American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.

Radical Liberalism and Radical Education: A Synthesis and Critical Evaluation of Illich,
Freire, and Dewey
Author(s): Peter M. Lichtenstein
Source: The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Jan., 1985), pp.
39-53
Published by: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.
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 Radical Liberalism and Radical Education:
A Syntbesis and Critical Evaluation of Illich,
Freire, and Dewey

By PETER M. LICHTENSTEIN*

ABSTRACT. Radical liberalism is a social philosophy which spans two traditions:

liberalism (both classical and modern) and left wing radicalism. The former
seeks the liberation of individuals from political/economic power; the latter
seeks to overturn a social order based on privilege and property. The writings
of Illich, Freire, and Dewey represent an educational philosophical tradition
that falls squarely into the radical liberal school. All three educators generally
share a similar attachment to pluralistic, developmental, solidaristic, and
egalitarian values. They also desire educational systems which are based on
participatory democracy. Theirs is a praxis-oriented, consciousness raising
educational alternative which serves as the starting point for revolutionary
social change.

Introduction

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is to clarify the theoretical connection between

radical liberal theories of education and radical liberal social philosophy.
The term "radical liberalism" as applied to education theory refers to those
critical, non-Marxian analyses of the education process and of the institutions
which delimit that process. Although there exists a rather enormous collection
of non-Marxian education literature that could be classified as "radical," the
views of Ivan Illich [1973, 1971 and 1969], Paulo Freire [1975 and 1971] and
John Dewey [1966, 1962, 1940, 1916, 1915, 1900 and 1887] suitably represent
the general tenor of that literature and are for this reason selected as the basis
for analysis.
The term radical liberalism, both in its application to education theory as
well as social theory, is nevertheless fraught with ambiguity, despite the
apparent freedom with which both elements are normally used. This ambiguity
is quite understandable because both liberalism and radicalism have over

* [Peter M. Lichtenstein, Ph.D., is professor of economics at Boise State University, 1910

University Drive, Boise, Idaho 83725.] This paper was written while I was a Visiting Fellow at
Cornell University's Program on Participation and Labor Managed Systems. 1 am grateful to
several people for their critical comments, especially two anonymous reviewers.

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 44, No. 1 (January, 1985).
? 1985 American journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.

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40 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

time undergone many changes in usage. These changes may in turn be

directly linked to the many political and economic transformations that have
occurred in the countries in which these philosophies have been popularized.
Thus, the term liberal has been applied to every one from Milton Friedman
to John Maynard Keynes, and the term radical to everyone from Jeremy
Bentham to Karl Marx. The ambiguity therefore springs from the ambiguity
which has surrounded each of its sources.
In order to understand the broad philosophical context in which non-
Marxian radical education theories are located, this paper will employ a
working definition of radical liberalism. This definition, outlined in a previous
article in this Journal [Lichtenstein, 1984], will then be applied to help clarify
the principles of non-Marxian radical education theory.' Section II examines
the work of Illich, Freire and Dewey in the context of this definition of radical
liberalism, while Section III explores the revolutionary qualities of these
theories. Section IV examines the boundary which separates radical liberal
theories of education from Marxian theories, and Section V briefly summarizes
the arguments of this paper.

II

Radical Education and Radical Liberalism

THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION contains many examples of attempts to radically

alter the experience of schooling along radical liberal lines. Among the more
noteworthy of such experiments were the popular folk high schools begun
by Bishop Grundtvig in Denmark in the 1840s. Discovered by American
educators in the 1920s, the Danish folk high schools were based on the
philosophy that people would develop "naturally" if provided with an
environment that was supportive of their individual learning needs. The high
schools were aimed at adults-mainly peasants, small holders-and provided
no diplomas, certificates, or grades. There were no entrance requirements
other than the desire for self knowledge, and the learning experience
was a communal one, with students living together on the school premises.
[Davis, 1971]
In Sweden, also, a "free" workers' high school movement arose at the turn
of the century, although it was secular rather than religious. Copied in
Denmark, these high schools were owned by the Workers Education Association
and offered freedom of choice of subjects, experimental pedagogy, study
circles, and required residence. [Davis, 1971]
Similar experiments occurred in England at the turn of the century, largely

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 Radical Education 41

as an outgrowth of the labor movement. Labor's demand for reform of the

system of universal education was vigorously pressed. Ultimately it lead to
the Labour College movement and to the founding of Ruskin College at
Oxford University. There were also the educational activities that were
sponsored by the popular co-operative movement, such as the Rochdale
Educational Guild, the "Pleasant Sunday Afternoons" of the Liberals and the
Socialist Sunday School movement which brought together socialists of every
variety-Christian, Guild, Democratic, Anarchist as well as Marxian-for
lectures and discussions. All of these experiments had working class support
and subscribed to humanistic philosophies. [Simon, 1965]
Similar educational reform movements have occurred in the United States
[Butts, 1978], the most recent of which took place during the 1960s and 1970s.
The latter movement reflected a growing awareness that many minorities and
women were being left out of both the educational process and the economic
process. A causal connection was thought to exist between these two phenom-
ena. These groups were economically disadvantaged because they were
educationally disadvantaged. This view became dominant and ultimately led
to compensatory education policies. [Carnoy, 1974] These compensatory
policies were typical (etatist) liberal responses which did little to alter the
underlying social relations and structures of schools and universities. It was
believed that by providing disadvantaged groups with greater educational
opportunities the economic results (higher incomes, job advancement, etc.)
would automatically occur without having to change either the educational
system or the economic system. The mainstream liberal view therefore
assumed that increases in the average level of education could substitute for
structural social change.
During this time there was also a renewed interest in radical education
philosophies and radical education experiences. This is illustrated by the free
school movement which included the more passive, apolitical Summerhill-
type schools, parent-teacher cooperatives, community elementary schools,
and the more activist countercultural free high schools. Most, if not all, of
these experiments were aimed at libertarian education and pedagogy, and the
hope that "the schools based upon [that pedagogy] will develop children who
are joyful, cooperative, and peaceful, neither racist nor sexist nor repressed."
[Graubard, 1972a, p. 368; see also Graubard, 1972b]
This free school movement (which also affected university curricula) was
accompanied by a wave of popular and academic literature advancing a variety
of so-called radical education alternatives. [E.g., Goodman, 1964; Neill, 1960;
Postman and Weingartner, 1969; and Reimer, 1971] Academic interest in these

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42 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

alternative experiments was also kindled by scholarly sociological analyses of

countercultural organizations, particularly of the experimental school. [Barrow,
1978; Swidler, 1979]
Representative of the general tenor of this recent movement are the works
of Illich, Freire, and Dewey. Their works encompass most of the educational
views advanced by the participants in the movement, and, as will be demon-
strated, are firmly planted in the general radical liberal tradition. We shall
examine their education theories on the basis of the six definitional coordinates
outlined [Lichtenstein, 1984]. These coordinates include (1) pluralism; (2)
developmental individualism, (3) solidarity; (4) egalitarianism; (5) participa-
tion; and (6) social revolution. The first five will be discussed here while the
sixth will be left to Section III.
Pluralism. According to Illich, the current school system violates basic
pluralistic values by centralizing initiative and authority. Thus, only schools
can educate because they are the ones who happen to have the resources.
Education in industrial society has become institutionalized, encapsulating
the rights of other groups and organizations to educate. To Illich, modern
school systems are therefore self-generative, creating their own criteria for
judging how much education is necessary for society to provide.
Freire echoes this criticism: individuals have no ability to exercise control
over the educational process, and in their role as students become mere
receptacles of predigested knowledge. This theme also recurs in Dewey,

whom Wirth calls "the philosopher of the back to people movement." [Wirt
1981, p. 123] Dewey saw that the education process had been "co-opted by
an industrial philosophy of social efficiency," [Wirth, 1981, p. 125] and that it
had come to be dominated by the narrow interests of the few. The centralization
of the power to educate in the hands of a professional class operating in the
interests of an industrial system has resulted in an almost total absence of
pluralism in the sphere of education. The pluralistic alternative to this situation
is best described by Dewey:
. . . with the development of commerce, transportation, intercommunication, and emigration,
countries like the United States are composed of a combination of different groups with
different traditional customs. It is this situation which has . . . forced the demand for an
educational institution which shall provide something like a homogeneous and balanced
environment for the young. Only in this way can the centrifugal forces set up by
juxtaposition of different groups within one and the same political unit be counteracted.
The intermingling in the school of youth of different races, differing religions, and unlike
customs creates for all a new and broader environment. [Dewey, 1916, pp. 25-261

Developmental Individualism. According to Illich, the centralized, com-

pulsory nature of modern education thwarts the individual's growth intellec-

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 Radical Education 43

tually. People lack the power over their own circumstances and become
increasingly unable to "organize their lives around their own experiences and
resources within their own communities." [Illich, 1971, p. 4] The individual
therefore becomes alienated from the process of education, a process which
is expropriated from him and reified in an institution over which he or she
has no effective control. "The power of school thus to divide social reality
has no boundaries: education becomes unworldly and the world becomes
uneducational." [Illich, 1971, p. 24] Because the schools become the "repository
of society's myths" [Illich, p. 37] individuals cannot hope to unveil the real
manipulative nature of modern industrial society.
Freire also observes how the creative and activist impulses of people are
annulled by education. The "banking" approach to education reproduces the
dialectical oppressed-oppressor relationship: the culture of the oppressor class
"invades" and dominates the oppressed class. The latter learn to emulate
their oppressors by accepting their culture. This is a form of self-depreciation
which Dewey also observes and sees arresting human development. Although
Dewey's criticisms were directed at the classroom of the late 19th and early
20th centuries, they are applicable to today's classroom as well. Bureaucratic
centralism puts the teacher in a subservient relationship with the administration
and externalizes the control of the educational processes outside of the
teacher. Moreover, the "undemocratic suppression of the individuality of
teachers," Dewey said, "is linked to a suppression of the intelligence of
students." [Wirth, p. 137] Dewey consequently regarded education, ideally, as
"a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social
aims," where these aims were "cooperative human pursuits and results."
[Dewey, 1916, p. 115]
Solidarity. Illich's position on this concept is best illustrated by his
liberationist Catholic theology. [Elias, 1976; McCann, 1981] Fraternal relations
among people are symbolized by the Christian's union with Christ. In the
sphere of education, the contradictory hierarchical and antagonistic relation-
ships between students and teachers, administrators and teachers, and parents
and teachers, prevent such a communion from occurring.
A yearning for a pre-industrial brotherhood, an idea central to modern
Christian humanism, appears also in the work of Freire. The latter reflects a
view in which people's relationship to God is used as a standard by which to
judge their relationships to each other. The fraternal relationship which
Freire, like Illich, seeks is religiously grounded and underpinned by the
"pedagogy of the oppressed."
To Dewey, the educational system is nurtured by a class-divided society in

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44 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

which the "influences which educate some into masters, educate others into
slaves. And the experience of each party loses in meaning, when the free
interchange of varying modes of life-experience is arrested." [Dewey, 1916,
p. 98.] Dewey envisions a community in which separate groups, with conflicting
views of the world, can share their knowledge in a continual process of
"reconstructing experience," a community based on sharing, and free and
open interaction. This feature of Dewey's philosophy became central to the
progressive educational movement which, through the Progressive Education
Association, claimed in 1933 that education
should aim to foster in boys and girls a profound devotion to the welfare of the masses, a
deep aversion to the tyranny of privilege, a warm feeling of kinship with all races of
mankind, and a quick readiness to engage in bold social experimentation. [quoted in
Cagan, 1978]

Egalitarianism. Illich sees the education system as a prime source of social

inequality: only the schools and universities have the financial resources and
legal authority to educate. He sees our society as an industrial, consumer
oriented one in which individual values are "institutionally engineered."
[Illich, P. 70] "Certified college graduates fit only into a world which puts a
price tag on their heads, thereby giving them the power to define the level
of expectations in their society." [Illich, p. 35] Educational institutions therefore
become manipulative post-industrial bureaucracies which addict their clients
to the consumer oriented values and interests of business. [Gintis, 1972, p.
73] Thus, the student becomes indoctrinated into becoming a docile, passive
consumer, and the negation of this tendency would, for Illich, consist of
egalitarian educational systems without "schools," of voluntaristic systems of
learning webs in which everyone would have equal access to society's
educational resources.
To Freire, the education-led social revolution would negate the oppressor-
oppressed negation, and would presumably result in a classless, egalitarian
society meeting the requirements of his Christian humanist heritage. And to
Dewey, "School facilities must be secured of such amplitude and efficiency
as will in fact and not simply in name discount the effects of economic
inequalities, and secure to all the wards of the nation equality of equipment
for their future careers." [Dewey, 1916, p. 114] Even more poignantly, Dewey
asserted that it is a "flat hostility to the ethics of modern life to suppose that
there are two different ends of life located on different planes; that the few
who are educated are to live on a plane of exclusive and isolated culture,
while the many toil below on the level of practical endeavor directed at
material commodity." [Dewey, 1940, pp. 48-49]

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 Radical Education 45

All three education philosophers therefore envision an educational process

which would reproduce an egalitarian social system in which everyone would
have equal access to educational resources.
Participation. All three authors express distinct participatory sentiments.
These can be clearly seen in their visions of ideal educational processes.
Illich, as mentioned before, envisions a system of convivial educational
"webs," or channels of access to educational resources. These would consist
of (1) reference services to educational material; (2) skill exchanges for those
wishing to acquire or improve upon a skill; (3) peer matching, in which
voluntary associations of people can organize themselves to pursue a common
interest; (4) reference services to "educators at large" in which professional
educators would be employed to consult with and guide anyone interested
in a certain topic. Such a system would be an alternative to the current system
of compulsory education and would provide equal access to resources, enable
anyone to find peers who are also interested in similar topics, and provide
public forums for anyone wishing to share ideas. Such a system would allow
everyone to freely and fully participate in all aspects of education.
Freire's ideal system carries with it a similar participatory impulse. His
alternative to the banking approach to education is dialogue, a problem-
posing method of education in which knowledge is created through active
participation in dialogue. Participants would relate in a non-authoritative
manner: students would become teachers and teachers would become students.
Education would also become a method of "conscientization" [Freire, 1975]
in which reflection and action are unified and in which the educator's role
would be similar to the role of the radical theologian. [McCann, 1981;
Guitierrez, 1973]
Dewey's participatory ideal was a social and educational alternative that
would do away with the class divisions which defined contemporary educational
institutions. He envisioned a society in which the division of mental and
physical labor, reflected in the division between liberal and vocational
education, would be eliminated. What was required was a Freireian praxis
education:2 "The problem of education in a democratic society is to do away
with [this] dualism and to construct a course of studies which makes thought
a guide of free practice for all...." [Dewey, 1916, p. 305] "All education
proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness."
[Dewey, 1887, p. 3] The participatory nature of Dewey's praxis-oriented
education becomes clear:
. . . the great majority of workers have no insight into the social aims of their pursuits
and direct personal interest in them. The results actually achieved are not the ends of

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46 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

their actions, but only of their employers' . . . It is this fact which makes the action
illiberal, and which makes any education designed simply to give skill in such undertakings
illiberal and immoral. The activity is not free because not freely participated in. [Dewey,
1916, p. 304, emphasis added]

Before we turn to the sixth coordinate of the radical liberal approach, to

which we devote the entire next section, it should be noted by way of
summary that all three philosophies are informed by the radical liberal
paradigm. They are characterized by the desire to liberate mankind from
oppressive, class divided, alienating social systems, and education plays a
central role in that liberation.

III

Education as Liberation

THE SIXTH, AND FINAL COORDINATE of the radical liberal approach to educat
is its call for a revolution in cultural values and in social practices. This
revolutionary stance sets the radical liberal apart from the mainstream laissez-
faire and etatist liberal. The primary goal of radical liberal educators is the
liberation of people from oppression and from the constraints imposed by a
class-divided industrial society. They see a social transformation leading to a
non-alienating, developmental, libertarian culture. How is this to be achieved,
and what is their program for social change?
Illich's liberationist program begins with the sphere of education. Society
must be "deschooled," and the responsibility for education must be returned
to the learner. The cultural revolution which Illich seeks must begin, therefore,
with the dismantling of compulsory education institutions and their subsequent
replacement with a system of educational webs such as those described in
the previous section.
The reason why this revolution must begin with education and not elsewhere
is because the "school is not yet organized for self-protection as effectively
as a nation State, or even a large corporation." [Illich, p. 49] Thus a revolution
directed at education would be more likely to succeed and would be less
painful and bloody than might otherwise be the case.
Illich's program for change therefore calls for the development of a strong
countercultural movement directed not at the democratization of compulsory
schools but at their elimination. This requires "a new understanding of the
educational style of an emerging counterculture" [Illich, p. 70], a counterculture
rooted in Illich's theological perspective and which "calls for voluntary
poverty, chastity, and joyful renunciation of the present world." [Elias, p. 58]
This, to Illich, is the task of Christian salvation, which, in secular terms, is
synonymous with liberation.

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 Radical Education 47

Freire's revolutionary program is rooted in his attachment to Hegelian

dialectics, according to which revolution is the negation of the oppressor-
oppressed negation. Freire's dialectics of pedagogical liberation serves as the
basis for his program of social change, a program which cannot be achieved
peacably: "Freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift." [Freire, 1971,
p. 34]
The social change which Freire seeks originates in a praxis-oriented,
educational process that would awaken the consciousness of the oppressed
through the use of dialogue. Only through this process can people come to
see and act upon the oppressive relations in which they find themselves.

Only as they discover themselves as "hosts" of the oppressor can they contribute to the
midwifery of their liberating pedagogy. .. The pedagogy of the oppressed is an
instrument for their critical discovery that both they and their oppressors are manifestations
of dehumanization. [Freire, 1971, p. 33]

The goals of this pedagogical liberation process are cooperation, unity,

organization, and cultural synthesis, each of which can be viewed as negations
of contemporary society's methods of cultural conquest through mythisization,
disunification, manipulation, and cultural invasion.
Freire's analysis of liberation and social change can, like Illich's, be best
understood in reference to his Christian humanist heritage. However, Illich's
theologically grounded program is based on passive renunciation of the
present world, while Freire sees the task of the Christian to be the active
revolutionary struggle against all forms of oppression. Revolution through
"conscientization" is, according to Freire, the act of creating a humanized
world; it is an act of love and humility.
Dewey turned to the potential of science to develop his program for a
social transformation to a democratic humanistic alternative future. To Dewey,
science has been captured by industry and made to serve dehumanizing
purposes. However, to Dewey, science can be progressive and humane. It
can liberate people's minds and create new knowledge and extend the
boundaries of our creative capacities. "Science marks the emancipation of
mind from devotion to customary purposes and makes possible the systematic
pursuit of new ends. It is the agency of progress in action." [Dewey, 1916,
p. 262]
The liberating effects of science, employed in the service of education,
implies:

The problem of an educational use of science is then to create an intelligence pregnant

with belief in the possibility of the direction of human affairs. The method of science
engrained through education in habit means emancipation from rule of thumb and from
the routine generated by rule of thumb procedure. [Dewey, 1916, p. 263]

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48 American Journal of Economics and Sociologyc

To Dewey, then, "science is the organ of general social progress." [Dewey,

1916, p. 270] But to give science this role requires that social relationships
and social organizations change as well. They must encourage and permit
free and open communication, cooperation, and collaboration. Such an ideal
institutional environment is similar to the kind of dialogue-environment
envisioned by Illich and Freire: "a mode of associated living, or conjoint
communicated living." [Dewey, 1916, p. 100] And such an environment in
turn requires a system of democratic planning and industrial democracy, a
system which makes work experience educative, and which returns control
to the worker: "This means an increasing share given to the wage-earner in
controlling the conditions of his own activity." [Dewey, 1962, p. 153] Workers
must come to understand and control science as applied to industry rather
than remain mere appendages to science-produced machines. In making this
plea Dewey, unlike Illich and Freire, draws an explicit connection between
educational alternatives and economic alternatives.
In summary, the general theory of social change embedded in the works
of Illich, Freire, and Dewey takes the sphere of education to be of central
importance. Social transformation to a humane democratic society requires
that the educational activities of people be internalized in and controlled by
the learner instead of by a separate class of specialists who function to serve
the interests of a social elite. Education can be liberating, it can emancipate
humanity by awakening and elevating the consciousness of (i.e., "conscien-
tizing," to use Freirian terminology) the learner and by making the learner
aware and active, instead of deluded and passive.
All three also argue for the elimination of the dualism between intellectual
work and physical work, and stress the importance of unifying knowledge
and practice, and of the need for those involved in the education process for
relationships built on dialogue. Education, like the rest of society, must be
built on democratic participation and voluntary action.

IV

Radical Liberal vs. Marxian Education Theory

IN ORDER TO GAIN a deeper appreciation for the distinctiveness of the radical

liberal approach to education it is necessary to consider not only the boundary
which separates that doctrine from mainstream liberalism, but also the
boundary setting it off from the Marxian view.
In the Marxian literature, the education system is viewed as a set of
structures, or "sites" within the liberal-democratic State. [Bowles and Gintis,

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 Radical Education 49

1981] As such it displays both correspondences as well as contradictions with

the economic system [Paci, 1977; Carter, 1976] and serves not only to
reproduce existing class relationships and attitudes [Bowles and Gintis, 1976]
but also to legitimate the existing social structure and the role of the State
within that structure. [Habermas, 1976; Broady, 1981] The emphasis of the
Marxian approach is therefore on correspondence, contradiction, reproduction
and legitimation.3
Radical liberal educators also stress these factors as being basic to our
understanding of the role of education. Illich's analysis, for example, explored
the relationship between the need for business to sell commodities and the
commercial, consumer oriented values that are reproduced in the schools and
universities. The correspondence between these two factors is marked, ac-
cording to Illich, by corporate bureaucracies which manipulate and indoctrinate
students through the agency of compulsory schools.
Freire's critique of education also stressed the reproductive qualities of
education, in particular the production of oppressive class relationships. And
Dewey's educational philosophy which was rooted in his critical view of
capitalism, echoed similar criticisms. For this reason, Dewey was even
considered by many to be a close ally of the left.
Marxian analysis of education also suggests that the education system
functions, through both its curricular form as well as its curricular content
[Apple, 1981] to (1) maintain and extend the ideological hegemony of
capitalist culture and ideology [Gramsci, 1971]; (2) provide the necessary skill
qualifications for the economy by regulating the flow of students through the
system [Paci, 1977]; (3) insure that its graduates assume the behavioral
attitudes and values necessary for the smooth functioning of the economy
(e.g., obedience, uncritical enthusiasm, adaptability, and perseverance) [Apple
and King, 1977; Bowles and Gintis, 1977]; and (4) guarantee the stability of
the social hierarchy by screening, tracking and labelling students prior to
their entry into the world of work [Boudon, 1977; Halsey, 1977, Karabel, 1977;
Sewell and Shah, 1977]. It also suggests that contemporary education is
coming increasingly under the sway of the logic of capitalist calculation, that
it is being penetrated by a Weberian form of rationality, partly in response to
the existing economic crisis and partly in response to the introduction of new
technologies into the classrooms. [Apple, 1981] This development is gradually
transforming the social relations within the education system by individualizing
and routinizing the learning process, and by transforming the nature of
teaching from an activity that has been relatively autonomous, spontaneous,
and creative, into one that is increasingly standardized, administrative, and
programmatic.

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50 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

However, a close examination of the radical liberal literature reveals that

they too regard many, if not all of these factors to be equally as important. In
fact, the radical liberal vision of a humane, developmental, participatory and
egalitarian learning environment is not unique and is generally shared by
Marxian educators as well. Wherein, then, lies the difference between radical
liberal and Marxian education theory? On what grounds can we argue that
radical liberalism and Marxism are different on the issue of education, that
they should not be placed in the same "radical" category?
For one thing, radical liberal educators tend to attribute the problems of
contemporary education to the commercialization of social values and the
dehumanization which arises out of industrialization. They see the crisis of
education to be a reflection of a broader crisis within western culture.
Marxian educators, on the other hand, witness the same problems in
education but anchor these problems directly to the dynamics of capitalism.
It is not industrialization, or cultural atrophy per se which are responsible but
the exploitative and authoritarian manner in which production occurs in
capitalism.
This difference is directly related to the materialistic philosophy which
defines Marxism, an approach which is typically rejected by radical liberals.
Because of this difference, radical liberals give more attention to the prospects
of social transformation (which both groups desire) through conscientization.
This causes them to accept the primacy of education in their theories of social
change.
Marxist educators, on the other hand, stress the primacy of capitalist
production, and would directly link any educational alternatives to more
fundamental economic alternatives. The deficiency of radical liberal thought
is, to the Marxists, that they have not tied their praxis-oriented, consciousness
raising education alternative to a larger program of revolutionary change.
From a Marxist perspective, then, the radical liberal approach has a transcen-
dental, idealistic quality to it. It presumes that students and teachers can rise
above the illiberal and oppressive forces which confine them by willing into
action countercultural alternatives. This makes the radical liberal proposals
appear utopian to Marxian educators.

Summary and Conclusions

IT HAS BEEN ARGUED that radical theories of education, especially those which
became popular during the early seventies, represent a distinctive philosophical

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 Radical Education 51

paradigm. This paradigm is situated between traditional liberalism on one

hand and Marxism on the other. While it shares the liberative thrust of
traditional liberalism, it nevertheless rejects the latter's three basic principles
(possessive individualism, private property, and political democracy) [Lichten-
stein, 1984]. On the other hand, this paradigm shares much of the Marxian
critique of education, yet it rejects the latter's materialistic philosophy.
Because of its intermediate position, this paradigm has been assigned the
label "radical liberal." It has a philosophical foundation which is made up of
six basic elements (pluralism, developmental individualism, solidarity, egali-
tarianism, participatory democracy, and social transformation), and the views
of three radical liberal educators, Ivan Illich, Paulo Freire, and John Dewey,
were examined from the perspective of these elements.
The boundary which separates radical liberal education theory from radical
Marxian theory was then described. Although this boundary, like all taxonomical
boundaries, is fuzzy, the difference lies essentially in the degree to which the
critique of education is tied to a critique of capitalism. Marxian educators
regard this connection as vitally important while radical liberals do not, even
though they appear to share similar perspectives.
Finally, Illich, Freire, and Dewey make an important contribution to the
definition of a radical liberal humanistic vision of the future. Their contribution
lies in the fact that their educational philosophies keep alive the dream of a
humanistic libertarian society in which the dignity of man replaces the
calculus of production for profit. Education in such a humanistic society
would necessarily be a critical endeavor and would foster the development
of people who are motivated by cooperation, altruism and compassion instead
of by competition, egoism and hedonism.
The current system of education in capitalism, seen from a radical liberal
perspective, lulls students into a false sense of freedom and disguises the
social forces which influence the form and content of curricula. It enforces
the mistaken impression that contemporary capitalism is shaped and maintained
by a consensus. Education has become a means for life rather than life itself;
it fragments, divides, and breaks the circle of human relationships, creating
in its place a society based on competitive individualism.
Contrasting the radical liberal view of the existing educational system with
the radical liberal ideal, with what might exist, brings into stark relief the
gross inadequacy of the educational reforms now being discussed by educators
and politicians (merit pay, longer school days, school district consolidation,
computer education, etc.). Yet the kind of educational arrangements which
radical liberals recommend cannot coexist with social structures that are

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52 American Journal of Economics and Sociology

hostile to such arrangements. Humanistic education cannot functi

in a society which holds divergent values. The radical liberal call for social
revolution through education therefore will fall on deaf ears (at least in
advanced capitalist societies) unless that call is broadened to include other
spheres besides education. In other words, the ability of existing industrial
society to turn back any assault on its integrity as a viable status quo should
not be underestimated.

Notes

1. In that article it was suggested that radical liberalism takes exception to the liberal
adherence to political democracy and private property; political democracy extends human
freedom while private property abridges human freedom. It was also argued that radical liberal
philosophy can be defined to include the following tenets: pluralism, developmental (as
opposed to possessive) individualism, solidarity, egalitarianism, participatory democracy, and
social revolution. These six coordinates are used in this paper to provide a definition for
radical liberal education theories.
2. The connection between Freire and Dewey on the issue of dialogue in praxis education
is also observed by Wirth. [1981, p. 129]
3. It should be made clear that I am speaking throughout this paper of the contemporary
western Marxian critical theory of capitalist education and not of Soviet Marxian education
theory.

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