On The General Theory of Meaninful Representation

B R E N T MUNDY
ON THE GENERAL THEORY OF MEANINGFUL

REPRESENTATION*
ABSTRACT. The numerical representations of measurement, geometry and kinematics

are here subsumed under a general theory of representation. The standard theories of
meaningfulness of representational propositions in these three areas are shown to be
special cases of two theOries of meaningfulness for arbitrary representational pro-
positions: the theories based on unstructured and on structured representation respec-
tively. The foundations of the standard theories of meaningfulness are critically analyzed
and two basic assumptions are isolated which do not seem to have received adequate
justification: the assumption that a proposition invariant under the appropriate group is
therefore meaningful, and the assumption that representations should be unique up to a
transformation of the appropriate group. A general theory of representational meaning-
fulness is offered, based on a semantic and syntactic analysis of representational
propositions. Two neglected features of representational propositions are formalized and
made use of: (a) that such propositions are induced by more general propositions defined
for other structures than the one being represented, and (b) that the true purpose of
representation is the application of the theory of the representing system to the
represented system. On the basis of these developments, justifications are offered for the
two problematic assumptions made by the existing theories.
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
T h e r e is an i n t u i t i v e sense in w h i c h m e a s u r e m e n t i n v o l v e s the use of

n u m b e r s to represent facts c o n c e r n i n g m a g n i t u d e , a n d t h e use of
c o o r d i n a t e s in g e o m e t r y a n d k i n e m a t i c s s e e m s to i n v o l v e a s i m i l a r f o r m
of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of g e o m e t r i c a l o r s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l facts b y n u m e r i c a l
facts. T h e s e p a r t i c u l a r f o r m s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n h a v e b e e n s t u d i e d in
c o n s i d e r a b l e d e t a i l i n w o r k s o n t h e t h e o r y of m e a s u r e m e n t , t h e
f o u n d a t i o n s of g e o m e t r y , a n d t h e t h e o r y of r e l a t i v i t y , a n d the a n a l o -
gies b e t w e e n t h e m h a v e o f t e n b e e n n o t e d . 1 Q u i t e similar c o n c e p t s a n d
m e t h o d s a r e o f t e n e m p l o y e d in t h e f o r m a l d e v e l o p m e n t a n d analysis of
n u m e r i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s in t h e s e v a r i o u s areas. H o w e v e r , it is n o t
always n o t e d t h a t t h e r e is a s i g n i f i c a n t b o d y of p o s i t i v e t h e o r y c o m -
m o n to all of t h e s e c a s e s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , in t h e sense t h a t c e r t a i n
i m p o r t a n t c o n c e p t s a n d t h e o r e m s w h i c h a r e o f t e n d e f i n e d o r p r o v e d for
e a c h of t h e s e c a s e s s e p a r a t e l y a r e a c t u a l l y all s p e c i a l c a s e s of t h e s a m e
c o n c e p t o r t h e o r e m , w h i c h m a y b e f o r m u l a t e d o n c e a n d for all w i t h i n a
general theory of representation. M y p e r s o n a l b e l i e f is t h a t s u c h a t h e o r y
Synthese 67 (1986) 391-437.

© 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
392 BRENT MUNDY
may ultimately play a role in epistemology and philosophy of science

comparable to that which the theory of models (i.e., formal semantics)
has played in philosophy of language.
The present paper is concerned with one particular aspect of this
theory, namely that which is known in the theory of measurement as
meaningfulness. It is recognized for all of the types of representation
mentioned above that certain of the numerical propositions formulated
using a given representation (scale, coordinate system) are meaningful
in the sense of conveying objective information about the facts
represented, and certain others are meaningless. The hallmark of a
meaningless proposition is that its truth-value depends upon what scale
or coordinate system is employed, whereas meaningful propositions
have truth-value independent of choice of representation, within cer-
tain limits. The formal analysis of this distinction leads, in all three
areas, to a rather involved technical apparatus focusing upon in-
variance under changes of scale or changes of coordinate system. (In
the theory of relativity for example one is concerned with invariance
under the Galilean or Lorentz transformations.) Here I will study the
problem of meaningfulness of formal representations from the view-
point of the general theory of representation.
The first part of this article, comprising sections 2-6, presents an
introductory exposition and critical analysis of the existing accounts of
representational meaningfulness from the viewpoint of the present
general theory. Section 2 presents the basic concepts of general formal
representation while section 3 gives some examples, and distinguishes
several important varieties of representation. Section 4 introduces the
basic concept of a representationalproposition.
Sections 5 and 6 survey and critically analyze the existing theories of
representational meaningfulness, making use of the concepts of the
present general theory. Section 6 explains the formal relation between
the earlier unstructured theory and the later structured theory of
meaningfulness. These sections illustrate the unifying power of the
general theory of representation.
The second half of the present paper, comprising sections 7-10, is
constructive. I develop an extended theory of representational
meaningfulness in the context of the general theory of representation,
taking into account two crucial features of formal representation which
are not acknowledged explicitly in the existing theories.
Section 7 develops a semantic theory of representational propositions
THEORY OF MEANINGFUL REPRESENTATION 393
and their content, which is analyzed as the information which they are
capable of conveying concerning the systems to which they refer. This
leads to an intuitively plausible semantic analysis of what it is for a
representational proposition to be meaningful. Section 8 presents a
family of formal representational languages which, under the set-
theoretic semantics provided for them, are capable of expressing
representational propositions in the semantic sense of section 7. I claim
that all of the representational propositions occurring in the standard
applications of formal representation are expressible in languages of
this type.
Section 9 introduces the concept of a structural representational
proposition, i.e., one whose representational meaning pertains only to
the formal structure of the system referred to, and proves the meta-
theorem that all representational propositions expressible in one of the
representational languages of section 8 are structural. Section 10,
finally, brings out the crucial role played in representation by ap-
plications of the theory of the representing system to make statements
about the represented system; this second neglected feature is for-
malized in the concept of an image proposition.
2. F O R M A L REPRESENTATION
In this section I will present the basic concepts of the general theory of
representation, abstracted from current practice in the theories of
measurement, geometry, and kinematics. The theory is a formal one, in
the sense that all of the concepts involved depend only upon the
abstract formal structure of the entities or systems considered. (Only
thus is a precise mathematical development of the theory possible.)
However, it may still apply to particular concrete instances of
representation, insofar as they may possess the requisite formal struc-
ture, in addition to their more concrete features. The relation between
the general theory and its instances is like that of pure to applied
mathematics, or of formal semantics to the study of natural language.
The object of representation, for the present theory, is a relational
system in the standard sense of model theory: a set A of objects
a, b, c . . . , together with an ordered set of relations R1, R2 . . . . Ri . . . .
over the elements of A. Each relation Ri has a fixed degree di, and the
sequence dl, d2 . . . . d i . . . of degrees defines the logical type of the
relational system A. (I shall use the same letter to designate both a
394 BRENT MUNDY
relational system and its underlying set, using expressions such as, "the
set A" or "the system A" when necessary to avoid ambiguity. Proper-
ties are included as relations of degree 1.)
The medium of representation for a relational system A, on this
theory, is an arbitrary relational system B of the same logical type as A.
The means of representation of system A in system B is a function f
from the set A into the set B which satisfies the condition that, for all
elements a~ and relations R p of the system A and all relations R~ of the
system B,
(F) R ~ ( f ( a l ) , . . . f(a,))--~ RA(aa . . . . a,).
A function f satisfying (F) will be called faithful.

The reasoning behind this is as follows. The basic goal of represen-
tation is that atomic facts R~(bl . . . . bn) in the system B should serve to
represent atomic facts R P ( a l , . . . a,) in the system A in a systematic
fashion. In other words, we should be able to infer R p ( a a , . . . , a,) from
R ~(b~ . . . . b,) under certain conditions. This is secured by condition (F).
Each element a~ of A is represented in B by the element f(a~) of B, and
condition (F) tells us that for any atomic fact R ~ ( f ( a l ) , . . . f(a,)) in the
system B which involves only elements of B which are representatives
of elements of A, we may infer the corresponding atomic fact
R P(aa . . . . a,) in A for any corresponding elements a~ of A. (More than
one element of A may have the same representative in B, since f is not
required to be 1-1.) Thus, an essential feature of representation is
captured by the formal concept of a faithful function f from system A
to system B.
Note that there is really no need here to require f to be defined on all
of the set A. The basic requirement of the informal concept of
representation is simply that for any elements a~ of A which possess
representatives in B, condition (F) should hold. Thus, for a completely
general theory of representation, one should take the objects f provi-
ding representations of A in B to be arbitrary faithful functions from
subsets of A into B.
The formal representations encountered in geometry, kinematics, and
measurement are not of this completely general character. They satisfy
two further conditions. First, the function f is assumed to be defined on
the entire set A, so that every element of A has a representative in B.
Second, they satisfy the condition that, for all elements a~ and relations
R A of the system A and all relations R~ of the system B,

(H) R A ( a l , . . . a,)--> Rf(f(al),.. . f(a,)).
A function f from A to B satisfying (H) will be called a homomorphism
from A to B, following standard usage. In intuitive terms, this means
that not only does f provide reliable information about the atomic facts
in A (i.e., the inference from B to A is allowable, as expressed by (F)),
but also f provides complete information about the atomic facts in A.
(That is, the inference from A to B is allowable, as expressed by (H), so
that every atomic fact RA(al . . . . a,) in A has a representative
RiB(f(al) . . . . f(a,)) in B.) Thus the representations in these special
cases are provided by faithful homomorphisms, functions from A to B
satisfying
(FH) R~(al . . . . an) ~ R ~ ( f ( a l ) . . . . f(a,)).
Since the object of the present paper is a unified treatment of these
special cases, I will restrict my attention here to the case of represen-
tation by a faithful homomorphism, and say nothing further about the
more general theory. The set of all faithful homomorphisms from A to
B will be called FH(A, B). 2
There are two other respects in which the present treatment introduces
special conditions which should be removed in a truly general theory of
representation. The first of these is the assumption that the object and
medium of representation must be relational systems in the precise sense
defined above. In fact, the theory may be developed using the broader
notion of a set-theoretical structure ("STS") in the sense of Suppes
(1970) in place of that of a relational system. Furthermore, there are
cases where this seems to be appropriate. I will give an example, with-
out attempting a precise definition of a STS. In the treatment of proba-
bility from the standpoint of the theory of measurement (cf. Krantz
et al., 1971, pp. 204-5), it is appropriate to take as the object A of
representation a STS of the following type: a set X called a sample space,
together with a set E of subsets of X which is closed under Boolean
operations (algebra of events), together with a binary relation E1 > E2 on
the elements of E (interpreted as meaning that the event E1 is more
probable than the event E2). The goal of the measurement of probability
is to represent the relation E1 > E2 through assignment of numerical
probabilities to the events in E.
To incorporate general STS's into the theory of representation in
396 BRENT MUNDY
place of relational systems, all that is necessary is to formulate ap-

propriate definitions of the logical type of a STS, of a faithful function
from one STS to another STS of the same logical type, and of a
homomorphism from one STS to another STS of the same logical type.
This may easily be done. All of the results of the present theory and
paper will then carry over directly to the case of representation of
general STS's by other STS's of the same logical type. This is because (as
will be seen in what follows), the entire development here depends upon
nothing more than the basic properties of faithful homomorphisms
between two arbitrary structures of the same logical type.
The second special assumption which should be removed for a truly
general theory is the restriction to representation using an STS of the
same logical type as that which is to be represented. Unlike the
preceding generalization, this step involves radical changes in the
mathematical structure of the theory, and previous results do not
automatically generalize. Nonetheless this type of representation is well
worth studying formally, as may be seen from its connection with the
reduction of theories. That is, it seems that the claim that theory 7"1
reduces to theory T2 may be interpreted as asserting that every model
of '~//1 of T1 may be represented in some model M2 of T2--e.g., gases
may be represented as assemblies of molecules obeying the laws of
Newtonian mechanics. (Cf. Adams, 1959; Suppes, 1960; Sneed, 1979
for related concepts of reduction.) The notion of representation
employed in such cases will be the generalized one just alluded to, since
the models M of different theories T will in general be STS's of
different logical type. This type of representation will not be discussed
in this article.
3. EXAMPLES OF FORMAL REPRESENTATION
I will now briefly present some examples of formal representation in the

sense of the present theory, focusing upon the standard cases of
numerical representation. First, however, it should be noted that
numerical representation has often been employed in cases where no
relational systems A and B are explicitly defined. In these cases, the
elements of the set A (usually physical objects) are mapped to elements
of the set B (usually numbers or numerical entities such as vectors) by
some function f, and it is understood that the numerical relations of the
elements of the set B are to represent in some way certain physical
T H E O R Y OF M E A N I N G F U L R E P R E S E N T A T I O N 397
relations of the elements of the set A. However, it is not explicitly

specified which numerical relations and physical relations these are.
Thus the sets A and B are not endowed with any definite relational
structure, and the intuitive relation of "representation" involved can-
not be given definite formal content in the manner of the previous
section. I shall refer to this as unstructured representation, as opposed to
the structured representation of the previous section. A theory of
meaningfulness for representational propositions was first developed in
the context of unstructured rather than structured representation. This
theory will be discussed in section 5.
In the theory of measurement, unstructured representation was
employed by Stevens (cf. Stevens, 1946). Structured representation is
suggested in Suppes (1951, following H61der, 1901), and is clearly
introduced in Scott and Suppes (1958, following Tarski, 1954, 1955).
The use of structured representation is characteristic of the subsequent
work on measurement of this school (Suppes and Zinnes, 1963; Krantz,
Luce, Suppes and Tversky, 1971; Pfanzagl, 1971; Roberts, 1979); cf.
Luce (1979) for a survey. Some examples of structured measurement
representation are the following.
(a) Ratio scale. The relational systems are of type (2,3). The
numerical system Brat is (R, < , +), i.e., the two-place relation R~(x, y)
is defined as x < y, and the three-place relation R~(x, y, z) is defined as
x + y = z. (R is the real numbers.) Given an empirical relational system
A of this type, one seeks representations f in FH(A, Brat). From the
structure of Brat, one sees that RA(a, b) will be some sort of empirical
order relation defined on the elements of A, i.e., a is in some way less
than b, and R2A(a, b, c) will be some sort of addition or concatenation
relation, i.e., c is in some way a sum of a and b.
(b) Interval scale. The relational systems are of type (4). The
numerical relational system Bint has domain R, and R~(x, y,z, w) is
defined as x - y > z - w. Given an empirical relational system A of this
type, one seeks representations f in FH(A, Bint). RA(a, b, c, d) will be
some sort of empirical relation of greater difference, i.e., in some
empirical sense the difference between a and b is greater than that
between c and d.
Examples (a) and (b) illustrate the important fact that different types
of numerical representation may involve the same set B of numbers.
This is why it is important to pass from unstructured to structured
representation: to make clear which numerical relations are supposed to
398 BRENT MUNDY
be playing a role in the representation process. Given a function from

the set A to the set R, one could not be sure which (if either) of these
two types of representation was intended.
In geometry, unstructured representation is perhaps the usual atti-
tude toward the use of coordinates, but seems especially characteristic
of the views of F. Klein. (This statement will be amplified in section 5;
for the views of Klein, cf. Kunle and Fladt, 1974.) Structured represen-
tation seems to emerge for the first time with the work of Hilbert (cf.
Hilbert, 1899), and is the characteristic viewpoint of modern work on
the foundations of geometry (e.g., Borsuk and Szmielew, 1960). An
example of structured representation in geometry is the following.
(c) Euclidean plane geometry using betweenness and congruence. The
relational systems are of type i3, 4). The numerical system BEud has for
its domain the set of all pairs ix, y) of real numbers. The relation
R~(ix, y), iz, w), (u, v)) is defined to hold iff there is some positive real
number k such that k ( z - x ) = ( u - x ) and k ( w - y ) = ( v - y ) . The
relation R~(ix, y), iz, w), ix', y'), iz', w')) is defined to hold iff ( x -
z) 2 + (y - w) 2 = (x' - z') 2 + (y' - w') 2. Given an empirical relational
system A of type i3, 4), one seeks representations f in FH(A, BEud).
RA(a, b, c) will mean that b is in some empirical sense between a and b
on a straight line, and RA(a, b, c, d) will mean that in some empirical
sense the distance between a and b is equal to that between c and d.
In space-time geometry unstructured representation seems to be the
usual viewpoint, with structured representation being found for the
most part only in the works of philosophers and others paying special
attention to the foundations of space-time theory. The best early
example of what amounts to structured representation of a space-time
relational system is the work of Robb (1914-1936). More recent work
in this tradition includes Schutz (1973, 1981), Field (1980, Ch. 6),
Mundy (1982 (a), (c)), Dorling (a). An example of structured represen-
tation of a space-time structure is the following.
(d) Minkowski geometry using the Robb causal primitive. The rela-
tional systems are of type i2). The numerical system Bcau has domain
R 4, and the two-place relation R1B((x, y, z, w), ix', y', z', w')) defined
a s ( x -- x ' ) 2 -t- ( y -- y,)2 + ( z -- z ' ) 2 ~ ( w -- w ' ) 2. Given a relational system
A of type (4), one seeks a representation f in FH(A, Bcau). RA(a, b)
means that event a may have some causal influence on event b.
In these and in all cases, it is of course not at all certain that an
arbitrary system A of the given logical type will possess even one
faithful homomorphism into the chosen numerical system B, i.e.,

FH(A, B) may be empty. In the theory of measurement and in
axiomatic geometry one formulates axioms governing the structure of
the system A, and proves a representationtheorem that for any system A
of the given type satisfying the given axioms there is at least one f in
FH(A, B), i.e., that numerical representation in the system B is possible
for any such system A.
In addition to the distinction between unstructured and structured
representation, it is important to distinguish between general represen-
tation by means of a faithful homomorphism f in FH(A, B) (F-
representation), and representation by means of an isomorphism (I-
representation). (An isomorphism is a homomorphism which is faithful,
1-1, and onto.) I(A, B) will mean the set of all isomorphisms from A to
B, and M(A, B) will mean the set of all functions (mappings) from A to
B. Thus we have I(A, B ) C F H ( A , B)CM(A, B).
In geometry and space-time geometry, illustrated by cases (c) and (d)
above, the focus has been on /-representation rather than F-
representation. This has the consequence of restricting the system A
which is numerically represented to be one which is isomorphic to the
chosen numerical system B, and hence significantly lessening the scope
of the representation theory. (The theory of /-representation is con-
siderably simpler than that of general F-representation.) In the theory
of measurement, the early work of H61der (1901) was based on
/-representation, but the modern trend stemming from Suppes (1951)
and Scott and Suppes (1958) has emphasized the broadening of the
representational framework by weakening these assumptions on the
representation f. Suppes (1973) suggested a similar broadening in the
areas of geometry and space-time geometry. Mundy (1983) contains
some work along these lines.
This distinction is very important for physical ontology. A H61der-
style/-representation for a system A of physical quantities requires A
to have the cardinality of the continuum, in order to be isomorphic to
Brat- Since of course there does not seem to be a continuum of actual
physical objects, one must suppose the elements of the system A to be
some sort of idealized physical entity such as a physically possible
magnitude. The use of numbers to represent quantities of kind A is then
apparently made to depend upon the postulation of a continuum of
physical entities of this sort. (Such an approach to quantities is taken,
for example, in Luce, 1978.) The passage to representation by a general
400 BRENT MUNDY
f in FH(A, Brat) allows one to employ numerical representation of the

physical quantities of the system A without having to make such strong
ontological assumptions concerning A. (Suppes, 1951 cites this reason
for moving away from/-representation.)
The corresponding transformation in the case of geometry and
space-time geometry amounts to the formulation of a special type of
relational theory of space (or of space-time) in the place of the absolute
space (or space-time) to which the use of /-representation seems to
commit one. The physical system A of spatio-temporally related entities
is no longer required to be isomorphic to the corresponding geometri-
cal numerical system B, and hence is no longer required to include in its
domain a continuum of the idealized physical entities called points of
space (or of space-time). The system A may be taken to consist only of
actual physical objects and their spatial (spatio-temporal) relations, just
as the domain of a measurement representation in modern measure-
ment theory is taken to include only actual objects.
4. R E P R E S E N T A T I O N A L PROPOSITIONS
The purpose of formal representation is to express information about

elements of the system A being represented. The introduction
of the representing system B and the representational function f
are means to this end2 The information is expressed in the form of
representational propositions. Such propositions are employed with
both structured and unstructured representations. Intuitively, one
thinks of representational propositions as ones which involve a
reference to the numerical values given by a particular scale of
measurement, or by a particular coordinate system of geometry or
kinematics. For example:
(1) Object al has scale value equal to 2.
(2) The scale value of object al is twice the scale value of object
a2.
(3) Object al has scale value greater than that of any other
object x in system A.
(4) The object a is located at the point (2, 3).
(5) The vector displacement from object al to object a2 is (5, 7).
(6) The vector displacement from object al to object a2 is
twice that from object a3 to object a4.
Such statements purport to express information about the objects

referred to in them, but do so in a way which apparently depends upon
the assignment of numerical scale or coordinate values to the objects in
question. Such propositions are extremely common in applications of
numerical representation. Indeed, complex and expensive experiments
are often undertaken with the aim of determining the truth or falsehood
of such propositions (e.g., measurement of atomic weights, fundamental
constants, etc.). The problem of meaningfulness for such statements is
essentially the question to what extent they convey information about
the objects referred to which is "objective", or independent of the
particular mode of representation adopted.
The present analysis will ultimately depend upon a specific formal
model of representational propositions, the full details of which will not
emerge until later. At this point I wish to introduce a simplified model
of representational propositions, highlighting those aspects of re-
presentation which are central to the existing accounts of represen-
tational meaningfulness. This simplified model will then be used in the
next two sections to provide an idealized formal account of previous
work on representational meaningfulness. Sections 7 and 8 will then
extend the model to take into account certain additional formal features
of representational propositions which are not emphasized in the
current accounts, and sections 9 and 10 will pursue the problem of
meaningfulness on the basis of the extended model.
The characteristic feature of representational propositions is that
while they make statements about the elements of the system A, they do
so by means of a representational map f in M(A, B), in such a way that
their truth may depend upon the choice of the map. Semantically,
therefore, we may think of a representational proposition as a partial
function p(k, f) from some (possibly empty) sequence k = (al, a 2 , . . . )
of elements of A (henceforth called a sequence in A) and from some f in
M(A, B), into {0, 1}. Here the dependence on the sequence k
represents the singling out of particular elements of the system A, as is
done by phrases such as 'the object al' in the above examples; of course
the truth of a representational proposition depends upon which ele-
ments of A are so singled out, and hence depends upon such a sequence
as well as upon the representational map f. The function p is partial
because usually the representational proposition is constructed in such
a way that the sequence k is required to be of a certain minimum length
in order for the function p to be defined. (In the above examples the
402 BRENT MUNDY
length of the sequence is indicated syntactically by the number of

constants aj which occur in the statement of the representational
proposition in English.) It may also happen in some cases that the value
of p is not defined for all f in M(A, B). In the representation of
continuous physical quantities, for example, the representational pro-
position may involve mathematical operations of differentiation or
integration of values of f which will not be defined for all f in M(A, B).3
Of course such a function may always be made total by defining .it to
equal 0 in those cases where it was undefined previously; the
definitional gaps are merely a representation of our intuition that
propositions containing nonreferring terms should be thought of as
meaningless rather than false. In what follows I shall for simplicity treat
propositions as total functions.
In general then, given any two relational systems A and B of the
same logical type, I define an A B proposition to be a function p(k, f)
from sequences k of elements of A and mappings f in M(A, B) into
{0, 1}. I will sometimes say 'p is true' or 'p holds' to mean that
p(k, f) = 1.4
The above examples of vernacular representational propositions
obviously define AB propositions in the present sense, relative to an
arbitrary linear ordering of the constants aj which occur in them. (That
is, the jth constant will be taken as referring to the term kj of the
sequence k.) Proposition (1), for example, corresponds to the partial
function p for which p(k, f) is defined to equal 1 if f(kl) = 2, and to
equal 0 otherwise. That is, (1) is true if and only if the object in A
referred to as 'al' is carried by the representation function f to the
element 2 of B. Similarly, (3) is true if and only if f(kl) > f(x) for all x in
A. This basic idea will be extended to a full formal syntax and semantics
for representational propositions in section 8. For now it suffices that
A B propositions in the present semantic sense may be taken as formal
analogs to representational propositions in the intuitive sense.
Many of the representational propositions encountered in practice
have a special form, which is illustrated in the above vernacular
examples. This is the finite functional form u(f(kl) . . . . f(k,)) = 1, where
u(x~,.., x,) is a function from a finite number of numbers into {0, 1}, or
in general from a finite number of elements of the representing system
B into {0, 1}. In practice the ki are elements of the empirical system A,
the f(ki) are the numerical values assigned to those elements by a scale f
in M(A, B), and the proposition u(f(kl) . . . . f(k,)) = 1 expresses some
mathematical property (e.g., the mean or standard deviation) of those

numerical values. (1), for example, may be expressed as u(f(k~))= 1,
where u(x) is defined to equal 1 if x = 2, 0 otherwise. Representational
propositions expressible in finite functional form constitute a special
subclass of AB propositions, in which the truth value depends upon
only a finite sequence of scale values. Representational propositions
involving the application of integration or differentiation to scale
values do not have finite functional form, since those mathematical
operations u depend upon a continuous set of values of f. One
important reason for introducing the abstract model of a represen-
tational proposition as a function of maps is to include representational
propositions which do not have finite functional form, and which
therefore do not have a simple syntactical expression in a first-order
formal language.
An AB proposition expresses information about the assignments
made by the representational map f to the elements of the system A,
with special reference to the individual elements singled out by the
sequence k. It is often appropriate to suppress the reference to the
sequence k, and to think of a representational proposition simply as a
function p(f) from M(A, B) into {0, 1}. This is appropriate because in
most practical contexts the sequences are fixed once and for all, while
various different scales f may be brought into play. "The theory of
meaningfulness is concerned with the consequences of using different
representations f to convey information about the same fixed set of
elements of A, which may in general be thought of as fixed by the same
sequence as before. The next two sections will present an exposition
and critical analysis of existing theories of meaningfulness for
representational propositions p(f) in this sense.
5. MEANINGFULNESS FOR UNSTRUCTURED

REPRESENTATION
The problem of meaningfulness for representational propositions arises

when one asks whether the information that p(f) = 1 implies anything
definite or objective about the represented system A itself, independent
of its particular representation in B using the function f. (There is no
doubt that p(f) is meaningful as a statement about the scale f; the
question is whether it conveys information about the system A.) This
problem exists for both unstructured and structured representation,
404 13 R E N T MUNDY
though it is typically attacked differently in the two cases. In this section I

will outline the standard approach to the problem of meaningfulness in
the context of unstructured representation, and in the next section I will
do the same for structured representation. It is interesting to note that
these two standard approaches to representational meaningfulness seem
to have each been developed twice, once in the area of geometry and
kinematics, and then again in the area of measurement. Since the
particular topic of meaningfulness has been studied in more detail in the
context of measurement than in geometry and kinematics, I shall pay
more attention to the developments in measurement theory, and simply
note the corresponding points in the cases of geometry and kinematics.
Recall that an unstructured representation is given by a function f
from a set A to a (usually numerical) set B, without specification of
relational structure to make these sets into relational systems and
provide a nontrivial content to the notion of a faithful homomorphism.
Such a function f allows for the formulation of representational pro-
positions p(f) such as those of the previous section.
A theory of meaningfulness for numerical representational pro-
positions, in the context of unstructured representation, was given by S.
S. Stevens (1946). (The following is an interpretation of Stevens' ideas
within the present framework, not a strict historical account.) Stevens
realized that not all functions f in M(A, B) are equally suitable for
measurement representation, but did not have any precise explanation
of what determines which functions f are suitable. Stevens in effect
asserted the existence of a certain subset S(A, B) of M(A, B) contain-
ing the suitable mappings, but did not offer any exact definition of
suitabilityP
Stevens saw that S(A, B) in general contains more than one element
f, and was thus led to formulate the basic necessary condition for
meaningfulness:
(1) If a representational proposition p based on representation of
set A in set B is meaningful, then p(f) = p(f') for any two
functions f and f' in S(A, B).
This is intuitively correct, since if p expresses some objective fact about
the system A, that fact ought to be independent of our choice between
the two equally suitable scales f and f'. Note that no definition of
meaningfulness is given or assumed here. Condition (1) is taken to
follow simply from our intuitive conception of meaningfulness, what-
ever that may be.
THEORY~ OF MEANINGFUL REPRESENTATION 405
(1) has a sound intuitive basis, but yields only a necessary condition
for meaningfulness. Stevens seems to have believed the condition to
also be sufficient:
(2) If p(f) = p(f') for all f, f' in S(A, B), then p is meaningful.
Stevens gave no argument for (2). While not implausible, (2) clearly
seems to call for some argument, with reference to an antecedent
intuitive conception of meaningfulness. Such arguments will be con-
sidered later. For the time being I will take (1) as established and (2) as
doubtful.
Conditions (1) and (2) as they stand are not precise, since the class
S(A, B) of suitable representation mappings has not been defined.
Stevens in fact did not give a precise definition of S(A, B), but he was
able to furnish enough information about it to provide (1) and (2) with
precise content. Analysing our intuitive conceptions of a suitable scale,
he introduced the key concept of an admissible scale transformation,
i.e., a numerical function g on the set B of numbers which preserves the
suitability of scales, in that the composition f' = g o f of g with a suitable
scale f is again a suitable scale. Thus, we define an element g of
M(B, B) to be admissible for S(A, B) if for each f in S(A, B), g o f is
also in S(A, B). Stevens made the following claim:
(3) For each class S(A, B) of representations, there is a specifiable
group (in the mathematical sense) G(A, B) of transfor-
mations admissible for S(A, B).
In the case of length measurement, for example, the group G(A, B) is
taken to be the group Grat of ratio transformations (g(x) = kx for some
positive real constant k), and f' is related to f by a change of unit, e.g.,
from feet to meters, s
Stevens also made the following claim:
(4) For any f and f' in S(A, B), there is a g in G(A, B) such
that f' = g o f.
It should be noted that (3) and (4) are logically quite distinct, and that
(3) has a rather greater intuitive foundation than (4). (3) and (4)
together serve to fix S(A, B) completely, given a specification of the
group G(A, B) and a single f in S(A, B). Namely, S(A, B) is the set of
all f ' = g o f, as g varies over G(A, B). Thus, given (3) and (4), (1) and
(2) acquire a definite content.
Stevens defined the type of a scale f, or a family of scales S(A, B), in
406 BRENT MUNDY
terms of the associated group G(A, B) of admissible transformations.

Thus a ratio scale was defined to have the group Grat associated with it,
while an interval scale has the group Gi,t of positive linear trans-
formations: g(x)= kx + b, b an arbitrary and k a positive real. He
stated for various existing scales what he took their group G(A, 13) to
be. However, he did not give an adequate account of what determined
which group G(A, B) was associated with a given scale-family S(A, 13),
and did not give any justification for the claims (3) and (4), other than
the observation that they seem to hold true in all known cases.
The Stevens theory of meaningfulness for numerical representational
propositions has two distinct parts. The first part is based on (1) and (3).
Let f be in S(A, B), and g in G(A, B). By (3), g o f is in S(A, 13); and so
by (1), any meaningful p must satisfy p(f) = p(g o f), for all such f and
g. We may express this by saying that p is invariant under the action of
G(A, B). If p is a numerical representational proposition expressed in
some definite mathematical form, this induces a definite mathemati-
cal condition on p.6 The first part of the Stevens theory of meaningful-
ness is this necessary condition for meaningfulness:
(a) If a representational proposition p(f) pertaining to a family of
representations S(A, B) is meaningful, then p(f) is invariant
under G(A, B).
Note that (a) depends only on (1) and (3), not on (2) or (4). To arrive at
the second part of the Stevens theory of meaningfulness, we argue as
follows. Suppose that p(f) = p(g o f) for all f in M(A, B) and all g in
G(A, 13), and let fl, f2 be in S(A, B). By (4), there is a g in G(A, B)
such that fl = g ° f2, and hence P(fl) = P(f2). Thus p(fl) = P(f2) for all
fl, f2 in S(A, B), and hence p is meaningful by (2). Thus, given (2) and
(4), we arrive at the following sufficient condition for meaningfulness:
(b) If p(f) is invariant under G(A, B), then p(f) is meaningful.
The Stevens theory of meaningfulness consists of the conjunction of (a)
and (b), here presented as based upon (1)-(4). Condition (a) was of
more immediate practical importance for Stevens than (b), since he was
concerned to rule out as meaningless various representational pro-
positions p(f) which did not satisfy the conclusion of (a). However, he
seemed to take it for granted that propositions which did meet the
condition (a) could be accepted as meaningful without further in-
vestigation, and hence he seems to have accepted (b) as well.
Thus, for Stevens, invariance of a representational proposition p(f)

under the action of G(A, B) is necessary and sufficient for meaningful-
ness. However, this conclusion depends upon the four premises (l)-(4),
of which only (1) possesses a sound intuitive basis.
In the domain of geometry, the views of Felix Klein (Erlangen
Program, 1872) bear a remarkable analogy to those of Stevens regard-
ing measurement. 7 Klein's view may be construed as involving un-
structured numerical representation in the present sense: geometry is
concerned with a set A of objects (points), which are represented
numerically by functions f into a numerical set B (e.g., R ", for an
n-dimensional geometry). The functions f are "called coordinate sys-
tems. Only certain coordinate systems f are suitable for a given
geometry; these compose a class S(A, B) characteristic of the
geometry.
As with Stevens, no explicit characterization of the class S(A, B) of
suitable coordinate systems is offered. However, an implicit charac-
terization is offered, in a manner quite analogous to Stevens. A certain
group G(A, B) of mappings g from B to itself are distinguished as
admissible coordinate transformations for the geometry S(A, B). The
group G(A, B) is explicitly defined, by stating the mathematical form
of the transformations g as functions of the n-tuples of numbers which
are the elements of B. Application of a coordinate transformation g to
a suitable coordinate system f is asserted to yield another suitable
coordinate system f' = g o f. In other words, Klein asserts proposition
(3) above. It is also asserted that any two suitable coordinate systems
are related by a transformation of the group G(A, B), i.e., (4) is
asserted. Klein then proceeds to classify various geometries by
reference to what groups G(A, B) are associated with them, just as
Stevens classified scale types. (Many of the groups associated with the
most familiar types of geometry fall into a hierarchy linearly-ordered by
inclusion, larger groups corresponding to "weaker" geometries. The
same is true of Stevens' scale-types; e.g., ratio scales are "stronger"
than interval scales because Grat is contained in G~nt.) Klein regards the
group G(A, B) as constitutive of the geometry, just as Stevens re-
gards it as constitutive of the scale type. Neither offers any explanation
of why g e o m e t r i e s o r scale-types should always have such groups
G(A, B) associated with them, or of what determines which group is
associated with which geometry or scale-type.
Klein then has a theory of meaningfulness for geometrical represen-
408 BRENT MUNDY
tational propositions p(f) which is precisely analogous to the Stevens

theory in the case of measurement, and which may be based upon
(1)-(4). Namely, a geometrical representational proposition p(f) is
meaningful for the geometry S(A, B) if and only if it is invariant under
the action of the geometrical group G(A, B), in the sense of note 6. In
other words, (a) and (b) are asserted, based on (3) and (4), with a tacit
appeal to (1) and (2).
Finally, in the case of kinematics and space-time geometry, a quite
analogous view has been maintained, s A space- time coordinate system is
a function f from a set A of physical events or space-time points, into a
numerical set B (taken to be R4). A certain distinguished family
S(A, B) of such functions are taken to be the ones suitable for purposes
of such representation. (They are called inertial coordinate systems.) The
class S(A, B) is not explicitly defined, but it is implicitly characterized
by reference to a group G(A, B) of space-time coordinate trans-
formations g carrying the set B onto itself. This group is specified
explicitly, by stating the mathematical form assumed by its elements g
as acting upon the 4-tuples of numbers which are the elements of B.
(For classical space-time the group G(A, B) was the group of Galilean
transformations plus Euclidean rotations and affine translations and
dilations; the passage to special relativity consisted in the substitution of
the group ot Lorentz transformations, i.e., passage to a different
geometry in the sense of Klein.) As with Stevens and Klein, the group
G(A, B) is regarded as constitutive of the space-time geometry. Again,
propositions (3) and (4) are asserted, so that the set S(A, 13) is fixed by
the action f' = g o f of G(A, B) upon any one of its members. A theory
of meaningfulness may then be based upon (1) and (2), leading to the
conditions (a) and (b) for meaningfulness, i.e., the condition of Galilean
or of Lorentz invariance respectively, considered as necessary and as
sufficient for meaningfulness.
The use in geometry and kinematics of unstructured representation
together with an invariance criterion of meaning based on a postulated
group G(A, B) preceded the work of Stevens, with whom this approach
is associated in the literature on measurement. Stevens does not
mention the deep formal connection between his ideas concerning
measurement and the earlier work in geometry and kinematics.
In summary, the viewpoint of unstructured representation (in
measurement, geometry, or kinematics) is associated with a charac-
teristic theory of meaningfulness for representational propositions p(f),
based on invariance under the transformations of a group G(A, B)

associated with the representation. This theory is expressed in (a) and
(b), which may be based upon (1)-(4). The theory lacks firm foun-
dations, in that no justification is offered for (2), (3), or (4). In the next
section we shall see how an approach based on structured represen-
tation has improved upon this theory of meaningfulness.
6. MEANINGFULNESS FOR STRUCTURED

REPRESENTATION
The Stevens theory is based on unstructured representation. The

passage to structured representation (Scott and Suppes, 1958) is made
by changing the sets A and B to relational systems of some specified
logical type, and identifying the intuitive family S(A, B) of suitable
representations with the precisely defined set FH(A, B) of faithful
homomorphisms from the system A to the system B. (Cf. examples (a)
and (b) of section 3.) Thus (1) becomes:
(1") If a representational proposition p based on representation of
system A in system B is meaningful, then p(f) = p(f') for any
two functions f and f' in FH(A, B).
If the identification of FH(A, B) with S(A, B) is accepted, (1") is
supported by the same argument as is Stevens' (1).
Similarly, Steven's (2) becomes
(2*) Ifp(f) = p(f') for all f, f' in FH(A, B), then p is meaningful.
In Suppes and Zinnes (1963, p. 66), (2*) is asserted as part of a
definition of "meaningfulness": a representational proposition is
defined to be "meaningful" just in case p(f) is constant on FH(A, B).
(A corresponding definition is given in Roberts, 1979, pp. 58-59.)
However Suppes and Zinnes say in a footnote that this definition seems
to give only a necessary condition for meaningfulness, not a sufficient
one. I take this to mean that the authors recognize that no argument has
been presented for (2"), with reference to an intuitive conception of
meaningfulness (as opposed to the necessary condition (1"), for which a
convincing argument is available). Thus, just as with Stevens, I will take
(1") to be established but (2*) to be doubtful.
The structured approach to measurement representation has two
immediate advantages over the unstructured approach of Stevens. 9 In
410 BRENT MUNDY
the first place, one obtains an explanation of the presence of an

invariance group G(A, B) in every case, and an explanation of what
determines which group is associated with which family S(A, B) of
scales. The explanation is this. G(A, B) is identified as the automor-
phism group I(B, B) of the numerical system B, i.e., the set of all
isomorphisms g from B to itself. (This explanation was not available to
Stevens, since it depends upon the explicit identification of B as a
relational system rather than as a mere set.) For example, the difference
noted by Stevens between ratio and interval scales, associated with the
two groups a r a t and Gint, is explained by the claim that these two forms
of representation employ the two different numerical relational systems
Bra t and Bi,t of section 3, which use different basic relations over the
same underlying set. As a matter of mathematical fact, /(Brat, Brat) =
Grat and I(Bint, Bint) = Gint. Thus the role played by the groups Grat and
Gi,t in the Stevens theory is explained. 1°
In the second place, one now obtains an immediate justification for
Stevens' claim (3). Namely, with S(A, B) now identified as FH(A, B)
and G(A, B) identified as I(B, B), (3) becomes
(3*) For each class FH(A, B) of representations, there is a
specifiable group (in the mathematical sense) I(B, B) of
transformations admissible for FH(A, B).
(3*) is a mathematical triviality. By the basic properties of an isomor-
phism, if f is a faithful homomorphism from A to B and g is an
isomorphism from B to B, then it immediately follows that g o f is a
faithful homomorphism from A to B, and hence that g is admissible for
FH(A, B). This is true for arbitrary systems A and B of the same logical
type.
The viewpoint of structured representation thus provides a strong
formal foundation for the first part of the Stevens theory of meaning-
fulness, i.e., (a), which we saw to depend only upon (1) and (3). From
(1") and (3*) one may conclude
(a*) If a representational proposition p(f) pertaining to a type of
representation FH( A, B) is meaningful, then p(f) is invariant
under I(B, B).
This follows by the same argument as was used for the Stevens
condition (a). Since (3*) has a much firmer foundation than Stevens' (3),
the passage to structured representation may be regarded as having
substantially improved upon the Stevens theory of meaningfulness,

providing a firm foundation for Stevens' condition (a). Since the groups
I(B, B) in the structured theory are the same as the Stevens groups
G(A, B), the practical consequences of (a*) are the same as those of
Stevens' (a).
What about Stevens' propositions (4) and (b)? The proposition
corresponding to (4) under the structured approach is
(4*) For any f and f' in FH(A, B), there is a g in I(B, B) such that
f'=gof.
While (3*) is a mathematical triviality which holds for any two systems
A and B of the same type, (4*) is emphatically not so. (4*) will be true
for some systems A, and false for others. Workers in the theory of
measurement have sought axioms governing the structure of the system
A which are sufficient to ensure both that FH(A, B) is nonempty
('representation theorem') and that (4*) holds ('uniqueness theorem',
meaning that the representation of A in B by an f in FH(A, B) is unique
up to admissible transformations). That (4*) should hold is thus treated
as an additional condition ('uniqueness condition') to be satisfied by a
system A which is to be represented explicitly in a system B.11
Why is it important that (4*) be satisfied? Why, in other words, do we
need to prove the uniqueness theorem in addition to the representation
theorem? The existing expositions of the theory of measurement do
not seem to provide any definite answer. Two possible answers are
suggested by what we have seen so far. One is to note that Stevens' (4)
does seem to hold true as an empirical regularity, so that one might wish
to establish (4*) in each special case, simply to bring the theory into
accord with those empirical facts about the various known scales. This
is somewhat unsatisfactory however, since one would prefer a deeper
explanation which established some formal necessity for (4*) to hold
uniformly in all cases of formal representation. Stevens postulated both
(3) and (4) as general laws governing all numerical representation. The
analysis in terms of structured representation has succeeded in explain-
ing (3) as a consequence of the mathematical law (3"), which follows
from the basic principles of the general theory of representation. No
such explanation is yet provided for (4), since (4*) does not appear to
follow from the basic principles of representation. Instead it has become
a methodological directive in the theory of measurement to make (4*)
true in each special case, by finding further conditions on the various
412 BRENT MUNDY
types of system A from which (4*) will follow. This obviously does not
provide a very satisfying explanation of Stevens' original observation
(4).
The other possible justification for the uniqueness condition (4*)
would appeal to the second half of the Stevens theory of meaningful-
ness, i.e., (b). Just as (4) and (2) yield (b), so (4*) and (2*) yield
(b*) If p(f) is invariant under I(B, B), then p(f) is meaningful.
(a*) and (b*) together yield the conclusion that I(B, B)-invariance is
necessary and sufficient for meaningfulness, in complete analogy with
the Stevens theory.
This is certainly a desirable conclusion. However, it is not clear that
this provides a sufficient justification for imposing the uniqueness
condition, i.e., restricting attention to systems A for which (4*) is true. In
the first place, (b*) depends upon (2*) as well as (4"), and as I noted
above, (2*) has no better foundation than Stevens' (2). Hence imposing
the restriction (4*) upon the systems A is not sure to yield the desired
conclusion (b*).
I mentioned above that (2*) is sometimes asserted as part of a definition
of "meaningfulness". In this context, (4*) would of course yield the
conclusion (b*). However, (b*) is only an interesting or desirable
conclusion if 'meaningful' is understood in something like the ordinary
sense. Changing the meaning of the term 'meaningful' to make (2*)
trivially true will at the same time make (b*) uninteresting. What is
required is some argument that (2*) is true (and this will be a nontrivial
assertion) when 'meaningful' is understood in the ordinary or intuitive
sense.
In the second place, even if (2*) could be placed on a firm foundation,
it is not clear that this would justify the practice of restricting attention to
systems A for which (4*) is true. For the consequence (b*) (securing of a
sufficient as well as necessary condition for meaningfulness) of the
uniqueness condition (4*) is merely one attractive feature which a family
of representations FH(A, B) might possess. No reason has been given to
think that this feature is either so important or so widely satisfied that it is
rational to restrict our attention in advance to systems A wbich possess it
(i.e., which satisfy (4*)). Might there not be systems A which do not
satisfy (4"), but which possess other virtues which make them worthy of
study? Might the actual world not contain relational systems which
violate (4*)? Surely we do not wish to reject this possibility a priori.

For these two reasons, the desirability of deriving (b*) does not seem
to yield a satisfactory justification for the uniqueness condition (4*).
One of the main goals of the present paper is to provide such a
justification. This will be done in section 10.
To summarize, the analysis of measurement using structured
representation has improved the Stevens theory of meaningfulness in
several crucial respects. The vague subset S(A, B) of M(A, B) has
been analyzed as FH(A, B). The groups G(A, B), whose origin and
identity were rather mysterious on the Klein-Stevens theory, have been
analyzed as I(B, B). Finally, Stevens' unsupported claim (3) has been
justified in the form (3"), with the result that the first half (a) of the
Stevens theory of meaningfulness has been justified in the form (a*),
soundly based upon (1") and (3*). However, (2"), (4*) and (b*) have no
better foundation in this theory than (2), (4) and (b) did for Stevens. (4)
has been provided with a definite mathematical content as (4"), but no
adequate reason has been given for accepting it, i.e., for restricting
attention to those systems A which make (4*) true.
The passage from an unstructured to a structured notion of
representation has been carried out in the areas of geometry and
kinematics in a manner quite analogous to that outlined above in the
case of measurement. The introduction of structured representation
into geometry seems to be due to Hilbert (1899). Instead of a mere set A
of points, Hilbert specifies a relationalsystem A, with primitive relations
like those of example (c) in section 3. Representation is given by means
of an isomorphism from A to a numerical system B of the same type.
(Cf. the discussion in section 3 regarding the use of/-representation in
geometry.) One thus has now the precisely defined family I(A, B) of
isomorphisms from A to B in place of the vague family S(A, B) of
Klein's picture. The invariance group G(A, B) is again identified as
I(B, B). Thus the presence of Klein's invariance group G(A, B) for
each type of geometry S(A, B) is explained, just as the Stevens groups
for scale types were explained, and the mathematical form of each
group G(A, B) is determined by the numerical system B, as above. (3*)
holds with I(A, B) in place of FH(A, B) for any two systems A of
the same type, using the same argument as before. Thus Klein's
assertion of (3) is justified, using structured representation, by the
mathematical fact (3*). A necessary condition for meaningfulness
414 BRENT MUNDY
corresponding to Klein's (a) may then be derived in the form (a*), based
on (1") and (3*).
A significant difference between the cases of geometry and of
measurement, deriving from the use of isomorphism representation in
geometry, is that in this case the proposition (4) can also be justified.
This is because (4*) becomes a mathematical triviality like (3"), when
I(A, B) is substituted for FH(A, B). (This illustrates the greater sim-
plicity of isomorphism representation as compared with general
representation, mentioned in section 3.) Thus, assuming (2*), the
second half (b) of the Stevens theory of meaningfulness may also be
justified as (b*), in the case of isomorphism representation. (2*) itself,
however, has the same doubtful status as before.
Similar remarks apply to space-time geometry, with the difference
that while the Hilbert picture based on structured representation is now
the standard viewpoint for the foundations of geometry, structured
representation has not yet received wide acceptance as the appropriate
foundational viewpoint concerning space-time coordinates. 12 Robb's
viewpoint provides an example of structured representation of space-
time structure. Space-time is construed not as a set but as a relational
system A of type (2}, and the vague family S(A, B) of suitable
(Minkowskian) space-time coordinate mappings is interpreted as
I(A, B), where B is the numerical relational system Beau of section 3.
The Lorentz group is identified and explained as I(B, B), and the
requirement of Lorentz invariance as a necessary condition for
meaningfulness is derived as proposition (a*), soundly based on (1") and
(3*) (with I(A, B) in place of FH(A, B)). Finally, the sufficient con-
dition (b) for meaningfulness is derived as (b*), based on the mathema-
tical fact (4*) (with I(A, B) in place of FH(A, B)) and the doubtful
proposition (2*).
To conclude this section, I will list the remaining weak points of the
theory of meaningfulness based on structured representation. First,
proposition (b*) depends in every case upon (2*), for which no
argument has yet been given. Second, in the general case of F-
representation, (b*) also depends upon (4"), for which no sufficient
argument has yet been given. The remainder of this paper is essentially
devoted to providing (2*) and (4*) (and hence (b*) as well) with a firm
foundation. This will complete the task of placing the Stevens theory of
meaningfulness on a firm foundation within the framework of struc-
tured representation.
7. INDUCED PROPOSITIONS AND CONTENT
I will focus first on proposition (2*). To justify (2*), it will obviously be

necessary to make a closer analysis of the intuitive notion of meaning-
fulness which occurs in it. The approaches to meaningfulness outlined
in the previous two sections have treated 'meaningful' as a simple
predicate of statements or propositions. Intuitively, however, meaning-
fulness of a representational proposition p(f) consists in the fact that its
truth or falsehood conveys some definite information, independent of
the representation f. This information constitutes the content of p(f), in
contrast with its overt meaning as a statement about the scale f. Every
representational proposition possesses an overt meaning (i.e., the
statement that the value of the function p at the argument f is 1) and is
overtly true or false; the problem of meaningfulness is concerned with
the circumstances under which p(f) also has a content, i.e., conveys
representation-independent information about its subject matter. The
question, "Is p meaningful?" is thus transformed into the question,
"Does p convey a content, and if so, what?" Stevens has shown that a
necessary condition for this is that p be constant over S(A, B) (or
FH(A, B) in the case of structured representation), but we have yet to
show why this should be sufficient, i.e., why (2*) should be accepted.
Now in fact I believe that (2*) is not justified on the basis of the
simple model of representational propositions as functions p(k, f) from
sequences k in A and maps f in FH(A, B), put forth in section 4. To see
this, consider the function p defined to be equal always to 1. This
satisfies the condition (2"), and yet the fact that p(f) = 1 conveys no
information whatever about the system A or its elements, and therefore
cannot be said to possess a content.
The real problem here is not with (2"), however, but with our
provisional model of representational propositions, which must now be
modified and extended. The revised semantic model will bring to light a
further essential aspect of representational propositions which does not
seem to have been explicitly noted in the literature on structured
representation, namely their essential dependence on comparison of the
particular relational system A in question with other relational systems
of the same type.
In concrete terms the point at issue is this. The simple model of
section 4 and the general practice of structured representation suppose
a particular relational system A to be given, which the theory aims to
416 BRENT MUNDY
represent in a given system B of the same type. A is, for example, a set
of observed instances of certain empirical relations of order and
concatenation. The problem of representation is to choose a scale
f such that certain representational propositions p(f) using it will be
meaningful. Since only one represented system A is involved, there is
no apparent reason to consider maps f' which might be defined on other
systems A' into the same representing system B, and in fact this is in
general not done. It seems on deeper investigation however that for a
proper analysis of representational meaning it is necessary to do so.
This is because the concept of information necessarily involves the
selection of one from among a number of alternatives. Consider any
meaningful and true representational proposition p which does not
involve the selection of particular elements of A, i.e., does not depend
on a sequence k in A. By the Stevens condition (1) we must have p(f)
constant on all of S(A, B), and since p is true, p(f) = 1 for all f in
S(A, B). But p was any true and meaningful representational prop-
osition about A as a whole. Thus we have reached the paradoxical
conclusion that all such true and meaningful representational pro-
positions are the same function p, which furthermore is the same as the
constant function which we conceded above to be meaningless.
What has gone wrong is this. Different propositions about the same
system A do indeed convey different information about A, but to see
what this information is we must look at other systems which do not
possess the property in question. That is, in order to determine the
meaning of a representational proposition (and hence to provide
sufficient conditions for it to have one) we must analyze represen-
tational propositions as functions which are defined not only for a single
system A and map f in S(A, B), but for a variable system X and map f
in S(X, B). The exact information furnished by the truth of p for A and
f will then depend upon the behavior of p on other systems A'. In terms
to be made more precise below, the proposition p(f) must be induced
by the application to the system A of a more general proposition q
defined for general systems X of this logical type. This extension of the
present model of a representational proposition is the only method I can
see for arriving at an analysis of the information conveyed by a
representational proposition, and hence of the concept of content.
We proceed as follows. Let K be a logical type. Define a KB
proposition to be a [unction q(X, k, f) from an arbitrary system X of
type K, a sequence k in X, and an f in FH(X, B), into {0, 1}. A KB
proposition q will be said to induce the A B proposition p if q(A, k, f) =

p(k, f) for all f in M(A, B) and all sequences k in A. For brevity I will
sometimes suppress the reference to the sequences k, and speak of a
KB proposition as a function q(X, f) from a system X of type K and a
function f in M(X, B), into {0, 1}. Then the KB proposition q(X, f)
induces the A B representational proposition p(f) if q(A, f) = p(f) for
all f in M(A, B). I will continue to speak of such propositions as being
true, or homing, when their value is 1.
The present proposal is then that K B propositions should be taken as
the fundamental representational statements, rather than A B pro-
positions. Thus, each A B proposition p which is employed in practice
and in standard structured representation theory must be shown to be
induced by a certain KB proposition. The content of such an A B
proposition may then be determined by looking at the K B proposition
which induces it. Since different K B propositions behave differently on
different systems of type K, it becomes possible for different true and
meaningful A B propositions to be analyzed as having different con-
tents, even though they behave alike when considered simply as A B
propositions.
This program has three distinct parts. We must: (i) develop a theory
of content and meaningfulness for KB propositions and the A B
propositions which they induce; (ii) show that some version of (2*) is
justified on the basis of that theory, for A B propositions which are
induced by a KB proposition; and (iii) establish that every A B
proposition employed in practice actually is induced by a certain
uniquely defined KB proposition associated with it. The present section
is devoted to (i) and (ii), the next section to (iii).
The content of an A B proposition must be information about the
system A and the location within it of the elements singled out by some
sequence k in A. Such information is expressed abstractly by a K
proposition, which is defined to be a function s(X, k) from an arbitrary
system X of type K and an arbitrary sequence k in X into {0, 1}. The
content of an A B proposition p(k, f), if it has one, must be expressed by
some particular K proposition s, applied to the particular system A and
sequence k in A. The problem of (i) is simply to determine what this K
proposition s is, in the case of an A B proposition q(A, k, f) which is
induced by a KB proposition q. Formally, our problem is to associate
with each K B proposition q a specific K proposition sq, in such a way
that what we intuitively identify as the content of any A B proposition
418 BRENT MUNDY
q(A, k, f) induced by application of q to A using some scale f may be

expressed in an objective and representation-independent manner as
sq(A, k).
Note also that there will in fact be two distinct representational
meanings associated with such a proposition p, one expressing the
objective information conveyed when it is meaningful and true, and the
other expressing the objective information conveyed when. it is
meaningful and false. I will refer to these pieces of information as the
positive and the negative content of p respectively. These are in general
not contradictories, since when p is meaningless neither need be true.
Thus what we require are actually two distinct K propositions Sq+ and
Sq_, to express the positive and the negative content respectively of the
AB proposition q(A . . . . ) induced by q, in case it is meaningful.
I will now make some statements about induced representational
propositions which involve the intuitive concepts of content and
meaningfulness. These statements, it seems to me, can be recognized as
necessary conditions on any reasonable specification of the content of
those intuitive concepts. Here q(A, f) is an AB proposition induced by
a KB proposition q, f is an arbitrary element of M(A, B), and Sq+and
Sq_ are the positive and negative contents of q, if they exist (i.e., if q is
meaningful). S(A, B) is the Stevens set of suitable representations,
which might be for example FH(A, B) or I(A, B) in the context of
structured representation theory. (The dependences on fixed sequences
k in A are suppressed.)
(x) If q(A, f) is meaningful then f is in S(A, B), and q(A, f) =
1 iff sq+(A) = 1 and q(A, f) = 0 iff sq_(A) = 1.
(y) If Sq+(A)= 1 then q(A, f) is meaningful and true for every f
in S(A, B) and S(A, B) is nonempty.
(z) If Sq_(A) = 1 then q(A, f) is meaningful and false for every f
in S(A, B) and S(A, B) is nonempty.
The intuitive justification for (x) is that if f is not in S(A, B) then any
representational proposition using it must be meaningless; the rest is
just the definition of positive and negative content. (y) (respectively (z))
also seem to be part of the concept of representational meaning. It is a
piece of objective and representation-independent information about
the system A that every f in S(A, B) makes q(A, f) true (respectively
false), and that there is at least one such f. By Stevens (1) this is a
necessary condition for q(A, f) to be meaningful and true (respectively
false) for any f in S(A, B), and hence it should be included as part of the
positive (respectively negative) content of q(A, _ ), since it constitutes
objective and representation-independent information about the sys-
tem A which follows from the meaningful truth (respectively falsehood)
of q(A, f).
The above propositions suffice to determine exactly the K prop-
ositions Sq+ and Sq_ expressing the content of q, and the extension of
the intuitive predicate 'meaningful'. This means that they yield a
definite theory of meaning and meaningfulness for KB propositions q
and the AB propositions which they induce. This theory will imply a
version of (2"), as required.
By (x) we have
(i) If q(A, f) is meaningful then S(A, B) is nonempty and
q(A,_ ) is constant on S(A, B).
Now we may determine Sq+and Sq_.Assume that q(A, fo) is meaningful
for some fo; we will first determine the positive content Sq+of q(A, fo).
By (y) and (i) we have
(ii) If Sq+(A) 1 then S(A, B) is nonempty and q(A, f) = 1 for
=
all f in S(A, B).

Conversely, suppose that S(A, B) is nonempty and q(A, f) -- 1 for all f
in S(A, B). Since q(A, fo) is meaningful, (x) implies that Sq+(A).
Combining this with (ii) yields the desired characterization of Sq+:
(iii) Sq+(A)= 1 iff S(A, B) is nonempty and q(A, f) = 1 for all f

in S(A, B).
Similarly, (x), (z) and (i) yield
(iv) Sq_(A)= 1 iff S(A, B) is nonempty and q(A, f) = 0 for all f
in S(A, B).
These arguments work for any specification of the set S(A, B) of
suitable representations, so long as it satisfies the Stevens condition (1).
Finally, assume that q(A, _ ) is constant on S(A, B) and that S(A, B)
is not empty. Then by (iii) and (iv) either Sq+(A) or sq_(A) holds,
according as the constant value of q is 1 or 0 on S(A, B). Therefore by
(y) and (z), q(A, f) is meaningful for every f in S(A, B). We thus have
a sufficient condition for meaningfulness of induced propositions,
420 BRENT MUNDY
corresponding to Stevens' (2) and the structured representation (2*):

(2**) If S( A, B) is nonempty and q( A , _ ) is constant on S( A, B)
then q(A, f) is meaningful for every f in S(A, B).
From (i) and (2**) we obtain the desired characterization of meaning-
fulness:
(**) An induced representational proposition q( A, f) is meaningful
iff S(A, B) is nonempty and q(A, _ ) is constant on S(A, B).
The propositional content of (2**) and (**) is not particularly surpris-
ing, and one could imagine them being accepted without argument as
(2) and (2*) have been accepted. The point of the present development,
however, is that (2*) and (**) have been shown to follow from the
natural conditions (1) and (x), (y), (z) on the intuitive concepts of
meaningfulness and content for induced representational propositions.
Thus we have an objective justification for these claims, in the case of
induced propositions, of a sort which has never been given for (2) or
(2*) as claims about simple A B propositions.
Of course, (2**) implies (2*) if we suppose that every simple AB
proposition p(f) considered in the theory is in fact induced by a unique
KB proposition q, and we make the structured representation sub-
stitution of FH(A, B) for S(A, B), and we restrict attention to systems
A for which S(A, B) is nonempty. (As noted earlier, (4*) is already
justified in the case of /-representation, i.e., taking I(A, B) for
S(A, B).) Thus, our problem of justifying (2*) within the structured
representation context will be solved if only we can justify the assump-
tion that every AB representational proposition p is induced by a
unique KB proposition q. This will be done in the next section.
8. R E P R E S E N T A T I O N A L LANGUAGES
In this section I will outline the structure of a family of formal languages

designed for the expression of labelled KB and AB propositions, for
arbitrary systems A and B of type K. I will refer to these as KK
languages LICK. As an example of the general principles of construction
of these languages, I will introduce certain strong infinitary languages
LKIC(c) of cardinality c. However, it will be evident that the general
principles of construction are independent of the strength of the logical
apparatus introduced into the languages. I claim that all ordinary
numerical representational propositions are expressible in some K K

language. The expression of an A B proposition p(f) in a K K language
will be seen to fix in a natural way a K B proposition q by which p(f) is
induced as q ( A , f ) . The assumption that all representational pro-
positions p(f) are induced by some K B proposition q, required for the
theory of representational meaning developed in the previous section,
will thus be justified.
Intuitively a K K language is simply a formal language which
possesses the capacity to refer to the elements and basic relations of two
different systems of the same logical type K, and also to refer to a
representational map f connecting the two. Since both systems are of
the same logical type, the same relation symbols may be used for atomic
sentences in both systems. The syntactic differentiation is necessary
only for the terms referring to elements of the two systems (including
terms involving the representational mapping).
Formally, the syntax of a K K language is as follows. The primitive
symbols are: a set of X-constants a~ of cardinality c (the subscript i is
taken to range over some index-set of cardinality c); a set of Y-
constants b~ of cardinality c; a set of X-variables x~ of cardinality c; a set
of Y-variables Yi of cardinality c; a set of relation symbols Rj of degree
dj appropriate for symbols of type K ; the identity-symbol = ; a special
function-symbol f*, distinct from all of the Rj; and logical symbols. For
the language LKK(c) we use the logical symbols - , &, infinitary
conjunctions & ( ) , and infinitary existential quantifiers 3 ( ) .
The terms of a K K language are defined as follows: The X-terms
consist of all the X-constants a~ and X-variables xi. The Y-terms
consist of all the Y-constants bi, all the Y-variables y~, and all
expressions of the form f*(s) where s is an X-term.
The atomic formulas of a K K language are all expressions of the
form sl = sz, where sl and s2 are both X-terms or are both Y-terms, and
all expressions of the form R j ( q , . . . t~), where Rj is a relation of degree
n for systems of logical type K, and the t~ are all X-terms, or are all
Y-terms.
The formulas for LKK(c) are defined recursively from the atomic
formulas in the usual way, i.e.,
(1) Each atomic formula is a formula.
(2) If F and G are formulas, so are - F and F & G.
(3) If (F~) is a sequence of formulas of cardinality less than c,
&((F/)) is a formula.
422 BRENT MUNDY
(4) If (zi) is a sequence of distinct variables ( X - v a r i a b l e s or

Y-variables) of cardinality less than c and F is a formula, then
(3(zi))F is a formula.
(5) Nothing is a formula unless it follows from a finite n u m b e r of
applications of these rules that it is a formula.
We introduce the remaining logical symbols and quantifiers by
defnition in the standard ways, and use the usual definitions of free and
bound variables. A sentence of an LKK is a formula which contains no
free variables.
Proceeding now to the semantics of a K K language, let X and Y be
arbitrary systems of type K. An X Y valuation v = (k, f) consists of: a
function k defined on some subset of the variables and constants of
LKK, which carries X - c 0 n s t a n t s and X - v a r i a b l e s to elements of X, and
carries Y-constants and Y-variables to elements of Y; and a function f
in M ( X , Y). A valuation v is called suitable for a given t e r m t or
formula F, if the domain of definition of k includes all of the constants
and free variables occurring in t or F. If a valuation v = (k, f ) is
suitable for a given t e r m t, it determines an interpretation v(t) for that
term, as follows: If t is a variable or constant, v(t) = k(t). If t has the
f o r m f*(s) for some X - t e r m s, then v(t) = f(v(s)). Thus, v(t) is in X or
Y according as t is an X - t e r m or a Y-term.
W e may now define recursively the notion of an X Y valuation v
satisfying a formula F of LKn(c) in the obvious way, as follows:
(1) If F has the form h = t2, v satisfies F iff v is suitable for F
and v(h) = v(t2).
(2) If F has the form R j ( h , . . . t,) for X - t e r m s (respectively
Y-terms) t~, v satisfies F iff v is suitable for F and
R~(v(h) . . . . V(tn)) holds in X (respectively Y).
(3) If F has the f o r m - G, v satisfies F iff v is suitable for F and
v does not satisfy G.
(4) If F has the form G & H , v satisfies F iff v is suitable for F
and v satisfies both G and H .
(5) If F has the f o r m &((Fi)) for some sequence (Fi) of car-
dinality less than c, v satisfies F iff v is suitable for F and v
satisfies each F~.
(6) L e t F h a v e the f o r m (3(z~))G for some sequence z = (zl) of
variables, of cardinality less than c, and let v = (k, f ) be
suitable for F. Define a z-variant of v to be an X Y v a l u a t i o n
v # = ( k # , f), where the domain of definition of k # includes

that of k, includes all of the variables zi of z, and agrees with
k except possibly on the variables z~. Then v satisfies F iff v
is suitable for F and some z-variant of v satisfies G.
Let B be a fixed system of type K, and kB a fixed function from the

Y-constants bi of a K K language into the domain of B. Relative to this
K B interpretation (B, kB) of LKK, each sentence S of the language de-
termines a K B proposition qs in the following manner. Let there be n
X-constants aj in S, and fix any 1-1 function h-from the constants aj of
S onto the ordinal numbers less than n. qs(X, k, f) is to be defined for
all systems X of type K, sequences k in X of length at least n, and
mappings f in M ( X , B). Given such an X, k, and f, define an X B
valuation v = (k +, f) suitable for S, where k + is the union of k o h and
kB. The function qs(X, k, f) is defined to equal 1 if v satisfies S, and 0 if
v does not satisfy S.
Thus the languages LKK are suitable for the expression of K B
propositions, for any system B of type K. In an obvious way they also
serve to express A B propositions for any fixed A, thus defining an A B
interpretation (A, B, kB).
My claim here is that the representational A B propositions employed
in practice can all be expressed in formal K K languages with an
appropriate logical apparatus, under an appropriate A B or K B inter-
pretation. For example, the proposition, 'Object al receives the scale
value 2' is expressed by the sentence 'f*(al) = b2', under an A B or K B
interpretation for which B has been fixed to be a numerical system of
type K, and kB(b2) is the number 2, which occurs as an element of B. (In
practice we simply use the numerals '2' etc. as the Y-constants bi of a
special K K language designed for the expression of numerical A B and
K B propositions, and hence would write the formula simply as 'f*(al) =
2'. This is a mere notational variant.) Similarly, the proposition that
object al has a greater scale-value than object a2 is expressed by a
proposition of the form 'Rl(f*(al), f*(a2))', where Rl is a binary
relation occurring in systems of type K. The proposition that object al
has maximal scale-value among the elements of X has the form
'(Vxl)Rl(f*(al), f*(xl)'. It seems clear from these examples that all
standard representational propositions may be formally expressed in an
appropriate K K language under an appropriate A B or K B inter-
pretation, using the X-variables and constants to refer to and quantify
424 BRENT MUNDY
over elements of the empirical system X, the Y-variables and constants

to refer to and quantify over the numbers in the numerical system B,
the relations Ri to express both the basic mathematical structure of the
system B and the basic empirical structure of the system X, and the
primitive symbol f* to express the assignment of elements o f B to
represent elements of X.
Some freedom of choice remains regarding the strength of the logical
and set-theoretical apparatus of a K K language. The only requirement
is that it be strong enough to allow for a development using the Y-terms
and the logical apparatus defined over them of as much of the
mathematical theory of the system B as one intends to use in
the numerical propositions which are formulated. For example, if the
logical type of K is that of the theory of fields, the system B is the real
number field, and one wishes to use calculus in the numerical pro-
positions, the K K language employed must include as much set theory
or second-order logic as is needed to define derivatives and integrals of
functions. It seems evident that a semantics of the sort here given for
LKK(c) may be developed for any K K language, allowing for the
expression of K B and A B propositions in that language.
The justification of (2) and (2*) offered in the previous section is now
complete. For any standard representational A B proposition p, there
will be a natural expression of p as a sentence S of a K K language LKK,
under a certain A B interpretation (A, B, kB). We may thus im-
mediately find in a natural way a distinguished K B proposition q which
induces p, namely that expressed by the same sentence S under the
associated B interpretation (B, kB) of LKK.
The essential step in the justification of (2) is thus seen to be the
recognition that A B representational propositions p should be thought
of as induced by K B representational propositions, and that the
syntactic form of an A B proposition (when properly formalized in a K K
language relative to a fixed K B interpretation) shows us directly by
what K B proposition q it is induced.
9. STRUCTURAL PROPOSITIONS
I pass now to the justification of the uniqueness requirement (4*), in the

case of general F-representation. It was noted in section 6 that (4*) is
not true as a mathematical consequence of the conditions on represen-
tation which we have already established, as (3*) is. Therefore (4*) can
only be justified on the basis of conditions on representation going

beyond those which we have so far established.
One such line of justification was mentioned in section 6. With (2*)
now placed on a firm foundation, (4*) would imply (b*), and hence
would imply that I(B, B)-invariance of a representational proposition
p(f) is necessary and sufficient for meaningfulness. However, I also
noted there that this "nice" consequence (b*) is only one of many
possible formal virtues which a system A might possess, and that no
grounds have been given for supposing that it is appropriate to restrict
attention to systems satisfying (4*) simply in order to secure the
consequence (b*). In particular, it seems possible that the actual world
might contain systems A of the same logical type K as some numerical
system B, and which we might wish to represent in B, but which do not
satisfy (4*). To justify the uniqueness condition (4*) it must be shown
that this possibility cannot arise, i.e., that certain further natural
conditions on representation, not yet articulated, would be violated in
such a case. In the next section I will attempt to show this.
It is first convenient (albeit not strictly necessary for the present
project) to further sharpen our formal model of representational
propositions by making explicit another essential feature of ordinary
representational propositions such as those of measurement, geometry,
and kinematics. This is the fact that the information conveyed by these
propositions about the represented system A and its elements is
structural information. By this [ mean that all of the relevant in-
formation concerning the objects in question is supposed to inhere in,
and be determinable from, the formal structure of the relational system
A of which the objects are elements, and their situation within it. The
axiom systems of the theory of measurement and of axiomatic geometry
convey information concerning the formal structure in this sense of the
qualitative relational systems A to which they pertain. The process of
formal or numerical representation of such a system A by means of a
faithful homomorphism f into a specified numerical system B also
conveys structural information in this sense. While I do not know of any
explicit statements of this point in the literature, it seems implicit in the
very use of relational systems to model the process of representation,
with the tacit assumption that whatever information the process of
representation does in fact convey can indeed be captured using the '
purely formal tools of the structured representation approach (cf.
sections 2, 3, and 6).
426 BRENT MUNDY
This feature is not a trivial one. One may easily define represen-
tational propositions which are perfectly meaningful in the sense both
of standard representational theories of meaningfulness and in the sense
of the present more detailed theory as developed above, but which fail
to convey structural information in the present sense. For example let o
be any fixed object, and define q(X, f) to equal 1 for any system X of
type K and f in M(X, B) iff o is in X. q is meaningful in the above
semantic sense for any system X for which S(X, B) is nonempty, and in
fact it conveys the objective and representation-independent in-
formation that S(X, B) is nonempty and that o is (respectively is not) in
X. What makes it odd is simply that its truth or falsehood for a given
system X depends not only on the formal structure of x but also on the
particular identity of the elements of X, i.e., upon whether any of them
is identical with the particular object o. Thus q could be true for one
system X and false for an isomorphic system X'.
There is a (rather obvious) theory of representational propositions
which are structural in character. First, define a structural K proposition
to be a K proposition s(X, k) which is invariant under isomorphisms g,
assuming the values of the sequence k' in X' = gX to be related by the
same isomorphism as the elements of X; that is, s(X, k) = s(X', g o k)
whenever g is an isomorphism from X to X'. (Here g o k is the
sequence (g(kl) . . . . . g(ki)...).) This is obviously the appropriate
notion of a K proposition expressing information which pertains only to
the formal structure of the system X.
For representational propositions, a KB proposition q may similarly
be defined to be structural on condition that if g is an isomorphism from
X to X' then q ( X , k , f ) = q ( X ' , g o k , fog-i). Here f og-~ is the
representation of X' in B which corresponds to the representation f of
X in B, via the isomorphism g. (It is of course trivial that f o g-i is in
FH(X', B) given f in FH(X, B) and g in I(X, X').)
It is obvious that if q is a structural KB proposition, then the K
propositions so+ and Sq_ expressing the positive and negative represen-
tational meaning of q are themselves structural. Thus the information
conveyed about a system X .by a meaningful structural KB prop-
osition q(X, f) is indeed structural information. We can now note
the fact (obvious by the extensional and structural character of the
set-theoretical semantics of a K K language) that the KB propositions
expressed by sentences S of K K languages are in fact structural. Since
all ordinary representational propositions are expressible in some K K
language, this shows that all such propositions are structural.
T H E O R E M 1. Let B, X, and X' be systems of type K, g be an

isomorphism from X to X', F be a formula of LKn, and v = (k, f) be an
X B valuation of LKK suitable for F. Then v' = (g o k, fo g-i) is an X ' B
valuation suitable for F, and v' satisfies F if and only if v satisfies F.
Proof. Immediate by induction on formulas.
T H E O R E M 2. Let (B, kB) be a K B interpretation of LKK, and let S be

a sentence of LKK. Then the K B proposition qs expressed by S under
the given K B interpretation is structural.
Proof. From theorem 1.
The above theorems will hold for any K K language LKK, regardless
of the type of logical apparatus with which they are equipped. In
particular, they hold for the strong infinitary languages Lnl,:(c) of
cardinality c defined in the preceding section. We thus obtain an
extensive class of structural K B propositions, i.e., all of those expres-
sible by sentences of any K K language, under any K B interpretation.
10. IMAGE PROPOSITIONS
We are now in a position to approach the problem of justifying the

uniqueness condition (4*) of section 7:
(4*) For any f and f' in FH(A, B), there is a g in I(B, B) such that
f'=gof.
Since this condition does not follow from the general principles of the
formal theory of representation as so far developed, any justification of
it will evidently depend upon the identification of certain further
features of formal representation not yet made explicit in the theory.
The following discussion will attempt to provide this.
First we must consider somewhat more deeply the actual purpose of
formal representation. There is an obvious sense in which the standard
forms of numerical representation do more than merely to represent in
the simple sense of section 2 the structure of the empirical relational
system A. They do not simply register for us the instances of the various
primitive relations among the various elements of A. If that were all
they did it would be unclear why one should employ numerical
representation at all, rather than simply listing the atomic propositions
true in the system A, or eml~loying representation in some other sort of
428 BRENT MUNDY
system B than the ones we do in fact use. (Of course any system A may
be represented in m a n y different systems B by a faithful h o m o m o r -
phism.)
Certain special a d v a n t a g e s of formal representation in the actual
numerical systems e m p l o y e d for that purpose are indicated in the
following quotations f r o m C a r n a p (1966):
Why do we go to all the trouble of devising complicated rules and postulates in order to
have magnitudes that can be measured on numerical scales?
We all know the answer. It has been said many times that the great progress of science,
especially in the last few centuries, could not have occurred without the use of the
quantitative method. (p. 105)
The major advantage.., is that quantitative concepts permit us to formulate quan-
titative laws. Such laws are enormously more powerful, both as ways to explain
phenomena and as means for predicting new phenomena. Even with an enriched
qualitative language, in which our memory is burdened with hundreds of qualifying
adjectives, we would have great difficulty expressing even the simplest laws. (p. 106)
The most important advantage of the quantitative law, however, is not its brevity, but
rather the use that can be made of it. Once we have the law in numerical form, we can
employ that powerful part of deductive logic we call mathematics and, in that way, make
predictions. (p. 108)
T h e s e quotations illustrate the widely a c c e p t e d view that the main

purpose of numerical representation is to allow for the e m p l o y m e n t of
standard m a t h e m a t i c a l m e t h o d s to draw conclusions a b o u t the qualita-
tive system A, using standard m a t h e m a t i c a l concepts definable within
the numerical system B. This type of application of representation
requires the system B to be one for which a significant b o d y of
m a t h e m a t i c a l theory has b e e n developed. T h e purpose of represen-
tation in the chosen system B is then not merely to record the atomic
facts of the system A, but rather to use the m a t h e m a t i c a l theory of the
system B as a m e a n s of analysis of the system A. This is the further
feature of formal representation not yet t a k e n into account in the theory
as so far developed: its application of the theory of the system B to the
system A. This will be seen below to provide a justification for (4*).
First we must formalize t h e c o n c e p t of an application of the theory of
the system B to the system A by m e a n s of a representation, A natural
way to do this is as follows. A representation f in M(A, B) produces an
image of the system A in the system B, which we can think of as the
substructure of B defined by the subset f(A) of B which is the image of
the m a p p i n g f. This substructure f(A) will h a v e various properties
definable directly within the theory of the system B. 13 T h e general f o r m
of an application of a mathematical theory to an empirical system A by

means of a representation f seems to consist simply in the ascription,
using the theory of the system B, of some property to the image f(A) of
the system A under f. (Typical examples are: the specification of the
mean or standard deviation of the set of values of f; the statement that
the values of f satisfy a certain differential equation.) I will call such an
ascription an image proposition about the system A, using the represen-
tation [ into B.
Formally, a B proposition is a function sB from sequences k in B into
{0, 1}. Let j be an enumeration of the elements of A by some ordinal
number. Then an A B image proposition about A is a proposition of the
form sB(foj) for some B proposition sB, where fo] enumerates the
image of A under the chosen element f of M(A, B). An image
proposition is an A B proposition p(j, f), since its truth value depends
upon a sequence j of elements of A and a mapping f in M(A, B). It is a
special type among such A B representational propositions, since it has
the special form p(j, f) = sB(f o j) for a B proposition sB. Thus it can
only express properties of the system A which show up in the image
/(A), unlike the general A B representational proposition which may
also employ quantifiers ranging over elements of A (as reflected in the
syntax of a K K language). It is obvious that A B image propositions p
are induced by corresponding KB image propositions q(X, j, f) as
q(A, ], f), where the KB image proposition q has the special form
q(X, j, f) = sB(f o ]), for any system X of type K, enumeration j of X,
and map f in M(X, B).
The ultimate purpose of formal representation is then to express
propositions about the represented system A in the form of A B image
propositions sB(foj), using B propositions sB definable within the
theory of the system B. We must now determine what such definability
is. The most general answer is that a B proposition sB should count as
definable within the theory of B iff it is structural in the sense defined
earlier for K propositions, i.e., invariant under all automorphisms of B:
sB(k) = sB(g ° k) for all g in I(B, B) and all sequences k in B. (Luce
(1978) adopts this viewpoint.) Every concept of syntactic definability of
a B proposition in a formal language for systems of type K has this
property, and conversely it is straightforward to show that every B
proposition which is thus invariant is capable of such syntactic definition
in a sufficiently strong (usually set-theoretic or infinitary) language of
type K. An image proposition sB(fo j) for which sB is structural will be
430 BRENT MUNDY
called a structural image proposition. It is obvious that structural image

propositions sB(foj) are also structural as AB or KB propositions
q(X, j, f). It seems clear upon examination of examples (or by formaliz-
ing in a KK language and applying theorem 2) that all of the image
propositions occurring in standard applications of mathematics to
empirical subject-matter are structural ones. Conversely, it seems clear
that any structural B proposition in the theory of B is a legitimate
candidate for empirical application to the system A, through use in an
image proposition. 14
Since image propositions are AB representational propositions in-
duced by KB propositions, the theory of meaningfulness and content
developed in the preceding sections applies immediately to them. That
theory yielded necessary and sufficient conditions (**) for meaningful-
ness of all induced representational propositions: an induced AB
representational proposition q(A, k, f) is meaningful iff S(A, B) is
nonempty and q(A, k , _ ) is constant on S(A, B). The intended
practical force of the theory of meaningfulness is of course that a
representational proposition is legitimate or allowable just in case it is
meaningful. However, the present discussion of the intended purpose of
representation (application of the theory of B to the system A by means
of image propositions) has yielded an independent characterization of a
class of allowable representational propositions, namely the structural
image propositions. Clearly then we require a further assumption or
principle to guarantee the consistency of these two different accounts of
what representational propositions are allowable. Namely, we require:
(5) Every structural image proposition is meaningful.
This requirement seems inescapable, given the separate intuitive

justifications both for the theory of representational meaningfulness
and for the present view of the role of structural image propositions.
The intuitively justified postulate (5) suffices to complete our theory.
In fact, in the context of the theory of F-representation and meaning-
fulness as developed above, (5) is equivalent to (4*). This is shown by
the following two theorems, taking the case of S(A, B) = FH(A, B) as
in the standard theory of structured F-representation, and assuming
FH(A, B) to be nonempty. (The uniqueness condition (4*) is in general
not sought unless it has already been determined that there is at least
one representation, i.e. S(A, B) is nonempty.)
T H E O R E M 3. Let A and B be systems of type K. If every structural

image proposition sB(fo j) is meaningful then for any two elements f
and f' of S(A, B) there is a g in I(B, B) such that f' = g o f.
Proof. 15 Let (5) hold, and suppose that there exist f and f' in S(A, B)
such that no g in I(B, B) satisfies f' = g o f. Let j be an enumeration of
A, and define the B proposition sB(k) by the condition that sB(k) holds
iff there is a g in I(B, B) such that k = g o f o j. Taking g as the identity
we have sB(foj), sB is structural, since if k = gofo] for some g in
I(B, B) and h is in I(B, B) then h o k = (h o g) o f o j for the element
h o g of I(B, B), so that sB(h o k) also. If sB(f' o j) then we have a g in
I(B, B) with f ' o j = g o f o j , which since j is 1-1 implies f ' = g o f,
contrary to hypothesis; thus sB(f' oj) is false. This shows that the
structural image proposition sB is not meaningful, since
su(f' ° j) :fi sB(f ° j), i.e., sB(__o j) is not constant on S(A, B).
T H E O R E M 4. Let A and B be systems of type K, with S(A, B) not

empty. If for any two elements f and f' of S(A, B) there is a g in I(B, B)
such that f ' = g o f, then every structural image proposition sB (__ o ]) is
meaningful.
Proof. Let sB(_ o j) be a structural image proposition, for any fixed
enumeration ] of A. Let f and f' belong to S(A, B), and by the
hypothesis let f ' = g of. Since sB is structural we have sB(f'oj)=
s B ( g - l o f ' o ] ) = sB(f°j). Thus s B ( o j ) is constant on S(A, B), and
since S(A, B) is nonempty it follows that s~(__ o j) is meaningful.
The intuitive idea behind the proof of theorem 3 is very simple. If

(4*) fails, then the theory of B allows one to distinguish structural
differences between the images f(A) and f'(A) as substructures of B,
(expressed in the proof using the B-proposition sB(k)), and hence to
express structural image propositions which are representationally
meaningless, i.e., express no intrinsic structural feature of the system A
itself, but only information about where in B the mapping happens to
place its image of A.
This completes our justification of (4*). As noted in section 6, the
present uniqueness condition (4*) implies all of the other uniqueness
conditions prevalent in the literature, because the present concept of an
admissible transformation (as an element of I(B, B)) is the strongest of
those prevalent in the literature. Thus the present justification of (4*)
also retrospectively justifies the weaker uniqueness conditions.
432 BRENT MUNDY
In conclusion, the constructive part of this paper has offered a

justification of the two problematic assumptions (2) and (4) of the ori-
ginal Stevens theory of meaningfulness in the context of unstructured
representation, and of their correlates (2*) and (4*) in the structured
case. The justification of (2) relative to an intuitive concept of
meaningfulness depended upon the recognition that A B represen-
tational propositions are induced by KB representational propositions,
and that the content of an A B representational proposition p can only
be determined by reference to the unique KB proposition q which
induces it. The content is then found to be precisely the K proposition
which asserts that S(X, B) is nonempty and that q(X, k, f) = 1 for all f
in S(X, B); the induced propositions q(A, k, f) are found to be
meaningful in the intuitive sense just in case S(A, B) is nonempty and
q(A, k, _ ) is constant on S(A, B). This is roughly the content of the
propositions (1) and (2) of the existing theories, but it is here justified
relative to an antecedent intuitive concept of meaningfulness and
content. The justification depends upon the assumption that all A B
representational propositions employed are induced by unique KB
propositions q. This assumption was justified by the introduction of the
representational languages Lrr, the observation that all A B pro-
positions expressible in a K K language are induced by corresponding
KB propositions expressed by the same sentence, and the observation
that all representational A B propositions employed in practice are
expressible in some K K language.
The justification of the uniqueness condition (4) or (4*) depended
upon the observation that the real purpose of formal representation is
the application of the theory of the representing structure B in the
formulation of representational propositions about the systems A. This
idea in turn was formalized using the concept of a structural image
proposition, as the particular type of representational proposition which
expresses such an application. The.justification of (4*) is then com-
pleted by showing that (4*) is precisely the assumption required to
ensure that these propositions are representationally meaningful, i.e.,
that the representation can fulfill its real purpose.
NOTES
* Material from this paper was presented at a conference on meaningfulness in the theory
of measurement~ held at New York University in December 1984, hosted by J. C.
Falmagne. I would like to thank Patrick Suppes for arranging my invitation to this
conference, and David Krantz, R. Duncan Luce, and Fred Roberts for helpful comments.
I would also like to thank an anonymous referee for extremely detailed and helpful
comments and suggestions, the most important of which are acknowledged in footnotes.
The comprehensive work of Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky on the theory of
measurement takes the field to comprise all cases of numerical representation, and hence
to include geometry and kinematics as special cases (to be treated in a forthcoming
second volume). However, no general formal framework comprising all of these cases is
offered. (Indeed, the authors explicitly disavow the intention of offering any such
framework: vol. I, section 1.3, page 13.) The present theory could be regarded as
undertaking to fill this gap.
2 The term faithful has been drawn from the standard mathematical theory of represen-
tations of algebraic structures (structures whose primitive relations are operations, e.g.,
groups or algebras), which is not discussed in the present paper. (For a survey see the
article 'Representations' in Iyanaga and Kawada, 1977.) In this theory a representation is
required simply to be a homomorphism in the present sense, usually into an algebraic
structure in which the basic objects are matrices and the basic algebraic operations are
matrix multiplication and addition. The representation is called faithful if it satisfies a
further condition which is equivalent, in the case of algebraic structures, to the definition
given here. The use of nonfaithful representations in algebraic representation theory
places it somewhat outside the scope of the present theory, for which faithfulness is the
essential feature of a representation.
In the literature on measurement it has become customary to use the simple term
"homomorphism" for what is here called a faithful homomorphism. (This usage stems from
Scott and Suppes, 1958, and is followed by Suppes and Zinnes, 1963; Pfanzagl, 1971;
Krantz et al., 1971; Roberts, 1979.) I consider this usage to be undesirable. First, it conflicts
with the prior usage in algebra and model theory, according to which condition (H) alone
defines a homomorphism. Second and more important, it tends to conceal the presence of
two separate conditions having unequal importance. The representational capacity of a
function f in the intuitive sense derives from its being faithful, (i.e., satisfying condition (F))
and is quite independent of whether it is a homomorphism in the ordinary sense, (i.e.,
satisfies condition (H) as well). The latter is merely an additional condition which it is
convenient to impose. To use the term "homomorphism" for functions satisfying (FH)
seems to overrate the importance of condition (H) and underrate that of condition (F).
3 Such examples will be considered at greater length elsewhere, as part of a detailed
analysis within the present framework of the specific types of representational pro-
positions employed in classical mathematical physics.
4 The idea of analyzing representational propositions abstractly in terms of functions p(f)
of representations f in M(A, B) is to be found in Robinson (1963, pp. 35ff). It does not seem
to have had much direct influence in the measurement literature. The present use of
sequences of elements of A defined on an unspecified ordinal number is due to an
anonymous referee, and replaces a clumsier model using functions into A from a set of
'labels' corresponding to the constants aj of the proposition.
5 S(A, B) is not a function of A and B alone. There might be two different types of
representation S(A, B) and S'(A, B) of A in the same set B, which were suitable for
different purposes; cf. examples (a) and (b) of Section 3. Similar remarks apply to the
group G(A, 13) defined below, i.e., S'(A, B) might have its own group G'(A, B).
6 This is not quite true as I have done things here, since S(A, 13) is not precisely defined,
and hence the expression "for all f in S(A, B)" does not have a definite content. In
practice invariance is defined using the formally stronger condition that p(f) = p(g o f)
434 BRENT MUNDY
for all f in M(A, B), which has a definite content. For representational propositions
expressible in finite functional form, a good case can be made that this substitution is
legitimate. These details are omitted here. This whole argument is a retrospective
reconstruction of an argument which Stevens himself did not give explicitly. Stevens
simply states that invariance in the sense of this note is to be regarded as a criterion of
meaningfulness, giving as examples various representational propositions expressed in
functional form.
7 For the views of Klein, cf. Kunle and Fladt (1974). This analogy should not be pushed
too far. Some differences between the theories of Klein and Stevens will be noted in the
next section.
s Yaglom (1979) is a good source on connections between the unstructured represen-
tation views of Klein in geometry, and relativity principles in kinematics. See also Torretti
(1983).
9 The following account is a "rational reconstruction" of the theory of meaningfulness
implicit in the structured representation tradition, with special focus on the justification of
the Stevens theory. Later notes will mention some of the rough edges which are smoothed
off in the main text.
10 The identity of the Stevens invarianee or uniqueness group with the group G(B) does
not seem to have been explicitly stated in the main systematic expositions of the
structured-representation approach to measurement, e.g., Suppes and Zinnes (1963) or
Krantz et al. (1971). The earliest published statement of this identity known to me is Luce
(1979, p. 95).
At least one reason for this seems to be the prevalence of many different (and not
always clearly distinguished) concepts of 'admissible transformation' (AT) in the struc-
tured representation literature. The only common feature of all definitions is that
application of an A T preserves membership in S(A, B) or FH(A, B). Some of the
parameters which may vary are: (a) Does an AT preserve suitability for all f in S(A, B),
or only for a specific f? (b) Is an A T defined as a function on all of the system B, or only
on the range of the one or more [ in S(A, B) for which it is said to be an AT? (c) Does an
A T have to act on elements of S(A, B) by functional composition, i.e., f' = g o f, or may
it be an arbitrary function F(f)= f' on S(A, B)? Ambiguities (a)-(c) were noted by
Roberts and Franke (1976), and are present in the definition of admissible transformation
given in Krantz et al. (1971, p. 12). Ambiguity (a) is also present in the definition given in
Roberts (1979, p. 58).
A further parameter for variation within the structured representation context is: (d)
Are AT's required to preserve some degree of structure on the system B, i.e., to belong
to FFI(B, B) or to I(B, B), or may they be any element of M(B, B)? The standard usage in
the structured representation tradition has been to consider any element of M(B, B) as a
possible AT, whereas in the text I identify the AT's as just the elements of I(B, B). My
reason is simply that only this identification will yield in general the fundamental claim (3)
of the Stevens theory, i.e., that the AT's form a group. Other specifications of the
definitional parameters noted here will not have that feature, and hence will not lead to a
straightforward justification of the Stevens theory, or a simple identification of the
Stevens groups G(A, B). (Note also that the present characterization of AT's as
automorphisms of B is the strictest of the alternatives listed, i.e., an element of I(B, B) is
admissible by any of the definitions in current use. This in itself is a reason for favoring
the present definition, as capturing the core content of the intuitive concept.)
11 Cf. Roberts (1979, pp. 59-60) or Roberts and Franke (1976) for examples of cases in
which uniqueness conditions are not satisfied. It should be noted here that the concept of
uniqueness suffers from the same confusions and ambiguities within the structured
representation literature as does the concept of admissible transformation (cf. preceding
note), since the uniqueness condition is generally understood simply to assert that any two
representations f and f ' are related by an admissible transformation, where 'admissible
transformation' may be understood in any of the ways mentioned in the previous note.
(For example, Roberts' concept of a regular representation (Roberts, 1979, p. 59) ex-
presses the uniqueness condition for Roberts' concept of an A T , which is weaker than
that used here.) (4*) expresses the uniqueness condition for the strong concept of A T
presented here as an explication of Stevens. Since an A T in the present sense is an A T in
all of the other current senses, (4*) implies the uniqueness condition for any of the other
senses of A T . References in the text to various lines of 'justification of (4")' can in general
be understood as referring to justification of the uniqueness condition relative to some
notion of admissible transformation, not necessarily the present strong one. When I say
that (4*) has not been justified hitherto I actually intend the stronger claim that imposition
of the uniqueness condition has not been justified for any of the concepts of A T in
current use, let alone the strong one proposed here. I concentrate on (4*) in the text
because that is what I have claimed to be the form of uniqueness actually postulated by
Stevens, and what I here attempt to justify.
12 The confrontation between the representational viewpoint advocated here and
standard practices concerning space-time coordinates must be left for another paper.
13 'The' theory of the system B is of course many different theories in the formal sense,
depending upon what logical apparatus is employed, e.g., the first-order theory of B is
different from the set-theoretical theory of B. Here I mean any theoi'y of the structure B,
i.e., the totality of all mathematical facts about B expressible in any mathematical theory
which applies to it.
14 The referee has questioned this point, suggesting the more stringent condition that
only finitary B propositions (i.e., ones for which the sequence k contains only a finite
number of terms) count as legitimate candidates for application to empirical systems.
While such a restriction may be appropriate for some future finitist and operationist
reconstruction of quantitative methods, existing practice seems clearly to allow for the
employment of as much of the theory of the numerical system B as may be wanted.
Concrete examples of image propositions involving infinitary B propositions are fur-
nished by the manifold applications of the calculus to empirical scale values. For example,
to assert of any empirical quantity depending on time that the scale values satisfy a
particular differential equation (e.g., exponential growth or decay) during some interval
of time is a statement about infinitely many values of the scale for infinitely many
instances of the empirical quantity which it represents. Such an assertion is formalizable
within the present framework only by means of an infinitary image proposition.
~5 This simple semantic proof suggested by an anonymous referee replaces a much longer
syntactic proof in which the structural proposition sB was defined explicitly in an infinitary
K K language.
436 B R E N T MUNDY
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Dept. of Philosophy
University of Oklahoma
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On The General Theory of Meaninful Representation

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On The General Theory of Meaninful Representation

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B R E N T MUNDY

ON THE GENERAL THEORY OF MEANINGFUL

ABSTRACT. The numerical representations of measurement, geometry and kinematics

T h e r e is an i n t u i t i v e sense in w h i c h m e a s u r e m e n t i n v o l v e s the use of

Synthese 67 (1986) 391-437.

may ultimately play a role in epistemology and philosophy of science

(F) R ~ ( f ( a l ) , . . . f(a,))--~ RA(aa . . . . a,).

A function f satisfying (F) will be called faithful.

R A of the system A and all relations R~ of the system B,

place of relational systems, all that is necessary is to formulate ap-

3. EXAMPLES OF FORMAL REPRESENTATION

I will now briefly present some examples of formal representation in the

relations of the elements of the set A. However, it is not explicitly

be playing a role in the representation process. Given a function from

faithful homomorphism into the chosen numerical system B, i.e.,

f in FH(A, Brat) allows one to employ numerical representation of the

The purpose of formal representation is to express information about

Such statements purport to express information about the objects

length of the sequence is indicated syntactically by the number of

mathematical property (e.g., the mean or standard deviation) of those

5. MEANINGFULNESS FOR UNSTRUCTURED

The problem of meaningfulness for representational propositions arises

though it is typically attacked differently in the two cases. In this section I

terms of the associated group G(A, B) of admissible transformations.

Thus, for Stevens, invariance of a representational proposition p(f)

tational propositions p(f) which is precisely analogous to the Stevens

based on invariance under the transformations of a group G(A, B)

6. MEANINGFULNESS FOR STRUCTURED

The Stevens theory is based on unstructured representation. The

the first place, one obtains an explanation of the presence of an

substantially improved upon the Stevens theory of meaningfulness,

violate (4*)? Surely we do not wish to reject this possibility a priori.

7. INDUCED PROPOSITIONS AND CONTENT

I will focus first on proposition (2*). To justify (2*), it will obviously be

proposition q will be said to induce the A B proposition p if q(A, k, f) =

q(A, k, f) induced by application of q to A using some scale f may be

all f in S(A, B).

(iii) Sq+(A)= 1 iff S(A, B) is nonempty and q(A, f) = 1 for all f

corresponding to Stevens' (2) and the structured representation (2*):

In this section I will outline the structure of a family of formal languages

numerical representational propositions are expressible in some K K

(4) If (zi) is a sequence of distinct variables ( X - v a r i a b l e s or

v # = ( k # , f), where the domain of definition of k # includes

Let B be a fixed system of type K, and kB a fixed function from the

over elements of the empirical system X, the Y-variables and constants

I pass now to the justification of the uniqueness requirement (4*), in the

only be justified on the basis of conditions on representation going

T H E O R E M 1. Let B, X, and X' be systems of type K, g be an

T H E O R E M 2. Let (B, kB) be a K B interpretation of LKK, and let S be

10. IMAGE PROPOSITIONS

We are now in a position to approach the problem of justifying the

T h e s e quotations illustrate the widely a c c e p t e d view that the main

of an application of a mathematical theory to an empirical system A by

called a structural image proposition. It is obvious that structural image

(5) Every structural image proposition is meaningful.

This requirement seems inescapable, given the separate intuitive

T H E O R E M 3. Let A and B be systems of type K. If every structural

T H E O R E M 4. Let A and B be systems of type K, with S(A, B) not

The intuitive idea behind the proof of theorem 3 is very simple. If

In conclusion, the constructive part of this paper has offered a

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