G.R. No. 171175 October 30, 2009
"
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ARTURO F. DUCA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside and
annul the Decision1 dated November 23, 2005 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312.
The CA decision reversed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Criminal Case No.
2003-0194-D3 which affirmed an earlier decision4 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan,
convicting respondent Arturo Duca of the crime of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
The facts as found by the CA are quoted as follows:
It appears that Arturo Duca, together with his mother, Cecilia Duca, were charged of the crime of Falsification of Official
Document defined and penalized under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code in an
Information which reads:
"That on or about December 10, 2001 in the Municipality of San Fabian, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused confederating together and mutually abiding each other, with intent to
cause damage, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause the preparation of a Declaration of Real Property
over a bungalow type residential house covered by Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 of the Municipal Assessor’s
Office of San Fabian, Pangasinan by making it appear that the signature appearing on the sworn statement of owner is that of
Aldrin F. Duca when the truth of the matter is not because the latter was abroad at that time having arrived in the Philippines
only on December 12, 2001, and it was accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his own signature thereon to the damage and
prejudice of the undersigned private complainant Pedro Calanayan."
Upon being arraigned, both the accused pleaded ‘not guilty’. Then trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that sometime in 1999, Pedro Calanayan (hereinafter "Calanayan"), private complainant
herein, filed an action for ejectment and damages against Cecilia F. Duca, Ruel F. Duca, Arsenio F. Duca and Vangie F. Duca
before the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. 960
(SF-99). The case was decided in favor of Calanayan. There being no appeal interposed by the aforesaid defendants, the said
decision became final and executory. On November 22, 1999, a writ of execution was issued by the MCTC to enforce the
decision. On February 29, 2000, the money judgment was likewise satisfied with the public auction of the lot owned by Cecilia
Duca covered by TCT No. 233647. On March 1, 2000, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of Jocelyn Barque, the highest
bidder in the auction sale.
On October 19, 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of Execution and Damages with prayer for Writ
of Injunction and Temporary Restraining order against Sheriff IV Vinez Hortaleza and Police Officers Roberto Vical, Alejandre
Arevalo, Emilio Austria, Victor Quitales, Crisostomo Bonavente and Calanayan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2000-
0304-D.
When the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the effect that the house erected on the lot subject of the ejectment case
is owned by her son Aldrin Duca. In support of such claim she presented Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 (Exhibit
"B"). At the back of the said exhibit is a sworn statement showing that the current and fair market value of the property, which is
a bungalow, is P70,000.00 with the signature affixed on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca and subscribed and sworn to
before Engr. Reynante Baltazar, the Municipal Assessor of San Fabian, Pangasinan, on December 10, 2001. The signature on top
of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca is that of Arturo Duca. According to the prosecution, Arturo made it appear that the
signature is that of his brother Aldrin who was out of the country at that time. Aldrin arrived in the Philippines only on
December 12, 2001, as evidenced by a certification from the Bureau of Immigration, Manila. Arturo even made it appear that his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 03841661 issued on December 10, 2001 is that of his brother Aldrin. That because of the
misrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were able to mislead the RTC such that they were able to get a TRO against Sheriff
Hortaleza and the policemen ordering them to stop from evicting the plaintiffs from the property in question.
Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca. Cecilia testified that she had no participation in the
execution as she was in Manila at that time.
On the other hand, Arturo testified that the signature atop the name Aldrin Duca was his. However, he intersposed the defense
that he was duly authorized by the latter to procure the said tax declaration.
On April 3, 2003, the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto rendered a decision, dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Arturo F. Duca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification defined
and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes upon said accused a prison term of two years,
four months and one day to six (6) years of Prision Correccional and a fine of P2,000.00. Accused Cecilia is acquitted for lack of
evidence.
The accused Arturo F. Duca is hereby ordered to pay to the complaining witness actual damages in the amount of P60,000.00
moral damages of P150,000.00 plus exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus cost.
Page 1 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied with the decision, Arturo Duca appealed. On March 24, 2004, the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 44, rendered a
decision, disposing the case as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision dated April 3, 2003 of the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan
convicting accused Arturo F. Duca of the crime of Falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code and imposing upon said accused an imprisonment of two years, four months and one day to six (6) years of Prision
Correccional and a fine of P2,000.00, and ordering him to pay to the complaining witness actual damages in the amount of
P60,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P150,000.00 plus exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus cost, is
AFFIRMED.
x x x.
SO ORDERED."5
Aggrieved with the ruling of the RTC, Duca elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review. On November 23, 2005, the
CA promulgated its assailed decision acquitting Duca of the crime charged and reversing the RTC decision. The CA held:
However, the prosecution failed to establish the fact that Arturo was not duly authorized by Aldrin in procuring the tax
declaration. On the contrary, the defense was able to establish that Arturo Duca was duly authorized by his brother Aldrin to
secure a tax declaration on the house erected on the land registered under their mother’s name.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing testimony, it can be deduced that Arturo could not have falsified the Tax Declaration of Real Property under
Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116B1 (Exhibit "B") by making it appear that Aldrin Duca, his brother, participated in the
accomplishment of the said document since he was actually acting for and in behalf of the latter. It must be noted that as early as
June 2001, Arturo has already been authorized by Aldrin; albeit verbally, to register the house in the latter’s name as he cannot
do it personally as he was abroad. This authority of Arturo was confirmed by the latter’s execution of an Affidavit dated January
19, 2002 confirming the procurement of the said tax declaration (Exhibit "6") as well as a Special Power of attorney executed on
June 17, 2002 (Exhibit "7"). Thus, what appeared to be defective from the beginning had already been cured so much so that the
said document became valid and binding as an official act of Arturo.
If Arturo did not state in the Tax Declaration in what capacity he was signing, this deficiency was cured by Aldrin’s subsequent
execution of Exhibits "6" and "7".
The RTC’s conclusion that the special power of attorney executed by Aldrin was a mere afterthought designed to extricate
Arturo from any criminal liability has no basis since from the very start, it has been duly established by the defense that Aldrin
had verbally instructed Arturo to cause the execution of Exhibit "B" for the purpose of registering his house constructed on his
mother’s lot for taxation purposes.6
Hence, the instant petition anchored on this sole ground:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND HAD ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED PRIVATE RESPONDENT ARTURO F. DUCA’S APPEAL WITHOUT GIVING
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL THE OPPORTUNITY
TO BE HEARD THEREON.7
Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved the respondent’s appeal without notifying
the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor
General to file his comment. Petitioner contends that once the case is elevated to the CA or this Court, it is only the Solicitor
General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely abused its discretion when it
acted on respondent’s appeal without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the decision of the
CA acquitting respondent should be considered void for being violative of due process.
In his Comment,8 respondent argues that there was no denial of due process because the prosecution was properly represented by
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and a private prosecutor who handled the presentation of evidence under the control and
supervision of the Provincial Prosecutor. Since the control and supervision conferred on the private prosecutor by the Provincial
Prosecutor had not been withdrawn, the Solicitor General could not claim that the prosecution was not afforded a chance to be
heard in the CA. According to the respondent, he should not be prejudiced by the Provincial Prosecutor’s failure to inform the
Solicitor General of the pendency of the appeal.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code
explicitly provides, viz.:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. – The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. x x x It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis supplied)
Jurisprudence has been consistent on this point. In the recent case of Cariño v. De Castro, 9 it was held: Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People is requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition,
vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
was to "represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings." This provision (emphasis supplied)
has been carried over to the Revised Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt, Respondent appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.10 The respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to serve copies of his petition for review upon the
Likewise, in City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina,11 the Court made the following pronouncement: adverse party, in this case, the People of the Philippines through the OSG. Respondent failed to serve a copy of his petition on
Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be the OSG and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City. 21 The service of a copy of the petition
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of on the People of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be inefficacious for the reason that the Solicitor General is the
offenses before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the sole representative of the People of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court. The respondent’s failure to
regional trial courts. However, when such criminal actions are brought to the Court of Appeals or this Court, it is the Solicitor have a copy of his petition served on the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of
General who must represent the People of the Philippines not the fiscal. 12 the petition as provided in Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to dismiss the
And in Labaro v. Panay,13 the Court held: petition. However, the CA, instead of dismissing respondent’s petition, proceeded to resolve the petition and even acquitted
The OSG is the law office of the Government authorized by law to represent the Government or the People of the Philippines respondent without the Solicitor General’s comment. We, thus, find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
before us and before the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings, or before any court, tribunal, body, or commission in any to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed decision.
matter, action, or proceeding which, in the opinion of the Solicitor General, affects the welfare of the people as the ends of On a procedural matter, the Court notes that petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without filing a
justice may require.14 motion for reconsideration with the CA. It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain,
Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the appellate counsel of the People of the speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a general rule, must be filed
Philippines and as such, should have been given the opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People. The records show that the before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is sought. Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action
CA failed to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment on Duca’s petition. A copy of the CA Resolution 15 dated May 26, will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its
2004 which required the filing of Comment was served upon Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr. (counsel for Duca), Atty. Villamor Tolete assigned errors.22 This rule, however, is not without exceptions. In National Housing v. Court of Appeals, 23 we held:
(counsel for private complainant Calanayan) and RTC Judge Crispin Laron. Nowhere was it shown that the Solicitor General However, in Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held that while generally a motion for
had ever been furnished a copy of the said Resolution. The failure of the CA to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment reconsideration must first be filed before resorting to certiorari in order to give the lower court an opportunity to rectify its
deprived the prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. errors, this rule admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied without considering the circumstances of the case. The
Pertinently, Saldana v. Court of Appeals, et al.16 ruled as follows: filing of a motion for reconsideration is not a condition sine qua non when the issue raised is purely one of law, or where the
When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated error is patent or the disputed order is void, or the questions raised on certiorari are the same as those already squarely presented
(Uy vs. Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 [May 29, 1974]; Serino vs. Zoa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433 [Aug. 31, 1971]; People vs. to and passed upon by the lower court.24 (emphasis supplied)
Gomez, L-22345, 20 SCRA 293 [May 29, 1967]; People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17 SCRA 1119 [Aug. 31, 1966]). The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari without a motion for
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, reconsideration is justified.
the violation of the State’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdiction issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312 is
L-300026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the CA for further proceedings. The CA is ordered to decide the case with
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction dispatch.
(Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370, [May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). SO ORDERED.
Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a ‘lawless thing, which can be treated as
an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head’ (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra). 17
The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its
evidence in support of the charge. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a decision rendered without due
process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a
party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard.18
The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor General the chance to file his comment on
the petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition filed before the
CA. The said decision is, therefore, a nullity. In Dimatulac v. Villon, 19 we held:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society
and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily
a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it
could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and
offended party, on the other.20
Further, the CA should have been guided by the following provisions of Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. – A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time
to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and
furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted
except for the most compelling reason and in no case to extend fifteen (15) days.

Page 2 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110

G.R. No. 168168 September 14, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On January 26, 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of
attempted rape in the complaints which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-125
That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a
minor 10 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Criminal Case No. 96-150
That on or about the 29th day of December 1995, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own
daughter, a minor 12 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Criminal Case No. 96-151
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus
commencing the commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of
execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the
timely arrival of the complainant's mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Complainant was born on August 26, 1983, and was 10 years old when she was first sexually abused in the morning of
September 1993. While inside their house in Sucat, Paraaque, appellant entered her room and laid down beside her. He removed
her clothes and asked her to lie face down then inserted his penis into her anus. Complainant cried and felt so much pain, but she
kept the incident to herself as her father might hurt her.5
A few days later, appellant again ravished her. After removing his clothes, he asked her to lie on her side facing him and to place
her thigh over his. While in that position, appellant inserted his penis into her vagina which caused tremendous pain. 6 As in the
first incident, complainant kept the ordeal to herself. It was only in November 1995 that she confided the sexual abuses to her
mother.
On December 29, 1995, appellant again assaulted her daughter. While leaning on the kitchen sink, he raised her t-shirt, fondled
and kissed her breasts. He then removed their shorts, fondled her vagina and inserted his penis, but when her brother Edwin went
out of his room, appellant immediately asked her to dress up.7
The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996. Appellant laid complainant down on the sofa then placed
himself on top of her and made pumping motion even with their shorts on. Appellant stopped only when he heard the arrival of
his wife.8
On January 3, 1996, complainant and her mother visited a relative in Cainta, Rizal, who upon learning of the abuses done by the
appellant, advised them to go to Camp Crame where they filed a complaint. 9 The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime
Laboratory examined complainant and found her to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin
state.10
Appellant denied the accusations against him. He testified that he married Maria Loreto V. Dimaano on December 25, 1976 and
begot three children with her, namely, Edwin, Eric, and Maricar. He alleged that he worked in several companies abroad11 but
admitted that he was in the Philippines in September 1993. He contended though that he could not have raped complainant
because he was always in the office from 7:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. waiting to be dispatched to another assignment overseas. 12
He claimed it was impossible for him to rape his daughter on December 29, 1995 or January 1, 1996 because there were other
people in the house. He argued that had he raped complainant, then she would not have accompanied him to the Paraaque Police
Station and Barangay Hall of San Antonio to apply for police clearance and barangay I.D., and to Uniwide Shopping Center at
Sucat, Paraaque, where they applied for membership at the Video City Club. 13 He also maintained that the fact that his daughter
was in a non-virgin state did not conclusively prove that he was responsible for it because it is also possible that his daughter had
sexual intercourse with another man her age.14
The trial court found the testimony of complainant to be spontaneous and credible. She narrated the obscene details of her
harrowing experience which no girl of tender age would have known unless she herself had experienced it. It found the delay in
Page 3 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110
reporting the rape understandable due to the fear complainant had of her father who had moral ascendancy over her. Also, the
quarrel between complainant's parents was not sufficient motive for the wife to lodge a serious charge of rape against appellant.
It disregarded the Compromise Agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sumbong since complainant was not assisted by a
lawyer when she signed the same. Besides, she testified in open court that she was pursuing the case against her father. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Edgardo Dimaano is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape (2 counts) and the
crime of attempted rape. For the rape committed in September 1993, he is sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua. For the
rape on December 29, 1995, he is imposed the supreme penalty of death. And for the crime of attempted rape, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103 as amended), he is sentenced to a penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional medium to 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayor maximum. He is ordered to indemnify the victim the
amount of P50,000.00 and to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.15
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257
convicting accused-appellant Edgardo Dimaano of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
In Criminal Case No. 96-125, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found guilty of rape under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO
Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,0000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO, as found guilty of qualified rape under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, and sentenced to death penalty, is also ordered to
pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php75,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 96-151, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found guilty of attempted rape under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day to 10 years of prision mayor
as maximum. Accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php30,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php25,000.00 as moral damages, and Php10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalty Cases (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC,
effective 15 October 2004), this case is CERTIFIED to the Supreme Court for review.
Let the entire record of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.16
In his Brief, appellant raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION HAS OVERCOME THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED.
II. WHETHER OR NOR THE VOLUNTARY AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DULY CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR WHICH
PUT TO DOUBT THE REASONS BEHIND THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES OF RAPE AGAINST
HEREIN ACCUSED.17
Appellant contends that if complainant's accusations were true, then she could have reported them to the authorities when she
accompanied him to Paraaque Police Station and the Barangay Hall of San Antonio or to their relatives when she had the
opportunity to do so. He also argues that had the trial court considered the Compromise Agreement and Sinumpaang Salaysay ng
Pag-uurong ng Sumbong, it would have known that complainant was only pressured by her mother into filing the complaint.
We are not persuaded.
This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and attitude during direct and
cross-examination by counsel.18 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court's
highest respect.19
It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and credit, more so if she is a
minor. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the
trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In so testifying, she could only
have been impelled to tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill motive.20
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the testimony of the complainant who was only 12
years old when she narrated to the court the violations of her person as follows:
For rape committed in September 1993:
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
When was the first time that he committed sexual assault upon you?
A: September 1993.
COURT: Q: After putting down your panty, what happened next, if any?
No specific date? A: He held my organ.
A: I cannot remember, Maam. ATTY. MALLARES:
ATTY. AMBROSIO: At this juncture, Your Honor, may we request witness to be more specific with respect to organ.
Can you remember how old were you at that time? ATTY. AMBROSIO:
A: 10 years old, Maam. When you say organ', what do you mean?
Q: So, after he removed your T-shirt, bra and pan(t)y and shorts, what happened next, if anything happened? A: Pekpek.
A: He asked me to lie face down. Pinadapa po niya ako. COURT: Proceed.
Q: After he asked you to lie face down, what happened next? ANSWER:
RECORD: The witness is crying. After he held my vagina, he also put down his shorts and brief.
A: He inserted in my anus ' ipinasok niya ang titi niya sa puwet ko. Q: After putting down his shorts and brief, what happened next?
Q: Did you tell anybody about what happened to you? A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.22
A: No, Maam. For Attempted rape committed on January 1, 1996:
Q: Why not? Q: Do you recall of any incident that happened on Jan 1, 199[6] 3:00 to 4:00 P.M.?
A: Because I was afraid of my father. A: We were in our sala on the sofa.
Q: Why are you afraid of your father? Q: When you say 'we', who are those you are referring to?
A: Because he might hurt me. A: Me and my father.
Q: After that incident in September 1993, do you recall any other incident that occurred? Q: While you and your father were in the living room and on the sofa, what happened?
A: There is, Maam. A: While we were on the sofa, my father was then raising my T-shirt and kissing my breast.
Q: When was it? Q: What were you wearing at that time?
A: After a few days after the first incident. A: Shorts, T-shirt, bra and panty.
Q: After he entered your room, what happened next? Q: What did your father do with your shorts, T-shirt and bra?
A: He laid beside me and he removed my clothes. A: He raised them.
Q: What did your father do with the clothes he was wearing? Q: What about your father, how was he dressed at that time?
A: He removed his clothes. A: Shorts and T-shirt.
Q: After removing his clothes, what happened next, if any? Q: After raising your bra and T-shirt, what happened next?
A: We were lying in my bed and he asked me to lie on my side ' pinatagilid niya ako. A: While he was kissing my breast, we were already lying on the sofa, then he went on top of me.
Q: After he asked you to lie down on your side, what happened next, if any? Q: After he went on top of you, what happened next, if any?
A: He asked me to raise my right leg and placed it on his side because he was then lying on his side. A: He was forcing to insert his penis while we were still wearing shorts.
Q: After he asked you to place your right thigh over his left thigh, what happened next, if any? Q: So, you mean to say, you were still wearing shorts at that time?
A: He inserted his penis into my organ.21 A: Yes, Maam.
For rape committed on December 29, 1995: Q: What happened next when he was forcing to push his penis into your vagina?
Q: On December 29, 1995, do you remember of any unusual incident that happened? A: It did not push through because my mother suddenly arrived.23
A: There was, Maam. The trial court believed the complainant and held that:
Q: What is that incident? The testimony of Maricar of her ignominious experience contains all the indicia of truth. It is spontaneous, direct and clear. It is
A: I was raped by my father on that day. vivid and complete with details. Her testimony is truthful and convincing. Her credibility is beyond question.
Q: Where were you on that day when you said he raped you? The Court believes that at her tender age, Maricar could not make public the offense, undergo the troubles and humiliation of
A: I was then at the kitchen of our house. public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if she has not in fact been raped. The Court believes that a
Q: What were you doing at the kitchen at that time? girl who is only twelve (12) years old would not ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody, much less her own father, if it
A: I was then sitting at our dining set. is not true.24
Q: What about your father, what he doing? We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and
A: He was cooking. the appellate court.
Q: What happened while sitting at the dining set, if any? Contrary to appellant's assertion, complainant's credibility was not diminished by her failure to report the sexual abuses to the
A: He told me to approach him. authorities and her relatives despite opportunities to do so. Delay in reporting the rape incidents, especially in the face of threats
Q: After you approached him, what happened next? of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim, more so when the lecherous attacker is her own father. Strong
A: I was leaning then at the kitchen sink and he asked me to embrace him. apprehensions brought about by fear, stress, or anxiety can easily put the offended party to doubt or even distrust what should
Q: What happened after you embraced him? otherwise be a positive attitude of bringing the culprit to justice. The Court has thus considered justified the filing of complaints
A: After that, he raised my T-shirt. for rape months, even years, after the commission of the offense.25
Q: After raising your T-shirt, what happened next? In the case at bar, the delay of more than two years is not an indication that the charges were fabricated for complainant's
A: He held my breast. reactions were consistent with reason. Her complete obedience to appellant, her lack of struggle and the studied silence she kept
Q: After that, what happened next? about her ordeal were all brought about by genuine fear posed by her own father against her.
A: He kept kissing my breast. Appellant's reliance on complainant's affidavit of desistance deserves scant consideration. A survey of our jurisprudence reveals
Q: How many times did he kiss your breast? that the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. The unreliable character
A: Many times. of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of having the
Q: What happened next after he kissed you breast? appellant arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical
A: He put my shorts down. examination of her private parts, repeating her accusations in open court and recounting her anguish in detail, will suddenly turn
Q: After putting your shorts down, what happened next, if any? around and declare that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. 26
A: He also put down my panty.

Page 4 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110

Too, complainant repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer assisted her when she affixed her
signature27 and had shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution of the cases.28 Besides, the trial court is not bound to
dismiss the cases, as it is still within its discretion whether or not to proceed with the prosecution,29 considering that the
compromise agreement and the affidavit of desistance were executed long after the cases have been filed in court.
Moreover, a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the State belongs the power to prosecute and punish
crimes.30 By itself, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in court. A
private complainant loses the right or absolute privilege to decide whether the rape charge should proceed, because the case was
already filed and must therefore continue to be heard by the trial court.31
In addition, a careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance reveals that complainant never retracted her allegation that she was
raped by her father. Neither did she give any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about the rape. All she stated in the
affidavit was that she had decided to withdraw the complaints after the appellant agreed not to disturb the complainant; to
consent to annul his marriage; allow his wife to solely manage the conjugal properties; and entrust the custody of his children to
his wife. Rather than contradict, this affidavit reinforces complainant's testimony that appellant raped her on several occasions.
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and without consent.1âwphi1 If the woman is
under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial not only because force is not an element of statutory rape,
but the absence of a free consent is presumed. Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the
woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and also that it was done
through force, violence, intimidation or threat.32
We have ruled that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not even be employed where the
overpowering moral influence of appellant, who is private complainant's father, would suffice. The moral and physical dominion
of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires. 33 The instant case is no exception. Appellant
took advantage of his moral and physical ascendancy to unleash his lechery upon his daughter.
Hence, under the above circumstances, we affirm the trial court's conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150 for the
crimes of rape committed in September 1993 and on December 29, 1995. However, we acquit appellant in Criminal Case No.
96-151 for the crime of attempted rape for failure to allege in the complaint the specific acts constitutive of attempted rape.
The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 is again quoted as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus
commencing the commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of
execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the
timely arrival of the complainant's mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.34
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time
of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. 35 What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.36 The
acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime
will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must
be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference
to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is
to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 37
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not allege specific acts or omission constituting
the elements of the crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts
of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein that the appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does not satisfy the
test of sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the one who drafted the complaint. This
insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of conviction; otherwise we would be violating the right
of the appellant to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 96-125 as the rape was committed in
September 1993 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, on December 31, 1993.
Prior to R.A. No. 7659, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the the crime of
rape, when committed against a woman who is under 12 years old or is demented. Anent the rape in Criminal Case No. 96-150
which was committed on December 29, 1995, Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, thus applies. It provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
Page 5 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, appellant was correctly sentenced to death as the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship were properly alleged in the information and proved during trial by the testimonies of the complainant, her mother
and the appellant himself; they were also supported by the photocopy of the marriage certificate and birth certificate,
respectively.
In the case of People v. Cayabyab,38 this Court, in affirming the death penalty, held that a photocopy of the birth certificate is
admissible to prove the age of the victim, as the original thereof is a public record in the custody of a public officer. The
admission of this secondary evidence is one of the exceptions to the 'best evidence rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. Further, we held that production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion,
whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring its production.
Indubitably, the marriage and birth certificates are public records in the custody of the local civil registrar who is a public officer.
The presentation, therefore of their photocopies is admissible as secondary evidence to prove their contents. It is also well to
note that appellant did not dispute their contents when offered as evidence to prove relationship and minority. Having failed to
raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a primary evidence, and
deemed admitted and the other party is bound thereby.39
Anent the awards of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the awards of civil indemnity and exemplary damages,
which the trial court lumped together for all the crimes committed, by separately awarding the sums of P50,000.00 40 and
P75,000.0041 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, and P25,000.0042 as exemplary
damages, for each count of rape, in line with the prevailing jurisprudence.
The award of civil indemnity, which is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon a conviction for
rape.43 On the other hand, exemplary damages is awarded when the commission of the offense is attended by an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.44
Finally, the awards of P50,000.0045 and P75,000.0046 as moral damages in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively,
by the Court of Appeals are also sustained in line with the prevailing jurisprudence. The award of moral damages is
automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed
that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. 47
WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.00263 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, finding appellant Edgardo Dimaano GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his own daughter, Maricar Dimaano, and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua and DEATH, respectively; and ordering him to pay the complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-125 the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and in
Criminal Case No. 96-150 the amounts of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, is AFFIRMED. Appellant is however ACQUITTED for the crime of attempted rape in Criminal Case No.
96-151 for failure of the complaint to allege the specific acts or omissions constituting the offense.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143193 June 29, 2005
MELBAROSE R. SASOT and ALLANDALE R. SASOT, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, The Honorable court of of appeals, and REBECCA G. SALVADOR, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 1, Manila, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The case subject of the present special civil action for certiorari is a criminal prosecution against petitioners for unfair
competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 1), and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-166147.1
Some time in May 1997, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation pursuant to a complaint by the
NBA Properties, Inc., against petitioners for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code on unfair competition.
In its Report dated June 4, 1997, the NBI stated that NBA Properties, Inc., is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of
the United States of America, and is the registered owner of NBA trademarks and names of NBA basketball teams such as "USA
Basketball," "Chicago Bulls," "Orlando Magic," "Los Angeles Lakers," "Rockets," "Phoenix Suns," "Bullets," "Pacers,"
"Charlotte Hornets," "Blazers," "Denver Nuggets," "Sacramento Kings," "Miami Heat," Utah Jazz," "Detroit Pistons,"
"Milwaukee Bucks," "Seattle Sonics," "Toronto Raptors," "Atlanta Hawks," "Cavs," "Dallas Mavericks," "Minnesota
Timberwolves," and "Los Angeles Clippers." These names are used on hosiery, footwear, t-shirts, sweatshirts, tank tops,
pajamas, sport shirts, and other garment products, which are allegedly registered with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer. The Report further stated that during the investigation, it was discovered that petitioners are engaged in the
manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution of counterfeit "NBA" garment products. Hence, it recommended petitioners’
prosecution for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.2
In a Special Power of Attorney dated October 7, 1997, Rick Welts, as President of NBA Properties, Inc., constituted the law firm
of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the company’s attorney-in-fact, and to act for and on behalf of
the company, in the filing of criminal, civil and administrative complaints, among others. 3 The Special Power of Attorney was
notarized by Nicole Brown of New York County and certified by Norman Goodman, County Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York. Consul Cecilia B. Rebong of the Consulate General of the Philippines, New York, authenticated
the certification.4 Welts also executed a Complaint-Affidavit on February 12, 1998, before Notary Public Nicole J. Brown of the
State of New York.5
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated July 15, 1998, Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez recommended the filing of an
Information against petitioners for violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. 6 The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on or about May 9, 1997 and on dates prior thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above named accused ALLANDALE SASOT and MELBAROSE SASOT of Allandale Sportslines, Inc., did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously manufacture and sell various garment products bearing the appearance of
"NBA" names, symbols and trademarks, inducing the public to believe that the goods offered by them are those of "NBA" to the
damage and prejudice of the NBA Properties, Inc., the trademark owner of the "NBA".
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the following grounds:
I. THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE
II. AND THIS HONORABLE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED OR THE PERSON OF
THE ACCUSED8
In support of the foregoing, petitioners argue that the fiscal should have dismissed Welts’s complaint because under the rules, the
complaint must be sworn to before the prosecutor and the copy on record appears to be only a fax transmittal.9 They also contend
that complainant is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, and cannot be protected by Philippine patent laws
since it is not a registered patentee. Petitioners aver that they have been using the business name "ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE,
INC." since 1972, and their designs are original and do not appear to be similar to complainant’s, and they do not use
complainant’s logo or design.10
The trial prosecutor of the RTC-Manila (Branch 1), Jaime M. Guray, filed his Comment/Opposition to the motion to quash,
stating that he has the original copy of the complaint, and that complainant has an attorney-in-fact to represent it. Prosecutor
Guray also contended that the State is entitled to prosecute the offense even without the participation of the private offended
party, as the crime charged is a public crime.11
The trial court sustained the prosecution’s arguments and denied petitioners’ motion to quash in its Order dated March 5, 1999. 12
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52151 which
was dismissed per its Decision dated January 26, 2000.13 According to the CA, the petition is not the proper remedy in assailing
a denial of a motion to quash, and that the grounds raised therein should be raised during the trial of the case on the merits.14 The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
Page 6 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent court is hereby ordered to
conduct further proceedings with dispatch in Criminal Case No. 98-166147.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision but this was denied by the CA. 16
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with issues raised as follows:
1. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED AND LICENSE (sic) TO DO BUSINESS IN THE
PHILIPPINES MAY MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION.
2. WHETHER AN OFFICER OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION MAY ACT IN BEHALF OF A CORPORATION WITHOUT
AUTHORITY FROM ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
3. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED IN BUSINESS AND WHOSE EMBLEM IT SOUGHT TO
PROTECT IS NOT IN ACTUAL USE IS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW.
4. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE AND THE PERSONS OF THE ACCUSED.
5. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION.17
Petitioners reiterate the argument that the complaint filed by Rick Welts of the NBA Properties, Inc., is defective and should
have been dismissed by the fiscal because it should have been personally sworn to by the complainant before the investigating
prosecutor. They also reiterate the claim that Welts failed to show any board resolution showing his authority to institute any
action in behalf of the company, and that the NBA’s trademarks are not being actually used in the Philippines, hence, they are of
public dominion and cannot be protected by Philippine patent laws. Petitioners further contend that they have not committed acts
amounting to unfair competition.18
The Office of the Solicitor General appeared in behalf of the People, and filed its Amended Comment to the petition, praying for
its dismissal, arguing that the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for reasons stated in its
Decision dated January 26, 2000.19
The petition must be denied.
The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion
to quash an information.20 The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on
his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision
is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. 21 Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special
civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterate the special defenses contained in
their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances22 in the present case such that immediate resort to a
filing of a petition for certiorari should be permitted. Clearly, the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the petition.
Moreover, the Court does not find any justification for the quashal of the Information filed against petitioners.
For one, while petitioners raise in their motion to quash the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that
the trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused, 23 their arguments focused on an alleged
defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal, complainant’s capacity to sue and petitioners’ exculpatory defenses against the
crime of unfair competition.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the time the alleged criminal acts were
committed, enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, to wit:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment
for various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense
charged.
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal and the
complainant’s capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.
For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint is substantially sufficient if it states
the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by complainant’s affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents,
and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their
absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. All these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before
Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be noted that even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not
necessarily render it invalid.24 Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant
on the merits.25
In this case, Welts’s Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by Notary Public Nicole Brown of the State of New
York that the same has been subscribed and sworn to before her on February 12, 1998, 26 duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate. While the copy on record of the complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosecution Attorney
Gutierrez stated that complainant’s representative will present the authenticated notarized original in court, 27 and Prosecutor
Guray manifested that the original copy is already on hand.28 It is apt to state at this point that the prosecutor enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of
accuracy.29
Moreover, records show that there are other supporting documents from which the prosecutor based his recommendation, to wit:
(1) The NBI Report dated June 4, 1997, containing an account of the investigation conducted from April 30, 1997 to
May 9, 1997, and the subsequent search and seizure of several items from petitioners’ establishment; 30
(2) The letter dated May 8, 1997 from the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell to
the NBI, seeking assistance in stopping the illegal manufacture, distribution and sale of "fake products bearing the
‘NBA’ trademark, and in prosecuting the proprietors of aforesaid factory;"31 and
(3) The Joint Affidavit executed by Rechie D. Malicse and Dalisay P. Bal-ot of the Pinkerton Consulting Services
(Phils.) Inc., which was certified to by Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez, attesting to their findings that petitioners were
found to be manufacturing, printing, selling, and distributing counterfeit "NBA" garment products. 32
Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and
prejudice on the part of public prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court should respect such determination. 33
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code34 is a public crime.
It is essentially an act against the State and it is the latter which principally stands as the injured party. The complainant’s
capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.
In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez,35 a case akin to the present dispute, as it involved the crime of Unfair Competition
under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, and the quashal of search warrants issued against manufacturers of garments
bearing the same trademark as that of the petitioner, the Court succinctly ruled that:
More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. What preceded this petition for certiorari was a letter-
complaint filed before the NBI charging Hemandas with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal
Code. If prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary investigation being conducted by the Special
Prosecutor the information shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines and no longer the petitioner which is only
an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is essentially an act against the State. It is the latter which is principally the
injured party although there is a private right violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue would become, therefore, of not much
significance in the main case. We cannot allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to escape prosecution upon a far-
fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no standing to sue.
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts for unfair competition or infringement of
trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign states under the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and France are parties. We are simply interpreting
and enforcing a solemn international commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which we are a party
and which we entered into because it is in our national interest to do so. 36 (Emphasis supplied)
Lastly, with regard to petitioners’ arguments that the NBA Properties, Inc., is not entitled to protection under Philippine patent
laws since it is not a registered patentee, that they have not committed acts amounting to unfair competition for the reason that
their designs are original and do not appear to be similar to complainant’s, and they do not use complainant’s logo or design, the
Court finds that these are matters of defense that are better ventilated and resolved during trial on the merits of the case.
WHERFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Let the records of this case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch 24) where Criminal Case No. 98-166147 is presently assigned, for further proceedings with reasonable
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

Page 7 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110

G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005
MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. MONINA A. ZENAROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 76, QUEZON CITY, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
After an information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned, pleaded guilty and were convicted and after they had
applied for probation, may the information be amended and the accused arraigned anew on the ground that the information was
allegedly altered/tampered with?
In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Evelyn Dimaculangan-Querijero dated 03 July 1996,1 accused Marcelo
Lasoy and Felix Banisa were charged as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.
The case docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-66788 was assigned and raffled to Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, presided by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced on 16 July 1996 in this wise:2
On arraignment accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA with the assistance of [their] counsel Atty. Diosdado
Savellano entered a plea of GUILTY to the crime charged against them in the information.
ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby find[s] accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, GUILTY of Violation of Section
4, Republic Act 6425 and they are hereby sentenced to suffer a jail term of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY and the period
during which said accused are under detention is hereby deducted pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 5127.
The evidence in this case which is the 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. The Property Custodian is ordered to turn over said evidences to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.
On the same date, both accused applied for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.3
On 28 August 1996, plaintiff People of the Philippines, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos, filed two
separate motions, first, to admit amended Information,4 and second, to set aside the arraignment of the accused, as well as the
decision of the trial court dated 16 July 1996.5 In plaintiff’s motion to admit amended information, it alleged:
1. That for some unknown reason both accused herein were charged of (sic) Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, R.P. 6425.
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully sell, or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.
When in truth and in fact the said accused should be charged for transportation and delivery, with intent to sell and to gain, of
Forty-Five (45) pieces of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 42.410 kilos from La Trinidad to Metro Manila.
2. That it is imperative to file an amended information in order to make it conformable to the evidence on hand.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is most respectfully prayed that the herewith attached Amended Information against
both accused be admitted and subsequently set for arraignment and trial.6 (Emphasis supplied)
Resolving the motions, the trial court, in its Order dated 03 September 1996,7 held:
The Motion to Admit Amended Information is hereby DENIED, as this court has already decided this case on the basis that the
accused was arrested in possession of 42.410 grams of marijuana and it is too late at this stage to amend the information.
Another Order8 of the same date issued by the trial court resolved the second motion in the following manner:
The Motion to Set Aside the Arraignment of the Accused as well as the Decision dated July 16, 1996, filed by the Public
Prosecutor is hereby GRANTED, it appearing from the published resolution of the Supreme Court dated October 18, 1995, in
G.R. No. 119131 Inaki Gulhoran and Galo Stephen Bobares vs. Hon. FRANCISCO H. ESCANO, JR. in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Leyte Branch 12, Ormoc City which was dismissed by this court on August 20, 1996,
the jurisdiction over drug of small quantity as in the case at bar should be tried by the Metropolitan Trial Court, although under
the statute of R.A. 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993 the penalty for possession or use of prohibited or regulated
drugs is from prision [correccional] to reclusion temporal which indeterminate penalty and under the rule on jurisdiction the
court which has jurisdiction over a criminal case is dependent on the maximum penalty attached by the statute to the crime.
The amended Information reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 kilos of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.9
Page 8 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110
This second information was assigned to Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Monina A. Zenarosa,10
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572.
Both accused filed a Motion to Quash11 which was opposed12 by the People in its Comment/Opposition filed before the trial
court. Subsequently, while the motion to quash before the RTC was as yet unresolved, both accused filed before the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari13 which they later moved to withdraw "to pave the way for Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon
City to act judiciously on their motion to quash.’’14 The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 15 November 199615 noted
the motion and considered the petition withdrawn.
In its now assailed resolution dated 14 February 1997,16 the trial court denied accused’s motion to quash, and scheduled the
arraignment of the accused under the amended information. Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration,17 duly opposed by the
prosecution,18 was denied by the trial court in its Order dated 16 April 1997.19 Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order20 based on the following grounds:21
A) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO
VALID INFORMATION AND, THEREFORE, THE ACCUSED CANNOT CLAIM THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY; and
B) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE RTC, BRANCH
103, HAD JURISDICTION OVER the case, docketed as Criminal CASE NO. Q-96-66799.22
In this Court’s resolution dated 23 July 1997,23 respondents were required to comment on the Petition. They submitted their
Comment on 18 November 1998.24 Accused filed their Reply25 on 02 March 2000. In compliance with the Court’s resolution
dated 29 March 2000,26 accused and respondents submitted their memoranda, respectively, on 26 May 200027 and 26 July
2000.28
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the
court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 29
The issues boil down to whether or not the first information is valid and whether or not the RTC, Branch 103, where the first
information was filed and under which Criminal Case No. Q-96-66788 was tried, had jurisdiction to try the case.
On the issue of validity of the information, accused and respondents submitted opposing views -- accused insisting on its
validity, whereas respondents asserted that the accused were arraigned under an invalid information. Alleging that there being an
alteration on the first information, hence it failed to reflect the true quantity of drugs caught in possession of the accused, the
prosecution insisted that the first information under which accused were arraigned is invalid.
In accord with the view of the prosecution, the trial court denied the accused’s motion to quash, stating:30
. . . [I]n the instant case, it must be recalled that the earlier information filed against the accused appeared to be sufficient in
form. It was discovered, however, that an alteration was made as to the weight of the marijuana fruiting tops which was placed at
only 42.410 grams when the correct amount should have been in kilos. This fraudulent alteration necessarily vitiated the
integrity of the proceedings such that despite the plea of guilt made by the accused it would not bar a subsequent prosecution for
the correct offense.
Generally speaking to entitle accused to the plea of former jeopardy, the prior proceedings must have been valid, and the lack of
any fundamental requisite which would render void the judgment would also make ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such
proceedings.
Fraudulent or collusive prosecution. A verdict of acquittal procured by accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not
put him in jeopardy; and consequently it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense.
Similarly, a conviction of a criminal offense procured fraudulently or by collusion of the offender, for the purpose of protecting
himself from further prosecution and adequate punishment, is no bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, either on
the ground that the conviction is void because of the fraud practiced, or that the state is not in any sense a party to it and
therefore not bound by it. (22 Corpus Juris Secundum, pp. 244-245)
It is impossible to believe that the accused were not aware of the deceitful maneuvering which led to the erasure of the true
weight of the marijuana fruiting tops as alleged in the information.
They cannot pretend not to know the exact amount of prohibited stuff for which they were charged before the information was
tampered with.
They could not feign innocence when they participated in that charade when they pleaded guilty upon arraignment.
Consequently, their plea to the lesser offense considering the decreased weight in the now altered information which merited a
much lighter penalty was irregularly obtained. Hence, they cannot be considered as put in jeopardy by the proceedings in court
which was tainted with fraud.
The accused should not be allowed to make a mockery of justice or to trifle with the courts by participating in a grand deception
of pleading guilty to a lesser offense knowing that they participated/acquiesced to such tampering and then tell the court that
they would be placed in jeopardy for the second time.
We do not agree with the trial court.
FIRST, it cannot be denied that the request for appropriate inquest proceedings dated 03 July 1996 addressed to the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City and received by Prosecutor Querijero, stated that the accused were apprehended "for conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with each other in facilitating and effecting the transportation and delivery . . . of forty–five
pieces of dried marijuana leaves (already in bricks) and weighing approximately forty-five kilos.’’31
In the joint affidavit of the poseur-buyer, PO3 Ernesto Jimenez Viray, Jr., and arresting officer SPOI Inadio U. Ibay, Jr., it is
stated that the accused were caught with approximately 45 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops.32 For some unknown reasons,
however, the Information filed against the accused reflected a much lesser quantity, i.e., 42.410 grams.
The question is whether this is sufficient to consider the first Information under which the accused were arraigned invalid.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court under Rule 110 are hereunder quoted:
Section 4. Information defined. – An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the
fiscal and filed with the court.
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,33 this Court citing People v. Marquez affirmed:34
It should be observed that section 3 of Rule 110 defines an information as nothing more than "an accusation in writing charging
a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court."
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof.35
In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant,
and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary
to follow the language of the statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by
law.36
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the
manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the
charge against them, is reasonably complied with.
Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule 110,37 Section 6, shows on its face that it is valid.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
SECOND, and with respect specifically to the trial court’s point of view that the accused cannot claim their right against double
jeopardy because they "participated/acquiesced to the tampering," we hold that while this may not be far-fetched, there is
actually no hard evidence thereof.38 Worse, we cannot overlook the fact that accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty
and convicted under the first information. Granting that alteration/tampering took place and the accused had a hand in it, this
does not justify the setting aside of the decision dated 16 July 1996. The alleged tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by
the accused may well be the subject of another inquiry.
In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People,39 the Court affirming the finality of a decision in a criminal case, citing Section 7,
Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, stated:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed a judgment [of conviction] becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
Indeed, the belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the information amended defies procedural rules, the decision
having attained finality after the accused applied for probation and the fact that amendment is no longer allowed at that stage.
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is emphatic:
Sec. 14. Amendment. – The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court,
when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section
11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial.
In Sanvicente v. People,40 this Court held that given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right against double jeopardy, even
an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is
when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. Respondent People of the Philippines
argues, citing the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan41 that the trial was a sham. We do not agree with the respondent as the trial
in the Galman case was considered a mock trial owing to the act of a then authoritarian president who ordered the therein
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and who closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure a
predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution of the respondents-accused therein of all the charges.42
The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. In this case, it bears repeating that the accused had been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they were already
Page 9 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110
in the stage where they were applying for probation. It is too late in the day for the prosecution to ask for the amendment of the
information and seek to try again accused for the same offense without violating their rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an information by motion of the prosecution and at the time when the
accused had already been convicted is contrary to procedural rules and violative of the rights of the accused.
FINALLY, on the issue of jurisdiction, the case of Gulhoran and Bobares v. Escano, Jr.,43 upon which both trial courts justified
their claim of jurisdiction, was actually based on this Court’s resolution dated 18 October 1995 where this Court held:
The criminal jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under
Section 32 (2) of B. P. 129, as amended by Rep. Act 7691 has been increased to cover offenses punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of the fine (Administrative Cir. No. 09-94, June 14, 1994). It appears that
the imposable penalties applicable to the subject cases are within the range of prision correccional, a penalty not exceeding six
years, thus falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC. It follows that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the charges against petitioners.
If we apply the resolution of this Court quoted above, it would seem that the Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
case under the first Information. Following that argument, the decision dated 16 July 1996 of the RTC Branch 103 was rendered
without jurisdiction, thus, accused may not invoke the right against double jeopardy.
Nonetheless, we cannot uphold this view owing to the fact that a later resolution superseding the resolution cited by the trial
courts, specifically Administrative Order No. 51-96 dated 03 May 1996, vests the RTC with jurisdiction to try Criminal Case
No. Q-96-67572. The resolution provides:
RE: SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, DANGEROUS DRUGS, CARNAPPING AND OTHER HEINOUS
CRIMES UNDER R.A. NO. 7659
Pursuant to Sec. 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in the interest of speedy and efficient administration of justice and subject to
the guidelines hereinafter set forth, the following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby designated to exclusively try and
decide cases of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING
OR FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, AND
VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES defined and
penalized under Rep. Act No. 7659, committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions:
...
11. Branch 103, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE JAIME N. SALAZAR, JR.
Subsequently, A.M. No. 96-8-282-RTC dated 27 August 1996, Re: Clarification on the applicability of Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 51-96 in relation to Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, declared:
. . . [T]he Court Resolved to AMEND the prefatory paragraph in Administrative Order No. 5-96, to read:
Pursuant to Section 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in the interest of speedy administration of justice and subject to the
guidelines hereinafter set forth, the following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby designated to exclusively try and decide
cases of KIDNAPPING AND/OR KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED
AGAINST A BANKING OR FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS
AMENDED, regardless of the quantity of the drugs involved.
This issue is further settled by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in People v. Velasco:44
. . . [A]ll drug-related cases, regardless of the quantity involved and the penalty imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as
applied/interpreted in People vs. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994; 234 SCRA 555), and of the provisions of R.A. No. 7691
expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, still fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts, in view of Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). R.A.
No. 7659 and R.A. No. 7691 have neither amended nor modified this Section.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is Granted. The Orders dated 14 February 1997 and 16 April 1997 issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, are set aside. Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572 is ordered Dismissed.
Accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa are forthwith ordered released from detention45 unless there may be valid reasons for
their further detention.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 184537 April 23, 2010
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, Petitioners,
vs.
The HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th DIVISION and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assailing the July 14, 2008 Resolution 1 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263, denying the Motion for Preliminary Investigation filed by the
petitioners who were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration done in open court on August 13, 2008.
An Information2 dated September 13, 2000 charging both petitioners with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, by causing undue injury to the government, reads:
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and
SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-
GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows:
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997, at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, public officials, being the Municipal
Mayor and PNP Member of Lavezares, Northern Samar in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, and with the late Limpio Legua, a private individual, with
deliberate intent, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into
a Pakyaw Contract for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for Barangays Mac-arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares,
Northern Samar, each in the amount of FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (₱48,500.00), Philippine
Currency, or a total amount of NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱97,000.00), Philippine Currency, without conducting a
competitive public bidding, thus depriving the government the chance to obtain the best, if not, the most reasonable price, and
thereby awarding said contracts to Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-accredited NGO, in violation of Sec. 356 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) and COA Circular No. 91-368, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
This case was initially raffled to the Third Division of Sandiganbayan and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 26319.
In a Resolution3 promulgated on June 14, 2002, the Third Division granted petitioners’ Motion to Quash and dismissed the
information "for failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused the government, an essential
element of the crime charged."
In a Memorandum4 dated July 1, 2003, the Ombudsman directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to study the
possibility of having the information amended and re-filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Thus, the OSP re-filed the Information5 dated August 17, 2007, this time, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263,
with the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, charging the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by giving
unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government.
The information, subject of the petition, now reads:
The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses, MAYOR
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA, a high ranking public
official being then the Mayor of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and committing the crime herein charged while in the discharge of
his official administrative function, conspiring and conniving with accused SPO2 FIEL B. GENIO, a member of Lavezares
Police Force (PNP) and with the late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-
accredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by then and there entering into a Pakyaw Contract with the
latter for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar,
in the amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total of NINETY SEVEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine Currency, without the benefit of a competitive public bidding to the prejudice of
the Government and public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation6 dated June 4, 2008 which was strongly opposed by the prosecution in its
Opposition7 dated June 18, 2008.
Petitioners contend that the failure of the prosecution to conduct a new preliminary investigation before the filing of the second
Information constituted a violation of the law because the latter charged a different offense–that is, violation of Section 3(e) by
Page 10 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110
giving unwarranted benefit to private parties. Hence, there was a substitution of the first Information. They argue that assuming
that no substitution took place, at the very least, there was a substantial amendment in the new information and that its
submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation. Further, they claim that newly discovered evidence
mandates re-examination of the finding of a prima facie cause to file the case.
On July 14, 2008, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the assailed Resolution denying the petitioners’ motion for
preliminary investigation. The graft court found that there is no substituted information or substantial amendment that would
warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation. It gave the following ratiocination:
The re-filed information did not change the nature of the offense charged, but merely modified the mode by which accused
committed the offense. The substance of such modification is not such as to necessitate the conduct of another preliminary
investigation.
Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the criminal liability of the accused upgraded in the re-filed information.
Thus, new preliminary investigation is not in order.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution states:
Finding the arguments of accused-movants indefensible, the sufficiency of the information must be sustained.
WHEREFORE, having established the sufficiency of the Information, the motion under consideration is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Accordingly, the arraignment of both accused shall proceed as scheduled. 8
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 dated August 6, 2008, submitting that the two Informations substantially charged
different offenses, such that the present information constituted a substitution that should have been preceded by a new
preliminary investigation.
On August 13, 2008, in a hearing for the arraignment of petitioners, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion 10 in open court.
Hence, petitioners interpose the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court anchored on the following grounds:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused
to order the preliminary investigation of the case a quo, when the second Information in the instant case constituted substituted
Information whose submission required the conduct of preliminary investigation.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused
to order the conduct of a preliminary investigation of the case a quo, since the second Information therein contained substantial
amendments whose submission required the conduct of preliminary investigation.
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused
to order the preliminary investigation of the case a quo, although the newly discovered evidence mandates due re-examination of
the finding that prima facie cause existed to file the case a quo.11
From the arguments raised by petitioners, the core issue is whether or not the two (2) ways of violating section 3(e) of Republic
Act 3019, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference constitute two distinct and separate offenses that would warrant a new or another
preliminary investigation.
In its Comment12 dated January 12, 2009, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, counters that there is no substituted information in contemplation of law and jurisprudence that would require the
conduct of another preliminary investigation. There is no newly-discovered evidence that would lead to a different determination
should there be another preliminary investigation conducted.
In their Reply,13 dated April 24, 2009, petitioners insist that the offenses charged in the first and second Information are not the
same, and what transpired was a substitution of Information that required prior conduct of preliminary investigation. Even
assuming there was no substitution, substantial amendments were made in the second Information, and that its submission
should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation.
We find no merit in this petition.
Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which
reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be 0unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
The essential elements of the offense are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.14
In a string of decisions, the Court has consistently ruled:
R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that the public officer should have acted by
causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a
violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly held in Santiago, as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This does
not however indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode
or under both.15
The afore-stated ruling is consistent with the well-entrenched principle of statutory construction that "The word or is a
disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule,
be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word." 16
Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted information. The Information dated August 17, 2007 filed in
Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263 charged the same offense, that is, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Only
the mode of commission was modified. While jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 17 provides that
there are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any party, including the
government; or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it does not mean that each act
or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may be charged under either mode18 or under both should both modes
concur.19
Petitioners’ reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag,20 ruling that, "in substitution of information another preliminary
investigation is entailed and that the accused has to plead anew to the new information" is not applicable to the present case
because, as already stated, there is no substitution of information there being no change in the nature of the offense charged.
Consequently, petitioners cannot invoke the principle enunciated in Villaflor v. Vivar, 21 that failure to conduct a new preliminary
investigation is tantamount to a violation of their rights. While it is true that preliminary investigation is a statutory and
substantive right accorded to the accused before trial, the denial of petitioners’ claim for a new investigation, however, did not
deprive them of their right to due process. An examination of the records of the case discloses that there was a full-blown
preliminary investigation wherein both petitioners actively participated.
Anent the contention of petitioners that the information contained substantial amendments warranting a new preliminary
investigation, the same must likewise fail.1avvphi1
Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in the first Information, and conferring unwarranted
benefits, alleged in the second Information, are two distinct violations of, or two distinct ways of violating Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, and that such shift from giving undue injury to conferring unwarranted benefit constituted, at the very
least, a substantial amendment. It should be noted that the Information is founded on the same transaction as the first
Information, that of entering into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay day care centers for barangays Mac-Arthur
and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar. Thus, the evidentiary requirements for the prosecution and defense remain the same.
To bolster their claim for a reinvestigation of the offense, petitioners cited the case of Matalam v. Sandiganbayan.22 The same is
inapplicable to petitioners’ case. In Matalam, there was indeed a substantial amendment which entitled the accused to another
preliminary investigation. The recital of facts constituting the offense charged therein was definitely altered. In the original
information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by the petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary
claims of the private complainants, whereas in the amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from the service of the private
complainants. In the case at bar, there is no substantial amendment to speak of. As discussed previously, the Information in
Criminal Case No. 26319 was already dismissed by the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan in view of the petitioners’ Motion
to Quash. As such, there is nothing more to be amended.
The Court is not unaware of the case of People v. Lacson,23 where it was written:
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new
Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary
investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the
prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new
witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a
new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are
charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal
complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is
upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits
and evidence.
No such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there was no modification in the nature of the charged offense.1avvphi1
Consequently, a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the petitioners.
Page 11 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110
Finally, the third assigned error, that newly discovered evidence mandates due re-examination of the finding of prima facie cause
to file the case, deserves scant consideration. For petitioners, it is necessary that a new investigation be conducted to consider
newly discovered evidence, in particular, the Affidavit of COA Auditor Carlos G. Pornelos, author of the audit report. We are
not convinced.
Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was
discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such
weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. 24
The Pornelos affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was executed by affiant way back in November 29, 2000,
as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it cannot be considered as newly found evidence because it was already in
existence prior to the re-filing of the case. In fact, such sworn affidavit was among the documents considered during the
preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed document to petitioners’ Supplement to Motion for Reinvestigation, 25 offered
to dispute the charge that no public bidding was conducted prior to the execution of the subject project.
More important is the prosecution’s statement in its Memorandum that, "after a careful re-evaluation of the documentary
evidence available to the prosecution at the time of the filing of the initial Information, and at the time of the re-filing of the
Information, the prosecution insists on the finding of probable cause, an exercise within the exclusive province of the Office of
the Ombudsman."26
Worthy of note is the case of Soriano v. Marcelo,27 viz:
Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office during a preliminary investigation is a
function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case,
given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call.
Without good and compelling reasons, the Court cannot interfere in the exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of its
investigatory and prosecutory powers.28 The only ground upon which it may entertain a review of the Office of the
Ombudsman’s action is grave abuse of discretion.29
Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism.30
The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of
law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction. 31
The case at bench discloses no evident indication that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with arbitrariness, whim or caprice. It
committed no error in refusing to order the conduct of another preliminary investigation. As sufficiently explained by the
prosecution, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary as there was neither a modification of the nature of the offense
charged nor a new allegation. Such conduct of preliminary investigation anew will only delay the resolution of the case and
would be an exercise in futility in as much as there was a complete preliminary investigation actively participated by both
petitioners.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution of
July 14, 2008, denying petitioners’ motion for preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR.,
Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances of Branch 149 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) – Order1 of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the
Amended Information indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution2 of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first
issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez3 (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family ("in
particular," former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.
(Malayan),4 a criminal complaint,5 before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355
in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova
Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon,
Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche,
Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the
accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com.
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned
subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had
previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder
after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati
RTC.
Decrying PPI’s refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum
by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet
under the address of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a blogspot 6 under the website address
www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-group7 at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily
accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.
Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates from August 25 to October 2,
2005, he "was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the
accused] containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and
particularly, Malayan."8 He cited an article which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which
stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation
because it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos
benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LET’S MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND WHEREVER.
Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let
us start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again
convince friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who joined
only after knowing that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements.
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD
SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x 9 (emphasis in the original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,10 the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen
(13) separate Informations11 charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No.
06-876, which was raffled off to public respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees
they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity,
character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso
Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article
imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website
www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and defamatory article as follows:
Page 12 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x
xxxxxxx
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the next time
they will try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as Annex "F" of the
complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article are known to the accused as
trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the accused are the ones responsible for the posting and
publication of the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted and published with the object of the discrediting and
ridiculing the complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutor’s Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who,
by Resolution of June 20, 2007,13 reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the
Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of "internet libel" was non-existent, hence, the
accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.14
Petitioners, as co-accused,15 thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a Motion to Quash 16 the Information
in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the
Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally
defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,17 petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial court’s
jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the
alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,18 the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed, quashed the Information, citing
Agustin v. Pamintuan.19 It found that the Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in
Makati at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco
Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information,20 insisting that the Information sufficiently conferred
jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban21 which held that the Information need not allege verbatim
that the libelous publication was "printed and first published" in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an
office in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information was
deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since venue is jurisdictional in
criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by
amendment.22
By Order of March 8, 2007,23 the public respondent granted the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration and accordingly
ordered the public prosecutor to "amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue."
The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007, 24 the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees
they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public
conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and
all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and
maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan
Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose
exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and
caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an
injurious and defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information25 which, they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public
respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were "printed and first published" by the accused in Makati; and
the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published
article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the Amended Information to be
sufficient in form.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration26 having been denied by the public respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008,
they filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
 2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES
TO BE DEFICIENT; and
3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CURING
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.27
With the filing of Gimenez’s Comment28 to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of
courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondent’s
admission of the Amended Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, 29 as a rule, requires that recourse must first be
made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. 30 A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those
against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals.31 The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but
purely legal questions.32
In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of exception, in
order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for
libel under Article 360 of the RPC –whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in
light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation
in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided,
however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province
where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission
of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private
individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.33 This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given
that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of
such cases.
In Macasaet,34 the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo35 which laid out the rules on venue in libel
cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement
in the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information
should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a
private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation
was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to
where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places,
namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged
defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by
availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published and accessed by the private complainant in
Makati City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an
examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals 36 explained the
nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel, following the amendment by
Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the province
wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or
Page 13 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110
composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation
of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the
libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under
that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of
the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal
and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman,
93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal
action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-
town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act
No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue
in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The
disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or
possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in
the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published,
as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines
or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet
as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating
his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners’ website in Makati with "printing and first publication" would spawn the
very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to
see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages
therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the
offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the
defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the
pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.1avvphi1
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the Court’s
pronouncements in Chavez37 are instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private person must file
the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainant’s place of residence. We would
also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is
no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are
hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of
residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was
printed and first published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to quash the Amended
Information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008 are
hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 172476-99 September 15, 2010
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking to annul the 5 April 2006 Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division
in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45. The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment on 26 February
2006 pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him.
The Facts
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with the rank of Brigadier
General, when he served as President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) from 5 April 1994 to
27 July 1998.3
During petitioner’s term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020
square meters of land situated in General Santos City for development as housing projects.4
On 1 August 1997, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual
vendors,5 executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the agreed price of ₱10,500.00 per square
meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the payment to the individual vendors of the purchase price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter of
the property.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The unilateral deeds of sale
reflected a purchase price of only ₱3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual purchase price of ₱10,500.00 per square
meter. On 24 September 1997, Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale
became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.6
On 18 December 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South Cotabato, which
includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit7 against petitioner, along with 27 other respondents,
for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation
of public funds or property through falsification of public documents. The case was docketed as Case No. OMB-3-98-0020.
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman, in its 20 January 1999 Resolution,8 found petitioner probably guilty of
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds that the following crimes were committed and that
respondents, whose names appear below, are probably guilty thereof:
xxxx
4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO, conspirators for twelve (12) counts of falsification of
public documents relative to the twelve (12) unilateral Deeds of Sale;
xxxx
6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. WILFREDO PABALAN, and NILO FLAVIANO twelve (12) counts of violation of section 3(e) of
RA 3019 for short-changing the government in the correct amount of taxes due for the sale of Lot X to AFP-RSBS;9
On 28 January 1999, the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations 10 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and
12 informations11 for falsification of public documents against petitioner and several other co-accused.
Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration dated 12 February 1999,12 with a supplemental motion dated 28 May 1999,13
of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. In its 11 June 1999 Order, 14 the Sandiganbayan disposed of
petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration, thus:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which to evaluate its evidence and to do whatever is
appropriate on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999 and supplemental motion thereof dated May 28, 1999 of
accused Jose Ramiscal and to inform this Court within the said period as to its findings and recommendations together with the
action thereon of the Ombudsman.
In a memorandum dated 22 November 2001, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be
excluded from the informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA), in a memorandum dated 18 December
2001, recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell,
bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject property. 15
The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the Office of the Ombudsman for Military
(OMB-Military). In a memorandum dated 21 August 2002, the OMB-Military adopted the memorandum of OMB-OSP
recommending the dropping of petitioner’s name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio approved the
recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the recommendation of the OMB-Military was not manifested before the
Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors16 was tasked to review the records of the case. After thorough review, the panel of prosecutors found that
petitioner indeed participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements,
Page 14 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110
vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at the price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors
posited that petitioner could not feign ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated the false
purchase price of ₱3,000.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors concluded that probable cause existed for petitioner’s
continued prosecution. In its 19 December 2005 memorandum,17 the panel of prosecutors recommended the following:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend the following:
1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military be set aside and the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal (petitioner) be DENIED;
2. Another information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 be filed against Ramiscal and all the other accused
for causing damage to the government when it caused the payment of the amount of Php 10,500.00 per square meter
for the subject lots when the actual amount should only be Php 3,000.00 per square meter. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of prosecutors. Upon receipt of the final
findings of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of petitioner.
Meanwhile, on 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for reconsideration 19 of the Ombudsman’s finding of
probable cause against him.
On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea, the Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of
not guilty. On 9 March 2006, petitioner filed a motion to set aside his arraignment20 pending resolution of his second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable
cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or evidence petitioner may
have should be ventilated in the trial of the case. In its assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied for lack of
merit petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.21
The Issue
Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment pending
resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him?
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman should have excluded him from the informations. He claims lack of probable cause to
indict him considering the prior findings of the Ombudsman recommending the dropping of the cases against him. Petitioner
claims that heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and that there should be grounds other than
the mere signature appearing on a questioned document to sustain a conspiracy charge.
Respondent Sandiganbayan counters that it correctly denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment. Respondent court
argues that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, filed on 26 January 2006 and pending with the Ombudsman at the time of his
arraignment, violated Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended. Respondent
court maintains that the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause against petitioner was the final decision
of the Ombudsman.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, 22 sanction
the immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the pendency of a
motion for reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of the Rules, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. –
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the
same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy
Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the information has already been
filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information
in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion. (Emphasis supplied)
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding
information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically
follows the filing of the information.
An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the
opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. The accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to
which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty.23
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493,24 otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the court must proceed with the
arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared before the
court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later, thus:
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment. There is grave abuse of discretion when
appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. x x x (Emphasis power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent
supplied) and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. 35
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of RA 8493, provides: Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction and control
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. – over a case properly filed before it. The Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case. 36 There being no showing of grave abuse
(30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. xxx (Emphasis supplied) of discretion on its part, the Sandiganbayan should continue its proceedings with all deliberate dispatch.
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA 8493 mean the same thing, that the 30-day We remind respondent to abide by this Court’s ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,37 where we stated that the mere filing of a
period shall be counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, which is when the accused petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before the
appears before the court. Sandiganbayan, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which applies Sandiganbayan. Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so provides:
suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which the petition [for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus]
of the Sandiganbayan, thus: is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course
cases: of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to public respondent from further proceeding in the case. (Emphasis supplied)
fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose. Case Nos. 25122-45, which denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment. This Decision is immediately executory.
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and Costs against petitioner.
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the SO ORDERED.
Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office.25
Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in this case.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA
8493.
Further, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed Resolution, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed on
26 January 2006 was already his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him.
The Ombudsman, in its 19 December 2005 memorandum, has already denied petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration, 26
impugning for the first time the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. Under Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner can no longer file another motion for reconsideration questioning yet
again the same finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner’s defenses are evidentiary in nature and are best threshed out in the trial of the
case on the merits. Petitioner’s claim that the Ombudsman made conflicting conclusions on the existence of probable cause
against him is baseless. The memorandum of the OMB-Military, recommending the dropping of the cases against petitioner, has
been effectively overruled by the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend the following:
1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military be set aside and the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal be DENIED;27 (Emphasis supplied)
As the final word on the matter, the decision of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause against petitioner prevails. This
Court does not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause. 28 The Ombudsman is endowed with a wide
latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power to pass upon criminal complaints. 29 As this
Court succinctly stated in Alba v. Hon. Nitorreda:30
Moreover, this Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally
mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers. Otherwise stated, it is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of
discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative and independence are
inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the
public service.31
In Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman,32 the Court explained the rationale behind this policy, thus:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of
the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with
regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.33
Significantly, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed
in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman,
which has full control of the case.341avvphi1

Page 15 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110

G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
1
This is a Petition for Review of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R.
SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration.2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January
1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in
payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment
for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account.
Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June
1995, but to no avail.3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg.
22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his
counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent
money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in
appreciation of his services, he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had
filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks
and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the
same as the those appearing on the checks.7 He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself
had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and
dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the
case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was possible
for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during
the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson
without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, 11 ACP Sampaga held that
the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg.
22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on
20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus,
considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed
against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated
that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating
prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner. 15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that
the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. 16 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ
resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor
and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was
directed to file three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 19 On 8 July 2003, the City
Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson,
ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of
special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not
provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised
Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder. 23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes,
Page 16 of 18 CRIMPRO ROLE OF OSG TO RULE 110
Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings,
and not the one before the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The
petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of
non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition is a mere
photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution, attaching to said motion an amended
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.27 Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that
subsequent compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the
Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical
grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the
Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law
which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they
claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases.30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially complies with the rules,
the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a
deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true
and correct–the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with
the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served, 32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching the
pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that there was failure to attach a
certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition
before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004,33 a certified true copy of which
was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring
that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in
this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for
preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly
involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, petitioner notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave
injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control. 38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which
do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month,
but less than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty
of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326,
 a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a
case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses
was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. 41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926
at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the
peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the
prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch
as the filing of the complaint signifies the
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused. 44 These cases were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao
and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding
which suspends the prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the complaint in
the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt
the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try
the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate
the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender, 48 and hence, the prescriptive
period should be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled
that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more
recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature
and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities
Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus
effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation
and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for
purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should
now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and
judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding
instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.54
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under
his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within
the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of
the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed
resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had
already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-
flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights
and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond
their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the
City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is
a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the
filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944 December 13, 2005 Respondent’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of complainant public prosecutor or a
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2189-RTJ] private prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by
STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE, Petitioner, subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.
vs. Respondent’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be,
JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO, Respondent. cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.
DECISION Respondent’s lament about complainant’s failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the August 13 and 20, 2004
CARPIO MORALES, J.: hearings or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of his Orders allowing
On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It does not absolve respondent of his utter disregard of
defense in Criminal Case No. 1771 TB, "People v. Vice Mayor Salvador Ramos, et al.," for violation of Section 3 of Presidential the Rules.
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roberto L. Ayco is hereby ordered to pay a fine FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00)
Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case. with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13 and 20, 2004 undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon Respecting the counter-complaint against complainant State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote, respondent is advised that the same
City, hence, his absence during the proceedings on the said dates. should be lodged before the Secretary of Justice.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case on August 27, October 1, 15 and 29, 2004, State Prosecutor Pinote SO ORDERED.
refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, he maintaining that the proceedings
conducted on August 13 and 20, 2004 in his absence were void.
State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation on November 12, 2004 before the trial court, he restating why he was
not present on August 13 and 20, 2004, and reiterating his position that Judge Ayco’s act of allowing the defense to present
evidence in his absence was erroneous and highly irregular. He thus prayed that he should not be "coerced" to cross-examine
those two defense witnesses and that their testimonies be stricken off the record.
By Order issued also on November 12, 2004, Judge Ayco, glossing over the Manifestation, considered the prosecution to have
waived its right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by State Prosecutor Pinote (complainant) against Judge Ayco
(respondent), for "Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct."
By Comment dated March 18, 2005, respondent proffers that complainant filed the complaint "to save his face and cover up for
his incompetence and lackadaisical handling of the prosecution" of the criminal case as in fact complainant was, on the request
of the Provincial Governor of South Cotabato, relieved as prosecutor in the case by the Secretary of Justice.
And respondent informs that even after complainant was already relieved as the prosecutor in the case, he filed a motion for his
inhibition without setting it for hearing.
On the above-said Manifestation filed by complainant before the trial court on November 12, 2004, respondent brands the same
as "misleading" and "highly questionable," complainant’s having undergone medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center on
August 13 and 20, 2004 having been relayed to the trial court only on said date.
On his Order considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence, respondent justifies the same on complainant’s
failure to formally offer the evidence for the prosecution despite several extensions of time granted for the purpose.
Finally, respondent proffers that no substantial prejudice was suffered by the prosecution for complainant was permitted to cross
examine the two defense witnesses but he refused to do so.
By way of counter-complaint, respondent charges complainant with "Contempt of Court" and "Grave Misconduct" and/or
"Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of the Bar and as an Officer of the Court."
On evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), citing Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on
Criminal Procedure, finds respondent to have breached said rule and accordingly recommends that he be reprimanded therefor,
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in the event of lack of public
prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecution Office to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the Court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal
action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of a public
prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor
may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the
case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the
termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly
prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness.1 It is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of
criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the
bedrock of peace of the people.2

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