Frank

 Aigner  
Airpower  &  Modern  Conflict  
Fall  2011  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stopping  the  Unstoppable:  Douet,  Mitchell,  and  Arnold  
vs.  Chennault  and  ‘Defensive  Pursuit’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Just  as  land  warfare  has  J.F.C.  Fuller  and  Leon  Trotsky,  and  warfare  at  sea  has  
Sir  Julian  Corbett  and  Alfred  Mahan,  so  too  modern  air  warfare  has  its  early  
theorists.    Among  these,  Giulio  Douet  stands  out  as  having  influenced  a  number  of  
air  power  thinkers,  civilian  and  military,  in  Europe  and  in  the  United  States.  His  
early  experiences  with  military  aviation  were  to  shape  his  thinking  about  air  power,  
which  in  turn  was  to  influence  others.  Among  his  ardent  supporters  were  airmen  
from  the  United  States  Army  Air  Corps’  “Bomber  Mafia”,  William  “Billy”  Mitchell  and  
Henry  “Hap”  Arnold,  who  agreed  with  Douet’s  stance  in  the  bomber-­‐versus-­‐fighter  
debate:  the  bomber  was  basically  unstoppable,  would  deliver  its  munitions  on  
target,  and  thus  was  the  air  power  tool  of  the  next  war  (Meilinger,  1997:  7).  
However,  there  were  other  theorists,  as  well,  airmen  like  Claire  Lee  Chennault,  who  
had  thought  about,  written  about,  and  field-­‐tested  methods  for  preventing  bombers  
from  getting  to  their  targets  (Rice,  2003:  35).    Chennault’s  involvement  with  the  
American  Volunteer  Group  (AVG)  countering  the  Japanese  air  campaign  in  China  
created  an  opportunity  for  him  to  apply  his  methodology  of  how  to  prevent  the  
bomber  from  hitting  its  target,  and  empirically  refute  the  notion  that  “the  bomber  
always  gets  through”  (Baldwin,  2008:  72).  
 
  Initially  commissioned  an  artillery  officer  in  1888  after  graduating  from  
Genoa  Military  Academy  at  the  top  of  his  class,  Giulio  Douet  was  quickly  recognized  
for  his  academic  abilities,  and  was  enrolled  at  the  Polytechnic  Institute  in  Turin  for  
the  study  of  science  and  engineering.  By  1900,  in  no  small  measure  due  to  his  ability  
to  write  technical  papers  and  texts,  he  had  been  appointed  to  Italy’s  General  Staff  
(Meilinger,  1997:  1).    As  Italy  began  to  acquire  aviation  assets  (its  first  dirigible  was  
constructed  in  1905,  and  first  airplane  in  1908)  Douet  immediately  recognized  the  
airplane’s  possibilities,  predicting  that,  “Soon  it  will  be  able  to  rise  thousands  of  feet  
and  to  cover  a  distance  of  thousands  of  miles”.  Much  to  Douet’s  consternation,  
however,  his  superior,  Col.  Maurizio  Moris  was  a  dirigible  advocate;  indeed,  Italy  
was  spending  ¾  of  its  aviation  outlay  on  zeppelins  at  the  outbreak  of  World  War  I  
(Meilinger,  1997:  2).    One  of  his  earliest  and  most  prescient  beliefs  was  that  
command  of  the  air  would  be  rightly  sought  by  an  “Independent  Air  Force”,  and  that  
having  military  aviation  assets  remain  a  “service”  or  as  “auxiliary  aviation  of  the  
army  and  navy”  would  not  be  sufficient  (Douet,  1998:  32-­‐33).  He  thus  became  an  
adherent  of  the  creation  of  an  entirely  separate  ranch  of  service,  with  pilots  as  the  
officers  in  command  (Meilinger,  1997:  2).  As  Douet  points  out  in  The  Command  of  
the  Air,  Italy  can  claim  “first  user”  status  when  it  comes  to  airpower;  Italy  fought  a  
war  with  Turkey  over  Libya  in  1911-­‐12,  and  used  aircraft  for  reconnaissance  and  
liaison  duties  (Douet,  1998:  3).  The  Origin  of  Air  Warfare,  published  by  the  Historical  
Office  of  the  Italian  Air  Force,  makes  even  greater  claims  for  air  power  use  during  
this  conflict,  including  forward  observing,  air  transport  of  men  and  materiel,  
bombing  of  Turkish  soldiers  ,  Turkish  logistics  depots,  both  daylight  and  nighttime,  
indeed  “most  of  the  traditional  roles  of  airpower  employment  were  identified  and  
attempted  during  the  very  first  year  aircraft  saw  combat”  (Meilinger,  1997:  3).  Thus,  
Douet  was  thinking  about  and  writing  on  airpower  doctrine  before  the  advent  of  
World  War  I.  Now  Major  Douet,  he  was  charged  with  the  task  of  writing  an  
assessment  of  the  war  with  Libya  specific  to  its  implications  on  future  use  of  aircraft  
in  conflicts.  One  of  his  recommendations  with  portent  for  the  future  was  that  Douet  
felt  that  the  best  use  of  aircraft  would  be  high-­‐altitude  bombing,  and  that  they  
should  carry  a  “heavy  load  of  bombs”  (Meilinger,  1997:  3).    
 
  With  the  coming  of  World  War  I,  he  began  to  write  position  papers  calling  for  
large  fleets  of  bombers  (500+  aircraft),  but  between  his  calls  for  numbers  of  aircraft  
that  his  contemporaries  found  outlandish  (calling  for  a  fleet  of  20,000  aircraft  to  be  
built  to  assault  Germany)  and  his  criticism  of  Italy’s  prosecution  of  the  war,  Douet  
found  himself  not  only  out  of  the  military,  but  in  military  prison.    However,  as  some  
of  his  criticisms  began  to  appear  valid  in  light  of  Italy’s  poor  performance  in  the  war,  
and  some  of  his  predictions  came  true,  he  was  released  and  made  the  Italian  General  
Air  Commissariat’s  central  director  of  aviation.  It  was  through  this  position,  and  
through  his  friendship  with  the  Italian  aircraft  designer  Gianni  Caproni,  that  he  had  
direct  influence  on  airpower  thinking  in  the  United  States  (Meilinger,  1997:  6).    
   
  It  was  after  World  War  I  that  Douet  was  to  write  his  most  influential  work,    
The  Command  of  the  Air.  Overall,  Douet’s  dictum  could  be  summed  up  using  the  
sporting  analogy  that  the  “best  defense  is  a  good  offense”  (Meilinger,  1997:  10).  
While  the  work  acknowledges  many  possible  military  uses  of  aviation  
(reconnaissance,  transport,  close  air  support,  pursuit),  Douet  is  clear  that  the  others  
should  be  strictly  thought  of  as  secondary  to  the  strategic  bombing  arm  of  an  air  
force.  His  thesis  centered  on  two  types  of  targets,  two  centers  of  gravity.  The  first  
was  that  strategic  bombing  should  be  employed  to  decimate  the  enemy’s  production  
capability,  its  “industrial  base”,  and  the  second  was  that  strategic  bombing  should  
target  the  enemy’s  civilian  morale  (Eula,  1986:  94).  These  deep  strikes  on  the  enemy  
were  to  be  made  using  a  “battleplane”,  which  was  to  carry  bombs  and  defensive  
armament,  i.e.  machine  guns,  for  self  defense  (Douet,  1998:  117).  Douet  goes  to  
some  length  in  arguing  that  a  properly  engineered  “battleplane”  could  really  fulfill  
the  role  of  both  fighter  and  bomber,  and  that  in  any  event  the  bomber  could  do  
things  a  fighter  could  not,  thus  “if,  instead,  the  Independent  Air  Force  consists  
entirely  of  battleplanes”,  certain  economies  of  force  would  be  realized  (Douet,  1998:  
118).  Douet  mentions  the  idea  of  early-­‐warning  systems,  but  dismisses  “elaborate  
system(s)  of  signals”  as  not  up  to  task.  To  borrow  a  phrase  from  Stanley  Baldwin,  
the  “bomber  will  always  get  through”  (Baldwin,  2008:  72),  Douet  explained,  because  
the  enemy  has  to  spread  his  defense  very  thinly,  as  he  doesn’t  know  where  the  
enemy  bombers  will  attack.  Apart  from  claiming  the  “airplane  is  not  adaptable  to  
defense”,  Douet  argued  that,  in  order  to  even  attempt  to  defend  against  bombers,  a  
potential  adversary  would  need  20  times  more  fighters  than  the  number  of  bombers  
being  used  against  him  (Douet,  1998:  17;  my  italics).  In  the  second  edition  of  The  
Command  of  the  Air,  which  came  out  in  1927,  he  went  even  further,  stating  that  
pursuit  and  attack  aircraft  were  “useless,  superfluous  and  harmful”,  and  did  not  
constitute  airpower  (Meilinger,  1997:  13).  While  Douet’s  book  and  the  ideas  
contained  therein  led  to  “lively  debate”  in  the  Italian  air  force  journal  Rivista  
Aeronautica  (Corum,  1997:  160),  in  the  United  States  Douet’s  tome  was  to  become  
“pivotal”  at  the  Air  Corps  Tactical  School  (Eula,  1886:  94).  
 
  Back  in  1917,  even  before  the  publication  of  The  Command  of  the  Air,  Douet  
had  begun  to  influence  American  military  aviators;  two  American  Air  Service  (the  
United  States  Army’s  World  War  I  aviation  branch)  officers,  Col.  Raynal  Bolling  and  
Major  Edgar  Gorrell,  had  been  sent  to  Europe  to  obtain  aircraft  plans  for  production  
in  the  United  States,  and  were  persuaded  by  Gianni  Caproni  to  purchase  the  design  
for  one  of  his  heavy  bombers.  Additionally,  Caproni  introduced  Major  Gorrell  to  
Douet’s  ideas  through  the  writings  of  an  Italian  journalist,  Nino  Salvaneschi,  who  
was  a  close  associate  of  Douet’s  (Interestingly,  Salvaneschi  used  the  word  
“battleplanes”  in  his  writing,  a  term  which  Douet  was  to  use  in  his  major  work,  The  
Command  of  the  Air).  Salvaneschi’s  articles  advocated  the  strategic  bombing  of  
Germany  in  order  ‘“to  kill  the  war”,  not  by  destroying  the  enemy  army  but  by  
destroying  its  “manufactories  of  arms”’  (Meilinger,  1997:  7).    Major  Gorrell  and  his  
associate,  Colonel  William  “Billy”  Mitchell,  inspired  by  Douet’s  ideas,  created  a  plan  
to  strategically  bomb  Germany  into  capitulation.  Mitchell  wrote  that  his  plan  “would  
have  caused  untold  sufferings  and  forced  a  German  surrender”  (Clodfelter,  
1997:87).  The  war  ended  before  Gorrell  and  Mitchell  could  put  their  plan  to  the  test,    
but  the  end  of  the  war  was  not  the  end  of  Douet’s  influence  on  United  States  military  
aviation.  
 
  Douet’s    The  Command  of  the  Air  “became  the  strategic  bible  of  the  Air  Corps”.  
In  1931,  then  Captain  Chennault  wrote  that  the  book  ”painted  a  brilliant  picture  of  
great  bomber  fleets  fighting  their  way  unescorted  to  targets,  with  the  enemy  
fighters  and  flak  impotent  in  the  face  of  their  fury.”  (Rice,  2003:  29)  This  Douetian  
vision  of  bombers  by  the  hundreds  or  thousands  wafting  their  way  over  enemy  
targets  and  pummeling  them  with  impunity  found  resonance  with  the  Air  Corps  
Tactical  School’s  “Bomber  Mafia”:  men  like  William  “Billy”  Mitchell,  Ira  Eaker,  Carl  
Spaatz,  and  Henry  “Hap”  Arnold.  (Faber,  1997:  187)  Their  program,  which  at  times  
they  had  to  pursue  tactfully  due  to  interservice  rivalries,  could  have  been  written  for  
them  by  Douet,  and  was  fourfold:    
 
 
1. Make  America  an  airpower  nation  rather  than  a  seapower  nation  

2. Create  publicity  for  airpower  by  emphasizing  its  peacetime  uses  

3. Create  an  independent  air  force,  and…  

4. Develop  their  concept  of  unescorted  high  altitude  precision  daylight  bombing  

(HAPDB)  

(Faber,  1997:  186)  Their  development  of  HAPDB  continued  to  stress  that  airpower  
was  an  offensive  weapon  that  was  “impossible  to  stop”,  and  the  certainty  of  the  
collapse  of  enemy  morale  when  subjected  to  aerial  assault  (Faber,  1997:  216).  
 
  As  early  as  1920,  then  Lieutenant  Claire  Lee  Chennault  had  thought  the  one-­‐
on-­‐one  dogfighting  skills  that  pilots  were  being  taught  were  wrong-­‐headed.  Having  
read  Oswald  Boelcke’s  writings  from  World  War  I,  Chennault  thought  more  about  
operating  in  pairs  and  flying  formation  (Rice,  2003:  25).  In  1923  Chennault  was  
placed  in  command  of  the  Nineteenth  Fighter  Squadron,  and  by  versing  his  pilots  in  
his  style  of  flying,  they  performed  very  well  in  wargames  against  other  U.S.  Army  
and  U.S.  Navy  units  (Rice,  2003:  26).  In  1931,  Chennault  was  assigned  to  the  Air  
Corps  Tactical  School.  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  Air  Corps  Tactical  School  was  the  
bastion  of  the  “Bomber  Mafia”,  who  were  hardcore  advocates  of  Douet’s  bombers-­‐
only  thesis.  Chennault,  
 
       “and  a  minority  of  fighter-­‐plane  advocates,  thought  that  the  
notion  of  a  bomber’s  invulnerability  was  rubbish.  While  not  
opposed  to  the  bomber,  Chennault  insisted  that  bombers  were  
 susceptible  to  attack  by  fighters…  he  believed  that  bombers  
could  not  operate  effectively  until  air  superiority  was  
established.  Whether  operating  against  incoming  enemy  
bombers,  or  against  enemy  fighters  threatening  outgoing  
American  bombers,  only  fighter  trained  to  “destroy  hostile  
enemy  aircraft”  could  win  air  superiority”  (Rice,  2003:  30)  
 
Chennault  also  linked  fighter  tactics  to  the  need  for  an  early-­‐warning  network  to  
give  pilots  information  about  enemy  strength,  location,  and  heading.    But  many  of  
the  other  instructors  at  the  ACTS  taught  World  War  I  era,  man-­‐to-­‐man  dogfighting,  
Removed  from  any  context  of  air  defense  or  bomber  escort.  Chennault,  though,  
continued  to  develop  his  Boelcke-­‐influenced  thinking  about  aircraft  fighting  in  
teams.  Chennault’s  critics  trumpeted  Air  Corps  maneuvers  in  1931  where  the  
commander  of  the  fighter  aircraft  charged  with  defending  was  unable  to  intercept  a  
single  bomber  in  two  weeks’  worth  of  wargames.  An  ACTS  general  decided,  “Due  to  
increased  speeds  and  limitless  space,  it  is  impossible  for  fighters  to  intercept  
bombers  and  therefore  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  employment  of  air  force  to  develop  
fighters”  (Rice,  2003:  33).  As  there  had  been  no  early-­‐warning  network,  Chennault  
knew  why  the  interceptors  had  faired  poorly  in  the  exercises.  So,  in  1933,  for  
wargames  held  in  Ohio  and  Kentucky,  Chennault  set  up  16,000  square  miles  of  
warning  network,  with  spotters  reporting  in  to  airfields  by  radio  or  telephone.  
Chennault’s  aircraft  were  able  to  intercept  and  attack  aircraft  well  before  they  
reached  their  target  area.  The  “Bomber  Mafia”  cried  foul,  but  Chennault  had  the  
evidence  he  needed,  and  thereafter,  in  1933,  he  wrote  The  Role  of  Defensive  Pursuit,  
in  which  he  expounded  his  theories  on  using  aircraft  to  defend  targets  from  
bombers,  and  defend  bombers  from  enemy  aircraft  (Rice,  2003:  35).  However,  
Chennault  was  looking  for  an  opportunity  to  put  his  ideas  into  real  practice,  and  war  
in  China  gave  him  the  chance  to  “prove”  his  theories.  
 
  In  1937,  at  the  behest  of  Chiang  Kai-­‐Shek,  Chennault,  having  been  discharged  
from  the  U.S.  Army  as  no  longer  fit  to  fly,  went  to  work  in  China  to  develop  the  
Chinese  air  force.  Disappointed  by  the  state  of  China’s  fledgling  airpower,  and  what  
Chennault  considered  its  woefully  inadequate  chances  against  Japanese  military  
aviation,  Chang  Kai-­‐Shek  proposed  a  radical  solution:  that  Chennault  go  back  to  the  
United  States,  and  there  purchase  one  hundred  modern  American  interceptors,  
along  with  contracting  one  hundred  American  military  pilots  to  fly  them.  This  was  
no  small  task,  as  the  American  military  establishment,  sensing  war  on  the  horizon,  
did  not  want  to  let  one  hundred  planes  or  pilots  go.  However,  the  project  became  
known  to  Franklin  Delano  Roosevelt,  who  approved  the  scheme  on  December  23,  
1940,  and  made  it  possible  for  Chennault  to  acquire  what  was  needed  (Ford,  1991:  
48).    Thus  American  pilots  went  to  fight  in  China,  before  Pearl  Harbor,  in  much  the  
same  way  that  Americans  had  signed  on  with  the  R.A.F.,  and  fought  in  the  Lincoln  
Brigade  in  Spain.  
 
  Chennault  followed  his  own  dictates  from  The  Role  of  Defensive  Pursuit,  
in  which  he  stressed  a  three-­‐part  approach  to  air  defense:  “detecting  and  reporting,  
interception  by  pursuit,  and  destruction  or  repulse  of  the  invaders.”  He  called  his  
early-­‐warning  system  “Jing  Bao”,  which  means  ‘to  be  alert’  in  Chinese  (Rice,  2003:  
50).  On  the  American  Volunteer  Group’s  first  day  of  operation,  December  20,  1941,  
the  Japanese    21st  Hikotai  sent  ten  twin  engine  bombers  to  strike  Kunming.  Upon  
being  engaged  by  AVG’s  fighters,  the  Japanese  jettisoned  their  bombs  (before  
reaching  their  target)  and  headed  back  to  their  airfield  in  Indochina,  losing  four  of  
the  ten  bombers  to  the  AVG  (Ford,  1991:  111-­‐118).  This  poses  a  conundrum  
unforeseen  by  Douet,  Mitchell  or  Arnold:  bomber  crews  ‘losing  their  nerve’,  
dropping  their  ordnance  and  fleeing  on  merely  making  visual  contact  with  enemy  
interceptors.  Chennault’s  theorized  that  if  the  AVG  could  cause  25%  casualties  on  
any  given  Japanese  air  unit,  that  unit  would  not  be  able  to  continue  the  campaign.  
The  Japanese  unit  involved  in  the  December  20  attack,  the  21st  Hikotai,  did  not  
reappear  in  China,  and  no  other  Japanese  units  attacked  from  Indochina  for  another  
month  (Ford,  1991:  118).  On  December  23,  the  Japanese  62nd  Sentai  sent  fifteen  
bombers  to  strike  Rangoon,  Burma;  ten  came  back,  and  those  aircraft  were  badly  
damaged,  with  crew  members  wounded  or  killed  even  in  aircraft  that  were  not  shot  
down.  December  25  brought  no  better  luck  for  the  Japanese;  the  12th  Sentai  lost  five  
bombers  from  a  12-­‐plane  formation.  These  losses,  both  in  airframes  and  trained  
crew,  caused  General  Michio  Sugawara,  in  charge  of  in-­‐theatre  Japanese  air  assets,  
to  call  “off  the  campaign  against  Rangoon.”  (Ford,  1991:153).  Chennault’s  AVG  
continued  inflicting  losses  on  in-­‐theatre  (China-­‐Burma-­‐India)  Japanese  aviation  
assets  in  this  manner,  shooting  down  296  Japanese  aircraft  in  between  December,  
1941,  and  July,  1942,  when  the  AVG  (by  this  time  known  as  the  “Flying  Tigers”)  was  
disbanded  and  re-­‐incorporated  into  the  United  States  Army  Air  Force  (Ford,  1991:  
140,  388).      
 
  Giulio  Douet…  theorist?  Visionary?  Certainly,  one  could  argue  that  much  of  
his  vision  was  instrumental  in  air  forces  becoming  masters  of  their  own  destiny;  his  
“Independent  Air  Force”  was  certainly  striven  for  by  the  Army  Air  Corps’  “Bomber  
Mafia”  (Faber,  1997)  and  airmen  in  France,  Italy  and  Germany  (Corum,  1997).  But  
Douet  was  wrong  about  the  bomber  being  unstoppable,  as  attested  to  by  
Chennault’s  success  in  China  (Ford,  1991),  as  well  as  by  R.A.F.  success  in  the  Battle  
of  Britain  (Wood,  1961).  In  both  cases,  part  of  “stopping”  a  bomber  was  found  to  
simply  be  attriting  an  enemy  bomber  squadron  until  they  can  no  longer  fight  (Faber,  
1997:  221).  HAPDB,  based  on  Douet’s  theories  and  the  “Bomber  Mafia’s  belief  that  
massed  bomber  formations  could  penetrate  enemy  air  defenses  without  fighter  
escorts  and  still  destroy  selected  targets  with  acceptable  losses  was  “dead  wrong.”  
(Faber,  1997:  220)  The  Japanese  experience  in  China  is  evidence  of  this,  as  was  the  
German  experience  in  the  Battle  of  Britain  (Wood,  1961).  Fighter  planes  were  
clearly  shown  to  not  be  “useless,  superfluous  and  harmful”  (Meilinger,  1997:  13),  as  
Japanese  (and  German,  American  and  British)  pilots  were  quick  to  find.  Thus,  while  
Douet’s  theorizing  gave  food  for  thought,  some  agreed,  some  did  not,  and  in  
furthering  the  debate  is  perhaps  where  we  should  laud  General  Giulio  Douet.  
 
 
 
 
  
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