Tourism Management, Vol. 18, No. 5, pp.

273-286, 1997
Pergamon © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd
All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain
0261-5177/97 $17.00+0.00
PII: S0261-5177(97)00016-2

Development of a model system for

touristic hunting revenue collection
and allocation
Joni E Baker
Department of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843,
USA

Ecotourism can take many forms and provide different levels of human and environmental
benefits. The trend has been toward nonconsumptive forms of nature-based tourism, such as
bird-watching and photographic tourism. Declining budgets, however, have forced many
managers to look increasingly to consumptive uses of natural resources, which have more
revenue-producing potential. One consumptive option, trophy or sport hunting, provides
significantly higher revenues on a per visitor basis than photographic tourism, and it may
also impact the environment less severely. The tourist hunting industries of six eastern and
southern African countries are profiled, and models of their revenue collection and disburse-
ment systems provided. The relative merits of the six systems are discussed in terms of the
level of benefits which accrue to local people and to wildlife protection programs. An optimal
revenue collection/disbursement system is proposed. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd
Keywords: hunting, ecotourism, trophy hunting, community-based conservation, sustainable use, wildlife, Africa

Introduction Consumptive vs nonconsumptive nature

Ecotourism is widely lauded as the solution to two
pressing problems in the tourism industry. First, it
promises to mitigate many of the negative social,
cultural, and environmental impacts of too many
insensitive travelers. Second, it promises to bring
benefits to people living near tourist attractions and
to improve the overall community standard of living.
Ecotourism, however, comes in many forms, which
provide varying levels of benefits.
Sport or trophy hunters, for example, claim that
while their recreational activity is a consumptive
form of ecotourism, it is even less destructive of the
natural environment than photographic tourism/
They also contend that touristic hunting brings more
benefits to local communities and provides more
revenue for wildlife conservation programs than
photographic tourism. 2 The levels of benefit to local
people and to wildlife conservation, however, can
vary according to the revenue collection and alloca-
tion system used. This paper reviews the hunting
revenue collection and allocation systems of six
countries in eastern and southern Africa and
proposes a model system which may maximize
community benefits and the sustainable use of
wildlife resources.
tourism
The ideal of preserving wildlife in a pristine state for
all time to come is arguably no longer practical in a
world of exponential population growth, declining
resources, and public pressure to reduce govern-
mental expenditures. Wildlife refuges and preserves
are relatively few and far between, and they are
expensive to police and maintain. Further, the
tangible human benefits of environmental causes
such as wildlife protection are not yet well estab-
lished, and intangible benefits are even more diffi-
cult to quantify when arguing for additional
resources for conservation programs. As a conse-
quence, government officials at all levels are seeking
ways to make wildlife protection programs pay for
themselves.
Many conservationists were reluctant at first to
accept the proposition that wildlife resources should
be 'used' at all? Consumptive uses of wildlife, such
as hunting and fishing, are considered morally repre-
hensible by some, and are opposed by others as
leading to the extinction of (or at least threatening)
certain species? Even nonconsumptive uses, such as
photographic tourism, can harm wildlife, as masses
of tourists swarm around fewer and fewer animals?

273
Development of a model system: J E Baker
Yet many conservationists now accept the reality
that wildlife resources will be used, particularly in
lesser developed countries where daily life is a
struggle." In a low key manner, so as not to alienate
members who still oppose any consumptive use of
wildlife, groups such as the World Wildlife Fund
and the African Wildlife Foundation are redirecting
their efforts toward ensuring that the use of wildlife
resources is 'sustainable', i.e. that the long term
survival of species is not jeopardized. 7
In the case of Africa, the concept of sustainable
utilization is both controversial and emotional.
While there is agreement on the goal, to ensure that
Africa's wildlife heritage survives for future genera-
tions, there is no consensus on the strategy. The
conservation community and the public are split
over attempts to define what are, in principle, the
best methods of sustainable use, what are the best
methods for Africa, and what are the best methods
for individual communities within Africa.
Sustainable utilization
The phrase 'sustainable utilization' has its roots in
the utilitarian approach to conservation, which was
the basis of the early conservation m o v e m e n t in the
United States. In 1864, George Perkins Marsh
published Man and Nature: or Physical Geography as
Modified by Human Nature, a monumental treatise
on the environmental impacts of human activities.
This work, in laying the foundation for utilitarian
conservation, questioned the assumption that
America's natural resources were inexhaustive and
warned that the country's national identity and
strength might be weakened if uncontrolled exploi-
tation of natural resources continued. ~ Utilitarians
emphasized the wise use of natural resources for the
benefit, especially the economic benefit, of mankind,
balancing long term preservation with near term
use, benefit and enjoyment.
In resurrecting this concept in the early 1980s and
applying it to Africa, international conservationists
Travel Agencies
~,..expenditures~
Airlines
Localpersonal
expenditures
e.g.,souvenirs ] [:~
LocalFees
collecteddirectly
attheparks
Figure 1 Distribution channels through which tourist expenditures flow
274
realized that, no matter how desirable from a
conservation standpoint, preserving ecosystems in
their pristine state to save endangered species of
wildlife was impractical in view of the poverty of
most sub-Saharan states. Natural resources would be
used out of the necessity to survive, particularly in
rural areas. The emphasis, conservationists decided,
must be on 'sustainability' of use if the diversity of
Africa's wildlife is to remain for future
generations?.'"
Tourism vs hunting
The two most widely recognized uses of African
wildlife resources are tourism and hunting. Tourism,
or more specifically, photographic tourism, provides
economic benefits to the local communities which
allow visitors to view wildlife in their areas. Most
tourists book their African safaris through travel
agents based in their home country, but they contri-
bute to the local economy through their logistical
expenditures (hotels, restaurants, sales taxes, etc.).
In addition, fees may be charged for the opportunity
to view wildlife (e.g., park entrance fees). These
taxes and fees may be used to maintain the wildlife
attraction or to support community development
projects, or funds may be returned to a higher level
of government. The alternative channels through
which tourist expenditures may flow to support
wildlife conservation programs and to benefit local
residents are depicted in Figure 1.
Many conservationists, however, argue that this
form of ecotourism too often results in degradation
of the environment and too often harms the wildlife.
Bonner illustrates how tourists have caused lasting
damage to some of Africa's premier tourist spots. In
Kenya, for example, the tourists
speed across the plains in their minivans, in pursuit of
a lion pride or rhino, tearing up the grass and in rainy
periods cutting ugly ruts. In Amboseli (National
Park), the tourists have contributed as much to the
park's deterioration as the elephants have. There
have simply been too many tourists for the small
logis
~ t~~:::::=~ / Conservation ~' )
I programsand/or l
t,N~ommunity
developmeV

park, and they turn the place into a dust bowl in dry
years, in addition to a Disneyland in high season."
In their pursuit of the perfect photograph, tourists
often interfere with the animals' natural hunting and
mating behavior. Because people and vehicles are
such familiar sights, animals have become docile,
practically domesticated. Further, tourists demand
relatively luxurious accommodations and amenities,
even in remote locations, and they attract scores of
cheap souvenir hawkers, like vultures to carrion.
Many experts argue that the net economic gain to
the host country and people is negligible; most of
the gross revenues return to t o u r i s m - r e l a t e d
companies such as travel agencies and airlines based
in Europe or the United States? 2 Richard Leakey,
the Director of the Kenya Wildlife Service from
1989 to 1994, for example, has said that 'with few
exceptions, people living in areas with wildlife
receive few or none of the economic benefits of
tourism'? -~
A second major use of African wildlife resources
is hunting and the related use or sale of meat, hides
and trophies. Often called consumptive utilization,
the killing of animals for sustenance or commercial
purposes has vehement opponents and equally
impassioned advocates. Critics, for example, argue
that not only is the intentional killing of animals
immoral and abhorrent, but also that tourist hunting
will result in the extinction of even more animal
s p e c i e s . ~4
Proponents of consumptive use, however, argue
that not only is controlled hunting of wildlife desir-
able, it is also preferable to regular, photographic
tourism because:
• Hunters are not nearly as ecologically destructive
as tourists. Hunters require fewer services and
accommodations, and less infrastructure, thus
keeping wildlife habitats more pristine. '~
• The cost of a hunting safari in Africa is easily
double or triple the cost of a regular safari of the
same length, and more of that money is spent in
and remains in the country of hunt. A former
Director of Tanzania's Wildlife Department has
commented that one hunter is worth 100 tourists
to the local economy?"
• Areas hosting the most wildlife (in numbers and
variety) are often inaccessible to regular tourists,
or practically inaccessible because of poor trans-
portation services and infrastructure. These areas,
however, are precisely those likely to attract sport
hunters, increasing both the number of visitors
and local benefits.
• Overpopulation of certain species can damage if
not destroy the natural habitat, thereby
threatening the existence of other species.
Elephants in particular can be very destructive,
leaving hundreds of kilometers of land barren of
Development of a model system: J E Baker
trees--and species dependent on those trees. The
selective killing of overpopulated herds through
culling can therefore be imperative to save biodi-
versity. If a fee is charged for culling, or the
animal by-products are consumed or used, so
much the better.
Finally, supporters of consumptive utilization
contend that the presence of legal hunters in the
bush serves as a deterrent to poachers.
Community-based conservation
The concept of community-based conservation
evolved in the 1980s to bolster support for both
consumptive and nonconsumptive uses of wildlife
resources. The concept recognizes that wildlife
conservation is not just about animals but also about
people. Bonner argues persuasively that for too
long, Western conservationists have imposed their
own philosophies of conservation on Third World
countries, with little regard for, or understanding of,
what wildlife means to indigenous people. ~7 When
many Africans see an animal, they perceive it as a
source of meat; in Swahili and other Bantu
languages, the word for meat and wildlife is the
same. '~ Also, to many Africans, wild animals are
viewed with concern since they can threaten both
human lives and crops.'" Preservation of wildlife is
thus not only a foreign concept, but it can be
antithetical to their interests. Yet thanks to Western
conservationists, Africans now find themselves
forbidden to use their wildlife resources as they have
done traditionally for hundreds of years for basic
sustenance and practical use of animal by-products.
(The irony, of course, is that restrictions were put in
place primarily because of excessive exploitation by
Westerners.) Why should Africans be sympathetic
to, much less support, outside efforts to 'save the
animals', particularly when human population
growth necessitates the conversion of more and
more land for agricultural purposes?
To supporters of community-based conservation,
the key to the survival of wildlife in Africa is to
involve rural residents directly in conservation
efforts. Because most of the people in these areas
exist at a very basic subsistence level, it is argued
that the best way to secure their involvement is to
permit them to derive, once again, economic
benefits from the wildlife. If animals have an
intrinsic value which can improve the community's
standard of living, then the community has a vested
interest in protecting the source. Community
involvement in wildlife conservation is particularly
important in Africa, proponents say, because high
population growth, industrialization and expansion
of agriculture are all competing for the land
supporting wildlife.
275
Development of a model system: J E Baker
Wildlife and property rights
The most efficient, sustainable use of wildlife is
determined in part by who owns the resources. In
general, natural resources may be privately owned
or state-owned, or may be common-property or
open access resources. From a sustainability
viewpoint, open access is the least desirable scenario
since unlimited, unrestricted access promotes an
inefficient allocation and destroys any incentive to
conserve. 2'' In Africa, wildlife is generally either
state-owned or subject to common property arrange-
ments, although private game farms are common in
South Africa and Namibia and are gaining in
popularity Kenya and other countries.
Community-based conservation programs seek to
devolve the right to use wildlife (but not ownership
of wildlife) to the local level. However, even with
well-defined user rights, animals which migrate
across regions governed by multiple jurisdictions are
likely to remain common property 2' if not an open
access resource. 22 While this could lend itself to the
'tragedy of the commons' situation described by
Garrett Hardin, Freeman and Kreuter point to
numerous community-based management systems
which have resulted in the sustainable use of a wide
range of environmental resources, often over
extended periods. 23 To prevent a tragedy of the
commons, resource use must be restricted to certain
people at certain levels.
Many public choice economists argue that the role
of government should be limited to a precise defini-
tion of property rights. Livingston, however, argues
that by providing only an opportunity to use wildlife,
rather than ownership of wildlife, alternative institu-
tional arrangements can still affect the degree to
which environmental interests are achieved. 24 The
'rules of the game', such as under what circum-
stances and to what degree the opportunity to use
wildlife is exercised, are important factors influ-
encing the efficient (or inefficient) use of natural
resources. 25
The biological component
Consumptive uses of wildlife, of course, are not
necessarily sustainable in the long run. However,
safari professionals contend that tourist hunters are
after only a very small percentage of the male
segment of the population and, by definition, the
take is small and select. 2~ Professional hunter Robin
Hurt has said that he intentionally seeks out for his
clients, very old males which have been ejected or
separated from their herd and are no longer repro-
ductive. 27 Freeman and Kreuter have demonstrated
that elephants have increased in population even
when hunted, provided their nutritional require-
ments are met. 2~
276
At the international level, efforts to control
commercial pressure for unsustainable wildlife
harvests include the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES), a treaty which entered force on 1
July 1975. Under the CITES regime, species which
are determined to be endangered or threatened can
be listed in the treaty's appendices and thus become
subject to quotas restricting international shipments
of those species (and parts or derivatives of those
species).
Although more than 27000 species are currently
listed in the CITES appendices (mostly plants),
perhaps the best known (and most controversial)
listing was the 'ban' on ivory trade which was
approved in 1989. However, it is important to note
that CITES controls do not summarily prohibit the
killing of or commercial trade in listed species;
rather, member countries submit for CITES
approval annual quotas of proposed takings which
they determine to be 'sustainable'; i.e. which they
believe will not affect the long term survival of the
species in their particular country. Individual
governments can, therefore, approve the culling of
listed species which may be overpopulated in their
countries, and can allow sport and subsistence
hunting of CITES-listed species, as long as inter-
national shipments of listed species and their parts/
derivatives from those countries do not exceed the
quotas approved by the CITES Secretariat.
CITES critics argue that these quotas are not
based on reliable population estimates and that they
have been abused by certain countries?' In practice,
the efficacy of any wildlife management system can
be affected by numerous factors, including political
influence, lack of transparency, accountability gaps,
corruption, and local patronage, as well as unsus-
tainable or age biased quotas?" It is beyond the
scope of this paper to address the many local
circumstances which have influenced the success, or
failure, of community-based conservation programs
in achieving the dual goal of community benefit and
wildlife conservation. This study rather focuses on
the specific revenue collection and disbursement
mechanisms through which hunting proceeds flow in
an effort to achieve these two objectives. Once the
'optimal' revenue structure has been selected,
additional management controls will be required to
ensure that implementation of the system is carried
out in an efficient and effective manner? ~
The hunting/conservation nexus
Just how valuable can hunting be to local commu-
nities, and how can it aid in wildlife conservation?
The first step in answering these questions is to
examine hunting revenue collection and disburse-
ment systems. Most African hunting safaris are
arranged by specialized companies called 'outfitters',

many of which are based in the United States. These
companies sell hunting packages which can be
customized according to the desires of the client.
The outfitters make most or all logistical arrange-
ments for the trip, including acquisition of the
necessary permits and the provision of a profes-
sional hunter to accompany the tourist hunter.
Outfitters generally charge a daily rate which can
vary according to the length of the safari and to the
ratio of tourist hunters to professional hunters (not
usually greater than 2:1). For the 1995/1996 hunting
season, for example, Tanzania Game Tracker Safaris
Ltd, based in Houston, Texas, charged from $830 to
$1340 per hunter per day. A Colorado-based
company, on the other hand, does not use daily
rates but for the same season charged each client
from $22400 to $30600 per safari, depending on the
tourist/professional ratio and number of days.
Tourist hunters may then be charged a range of
fees by the host government. These may be collected
by the outfitter on the government's behalf or paid
directly when the tourist arrives in the country to
hunt. These charges can include a conservation fee,
firearms and ammunition permit fees, trophy export
fees, airport taxes, etc. Governments may also
charge a fee for each animal killed or wounded,
which can range from $10 for a game bird to $7500
(or more) for an elephant. On top of this, tourist
hunters are responsible for international airfare to
and from the country of hunt, preparation and
shipping charges for any trophies taken home, and
other miscellaneous expenses. The total cost of a
hunting safari, therefore, is typically around $50000,
and can go up to $120000 or even higher. Hunting
host countries collect additional revenue directly
from the outfitters, usually through concessions fees,
which are passed on to tourist hunters in the daily
or safari rates charged by the company. The alterna-
tive channels through which hunter expenditures
flow to support wildlife conservation programs
and/or to benefit the local community are shown in
Figure 2.
Among the six countries of southern and eastern
Africa which presently allow tourist hunting, each
has different methods of collecting and disbursing
revenue from the hunting industry and different
management systems. A brief review of the six is
given in the following sections.
Figure 2 Distribution channels through which touristic hunter expenditures flow
Development of a model system: J E Baker
Tanzania
Tanzania had the first block and quota system in
Africa, developed in the 1960s and regulated by
professional hunting organizations such as the East
African Professional Hunters' Association and the
Tanganyika Hunters' Association. Hunting blocks
were assigned to private companies for varying
lengths of time, and quotas were set on some
species. By the early 1970s, however, poaching was
rampant, the hunters associations had dissolved,
quotas were increased with no reference to popula-
tion data, and new blocks proliferated; in sum, there
was a complete loss of control of the industry. 32 As a
result, the government instituted a total ban on
hunting from 1973 to 1978, after which time it
resumed under the management of the parastatal
Tanzanian Wildlife Corporation (TAWICO).
TAWICO, however, was not able to exploit fully
the opportunities available, so it began to sublet
hunting areas to private companies? ~ In 1984, nine
companies had hunting blocks; by 1995, the number
had reached 43, with overall management under the
direction of the Department of Wildlife. During the
1992/1993 hunting season, a conservatively estimated
$13 million (US) was earned from approximately
500 hunting safaris conducted in Tanzania, during
which 7034 animals were killed, including 18
elephants, 222 lions, and 214 leopards? 4
Hunting is authorized in Tanzania's game
reserves, game controlled areas, forest reserves and
open areas, encompassing some 180000 square
kilometers divided into 150 hunting blocks. Hunting
is not allowed in national parks or national
conservation areas. The Minister of Tourism,
Natural Resources and Environment, who oversees
the Department of Wildlife, has the authority to
allocate hunting blocks. Quotas are assigned for
different species within those blocks based on
population estimates provided by a monitoring
program of the Serengeti Wildlife Research Insti-
tute. Depending on the quotas, up to 70 species can
be shot (67 mammals, plus crocodiles, ostriches and
pythons), in addition to game birds.
In Tanzania, all outfitters are required to charge a
minimum daily rate of US$850, and since 1989, they
are required to bank 55% of the daily rate collected
from clients with the Bank of Tanzania. Outfitters
277
Development of a model system: J E Baker
collect government fees in foreign currency from
their clients and remit them to the Department of
Wildlife. Outfitters also pay to the government an
average of US$7500 in concessions fees (per hunting
block per year). Outfitters are required to have anti-
poaching programs in their blocks and are expected
to use a minimum of 40% of their quotas; otherwise,
they may have their concession revoked and the
block may be reassigned to a different company.
The Government of Tanzania levies a fee on
hunters per safari, which ranges from US$2060 for a
7-day safari to US$5640 for a 24-day safari. This
charge includes hunting permits, conservation fees,
trophy handling fees, observer fees and sales taxes.
Hunters are also required to pay a fee for each
animal killed or wounded according to an estab-
lished scale.
Under the system set up in 1978 when legal
hunting resumed, 75% of the proceeds of funds
collected from hunters and from outfitters was
returned to the Central Treasury and 25% was
deposited in the newly created Tanzania Wildlife
Protection Fund (TWPF). This allocation was
amended by a 1992 government directive that a
quarter of the Treasury's 75% would be returned to
District Councils to compensate local people for
damage and loss of life caused by wildlife. In 1992
as well, the Selous Game Reserve received author-
ization to retain one half of the Treasury's 75% for
its own operations and programs. Although not
formalized, this same percentage was subsequently
retained for other hunting areas in anticipation of
similar authorization.
In a draft policy for the management of tourist
hunting now under review by the Government of
Tanzania, the disbursement of the concessions and
game fees would be revised again with the following
allocation:
Table 1
Game Reserves Other Hunting Areas
Retention 50% Local Community 75%
TWPF 10% District Council 15%
Treasury 25 % TWPF 10% ~
District Councils 15%
The plan calls for local communities in the
hunting authorized areas to form associations and
eventually assume oversight and management
responsibilities for their wildlife, in cooperation with
the outfitter for that particular concession.
Outfitters would be required to develop physical
infrastructure in the area based on community
needs, to train and employ skilled and unskilled
manpower from the surrounding villages, and to
make surplus meat from their hunting operations
available to local villages, hospitals or schools. 3~' The
278
proposed revenue collection/disbursement system
for hunting proceeds in Tanzania is illustrated in
Figure 3.
Zambia
The present structure of Zambia's hunting industry
has its origins in the 1979 Lupande Research
Project. This was a joint research effort between the
New York Zoological Society and Zambia's
National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) which
evaluated the relationship between human disturb-
ances and elephant behavioral ecology. In 1983,
NPWS hosted a workshop to discuss how local
people could be involved in managing wildlife,
which led to a pilot project in the Luangwa Valley.
In the same year, the Zambian Government estab-
lished a Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund
(WCRF) to serve as an accounting mechanism for
redistributing funds from the hunting industry to
wildlife conservation and community development.
The Fund was also to serve as 'an institution which
fosters the understanding on the part of local
communities that wildlife conservation brings
economic benefits to them greater than amounts
earned from poaching'? 7 The concept of
community-based conservation was formally estab-
lished in 1988, when the Administrative Design for
Game Management Areas ( A D M A D E ) program
was introduced with the assistance of the World
Wildlife Fund (USA) and the US Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID).
Under A D M A D E , Zambia's 33 game manage-
ment areas are divided into hunting blocks
controlled by Wildlife Monitoring Units (WMU),
which are in turn supervised by Wildlife Monitoring
Authorities (WMA) composed of government,
private sector, and local representatives. WMA's are
responsible for monitoring off-takes, approving
quotas, overseeing revenue collection and the
expenditure of wildlife proceeds. WMU's, at the
chiefdom level, do the actual wildlife monitoring,
solve local wildlife problems, identify possible
community development projects, and facilitate the
implementation of those projects approved by the
WMA's. 3x Under the A D M A D E program, a training
center was established, and more than 500 villagers
have been certified as government wildlife scouts.
All trophy fees and safari concession fees are
deposited in the WCRF, as well as 50% of the game
hunting license fees. The other 50% of license fees
is returned to the Central Treasury. WCRF
revenues are then distributed in three ways: 25%
goes to the National Parks and Wildlife Service for
W C R F administration and other activities; 35% is
returned to the local management sub-authority
from which the funds originated; and 40% is
dedicated to the local field NPWS unit and village
scouts serving in the area from which the funds

Out0tt0rI
~:x Cli~Hunting
F~~J
(f"~o DailyRate--~
Figure 3 Proposed revenue collection and disbursement system for hunting proceeds in Tanzania
originated. The 35% received by the local manage-
ment sub-authority can be used for community
improvements such as clinics, wells, and schools.
The hunting revenue collection/disbursement system
in Zambia is depicted in Figure 4. In 1994, the
WCRF 'revolved' $627000 of the $707000 it
collected?"
Zimbabwe
In 1978, Zimbabwe's Department of Parks and
Wildlife Management (NPWM) introduced a
program to reduce human/wildlife conflicts and to
improve local attitudes toward conservation.
Through the project, called WINDFALL (Wildlife
Industries New Development For All), culled meat
was to be distributed to individuals living near
national parks, and revenues from safari hunting
were to be returned to District Councils.
WINDFALL largely failed in its objectives, however;
'little meat found its way back to local communities,
and only a small proportion of the proceeds survived
the circuitous routes of bureaucratic accountancy
before returning to local district councils, let alone
to original communities'?"
Co•ssionsFe~
Outfitter I ff:~> ~
Figure 4 The revenue collection and disbursement system for hunting proceeds in Zambia
Development of a model system: J E Baker
GameReserves
Retention50%
TWPF 10%
Treasury25%
District Councils15%
w ,if0 ep
OtherHuntingAreas
LocalCommunity75%
District Councils15%
TWPF 10%
A second effort at community-based conservation
emerged in Zimbabwe in the early 1980s when the
Government gave the Shangaan people responsi-
bility for wildlife in their areas. The Government
had earlier evicted the Shangaans from their tradi-
tional lands when Gonarezhou National Park was
established in 1966. When they were not permitted
to return to the area after the country gained
independence in 1980, the Shangaans' conflict with
the Parks Department escalated and was reflected in
increased poaching in and around the park.
In 1982, as a result of a dispute mediation effort,
the Shangaans received authority to manage wildlife
in their area. They decided they were likely to derive
the most economic return through safari hunting.
Thus, in August 1982, they sold the right to shoot
two elephants for the equivalent of US$3000 each,
with the provision that the meat would be given to
the local community. Over a 5-year period, the
Shangaans built a school, bought a grinding mill,
and built a clinic with proceeds from selling hunting
rights. In addition, they established a wildlife
management fund to pay local game scouts who
watch for poachers, monitor wildlife populations,
and provide advice on quotas. Local households
which had an estimated yearly income equivalent to
25% NationalParksand
WildlifeService
FundAdministration
35% LocalManagement
U:~> ~ W C R F ~ U:~> Sub-Authority
40% LocalFieldUnit
and Scouts
C~al Treasu~
279
Development of a model system: J E Baker
US$50 in the 1970s found that they were receiving
eight to ten times that amount per year from wildlife
revenues alone. 4~ In the process, the Shangaans'
attitudes toward wildlife changed radically; once
hostile to animals, they became increasingly protec-
tive as wildlife was recognized as a valuable
community asset.
Encouraged by the success of the Shangaans, the
NPWM tried once again to promote communal
management of wildlife, although it took nearly four
years for the proposed program to reach fruition.
Finally, in 1988, two of 55 districts in Zimbabwe
received 'Appropriate Authority' status, making
them the legitimate custodians of wildlife resources
in their areas. The process was formalized with the
advent of the Communal Areas Management
Program for Indigenous Resources ( C A M P F I R E ) in
1989. Communities participating in the program are
allowed to sell hunting or photographic safari rights
to private companies and can cull overpopulated
species. Safari arrangements may involve a lease
based on a percentage of the operator's annual
gross revenue or a combination of trophy and lease
fees?: Although NPWM sets hunting quotas and
trophy fees, local authorities are responsible for
overall wildlife protection and management. As of
1995, more than 20 of 55 local districts have joined
the C A M P F I R E program, which receives support
from the Zimbabwe Trust, the World Wildlife Fund
(WWF), USAID, and the University of Zimbabwe's
Center for Applied Science? 3
District Councils collect the hunting fees and are
permitted to retain no more than 15%. Up to 35%
may be allocated to wildlife management activities,
and no less than 50% is to be returned to the local
'producer' communities. Figure 5 illustrates the
hunting revenue collection/disbursement system in
Zimbabwe. Each community decides how their
proceeds will be spent. Some have divided the
proceeds equally among village heads of households;
others have financed community projects such as
schools, clinics, and grinding mills. Communities
also receive meat from periodic elephant culling
carried out by NPWM. WWF has estimatcd a
15-25% increase in household income for commu-
nities participating in the C A M P F I R E program? ~
(Retain not more than 15%)
Figure 5 The revenue collection and disbursement system for hunting proceeds in Zimbabwe
280
Botswana
Botswana has a particularly distinctive method of
allocating hunting rights. Hunting concessions are
awarded through a public auction among companies
which submit acceptable management and use plans
for the concession areas. Hunting licenses are
allocated through a raffle under the principle that
citizens should have equal access to the country's
resources. Any citizen can enter the raffle by
applying for a license to hunt in a specified part of
the country. No distinction is made between urban
or rural applicants, even though their reasons for
hunting may range from recreation to subsistence.
The license fee is kept low so that rural people can
afford them. (Free, special licenses are provided for
villagers in very remote areas.) Until recently, raffle
winners could transfer or sell their licenses, which
sparked a speculative secondary market in licenses.
Under new guidelines, however, concessionaires
have the first option to purchase licenses to hunt in
their areas from individuals wishing to sell them.
One drawback to the system is that because many
rural people who need to hunt to survive cannot get
licenses, they resort to poaching. 45 Hunting fees are
collected by Botswana's Department of Wildlife,
which turns them over to District Councils.
Under Botswana's 1992 Wildlife Conservation and
National Parks Act, local communities can apply for
lease rights in Controlled Hunting Areas and
Wildlife Management Areas. If granted, the rights
permit communities to sell established wildlife
quotas to safari operators or to citizen hunters, or to
use them for their own local hunting. By 1995, only
one community had succeeded in obtaining a lease
and a quota, although a second had received auton-
omous management authority and ten more applica-
tions were pending. 4" The two revenue collection
and disbursement systems in Botswana are illus-
trated in Figure 6.
Namibia
The hunting industry in Namibia dates back to a
project carried out by a couple of farmers in 1992.
Trophy hunting is now permitted on approximately
280 hunting farms, officially registered and
( Management
k. Authority f
District Councils
( ~ S than ~
 Development of a model system: J E Baker

ff~ [ ConcessionsFee
Hunting
@•7[ Companies ]
(Auction) ]

~ Q~J~x [ LicenseFee
((Raffle) ]
coca ]
DistrictCouncil

OR

outtterl ILocaCommuni
1
[CocaCommuni
1
Figure 6 The revenue collection and disbursement systems for hunting proceeds in Botswana

controlled by the Government. Private guest farms
and game farms may also offer hunting opportuni-
ties. In 1988, the Government opened concession
areas in the Caprivi and in Bushmanland; conces-
sions are awarded through a tender system. Safari
operators and hunting, guest and game farms are
allowed to set their own rates for services and for
trophies, although they are encouraged to adhere to
rates recommended by the Namibia Professional
Hunting Association. The Government collects
revenue through permit fees and through taxes and
duties assessed on private business transactions.
These funds are used to maintain Namibia's national
parks and for other conservation and research
programs. Figure 7 represents this revenue collection
and disbursement system.
In the 1980s, a few local nongovernmental organi-
zations and concerned individuals began pilot
projects involving local people as community game
guards. Since 1992, the Living in a Finite Environ-
ment (LIFE) project, supported by USAID, has
assisted Namibians in certain areas to use and
preserve their natural resources through tourism-
based activities such as crafts and campsites (but not
hunting). In March 1995, the Namibian Cabinet
approved a 'Conservancy Policy' which would give
people in all the communal areas the right to use
and benefit from their natural resources through
hunting, tourism, and other wildlife-related enter-
prises. Hunting will be subject to quotas to be set by
the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. By late
1995, implementing legislation for this new policy

Private Game Farms

ff~ /LandOwner ] E~> F ~ a n d T a x e ~ [22~> [ G o v e m m e n t ] ~ Conservationand

ResearchPrograms

Government Hunting Farms

[aove ent] Conservationand ]

ResearchPrograms]

Concession Areas

Conservationand
~ ~ > [ Outfitter ] ~ F~andTaxe~ ff~[ Government ] f f ~ .ResearchProgramsI
Figure 7 The revenue collection and disbursement systems for hunting proceeds in Namibia

281
Development of a model system: J E Baker
had not yet been presented to the National
Assembly.47 4 9
Republic of South Africa
South Africa allows hunting on private game land
and selective trophy hunting in a few game reserves.
Professional hunters, which must accompany tourist
hunters, negotiate a fee for the desired animal(s)
directly with the owner or manager of the land on
which the animal is found. They may also be
required to pay a land or concessions fee. This
decentralized process allows rural communities, as
well as wealthy owners of private resorts, to derive
benefits from wildlife. For example, the Mpakeni
people near the southwest corner of Kruger
National Park sell the right to hunt buffalo for
R20000 each and use the revenue for community
projects such as schools?" The hunting revenue
system in South Africa, depicted in Figure 8, is
clearly less complex than the other systems.
In addition to selective trophy hunting in some
government game reserves and parks, overpopulated
species in these areas may be culled or offered for
sale. For example, Hluhluwe-Umfolozi Park hosts
one of the largest populations of white and black
rhinos in the world, and up to 5% is offered for sale
each year. Private game reserves often buy white
rhinos from the park, paying on the average $5000
per animal; they can then charge a hunter client
almost double that amount to shoot one. ~' Black
rhinos are a protected species and cannot be sold
for hunting purposes.
Kenya
Although hunting was banned in Kenya in 1977 and
has not resumed, it is included in this discussion
because of the vigorous controversy which has
surrounded its proposed reintroduction. Hunting
was banned because quotas were often exceeded,
game rangers accepted bribes, false reports were
frequently filed, and animals were occasionally shot
from vehicles? 2 Both Richard Leakey, Director of
the Kenya Wildlife Service from 1989 to 1994, and
his successor, David Western, have supported
(WrophyFees)
~oncession F~J
Figure8 The revenue collection and disbursement system for hunting proceeds in the Republic of South Africa
282
hunting as a conservation tool. Their stance has
been influenced by the severe ecological damage
suffered in parts of the country from overpopulated
species. However, many Kenyans fear that lifting the
ban will create a negative image for the country,
depress the tourism industry on which the country is
dependent, and ignite opposition from the inter-
national community and animal rights organizations.
In 1994, KWS commissioned a report entitled
'Wildlife-Human Conflicts in Kenya'. A five
member, independent panel interviewed conserva-
tionists, ranchers, farmers, tour operators, local and
national government officials and others, and issued
their report, known as 'The Grassroots Report', in
July 1995. In their conclusions, the panel supported
lifting the hunting ban for game consumption.
However, KWS has not yet decided whether to
accept and implement this recommendation. "~ ~
Comparison of systems
The development of community-based wildlife
conservation programs is gradually shifting the
financial and management responsibilities for
wildlife use and conservation away from centralized
government control and toward local communities
and the private sector. Under Tanzania's draft
policy, for example, local people arc encouraged to
form associations and assume direct management
responsibility for their wildlife and to develop direct,
cooperative relationships with the outfitters
operating in their concession area. In Namibia and
South Africa, landowners, whether private
individuals or local villages, are in effect the
stewards of their wildlife resources, operating only
under the general guidance of national wildlife
policies.
Five principles defining the 'optimum conditions'
for community-based natural resources management
are widely supported by wildlife conservationists.
These precepts are that:
• Effective management of natural resources is best
achieved by giving the resource a focused value to
determine whether the benefit of managing a
resource exceeds the cost.
CdOoora1or
or Local Community

• Differential inputs must result in differential
benefits; those bearing the higher cost of living
with the resource must benefit more than those
who do not bear this cost.
• There must be a positive correlation between the
quality of management and the magnitude of
derived benefits.
• The unit of proprietorship should be the same as
the unit of production, management and benefit.
• The unit of proprietorship should be as small as
practicable, within ecological and socio-political
constraints, z"
The optimum method of encouraging local commu-
nities to use their wildlife resources wisely, based on
these principles, would therefore be to establish a
direct connection between each animal and its
benefit to the community. 57 Indirect or partial
receipt of benefits would obscure or diminish the
true value of the natural resource and would alter
the cost/benefit equation, perhaps leading to the
conclusion that wildlife management is not in the
best community interest. Further, the more circui-
tous the disbursement of benefits, the more trans-
action costs are incurred and the more opportunity
there is for disreputable officials to siphon off 'their
share'. In countries where corruption is pervasive,
the amount of revenue local residents receive from
the hunting industry may indeed be negligible if
funds pass through many hands before reaching the
local level. Finally, under centralized revenue collec-
tion and disbursement systems, local residents have
less incentive to manage and supervise off-takes (of
any kind), since their level of benefits is not clearly
linked to those off-takes.
If we accept that the optimal system of collecting
and disbursing revenues from tourist hunting would
be that which most directly relates wildlife to
community benefits, then what would this system
look like? First, trophy fees would be the most
desirable revenue source, since they clearly assign a
value to an animal. License fees and lease fees, on
the other hand, are less directly related to the
resource (assuming that the fees are the same
OuSter
Direct Arrangements
Figure 9 An optimal hunting revenue collection and disbursement system
Development of a model system: J E Baker
whether ten animals are killed or no animals are
killed), and the level of community benefit is not
dependent on the level of off-takes. Second, collec-
tion of trophy fees at the local level would be
preferable to a centralized revenue collection
system. A single fund administered far away from
the resource is susceptible to leakages, reducing
community benefits and obscuring the wildlife-
benefit connection. Centralized revenue systems also
increase transaction costs, decreasing the amount
available for community and conservation purposes.
However, in countries which operate block and
quota systems, a hunting concession fee might still
be levied and collected by the central authority to
offset those administrative expenses necessary to
establish and monitor quotas and provide oversight
of concessionaires (see Caveats below). A diagram
of this 'optimal' system is provided in Figure 9.
Of the six national systems described in this
paper, that authorized by 1992 legislation in
Botswana, by which hunters pay local communities
directly (or through an outfitter) for hunting privi-
leges, seems closest to the model revenue collection/
disbursement system shown in Figure 9. South
Africa's system, by which hunters negotiate a fee for
each animal, is also close to the model, although
hunters may also be subject to land or concessions
fees which are paid to the landowner. This revenue
collection system is similar to that in effect on
private game farms in Namibia, although rather
than paying concessions fees, landowners contribute
to national wildlife programs through general fees
and taxes associated with operating a business.
Extending this system to communal lands, and
devolving government control of wildlife resources
to local communities as proposed in its new policy,
will more closely fit the optimum model suggested
here.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, in the
proposed system for Tanzania, hunting revenue is
collected and processed at a central level. There is
no evident relationship between the number and
type of animals harvested in Village A and the
ept. o f W i l d l i f e ~
Program |
dministration/
°
Local Cornmunitie
\
283
Development of a model system: J E Baker
amount of money its District Council and/or its local
residents receive. In Zambia, hunting fees are
collected and processed through the Wildlife
Conservation Revolving Fund. Although 75% of the
fees is intended to be returned to the local commu-
nities from which the funds originated, the fact that
concessions fees, trophy fees, and license fees are
co-mingled obscures the resource/benefits nexus. In
Zimbabwe, the direct payment of trophy fees to
local communities, as .contrasted with lease
payments or a combination of lease/trophy fees paid
to the District Councils, would seem to be a more
preferable method of establishing the direct value of
each animal. The current system has suffered
practical implementation problems for a number of
reasons, including the fact that administrative
boundaries of subdistrict communities are unclear,
revenue and hunting records are maintained at the
district level and are seldom transmitted to local
villages, and human settlements are normally
separate from hunting locations, making it difficult
for local people to get precise details on where and
what kind of animals are shot? ~
Caveats
When wildlife is state-owned or common property,
the extent of state regulation of use is problematic.
Ideally, control should be minimized both to reduce
transaction costs associated with regulation and to
ensure that maximum benefits accrue to those who
are granted usufructuary rights over the natural
resource. However, for migratory species, some state
regulation is ultimately required in order to prevent
an open-access, 'tragedy of the commons', situation.
Acting rationally, local residents might want to use
the wildlife in their areas for sport hunting before
the animals migrate onto another community's
lands, or they may try to fence in the animals to
prevent them from migrating. Thus, to ensure that
the countries' C I T E S - m a n d a t e d responsibilities for
sustainability are carried out, national governments
will need to continue to set and monitor quotas in
order to discourage opportunistic hunting. As local
communities gain experience in managing their
wildlife, however, they can increasingly provide
valuable inputs to the quota-setting process and can
take on more responsibility for controlling access to
the wildlife in their areas.
In this sense, community-based conservation
programs cannot just emphasize community
benefits; they must also develop community manage-
ment. As Professor Murphree has noted, there must
be a correlation between the quality of management
and the level of benefits. The most effective partici-
patory approach will vary from country to country
and community to community; however, the point is
that local m a n a g e m e n t is just as much a part of
284
sustainable utilization as the conveyance of
community benefits.
Conclusion
Animal rights activists may cringe at the thought of
assigning a monetary value to an animal, but the
reality is that wildlife management is not only about
animals but also about people. In Africa, the people
who must live with wild animals do not share the
same idealistic reverence for wildlife of many
Westerners. Thus, individuals and organizations
interested in the long term survival of species must
look beyond sermons, toward practical measures to
achieve this goal. Utilization of wildlife, even
consumptive use, is a powerful option, particularly
when proper management controls are in place to
ensure that use is sustainable.
Much more research is clearly needed in the areas
of community-based conservation and the sustain-
able utilization of wildlife resources, as exemplified
by some of the constraints found in Zimbabwe's
C A M P F I R E project. Steiner and Rihoy have identi-
fied a number of basic, unresolved issues relating to
the optimum institutional framework for
community-based conservation, including the
relative merits of producer communities and estab-
lished administrative units, socio-economic and
ecological management considerations, and bottom-
up and top-down management structures, z" At the
macro level, however, the question 'use or nonuse?'
is similar to that of 'photographic tourism or
hunting t o u r i s m ? ' - - t h e answer is not one or the
other, but how much of each and where. For the
foreseeable future in Africa, the use of wildlife
resources will take precedence over nonuse, so the
challenge is to select the best mix of uses for each
locality which will maximize community benefits
without jeopardizing Africa's wildlife heritage." .....
Acknowledgements
The author gratefully acknowledges Dr John
Crompton's encouragement and useful comments
provided by the editor and three anonymous
reviewers.
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