ADMIN LAW ANNY

1. PCGG VS. JUDGE PEÑA

159 SCRA 556

 Nature of quasi-judicial function

 A body exercising quasi-judicial function is co-equal with the RTC
 Rationale for prohibition on split jurisdiction
 The rule on prior exhaustion of administrative remedies

FACTS:
This is a case about the Presidential Commission on Good Government, created through E.O. 1,
charging it with the task of assisting the President in regard to the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated
by the Marcoses, including the power to issue freeze orders or sequestration of all business enterprises owned
by them upon showing of a prima facie case.

March 25, 1986 –

PCGG issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of two export garment
manufacturing firms: American Inter-fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation.

June 27, 1986 –

PCGG designated the OIC, Saludo, and Yeung Chun Ho as authorized signatories to effect deposits
and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations.

Sept. 4, 1986 –
PCGG designated Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory, in the absence of Yeung Chun Ho and Marcelo de
Guzman, in the absence of Saludo.

Feb. 3, 1987-
Saludo, in a memorandum, revoked the authorizations previously issued upon finding that Mr. Yim Kam
Shing was a Hong Kong Chinese national staying in the country on a mere tourist visa. The PCGG
Commissioner approved the memorandum. Shortly, thereafter, Saludo withdrew funds from Metrobank against
the accounts of the two corporations for payment of the salaries of the stuff.

Yeung Chung Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan instituted through Yim Kam Shing an action for
damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the said bank, PCGG, the Commissioner and
OIC Saludo with the RTC, questiong the aforesaid revocation of the authorization as signatory previously
granted to Yim Kam Shing. RTC issued TRO.

PCGG filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to Yim’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the
ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over the subject of the case. RTC judge
denied PCGG’s motion to dismiss and granted Yim’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the PCGG.

HELD:
NO.

The Supreme Court held that RTC and the CA for that matter have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the
exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Art. XVIII, sec. 26 of the Constitution and
therefore may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission.
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Under section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the
Commission regarding "the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by
Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates,
Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees" whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the
"exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related
to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject
to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.

POWERS OF THE PCGG

E.O. 1 created PCGG, charging it to assist the President in the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by
the Marcoses, including sequestration and provisional takeover of all business enterprises owned by them as
well as conduct investigations, require submission of evidence by subpoena, administer oaths, punish for
contempt.

Freedom Constitution (Proc. No. 3) mandated the President to “…recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the
leaders and supporters of the previous regime….”

QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION

As can be readily seen, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the
Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and “co-equal bodies have no power to control the
other.” However, although under B.P. 129, the CA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgment…of regional trial courts and quasi-judicial bodies, E.O. 14 specifically provides in section 2 that "The
Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the
Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to
question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court,
the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions
and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court.

PROHIBITION AGAINST SPLIT JURISDICTION

The law and the courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of actions. To paraphrase the
leading case of Rheem of the Phil., Inc. vs. Ferrer, et al.: to draw a tenuous jurisdiction line is to undermine
stability in litigations. A piecemeal resort to one court and another gives rise to multiplicity of suits. To force the
parties to shuttle from one court to another to secure full determination of their suit is a situation gravely
prejudicial to the administration of justice. The time lost, the effort wasted, the anxiety augmented, additional
expenses incurred, the irreparable injury to the public interest – are considerations which weigh heavily against
split jurisdiction.

In addition, the case against PCGG and its Commissioner is clearly barred by the immunity provision of E.O. 1,
as buttressed by section 4(b) thereof which further provides that: “No member or staff of the Commission shall
be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.”

Executive Order No. 1 thus effectively withholds jurisdiction over cases against the Commission from all lower
courts, including the Court of Appeals, except the Sandiganbayan in whom is vested original and exclusive
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jurisdiction and this Court. Early on, in special civil actions questioning challenged acts of the Commission, its
submittal that the cited Executive Order bars such actions in this Court was given short shrift because this
Court, as the third great department of government vested with the judicial power and as the guardian of the
Constitution, cannot be deprived of its certiorari jurisdiction to pass upon and determine alleged violations of
the citizens' constitutional and legal rights under the Rule of Law.

PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION

AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The Court recently had occasion to stress once more, in G.R. No. 82218, Reyes vs. Caneba March 17, 1988,
that "(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative
remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. Acts of an administrative agency
must not casually be overturned by a court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of
the administrative agency acting within the perimeters of its own competence."

Applying these fundamental doctrines to the case at bar, the questions and disputes raised by
respondents seeking to controvert the Commission's finding of prima facie basis for the issuance of its
sequestration orders as well as the interjection of the claims of the predecessor of American Inter-fashion and
De Soleil Corporations, viz. Glorious Sun Phil., headed by Nemesis Co are all questions that are within the
primary administrative jurisdiction of the Commission that cannot be prematurely brought up to clog the court
dockets without first resorting to the exhaustion of the prescribed administrative remedies. The administrative
procedure and remedies for contesting orders of sequestration issued by the Commission are provided for in
its rules and regulations. Thus, the person against whom a writ of sequestration is directed may request the
lifting thereof, in writing; after due hearing or motu proprio for good cause shown, the Commission may lift the
writ unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may deem necessary, taking into consideration the
evidence and the circumstances of the case. The resolution of the Commission is appealable to the President
of the Philippines. The Commission conducts a hearing, after due notice to the parties concerned to ascertain
whether any particular asset, property or enterprise constitutes ill-gotten wealth. The Commission's order of
sequestration is not final, at the proper time, the question of ownership of the sequestered properties shall be
exclusively determined in the Sandiganbayan, whose own decisions in turn are subject to review exclusively by
the Supreme Court

It should be emphasized here, as again stressed by the Court in the recent case of Republic, et al. vs.
De los Angeles, et al., G.R. No. L-30240, March 25, 1988, that "it is well-recognized principle that purely
administrative and discretionary function may not be interfered with by the courts. In general, courts have no
supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of government. This is
generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. There
should be no thought of disregarding the traditional line separating judicial and administrative competence, the
former being entrusted with the determination of legal questions and the latter being limited as a result of its
expertise to the ascertainment of the decisive facts." This is specially true in sequestration cases affected by
the Commission for the recovery of the nation' s plundered wealth that may affect the nation's very survival, in
the light of the constitutional mandate that such sequestration or freeze orders "shall be issued only upon
showing of a prima facie case" and the settled principle that findings by administrative or quasi-judicial
agencies like the Commission are entitled to the greatest respect and are practically binding and conclusive,
like the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts, save where they are patently arbitrary or capricious or
are not supported by substantial evidence.

2. UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS. CA

313 SCRA 404
FACTS:
Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in
Anthropology of theUniversity of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP). After
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completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, she worked on her dissertation entitled,
"Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines." However, after going over her dissertation, the
assistant Dean informed the CSSP Dean Paz that there were portions in Celine’s dissertation that was lifted
from various published works without proper acknowledgment. Nonetheless, Celine was allowed to defend her
dissertation and was able to have a passing mark. Dean Paz in a letter, then requested the Vice Chancellor for
Academic Affairs, to exclude Celine from the list of candidates for graduation, pending clarification of the
problems regarding the latter’s dissertation. Apparently, the letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time
and Celine was able to graduate.

Subsequently, the assistant dean formally charged Celine with plagiarism and recommended that the
doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Various ad hoc committees were then formed to investigate the
plagiarism charge against Celine. In a letter, Dean Paz informed Celine of the charges against her and in a
subsequent letter; Celine was summoned to a meeting and was asked to submit her written explanation to the
charges against her. During the meeting, Celine was informed of the charges against her and was provided a
copy of the findings of the investigating committee. Celine on the other hand submitted her written explanation
in a letter. Subsequently, the investigating committees submitted their report with the same conclusion, - that
there was indeed an overwhelming proof of massive lifting and even admission on the part of Ms. Celine that
she plagiarized, and so the Committee recommended the withdrawal of the doctoral degree of Ms. Celine.

On the basis of such report, a letter was sent to Celine informing her of the withdrawal of her Ph.D
degree. Celine then raised the matter to the Trial Court which dismissed the same. Upon appeal however, the
CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court on the basis that Celine was denied due process. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:
1. WON Celine was denied of Due Process. (#84 Due Process in Administrative Proceedings)
2. WON the UP Board of Regents has the authority to withdraw the Ph.D already conferred. (#25 Quasi –
Judicial Power)

HELD 1:
NO. The court held that it cannot be said that Celine was denied of Due Process.

FIRST, from the facts of the case it is clear that various committees had been formed to investigate the
charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in
her defense and consequently all investigations resulted in a finding that Celine committed dishonesty in
submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree. In
administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a
controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.27 A party who has availed
of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.28 In this
case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her29 and afforded opportunities to
refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she was able to do30 Private respondent
then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition,
she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.

SECOND., it is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience
before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in the courts of justice. And Third, Celine cannot contend that she was entitled to be furnished
a copy of the report of the Zafaralla committee as part of her right to due process. In Ateneo de Manila
University v. Capulong,34 we held: Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not
accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners'
February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such
opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases
involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding
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conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a
judicial proceeding. . .

In sum:
1. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain
one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of;

2. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to
those in the courts of justice; and
3. Due Process in disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to
cross examination.

HELD 2:
YES. The UP Board of Regents has the authority to withdraw the conferment of a degree founded on
fraud.

Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the
Philippines.38 It has the power confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council.39 If follows
that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered,
subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating a student's rights.
An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is
not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a university's highest academic
degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic
excellence is the university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to
protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.

3. HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO VS. CHR

204 SCRA 483
PRINCIPLES:
(1) The grant of investigatory power does not imply the grant of judicial or quasi-judicial power.

(2) Matters relating to discipline of teachers are under the original Jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, and may be appealed to the Civil Service Commission, and lastly to the Supreme Court

(Note: Under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, appeals from the Civil Service Commission must
first go through the Court of Appeals).

FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they
described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure
of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention.
The teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education (Hon.
Isidro Cariño) to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements.
Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the
days that followed.

For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were
administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges.
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They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" (the Civil
Service Decree) and temporarily replaced.

The MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner
Secretary Cariño, which was dismissed. Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court on certiorari, in an
attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the alleged violation of the striking teachers’ right to due process
and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. After their petitions were denied, respondent
teachers thereafter submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human
Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.
The Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño
requiring his attendance therein. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of
complainants' evidence.

The Commission on Human Rights had earlier made clear its position that it does not feel bound by the
Supreme Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, making plain its intention to hear and resolve
the case on the merits. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: Where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government
agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudication, may the Commission on Human Rights take
cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?

HELD:
NO.

The CHR has no such power. It was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-
judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The CHR may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function the Commission
does not have.

It cannot try and decide cases as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is
not to adjudicate or adjudge.

"Investigate," means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is
the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the
law to the facts established by the inquiry.

"Adjudicate," means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle, to settle finally
(the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on:
settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or
quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot
and should not "try and resolve on the merits" the matters involved. These are matters undoubtedly and
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clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the Secretary of Education had already taken
cognizance of the issues and resolved them, and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the
aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon
said issues. The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no
business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service
Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its
own judgment on the questions involved.

Reversal can only be done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by the Supreme Court. The only
thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the
appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. It
cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Petition GRANTED; CHR Order ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent CHR and the Chairman and
Members thereof PROHIBITED from hearing and resolving the case (Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-
775) on the merits.

4. EASTERN TELECOM VS. INT'L COMMUNICATION CORP.

435 SCRA 55

FACTS:
International Communication Corporation, now known as Bayan Telecommunications Corporation or
Bayantel, applied for and was given by the NTC a Provisional Authority (PA) on March 3, 1995, to install,
operate and provide local exchange service in Quezon City, Malabon and Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
entire Bicol region. Meanwhile, Telecommunications Technologies Philippines, Inc. (TTPI), as an affiliate of
petitioner Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), was granted by the NTC a PA on September
25, 1996, to install, operate and maintain a local exchange service in the Provinces of Batanes, Cagayan
Valley, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, Nueva Vizcaya, Ifugao, Quirino, the cities of Manila and Caloocan, and the
Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila. It appears, however, that before TTPI was able to fully accomplish its
rollout obligation, International Communication Corporation (ICC) applied for and was given a PA by the NTC
on November 10, 1997, to install, operate and maintain a local exchange service in Manila and Navotas, two
areas which were already covered by TTPI under its PA dated September 25, 1996.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals with application for a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, arguing that the NTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting a provisional authority to respondent ICC to operate in areas already assigned to TTPI.

On April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review on the ground that the NTC
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting the PA to TTPI. It sustained the NTCs finding that ICC
is legally and financially competent and its network plan technically feasible. The Court of Appeals also ruled
that there was no violation of the equal protection clause because the PA granted to ICC and TTPI were given
under different situations and there is no point of comparison between the two.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed a serious error of law in upholding the Order of the NTC granting a
Provisional Authority to International Communication Corporation.

HELD:
NO.
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The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Court of Appeals in sustaining the NTCs
grant of provisional authority to ICC.

The power of the NTC to grant a provisional authority has long been settled. As the regulatory agency
of the national government with jurisdiction over all telecommunications entities, it is clothed with authority and
given ample discretion to grant a provisional permit or authority. It also has the authority to issue Certificates of
Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for the installation, operation, and maintenance of communications
facilities and services, radio communications systems, telephone and telegraph systems, including the
authority to determine the areas of operations of applicants for telecommunications services. In this regard, the
NTC is clothed with sufficient discretion to act on matters solely within its competence.

In granting ICC the PA to operate a local exchange carrier service in the Manila and Navotas areas, the
NTC took into consideration ICCs financial and technical resources and found them to be adequate. The NTC
also noted ICCs performance in complying with its rollout obligations under the previous PA granted to it.

The Court will not interfere with these findings of the NTC, as these are matters that are addressed to
its sound discretion, being the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its
special and technical forte. Moreover, the exercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter
that can best be discharged by the government agency concerned, and not by the courts.

5. MONTEMAYOR VS. BUNDALIAN

405 SCRA 264

FACTS:
Private respondent (Luis Bundalian) accused petitioner (Edillo Montemayor), of accumulating
unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019, that results to his dismissal as Regional
Director of the Department of Public Works and Highway. Petitioner explained that in view of the unstable
condition of the government service in 1991, his wife inquired from her family in the US about their emigration.
After the investigation, the PCAGC concluded that petitioner’s acquisition of the subject property was
manifestly out of proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired.
That it recommended petitioners dismissal from service.

Petitioner on the other hand pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases
filed before the Ombudsman which was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The PCAGC after conducting
its own investigation found that the complaint has basis and the Office of the president in turn concurred with
the PCAGC finding and ordered petitioner’s dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not he was denied of due process in the investigation before the PCAGC.
2. Whether or not the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the
administrative case before the PCAGC moot and academic.

HELD1:
NO.

We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the
opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the
parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are
sufficiently met. 6In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the proceedings
but his Philippine residence could not be located.7 Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that he was
deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly
represented by counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings,
moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the President and eventually filed his
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appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in every step of the investigation effectively
removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He
cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation.

HELD 2:
NO.

The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this
review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasijudicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers.15 Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for
the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised
Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the
PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC’s
investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the
case at bar. Hence, the petitioner’s dismissal was just proper after it was established that he acquired
properties whose value is disproportionate to his income in the government service.

6. PASCUAL VS. BELTRAN

505 SCRA 545

FACTS:
Raymundo was charged with Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Services/Gross
Insubordination/Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations. The DOTC exonerated Raymundo of
the charges.

Raymundo filed an action for damages arising from Malicious Administrative suit against Pascual,
primarily on the basis of the administrative complaint against her. During the trial, Pascual was represented by
the OSG. Raymundo filed a motion to disqualify the OSG since no right or interest of the government is
involved and that petitioner is sued in his private capacity.

The trial court granted the motion of Raymundo stating that Pascual is being sued for acts which he
committed in his official capacity but the cause of action is for torts, for which he may be held personally
answerable. It is a suit for damages, the interest of the government is in no way involved so that the
appearance of the SG is unjustified.

ISSUE: WON OSG has authority to represent Pascual in a civil suit for damages.

HELD:
NO. The OSG has no authority to represent Pascual in a civil suit for damages.

The law allows a public official to be represented by the OSG in all civil, criminal and special
proceedings, when such proceedings arise from the former’s acts in his official capacity. In this case, petitioner
was actually sued in his personal capacity. The complaint filed by Raymundo merely identified petitioner as
Director of Telecommunications Office, but did not categorically state he was being sued in his official capacity.
The reliefs sought by Raymundo are directed against Pascual personally and not his office. Raymundo is
claiming directly from Pascual. Thus, the OSG has no authority to represent him in such civil suit for damages.

1. Damages and its amount must be proved

Every judgment for damages, whether arising from a breach of contract or whether the result of some
provision of law, must rest upon satisfactory proof of the existence in reality of the damages alleged to have
been suffered. (Rubiso vs. Rivera 41 Phil. 39)
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Except in those cases where the law authorizes the imposition of punitive or exemplary damages, a
party claiming damages must establish by competent evidence the amount of such damages and courts
cannot give judgment for a greater amount than that actually prove. (Ventanilla vs. Centeno)

2. Only proximate, not remote, damages are recoverable.

Proximate damages – said to be such as are the ordinary and natural result of the omission or
commission of acts of negligence, and such are usual and might have been reasonably expected or
contemplated.
Remote Damages – the unusual unexpected result not reasonably to be anticipated from an accidental
or unusual combination of circumstances-a result beyond and over which the negligent party has no control.
In order to maintain an action for damages for injuries claimed to have been caused by a negligent or
other tortuous or wrongful act or omission, it should be made to appear that such act or omission was the
proximate cause of the injuries complained of.
The damages the plaintiff is entitled to recover in a civil action for damages are, in the absence of any
statutory modification of the rule, such only as are the natural and probable consequences of the wrongful act
or breach of contract. Those which naturally and proximately flow from the original wrongful act.

TEST: whether the facts shown constitute a continuous succession of events so linked together as to
make a natural whole or whether there was a new and independent cause intervening between the wrong and
the injury.

4. Speculative damages NOT recoverable

Alleged injuries or losses that are uncertain or contingent

cannot be used as a basis of recovery for TORT or contract actions.

An individual cannot be compensated for mere speculative probability of future loss unless he can
prove that such negative consequences can reasonably be expected to occur. The amount of damages sought
in a lawsuit need not be established with absolute certainty provided they are anticipated with reasonable
certainty.

Thus, in an action of ejectment, damages claimed by plaintiff on the basis of interest that could have
been realized had the lands been converted into a subdivision and sold were too speculative to sustain an
award, in the absence of evidence that the lands could have been sold at the price claimed and the purchase
money collected.(M.M. Tuason & co. vs. De Guzman)

7. HLC CONSTRUCTION VS. EHSHA

411 SCRA 504

FACTS:
Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association (EHSHA) and 150 individual members filed a civil
action for breach of contract, damages and attorney’s fees with the Regional Trial Court against the developers
of Emily Homes Subdivision for allegedly using substandard materials in the construction of their houses and
for not adhering to the house plan specifications.

Respondents asked petitioners to repair their defective housing units but petitioners failed to do
so. Respondents had to repair their defective housing units using their own funds. Hence, they prayed for
actual and moral damages arising from petitioner’s breach of the contract plus exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, claiming that it was the HLURB and not the trial
court which had jurisdiction over the case, that the defective certification on non-forum shopping which was
signed only by the president of EHSHA and not by all its members warrants the dismissal of the complaint.
 ADMIN LAW ANNY

ISSUE:
1. WON the HLURB and not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case.
2.

HELD 1:
YES.

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

The HLURB is the government agency empowered to regulate the real estate trade and business,
having exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:

(a) unsound real estate business practices;

(b) claims involving refunds and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

In this case, respondents’ complaint was for the reimbursement of expenses incurred in repairing their
defective housing units constructed by petitioners. Clearly, the HLURB had jurisdiction to hear it.

HELD 2:
NO.

FORUM SHOPPING

The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a
case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the rules
on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective - It does
not thereby prohibit substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.

Respondents EHSHA et.al. filed the complaint against petitioners as a group, represented by their
homeowners’ association president Mr. Samaon M. Buat. Respondents raised one cause of action which was
the breach of contractual obligations and payment of damages. They shared a common interest in the subject
matter of the case, being the aggrieved residents of the poorly constructed and developed Emily Homes
Subdivision. Due to the collective nature of the case, there was no doubt that Mr. Samaon M. Buat could
validly sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of all his co-plaintiffs.

In cases therefore where it is highly impractical to require all the plaintiffs to sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping, it is sufficient, in order not to defeat the ends of justice, for one of plaintiffs, acting as
representative, to sign the certificate provided that, as in Cavile et al., the plaintiffs share a common interest in
the subject matter of the case or filed the case as a “collective,” raising only one common cause of action or
defense. Finally, though there was no forum shopping in this case, the trial court should have nonetheless
dismissed the complaint for a more important reason – it had no jurisdiction over it. It is the HLURB, not the
trial court, which had jurisdiction over respondents’ complaint.
8. OMBUDSMAN VS. VALERA
471 SCRA 719
 ADMIN LAW ANNY

NATURE:
Petition for review on certiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman and Villa Ignacio, in his capacity as the
special prosecutor, seeking the reversal of the CA decision setting aside the Preventive suspension order
issued by VillaIgnacio against respondent Atty. Gil A. Valera.

FACTS:
Respondent Valera was appointed Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs in charge of the
Revenue Collection Monitoring Group. The office of Ombudsman received a Sowrn complaint filed by the
Director of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) and Atty. Adolfo Casareño
against respondent Valera for entering into a compromise agreement with Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp. in
Civil Case No. 01-102504 to the prejudice of the government. Petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio the
Issued a Preventive suspension order against Atty. Valera, VillaIgnacio likewise denied Valera’s motion for
reconsideration. Even before his motion for reconsideration was acted upon, however, respondent Valera
already filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition as he sought to nullify
the Order of preventive suspension issued by petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio. The appellate court
then rendered the assailed Decision setting aside the Order of preventive suspension and directing petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to desist from taking any further action. Hence this petition.

Private respondent’s petition filed before the court a quo should have been dismissed for violation of
the rule on forum shopping.

ISSUE: WON there was Forum Shopping in this case.

HELD:
YES.

Respondent Valera’s alleged non-compliance with the rule on non-forum shopping when he filed the
petition for certiorari with the appellate court, the appellate court correctly overlooked this procedural lapse. In
this case, it was ruled that petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio had no authority to issue a preventive
suspension order. Hence, the appellate court’s decision in relaxing the rule requiring the certification on non-
forum shopping is justified.

9. VELASQUEZ VS. HERNANDEZ

437 SCRA 358

FACTS:
Petitioner Tomas G. Velasquez received a letter informing him of the alleged infractions committed by
respondent, Helen B. Hernandez, such as soliciting, accepting, and receiving sums of money, in exchange for
transfer or promotion of complainant teachers. Acting on the letter, petitioner Velasquez convened a fact-
finding committee to determine the veracity of the alleged violations of respondent and to render a formal
report and recommendation.

The committee after due investigation recommended the filing of administrative and criminal complaints
against respondent. A formal charge for Grave Misconduct, Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, Abuse of Authority, and Violation of Section 22 (k) Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O.
292 and other related laws was filed against respondent.

Meanwhile, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Abra issued a Resolution entitled, “People of the
Philippines v. Helen Hernandez, et.al.” This Resolution, arose from the sworn complaints filed by the
complaining teachers, indicting respondent and a certain Luzviminda de la Cruz for violation of Section 3(b),
Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Respondent and dela
 ADMIN LAW ANNY

Cruz were charged with direct bribery. However, upon motion filed by respondent and her co-accused, the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman ordered the withdrawal of Informations for direct bribery filed against
respondent and de la Cruz.

After due proceedings, the CSC issued a Resolution finding respondent guilty of the charges against
her and ordering her dismissal from the service. The appellate court however reversed the decision of the CSC
saying that though the cause of action in the CSC and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman are distinct;
nevertheless, it said that in order to obviate the risk of violating the rule, petitioners should have attached the
certification against non-forum shopping.

ISSUE: WON the formal charge filed in the CSC should contain a certificate against Forum Shopping?

HELD:
NO.

Forum shopping consists of filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It may also
consist in a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking another and
possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari. The most
important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused the courts and parties-
litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs. A party, however, cannot be said to have sought to improve his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision or action where no unfavorable decision has ever been rendered against him in
any of the cases he has brought before the courts.

In not a few cases, this Court has laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping as where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other. Stated differently, there must be between the two cases
(a) identity of parties;
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) that the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

It is significant to note that the action filed before the CSCCAR is administrative in nature, dealing as it
does with the proper administrative liability, if any, which may have been incurred by respondent for the
commission of the acts complained of. In stark contrast, the case filed before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, which incidentally was not initiated by herein petitioners but by the complainant
teachers, deals with the criminal accountability of the respondent for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Unmistakably, the rule on forum shopping would find no proper application since the two cases
although based on the same essential facts and circumstances do not raise identical causes of action and
issues. It would, therefore, be absurd to require the certification of forum shopping to be attached to the formal
charge filed before the CSC, for the evil sought to be curbed by the proscription against forum shopping is
simply not extant in the instant case.
 ADMIN LAW ANNY

10. PPSTA VS. HEIRS OF ILAGAN, ET AL.

497 SCRA 817

FACTS:
Carolina P. Iligan was a bona fidemember of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association
(PPSTA). She started as a "substitute teacher." She was a member of PPSTA's Mutual Assistance System
(MAS), a death benefit program whereby a member pays a fixed contribution and upon his or her death, the
heirs are paid a fixed amount. She was also a member of the Mutual Retirement Benefit System (MRBS), a
retirement plan wherein a member pays a monthly premium of P4.00 and upon retirement would receive the
benefit corresponding to the number of years paid for. Carolina was issued the respective certificates of
membership, and the premium contributions for the two policies were automatically deducted from her monthly
salary. She died at the hospital on October 2, 2001.

Carolina's heirs, Joselito Iligan, Joy Iligan, and Irene P. Iligan, demanded that PPSTA pay them the
P100,000.00 death benefit due to them as her heirs. PPSTA offered to remit only 50% of Carolina's total
contributions, considering that, for failure to pay the monthly premiums, her policies had already lapsed as of
November 2000, after the 90-day grace period provided under the Rules and Regulations of the MAS and the
MRBS.

On April 11, 2002, the said Heirs filed a complaint for specific performance and sum of money before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, naming PPSTA, its Acting General Manager and
President Ramon G. Asuncion, Jr., and Accounting Section Chief Editha Tamuyao, as defendants.

MTC RULING:
MTC rendered judgment in favor of defendants.

The MTC ruled that Carolina's heirs failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove their claim. Based
on the evidence on record, Carolina knew of the MAS and MRBS rules and regulations regarding premium
payments.

Carolina's heirs appealed the decision to the RTC.

RTC RULING:
RTC reversed the ruling of the MTC finding that Carolina was not given a copy of the PPSTA's rules
and regulations for its MAS and MRBS programs, or notified of her delinquency in remitting her premium
contributions

Aggrieved, the PPSTA filed a petition for review with the CA.

Petitioner Editha Tamuyao executed the requisite verification and certification of non-forum shopping in
her behalf, while petitioners Ramon G. Asuncion, Jr. executed the requisite verification and certification of non-
forum shopping in his behalf and in behalf of petitioner PPSTA, alleging therein that he is petitioner PPSTA's
corporate secretary and that he had caused the preparation and filing of the petition for review. However,
petitioners failed to incorporate or append in their petition a copy of the resolution of the Board of Directors of
petitioner PPSTA, authorizing petitioner Asuncion to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in its behalf.

CA RULING:
On June 8, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition for being "defective in substance," there being no proof
that Asuncion had been duly authorized by petitioner PPSTA to execute and file a certification of non-forum
shopping in its behalf.
 ADMIN LAW ANNY

ISSUE: WON Asuncion as the former Acting General Manager had the authority to sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping.

HELD:
NO.

Under Section 3 [13] of Rule 42, failure to comply shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition. The rule on certification against forum shopping is intended to prevent the actual filing of multiple
petitions/complaints involving identical causes of action, subject matter and issues in other tribunals or
agencies as a form of forum shopping. This is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant should not be allowed
to pursue simultaneous remedies in different forums, as this practice is detrimental to orderly judicial
procedure.[14]Although not jurisdictional, the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping is
mandatory. The rule requires that a certification against forum shopping should be appended to or incorporated
in the initiatory pleading filed before the court. The rule also requires that the party, not counsel, must certify
under oath that he has not commenced any other action involving the same issue in the court or any other
tribunal or agency.

The requirement that the certification of non-forum shopping should be executed and signed by the
plaintiff or principal means that counsel cannot sign said certification unless clothed with special authority to do
so. The reason for this is that the plaintiff or principal knows better than anyone else whether a petition has
previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same issues. Hence, a certification signed by
counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition. In the case of natural
persons, the Rule requires the parties themselves to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping. However, in
the case of the corporations, the physical act of signing may be performed, on behalf of the corporate
entity, only by specifically authorized individuals for the simple reason that corporations, as artificial persons,
cannot personally do the task themselves. It cannot be gainsaid that obedience to the requirements of
procedural rules is needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly
be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

We agree with respondents' contention that when they filed their complaint in the MTC, they impleaded
petitioner Asuncion as party-defendant in his capacity as the Acting General Manager of petitioner PPSTA. As
such officer, he was authorized to sign a verification and certification of non-forum shopping. However, he was
no longer the Acting General Manager when petitioners filed their petition in the CA, where he was in fact
referred to as "the former Acting General Manager." Thus, at the time the petition was filed before the CA,
petitioner Asuncion's authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping for and in behalf
of petitioner PPSTA ceased to exist. There was a need for the board of directors of petitioner PPSTA to
authorize him to sign the requisite certification of non-forum shopping, and to append the same to their petition
as Annex thereof.

We have reviewed the records, however, and find that a strict application of Rule 42, in relation to
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court is not called for. As we held in Huntington Steel Products, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission, while the requirement of strict compliance underscores the
mandatory nature of the rule, it does not necessarily interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under
justifiable circumstances. The rule should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective which is the goal of all rules of procedure, that is, to achieve justice as
expeditiously as possible. A liberal application of the rule may be justified where special circumstances or
compelling reasons are present.

Technical rules of procedure should be rules enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.
The liberality in the application of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard
of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration of justice. Indeed, it cannot be gainsaid that
regulations of petitioner PPSTA and its MAS and MRBS programs. Compassion for the beneficiaries of those
 ADMIN LAW ANNY

who are not entitled to the benefits ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust funds to which
thousands of members and their families look to for benefits. If these benefits are given to beneficiaries who
are not after all entitled thereto, the trust funds stand to be depleted.

11) PHIL. BANK OF COMMUNICATION VS. CIR

302 SCRA 241

FACTS:
Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a commercial banking corporation duly
organized under Philippine laws, filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first and second quarters of 1985,
reported profits, and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00 by applying PBCom's tax credit memos for
P3,401,701.00 and P1,615,253.00, respectively. Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered net loss of
P25,317,228.00, thereby showing no income tax liability in its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended
December 31, 1985. For the succeeding year, ending December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported a
net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year.

But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from leased properties. The lessees withheld
and remitted to the BIR withholding creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in 1986. On
August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of
P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985.

Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their
lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69.

Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner instituted a
Petition for Review on November 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The petition was docketed
as CTA Case No. 4309 entitled: "Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue."

The CTA decided in favor of the BIR on the ground that the Petition was filed out of time as the same
was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period pursuant to Revenue Memorandum Circular 7-85.

ISSUE: WON CIR’s RMC No. 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years, is valid.

HELD:
NO.

After a careful study of the records and applicable jurisprudence on the matter, we find that, contrary to
the petitioners contention, the relaxation of revenue regulations by RMC 7-85 is not warranted as it disregards
the two-year prescriptive period set by law. In the case of People vs. Lim, it was held that rules and regulations
issued by administrative officials to implement a law cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the latter.

When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85, changing the prescriptive period
of two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such circular created a clear
inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law;
rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress.

It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in the
sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to time by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the
executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such
 ADMIN LAW ANNY

interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not
countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the
law they seek to apply and implement.

12) OPLE VS. TORRES

293 SCRA 141
JULY 23, 1998

FACTS:
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System," was issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996.

Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate A.O. No. 308 on several grounds. One of
them is that: The establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System requires a
legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the
legislative powers of congress. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law
and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign
resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.

On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308 was issued within the executive and
administrative powers of the president without encroaching on the legislative powers of congress.

ISSUE: Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate.

HELD:
YES.

Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution has
vested this power in the Congress. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and
comprehensive. Any power deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.

The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power
to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance. As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He
represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees
of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. Corollary to the power
of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of
general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his
control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules
and regulations.

From these precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be
covered by an administrative order.
 ADMIN LAW ANNY

The Administrative Code of 1987 provides:

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated
in administrative orders.

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose
of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The Court rejects the argument that A.O. No.
308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and
incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance and
embodies changes in administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the people.

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of
1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the
extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. As said
administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as
the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of
Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

Petition is granted and A.O. No. 308 is declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

13) REP. VS. MIGRINO

189 SCRA 300

FACTS:
Acting on information received by the New AFP Anti-Graft Board, which indicated the acquisition of
wealth beyond his lawful income, private respondent Ret. Lt.Tecson was required by the Board to submit his
explanation/comment together with his supporting evidence. Private respondent was unable to produce his
supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The
Board proceeded with its investigation and submitted its resolution, recommending that private respondent be
prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended.

The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss the
case on the following grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action
against him under Rep. Act No. 1379 has already prescribed; (3) that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it suspended the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was inapplicable to his case; and (4) that having
retired from the AFP, he was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No. 3019. The Board opposed the motion to
dismiss. The PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Private respondent moved for
reconsideration but was denied by the PCGG. Private respondent was directed to submit his counter-affidavit
and other controverting evidence.

Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the RTC. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the
principal ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of PCGG v. Pena. Private
respondent opposed the motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the opposition.

The court judge denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The respondent judge granted the application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from investigating or prosecuting private
respondent under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing of a bond in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos. Petitioner strongly argues that the private respondent’s case falls within the jurisdiction of the PCGG.
Hence, this petition.
 ADMIN LAW ANNY

ISSUES: WON PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private respondent

HELD:
NO. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman, creating the Board and authorizing it to
investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service,
to support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private respondent

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, the term “subordinate” as used
in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos
and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the
close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2. Clearly, this alleged unlawful
accumulation of wealth is not that contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

14) LUPANGCO VS. CA

160 SCRA 848

FACTS:
Oct 6, 1986, (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 "Additional Instructions to Examines," to all who will take
the licensure examinations in accountancy.

“No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall
receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or
the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars
institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.”

Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of
the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. “

Oct 16, 196, petitioners et al, filed an injuction suit against PRC, in the RTC.

RTC HELD:
that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and
giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.

PRC to CA – Appeal

CA HELD:
RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105,
stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are
co-equal bodies.

“That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the Regional
Trial Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to control each other or interfere with each
other's acts.”

ISSUE: Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it
cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter.
 ADMIN LAW ANNY

HELD:
YES. RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from
enforcing its resolution.

RE: Reso 105:

The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC.
Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every
examinee during the three days before the examination period.

It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for
which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. 22

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how
they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the
lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every
right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy
their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As defined in a decision of
the United States Supreme Court:

The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It
means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the equal rights
of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and
vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest enjoyment. 23

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers
believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full fledged public
accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or
riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. At this
juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology, regarding academic freedom to wit:

... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It
decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This
constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.

Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in
the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving
them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be
refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and
psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten
branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it
right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or
swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if
violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the
respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom
of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.
 ADMIN LAW ANNY

In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void
and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional.

15) DADOLE VS. COA

393 SCRA 262

FACTS:
Petitioners RTC Judges Dadole et al and MTC judges Temistocles et al stationed in Mandaue City
received a monthly allowance of P1,260 each pursuant to the yearly appropriation ordinance. Eventually, in
1991, it was increased to P1,500 for each judge. However, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
then issued Local Budget Circular No. 55 which provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by
a local government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Acting on
the said DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners in excess
of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Thus, petitioners filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest.
However, it was treated as a motion for reconsideration and was endorsed to the Commission on Audit
Regional Office. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the said motion to their Head Office with
recommendation that the same should be denied. Accordingly, it was denied by the COA. Hence, petitioners
filed the instant petition. They argued, among others, that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of
Mandaue City by dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional
allowances to judges stationed therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not LBC 55 is void for infringing the local autonomy of Mandaue City.

HELD:
YES.

We recognize that, although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the
exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision
by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that: "Sec. 4. The President
of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. . . . " Under Section 458, of RA
7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional allowances to
judges "when the finances of the city government allow." The said provision does not authorize setting a
definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, this Court need not belabor the
point that the finances of a city government may allow the grant of additional allowances higher than P1,000 if
the revenues of the said city government exceed its annual expenditures.

Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the
criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(l)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over
local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In
other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis. The President can only interfere in the
affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is
the scope of the President's supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of
his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within
the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or
her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government
unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the
executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.
 ADMIN LAW ANNY

16) CIR VS. CA & FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP.

261 SCRA 236

FACTS:
Fortune Tobacco Corporation is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes.
On various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of trademark
registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.

The CIR initially classified 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed in the
World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune changed the names of 'Hope'
to Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand
category. Fortune also submitted proof the BIR that 'Champion' was an original register and therefore a local
brand. Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands.

RA 7654 was passed in it was provided that 55% ad valorem tax will be imposed on local brands
carrying a foreign name. Two days before the effectivity of RA 7654, the BIR issued Revenue Memorandum
Circular No. 37-93, in which Fortune was to be imposed 55% ad valorem tax on the three brands classifying
them as local brands carrying a foreign name.

Fortune filed a petition with the CTA which was granted finding the RMC as defective. The CIR filed a
motion for reconsideration with the CTA which was denied, then to the CA, an appeal, which was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether the RMC was valid.

HELD:
NO.

The RMC was made to place the three brands as locally made cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to
thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions
applied to locally manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity were not so classified as bearing
foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the RMC, the brands were subjected to 45% ad valorem tax. In so
doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law but it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due
observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored.

The Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective
administrative issuance.

17) ROMULO, ET. AL. VS. HDMF

333 SCRA 777

FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, petitioner Romulo, Mabanta,
Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER), a law firm, was exempted for the period 1
January to 31 December 1995 from the Pag~IBIG Fund coverage by respondent Home Development Mutual
Fund (hereafter HDMF) because of a superior retirement plan.

On 1 September 1995, the HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742,
issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a
waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, it must have a plan providing for both provident/
retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag~IBIG Fund.
 ADMIN LAW ANNY

On 16 November 1995, PETITIONER filed with the respondent an application for Waiver or
Suspension of Fund Coverage because of its superior retirement plan. In support of said application,
PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the 1995 Amendments to the Rules are invalid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Board Resolutions is valid?

HELD:
NO. The board resolution is not valid. Where the Board of Trustees of the Home Development Mutual
Fund (HDMF) required in section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
implementing PD 1752, as amended by RA 7742, that employers should have both provident/retirement and
housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Pag-ibig Fund Coverage, it
effectively amended Section 19 of PD 1752 which merely requires as a pre-condition for exemption from
coverage the existence of either a superior provident / retirement plan or a superior housing plan, and not the
concurrence of both plans. And when the HDMF Board subsequently abolished that exemption through its
1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of PD 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of section 19
are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board.

18) CONTE VS. COA

264 SCRA 20

FACTS:
Petitioners Avelina Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were former employees of the Social Security
System (SSS) who retired from government service. They availed of compulsory retirement benefits under
Republic Act No. 660.

In addition to retirement benefits provided under R.A. 660, petitioners also claimed SSS “financial
assistance” benefits granted under SSS Resolution No. 56, series of 1971.

Their applications were however denied because of respondent COA’s 1989 ruling disallowing all
claims for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56 for the reason that the scheme of financial
assistance authorized by the SSS constituted additional retirement benefits, and the scheme partook of the
nature of a supplementary pension/retirement plan proscribed by RA 4968 (The Teves Retirement Law), the
law amending CA 186(the GSIS Charter).

ISSUE: WON COA abused its discretion when it disallowed in audit petitioners’ claims for benefits under SSS
Res. 56? No.

HELD:
NO.

It is clear from the clauses and provisions of Resolution 56 that its financial assistance plan constitutes
a supplemental retirement/pension benefits plan and Sec. 28 (b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968 in no
uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan -- other than the GSIS -- for government
officers and employees.

Though it may be disputed that Res 56 was promulgated for laudable purposes, it simply cannot be
tolerated for such reason alone as the said Resolution clearly contravenes the provision of law and is therefore
invalid, void and of no effect. SSS had no authority to maintain and implement such retirement plan,
 ADMIN LAW ANNY

particularly in the face of the statutory prohibition. The SSS cannot, in the guise of rule-making, legislate or
amend laws or worse, render them nugatory.

It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must
prevail. A rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in
order for such rule or regulation to be valid. The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a
delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by the Congress or the
Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control
with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what
fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or
which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.

19) PHIL. CONSUMERS' FOUNDATION VS. DECS

FACTS:
The DECS, as recommended by the Task Force on Private Higher Education and through respondent
Secretary issued Dep Order No. 37, a modification of a previous Department Order, authorizing the 10% to
15% increase in school fees. Petitioner opposed and alleged in a petition that said order was issued without
any legal basis arguing that authority of DECS to regulate school fees does not always include the power to
increase the same.

Sec. 57 (3) of BP Blg. 232 (The Education Act of 1982), vests the DECS with the power to regulate the
educational system; and Sec. 70 of the same act grants the DECS the power to issue rules which are likewise
necessary to discharge its functions and duties under the law.

The respondent Secretary maintains that the increase in tuition and other school fees is urgent and
necessary.

ISSUE: WON the fixing of school fees through department order by DECS is a valid delegation of legislative
power.

HELD:
YES.

Power granted to the educational department to regulate the educational system includes the power to
prescribe school fees. In the absence of a statue stating otherwise, this power include the power to prescribe
school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such,
the power should be considered lodged with the DECS.

20) FEDERACION ESPAÑOL PROFESORES VS. SEC. QUISOMBING