one oclock in the afternoon. At the
offices of Suarez Travel Services, he found his aunt Conchita talking with Roel Sicangco and Myla Miclat. He
waited. After Roel and Myla had left, Conchita told him that he could not work as yet on the television set as
she had a lot of other things to attend to first in Manila. He asked Conchita if she wanted company but she told
him to go ahead as she still had to entertain a woman who just came in. He left Conchitas office and
saw Roel and Myla waiting for a passenger jeepney. Johnny noticed a man on board a parked vehicle who was
holding a clutch bag. He saw the man enter his aunts office. Meanwhile, he boarded a passenger jeepney and
went to the terminal of the Philippine Rabbit bus line. Johnny reached La Loma at four oclock in the afternoon.
He informed Nimfa that he was unable to repair Conchitas television set. Between four-thirty and five
oclock in the afternoon, Nimfa received a call from Conchita who informed him that she sent Johnny home
since she had as yet a lot of paper work to do. The following morning, Nimfa was informed
of Conchitas death. Johnny was advised by Nimfa not to go to the wake because Conchitas brothers suspected
him of being responsible for the killing of their sister. Johnny stayed at the house of his live-in partner and
came home only after the burial.
In convicting Quizon of the crime with which he was indicted, the trial court held:

The fact of death of victim Conchita Pasquin is beyond dispute. Her cadaver was found in her bedroom
wrapped with a white blanket. There was also a contusion on the right side of the face and abrasions on the
victims right and left side of the neck, right elbow, right forearm and at the palm. Accused likewise admitted
that he went to the office of the victim in the afternoon of September 5, 1997 and saw
thereat Myla Miclat and Roel Sicangco who left ahead of him.

xxx xxx xxx

Nobody actually saw how the victim was killed and how the robbery was committed. The Prosecution is
relying only on circumstantial evidence to secure the conviction of the accused Johnny Quizon. Under our
rules on evidence, an accused can still be convicted even if no eyewitness is available provided that enough
circumstantial evidence has been established by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused committed the crime (People vs. Lagao, Jr., 271 SCRA 51.)

xxx xxx xxx

No direct evidence was presented by the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused. We are constrained
to consider the circumstantial evidence introduced by the prosecution to determine whether the same would be
sufficient to convict the accused:

1. Conchita Pasquin was a victim of foul play. There were contusions and abrasions on the upper part of the
body. The steel door of the office was left open the whole night of the September 5 up to the early morning of
September 6, when the victims body was discovered. The light of the office was also on and her body was
wrapped in a white blanket when discovered. Definitely she could not have died a natural death.

2. The accused was at the victims office in the afternoon of September 5, 1997 when Myla Miclat gave the
sum of P17,000.00 for the purchase of her plane ticket in Manila.

3. The victim was in a hurry to leave for Manila to purchase Myla Miclats plane ticket. In
fact, Myla Miclat was told by the victim to return that evening to the office to get her ticket.

4. When Myla Miclat and her boyfriend left the victims office, there were no other person inside the office
except the accused and the victim at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.

5. At around 2:00 oclock of that same afternoon, Rowena Abril, a secretary of the law office adjacent to the
Suarez office, heard three very loud noises coming from the victims office. When Rowena went out after
around 25 minutes to buy something at a nearby store, she saw the accused hurriedly leaving the said office.
The accused hurriedly left for Manila that same afternoon leaving the victim behind who was also in a hurry
to go to Manila to purchase the plane ticket of Myla Miclat.

6. At around 2:00 oclock of that same afternoon, Rowena Abril heard several knockings at the victims office
but nobody opened the door.

7. At around 10 minutes before 5:00 p.m., Rowena Abril went to the office of the victim to return the
magazine the victim lent to her earlier, but nobody answered her, so she just left.

8. Myla Miclat returned that evening at around 7:00 p.m. but nobody opened the door of the victims office.

9. On September 7, 1997, the body of the victim was brought to the house of the accused but the latter never
showed up during the entire wake for the victim.

10. The police were not able to find him at his girlfriends house.

11. The accused also did not attend the burial.

12. The alibi given by the accused for not attending the wake and the burial of his aunt was that he was trying
to avoid his uncles who were mad at him because he was being suspected of killing his aunt. The accused was
arrested by the police at their house where the wake was held one week after the burial hence, he was not
really afraid of his uncles.

13. Instead of helping the police in solving the crime and apprehending the killer of his aunt (as he claims to
be innocent) the accused went into hiding immediately after the killing.

14. The victim was not able to leave for Manila to buy the plane ticket for Myla Miclat but the said amount of
P17,000.00 for the plane ticket was never recovered.

The abovecited circumstances clearly made an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Johnny Quizon is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

Accused Johnny Quizon is further ordered to pay the heirs of Mrs. Marietta Suarez the sum of P34,133.10 as
actual damages and to pay the heirs of Conchita M. Pasquin the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity.[2]

In his appeal to this Court, Johnny M. Quizon raised the lone assignment of error that -

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT GUILTY OF ROBBERY
WITH HOMICIDE WITHOUT HIS GUILT HAVING BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[3]

The Office of the Solicitor General, instead of filing an appellees brief, submitted to the Court a
well-ratiocinated manifestation and motion averring that the existence of every bit of circumstantial evidence
was not satisfactorily established. The OSG maintained:

Appellant should be acquitted and released. The prosecution miserably failed to meet the requirements of
circumstantial evidence necessary for conviction.

First. The trial court erred in accepting the testimony of Miclat that appellant was the last person who was
with the victim before she died. The trial court similarly blundered in debunking the testimony of
both Sicangco and the appellant that after appellant had left the office, other persons entered the victims office
[TSN, January 7, 1999, pp. 8-10, Testimony of Roel Sicangco; TSN, May 25, 1999, pp. 12-13, Testimony of
Johnny Quizon]. However, there was nothing in Miclats testimony that directly refuted the testimony
of Sicangco that there were other persons who entered the office afterwards. Miclat declared that she did not
see whether or not the man with the collectors bag returned after they left the office. Miclats testimony went:

Q Im only concern [sic] with the better administration of justice. I know that you want to cooperate
so much by your testimony. Now, you are supposed to be a star witness for the presence of the
accused in that office. My question is, you did not see the accused doing anything to the victim,
is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not also see whether that man with a collectors bag went back or not in that office?
A No sir.
 Q But you know in every office it is usually visited by several persons because of their papers or
transaction?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in that office it is usually visited by several persons because of their papers or transaction?
A Yes, sir. [TSN, September 9, 1998, pp. 17-18]

Sicangco, on the other hand, testified to the circumstances after they left the travel agency, and whose
declaration was never rebutted by Miclat. He stated:

Q How do you know that Johnny Quizon arrived at 1:30 oclock in the afternoon of September 5,
1997?
A Dahil sa estimate ng pagdating namin sa office at saka iyong interval.
Q When you left the office together with your live-in-partner, where was Johnny Quizon then?
A Noong papaalis na kami sa agency, tapos nakita ko si Johnny sa may
funeral palabas at habang naghihintay kami ng jeep, nakita ko siya sumakay ng jeep papuntan
g Dau, Mabalacat.
Q When you and your wife and Johnny Quizon left the premises, were there still other persons
inside the office besides that man and his lady companion?
A Noong palabas na kami sa agency, napansin ko si Johnny sa may likuran.
At habang naghihintay kami ng jeep, nakita ko iyong babae at iyong lalake pumasok sa travel
agency.
Q Did you see Johnny Quizon ride on a jeep?
A Yes, sir.
Q To what destination?
A Dau, Mabalacat.
Q Before this Court your live-in-partner testified that when you left the office, she did not notice
that man and his lady companion entering the office, what can you say about that?
Court:
Did she testify about a man and a woman?
Atty. Castillon [defense counsel]:
Yes, Your Honor, during my cross-examination.
Pros. Quiambao:
[for the government] What she testified was that when she left, the only persons left in the office
were the victim and Johnny Quizon.
Atty. Castillon:
That is what she testified. And I am trying to find out from this witness if that is true.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Castillon:
 Because according to the witness, they came back and entered the office.

Clearly, the prosecution could present only a witness who saw appellant in the vicinity of the crime scene on
the day the crime was committed. If the testimony of Sicangco is suspect as being tainted with pity for a
fellow-inmate, it is to be noted that Sicangco likewise freely admitted of his love for Miclat [TSN, January 7,
1999, p. 23]. Miclat, on the other hand, categorically declared that she did not know whether other persons
entered the office afterwards. As against Miclat, a former live-in-lover, and appellant, a mere
fellow-inmate, Sicangcos sympathy for appellant exceeded his love for Miclat because he did not want an
innocent person to suffer for a crime he did not commit
[Ako nagtetestigo ako para matulungan si Johnny. Basta ako gusto kong tulungan si Johnny dahil napakahira
p nang maparusahan ng hindi mo naman ginawa. [TSN, January 7, 1999, p. 13]

That appellant was the last person seen with the victim on the day she died does not necessarily prove that he
killed her. It was not established that appellant and the victim were together until the crime was committed. It
was not even shown that appellant was the only one who was with the victim before she died. The travel
agency was already opened when Miclat, Sicangco and appellant came. There were several persons there even
before Miclat and company arrived. The prosecution has not completely discounted the possibility that there
were other persons who transacted business with the victim when Miclat and appellant left, considering that
the travel agency is a place of business that caters to several clients. There was an eyewitness, Sicangco, who
declared that at least two persons came after appellant left the office [TSN, January 7, 1999, pp. 8-10]. Even
the secretary of the neighboring law firm, prosecution witness Abril, testified that there were several persons
who were knocking at the door of the victims office after appellant left (TSN, May 6, 1998, p. 13).

True, a person may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence; but the proven circumstances should
inexorably lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as the guilty person, to the
exclusion of all others. Where the evidence presented admits of other conclusions, the accused must be
acquitted. Only if the judge below could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by
the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that
every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the
test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be
satisfied that on the defendant is laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate
the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty. It is critical that the moral
force of the criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent
men are being condemned. It is important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary
affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing
a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty [People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349 (1992); People
v. Andag, 96 SCRA 861 (1980); People v. Benamira, 277 SCRA 232 (1997)].

A much graver set of inculpatory circumstantial evidence against the accused were present in People v.
Mijares, [297 SCRA 520 (1998)]. Despite that, the accused was acquitted. A seven-year old playmate testified
seeing accused Mijares as the last person who was with the victim the night the victim was killed. The victim,
a girl of tender age, was found dead. The two most damning circumstances crucial to the prosecutions case
were that 1] appellant was the last person seen with the victim; and 2] his slippers were found at the crime
scene. This Honorable Court ruled that these circumstances are subject to two antithetical interpretations, one
of guilt and the other of innocence. This case even cited two analogous cases which fall squarely with the case
at bar, viz:

In People v. Ragon, the trial court convicted appellant of murder, based on these circumstances: he and his
companions were the last persons seen with the victim, and the cap worn by Ragons companion was found
beside the victims dead body. x x x However, this Court found that the circumstantial evidence presented did
not conclusively point to Ragon as the perpetrator of the murder. The presence of the cap
of Ragons companion beside the dead body only proved that said person, not necessarily Ragon himself, was
at the locus criminis. That such cap was found in the vicinity of the crime scene did not necessarily imply that
the accused killed the victim.

In People v. Binamira, the trial court convicted the accused based on the following pieces of circumstantial
evidence: (1) he was accosted by security guards near the crime scene; (2) he was walking suspiciously fast;
(3) bloodied clothes were allegedly recovered from him. Appellant therein was acquitted because the evidence,
in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence, has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and was
thus insufficient to support a conviction. Indeed, this Court has ruled that a person cannot be held liable for the
killing, unless all the proven circumstances point to his guilt.

The case of People v. Boneo [174 SCRA 612 (1989)] recounts a fisherman who was last seen alive with
the Boneo brothers. He accompanied the brothers out to sea late at night to get an animal he was supposed to
buy from the other side of the shore. He was found dead and the P3,000.00 he was carrying gone. The
Supreme Court waxed poetic when it declared - This rule must be observed with more rigor where the
evidence of the prosecution is merely circumstantial, as in the case at bar. While this is not to say that this
kind of evidence will never be sufficient to convict, it does mean that it must be especially persuasive if it is to
still, as it must, every whisper of doubt that the accused is not innocent. Absent conclusive proof of his guilt,
the prisoner must be released and purged of all the stigma of the charge upon his head.

In People v. Garcia, [215 SCRA 349 (1992)], this Honorable Court lauded the OSG for utmost objectivity and
fairness by acquitting the accused because the only circumstance that can be appreciated against him was that
the prosecution witness saw him standing near the banana plants about fifteen meters away from the house of
the victim minutes before the discovery of the deceased.

Similar circumstances did not merit a conviction, as in People v. Nicolas, [204 SCRA 191 (1991)], where the
accused was present at the store where the victim was killed and with him was found part of the stolen money
as well as bloodied pants. In People v. Geron [281 SCRA 36 (1997)], the string of circumstances which the
trial court relied upon for conviction consisted of the presence of the accused at the crime scene; he had in his
possession articles belonging to the victims at the time he was apprehended; and the accused fled from the
crime scene. This Honorable Court held that the above circumstances point to no inference exclusively
consistent with the guilt of the accused. It explained that: First, the mere presence of the accused at
the locus criminis and his possession of certain items belonging to the victims, while it may have pointed the
finger of suspicion at him, cannot be solely interpreted to mean that he has committed the robbery and the
attendant killings. (at p. 47)

Second. The trial court was unable to cite any particular circumstance at all to show that appellant in the case
at bar had a motive to commit the crime.

There is absolutely no motive for appellant to rob or kill the victim. Noteworthy is the testimony of the sister
of the deceased, Nimfa Quizon, who testified in appellants favor. Appellant is not her own son, but her
nephew [TSN, February 24, 1999, p. 3]. Further, Miclat herself heard from the victim that she had been the
one responsible for the appellants rehabilitation [TSN, September 9, 1998, p. 8]. It goes against the grain of
human experience for a sister to prevaricate on the true identity of the killer of her own blood-sister just to
hide the guilt of a nephew.

Lest it be forgotten, the Constitution mandates that the accused must be presumed innocent. Hence, if the
circumstances are capable of several interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the others consistent with his guilt, then the evidence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty
and is thus insufficient to support a conviction [People v. Mijares, 297 SCRA 520 (1998)].
Third. The trial court considered appellants failure to attend the funeral rites of the victim as a sign of guilt.
This is not so [People v. Andag, supra; People v. Mijares, supra]. Appellant and the sister of the victim
testified that the brothers of the victim, uncles of the appellant, strongly suspected him as the killer. He simply
followed the order of his step-mother, his aunt Nimfa Quizon, to avoid attending the wake and the burial to
avoid any mishap that might occur because of the supposition that he was the killer.

Fourth. The trial court faults him for not clearing his name upon notice that he was a suspect and that he went
into hiding, citing that the wicked man flees though no one pursues. Unfortunately, no such flight could be
ascribed to the appellant. The trial court lost sight of the fact that appellant was not a resident of Angeles City,
and that he stayed in the house of his father in La Loma, Quezon City to do some odd jobs and at the house of
his girlfriend in Paraaque [TSN, May 25, 1999, p. 11]. Flight, in order to be considered as an indication of
guilt, presupposes that a person escapes from the authorities to evade prosecution. It does not contemplate a
situation where the accused returns to his home where at any time, he may be picked up for questioning in
connection with or arrested for having committed a crime. Flight, when adequately explained, cannot be
attributed to ones consciousness of guilt. Appellant presented an unrebutted explanation that he fled, not
because of guilt for having perpetrated a crime, but rather for fear of his own relatives reprisal as the primary
suspect in the killing of his own aunt. [People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349 (1992)]; People v. Geron, 281 SCRA
36 (1997)]; People v. Mijares, 297 SCRA 520 (1998)].

Fifth. The Courts acceptance of various details as to the irregularity and strangeness of appellants actions as
constitutive of his guilt like appellants hurried leaving of the premises, his leaving the victim behind when
both of them were going to Manila, and his alleged lack of cooperation with the police in searching for the
true criminal, is premised on a precarious foothold.

Likewise, there is no testimony as to the death of the victim, but only a general medico-legal explanation that
the strangulation of the victim hastened the victims heart and lung disease. There is no evidence of
fingerprints, hair and skin samples on the deceased that might lead to the identity of the killer. The rope or
cloth or blanket that was supposed to have strangled the victim was not presented. There was no testimony
that the belongings of the victim were in disarray to show struggle during the crime. The prosecution was
unable to present evidence as to how the victim died. The alleged P17,000.00 paid to victim and the pieces of
jewelry lost were never presented in court, much less were they found on the appellant.

As the saying goes: The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or
compass. [People v. Geron, 281 SCRA 36 (1997)]. No court, when confronted with issues that affect the life
and liberty of citizens in a free society, should treat flippantly the latters constitutional guarantees and supply
deficiencies in the evidence for the prosecution with its own bias, suspicion or speculation [People v. Garcia,
215 SCRA 349 (1992)].[4]

The OSG thus prayed:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Angeles City,
dated March 27, 2000, in Criminal Case No. 97-893 be REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and accused-appellant
JOHNNY M. QUIZON be ACQUITTED.[5]

The Court upholds the recommendation of the Solicitor General.

Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. -Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

 (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

The foregoing elements must all be obtaining in order to aptly warrant the conviction of an accused. The
circumstances proved must be congruous with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty and inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt.[6] It must be shown (a) that there is more
than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived have been firmly established and (b)
that the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The
Court has once said:

x x x. Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of conviction based
on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.[7]

Evidently, Conchita Magpantay Pasquin was a victim of foul play. The circumstances recited by the trial
court, however, would be insufficient to create in the mind of the Court a moral certainty that appellant was
the one responsible for the commission of the crime. Appellants mere presence at the locus criminis would be
inadequate to implicate him[8] in the commission of the crime. No evidence was adduced that appellant was
the last person to see or talk to the victim before she was killed. Roel Sicangco testified that when he
and Myla arrived at Conchitas office, the latter had just finished talking to a woman and a man with a
collectors bag. After Roel and Myla finished their transaction with Conchita, the same man and woman,
whom they saw earlier, again entered Conchitas office. Roel testified that he saw Johnny come out of the
office and board a passenger jeepney going to Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The prosecution failed to show
that Sicangco had any good reason to lie. Even while the trial court had observed that Conchitas jewelry and
money were never found, no evidence was introduced that appellant had them, or that he had them in his
possession at anytime after Conchitas death. The trial court found it strange that appellant did not wait
for Conchita when the latter said that she was also leaving for Manila. Appellant said that he did offer to wait
for Conchita but she told him to go ahead as she still had some other work to attend to.
The fact that appellant did not attend Conchitas wake is not an indication of either flight or
guilt. Nimfa Quizon would appear to have warned appellant against going to the wake after he earned the ire
of their relatives who had suspected him to be the killer.
Significantly, no ill-motive was ascribed on appellant to either kill or rob his own aunt.
The circumstances recited by the trial court might be enough to create some kind of suspicion on the part
of the trial court of appellants involvement, but suspicion is not enough to warrant conviction. A finding of
guilt based on conjecture, even if likely, cannot satisfy the need for evidence required for a pronouncement of
guilt, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt of the complicity in the crime.[9] No matter how weak the defense is,
it is still imperative for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
evidence for the prosecution, it has been said, must at all times stand or fall on its own weight and it cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.[10] An accused has the right to be presumed
innocent, and this presumption prevails until and unless it is overturned by competent and credible evidence
proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[11] In case of any reservation against the guilt of accused, the Court
should entertain no other alternative but to acquit him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of finding appellant JOHNNY M. QUIZON
guilty of robbery with homicide is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and he is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. The Court further orders appellants immediate release from custody, unless he is lawfully held for
another lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision immediately and to
report to this Court the action taken hereon not later than five (5) days from receipt hereof.

V. Presumptions
9. Datalift Movers v. Belgravia Realty, G.R. No. 144268, August 30, 2006

In an action for ejectment filed by Sampaguita Brokerage, Inc. and its sister company, Belgravia
Realty & Development Corporation, against the herein petitioners Datalift Movers, Inc. and/or Jaime B.
Aquino, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), of Manila, Branch 3, later the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 36, and eventually the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 52189 are one in ordering
the petitioners ejectment from the premises involved in the suit and their payment of unpaid rentals, attorneys
fees and costs. Undaunted, the petitioners have come to this Court via this petition for review with application
for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to seek the reversal of the affirmatory decision
of the CA, including those of the courts below it.

We likewise AFFIRM, but first the facts:

The premises involved in this case is a warehouse (bodega) used by petitioner Datalift Movers, Inc.
(Datalift for short) for its cargoes in connection with its brokerage business. The warehouse stands on a
3,967.70 squaremeter lot owned by the Philippine National Railways (PNR) and located at No. 883 Santibaez
Street corner Cristobal Street, Pandacan, Manila.

Sometime in 1987, PNR leased out the lot to Sampaguita Brokerage, Inc. (Sampaguita, hereafter),
pursuant to a written contract commencing on July 1, 1987 and terminating on June 30, 1990 for a monthly
rental of P6,282.49, subject to a ten (10%) percent increase every year.

Sampaguita thereafter entered into a special arrangement with its sister company, Belgravia Realty &
Development Corporation (Belgravia for short) whereby the latter would put up on the lot a warehouse for its
own use. True enough, Belgravia did put up a warehouse occupying an area of about 3,000 squaremeters of
the lot. However, instead of using the said warehouse for itself, Belgravia sublet it to petitioner Datalift,
represented by its president Jaime B. Aquino, pursuant to a 1-year written contract of lease[1] dated October 2,
1990, commencing on October 5, 1990 and ending on October 5, 1991, subject to extension upon mutual
agreement by the parties. By the terms of lease, Datalift shall pay Belgravia a monthly rental
of P40,000.00 payable on or before the 15th day of each month, provided an advance rental for two (2) months
is paid upon execution of the contract.
 After the one year contract period expired, lessee Datalift continued in possession and enjoyment of
the leased warehouse, evidently by acquiesance of lessor Belgravia or by verbal understanding of the parties.
Subsequently, Belgravia unilaterally increased the monthly rental to P60,000.00 starting June 1994 to October
1994. Monthly rental was again increased from P60,000.00 to P130,000.00 beginning November 1994
onwards, allegedly in view of the increased rental demanded by PNR on Sampaguita for the latters lease of
the formers lot whereon the warehouse in question stands. Because of the rental increase made
by Belgravia, Datalift stopped paying its monthly rental for the warehouse.Thereafter, Sampaguita addressed
demand letters to Datalift asking the latter to pay its rental in arrears in the amount of P4,120,000.00 and to
vacate and surrender the warehouse in dispute. The demands having proved
futile, Belgravia and/or Sampaguita filed with the MeTC of Manila their
[2]
complaint for ejectment against Datalift and/or its controlling stockholder, Jaime B. Aquino.

In their Answer with Counterclaim,[3] the defendants interposed the following defenses:

1) Sampaguita has no cause of action against them, not being a party nor privy to
the Datalift-Belgravia contract of lease;

2) Under the PNR-Sampaguita contract of lease over the PNR lot, Sampaguita is prohibited
from subleasing the property;

3) The same PNR-Sampaguita contract had allegedly expired;

4) Lessor Belgravia likewise has no cause of action because it was neither the owner nor
lessee of the lot whereon the warehouse stands.

By way of counterclaim, defendants Datalift and Aquino prayed for the refund by Belgravia of the
rentals they paid during the entire period of their lease of the warehouse, plus exemplary damages and
litigation expenses.

In a decision[4] dated October 16, 1997, the MeTC of Manila, Branch 3, rendered judgment for
plaintiffs Sampaguita and Belgravia but reduced the amount of rental arrearages to a reasonable level
of P80,000,00 a month, saying:

Upon the other hand, this Court is not persuaded or inclined to favor the very
substantial increase in the amount demanded by Sampaguita and/or Belgravia upon Datalift,
from P60,000.00 to P130,000.00 per month. Such increase is arbitrary, highly unconscionable
and beyond the ambit of equity and justice considering that the original agreed rental on the
premises in 1990 was only P45,000.00 per month, the latter increase to P60,000.00 per month.
The unilateral increase of P70,000.00 making the monthly rental P130,000.00 effective June,
1994, is, as earlier said, beyond the conscience of man. Belgravia would be guilty likewise, of
unjust enrichment.
 The increase in rental for P60,000.00 per month to P80,000.00 per month, following
the trend in the amount of increase during the previous years would, to the mind of the Court
be reasonable and justified. Thus, the rental in arrears due and demandable upon defendants
would be P20,000.00 per month from June, 1994 to October, 1994, defendants having paid
already P60,000.00 per month during the five (5) months period, the P80,000.00 per month
from November, 1994 to the present.

In the same decision, the MeTC rejected the defendants challenge against Belgravias title over the PNR lot
occupied by the subject warehouse.

More particularly, the MeTC decision dispositively reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds and so hold that
plaintiffs have proven their case against defendants by preponderance of
evidence sufficient to grant what is prayed for in their Complaint with certain
modification and hereby renders judgment:

1) Ordering defendants and all persons, natural or juridical, claiming

rights, interest or title under them, to vacate and surrender peacefully to
plaintiffs that warehouse and the area/premises occupied by them located
at No. 883 Santibaez Street corner Cristobal Street, Pandacan, City
of Manila;

2) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff Belgravia the difference

of P20,000.00 from what had been already paid of P60,000.00 per month for
the months of June, 1994 to October, 1994 or a total of P100,000.00; and the
unpaid rentals at P80,000.00 per month from November, 1994 to the present
and until defendants vacate and surrender the warehouse and premises
subject of this litigation;

3) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff P30,000.00 for and as

attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, and

4) To pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Obviously dissatisfied, both parties appealed to the RTC whereat the appeal was raffled to Branch 36
thereof. In their appeal, Datalift and its co-defendant Jaime B. Aquinoquestioned the MeTCs finding that there
was an implied new lease between PNR and Sampaquita on the lot on which the warehouse in question stands,
and accordingly fault the same court for ordering them to vacate the same warehouse and to pay rentals as
well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

For their part, Sampaguita and Belgravia assailed the MeTC decision for not
ordering Datalift and Aquino to pay the increase rental of P130,000.00 a month beginning June 1994, and for
not ruling that both defendants are jointly and subsidiary liable for the amounts awarded to them.
 In a decision[5] dated March 11, 1999, the RTC, reechoing the MeTCs ruling on the authority
of Sampaguita and Belgravia to institute the complaint for ejectment as well as the same courts finding as to
the reasonable amount of rental in arrears due Belgravia, affirmed in toto the assailed MeTC decision, thus:

In the light of the foregoing, the assailed decision of MeTC of Manila, Branch 3 is
affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.

This time, only Datalift and its co-petitioner Jaime B. Aquino elevated the case to the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 52189.

Again, in a decision[6] dated August 4, 2000, the CA dismissed the petitioners recourse thereto and
affirmed with slight modification the challenged affirmatory decision of the RTC, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 36, Manila, dated March 11, 1999, affirming in toto the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 3, is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the award
of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

Still unable to accept the adverse decisions of the three (3) courts below, the petitioners are now with
this Court via this petition for review on their submission that the CA erred:
XXX IN HOLDING THAT AN IMPLIED NEW LEASE WAS CREATED BETWEEN PNR
AND RESPONDENTS (i.e. SAMPAGUITA and BELGRAVIA) WHEN THE FORMER
DID NOT TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO EJECT THE LATTER FROM THE SUBJECT
PREMISES.

XXX IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO QUESTION

WHETHER AN IMPLIED NEW LEASE WAS CREATED BETWEEN PNR AND THE
RESPONDENTS.

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners first fault the CA for affirming the RTC and the MeTC which ruled that the subject
warehouse and the land and area which it occupies rightfully belong to respondent Belgravia, not Datalift, for
an implied new lease was created between PNR, the acknowledged owner of the lot,
and Sampaguita, Belgravia's sister company, which, by virtue of a special
arrangement, Sampaguita allowed Belgravia to construct a warehouse on the leased lot and sub-leased the
same to Datalift.
 At first glance, the petitioners' argument may appear to have some merit, but it is still insufficient to
warrant a reversal of the CA decision.

Relative to the first argument, the CA decision pertinently reads:

There is no definite showing that the lease contract between PNR

and Sampaguita Brokerage, Inc. had been effectively terminated. As held by the court a
quo: (B)y PNR not taking a positive action to eject Sampaguita from the leased premises up
to the present, again, there is a tacit renewal of the lease contract between PNR
and Sampaguita.(Emphasis in the original.)

The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields respondent Belgravia, as lessor, from being questioned
by the petitioners as lessees, regarding its title or better right of possession as lessor because having admitted
the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship, the petitioners are barred from assailing Belgravia's title of better
right of possession as their lessor.

Section 2, Rule 131, of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions. -- The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions:

(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it;
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (Underscoring ours.)

Conclusive presumptions have been defined as inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it
will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong.[7] As long as the lessor-lessee
relationship between the petitioners and Belgravia exists as in this case, the former, as lessees, cannot by any
proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that Belgravia has valid title to or better right of
possession to the subject leased premises than they have.

It was superfluous on the part of the MeTC to rule on the source or validity of Belgravia's title or right
of possession over the leased premises as against the petitioners as lessees in this case. If at
all, Belgravia's title or right of possession should only be taken cognizance of in a proper case between PNR
and Belgravia, but not in the present case.Any ruling which the court may render on this issue will, at the very
least, be an obiter dictum, if not outrightly ultra vires.
 The apparent error made by the MeTC will, however, not affect the result of the judgment rendered in
this case. In fact, the application of the rule on conclusive presumption under the afore-quoted Section 2,
Rule 131 strengthens the position of the MeTC that the petitioners may be validly ordered to vacate the leased
premises for nonpayment of rentals. Likewise, the logical consequence of the operation of this conclusive
presumption against the petitioners is that they will never have the personality to question whether an implied
new lease was created between PNR and the respondents, because so long as there is no showing that
the lessor-lessee relationship has terminated, the lessors title or better right of possession as against the lessee
will eternally be a non-issue in any proceeding before any court.

Additionally, as correctly pointed out by the CA, being non-privies to the contract of lease between
PNR and respondent Sampaguita, the petitioners have no personality to raise any factual or legal issue relating
thereto.

Despite non-merit of petitioners' arguments, and notwithstanding the petitioners' failure to assail the
accuracy of the dates when the increase of rental from P60,000.00 to P130,000.00 was effected, in the interest
of justice, the Court shall correct this plain error, and adjust the rental due in accordance with the facts as
borne by the evidence on record. The Court readily noticed that the MeTC decision erroneously reckoned the
effective date of the increased rental of P130,000.00 from June 1994 instead of the correct date of November
1994, which shall cause an overpayment of P100,000.00 by the petitioners. It is clear from the records that the
rental due and demandable, and which the petitioners already paid to respondent Belgravia from June 1994 to
October 1994 was only P60,000.00. It was only when Belgravia drastically increased the monthly rental
from P60,000.00 to P130,000.00, effective November 1994, that the petitioners altogether stopped paying
rentals. Thus, the order to pay unpaid rentals in the adjusted amount of P80,000.00 should be reckoned only
from November 1994 until the time that the petitioners finally vacate the premises. There are no unpaid
differentials of P20,000.00/month due from June 1994 to October 1994.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the CA is hereby AFFIRMED with

the MODIFICATION that the petitioners are ordered to pay only the unpaid rentals from November 1994 in
the amount of P80,000.00 until they vacate the leased premises.

No pronouncement as to costs.