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Dean Carlota
Dean Carlota
Citation:
Dante B., Editor Gatmaytan. Grandeur: Lectures
Delivered on the Occasion of the Centennial of the
University of the Philippines, College of Law
(2013).
SalvadorT. Car/ota
I See Julius Stone, The Twentieth Centugy Administrative Explosion and After, 52 CALIF L.
REv. 513, 516-517 (1964).
2 G.R. No. 47065, 70 PHIL. REP. 221 (S.C.,June 26, 1940).
3 Id.at 229.
Administrative Rulemaking andAdjudication
I
ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING AND ADJUDICATION AND THE
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
II
RULEMAKING AND THE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE
The basic idea behind the non-delegation doctrine is that since the
constitution has conferred upon the legislature the power to make laws,
the latter cannot evade responsibility by delegating such power to some
other body or agency. As explained by the Supreme Court in the 1908
case of United States v. Barias,the non-delegation doctrine "is based on
the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality
5 G.R. No. 4349, 11 PHIL. REP. 327, 330 (S.C., Sept. 24, 1908).
6 See People v. Que Po Lay, G.R. No. L-6791, 94 PHIL. REP. 640 (S.C., Mar. 29,
1954).
7 G.R. No. L-63915, 146 SCRA 446 (Dec. 29, 1986) (Phil.).
8 The Administrative Code in part provides:
Effecfiviy. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days
from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law,
or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and
welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying
the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules
known to persons who may be affected by them.
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, bk. VII, § 4, Exec. Ord. No. 292, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 6682 (Phil.).
CENTENNIAL LECFURES OF THE UP COLLEGE OFLA W
12 Rubi v. Provincial Bd., G.R. No. L-14078, 39 PHIL. REP. 660 (S.C., Mar. 7, 1919).
13 People v. Rosenthal, G.R. No. L-46076-77, 68 PHIL. REP. 328 (S.C., June 12, 1939).
14 Int'l Hardwood & Veneer Co. v. Pafigil Fed'n of Labor, G.R. No. L-47178, 70
delegation cases, in four cases, the Supreme Court struck down the validity of the
delegation of power. See Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Bd. of Pub. Util.
Comm'rs, G.R. No. L-11216, 34 PHIL. REP. 136 (S.C., Mar. 6, 1916); United States v.
Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. 17122, 43 PHIL. REP. 1 (S.C., Feb. 27, 1922); People v. Vera,
G.R. No. L-45685, 65 PHIL. REP. 56 (S.C., Nov. 16, 1937); Pelaez v. Auditor Gen.,
G.R. No. L-23825, 15 SCRA 569 (Dec. 24, 1965) (Phil.).
CENTENNAiL LECIVRES OF THE UP COLLEGE OFLAW
According to Davis:
III
LIMITATIONS ON THE RULEMAKING POWER
19 Concerning the limits on the rulemaking power, see Olsen & Co., Inc. v. Aldanese,
G.R. No. L-18740, 43 PHIL. REP. 259 (S.C., Apr. 28, 1922); Sy Man v Jacinto, G.R. No.
L-5612, 93 PHIL. REP. 1093 (S.C., Oct. 31, 1953); People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-
32166, 79 SCRA 450 (Oct. 18, 1977) (Phil.); Toledo v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, G.R. No.
92646-47, 202 SCRA 507 (Oct. 4, 1991) (Phil.); Comm'r v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
108358, 240 SCRA 368 (Jan. 20, 1995) (Phil.); Land Bank of the Phil. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 118712, 249 SCRA 149 (Oct. 6, 1995) (Phil.); GMCR, Inc. v. Bell
Telecomm. Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 126496, 271 SCRA 790 (Apr. 30, 1997) (Phil.); Ass'n
of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Auth., G.R. No. 110526, 286
SCRA 109 (Feb. 10, 1998) (Phil.); Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, 293 SCRA 141
(July 23, 1998) (Phil.); Philippine Bank of Commc'ns v. Comm'r, G.R. No. 112024, 302
SCRA 241 (Jan. 28, 1999) (Phil.); China Banking Corp. v. Members of the Bd. of Trs.,
Home Dev. Mut. Fund, G.R. No. 131787, 307 SCRA 443 (May 19, 1999) (Phil.);
Maxima Realty Mgmt. & Dev. Corp. v. Parkway Real Estate Dev. Corp., G.R. No.
136492, 422 SCRA 572 (Feb. 13, 2004) (Phil.).
20 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, bk. VII, §§ 3-4, Exec. Ord. No. 292, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 6682 (Phil.).
21 G.R. No. L-63915, 146 SCRA 446 (Dec. 29, 1986) (Phil.).
CE1NTENNIAL LECITIRES OF THE UP COLLEGE OF LA w
22 See Republic v. Express Telecomm. Co., G.R. No. 147096, 373 SCRA 316 (an. 15,
2002) (Phil.); Nat'l Ass'n of Elec. Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, G.R. No. 163935, 481 SCRA 480 (Feb. 2, 2006) (Phil.); GMA Network, Inc.
v. Movie & Television Review & Classification Bd., G.R. No. 148579, 514 SCRA 191
(Feb. 5, 2007) (Phil.); Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., G.R. No. 173918,
550 SCRA 680 (Apr. 8, 2008) (Phil.).
23 ADMINISTRATIvE CODE, bk. VII, § 9, Exec. Ord. No. 292, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 6682 (Phil.).
Administraive Rulemakang andAdjdication
to accommodate the input from the public in the final shaping of the
rule to be adopted.
One of the significant innovations introduced by the Administrative
Code of 1987 is the provision that "in the fixing of rates, no rule or final
order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published
ina newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the
first hearing thereon., 24 Rate fixing is legislative in nature. However,
there are instances when rate fixing assumes a quasi-judicial character.
This happens, according to the Supreme Court in the leading case of
Vigan Electric Li'gbt Co. v. Public Service Commission, 5 when the rate fixed
applies exclusively to one enterprise or entity and is based on a finding
of fact, in which case, due process requires notice and hearing. However,
when the rate to be fixed applies to all entities or enterprises of a given
kind, rate fixing becomes legislative in character and, unless the law
requires otherwise, notice and hearing may be dispensed with. With the
adoption of the policy of public participation in rate fixing, proposed
rates of legislative character should now be published in a newspaper of
general circulation before the first hearing.
IV
JUDICIAL FUNCTION OF ADMINISTRATwE AGENCIES
24 Id. 5 9(2).
25 G.R. No. L-19850, 10 SCRA 46, 52-53 (an. 30, 1964) (Phil.). The ruling of the
Supreme Court was subsequently reaffirmed in the case of Philippine Commc'ns
Satellite Corp. v. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818, 180 SCRA 218 (Dec. 18, 1989) (Phil.).
CEi\TENNLL LECTURES OF THE UP COLLEGE OF LAW
26 Ang Tibay v. Court of Indus. Relations, G.R. No. L-46496, 69 PHIL. REP. 635 (S.C.,
Feb. 27, 1940).
27 See ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, bk. VII, § 13, Exec. Ord. No. 292, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 6682 (Phil.); Gov't Serv. Ins. Sys. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, G.R. No.
96938, 202 SCRA 799 (Oct. 15, 1991) (Phil.).
Administraive Rulemaking andAdjudication
28 Asprec v. Itchon, G.R. No. L-21685, 16 SCRA 921 (Apr. 30, 1966) (Phil.).
29 G.R. No. L-46496, 69 PHIL. REP. 635 (S.C., Feb. 27, 1940).
CENTEI'NIAL LEC17JRES OFTHE UP COLLEGE OF LAW
V
CONTROL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING AND
ADJUDICATION
30 See Gatus v. Quality House, Inc., G.R. No. 156766, 585 SCRA 177 (Apr. 16, 2009)
(Phil.); Medina v. Comm'n on Audit, G.R. No. 176478, 543 SCRA 684 (Feb. 4, 2008)
(Phil.).
31 CONST. (1987), art. VII, §§ 1, 17 (Phil.).
Administrative Rulemaking andAdjudicaion
From the perspective of the legislature, its oversight power over the
agencies can be utilized as a control mechanism. Theoretically, through
the creation of oversight committees, agency operations are monitored
or supervised to ensure that the exercise of delegated powers is in
accord with legislative policies. On closer analysis, however, lack of time,
expertise, and organizational aptitude for effective and continuing
supervision-the very same factors that compelled the delegation of
rulemaking and adjudicatory powers to the agencies-substantially
diminish the functional value of these oversight committees as checks to
administrative action. Neither can we realistically consider the
congressional power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation as a
potent check on agency abuse or capriciousness in the exercise of their
powers. While the constitution mandates that these investigations be
conducted in aid of legislation, legislative history shows that quite a
number of these investigations are focused on the past conduct of
public officials who are suspected of having violated laws already in
existence. Oftentimes, the results of these investigations are
recommendations to the Office of the Ombudsman for the criminal
prosecution of officials who were investigated. Moreover, these
investigations are not undertaken on a regular basis and they are mostly
confined to major or sensational cases of graft and corruption. Clearly,
legislative investigation in aid of legislation is not an effective tool to
prevent administrative misbehavior.
Concerning the efficacy of the non-delegation doctrine as a tool to
prevent the capricious exercise of delegated powers, it has been noted
earlier that the fixing of legislative standards in the enabling statutes of
agencies as required by the doctrine can only be considered as an
effective method of checking agency action when such standards are
sufficiently definite or specific. Broad or vague standards are open
invitations to absolute or unfettered discretion, which may or may not
be exercised for the public interest.
It is, however, the rules of administrative procedure enacted by
Congress, which can help prevent uncontrolled discretion. It is
noteworthy that Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 contains
provisions, which prescribe procedural rules to be commonly observed
by agencies in administrative rulemaking and adjudication.32 If strictly
followed, these rules can further enhance the opportunity to be heard of
32 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, bk. VII, §§ 9-16, Exec. Ord. No. 292, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 6682 (Phil.).
CENTENNIAL LECTURES OF THE UP COLLEGE OF LAW
the parties affected by agency action thereby ensuring their right to due
process.
The judiciary offers the most effective check on agency action
through its power of judicial review. While the executive and legislative
branches can control administrative rulemaking and adjudication only to
a certain extent, the courts, through the various modes of judicial review
provided in the Rules of Court, can better control agency behavior to
ensure that it does not exceed the limits set by law. Undoubtedly, judicial
review offers the most direct way to check arbitrariness in the exercise
of administrative power and it provides immediate relief to the adversely
affected parties.
In evaluating the efficacy of judicial review as a checking device over
agency action, two major issues must be taken into consideration. The
first issue is a threshold issue as it relates to its availability. If judicial
review is available, the next issue that must be addressed pertains to the
scope or extent of such review.
Regarding the issue of availability, it is appropriate to ask at this
point whether or not judicial review is available in cases where the
enabling statute of the agency does not expressly provide for such
review. Should the silence of the law be interpreted to mean that the
intention of Congress is to withhold judicial review? The Supreme Court
answered this question in the negative in a case where the enabling
statute did not expressly provide for judicial review. The Court held that:
33 San Miguel Corp. v. Sec'y of Labor, G.R. No. L-39195, 64 SCRA 56 (May 16, 1975)
(Phil.). See also Meralco Sec. Indus. Corp. v. Cent. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, G.R.
No. L-46245, 114 SCRA 260 (May 31, 1982) (Phil.); Uy v. Palomar, G.R. No. L-23248,
27 SCRA 287 (Feb. 28, 1969) (Phil.); Sotto v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-17419, 41 PHIL. REP.
Administrative Rulemaking andAdjudicaion
VI
CONCLUSION
38 ADMINIsTRATIvE CODE, bk. VII, § 25(7), Exec. Ord. No. 292, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 6682 (Phil.).
Administrative Rulemaking andAdjudication
39 New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting), dted in
Bernard Schwartz, CrucialAreas in Administrative Law, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 401, 405
(1966).