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The Raising of American Troops for Service

in the West Indies during the War of
Austrian Succession, 1740±1

Abstract
This article is an account of the raising and dispatch to the West Indies of a
regiment of troops recruited in the American colonies for the Vernon±Cathcart
expedition to Cartagena on the Spanish Main.

T h e W a r o f Austrian Succession was a unique experience for the

American people for it was the first time that the British government raised
large numbers of American troops to serve in the West Indies. Before the
War of Austrian Succession, with the exception of attacks against the French
in Canada, such as the Walker expedition to Quebec in 1711, American
soldiers had almost exclusively been employed by American provincial
governments in operations against Indians.1 All of this would change in
the War of Austrian Succession: 3,000 American troops would be dispatched
during the War of Austrian Succession to the West Indies to serve with
regular British military forces in order to attack the Spanish. The Vernon±
Cathcart expedition against Cartagena on the Spanish Main, in 1741, was
thus the first time in which large numbers of Americans would serve outside
the mainland of North America. Moreover, the Vernon±Cathcart expedition
to the West Indies would place unusual demands on the American colonies.
And the American people, especially their elected colonial assemblies, would
respond to some of the burdens of the expedition by placing local American
interests before the requirements of imperial warfare.
The plan for the assault on Cartagena, which was formulated by the
British government in the last months of 1739, called for a force of eight
regiments of British soldiers to be sent from the British Isles to the West
Indies. At the same time an additional force of approximately 3,000 troops
was to be recruited in the North American colonies and sent to the West
Indies. The forces from Britain and North America were to rendezvous at
Jamaica where, in conjunction with British naval forces, they were to
undertake an attack on Cartagena.2 The decision to raise a force of Americans

1
There are many historians of warfare in colonial America. Two of the best are D. E. Leach, Arms
for Empire: a Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607±1763 (New York, 1973) and
I. K. Steel, Warpath: Invasions of North America (New York, 1994).
2
The most recent, and by far the best, account of the campaign in the West Indies is R. Harding,

# Institute of Historical Research 2000. Historical Research, vol. 73, no. 180 (February 2000)
Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden MA 02148, USA.
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t he r ais in g of ame ric an t r o op s , 1740± 1 21

to be employed in operations in the West Indies apparently grew out of the
belief, in London, that `every part of our Dominions, in proportion to their
strength and numbers should contribute to the promoting of the common
cause',3 and that there `is a very great number of good men in our colonies in
America which may be used with very great advantage against either France
or Spain'.4 Thus, in the spring of 1740, orders were issued for the first time by
the government in London to raise in America a regiment of troops for
service against the Spanish in the West Indies.
Alexander Spotswood, the governor of Virginia who held the rank of
major general, was appointed colonel of the regiment to be recruited in
America.5 However, Spotswood died on 7 June 1740, and was succeeded by
Lieutenant Governor William Gooch also of Virginia.6 This regiment of
Americans was to consist of four battalions of infantry. Each battalion
would be commanded by a lieutenant colonel, with a major as second-in-
command, and a staff consisting of an adjutant, a surgeon and a chaplain.
Furthermore, each battalion would be divided into companies with an
establishment calling for 100 privates, two drummers, four corporals, four
sergeants, one ensign, two lieutenants, and commanded by a captain.7 All
the non-commissioned officers and the rank and file of the regiment were
to be Americans. All the field and staff officers, as well as one lieutenant in
each company, were to be British and appointed by the government in
London. However, the British government, recognizing the importance of
local contacts in an effective recruitment drive, reserved a number of
commissions for Americans. All the captains, ensigns and one half of the
lieutenants were to be Americans and they were to be appointed by the
governors of the various American colonies. Officers appointed in America
were `to be men of interest in their country and well disposed to our
service'.8
The American troops were to be recruited in eleven North American
colonies.9 Thus, on 5 January 1740, with the exception of Nova Scotia, South
Carolina and Georgia, instructions were sent to every British colony on the
mainland of North America directing the governors to raise the required
men.10 Jonathan Belcher, the governor of Massachusetts, was informed, as

Amphibious Warfare in the 18th Century: the British Expedition to the West Indies, 1740±1 (Woodbridge,
1991).
3
Public Record Office, CO 5/752 fo. 357. In all quotations from manuscripts, standard
abbreviations have been extended and capitalization modernized, but the original spelling has
been retained.
4
British Library, 32692 fo. 544.
5
Ibid. fos. 9±13.
6
P.R.O., CO 5/41 fo. 215.
7
P.R.O., T 1/103 fo. 239.
8
P.R.O., SP 44/184 fos. 46±58.
9
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia and North Carolina.
10
Brit. Libr., Add. MS. 32693 fos. 15±25.

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22 t he r ais in g of ame ric an t ro op s , 1740± 1

were ten other governors in America, of the intended expedition to the West
Indies and instructed to begin recruiting troops for service in the Caribbean.
`Considering the number of inhabitants', the British government required
Massachusetts to provide ten companies consisting of 1,000 men. Belcher was
likewise directed to issue a proclamation `inviting our good subjects to enlist
in our service'. This proclamation also stated that all `officers and soldiers,
shall enter into our pay and enjoy the same pay, rank and privileges with the
rest of our British troops'. The wages of privates and non-commissioned
officers would begin the day on which the men actually enlisted, while
commissioned officers' pay would begin from the date of their commissions.
The troops raised in America would also be armed, clothed and equipped by
the British government. Indeed, upon arrival in the West Indies, the
American troops `shall be provided for in every other respect as our British
troops'. In the meantime the American colonial governments would be
required to provide the American troops with `all other necessarys' and to pay
for their provisioning during the initial stages of deployment to the West
Indies as well as to pay for the chartering of the ships needed to transport the
troops from America to Jamaica.11 To assist with training the American
troops, a number of privates and non-commissioned officers belonging to the
British forces garrisoning Nova Scotia, as well as the four independent
companies12 stationed at New York City, were to be transferred to the
American regiment. Also the troops raised in America would be able to share,
on an equal basis with the British forces, in `plunder'. At the conclusion of
the expedition the American forces would be returned to America at the
expense of the British government.
To assist the governors of the colonies with recruiting and organizing the
force, Colonel William Blakeney, the adjutant general of the expedition, was
to be sent to New York City. Blakeney was to bring with him eighty-eight
blank commissions for American officers.13 He was also to bring 3,000
muskets, bayonets, cartridge boxes with belts, a number of tents, drums and
camp colours for the American troops.14 Blakeney was also given £500 by the
government as `equipage money', whilst a further £500 was given for the
subsistence of the troops to be recruited in America.15 Moreover, an
additional 1,000 stand of arms as well as all the clothing required by the
Americans was to be dispatched directly to the West Indies.16 Blakeney was
asked to report back to London on the progress made by the colonial
authorities in America in their efforts to raise the required number of troops.
In the event that the governors of the colonies could not themselves recruit
11
P.R.O., CO 5/752 fos. 357±63.
12
For a history of the independent companies, see S. M. Pargellis, `The four independent
companies of New York', in Essays in Colonial American History Presented to Charles McLean Andrews
by his Students (New Haven, Conn., 1931), pp. 96±123.
13
In all, there were 30 commissions for captains, 28 for lieutenants and 30 for ensigns.
14
P.R.O. SP 44/184 fos. 7±8, 56.
15
The Papers of Lewis Morris, Governor of the Province of New Jersey . . . (New York, 1852), pp. 103±4.
16
P.R.O., CO 5/41 fos. 26±7, 52±3.

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t he r ais in g of ame ric an t ro op s , 1740± 1 23

the men, then Blakeney was directed `to apply to the governors for leave to
beat up for volunteers'. Conversely, if it should appear that more than 3,000
American troops could in fact be recruited, then Blakeney was to `give
assurances' that additional arms, clothing and equipment would be supplied
to the Americans upon their arrival in the West Indies.17 Upon arrival at
New York City in June 1740, Blakeney found `a strong disposition in the
people of these provinces to engage in the expedition', allowing him to
surmise that it would indeed be possible to recruit more than 3,000
Americans.18
Since the governors of each American colony were the officials who had
the main responsibility for raising and dispatching the troops to the West
Indies, when the directive from the government in London calling for the
recruitment of such troops arrived at Philadelphia, George Thomas, the
lieutenant governor of Pennsylvania, called a meeting of his council and on
14 April issued a proclamation calling for volunteers. Thomas's proclamation
stated the reasons for the war with Spain and called for men to enlist in `the
glorious expedition'. The Pennsylvania proclamation further stated that the
forces raised in America would be armed, equipped and paid by the British
government and notices were to be placed in the newspapers announcing
when, where and how men could enlist. The Pennsylvania proclamation also
stressed the fact that the troops raised in America would be commanded by
`an officer long settled in North America and engaged in affection to protect
their persons and secure their interests'. More importantly, the governor
would appoint and issue king's commissions to those persons who are
`inhabitants or well known' to command the troops raised in Pennsylvania.19
Similar proclamations were issued by the governors of other colonies in
America.20
To facilitate the recruitment process, a number of colonies paid bounties
as well as offered other inducements to men who enlisted for the expedition.
The government of Virginia granted each man who volunteered 6s 6d at the
time of enlisting, and then three Spanish pistoles upon embarking for
Jamaica.21 The colony of Rhode Island granted each man who enlisted
three pounds and an exemption from military service for a period of three
years after his return from the West Indies.22 The Massachusetts general
court gave each man who enlisted `five pounds in bills of old tenor or one
pound thirteen shillings and four pence in bills of new tenor'; in addition
each soldier was issued with `a good and convenient blanket' when he
17
P.R.O., SP 41/12, Memoranda for Col. William Blakeney, 5 Apr. 1740.
18
P.R.O., Co 5/41 fo. 215.
19
Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, ed. S. Hazard (10 vols., Philadelphia and
Harrisburg, Pa., 1851±2), iv. 395±7.
20
E.g., Documents relating to the Colonial History of the State of New Jersey (33 vols., Trenton, N.J.,
1880±1928), xv. 114±17.
21
P.R.O., CO 5/1423 fo. 63.
22
Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in New England, ed. J. R. Bartlett
(10 vols., Providence, R.I., 1856±65), iv. 573.

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24 t he r ais in g of ame r ic an t ro op s , 1740± 1

embarked for the West Indies.23 And in New Hampshire each soldier was
granted for enlisting five pounds `in bills of credit on this province and a
blanket'.24 The Quaker-controlled assembly in Pennsylvania, unlike in most
of the other colonies, refused to grant the governor's request for an
appropriation of money to pay bounties to enlist men.25 Nevertheless, the
failure of Pennsylvania to grant a bounty for enlisting apparently did not
hinder the raising of men in that province. Obviously the payment of
bounties was a means of facilitating enlistments, but perhaps of far greater
importance in obtaining volunteers for service in the West Indies was the
granting of British army commissions to Americans.
When Blakeney arrived at New York he divided among the various
colonies the eighty-eight blank commissions which he had brought from
England. From the outset there were more candidates to be made officers
than there were blank commissions,26 but it was the desire to obtain a king's
commission in the British army which attracted to the expedition those
people in the American colonies who were willing and capable of obtaining
the men required to fill up the ranks of the American regiment. Indeed,
according to Massachusetts Governor Jonathan Belcher, `Commissions is
what will encourage the enlistment more than anything else'.27 In New Jersey,
the governor Lewis Morris promised four men that if `they could raise
companies (as they believed they could) I would give them commissions'.28
The problem, however, was there were just eighty-eight blank commissions
made available for Americans. Given the enthusiasm that existed in the
colonies for enlisting for service in the expedition to the West Indies, but also
for doing so primarily under American officers, the commissions offered
could not meet such expectations. Moreover, although the number of
commissions required for a 3,000-man strong regiment was indeed eighty-
eight, the governors had been authorized by their instructions to recruit as
many men as possible and did in fact enlist more than 3,000 men. Ordering
the governors of the colonies in America to recruit more men than there
were commissions for the American officers who actually raised the men was
probably a mistake for, as Lewis Morris observed, this `will render the raising
of future levyes very difficult'.29
In order to overcome the problem of the shortage of commissions
available in the colonies it was decided by the British authorities that all
those American officers who had received warrants from colonial governors
would be commissioned upon arrival in the West Indies. For example, in
Pennsylvania Lieutenant George Thomas raised eight companies of soldiers,
23
The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of Massachusetts Bay (21 vols., Boston,
Mass., 1869±1922), xii. 671.
24
P.R.O., CO 5/948 fo. 85.
25
P.R.O., CO 5/1233 fo. 197.
26
P.R.O., CO 5/41 fo. 224.
27
P.R.O., CO 5/752 fo. 366.
28
Papers of Lewis Morris, p. 95.
29
Ibid., p. 104.

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t he r ais in g of ame ric an t ro op s , 1740± 1 25

but could give king's commissions to the officers of only four companies,
with the result that four captains, four lieutenants and four ensigns received
warrants from the provincial lieutenant governor instead of commissions
from the king.30 Nevertheless, not everybody in America thought this
arrangement to be suitable. There were several reasons for this. For instance,
some of the colonial governors, given the terms of their instructions, believed
that they would receive enough commissions to grant a captain's commission
to every person who raised a company. Such was the case with Governor
Morris in New Jersey who reported that he had recruited three companies
and could have raised an additional two companies `had there been
commissions sent as was expected from his Grace's [the Duke of Newcastle's]
letter; these not coming put a great damp upon the thing'.31 Others were
simply not convinced that the commissions would be forthcoming in the
West Indies and were not willing to take a chance. In Massachusetts
commissions and arms were provided for only four companies. However,
Belcher persuaded a fifth company to go on the expedition without these
items.32 In the event, the promise that commissions and arms would be issued
in the West Indies was disregarded by a number of men, and five out of ten
of the companies which were eventually raised in Massachusetts were
disbanded and the men sent home by the provincial authorities. Another
reason why the men would not go on the expedition was the failure of the
British government to provide arms for them. Indeed, the governor of
Massachusetts believed that, if he had had several months' notice, as well as
commissions for American officers and arms for the men, he could have
recruited `twenty or more companies' in the Bay Province.33
Although there were problems in retaining the men once enlisted, there
was apparently no difficulty in initially recruiting the rank and file. Thus
Blakeney reported from New York City that `As to the American levies, they
go briskly, even beyond what could have been expected during the high
harvest and high wages'.34 At times, however, some persuasion was necessary
for an effective recruitment. For instance in Virginia the justices of the peace
were authorized by statute to enlist forcibly `such able-bodied men as do not
follow or exercise any lawful calling or employment, or have not some other
lawful and sufficient support and maintenance to serve his Majesty as
soldiers'.35 Many of the men who joined up as privates appear, for the
most part, to have been the less fortunate in American society, that is
unemployed or underemployed labourers, debtors, indentured servants and
the like. Morris in New Jersey said that recruits were debtors and `some of

30
P.R.O., CO 5/1234 fo. 97.
31
Papers of Lewis Morris, pp. 103±4.
32
Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston, Mass., 1894), 6th ser., vii. 331.
33
P.R.O., CO 5/41 fos. 233±4.
34
Ibid. fo. 224.
35
W. W. Hening, The Statutes at Large: being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia (13 vols.,
Richmond, Va., 1809±23), v. 95.

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26 t he rais in g of ame ric an t ro op s , 1740± 1

the meaner half and some servants'36 and in Pennsylvania there were
complaints in the colonial assembly about the large number of indentured
servants being recruited.37 A British general officer would later complain that
the Americans enlisted from Maryland, Virginia and North Carolina were
mostly `Irish (probably popists) or English convicts'.38 In essence, as one
authority (who is also the most recent historian of the expedition to
Cartagena) concluded, the troops from Massachusetts, as presumably from
other American colonies, were recruited from roughly the same socio-
economic background as were the rank and file of the British army.39
The payment of subsistence to the troops recruited in the colonies for the
West Indian expedition was a third problem and one that became embroiled
in the maze of chronic financial problems of colonial America. Before his
death, Spotswood put forward a plan which was published at the time, calling
for paying the soldiers, upon embarkation, four months' pay in coin at the
rate of one Spanish pistole per month. According to Spotswood there were
several advantages to this scheme. If the soldiers received four months' pay in
advance they could leave money to support their families whilst in the West
Indies. Payment in advance would also assist enlistments by giving inden-
tured servants the means of buying their freedom as well as giving debtors
money to pay off their creditors. Moreover, the payment of all the troops
recruited in America at the same rate, and in Spanish coins, would eliminate
the problems which were bound to occur if the troops were paid by the
colonial governments in provincial paper money which greatly fluctuated in
value among various colonies. Moreover, the payment of American soldiers
in Spanish coin, Spotswood maintained, would do away with the jealousy
which could arise between the troops as a result of different colonies being
paid in provincial paper money of widely differing values.40
After consulting Lieutenant Governor William Gooch of Virginia and
Lieutenant Governor George Clarke of New York, Blakeney agreed to pay
the American troops one pistole a month until they joined the main British
force in the West Indies when they were to receive the same rate of pay as
British soldiers. Blakeney reckoned that one pistole equalled twenty-eight
shillings in New York money, which worked out to each American private
soldier receiving 2s 2/5d sterling per day, which was only 2/5d per day more
than the wages of a private in the British army.41 However, upon further
reflection and probably on the advice of Lewis Morris of New Jersey,42
Blakeney dropped the idea of paying the subsistence of the American troops
in Spanish pistoles. Instead he concluded that `the common currency in all

36
Papers of Lewis Morris, pp. 89, 96.
37
P.R.O., CO 5/1234 fos. 103±4.
38
P.R.O., CO 5/42 fos. 46±7.
39
Harding, p. 74.
40
P.R.O., CO 5/41 fo. 221.
41
P.R.O., CO 5/41 fo. 219.
42
Papers of Lewis Morris, p. 84.

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t he rais in g of ame r ic an t ro op s , 1740± 1 27

the colonies is paper, gold and silver, whether in bullion or specie, [and as
such it] is but a commodity that rises and falls according to its quantity in the
market'. Therefore the British officer reasoned that, since pistoles cost more
in London than in America, and that since the rarer sterling bills of exchange
usually commanded a higher value in America, the British government could
get more value for its money if the subsistence of the American troops was
paid, not in Spanish pistoles, but rather in sterling bills of exchange to be
drawn on London. In the event, the subsistence of the troops was paid by
Blakeney in the following manner: by transmitting to various colonial
governors sterling bills of exchange drawn on London, which were then to
be negotiated and exchanged for various provincial paper currencies in which
the soldiers were then paid.43 There were problems inherent in such a
scheme. For instance, those governors, such as Morris of New Jersey, whose
provinces were not the site of a major commercial centre, encountered
difficulties in negotiating large sterling bills of exchange.44 Another problem
was that the soldiers, who had believed that they would be paid in coin, were
now being paid in provincial paper money.
Under the terms of the instructions from the British government to the
colonial governors for raising troops each colonial government had to
provide ships to transport their troops to the Caribbean as well as pay for
the provisions required to feed the men during the voyage.45 In order to
obtain the necessary money to pay for the transportation of the troops to the
West Indies, each governor had to seek and obtain from his colonial assembly
an appropriation of funds. The necessity of raising money to pay for
provisioning and transporting the troops to the West Indies was a difficult
task for some of the governors, given the political and economic conditions
in colonial America. The economies of the British colonies in America were
for the most part agricultural and were characterized by an inadequate
circulating medium and chronic shortages of specie. These monetary prob-
lems were compounded by the fact that each colonial assembly looked upon
itself as being a mini house of commons having all the rights, prerogatives
and privileges of that body.46 Moreover, the members of each colonial
assembly represented local interests within a colony. As such they were often
loath to increase the taxes of their constituents at the command of the
government in London and for such a far-away crisis as a military expedition
to the West Indies, that did not seem directly to concern or benefit their
voters. The British government finally recognized that there might be some
difficulty in obtaining the needed appropriations from the colonial assem-
blies in America. As a result, in April 1740, the governors were authorized, if
absolutely necessary, to draw bills on the Navy Board in London in order to
43
P.R.O., CO 5/41 fos. 224±5.
44
Papers of Lewis Morris, pp. 94, 103.
45
E.g., P.R.O., CO 5/752 fos. 361±2.
46
Cf. J. P. Greene, The Quest for Power: the Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies,
1689±1776 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1963).

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28 t he r ais in g of ame r ic an t ro op s , 1740± 1

pay for the provisions and shipping needed to transport the troops to the
West Indies.47
In some colonies such as Massachusetts,48 New York49 and Virginia50 the
colonial assemblies promptly enacted the legislation required to pay for the
costs of transportation of their troops to the West Indies. However in
Pennsylvania, `because it is repugnant to the religious principles professed by
the greater number of the present assembly, who are of the people called the
Quakers', the legislative branch of the government expressly refused to
appropriate the money needed to victual and transport the Pennsylvania
troops. The lieutenant governor, George Thomas, attempted repeatedly and
failed to get the assembly of Pennsylvania to grant the required funds.51
Finally, seeing no other alternative, Thomas was forced to borrow
£5,124 1s 8d from a group of prosperous Philadelphians to feed and
transport the eight companies of Pennsylvania troops. In order to repay
this debt, the lieutenant governor applied to the Navy Board in London for
money even though there was £9,750 14s 1d in the Pennsylvania provincial
treasury.52
In New Jersey it was only with difficulty that Governor Morris was able to
obtain a bill from the colonial assembly, which he and his council thought
unsuitable, to pay for the transportation of the troops to the Caribbean.
According to Morris, the New Jersey assembly did not want to pay the
money required for the transportation of the troops, but at the same time it
did not wish to be seen as refusing to take any action on the question. As a
way out of this dilemma, the assembly wanted to adjourn `under the pretence
of waiting to see what their neighbors of Pennsylvania and New York would
do'. Morris, seeing this as a way of avoiding taking any action, refused to
permit an adjournment and applied pressure to the members of the assembly,
finally forcing the body to pass a bill appropriating £2,000 in bills of credit
for the transportation costs of the troops. However, `This bill, instead of
raising any money, only applied money already raised and applied for the
support of the government by other acts'. Furthermore, whilst there was no
grant of moneys made in the New Jersey legislation for the victualling of the
troops, the money actually appropriated for the transportation costs had to be
expended under the direction of the assembly. Even though Morris and his
council believed that the bill passed `was very confused and scarce
intelligible', the assembly refused to alter the legislation claiming that it
was `a money bill'. The governor thought that the New Jersey assembly had
passed this bill in the belief that Morris would veto it and the members of

47
P.R.O., CO 5/752 fos. 355±6.
48
Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, xii. 694, 707±8.
49
The Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the Revolution (5 vols., Albany, N.Y., 1894),
iii. 64±8.
50
Hening, v. 121±3.
51
Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, iv. 402±33.
52
P.R.O., CO 5/1234 fos. 103±7, 109, 115.

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t he rais in g of ame ric an t ro op s , 1740± 1 29

the assembly would then be able to blame the governor for the failure to
appropriate the money required to pay for the transportation of the New
Jersey troops. In the event, Morris repeatedly attempted but failed to get the
assembly to amend the legislation. In the end the governor was forced to
consent to the bill, even though he believed it to be a flawed piece of
legislation, and after informing the assembly that it would in no way serve as
a precedent for future legislation.53
In other colonies, too, the problems caused by the shortage of specie had
to be at least temporarily solved if the costs of victualling and transporting
troops to the West Indies were to be met. The lack of a circulating medium
was usually overcome by the issuing of paper notes even though this was in
theory prohibited by the British government. In fact there was a long
tradition in the issuing of paper money in America, with the first issue
dating back to 1690 in Massachusetts. The issuing of paper money would
once more be resorted to in order to finance the expedition to the West
Indies. In Delaware, for example, the provincial assembly voted on 9 August
1740 £1,000 to pay for the victualling and transportation of troops. In lieu
of money, bills of credit, which were later to be redeemed by taxation, were
issued by the provincial government in order to pay for provisions and the
freight of shipping.54 In New Hampshire, a province described by its
governor as `being very thin in men and estate',55 the assembly voted
£2,000 to pay for the feeding and transportation of the force. However, as
in Delaware, bills of credit were issued in New Hampshire too, which were
to be redeemed by the end of 1742 through taxation. Eager to collect the
funds needed to redeem these bills, and thus overcome the shortage of
specie in the local economy, the colony of New Hampshire allowed its
inhabitants to pay their taxes in a variety of ways, namely in money, bills of
exchange or in commodities. For taxation purposes a number of commod-
ities, such as hemp, flax and bar iron, were assigned monetary values. The
items collected as taxes were then sold off by the province and the proceeds
were used to redeem the bills of credit.56 In North Carolina, upon receipt of
instructions from London calling for the raising of troops for the West
Indies expedition, the governor, Gabriel Johnston, went before the colonial
assembly and requested an appropriation of funds. Thereupon, the assembly
demanded that Johnston lay before the house `the original instructions
signed by his Majesty, and other letters referred to in your Excellency's
speech'. The governor, to placate the assembly, consented to this and
produced the documents even though he believed that the assembly had

53
Papers of Lewis Morris, pp. 116±17; SPEECHES MADE, and a LETTER wrote by his Excellency
LEWIS MORRIS, Esq . . . (Philadelphia, Penn., 1741).
54
Minutes of the House of Assembly of the Three Counties upon Delaware at sessions held at New Castle
in the Years 1740±2 (N.P., 1929), pp. 5±10; R. Rodney, Colonial Finances in Delaware (Wilmington, Del.,
1928), p. 27.
55
Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society . . ., 6th ser., vii. 314.
56
Laws of New Hampshire, ed. A. S. Batchellor (10 vols., Manchester, N.H., 1904±22), ii. 579±81.

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30 t he r ais in g of ame ric an t r o op s , 1740± 1

`no right to demand a sight of my original instructions'. After inspecting the
governor's instructions, the assembly decided to pay for the raising and
transportation of the North Carolina troops by issuing `a certain quantity of
new bills'. This was done although Johnston had informed the body that,
under the terms of his instructions, he could not consent to the issuing of
paper money, unless the legislation contained `a suspending clause that it
should not take effect till his Majesty's pleasure should be known'. Never-
theless, the assembly disregarded Johnston's threat of a veto and passed a bill
without a suspending clause, appropriating the necessary funds in paper
money which were to be redeemed in one year by means of taxes and which
could be paid in commodities. By this measure Johnston was, in effect, given
the choice of either consenting to the issuing of paper money or not having
the legislation necessary to raise the troops for the West Indies expedition.
In the end, Johnston was forced to consent to the wishes of the North
Carolina assembly and approve a paper money bill without a suspending
clause.57 In the final analysis, the general lack of specie in the colonial
economies, itself the result of a number of factors, amongst them being the
lack of any form of institutionalized banking, meant that both governors
and colonial assemblies were forced to resort to credit, in the form of paper
money issues, in order to raise the funds needed to finance the military
expedition to the West Indies.
The fate of the American soldiers on the expedition to the West Indies
was at best inglorious and deadly; moreover, it has largely been forgotten.
The troops from Virginia, Maryland, Delaware and Pennsylvania sailed
directly to Jamaica while the forces from the northern colonies assembled
on ship board at Hampton, Virginia, and on 29 October 1740 proceeded to
the West Indies.58 At the beginning of 1741 some 3,119 American troops had
been assembled at Jamaica.59 The British did not think very much of these
troops. None of the Americans knew anything about soldiering and it was
found, at best, difficult to discipline them. Nevertheless, the Americans were
ultimately vital to the military operations in the Caribbean for they formed
approximately forty per cent of the British forces in the West Indies.60 They
served in the ill-fated attack on Cartagena and subsequently in the botched
campaign in Cuba. However, it was not enemy action which killed American
soldiers in the West Indies but rather tropical diseases. By the end of 1741,
the American force had been reduced to some 1,300 rank and file of which
450 men were sick.61 When George Washington's half-brother Lawrence
returned to Virginia from the expedition to the West Indies, he named the
family plantation after Admiral Edward Vernon, the British naval com-

57
The Colonial Records of North Carolina, ed. W. L. Saunders (10 vols., Raleigh, N.C., 1886±90), iv.
252±72.
58
P.R.O., CO 5/41 fos. 250±5.
59
P.R.O., CO 5/42 fo. 25.
60
Harding, p. 70.
61
P.R.O., CO 5/42 fo. 109.

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t he r ais in g of ame ric an t ro op s , 1740± 1 31

mander in chief at Cartagena. Mount Vernon is perhaps the only monument
to the Americans who served in the 1740±1 expedition to the West Indies.
At the end of the campaign in the Caribbean, when the disease-ridden
remnants of the American force straggled back to America, the whole
episode was soon forgotten both in America and in Britain.

In 1740 the British successfully raised more than 3,000 American troops to
serve on an expedition to the West Indies. When the directive arrived in
America from London to recruit men for service in the West Indies there
were no difficulties in enlisting the troops; men in all the American colonies
were willing to take the king's shilling and join `the glamorous expedition'.
What was not predicted by anybodyÐeither in America or BritainÐin the
rush to recruit the men and dispatch the force to the West Indies was that
colonial America had become a different country from Britain. Americans in
1740 were just not prepared to enlist and then serve under British officers in
any expedition. It was quickly discovered that key to the recruiting of
Americans for the West Indies was the granting of commissions to Americans
who also had the ability and means actually to recruit the required men. In
several colonies, Massachusetts and New Jersey for example, it was found that
the men would not serve unless their American officers were granted British
army commissions. Several years later when the British government once
more attempted to raise two regiments in America it was again found that
Americans would not serve under British officers.62
Not only was there a marked reluctance on the part of Americans to serve
under British officers, there was also a tendency in the colonial assemblies,
when requested to appropriate money to support American troops serving
with the British, to respond to local American political considerations rather
than to the demands of British imperial interests. In New Jersey and North
Carolina, for example, when requesting funds to transport the troops the
governors found themselves embroiled in disputes with the colonial
assemblies over rights and privileges. The assembly in Pennsylvania, when
confronted with demands for funds to support a British military effort,
absolutely refused to disregard the religious convictions of its constituents. In
other colonies the governors discovered that the only possible way, politically
as well as economically, to obtain the necessary funds from the colonial
assemblies was to consent, at times even contrary to their instructions from
London, to the issuing of bills of credit or of paper money. Perhaps the
American colonies were ultimately successful in forcing some changes in the
recruitment policies pursued by the British government. It is worthwhile
noting that in the seventeen-fifties, during the Seven Years' War, the British
government avoided the problems caused by the issuing of paper money, as
well as other potential conflicts with the colonial assemblies over money for

62
Cf. Correspondence of William Shirley; Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in
America, ed. C. H. Lincoln (2 vols., New York, 1912), i. 295±6.

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32 t he rais in g of ame r ic an t ro op s , 1740± 1

military purposes, by simply providing from London the necessary funds to
the various American provincial governments.63
Thus the raising and paying of troops in America, for the expedition to the
West Indies in 1740, brought forth some unexpected reactions on the part of
the Americans. In the way various colonial assemblies acted and the inability
of the royal governors, or indeed the British government, to force them to do
otherwise, one can discern the stirring of regional self-confidence and
political independence which would later lead to nationalism and revolution
in America.
Queen's College David Syrett
City University of New York

63
E.g., The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803 (36 vols., 1806±
20), xv. 937.

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