Locgov Reviewer

REVIEWER ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT agent, where the sovereign gets changed, the city, as agent of the State, could no
longer be held accountable for debts of the previous sovereign.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE
PHILIPPINES ISSUE: WON notwithstanding the cession of the Philippines to the US, followed by
a reincorporation of the city, the present municipality is liable for the obligations of
II. NATURE AND STATUS the city incurred prior to the cession to the US. YES.
RATIO: A municipal corporation has two powers: Governmental and Private.

Municipal Corporation A body politic and corporate constituted by the
Municipal laws that regulate private and domestic rights continue in force until
incorporation of the inhabitants for the purpose of local government thereof.
abrogated/ changed by the new ruler. Only laws of a political character are totally
Established by law partly as an agency of the state to assist in the civil government
abrogated/ changed by the new ruler. The property rights relinquished by Spain are
of the country but chiefly to regulate and administer the local or internal affairs of
limited to those which belong to the public domain. It did not affect property which
the city, town, or district which is incorporated.
belonged to the City of Manila as a municipal corporation. Absent any express
legislative declaration, there is no reason to suppose that reincorporation intended
Elements:
to permit an escape from the obligations of the old city.
1. Legal corporation or incorporation;
2. A corporate name by which the artificial personality is known and in
Lidasan v COMELEC
which all corporate acts are done;
3. Inhabitants constituting the population;
FACTS: 18 June 1966: President signed HB 1247 into law—RA 4790. It created the
4. Territory within which local civil government/ corporate functions are
Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The officials were elected in
exercised.
1967. However, 12 barrios were in Cotabato and not in Lanao del Sur. COMELEC
adopted a resolution that Dianaton shall be composed of the areas enumerated in
Nature/ status
RA 4790. The Office of the President recommended to the COMELEC that the
1. Subordinate branch of the government of the state;
statute be suspended pending correcting legislation. COMELEC issued another
2. Exercises delegated branches of government
resolution that only an declaration of unconstitutionality could it stop implementing
the law. Lidasan argued that it is unconstitutional for violating the one bill one
1. Municipal Corporation Proper Refers to incorporated cities, towns, or
subject rule.
villages invested with the power of local legislation;
2. QuasiMunicipal Corporation Quasicorporation, operates directly as an
ISSUE: WON RA 4790 is unconstitutional for violating the onebill onesubject rule.
agency of the state to help in the administration of public functions.
YES.
Tests:
RATIO:
1. Voluntary/ involuntary nature of the corporation
No bill may be enacted into law should include more than one subject.
2. Existence/ nonexistence of a charter
Congress must refrain from conglomeration of different subjects. The title of a bill
3. Whether the purpose of the corporation is solely as a governmental
must be couched in such a language sufficient to notify the public of the import of
agency or one for selfgovernment
the single subject. A change in the boundaries of 2 provinces may be made without
necessarily creating a new municipality.
Purposes of municipal corporations:
1. Serve as an agency/ instrument of the state in carrying on the functions
The principle that only the unconstitutional portion of a statute should be
of government which the state cannot conveniently exercise.
invalidated and the constitutional part must remain does not apply here. The
2. Act as an agency of the inhabitants of the community in the regulation of
explanatory note of the bill from which this statute originated expressed that the
municipal franchises and public utilities promotion, management, of local
envisioned municipality would be selfsufficient. This of course includes the 21
affairs, maintenance of water system, ferries, wharves, etc.
barangays, and not the 9 barangays that would be left if the valid portion would be
allowed to continue. Factors affecting the independence of a municipality include
Municipal Corporation Applies to incorporated villages, towns and cities; with
population, territory, and income.
power of local administration.
III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
Public Corporation Broader term, established for purposes connected with the
administration of civil/ local government
Constitution, Article X
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
Sec. 15. Every local government unit created or recognized under this Code is a body
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
law. As such, it shall exercise powers as a political subdivision of the National
Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory.
Sec. 3 The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
Dual Nature of Municipal Corporations
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
1. Public/ Governmental Acts as an agent of the State for the government
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
of the territory and the people within the municipal limits. Exercises a
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, elections,
part of the sovereignty of the state by delegation.
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers, and functions and duties of local
2. Private aspect Acts in a similar category as a business corporation,
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of said
doing functions not strictly governmental or political. Stands for the
local units.
community in the administration of local affairs, beyond the sphere of the
public purposes for which its government powers are conferred.
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan and political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component
Quasi Municipal Corporations cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to
Public corporations created as agencies of the state for a narrow/ limited purpose. their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the
Not possessed of powers/ liabilities of selfgoverning corporations. Generally relate metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services
to matters of state as distinguished from municipal concerns. requiring coordination.
Vilas v City of Manila Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component
cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective
FACTS: 1571: A municipal corporation was established and known as the officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within
Ayuntamiento de Manila. a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their
1894: The city government was reorganized, it had the power to incur debts for right to vote for elective provincial officials.
municipal purposes, to sue and be sued.
1901: The present incorporating act was passed, Act 183 of the Philippine Tan v COMELEC
Commission.
The petitioners in this case were creditors of the City of Manila prior to the FACTS: BP 885 was passed or “An Act Creating the Province of Negros del Norte.”
American occupation. The City of Manila argued that its charter has no reference to The petitioners in this case wanted to stop COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite.
obligations/ contracts of the old city; that their case is analogous to a principal and The petitioners were residents of Negros Occidental. The BP provided that the
Local Government Reviewer 1

plebiscite was to be conducted 120 days from the approval of the Act and that the 1. Unmanaged public sector deficit;
President was to appoint the first officials. 2. Consultation with presiding officers of the Senate and the House, and the
various local leagues;
The petitioners argued that the law was unconstitutional and contrary to 3. Recommendation of the secretaries of the DOF, DILG, and DBM;
statute. The Constitution states that no province, city, municipality, or barrio may 4. Must not be lower than 30% of the collection of the national IR taxes of
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered, 3rd fiscal year preceding the current one.
except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite. The LGC set as a
standard that a province must have at least 3,500 square kilometers as its territory.
The Solicitor General argued that BP 885 enjoys a presumption of legality and that
IV. CREATION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
the question is moot since the province of Negros del Norte had already been
proclaimed.
Nature
1. Essentially legislative
ISSUE: WON Negros del Norte was validly created. NO.
2. Exclusive/ unlimited
3. Can’t be delegated
RATIO: Two political units would be affected in case of a division of a province—the
parent and the proposed province. The Constitution commands that “affected units”
be considered in a plebiscite. The Court noted that the case of Paredes v Executive Essential Requisites
Secretary, which involved the creation of a new municipality where the parent unit 1. Territory contiguous
was not involved, could not be considered as a precedent. That case involved a 2. Population
barangay while this case involves a province. Almost half of the sugar plantations 3. Charter invests people with power of local government
would be dismembered form the parent province and some of its most important
cities. By prescription Existence presumed if exercised powers claimed by a community,
with knowledge and acquiescence of legislature, without interruption.
The SC also considered the new province as lacking in the territory requirement
since the land mass of the new territory was only 2,856 square kilometers. The De Facto Municipal Corporations
Court rejected the suggestion of the Solicitor General that even the area of the EEZ Corporation that exists in fact although not in point of law as there is a
should be considered in determining the territorial requirement. certain defect in some essential feature of its organization.
1. Valid law authorizing incorporation;
2. Attempt in good faith to organize it;
San Juan v Civil Service Commission
3. Colorable compliance with the law;
4. Assumption of corporate powers.
FACTS: 28 March 1988: The position of Provincial Budget Officer was vacated. 18
April 1988: Governor informed Director Abella of DBM that he has appointed
Attack against validity May not be attacked collaterally, it may be challenged by
Dalisay Santos as acting Provincial Budget Officer. Director Abella then
state in a direct quo warranto proceeding. However, if it is an absolute nullity, it is
recommended that private respondent, Cecilia Almajose be appointed as PBO given
subject to collateral attack. De Jure corporations cannot be attacked.
that she is a Certified Public Accountant. The Governor protested on the ground
that the DBM Undersecretary is not authorized to appoint the PBO. According to
Alvarez v Guingona (1996)
EO 112, the governor has the power to recommend nominees to the position of PBO.
ISSUE: If the governor appoints an unqualified person to the position of Provincial FACTS:
Budget Officer, can the DBM Secretary appoint another one? NO. - HB 8817 entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into
an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago”
RATIO: The phrase “upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned” was filed in the lower house.
must be given a mandatory application pursuant to the State policy of local - A counterpart of the bill was filed in the Senate, SB 1243.
autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized - The Senate conducted public hearings after HB No. 8817 was
power in Malacañang, and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be transmitted to the Senate.
weighed in favor of autonomy. The contention of the CSC that the recommendatory - Petitioners contend that RA 7720 is unconstitutional since:
power of the governor is merely directory is wrong. The Local Budget Circular No. o The Act did not originate exclusively from in the House as
31 which states that the DBM has the right to fill the vacancies if none of the mandated by Sec. 24, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.
nominees meets the requirements is baseless. o Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income
required under Sec. 450 of the LGC for it to be converted into
Pimentel v Aguirre a component city.
- The petitioners argued that the income of an LGU does not include the
FACTS: The petitioners in this case seek to annul section 1 of Administrative Order IRA. The average annual income of Santiago was more than P20M. It is
No. 372. It requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of reduced to only P13M, however, if the IRA is excluded from the
their authorized regular appropriations for non personnel expenditures. They also computation.
seek to stop Section 4 which withholds a portion of their Internal Revenue
Allotment by 10%. AO 43 was issued by Pres. Estrada when he assumed office. This ISSUE: WON RA 7720 should be declared unconstitutional for the two reasons
reduced the amount withheld to 5%. The petitioners argued that the president cited.
would in effect exercise the power of control over LGUs. HELD: NO. RA 7720 is constitutional.
The Solicitor General contended that this was issued to alleviate economic The acquisition of resources necessary to discharge its powers and effectively
difficulties, that the AO merely “directs” LGUs to reduce their expenditures and carry out its functions is effected through the vesting in every LGU of:
that the 10% withholding is only temporary. 1. The right to create and broaden its own source of revenue;
2. The right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being
ISSUE: WON the sections of the AO are unconstitutional. in the form of Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs); and
HELD: The “request” for a reduction in expenditures is legal. The withholding of the 3. the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization
IRA is illegal. and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial
boundaries.
RATIO: Decentralization involves the devolution of national administration, not
power, to LGUs. The decentralization of power involves the abdication of political The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and National wealth utilization
power in favor of LGUs declared to be autonomous. The policy setting in our country proceeds accrue to the general fund of the LGU and are used to finance its
still lies with the president and with congress. The LGUs, however, still have fiscal operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the
autonomy. They have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to LGC and its implementing rules and regulations.
their share in the national tax. The withholding is equivalent to a holdback, no
matter how temporary. The wordings of the law is clear that it shall be Income all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions
“automatically released.” The formulation/ implementation is subject to consultation of funds of the LGU.
with the appropriate public agencies, private sectors, and LGUs.
- DOF certified that the municipality had an average annual income of at
Before the President can interfere with fiscal matters of LGUs, the following must least 20M for the last 2 consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices.
be present:

Sec. 450 (c) of the LGC provides that “the average annual income shall include - Although Congress may delegate to another branch the power to fill in
the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
nonrecurring income.” IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income. essential that the law be:
o Complete in itself—set forth the policy to be executed
Cawaling, Jr. v COMELEC o Fix a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable
FACTS: 16 Aug 2000: Pres. Estrada signed into law RA 8806: An Act Creating the
City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the - Sec. 68 of the RAC does not meet these requirements of a valid delegation
Province of Sorsogon…16 Dec 2000: COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in the of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law.
municipalities 17 Dec 2000: Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers proclaimed the - The creation of municipalities is not an administrative function, but one
creation of the City of Sorsogon eminently legislative in character.
- The power of control of the President over executive departments,
Cawaling filed this petition for certiorari, which challenged the law on the ff bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly
grounds: the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its
1. The plebiscite was conducted beyond the 120day period from the officials. Such control does not include the authority either to abolish one
approval of RA 8806, violating Sec. 54 of the LGC; executive department or bureau or to create a new one.
2. It violates Sec. 450 (a) of the LGC which requires that only “a - The alleged power of the Prez to create municipal corporations would
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than
component city;” that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus, or
3. It contains two subjects: Creation of the City of Sorsogon and the offices.
abolition of the two municipalities.
Municipality of Candijay, Bohol v CA (1995)
ISSUE: WON RA 8806 violated the Constitution and the LGC. NO.
FACTS: The Municipality of Candijay claimed that the barrio of Pagahat is within
RATIO: its territorial jurisdiction and that it is not a part of the Municipality of Alicia. The
- The phrase “A municipality or a cluster…” is not a criterion but just one trial court ruled for Candijay but this was reversed by the CA. The CA found that
of the modes by which a city may be created. Sec. 10 Art. X of the the plans submitted by the two municipalities are inadequate insofar as identifying
Constitution allows the merger of LGUs to create a province, city, the monuments of the boundary line between the petitioner and the Muncipality of
municipality, or barangay in accordance with LGC standards. Mabini. The CA ruled that in cases of equiponderance of evidence, the courts must
- The creation of an entirely new LGU through a division or a merger of find for the defendant.
existing LGUs is recognized under the Consti so long as it complies with
the standards set by the LGC. The petitioner raised the ff issues before the SC:
- In response to Cawaling’s argument that there is no “compelling reason” 1. The CA improperly applied the rule on equiponderance of evidence;
merge the two municipalities, the Court stated that it could not pass 2. The respondent municipality does not have a juridical personality since it
upon the wisdom of RA 8806; was created under a void executive order; and
- The word “approval” in Sec. 54 of RA 8806, which should be read together 3. the challenged decision throws them back again to their controversy.
with Sec. 65 thereof, could only mean “effectivity” as used and
contemplated in Sec. 10 of the Code. ISSUE: WON a municipality, created under a void executive order, can be
- The law was first published in 25 Aug 2000 issue of TODAY. The considered as not having a juridical personality in light of the passage of the Local
publication of the law was completed on 1 Sept 2000, which should be the Government Code of 1991. NO.
reckoning point in determining the 120day period within which to
conduct the plebiscite. RATIO: The petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality
- COMELEC: Since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law, of the respondent on 19 January 1984 (35 yrs after its creation in 1949) during the
it could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect. proceedings in this case. After presentation of evidence, Candijay asked the trial
- As to the failure of the COMELEC to conduct an intensive info campaign, court to bar the respondent from presenting evidence on the ground that it had no
the Court said that no proof was presented by the petitioner to juridical personality. Candijay argued that EO 265 issued by Pres. Quirino is null
substantiate his claim. There is the presumption that COMELEC and void ab initio since Sec. 68 of the RAC constituted an undue delegation of
regularly performed its duty under the law in conducting the plebiscite. legislative power to the Prez.
Pelaez v Auditor General The Municipality of Alicia was created by EO 265, or ten years ahead of
the Municipality of San Andres, and had been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez
FACTS: From 4 Sept to 29 Oct 1964, the Prez, purporting to act pursuant to Sec 68 was promulgated. Various governmental acts through the years all indicate the
of the Rev. Admin Code, issued Exec. Order Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129, State’s recognition and acknowledgement of its existence. Alicia must benefit from
creating 33 municipalities; the effects of Sec. 422 (d) of the LGC and should be considered a regular, de jure
- On 10 Nov 1964, Pelaez filed this prohibition proceeding against the municipality.
Auditor General to restrain him from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said Eos and/ or any disbursement by According to Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC, municipal districts “organized
said municipalities. pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
- Pelaez argued that the EOs are void since Sec. 68 has been impliedly respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
repealed by RA 23701 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”
power. “Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving validity to
- Pelaez contended that since 1 Jan 1960, barrios may not be created acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have
except upon Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board been complied with, are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual
upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected qualification against impairment of vested rights.”2
- Since the Prez, under the new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he
even create a municipality which is composed of several barrios? Municipality of Jimenez v Baz
- Gov’t: new municipalities can be created without creating new barrios, by
placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. FACTS: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of then Pres. Quirino
pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Sinacaban laid claim to several
ISSUE: WON the EOs should be declared null and void ab initio. YES. barrios based on the technical description in EO 258. The Municipality of Jimenez
RATIO: asserted jurisdiction based on an agreement with Sinacaban which was approved by
- Where the power to fix such common boundary, in order to fix such the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which fixed the common boundary of
common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction Sinacaban and Jimenez.
between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative
nature—involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban.
into effect the law creating said municipalities, the authority to create It held that the earlier resolution approving the agreement between the
municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. municipalities was void since the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of
Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in the RTC of Oroquieta. Jimenez argued that the power to create
1
Sec. 3 of RA 2370: Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
2
changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress. Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, Sr.

municipalities is essentially legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General), then FACTS: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2312 pursuant to RA No. 7155
Sinacaban, which was created thru and EO, had no legal personality and no right to which created the Municipality of TulayNaLupa. 15 Dec 1991: A plebiscite was
assert a territorial claim. held in the barangays comprising the proposed Municipality of TulayNaLupa and
the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Only
ISSUES: 2,890 favored the creation of the new municipality while 3,439 voted against it.
I. WON Sinacaban has juridical personality. YES.
The Governor of Camarines Norte sought to set aside the plebiscite on the ground
II. WON RA 7160 Sec. 442(d) is invalid since it does not conform to the that it should not have been conducted since the approval and ratification of the
constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the 1987 Constitution reverted to the ruling in Paredes v Executive Secretary and that
creation of new municipalities. NO. Tan v COMELEC is no longer controlling.
RATIO: ISSUE: WON the term “political units directly affected” only comprises those areas
I. Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly recognized and its in the proposed LGU and not those from the mother LGU. NO.
acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In the case
of Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, the SC laid the factors to consider in RATIO: The deletion of the phrase “unit or” in Sec. 10 Art. XI of the 1973
validating the creation of a municipal corporation: Constitution has not affected the ruling of the SC in Tan v COMELEC.
1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation has not
been challenged; During the 1986 Con Com:
2. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity Mr. Davide: “I precisely asked for the deletion of the words “unit or”
of the EO creating the municipality; and because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it
3. the fact that the municipality was later classified as a 5 th class is the creation of a barangay, the municipality itself must participate in the
municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.
considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution
apportioning the seats in the House. It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be
conducted “in the political units directly affected,” it means that residents of the
In this case, the following factors are present: political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation have a right
to vote. The phrase “political units directly affected” contemplates the plurality of
1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was political units which would participate in the exercise.
decided in 1965 and yet the validity of EO 258 creating it had never
been questioned. It was only 40 years later that its existence was Miranda v Aguirre (1999)
questioned.
2. The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacaban’s corporate FACTS: 5 May 1994: RA 7720 converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into
existence. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, etc. an independent component city. 14 Feb 1998: RA 8528 was enacted, amending RA
7720. It changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a
Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that “municipal districts component city. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of this RA since it lacked a
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have provision submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a
their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of plebiscite. The respondents raised the defense of standing and the political question
this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.” Sinacaban has doctrine. The Sol Gen argued that the RA merely reclassified Santiago City from an
attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which “creation, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental. government units.”
II. Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took ISSUE: WON a reclassification of a city from an independent component city to a

effect. It is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. It applies only to new component city requires a plebiscite. YES.
municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. The requirement of
plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, Section 3 of the previous Constitution. RATIO: The wording of the constitution has a common denominator: the material
It cannot be applied to municipal corporations created before, such as Sinacaban. change in the political and economic rights of the LGU directly affected. The consent
of the people is required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of
V. ALTERATION AND DISSOLUTION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS legislative power. The changes are substantial. The city mayor will be placed under
the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and
Power to alter/ dissolve: ordinances of the city council will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of
1. Fixing, altering, changing boundaries of municipal corporations Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will have to be shared with the
2. Dividing a municipal corporation 2 or 1 separate municipality province. There would be a reduction in their IRA.
3. Merging or consolidating 2 or more municipalities into 1.
4. Annexing one municipality to another. When RA 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality
5. Repealing its charter. to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a
plebiscite called for that purpose. There is no reason why the same should not be
Effects of annexation/ consolidation: done when RA 8528 downgrades the status of their city. The rules cover all
1. On the legal existence of territory annexed—Dissolves annexed territory, conversions, whether upward or downward so long as they result in a material
under its jurisdiction; change in the LGU directly affected.
2. Laws/ ordinances of annexed corporation subject to all laws/ ordinances
by which annexing corporation is governed;
3. Right of officers/ employees of annexed consolidated territory to continue Tobias v Abalos
to hold their office. Terminate official relation with offices.
4. Title to property—Acquire title to property without compensation. But, if FACTS: RA 7657, “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
it forms part of municipality, provide for payment. Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Mandaluyong” was signed into
5. Debt/ obligations—Assumed. law on 9 Feb 1994. 10 April 1994: A plebiscite was held in Mandaluyong where the
“yes” votes won. Petitioners filed this case arguing that RA 7675 violated the “one
Effects of division of municipal corporation: subjectone bill” rule since the law allegedly contained two different subjects:
1. Legal existence of original corporation extinguishes corporate existence of 1. Conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and
original municipality. 2. Division of the congressional district of San Juan/ Mandaluyong into two
2. Property/ powers/ rights: Divided each municipality acquires title to the separate districts.
properties, powers, rights, and obligations falling within its territorial
limits. Petitioners: The seconds subject is not germane to the subject matter of RA
7657. Moreover, the separation of the two units has resulted in an increase in the
VI. PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENTS composition of the House beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the
Constitution. The division was not made pursuant to any census. There should have
Padilla v COMELEC been a plebiscite on RA 7657 on the part of the people of San Juan.
ISSUE: WON RA 7657 should be declared unconstitutional for the reasons given by
the petitioners. NO.

6 July 1983: Mayor confirmed the condemnation orders so demolition orders soon
RATIO: The creation of a separate congressional district is but a natural and logical followed.
consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. The present limit of 250
is not absolute. The Consti clearly provides that the House shall be composed of not ISSUE: WON the petitioners may avail of certiorari to question demolition orders
more than 250 members, “unless otherwise provided by law.” It means that the issued by the City Engineer of Manila. NO.
present composition of Congress may be increased if Congress itself so mandates. RATIO: Petitioners failed to show the elements needed for certiorari to prosper. 4 The
power to condemn buildings in Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
The contention that the people of San Juan should have been parties to City Engineer, who is at the same time the bldg official (Sec. 206, PD 1096).
the plebiscite is wrong since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate Sec. 275 and 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of Manila provide:
district representation was only ancillary to it. 275. Deterioration and Defects.—All buildings or parts of buildings which show
defects in any essential parts shall be repaired and put in safe condition at once, or
VII. GENERAL POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS if the deterioration be greater than fifty per centum of the value of the bldg, as
estimated by the city engineer, they shall be removed.
Technology Developers v CA (1991) 276. Condemnation Proceedings.—Whenever in the judgment of the City Engineer
any bldg has been damaged by any cause to such an extent as to be dangerous for
FACTS: Petitioner made and exported charcoal birquette. Pablo Cruz, the acting use, he may condemn the same. If the owner of the bldg is unwilling to abide by the
mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, ordered that it fully stop the operations of its plant condemnation order, he may formally object within 7 days. The mayor shall hear the
located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. owner and his experts and decide the case on the evidence presented. If the mayor
- The letter asked Mr. Manese (plant manager) to bring several confirms the city engineer’s action, the owner must remove the bldg w/in 15 days
documents3 with him to the mayor’s office. Petitioner sought to secure the from date of notification. If the owner does not comply, the bldg shall be removed at
documents but its request to obtain a mayor’s permit was not his expense and the city shall recover from him.
entertained.
6 April 1989: Cruz ordered that the plant be padlocked without any prior notice on Sec. 215 of PD 1096 (Nat’l Bldg Code) also states that when any bldg is
the petitioner. found dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation, or
- Petitioner asked for and obtained a writ of preliminary injunction against demolition, depending on the degree of danger to life, health or safety. There is no
the acting mayor. grave abuse of discretion in this case. The orders were made after thorough ocular
- In the hearing of the MR, petitioner’s counsel failed to attend. The inspections which showed that the bldg had defects of up to 80%. The act of the
provincial prosecutor submitted the following evidence: Mayor in approving the condemnation was also done in accordance with law. The
o Investigation report of the petitioner made by Marivic Guina petitioners submitted their protest 3 mos after notice, contrary to the 7day rule
recommending that the manufacturing process and raw prescribed by the city ordinance. Petitioners also failed to exhaust administrative
materials used by the factory produced fumes that are remedies since PD 1096 provided for an appeal to the Secretary of the Ministry of
hazardous to health so the company must shut down until the Public Works and a request for a reinspection of the bldg., something the petitioners
proper air pollution device is installed. failed to do.
o Signatures of residents complaining about the pollution.
o Letter addressed to Gov. Pagdanganan complaining about the
smoke. Binay v Domingo (1991)
- The lower court set aside the injunction it earlier issued. That decision
was sustained by the CA. FACTS: 27 Sept 1988: Petitioner Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution
No. 60.
ISSUE: WON the local executive may deny the application for a business permit by The resolution provided for a burial assistance program where qualified
virtue of his police power. YES. beneficiaries (to be given P500.00) are bereaved families whose gross monthly
RATIO: The matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed income does not exceed 2 thousand per month. It will be funded by the
to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its actions shall not be unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury.
disturbed on appeal unless it can be shown that it acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. The municipal
“No mayor’s permit was secured. Although the matter of determining secretary certified a disbursement fund of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the
whether there is pollution that requires control/ prohibition is addressed to the program. When it was referred to the COA, the resolution was disapproved.
Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR, it must be recognized that the
mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, COA: There is no relation between the objective sought to be attained under Res.
and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to No. 60 and the alleged public safety and general welfare of the people of Makati.
operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are Moreover, it is not for a public purpose. It only seeks to benefit a few individuals.
taken to control/ avoid injury to the health of the residents. The action of the mayor
was in response to complaints made by the residents of the area. The closure was The Municipal Council passed Resolution No. 243 which reaffirmed Res.
made after due investigation. The permit the petitioner obtained had already No. 60. However, the program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159.
expired and it did not exert any effort to extend its permit.”
Concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 60, reenacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health of Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare
the people from the deleterious effects of environmental pollution. clause. YES.
Chua Huat v CA (1991) RATIO: Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations.
Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid
FACTS (GR 63863, the 2nd of 2 cases in this decision): delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent
14 Sept 1972: Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. requested Romulo del Rosario (city engineer powers of the State.
of Manila) to condemn the dilapidated structures located at 1271 to 1277 Pedro Gil
St. and 1553 to 1557 Paz St., Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners. A valid delegation may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from
17 Nov 1982: Officials issued notices of condemnation addressed to the petitioners. the mere fact of the creation of the corporation, and as a general rule, municipal
It stated that the bldgs were found to be in dangerous condition and are therefore corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their
condemned. It also said that the notice is not a demolition order since it is still creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted,
subject to the approval of the mayor. The orders were based on the inspection and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as
reports made by Evaluation Committee of the Office of the City Engineer. empowering them to do things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the
19 Jan 1983: Civil Engr Romulo Molas (pvt practitioner) certified that although old, safety of the people.
the bldgs are still structurally sound and have a remaining economic life of at least 8
years. The inferred powers are as much delegated powers as are those conferred
22 Feb 1983: Petitioners formally protested against the notices. in express terms.
22 April 1983: Gamboa, one of the petitioners, was informed of a demolition order
for one of the structures.
4
1) A body that acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
3
Building permit, mayor’s permit, Region III Pollution of Environment and Nat Res Permit, discretion, and 2) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
etc. ordinary course of law.

Police power power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, The petitioner judge granted a writ of possession with the ancillary writ
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is not confined of demolition, justifying it by applying the rule on eminent domain.
within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow
the legal progress of a democratic way of life. Even before Proclamation No. 365, the land was the subject of cadastral
proceedings before another branch of the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. One of the
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and is claimants in this case is Medina who traced his ownership as far back as 1947 when
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the he allegedly bought it from a Subanan native.
people in their health, safety, and convenience as consistently as may be with
private rights. It extends to all the public needs. ISSUE: WON the municipality may order the demolition of private property despite
the pendency of cadastral proceedings that shall ultimately settle the question of
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally ownership.
benefits a limited number of persons. The care for the poor is generally recognized
as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of HELD: NO. But that is immaterial now since the buildings have already been
police power in the promotion of the common good. demolished. Petition dismissed. TC ordered to require the petitioners to put up a
bond to be determined after a hearing on the just compensation due to the private
No violation of equal protection clause in classifying paupers. They may respondents in case the demolition of their buildings is adjudged illegal.
be reasonably classified.
RATIO: The legality of the occupation by the private respondents in this case is still
Tatel v Municipality of Virac (1992) to be resolved in the cadastral proceedings. If Medina is declared the owner of the
land, then he is entitled to just compensation for the precipitate demolition of their
FACTS: 18 March 1966: Residents of Barrio Sta. Elena complained against the buildings. The issuance of a writ of possession and writ of demolition by the
disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the petitioner judge in the ejectment proceedings was premature. What the petitioner
warehouse of Mr. Tatel due to the smoke, obnoxious odor, and dust emitted by the should have done was to stop the proceedings in this case and wait for the final
machine. The Municipal Council of Virac appointed a committee to investigate. It outcome of the cadastral proceedings. However, the demolition of the buildings is
found that the neighborhood was crowded as there were narrow roads and that this now fait accompli.
showed that the warehouse was a fire hazard in the area. 22 April 1966: Resolution
No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac, declaring the warehouse a The complaint alleges factual circumstances of a complaint for abatement
public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code. of a public nuisance. A public plaza is outside the commerce of man and
Tatel’s MR was denied, he then filed this petition for prohibition. constructions thereon can be abated summarily by the municipality.
Council: Tatel’s warehouse violated Ordinance No. 13 which prohibited the Patalinhug v CA (1994)
construction of warehouses within 200 meters from a block of houses either in the
poblacion or barrios. FACTS: 17 Nov 1982: Sangguinang Panlungsod of Davao enacted Ordinance No. 363
(Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City). It provided that funeral homes must be
Tatel: The Ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to due process and equal established not less than 50 meters from any residential structures, churches, and
protection clause of the Constitution. other institutional buildings. Upon approval and certification of zoning compliance
by the zoning administrator, the building officer issued a building permit in favor of
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 13, in prohibiting the construction of warehouses in Patalinghug for the construction of the Metropolitan Funera Parlor at Cabaguio
densely populated communities, is a valid exercise of police power. YES. Ave.
RATIO: Municipal Corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and Residents of Barangay Agdao complained that it violated the ordinance
maintenance of local selfgovernment and as such are endowed with police powers to since it was within a 50meter radius from the Iglesia Chapel and several
carry out the objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general residential structures. The Sanggunian found out that the nearest residential
welfare clause of the Admin Code. structure (owned by Mr. Tepoot) was only 8 INCHES to the south.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must be within the corporate powers of the Despite such findings, petitioner continued with his construction. Private
municipality to enact. Ordinances are required to be: respondents then filed a case for declaration of nullity of a building permit. The trial
1. In accord with the Constitution or any statute; court dismissed the complaint saying that the residential buildings and the church
2. not be unfair or oppressive; are more than 50 meters from the funeral parlor. Mr. Tepoot’s place, according to
3. not be impartial or discriminatory; the court, should not be considered a residential establishment since its lessee is
4. must not prohibit but may regulate trade; engaged in the laundry business. The CA reversed the trial court and ruled that
5. must be general and consistent with public policy, and Tepoot’s land is a residential lot as reflected in the tax declaration.
6. must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance No. 13 meets these criteria. The ordinance regulates the construction of ISSUE: WON the declaration of an LGU that an area is a commercial zone is a valid
warehouses located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses wherein exercise of police power. YES,
inflammable materials are stored and not the construction of a warehouse per se.
The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire. No undue RATIO: The question of whether Mr. Tepoot’s bldg is residential or not is a factual
restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely determination which appellate courts should not disturb. The testimony of City
a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot’s bldg was used for a dual purpose:
danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far dwelling and for business. While its commercial aspect has been established by the
as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy that what has been presence of machineries and laundry equipment, its use as a residence was not fully
conceived by the municipal government. substantiated.
Judge Tamin v CA (1992) The findings of the trial court is supported by the fact that the
Sanggunian declared the area as commercial or C2. Once a local gov’t has
FACTS: 24 September 1990: Municipality of Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur, reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must
represented by its mayor (Domiciano Real) filed a complaint denominated as prevail. While the commercial character of the vicinity was declared through
“Ejectment with Preliminary Injunction and Damages” against respondents Medina ordinance, the respondents have failed to substantiate their arguments that
and Rosellon. It alleged that the petitioner municipality is the owner of a parcel of Cabaguio Avenue was still a residential zone. The declaration of an area as a
land with an area of 5,894 sq meters; that it was reserved for a public plaza under commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to
Pres. Proc. No. 365; that during the incumbency of Mayor Isidro Real, Sr., the promote the good order and general welfare of the people in a locality. Persons may
municipality leased an area of 1,350 sq meters to the defendants subject to the be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens to secure the general welfare
condition that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes. of the state.
It also stated that the defendants paid rentals until 1967, but that they refused to
pay after that period; that the national government had allotted funds for the Tano v Socrates (1997)
construction of a municipal gym but that it could not continue due to the presence of
the buildings of the defendants. They argued that the funds might revert back to the FACTS: 15 Dec 1992: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City enacted
national government and such would result to “irreparable damage, injury, and Ordinance No. 1592 which banned the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside
prejudice” to the municipality and its people who are expected to derive benefit from the city from 19931998.
the accomplishment of the project. 22 Jan 1993: Acting Mayor Lucero issued Office Order No. 23. It authorized officers
to inspect cargoes containing live fish and lobster that are shipped out of Puerto

Princesa. The purpose of the inspection is to check if the shipper had the required road in going to the old capitol bldg but must instead pass through a small
mayor’s permit issued by their office. passageway.
19 February 1993: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted Resolution No.
33 which prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, etc. of live marine coral ISSUE: WON the provincial board can order the closure of a road and use/ convey it
dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 yrs. for other purposes. YES.
The respondents implemented the ordinances, depriving all the fishermen, marine RATIO: Resolution 158 clearly says that “it is hereby resolved to close the old road.”
merchants, and shippers of the entire province of their only means of livelihood. The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or convey it for other
purposes is derived from RA 5185 in relation to Section 2246 of the Admin. Code. RA
The petitioners directly invoked the original jurisdiction of the SC arguing as 5185, Sec. 11 (II) (a): A municipal council may close any municipal road, street,
follows: alley, park, etc. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
1. It deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly conveyed for any purpose for which said other property belonging to the
restricted them from the practice of their trade, violating Section 2, municipality might be lawfully used or conveyed. While the cases on this subject
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of the 1987 Constitution. dealt with city councils and not provincial boards, there is no reason for not applying
2. Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the doctrine announced therein with respect to the closure of provincial roads. This
the Mayor’s permit could be granted or denied; ie. Mayor had absolute authority is inferable from the grant by congress of the funds to the province for the
authority in issuing the permit. construction of provincial roads.
3. The Ordinance took away the right of the fishermen to earn their
livelihood in lawful ways. Dacanay v Asistio (1992)
The respondents contended that it was a valid exercise of the Provincial FACTS: 5 Jan 1979: MMC Ordinance No. 7902 was enacted by the Commission,
Government’s power under the general welfare clause (Sec. 16 of the LGC). The designating certain city and municipal streets as sites for flea markets.
Ordinance, they argued, only covered live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms 10 Jan 1979: EO No. 135 was issued by Acting MMC Mayor Virgilio Robles; the
and excluded those not dwelling in the coral reefs and that it shall only last for 5 Caloocan City Flea Market Authority was established;
years. The court must also distinguish between catching live fish and selling it live The Caloocan City mayor opened 7 flea markets in their city. One of the streets
and those who have no intention at all of selling it live. designated was “Heroes del ‘96” where the petitioner lives. The road was considered
“the most viable and progressive, lessening unemployment in the city and servicing
ISSUE: WON the questioned ordinances enacted in the exercise of powers under the the residents with affordable basic necessities.”
LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment are a valid 1987: Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan, had the stalls demolished.
exercise of the police power of a municipal corporation. YES. Stall owners filed an action for prohibition against the City, the OIC Mayor, and the
RATIO: Laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. City Engineer.
Section 5 (c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of
the LGC “shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the LGUs in Trial Court: Heroes del ’96, V. Gozon, and Gonzales Sts. Are of public dominion.
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of 1. They cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject
the community. matter of contracts;
The LGC grants municipalities the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal 2. Cannot be acquired by prescription;
waters and to impose rentals, fees, or charges for their use. 3. Not subject to attachment and execution;
The sanggunians are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the LGU 4. Cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.
and its inhabitants.
The centerpiece of the LGC is decentralization. Indispensable to this is devolution. LGC provides that the City Engineer shall “prevent the encroachment of
One of these powers is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters private bldgs and fences on the streets and public places. The Charter of the City of
including the conservation of mangroves. The term “municipal waters” includes not Caloocan grants the City Engineer similar powers. Asistio then became the mayor.
only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, but also marine He did not pursue Martinez’s policy of clearing the city streets. Dacanay then filed a
waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline complaint in the Ombudsman. Ombudsman: There is an omission of an act which
from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low ought to be performed, in clear violation of RA 3019.
tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and 15 km from it (Sec. 131
[r] LGC). ISSUE: WON public streets or thoroughfares may be leased or licensed to market
stall holders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution passed by the Metro Manila
Two principal objectives of the Ordinances: Commission. NO.
1. Establish a “closed season” for the species of fish covered therein for 5 RATIO: The disputed areas from which the market stalls are sought to be evicted
years (This falls within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in are public streets.
municipal waters); A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. It may
2. Protect the coral in the marine waters of the city and the province from not be the subject of lease or other contract. As the stall holders pay fees to the City
further destruction due to illegal fishing activities (this falls within the Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the City
general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate there to Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such
cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate leases are null and void for being contrary to law.
penalties for acts which harm the environment. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the
community.
Cabrera v CA (1991) The EO issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del ’96 Street
as a vending area contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads
FACTS: 19 Sept 1969: Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 158 for public use.
which closed the old road leading to the new Capitol Bldg of the province and to give
to the owners of the properties traversed by the new road equal area as per the Petitioner and general public have a legal right to the relief demanded.
survey of the Highway District Engineer. Deeds of exchange were executed under Respondents have the corresponding duty to clear the streets and restore them to
which the province conveyed to several persons5 the portions of the closed road in their specific public purpose.
exchange for their own respective properties on which was subsequently laid a new Mandamus is proper.
concrete road.
Macasiano v Diokno (1992)
1978: Part of the northern end of the old road fronting the petitioner’s house was
planted to vegetables in 1977 by E. Alejandro. Anselmo Peña, who bought Vargas’s FACTS:
share, also in the same part of the road, converted it into a piggery farm. 13 July 1990: Municipality of Parañaque passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized
the closure of J. Gabriel, GG Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Ext., and Opena Streets
29 December 1978: The petitioner filed a complaint for “Restoration of Public Road located at Baclaran and the establishment of a flea market thereon. It was approved
and/ or Abatement of Nuisance…” He argued that the land fronting his house was a by the municipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2 which authorized the
public road owned by the province in its governmental capacity and that it is use of certain streets within metro manila for vending areas under certain
therefore beyond the commerce of man. conditions.
20 July 1990: MMA approved Ordinance No. 86 of the municipal council of Pque
Cabrera: Resolution No. 158 is not an order for a closure of the road but an authority subject to some conditions.6
to barter. A public road could not be subject of a barter without a prior order of
6
closure. The closure of the road has injured him since they can no longer use the old That the streets are not used for vehicular traffic; that it is not opposed by a
majority of the residents in the areas; that the 2 meter road to be used as a flea
5
Bagadiong, Alcala, Latorre, Tolentino, Alejandro, Vargas, and Reyes. market be distinctly marked, that the time of vending be designated; and that the
20 Jun 1990: Council authorized Mayor Ferrer to contract with any service jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents of the said cities and
cooperative for the establishment, operation, and management of the flea markets. municipalities."
8 Aug 1990: The municipality, and respondent Palanyag entered into an agreement
for the management of the vending areas. CFI: This provision empowers cities to purchase but not to expropriate lands for the
13 Sept 1990: Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent, ordered the destruction/ purpose of subdivision and resale, and so dismissed the present action, which seeks
confiscation of the stalls; to condemn several parcels of land having a combined area of 7,270 square meters
23 Oct 1990: Pque and Palanyag filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus. and situated on Legarda Street, City of Manila.
Trial Court: upheld the validity of the Ordinance.
ISSUE: WON the expropriation of the area is proper. NO.
ISSUE: WON an ordinance or resolution issued by a municipal council authorizing RATIO: Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to be applied in
the lease and use of public streets as sites for flea markets is valid. NO. determining whether the use is public or not, some go so far in the direction of a
liberal construction as to hold that public use is synonymous with public benefit,
RATIO: The areas are local roads used for public service and are considered public public utility, or public advantage, and to authorize the exercise of the power of
properties of the municipality. eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially where the interests
These properties are under the absolute control of Congress. involved are of considerable magnitude.
Local governments have no authority whatsoever to control the use of public
properties unless specific authority is given by Congress. The underlying reasons for these decisions are that the destruction of
The authority given by the LGC to close roads should be read and interpreted in congested areas and unsanitary dwellings diminishes the potentialities of epidemics,
accordance with basic principles already established by law. crime and waste, prevents the spread of crime and diseases to unaffected areas,
enhances the physical and moral value of the surrounding communities, and
424 Civil Code: Properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made promotes the safety and welfare of the public in general.
available to the public in general is outside the commerce of man and cannot be
disposed of or leased by the LGU to private persons. "In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and
land that embraces a whole town, or a large section of a town or city, bears direct
Closure: comply with due process; must be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the relation to the public welfare. The size of the land expropriated, the large number of
road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such people benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform secured by the
property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. Once condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and public use. The
withdrawn from public use, it then becomes patrimonial property. expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic slavery, feudalistic practices,
Only then can the LGU use or convey it for any purpose for which other property endless conflicts between landlords and tenants, and other evils inimical to
belonging to the LGU might be lawfully conveyed. community prosperity and contentment and public peace and order.

The municipality also failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the MMA. Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated
The exercise of the powers of LGUs should be subservient to paramount must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical
considerations of health and wellbeing of the members of the community. necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least
inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and property owner consistent
MMDA v Bel Air Village Assn., Inc. (2000) with such benefit. But measured even by this standard, and forgetting for a moment
the private character of the intended use, necessity for the condemnation has not
FACTS: Bel Air Village Assn. (BAVA) is the registered owner of Neptune St. in been shown. The land in question has cost the owner P140,000.
Makati.
Oreta (MMDA Chair): Wrote the BAVA president to ask for the voluntary opening Viewed from another angle, the case at bar is weaker for the condemnor.
of Neptune St. In the first place, the land that is the subject of the present expropriation is only
onethird of the land sought to be taken in the Guido case, and about twothirds of
MMDA: claims to have authority to open Neptune St. to traffic since it is an agent of that involved in the Borja condemnation proceeding. In the second place, the
the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Arellano Colleges' land is situated in a highly commercial section of the city and is
Manila. One of these is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use occupied by persons who are not bona fide tenants. Lastly, this land was bought by
of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. the defendant for a university site to take the place of rented buildings that are
unsuitable for schools of higher learning.
ISSUE: WON the MMDA can order the opening of a subdivision road to public
traffic absent an ordinance from the concerned LGU. NO. While a handful of people stand to profit by the expropriation, the
development of a university that has a present enrollment of 9,000 students would
RATIO: The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, be sacrificed. Any good that would accrue to the public from providing homes to a
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, few families fades into insignificance in comparison with the preparation of young
setting or policies, installation of a system and administration. Nothing in RA 7924 men and young women for useful citizenship and for service to the government and
grants it police power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been given any the community, a task which the government alone is not in a position to undertake.
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of LGUs, nothing in RA 7924
empowers the MMDA to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate City of Manila v Chinese Community of Manila (1920)
funds for the general welfare.”
FACTS: 11 December 1916: City of Manila presented a petition in the CFI asking for
MMDA is not an LGU or a public corp. endowed with legislative power. It is not the expropriation of certain lands for it to construct a public improvement (extension
even a “special metropolitan political subdivision” since it requires the approval by a of Rizal Avenue). Comunidad de Chinos de Manila, Tambunting, etc: each alleged
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question
MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in the Sangalang case. Although the was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with
MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of PD 824 shows that sepulchers and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street
the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. for public purposes.
MMDA Chair: appointed by the president. LGUs: Prez only exercises supervisory
authority; The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was necessary.
City of Manila: Once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only
resolution ordering the opening of Neptune St., its proposed opening by MMDA is function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in
therefore illegal. question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the
advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the
City of Manila v Arellano College (1950) necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in
expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method
FACTS: adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 267 provides:
"Cities and municipalities are authorized to contract loans from the Reconstruction That the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for
Finance Corporation, the Philippine National Bank, and/or any other entity or public purposes, is not denied. Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of
person at a rate of interest not exceeding eight per cent per annum for the purpose Manila) provides that "the city (Manila) . . . may condemn private property for
of purchasing or expropriating homesites within their respective territorial public use."
use shall be temporary.

The Charter of the city of Manila contains no procedure by which the said none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the
authority may be carried into effect. We are driven, therefore, to the procedure freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, the plain
marked out by Act No. 190 to ascertain how the said authority may be exercised. meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
From an examination of Act No. 190, in its section 241, we find how the right of
eminent domain may be exercised. Said section 241 provides that, "The Government The ascertainment of the necessity must precede, and not follow, the
of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any taking of the property. The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain
municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having, by law, the must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case.
right to condemn private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the
manner hereinafter prescribed." Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of
the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority.
Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon trial that the right
to expropriate the land in question exists, it shall then appoint commissioners. The city of Manila is not authorized to expropriate public property. Since
Sections 244, 245 and 246 provide the method of procedure and duty of the the city of Manila is only permitted to condemn private property for public use and
commissioners. Section 248 provides for an appeal from the judgment of the Court of since the Chinese Cemetery in the city of Manila is a public cemetery already
First Instance to the Supreme Court. Said section 248 gives the Supreme Court devoted to a public use, the city of Manila cannot condemn a portion of the cemetery
authority to inquire into the right of expropriation on the part of the plaintiff. If the for a public street.
Supreme Court on appeal shall determine that no right of expropriation existed, it
shall remand the cause to the Court of First Instance with a mandate that the Province of Camarines Sur v CA (1993)
defendant be replaced in the possession of the property and that he recover
whatever damages he may have sustained by reason of the possession of the FACTS: 22 December 1988: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
plaintiff. Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial
Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol
It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the phrase in said section, site, in order to establish a pilot farm for nonfood and nontraditional agricultural
"and if the court shall find that the right to expropriate exists," means simply that, crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.
if the court finds that there is some law authorizing the plaintiff to expropriate, then
the courts have no other function than to authorize the expropriation and to proceed "WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a
to ascertain the value of the land involved; that the necessity for the expropriation is fiveyear Comprehensive Development plan, some of the vital
a legislative and not a judicial question. components of which includes the establishment of model and pilot farm
for nonfood and nontraditional agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue
ISSUE: WON the courts can inquire and hear proof as to the existence of the culture laboratory centers, 15 small scale technology soap making, small
prerequisites needed in eminent domain proceedings initiated by LGUs. scale products of plaster of paris, marine biological and sea farming
research center, and other progressive feasibility concepts objective of
RATIO: The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal which is to provide the necessary scientific and technology knowhow to
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the farmers and fishermen in Camarines Sur and to establish a housing
power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only project for provincial government employees;”
find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain,
but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. The San
In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.
the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be
public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of
either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The trial court denied the motion
exercised in accordance with law to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the
property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the
When a municipal corporation attempts to expropriate private property amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private
and an objection is made thereto by the owner, the courts have ample authority, in respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.
this jurisdiction, to make inquiry, and to hear proof upon anissue properly
presented, concerning the question whether or not the purpose of the appropriation Province of Camarines Sur: claimed that it has the authority to initiate the
is, in fact, for some public use. The right of expropriation is not inherent power in a expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P.
municipal corporation and before it can exercise the right some law must exist Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.
conferring the power upon it. A municipal corporation in this jurisdiction cannot
expropriate public property. The land to be expropriated must be private, and the Solicitor General: Under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337),
purpose of the expropriation must be public. If the court. upon trial, finds that there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by
neither of said condition exists, or that either one of them fails, the right to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the
expropriate does not exist. If the property is taken in the ostensible behalf of a Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first
public improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being taken for secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate
a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for protection by the the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
courts.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the
It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper authority should Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the
grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some specified order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the
public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
purpose of that legislation. Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private
However, if the Legislature should grant general authority to a respondents from agricultural to nonagricultural land.
municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, the courts
have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the provisions above quoted, to However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the
make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly presented, concerning proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority
whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public. of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the lands
sought to be expropriated from agricultural to nonagricultural use, it assumed that
There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public
municipality is given authority to exercise the right of eminent domain and a use.
decision by the municipality that there exists a necessity for the exercise of that
right in a particular case. ISSUE: WON the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is
subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the
The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the implementor of the agrarian reform program. NO.
necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of a state, is an unreasonable exercise RATIO: Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation
of the right of eminent domain of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be
exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used
The exercise of the right of eminent domain is necessarily in derogation by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking
of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new
construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity and concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to

contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a
resort complex for tourists or housing project Ordinance A law. It has a general and permanent character.
Resolution Merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned a specific matter. Temporary.
resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center
would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise the power through a
Camarines Sur. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen resolution, it would have said so.
would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose Article 36, Rule VU of the IRR which requires only a resolution could not prevail
requirement of the Constitution. over the law.
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent Complaint does not state a cause of action—In a motion to dismiss based
domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. It is on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question
also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain submitted before the court is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint
certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local itself. WON those allegations are true is beside the point, for their truth is
governments. While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete hypothetically admitted by the motion.
within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power
must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other Res judicata is present in this case since VM Realty is a successor in
legislations. interest of Limpan Investment Corp. The principle of res judicata cannot bar the
right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. This right should be
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government absolute and unfettered even by prior judgment or res judicata. The ruling in this
units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of case that Pque could not exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution will
roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings once the legal requirements are
use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these complied with.
projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be
the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a
public purpose or public use. City of Cebu v Spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo (2002)
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that FACTS: 17 September 1993: City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain
shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged
public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such therein that it needed the parcels of land of respondents for a public purpose, i.e., for
legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of
no real or substantial relation to the public use. There is also an ancient rule that Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan
restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The lots are the most suitable site for the
sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto. purpose. The total area sought to be expropriated is 1,624 square meters with an
assessed value of P1,786,400. Petitioner deposited with the Philippine National
The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the Bank the amount of P51,156 representing 15% of the fair market value of the
valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded. This property to enable the petitioner to take immediate possession of the property
Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the condemned
property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower. Respondents: The purpose for which their property was to be expropriated was not
for a public purpose but for a single private entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc.
Municipality of Parañaque v VM Realty Corp. (1998) Petitioner could simply buy directly from them the property at its fair market value
if it wanted to, just like what it did with the neighboring lots. Besides, the price
FACTS: Pursuant to SB Res. No. 9395, the Municipality of Pque filed on 20 Sept offered was very low in light of the consideration of P20,000 per square meter, more
1993 a complaint for expropriation against VM Realty Corporation over 2 parcels of or less, which petitioner paid to the neighboring lots. Finally, respondents alleged
land. that they have no other land in Cebu City.
The purpose was to alleviate the living conditions of the poor by providing homes
through socialized housing projects. 23 August 1994: Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession
pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The motion was granted by the trial court
The RTC of Makati issued an order giving it due course. It authorized the petitioner on 21 September 1994.
to take possession of the property upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 15% of its
fair market value based on its current tax declaration. 14 December 1994: The parties executed and submitted to the trial court an
Agreement wherein they declared that they have partially settled the case and in
VM Realty: It failed to state a cause of action since it was filed pursuant to a consideration thereof they agreed.
resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
Parañaque: A resolution substantially complies with the requirements of the law commissioners' report was inaccurate since it included an area which was not
since the terms “ordinance” and “resolution” are synonymous for the “purpose of subject to expropriation. More specifically, it contended that Lot No. 1528 contains
bestowing authority on the LGU through its chief executive to initiate the 793 square meters but the actual area to be expropriated is only 478 square meters.
expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.” The remaining 315 square meters is the subject of a separate expropriation
proceeding in Civil Case No. CEB8348, then pending before Branch 9 of the
ISSUE: WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
force and effect as an ordinance so as not to deprive an expropriation case of a valid
cause of action. NO. On 16 August 1996, the commissioners submitted an amended
RATIO: The power of eminent domain is lodged in Congress. An LGU may exercise assessment for the 478 square meters of Lot No. 1528 and fixed it at P12,824.10 per
the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and square meter, or in the amount of P20,826,339.50. The assessment was approved as
subject to the latter’s control and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the just compensation thereof by the trial court in its Order of 27 December 1996. 6
the power or in other legislations.” (See Sec. 19 of RA 7160 which provides that an Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the decision was amended to reflect the new
LGU through its chief executive may exercise the power of eminent domain through valuation.
an ordinance)
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner alleged
Requisites for the exercise of the power of eminent domain: that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at
1. An ordinance enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market
chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
expropriation proceedings;
2. Exercised for public use, purpose, or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor ISSUE: WON just compensation in eminent domain cases commenced by an LGU
and the landless; should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. NO.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Sec. 9 Art. III RATIO:
of the Constitution and other pertinent laws; In their Comment, respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals did
4. Valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the not err in affirming the decision of the trial court because (1) the trial court decided
property sought to be expropriated but that it was rejected. the case on the basis of the agreement of the parties that just compensation shall be

fixed by commissioners appointed by the court; (2) petitioner did not interpose any Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
serious objection to the commissioners' report of 12 August 1996 fixing the just appropriate proceedings.”
compensation of the 1,624square meter lot at P20,826,339.50; hence, it was
estopped from attacking the report on which the decision was based; and (3) the An appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the
determined just compensation fixed is even lower than the actual value of the Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance and
property at the time of the actual taking in 1994. even during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be
suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance No. 28 took effect in October
Eminent domain is the Government's right to appropriate, in the nature 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in December 1997, more than a year after the
of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. effectivity of the ordinance in 1996.
However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation as
consideration therefor. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are
mandatory. Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by the municipality of
In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the Hagonoy to fix and collect public market stall rentals. Being its lifeblood, collection
determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly of revenues by the government is of paramount importance. The funds for the
provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. operation of its agencies and provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely
derived from its revenues and collections.
The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation Petitioner contends that its period to appeal should be counted not from
should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein the time the ordinance took effect in 1996 but from the time its members were
that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain personally given copies of the approved ordinance in November 1997. It insists that
is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule it was unaware of the approval and effectivity of the subject ordinance in 1996 on
"admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the two (2) grounds: first, no public hearing was conducted prior to the passage of the
date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation ordinance and, second, the approved ordinance was not posted. In petitioner's two
proceedings." (2) communications with the Secretary of Justice, it enumerated the various
objections raised by its members before the passage of the ordinance in several
More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and meetings called by the Sanggunian for the purpose. There is no evidence to prove
voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of the petitioner's negative allegation that the subject ordinance was not posted as
commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between required by law. In contrast, the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality
the parties. It has the force of law between them and should be complied with in of Hagonoy, Bulacan, presented evidence which clearly shows that the procedure for
good faith. the enactment of the assailed ordinance was complied with.
Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November 1996, petitioner did Estanislao v. Costales (1991)
not interpose a serious objection. It is therefore too late for petitioner to question the
valuation now without violating the principle of equitable estoppel. Estoppel in pais FACTS: 13 January 1982: Sanggunian of Zamboanga City passed Ordinance No. 44;
arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence it imposed a P0.01 tax per liter of softdrinks produced, manufactured, and/or bottled
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces within the city.
another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on 3 December 1982: Finance Minister sent a letter to the Sanggunian suspending the
such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the effectivity of the Ordinance as it allegedly contravened Sec. 19 (a) of the Local Tax
existence of such facts. Records show that petitioner consented to conform with the Code.
valuation recommended by the commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement 5 December 1990: Lower court found that the tax imposed by the Ordinance is not
now and assail correctness of the commissioner's assessment. among those that the Sanggunian may impose under the Local Tax Code, but
upheld its validity, saying that the Finance Minister did not act on it w/in 120 days
Finally, while Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just from receipt of the petition.
compensation shall be determined at the time of the filing of the complaint for Finance Secretary appealed.
expropriation, such law cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a substantive law.
ISSUE: WON an ordinance that imposes a tax on the output or production of a
Hagonoy Market Vendors Assn v Municipality of Hagonoy Bulacan (2002) business is valid. NO.
RATIO: The authority of the City is limited to the imposition of a percentage tax on
FACTS: 1 October 1996: Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan, enacted the gross sales or receipts of said product which, being nonessential, shall be at the
Kautusan Blg. 28 which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors in rate of not exceeding 2% of the gross sales or receipts of the softdrinks for the
Hagonoy. Article 3 provided that it shall take effect upon approval. It was posted preceding calendar year. The tax imposed is based on the output or production and
from November 425, 1996. not on the gross sales or receipts as authorized by the Local Tax Code.
November 1997: Petitioner's members were given copies of the approved Ordinance According to Sec. 19 and Sec. 23 of the LTC: A city may impose, in lieu of the
and were informed that it shall be enforced in January, 1998. graduated fixed tax prescribed under Sec. 19, a percentage tax on the gross sales for
the preceding calendar year of nonessential commodities at the rate of not
8 December 1997: Petitioner's President filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice exceeding two percent and on the gross sales of essential commodities at the rate of
assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance. Petitioner claimed it was not exceeding one percent.
unaware of the posting of the ordinance.
Pepsi Cola v. Tanauan: Inapplicable here since it involved a different law, the Local
Municipality: The ordinance took effect on 6 October 1996 and that the ordinance, as Autonomy Act.
approved, was posted as required by law. Hence, it was pointed out that petitioner's
appeal, made over a year later, was already timebarred. The Ordinance did not become valid by the inaction of the Finance Minister. It only
remains in effect if the minister did not comply with what is due him.
Secretary of Justice: Dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of
time, i.e., beyond thirty (30) days from the effectivity of the Ordinance on October 1, Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililia, Rizal (1991)
1996, as prescribed under Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code. The date
of effectivity of the subject ordinance retroacted to the date of its approval in FACTS: Petitioner PPC manufactured lubricated oil basestock which is a petroleum
October 1996, after the required publication or posting has been complied with, product with its refinery plant in Malaya, Pililia, Rizal.
pursuant to Section 3 of said ordinance. Sec. 142 (NIRC of 1939): Manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific
tax.
ISSUE: WON the appeal in this case is already timebarred. YES. PD 231: Local Tax Code: Municipality may impose taxes on business, except those
RATIO: The appeal with the Secretary of Justice is already timebarred. The for which fixed taxes are provided on manufacturers, importers or producers of any
applicable law is Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code which provides: article of commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers, distillers,
“That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue rectifiers, and compounders of liquors, distilled spirits, and/ or wines…
measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity Finance Secretary: Issued Provincial Circular No. 2673: It directed all LGU
thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in old or new ordinances
from the receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have in the business of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing or dealing in petroleum
the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and accrual and payment of products subject to specific tax under the NIRC; and Provincial Circular No. 26 A
the tax, fee or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days 73: Instructed treasurers to stop collecting any local tax imposed in tax ordinance
after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixtyday period without the enacted before or after the effectivity of the Local Tax Code on 1 July 1973.

He filed another petition for declaratory judgment against the resolution for being
Municipality of Pililia imposed Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 (Pililia Tax Code) illegal either as a donation or as a tax measure.
3 June 1977L PD 1158 was enacted, it imposed specific tax on refined/
manufactured mineral oils and motor fluids. CA: Mayor Tuzon and Treasurer Mapagu are liable to pay P20T as actual damages
In enforcing the Ordinance, Pililia filed a complaint against PPC for collection of and P5T as moral damages.
several taxes from 1979 to 1986. As for the Resolution, it was passed by the Sanggunian in the lawful exercise of its
PPC: Prov. Circular No. 2673 declared as contrary to national economic policy the legislative powers granted by the 1973 Constitution which provided that each LGU
imposition of local taxes on the manufacture of petroleum products as they are shall have the power to create its own source revenue and to levy taxes, subject to
already subject to specific tax under the NIRC and that it also covers all ordinances. such limitation as may be provided by law.
RTC of Tanay upheld the legality of the ordinance. Sec. 29, PD 231: The barrio council may solicit money, materials, and other
contributions from private agencies and individuals.
ISSUE: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC, is
still liable to pay (a) tax on business and (b) storage fees considering Prov. Circular ISSUE: WON a resolution imposing a 1% donation is a valid exercise of the taxing
No. 677; and mayor’s permit and sanitary inspection fee unto the respondent Pililia, power of an LGU. No Ruling.
based on the Ordinance. RATIO (some comments):
The Court did not concern itself with the validity of the Resolution since the issue
HELD: Pililia can only enforce collection from 1976 to 1986 and not those before was not raised in the petition as an assigned error of the CA. The measures have
1976. been sustained in the challenged decision, from which the respondent has not
appealed. The implementing agency made the “donation” obligatory.
RATIO:
Admin regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. The framers If it is to be considered as a tax ordinance, it must be shown to have been enacted in
of PD 426 intended to terminate the effectivity of the provincial circulars. accordance with the requirements of the Local Tax Code. It would include the
holding of a public hearing on the measure, its subsequent approval by the
The exercise of LGUs of the power to tax is ordained in the present Constitution. To Secretary of Finance, in addition to the requisites for publication of ordinances in
allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition would amount to restricting their general.
power to tax by mere admin issuances.
Drilon v. Lim (1994)
Mayor may not waive the payment of the mayor’s permit and sanitary inspection
fees. FACTS: Justice Secretary: declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null
and void for noncompliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances
Local tax code does not provide for prescriptive period for collection of local taxes. and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In Manila’s
Art. 1143 of the Civil Code governs. Action for obligation created by law prescribes petition for certiorari, the Manila RTC sustained the ordinance. It also declared
within ten years from time right of action accrues. Section 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional since it vests in the Justice Secretary the
power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in
Floro Cement Corporation v. Gorospe (1991) the Constitution.
FACTS: Justice Secretary: It is constitutional and the procedural requirements for the
Municipality of Lugait (Misamis Oriental) filed a complaint for collection of taxes enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the LGC had indeed not been observed.
against Floro Cement Corporation. The taxes are “manufacturers” and “exporter’s”
taxes for 1 Jan 1974 30 Sept 1975 amounting to P161,875.00 plus 25% surcharge. ISSUE: WON Sec. 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional for granting the Justice
They based it on Municipal Ordinance No. 5, passed pursuant to PD 231; and Secretary the power of control over LGUs. NO.
Ordinance No. 10. RATIO: Sec. 187 authorizes the Secretary to review only the constitutionality or
Floro: Not liable since the plaintiff’s powers to levy fees on “Mines, Mining legality of the tax ordinances and to revoke them if it does not pass the set
Corporations and Mineral Products” was limited by Sec. 52 of PD 463. Secretary of standards. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also
Agriculture and Natural Resources granted us a certificate of tax exemption for a permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government
period of 5 years. that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did not set aside the Manila Revenue
Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He
ISSUE: WON Ordinance Nos. 5 and 10 apply to petitioner Floro Corporation did not pronounce it as unwise or unreasonable. All he said is that it is illegal.
notwithstanding the limitation provided for in Sec. 5(m) of PD 231 and Sec. 52 of PD
463. NO. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
RATIO: Municipality’s power to levy taxes on manufacturers and importers is followed, he may, in his discretion , order that the act be undone or redone by his
provided in Art. 2, Sec. 19 of PD 231: Municipality may impose a tax on business subordinate or even decide to do it himself.
except those for which fixed taxes are provided for in this Code.
As regards the procedural requirements, they have all been observed as correctly
Cement is not a mineral product but rather a manufactured product. It is the result found by the trial court. Notices of the pubic hearings were sent to the interested
of a definite process—crushing of minerals, grinding, mixing, etc. Its minerals had parties, the minutes are there, and they were published. The only exceptions are the
already undergone a chemical change before cement reaches its saleable form. posting of the ordinances as approved but this omission does not affect its validity,
considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general
The power of taxation is a high prerogative of sovereignty. Its relinquishment is circulation will satisfy due process. Although the text was not translated and
never presumed. The exemptions mentioned in Sec. 52 of PD 463 only refers to disseminated, this requirement applies to the approval of local dev’t plans and
machineries, equipment, tools, for production, etc., as provided in Sec. 53 of the public investment programs and not to tax ordinances.
same decree. The manufacture and export of cement do not fall under it since it is
not a mineral product. Benguet Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals (1992)
Tuzon and Mapagu v. Court of Appeals (1992) FACTS: Benguet Provincial Assessor: Assessed real property tax on the bunkhouses
of petitioner Benguet Corporation occupied for residential purposes by its rank and
FACTS: 14 March 1977: Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, adopted file employees under Tax Declaration Nos. 8471 (1985) and 10454 (1986). The tax
Resolution No. 9: solicited 1% donation of the palay threshed from the thresher exemptions of bunkhouses under Sec. 3 of PD 745 was withdrawn by PD 1955.
operators who will apply for a permit to thresh. The proceeds will fund the Benguet Corp.: Appealed the decision to the LBAA of Benguet.
construction of the Sports and Nutrition Center Bldg of the municipality. CBAA: held that the bldgs of petitioner used as dwellings were exempt from real
property tax pursuant to PD 745.
Petitioner Lope Mapagu (treasurer) prepared a document for signature of all LBAA: affirmed taxability of the bunkhouses. On appeal, CBAA held the exemption
thresher/ owner/ operators who applied for a mayor’s permit. was withdrawn so petitioner should have applied for restoration of the exemption
with the Fiscal Incentives Review Board.
Private respondent Jurado tried to pay the P285.00 license fee for thresher
operators but it was refused on the ground that he did not sign the agreement to Benguet: LGUs don’t have any authority to levy realty taxes on mines pursuant to
give 1% of the palay he produced. Sec. 52 of PD 463 and Sec. 5 (m) of the Local Tax Code.
Sol Gen: Benguet is estopped from raising the question of lack of authority as it was
Jurado filed for an action for mandamus with the RTC to compel the issuance of the never raised before.
mayor’s permit and license.

ISSUE: WON respondent assessors may validly assess real property tax on the
properties of petitioner considering the proscription in the Local Tax Code and the ISSUE: WON Tarlac Enterprises is exempt from the payment of real property tax
Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974 against imposition of taxes on mines under Sec. 40 (g) of PD 464 in relation to PD 551 as amended. NO.
by local governments; RATIO: The SC did not agree with the lower court that the phrase “in lieu of all
WON the real tax exemption granted under PD 745 was withdrawn by PD 1955. taxes and assessments of whatever nature” in the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of PD
YES. YES. 551 expressly exempts private respondent from paying real property taxes. Said
proviso is modified and delimited by the phrase “on earnings, receipts, income and
RATIO: privilege of generation, distribution and sale” which specifies the kinds of taxes and
(1) The provisions of Sec. 52 of the Mineral Resources Dev’t Decree of 1974 (PD 463) assessments which shall not be collected in view of the imposition of the franchise
and Sec. 5 (m) of the Local Tax Code are mere limitations on the taxing power of tax. Said enumerated items have no relation to, and are entirely different from, real
LGUs; they are not pertinent to the issue before the SC. They cannot affect the properties subject to tax.
imposition of the real property tax by the national government.
There is also no merit in the respondent’s contention that the real properties being
Although LGUs are charged with fixing the rates of real property tax, it does not taxed, the machinery for the generation and distribution of electric power, the bldg
follow that they also have the authority to determine WON they can impose the tax. housing said machinery, and the land on which said bldg is constructed, are
necessary for the operation of its business of generation, distribution and sale of
It is the national government that levies real property tax. When LGUs are required electric current and should be exempt from taxation. The lower court erred in
to fix the rates, they are merely constituted as agents of the national government in exempting the private respondents from paying real property tax on its properties
the enforcement of the real property tax code. The delegation of taxing power is not enumerated in the complaint.
even involved since the tax has already been imposed and the LGUs are just
mandated to enforce it. Casiño v. Court of Appeals (1991)
(2) If the SC were to sanction the interpretation of Benguet, then necessarily all real FACTS: Casiño owned the Don Romulo Rodriguez Coliseum. He was the licensee of
properties exempt by any law would be covered, and there would be no need for a cockpit.
congress to specify “Real Property Tax Code, as amended” instead of stating clearly
realty tax exemption laws. The intention is to limit the application of the “exception The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City passed Resolution No. 49 which
clause” only to those given by the Real Property Tax Code. classified certain areas of the city as residential zones (it included Block 125, the
location of the Coliseum). The classification led to the cancellation of Casiño’s license
National Development Corporation v. Cebu City (1992) to operate. 13 August 1985: Res. No. 378 reclassified Block 125 as within the
recreational zone, thus allegedly amending Resolution No. 49. When it was
FACTS: NDC is authorized to engage in commercial, industrial, mining, agricultural transmitted to the mayor, he returned it within 10 days, without any action, stating
and other enterprises needed for economic development. 10 August 1939: President that his approval was not needed since it did not involve a disposition of city funds.
issued Proclamation No. 430 which reserved Block No. 4, Reclamation Area No. 4, of
Cebu City, consisting of 4,599 square meters, for warehousing purposes under the Mayor Lugod (succeeding mayor) issued to petitioner the permit to operate a cockpit
administration of NWC. NWC was succeeded by NDC. dated 2 April 1986. This was renewed a year later. Pvt. Respondent Gingoog
Gallera, Inc: Protested the operation of the Coliseum before the Phil. Gamefowl
1940: A warehouse with a floor area of 1,940 square meters was constructed on it. Commission. The PGC did not issue any certificate of registration!
1948: Cebu City assessed and collected from NDC real estate taxes on the land and PGC OIC: Suspend the operation of the cockpit.
the warehouse. GGI: Resolution No. 378 is invalid. Ordinance No. 49 was therefore not amended.
NDC paid under protest. The mayor’s permits are null and void for violating the PGC rules.
Cebu: Taxable since no law grants NDC exemption from real estate taxes. NDC, as Petitioner: The ¾ requirement is ultra vires and was just a formal requirement.
recipient of the land reserved by the President, is liable for payment of ordinary
taxes. They have ceased to be exempt under the Assessment Law when the ISSUE: WON the PGC controls the Coliseum with respect to cockfights. YES.
government disposed of them in favor of NDC. The SC has also used the standard of WON the mayor’s permits are null and void for not obtaining the ¾ votes in passing
“use” of property rather than “ownership” as basis for real estate taxability. Resolution No. 378. YES.
NDC: The Assessment Law exempts properties owned by the Republic from real RATIO:
estate tax. Board of Assessment Appeals v. CTA & NWSA: Properties of NWSA, a Resolution No. 378 failed to comply with the votes needed for its validity. In the
GOCC, are exempt from real estate tax since the law applies to all government enactment of ordinances in general, the application of the LGC is undisputed.
properties whether held in a proprietary or governmental capacity. However, under Sec. 6.44 of the ordinance, it is specific regarding amendments.
When there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one
ISSUE: WON a public land reserved by the president for warehousing purposes in which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the
favor of a GOCC, as well as a warehouse subsequently erected thereon are exempt former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general statement
from real property tax. YES as regards public land. must be taken to affect only such cases within its language as are not within the
provisions of the particular enactment. Block 125 remains classified as a residential
RATIO: To come under the exemption in Article 3, it is important to establish that area.
the property is owned by the government or by its unincorporated agency, and once
government ownership is determined, the nature of the use of the property, whether No registration certificate was issued by the PGC. 7 It was a condition precedent to
for proprietary or government purposes, becomes immaterial. the granting of a mayor’s permit. PGC did not grant such certificate because the
cockpit was not constructed within the appropriate areas of the city as prescribed in
As regards the warehouse constructed, a different rule should apply since the its zoning laws.
exemption of public property from taxation does not extend to improvements on the
public lands made by preemptioners, homesteaders and other claimants, or Gamboa, Jr. v. Aguirre, Jr.
occupants, at their own expense, and these are taxable by the state. Consequently,
the warehouse constructed on the reserved land by NWC, indeed, should properly be FACTS: August 1995: Negros Occidental Governor designated petitioner as Acting
assessed real estate tax as such improvement does not appear to belong to the Governor for the duration of the former’s trip abroad. When the SP held its regular
Republic. Since the reservation is exempt from realty tax, the erroneous tax session, respondents questioned the authority of petitioner to preside in view of his
payments collected by Cebu should be refunded to NDC. designationas Acting Governor. Seven members of the SP voted to allow the
petitioner to continue presiding while 4 voted against it.
Province of Tarlac v. Judge Alcantara (1992)
22 Sept 1995: Respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition.
FACTS: Tarlac Enterprises owned certain properties: parcel of land, ice drop factory,
machinery shed, machinery of diesel elect. sets, etc. The Municipality of Tarlac ISSUE: WON an incumbent ViceGovernor, while concurrently the Acting Governor,
assessed taxes in the amount of P532,435.55. It set the auction sale of the private may continue to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
respondent’s properties to satisfy the real estate taxes due.
Tarlac Enterprises admitted the demands for the payment but refused to pay it on 7
Rules and Regulations of the PGC state that: Sec. 6. Cockpits shall be constructed and
the ground that it was exempted under Sec. 40 par. (g) of PD 464 in relation to PD
operated within the appropriate areas as prescribed in zoning laws or ordinances; Sec. 12. All
551. RTC of Tarlac: dismissed the complaint filed by the Province against Tarlac cockpits in the Philippines shall register with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission not later
Enterprises, Inc. for collection of real property tax. Respondent must just pay the 2% than September 30, 1981. No cockpit shall be allowed to operate without the proper
franchise tax. registration certificate being secured annually, not later than January 31.

HELD: Although the issue is already moot given the expiration of the terms of office The SB acted on it by promulgating PK 18, requesting Congress to amend certain
of the parties, the Court answered with a NO. provisions of RA 7227. Unsatisfied, the respondents resorted to their power of
initiative under Sec. 122 par. B of the LGC of 1991.
RATIO: Sections 49(a) and 466(a)(1) of RA 7160 provide that the Vice Governor shall
be the presiding officer of the SP. In addition to that, he becomes the Governor and 6 July 1993: COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that
assumes the higher office for the unexpired term of his predecessor, in case of the subject was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
“permanent vacancy” therein. In case of a temporary vacancy, he shall automatically 1 Feb 1995: President issued Proclamation No. 532, defining the metes and bounds
exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Governor. It is true of the SSEZ
that in this case, the Vice Governor only “acts” and does not “become” the governor. 18 June 1996: COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2845: Adopting a calendar of
activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinances passed by the SB of
A ViceGovernor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasi Morong. It included a referendum day.
Governor. This means, that for the purposes of exercising his legislative
prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a nonmember of the SP for the time 27 June 1996: COMELEC promulgated the Res. No. 2848 which provided the rules
being. Unlike the old Code where the Governor is not only the provincial Chief and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
Executive but also the presiding officer of the local executive body, the new Code KB 19 of the SB of Morong.
delineated the union of the executivelegislative powers in the provincial, city and 10 July 1996: SBMA filed this action contesting the validity of Sec. 2848 on the
municipal levels except in the Barangay. The Governor is no longer a member of the argument that COMELEC is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that
SP. Not being included in the enumeration, the Governor is deemed excluded. Being proposes an amendment of a national law.
the Acting Governor, the Vice Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise
the duties of the latter office since the nature of the duties of the provincial ISSUE: WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in scheduling a local
Governor call for a fulltime occupant to discharge them. initiative which seeks to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10.
WON the local initiative seeks the amendment of a national law. YES.
Garcia v. COMELEC UNANSWERED. Premature.
RATIO: The process started by private respondents was an initiative but COMELEC
FACTS: Sangguniang Bayan of Morong passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 made preparations for a referendum only. Not once was the term “initiative used in
(1993): It agreed to the inclusion of the municipality as part of the Subic Special the resolution.
Economic Zone in accord with RA 7227. Congress differentiated the two:
1. Initiative power of the people to propose amendments to the
24 May 1993: Petition was filed with the SB to annul PK 10. Morong did not take Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election
any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission. Petitioners resorted called for the purpose.
to their power of initiative under the LGC of 1991, soliciting the number of 2. Indirect initiative Exercise of initiative by the people through a
signatures needed to repeal the resolution. proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.
3. Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a
The Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the SB, E. de Leon, wrote the COMELEC legislation through an election called for that purpose.
requesting a denial of the petition for local initiative as the exercise “will just
promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility.” Initiative is resorted to by the people directly either because the lawmaking body
fails or refuses to enact a law, ordinance, resolution, or act that they desire or
6 July 1993: COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative since its subject is because they want to amend or modify one already existing.
merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
Under Sec. 13 of RA 6735: local legislative body is given the opportunity to enact the
ISSUE: WON a resolution can be the subject of a local initiative. YES. proposal. If it refuses to do so within 30 days from its presentation, the proponents
RATIO: The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as through their duly authorized and registered representatives may invoke their
appropriate subject of a local initiative. The constitutional command to include acts power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned.
(i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress Should the proponents collect the required number within the period granted by the
when it enacted RA 6735. Thus, section 3(a) includes resolutions as subjects of statute, the COMELEC shall state a date for the initiative at which the proposition
initiatives on local legislation. 8 When Congress enacted RA 6735, it intended shall be submitted to the registered voters in the LGU.
resolutions to be the proper subjects of local initiatives. The debates confirm this
intent. The LGC of 1991 dealt with local initiative and did not change or limit its While initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and
scope. consented to by the lawmaking body. The process and voting in an initiative are
more complex than in a referendum where the voters simply write either “yes” or
Sec. 120, Chapter 2, Title IX, Book I merely defines the concept of local initiative as “no” in a ballot. There is a need for the COMELEC to supervise an initiative more
the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may closely especially if the proposal is lengthy and complicated. On the other issue, the
directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with Municipal Resolution still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law.
subjects that can be taken up in a local initiative. It cannot be argued that the
subject matter of the resolution merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for Ortiz v. Posadas
it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government. The inclusion of Morong in
SSEZ has far reaching implications. The petitioners were also denied their right to FACTS: 7 out of the 13 members present, including the president, of the municipal
due process. council of Tabaco, Albay, voted in favor of Ordinance No. 25, concerning cockpits,
and 6 members voted against the ordinance, with 3 members absent. It is contended
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC that only ordinances creating indebtedness require the approval of a majority of all
the members of the council.
FACTS: 13 March 1992: RA 7227 was enacted (Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992); it provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone. 24 Nov ISSUE: WON an ordinance passed by a majority of the members present and not by
1992: US Navy turned over the military reservation to the government. a majority of all the members is valid. Ordinance No. 25 is void.
April 1993: Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan, passed Pambayang Kapasyahan RATIO: The law is clear, it needs only application.
Blg 10, expressing its concurrence, as required by Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the
SSEZ. It was then submitted to the OP. The ayes and noes are taken upon (1) the passage of all ordinances, (2) all
24 May 1993: Respondents Garcia, Calimbas, et. al. filed a petition with the SB of propositions to create any liability against the municipality, and (3) any other
Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg 10 and asked for several conditions proposition, upon the request of any member. The same idea is carried into the next
precedent before Morong joins the SSEZ. sentence. For the passage of (1) any ordinance or (2) any proposition creating
indebtedness, the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal
council shall be necessary. Other measures prevail upon the majority vote of the
8
members present.
Sec.3. Definitions; (a) “Initiative” is the power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. Sec. 2224 of the Administrative Code, requiring in mandatory language the
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council for the
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
passage of any ordinance, whether or not an ordinance creating an indebtedness, an
Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; ordinance passed by less than that majority is invalid.
and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution, or ordinance.

The basic idea of the legislative body is to make impossible the approval of If the demands of the public welfare are brought about by a state of emergency, the
ordinances or of propositions creating indebtedness by minority votes of municipal interference upon individual rights must be coextensive and coterminous with the
councils at meetings hastily called. existence thereof.
V. Perez v. De la Cruz Since emergencies are temporary, the regulations promulgated must also be
temporary.
FACTS: 8 Jan 1968: During a private conference held at the office of the petitioner
Perez, with 7 councilors and the vicemayor of Naga present, the matter of selecting A law or ordinance affecting the rights of individuals, as a means t tide over a
the secretary of the municipal board of the city as well as the chairmen of the critical condition, to be valid and legal, must be for a “definite” period of time, the
various standing committees came up for discussion. length of which must be “reasonable,” in relation to the nature and duration of the
crisis it seeks to overcome or surmount.
At the indication by the 4 Nacionalista Party councilors of their desire to vote for a
particular person as secretary of the board and to hold the chairmanship of the The powers of municipal corporations delegated thereto by the National
committee on markets for one of them, vicemayor Perez expressed her intention to Government cannot escape the inherent limitations to which the latter—as the
vote, in the deliberation of such matters, to create a tie vote and to then exercise her source of said powers—is subject.
power to break such deadlock.
Morata v. Go
10 Jan 1968: in another conference, Perez reiterated the same intention to vote
twice. FACTS: 5 August 1982: Victor Go and Flora Go filed in the CFI of Cebu a complaint
against petitioners for recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting to
Respondents: We are entitled to relief of restraining the vicemayor from voting on P49,400.00.
legislative matters and acts/ proceedings of the board. The vice mayor is not a
member of the board but only its presiding officer, that as such, he cannot vote Petitioners: It must be dismissed because of the failure of the complainants to allege
except in case of a tie. prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by PD
1508, as well the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that
5 March 1968: Liberal councilors passed an amendment to the Rules of Procedure of no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties.
the Naga municipal board granting the chairman thereof the right to vote as a
member, and as presiding officer the right to vote again in case of a tie. The judge denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: WON the vice mayor, besides being a presiding officer of a municipal board, ISSUE: WON the dismissal was proper; WON the Lupon has the authority to settle
is also a member thereof? Can he vote twice, to create a deadlock and then to break amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city
it? NO. NO. or municipality. NO. YES.
RATIO: There is nothing in RA 305 (Charter of Naga City) that provides that the RATIO:
vice mayor is a member of the municipal board. The position of vice mayor was not The conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by PD 1508 as a
even provided for, as the city treasurer was designated as the “acting mayor” in case precondition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling
of the absence of the mayor. under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but
for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.
It is true that RA 2259 created the post of vice mayor, but it did not provide that he
shall be considered a member of the city council or municipal board. Section 6 of PD 1508 is clear: Conciliation is a precondition to the filing of a
complaint. The law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon.
Quiem v. Seriña case is not at point, since in that case, by express legal mandate,
the vice mayor of CDO city was made a member of the board. The Lupon of each barangay has the authority to bring together the parties actually
residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of disputes except
In the absence of any statutory authority constituting the vice mayor as a member of in some specified cases.
the municipal board, in addition to being the presiding officer thereof, we cannot
read into the law something which is not there. The law makes no distinction with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should
be compromised at the barangay level.
The rules of procedure of the municipal board of Naga City exclude the chairman
from voting except in case of a tie vote. By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of
the barangay leader and other respected leaders of the barangay, the animosity
The mere fact that the vice mayor was made the “presiding officer” did not ipso jure generated by protracted court litigations between members of the same political
make him a member thereof. unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided.
By explicit statutory command, courts are given authority to determine the validity It is designed to discourage the indiscriminate filing of cases in court.
of municipal proceedings.
To say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by
VIII. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS the inferior courts is to lose sight of its objective.
Homeowner’s Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of If it was the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by

Manila the inferior courts, then it would have said so.
FACTS: 21 Dec 1963: City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 4841. 9 Circular No. 22 issued by C.J. Fernando: Implementation of the Katarungang

The petitioners challenged this and the CFI declared it illegal and void ab initio. Pambarangay Law: Judges were directed to desist from receiving complaints,
CFI: The power to declare a state of emergency exclusively pertains to Congress. petitions, actions, or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said
There is no longer a state of emergency which justifies the regulation of house Lupons.
rentals. It limits the use of private properties.
Uy v. Contreras
ISSUE: WON a municipal ordinance that controls the increase in rent for an
indefinite period is a valid exercise of police power. NO. FACTS:
RATIO: The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde the other half of the 2 nd F of a
power. The exercise of police power is subject to a qualification, those found in the bldg located in Makati. She operated a beauty parlor.
Bill of Rights. It must be reasonable. 15 April 1993: Sublease contract expired but petitioner was not able to remove all of
her movable properties.
17 April 1993: Argument between petitioner and Atayde when the former sough to
9
An Ordinance Regulating Rentals of Lots and Building for Residential Purposes: It withdraw her remaining movable properties from the premises. It was followed by a
prohibited lessors and sublessors from increasing the rental to an amount in excess of the scuffle between the petitioner and Atayde and her employees.
proportion, percentage-wise, in the increase of the assessed value of the land leased or 21 April 1993: Respondents were examined for alleged injuries inflicted by
subleased. If only a portion of the land is leased or subleased, the proportionate value of the petitioner.
leased premises shall be the basis for determining the maximum rental to which the same may
23 April 1993: Respondents filed a complaint with the brgy captain of Valenzuela,
be increased. As regards buildings, owners were prohibited from increasing the rentals to an
amount beyond 10% per annum of the assessed value of the bldg leased and the land on Makati.
which the bldg stands.

11 May 1993: Office of Prov’l Prosecutor of Rizal filed 2 informations for slight punishable under Art. 282 of the Revised Penal Code falls within the purview of that
physical injuries against the petitioner. section.
Petitioner: filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they didn’t comply with PD Had Mejia observed the mandate of the law, he could have remanded the case to the
1508 (prior referral to Lupon) lupon instead of taking cognizance thereof and prematurely issuing the warrant of
Judge: At this stage, the accused already waived his right to a reconciliation arrest against the accused.
proceeding before the barangay given that the two parties are residents of different
barangays. The offense occurred in Makati, and the offense is about to prescribe. Corpuz v. Court of Appeals
The complainant may go directly to court where the complaint is about to prescribe
and be barred by the statute of limitations. FACTS: Alvarado and Corpuz: 2 tenants of Lorenzo Barredo.
Respondents: Prior referral is not applicable since they are not residents of Barredo: Decided to sell his property to the tenants in May 1988.
barangays in the same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different Alvarado and the other lessees executed an “Affidavit of Waiver” granting Barredo
cities or municipalities. the right to sell his house to any person who can afford to purchase it.
Barredo sold his house to Corpuz for P37,500.00.
ISSUE: WON a complaint that is about to prescribe is exempted from PD 1508. NO. A tenancy relationship was established between Corpuz and Alvarado.
RATIO: The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by PD
1508, but it is now under the LGC. PD 1508 was expressly repealed. October 1991: Corpuz demanded that Alvarado vacate the room that he was
occupying since the children of the former needed it for their own use.
The revised katarungang pambarangay law has 3 new significant features:
1. It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal cases to offenses Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer for recovery of possession of the room
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or a fine not exceeding occupied by Alvarado.
P5,000.00.
2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the Alvarado: The affidavit was forged; the dispute was not referred to the Lupong
contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties Tagapayapa.
are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such
workplace or institution is located. The MTC ordered Alvarado to vacate the room. The RTC reversed the ruling of the
3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses MTC.
during the pendency of the mediation. Paragraph (c) of Section 410
suffers from ambiguity when it states that the prescriptive periods “shall ISSUE: WON the case should be dismissed because of the general averment of
resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the Alvarado that the case was not referred to the Lupon. NO.
certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the RATIO: The MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases. The only issue to
lupon or pangkat secretary.” What is referred to as receipt by the be resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the physical or material
complainant of the complaint is unclear. Accordingly, in Section 11 of the possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto.
Rules and Regulations issued by the SOJ, the phrase “the complaint or”
is not found, such that the resumption of the running of the prescriptive Since the petition involves the issue of possession intertwined with the issue of
period shall, properly, be from receipt by the complainant of the ownership, Refugia applies:
certificate of repudiation or the certification to file action issued by the
lupon. Such suspension shall not exceed 60 days. The inferior court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and
possession de jure insofar as said evidence would indicate or determine the nature of
The third feature is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the mediation, possession. However, it could not resolve the issue of ownership.
conciliation, or arbitration process. It discourages any intentional delay of the
referral to a date close to the expiration of the prescriptive period and then invoking As regards the nonreferral to the Lupon, the SC was not persuaded.
such proximity as the reason for immediate recourse to the courts.
Dui v. CA: The failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was no
Although PD 1508 has already been repealed, the jurisprudence built thereon compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that
regarding prior referral to the lupon as a precondition to the filing of an action in defense.
court remains applicable.
The answer of Alvarado reveals that no reason or explanation was given to support
Since the slight physical injuries charged were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, his allegation.
the prescriptive period would have expired 2 mos after. However, its running was
tolled by the filing of the respondents’ complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela on 23 The proceeding in PD 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and noncompliance
April 1993, and automatically suspended for a period of 60 days, or until 22 June therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had already acquired
1993. If no mediation is reached, a certification to file action is issued, the over the subject matter and the parties.
respondents would still have 56 days within which to file their separate criminal
complaints for such offense. Petition was granted, the MTC decision was reinstated.
Wingarts v. Mejia Bonifacio Law Office v. Judge Bellosillo
FACTS: John Wingarts and Ophelia Wingarts filed three letter complaints against FACTS: Atty. Salomon of the Bonifacio Law Office charged Judge Bellosillo of the

Judge Mejia of the MTC of Pangasinan. These complaints were an offshoot of 3 MTC with ignorance of the law, Grave Abuse of Discretion, and Partiality in
criminal cases decided by the judge and involving Wingarts and Col. Munar. John connection with a civil case.
Wingarts was charged with malicious mischief and grave threats.
2 Apr 1996: An order was given referring the ejectment case back to the barangay
In the admin complaint relative to the malicious mischief case, the judge was for concilation proceedings despite the fact that it was alleged in the verified
charged with malicious delay in the administration of justice. The judge was also complaint that the matter had already been referred to the barangay and that a
charged with incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of authority for issuing copy of the Certification to File Motion was attached.
an arrest warrant against Wingarts despite the lack of prior barangay conciliation.
The case was later on dismissed and indorsed to the barangay official concerned. When Salomon asked about the order, he was required to submit the minutes of the
The 3rd case involved a charge of rendering an unjust decision. hearings. He complied but no action was taken. It took a year from the time of the
filing of the complaint for the judge to order that summons be served on the
Judge Mejia: I believed that there was substantial compliance with the defendants.
requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law since a certification from the
barangay captain was given to him. OCA: found Bellosillo either ignorant or negligent in referring the case back to the
barangay despite the presence of a valid Certificate to File Action. It also faulted
ISSUE: WON the judge properly issued the warrant of arrest without the required him with disregarding the Rules on Summary Procedure by calling for a preliminary
compliance with the KP law. NO. conference, directing the defendants to submit their Comment, and failing to render
RATIO: The judge is liable for incompetence and ignorance of the law for taking judgment within the reglementary period.
cognizance of the criminal case despite the legal obstacles thereto. Under Art. 408
(c), offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or a fine not ISSUE: WON the requirements of the LGC on the lupon were complied with. NO.
exceeding P5,000.00 require prior barangay conciliation. The crime of grave threats RATIO:

The records reveal that such Certification was improperly and prematurely issued.
It showed that no personal confrontation took place before a duly constituted After PI, the Ombudsman filed a case for usurpation of judicial function against the
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo took place. It was reflected in the minutes submitted mayor in the MTC of Loreto. The case was later on assigned to Judge Ariño after the
by the complainants. 1st judge inhibited himself.
The first hearing was dated 16 Feb 1999 and yet the CFA was issued on 1 March Irisari: Quash the information, the acts did not constitute a crime under the law.
1996. Under Sec. 143 (3) of the former LGC, mayors were authorized to issue arrest
warrants.
The barangay failed to exert enough effort required by law to conciliate between the
parties and to settle the case. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found him guilty of misconduct and abuse of
authority and suspended him for 8 months.
Supreme Court Circular No. 1493 provides:
In case mediation efforts have proven to be unsuccessful, there having been no DILG: Reversed it and held that the warrant was actually just an “invitation or
agreement to arbitrate, or where the respondent fails to appear at the mediation summons.”
proceeding before the Punong Barangay, the Punong Barangay shall not cause the
issuance of the CFA but must constitute the Pangkat Tagapamayapa before whom The respondent judge reconsidered his previous order and dismissed the case.
the conciliation proceedings should be held.
ISSUE: WON the judge should be held administratively liable. YES.
Mendova v. Judge Afable RATIO: The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of the
Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial authority involves the
FACTS: 18 Feb 1998: Mendova filed with the Office of the Brgy Chairman of following elements:
Poblacion, San Julian, Eastern Samar, a complaint for slight physical injuries 1. Offender is an officer of the executive branch;
against Robert Palada. 2. he assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or
decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.
Bgy Chairman Quintua, in his Certification, confirmed such fact. Pangkat
Chairman Cabago also certified that the case was set for hearing but that the These elements were alleged in the information. What he issued was a warrant of
parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. arrest. The defense that the former LGC allowed mayors to issue an arrest warrant
4 May 1998: Complainant filed with the MCTC of San Julian a similar complaint. will not prosper. This provision has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
3 Nov 1998: Judge dismissed the case on the ground of prescription. “Complaint in
this case dated 20 April 1998 was filed with this Court on 4 May 1998…. The alleged Ponsica v. Ignalaga: No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to
offense took place on 15 February 1998. From the date of the commission of the conduct PI, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the LGC has been
alleged offense, more than two months have elapsed… Art. 90 of the Revised Penal abrogated by the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional proscription has thereby
Code provides that light offenses prescribe in 2 months.” been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and
7 July 1999: Mendova filed with the OCA an admin complaint against the judge. He issuing warrants of arrest or search warrants may be exercised only by judges, this
alleged that the judge did not apply the provisions of the LGC which state in Sec. being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase “such
410 (c) that while the dispute is under mediation, the prescriptive periods for other responsible officer as may be authorized by law” found in the counterpart
offenses and causes of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of provision of the 1973 Constitution.
the complaint with the Punong Barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume
upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or Greater Balanga Dev. Corp. v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan
of the certification to file action issued by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary. Provided,
however, that such interruption shall not exceed 60 days from the filing of the FACTS: A parcel of land located in Bo. San Jose, Balanga, Bataan, was registered
complaint with the Punong Barangay. under a TCT in the name of petitioner. Petitioner is a domestic corporation owned
and controlled by the Camacho family, which donated to the municipality the
Office of the Court Administrator: Judge is guilty and recommended a P3,000.00 present site of the Balanga Public Market. The disputed land lies behind the
fine. market.
ISSUE: WON the judge in this case should be deemed administratively liable. NO. 1987: Petitioner conducted a relocation survey of the area. It found out that certain
RATIO: portions of the property had been usurped by the municipality which had tolerated
An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or the construction of shanties and market stalls while charging fees and entrance fees
erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available. from the occupants and users of the area.
The complaint in this case did not bother to file a motion for reconsideration of the
judge’s decision. The instant administrative complaint is premature. In this case, 11 January 1988: Petitioner applied with the Office of the Mayor for a business
the records fail to show when the complainant received the Barangay Certification permit. Mayor Banzon issued Permit No. 2729, granting the petitioner the privilege
to File Action. The undated certification he submitted merely states that the case to operate as a real estate dealer/ privatelyowned public market operator” under
was set for hearing before the barangay on several dates, but the parties failed to the name Balanga Central Market.
reach an amicable settlement.
19 Feb 1988: Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed Resolution No. 12 annulling the
When he filed on 4 May 1998, until the dismissal of the case on 3 November 1998, he Mayor’s permit issued to petitioner and advising the Mayor to revoke the permit.
still failed to present proof of his receipt of the BCFA. Mayor Banzon then issued EO No. 1, which revoked the permit.
He cannot fault Judge Afable for dismissing his case based on prescription. 13 July 1988: Petitioner filed this petition seeking to reinstate the mayor’s permit. It
argued that there was no ground for its revocation since it had not violated any law
While respondent admitted his mistake, the same may not be considered ignorance or ordinance.
of the law. It can only be an error in judgment.
The Municipality replied by saying that the petitioners violated an ordinance when
Muñez v. Ariño it failed to disclose the true status of the area and when it failed to secure separate
permits for its two businesses (Balanga Revenue Code).
FACTS: 26 December 1989: Mayor Asuero Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur,
summoned Muñez to his office for conference respecting a land dispute which Muñez ISSUE: WON the mayor’s permit initially issued was properly revoked. NO.
had with one Tirso Amado. RATIO: The authority of the mayor to revoke a permit he issued is premised on a
violation by the grantee of any of the conditions for which the permit had been
27 December 1989: Since Muñez failed to attend, Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of granted.
arrest against him.
The permit should not have been issued without the required information given in
The warrant was served by CFC Caballes and Cpl. Limayan. No investigation was the application form itself. Revoking the permit, however, because of a false
conducted afterwards. statement in the application form cannot be justified under the quoted provision.
Muñez filed a complaint against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and usurpation There must be proof of willful misrepresentation and deliberate intent to make a

of judicial function with the Ombudsman as well as an admin complaint for violation false statement. Good faith is always presumed, and petitioner did not make any
of the Constituion, misconduct in office and abuse of authority with the false statement in the pertinent entry.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur.

The application for 2 businesses in one permit is not a ground for revocation. Their 2. WON RA 6734 is unconstitutional as it does away with the required
Code does not expressly require two permits for the conduct of 2 or more businesses plebiscite.
in one place, but only that separate fees be paid for each business. The powers of
municipal corporations must be construed in strictissimi juris and any doubt must HELD: As to No. 2, it is constitutional.
be construed against the municipality.
Assuming arguendo that the lot in question was actually one of those awarded to the RATIO:
plaintiffs, and the TCT of petitioner is spurious, this still does not justify the As regards the Tripoli Agreement, it need not be discussed by the Court to resolve
revocation of the Mayor’s permit. this case.
The records reveal that the Sanggunian did not establish or maintain any public The law refers to the Constitution and it indicates that the creation of the
market on the lot. The resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the lot for autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional
expansion of the market beside it. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in requirements.
court, the landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land.
Under the Constitution and RA 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall
Although the SB has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent
business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions for their units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and citi4es where a majority vote in
issuance or revocation, the “anxiety, uncertainty, and restiveness” among the favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region.
stallholders and traders could not be a valid ground for revoking the permit of the
petitioner. The manner of revocation also violated the petitioner’s right to due The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be
process. included in the autonomous region.
Lim and Garayblas v Court of Appeals This majority must be of each unit. If the framers of the Constitution intended to
require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite, they would have
FACTS: so indicated. It can be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to
Policemen under Lim’s instructions inspected and investigated Bistro’s license as depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the
well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this.
of work in Bistro’s night club and restaurant operations.
Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s application for a business license, as well as the What the Constitution requires is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic
work permit for its staff for the year 1993. Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all
7 December 1992: Bistro filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition against Lim. constituent units put together, as well as the individual constituent units.
Lim issued a closure order on Bistro’s operations effective 23 January 1993.
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
Lim: The power of a mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
and their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments.
or revoke business permits and licenses as provided for in Sec. 11 (1), Article II of
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in Sec. 455, par. 3 (iv) of the LGC of Pandi v. Court of Appeals
1991.
FACTS:
Bistro: The Charter and the LGC do not grant Lim any power to prohibit the 9 August 1993, Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of
operation of night clubs. Lim failed to specify any violation by Bistro of the the DOH of the ARMM, issued a Memorandum designating Pandi, who was then
conditions of its licenses and permits. DOHARMM Assistant Regional Secretary, as OIC of the IPHOAPGH, Lanao del
Sur.
ISSUE:
WON a mayor may order the closure of a nightclub absent any violation of the The same memo also detailed Dr. Sani to the DOHARMM Regional Office in
conditions for the granting of its license. Cotabato.
HELD: NO. 15 September 1993: Lanao del Sur Governor Mutilan issued Office Order No. 7
designating Saber as OIC of the IPHOAPGH Lanao del Sur.
RATIO:
It is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits 12 August 1993: Sani filed a complaint with the RTC of Lanao del Sur challenging
necessarily includes the power to suspend or revoke these licenses. However, this his transfer to the DOH ARMM Office in Cotabato, alleging that he is the holder of a
power is premised on the violation of the conditions of these licenses and permits. permanent appointment as provincial health officer of the IPHOAPGH Lanao del
Sur.
The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers.
5 October 1993: Saber filed a quo warranto case claiming that he is the lawfully
Mayors have no power to order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of designated OIC of the IPHOAPGH.
inspecting or investigating them.
29 October 1993: Pres. Ramos issued EO 133 transferring the powers and functions
It violated Ordinance No. 7716 which prohibits police raids and inspections. The of the DOH in the region to the Regional Government of the ARMM.
proper LG officials include the City health officer or his representative and the City
treasurer. ISSUE: WON an incumbent provincial health officer can be assigned to another
province and if so, who can order such assignment; who can designate the OIC in
The regulatory power of MCs must always be exercised in accordance with law. the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur; and who is empowered to appoint the
Lim’s exercise of the power violated Bistro’s property rights that are protected under provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur—the Governor, the Regional Governor, or
the due process clause of the Constitution. the ARMM Secretary of Health?
Abbas v. COMELEC HELD/RATIO:
The Court of Appeal’s reliance on Sec. 478 of the LGC as Provincial Governor
FACTS: The Tripoli Agreement took effect on 23 December 1976. It provided for the Mutilan’s authority to appoint Saber is misplaced. Sec. 478 which provides that “The
establishment of Autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for provincial, city and municipal
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines and enumerated the 13 governments,” is not a grant of power to governors and mayors to appoint local
provinces comprising the areas of autonomy. health officers. It is simply a directive that those empowered to appoint local health
officers, being essential for public services, is a mandatory obligation on the part of
1987: New Constitution was ratified, it provided for regional autonomy. Art. X Sec. those vested by law with the power to appoint them.
15 provides the ARMM and the CAR.
As Regional Secretary of Helath, Macacua was, as of 6 Nov 1993, the official vested
1 August 1989: RA 6734 was enacted. by law to exercise supervision and control over all provincial health offices in the
ARMM.
ISSUES:
1. WON RA 6734 conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement.

The Regional Secretary, by virtue of EO 133, assumed the administrative powers
and functions of the Secretary of Helath of the National Government with respect to Abella was the official candidate of the LP. Private respondent is the wife of
provincial health offices within the ARMM. Emeterio Larrazabal (disqualified for lack of residence). She filed her own COC in
substitution of her husband. Her candidacy was challenged for alleged false
The official exercising supervision and control over an office has the administrative statements in her COC regarding her residence. 11 It was alleged that she was a
authority to designate, in the interest of public service, an OfficerinCharge if the resident of Ormoc City like her husband. The COMELEC dismissed the petition and
office becomes vacant. referred it to its law department on the ground that it was a violation of an election
offense. The SC set it aside and directed the COMELEC to determine the residence
Macacua, therefore, had the authority on 6 Nov 1993 to designate an OIC in the qualification of Larrazabal.
provincial health office of Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the permanent
provincial health officer. 3 Feb 1989: COMELEC upheld the challenged rulings of the provincial board of
canvassers.
After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional Secretary of Health lost
the authority to make such a designation. COMELEC: Lifted its TRO against her proclamation while the hearings in the
disqualification case continued.
Ordillo v. COMELEC
14 Feb 1991: 2nd Division disqualified Larrazabal as governor. It also denied Abella’s
FACTS: 30 January 1990: People of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, proclamation as governor.
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a
plebiscite held pursuant to RA 6766.10 ISSUES: WON Larrazabal is qualified to run as governor. NO.
WON the prohibition against the city’s registered voters
The COMELEC results showed that the creation of the Region was approved only by electing the provincial officials necessarily means a
a majority of 5,899 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly prohibition of the registered voters to be elected as provincial
rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city mentioned. Sec of officials. YES.
Justice: Ifugao can legally constitute the CAR. 8 March 1990: Congress enacted RA RATIO: Arts, 68 and 69 of the Family Code are at point. 12 Husband and wife as a
6861 which set the elections in the CAR. matter of principle live together in one legal residence which is their usual place of
Ordillo: The SC must declare COMELEC Res. No. 2259 as null and void. It must abode.
restrain the respondents from implementing AO 160. It must also declare EO 220
constituting the CEB and the CR Assembly and other offices to be still in force and In this case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily
effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted left her residence in Kananga, Leyte, in 1975 to pursue any calling, profession, or
and duly ratified. There can be no valid CAR in only one province since the business. What is clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her
Constitution and RA 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than husband and considered herself a resident therein. The intention of animus
one constituent unit. revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga is not present here. The fact
that she occasionally visits Kananga does not signify an intention to continue her
ISSUE: WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably residence therein. Despite the petitioner’s insistence, the evidence shows that her
for the creation of the CAR can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region. supposed cancellation of registration in Ormoc and transfer to Kananga is not
NO. supported by the records.
RATIO: Sec. 12 Art. X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly

urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting
Art. X Sec. 15 of 1987 Constitution: for provincial elective officials are independent of the province. In the same
There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the provision, it provides for other component cities within a province whose charters do
Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas not provide a similar prohibition. “shall not be qualified and 13 entitled to vote in the
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social election of the…”
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Frivaldo v. COMELEC
Republic of the Philippines.
FACTS:
The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is 22 January 1988: Juan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. League of Municipalities of Sorsogon: filed a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s
election on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in
Even RA 6766 shows that Congress never intended that a single province may the US in 1983.
constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd
situation of having 2 sets of provincial officials and another set of regional officials Frivaldo: I was naturalized, but I sought such citizenship only as a protection
exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same area. against Marcos. I returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help
restore democracy. Nottebohm: Citizenship acquired for reasons of convenience only.
There will be two legislative bodies: the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang I could not have repatriated myself since the Special Committee on Naturalization
Panlalawigan, exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao. had not been organized yet. My oath in my COC that I was a natural born citizen
amounted to a sufficient act of repatriation. My participation in the congressional
This must be distinguished from the Abbas case in that it laid the ff rule: What is elections divested me of US citizenship under US law.
required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act
in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all SolGen: Frivaldo was not a citizen and had not repatriated himself after his
constituent units put together, as well as the individual constituent units. naturalization as a US citizen. His election did not cure this defect since the people
of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the LGC, and the Omnibus Election
IX. MUNICIPAL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES Code.

Abella v. COMELEC ISSUE: WON Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election as
governor of Sorsogon. NO.
FACTS: RATIO:
Three people are contesting the governorship of Leyte: Nottebohm: Irrelevant since it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of
1. Adelina Larrazabal—obtained the highest number of votes in the 1 Feb two states as decided by a third state.
1988 election and was proclaimed but was later declared by the
COMELEC to lack both residence and registration qualification for the
11
post of Governor; They alleged that Larrazabal was neither a resident nor a registered voter of Leyte as
2. Benjamin Abella—obtained the 2nd highest number of votes but was not required by Sec. 42 of BP 337.
12
allowed by the COMELEC to sit as governor after the disqualification of 68. H & W are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity, and
Larrazabal; render mutual help and support. 69. H & W shall fix the family domicile. In case of
3. Leopoldo Petilla—Vice Governor of Leyte. disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the
other… for valid and compelling reasons…
10 13
An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region The conjunction and refers to two prohibitions: running and voting.

If Frivaldo really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire was made by the CID or the COMELEC as regards his specific intent to renounce
Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the his Fil citizenship.
laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA 473 and PD 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by repatriation, ISSUE: WON Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code “operates as a legislatively
or by naturalization. mandated special repatriation proceeding” and that it allows Labo’s proclamation as
the winning candidate since the resolution disqualifying him was not yet final at the
His alleged forfeiture does not concern us. Frivaldo should have tried to acquire time the election was held. NO.
naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. RATIO:
The fact remains that Labo has not submitted in this case any evidence to prove his
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the
not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the part of the COMELEC in canceling his COC.
officer’s entire tenure.
Sec. 72 if the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA
Labo v. COMELEC 6646. The COMELEC can now legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo,
his reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially so in this
FACTS: Labo was proclaimed mayorelect of Baguio on 20 January 1988. A petition case where Labo failed to present any evidence to support his claim.
for quo warranto was filed by private respondent on 26 January 1988 but the filing
fee was only paid on 10 February 1988, or 21 days after his proclamation. Labo’s status has not changed in this case. He was disqualified for being an alien.
His election does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession
Labo asked the SC to restrain the COMELEC from looking into the question of his of which is an indispensable requirement for holding public office. Up to this point,
citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation the Special Committee on Naturalization has not yet acted on the application of the
that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is WON the public petitioner for repatriation. In the absence of any official action or approval by the
respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that proper authorities, a mere application for repatriation does not amount to automatic
the quo warranto case against him was not filed on time. reacquisition of the applicant’s Philippine citizenship.
Lardizabal: He filed it ahead of time. It was only on 8 February 1988 that the The rule is the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle
COMELEC treated his petition solely as a quo warranto and redocketed it. He the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
immediately paid the filing fee on that date. elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. The
exception to this rule is if the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a
COMELEC: No direct proof that the petitioner had been formally naturalized as a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
citizen of Australia. This was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.
Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with There is a waiver of the validity and efficacy of their votes in such a case.
the CID upon his return to the country in 1980.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC
CID: Took into account the official statement of the Aussie Government through its
consul in the Philippines that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that FACTS:
date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. 20 March 1995: Juan Frivaldo filed his COC for Governor in the 1995 elections.
28 March 1995: Raul Lee questioned the COC and moved for Frivaldo’s
ISSUES: WON the quo warranto petition was filed on time. WON Labo is disqualification.
disqualified. WON the person who obtained the 2 nd highest number of votes may Frivaldo’s MR was unacted upon so he was voted for during the elections. Lee was
replace the winning candidate that was found ineligible. proclaimed although Frivaldo got the plurality of votes.
Frivaldo: He took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen on 30 June 1995.
HELD: YES. YES. NO. COMELEC: Annulled Lee’s proclamation and proclaimed Frivaldo as the governor
elect.
RATIO: The fee was paid during the tenday period as extended by the pendency of
the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a preproclamation proceeding ISSUE: Who should be the rightful governor of Sorsogon?
which did not require the payment of a filing fee. Publication is still necessary 1. Juan Frivaldo—Obtained the highest number of votes in 3 successive
despite an “immediately upon approval” clause as regards its date of effectivity. elections but who was twice declared disqualified to hold office due to his
alien citizenship but who now claims to have reassumed his lost
Labo did not question the authenticity of the evidence nor does he deny his citizenship through repatriation.
acquisition of an Australian passport. Res judicata does not apply to questions of 2. Raul Lee—2nd place in the canvass but who claims that the votes cast for
citizenship. Labo became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized through Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed
a formal and positive process. He was not even a qualified voter because of his to have intentionally thrown away their ballots and that legally, he
alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio under Sec. secured to most number of valid votes; or
42 of the LGC. 3. The incumbent Vice Governor, Oscar Deri, who obviously was not voted
directly but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over
The people of that locality could not have changed the requirements of the LGC and the post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a “permanent
the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total vacancy in the contested office has occurred.”
allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Philippines to preside over them as mayor of their city. The SUBISSUES:
respondent who filed the petition cannot replace the petitioner as mayor. The simple 1. WON the repatriation of Frivaldo was valid and legal. If yes, did it
reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, seasonably cure his lack of citizenship to qualify him to be proclaimed
he was not the choice of the people of Baguio City. and to become Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect?
2. WON Frivaldo’s judicially declared disqualification for lack of Fil
Topacio v. Paredes: It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the citizenship is a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for governor.
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the 3. WON COMELEC had jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the that it is not a preproclamation case, an election protest or a quo
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared warranto case.
through their ballots that they do not choose him. 4. WON the proclamation of Lee was valid.
5. WON COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in preventing Frivaldo from
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC assuming the governorship.
FACTS: This is the 2nd time the SC was asked to rule on the citizenship of Labo, Jr. HELD: FRIVALDO.
Labo believed that he is a Filipino citizen and so he ran for mayor of Baguio in the
1992 elections. Ortega filed a COC for the same office. RATIO:
1. Frivaldo had proved that he has acquired Philippine citizenship by
Labo: He is a Fil citizen. Alleged that there was a lack of trial on the merits and lack repatriation under PD 725 and that he took his oath of allegiance on 30
of due process in the first case and that he can prove his citizenship. In Vance v June 1995. There is a presumption of regularity in the performance of
Terrazas: It was held that in proving expatriation, an expatriating act and an intent official duty and that was not successfully rebutted by Lee. The law does
to relinquish citizenship must be proved by preponderance of evidence. No finding not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess
citizenship, unlike that for residence and age. Since Frivaldo reassumed

his citizenship, the very day the term of office of governor began, he was
therefore already qualified to be proclaimed. The LGC requires that an 27 February 2001: He filed his COC stating that he had been a resident of Oras for
official be a registered voter, it does not require him to actually vote. The two years.
SC also held that the repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of
his application on 17 August 1994. The legislative intent in PD 725 was 5 March 2001: Respondent Neil Alvarez, incumbent mayor of Oras, sought to cancel
to give it a retroactive operation. the COC on the ground that Coquilla made a material misrepresentation in the
2. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern COC since he had only been there for 6 months since he took his oath as a citizen.
a person’s future status with finality. A person may subsequently
reacquire, or lose, his citizenship. Coquilla won in the election with a margin of 379 votes. He was proclaimed mayor of
3. The Constitution has granted the COMELEC ample power to exercise Oras.
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective, provincial officials. 19 July 2001: COMELEC cancelled the COC on the ground that he failed to comply
4. There was insufficient evidence presented to show that the people of with the residency requirement. The number of years he claimed to have resided in
Sorsogon knew in fact and in law the alleged disqualification. Frivaldo Oras since 1985 as an American citizen before 10 November 2000 cannot be added to
should be the one proclaimed. his actual residence to cure the deficiency in days, months, and year to allow him to
5. The claim in the 5th issue is now moot and academic as the resolutions run for an elective office.
are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the COMELEC.
ISSUE: WON petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Easter Samar at least one year
before the elections held on 14 May 2001. NO.
Mercado v. Manzano RATIO:
The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring
FACTS: to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or “legal residence.” That
Ernesto Mercado, Gabriel Daza III and Eduardo Manzano were candidates for vice refers to a place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,
mayor of Makati in the 1998 elections. where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
Manzano got 103,853 votes, Mercado garnered 100,894 and Daza acquired 54,275 return and remain (animus manendi).
votes. Coquilla lost his domicile of origin by becoming a US citizen after enlisting in the
Manzano’s proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for navy.
disqualification on the ground that he was a US citizen.
Residence in the US is a requirement for naturalization as a US citizen. Until his
COMELEC: Granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of the COC of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship in 2000, he did not acquire his legal residence
Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and under Sec. 40 (d) of the LGC, here. His registration as a voter of Butnga in January 2001 is not conclusive of his
persons with dual citizenship residency as a candidate since Sec. 117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that
a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city
COMELEC en banc: Manzano was qualified to run for vice mayor. The BOC then where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election.
declared Manzano as the winner.
Caasi v. Court of Appeals
Sec. 40 (d) Those with dual citizenship. Congress commanded in explicit terms the
ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office. FACTS:
The petitioners in this case argued for the disqualification of Merito Miguel for the
ISSUE: WON dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification. NO. post of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in 1988 on
RATIO: the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the US,
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a not of Bolinao.
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of 2 or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Miguel: Admitted to the holding of a green card but denied that he is a permanent
resident of the US. He allegedly obtained it for convenience that he may freely enter
Dual allegiance refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by the US for his periodic medical exams and to visit his children there. He alleged that
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, having voted in all previous elections there.
involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual’s volition.
COMELEC: Possession of a green card does not establish that he has abandoned his
Art. IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution states that “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical residence in the Philippines.
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”
ISSUES: 1. WON a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the
In including this section, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with US; YES. 2. WON Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or
dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to immigrant to the US prior to the local elections on 18 January 1988. NO.
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual
citizenship” in RA 7160 Section 40 (d) and in RA 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as RATIO:
referring to “dual allegiance.” Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under Green card: Stated that Miguel was a resident alien. In his application, he wrote
the disqualification. that he intended to stay permanently. Miguel’s immigration to the US in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
It should suffice if, upon the filing of their COC, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating;
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
By filing a COC when he ran for this post, Manzano elected Philippine citizenship As a resident alien, Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the US.
and in effect renounced his American citizenship. His COC contained the following
statement: “I am a Filipino Citizen—NaturalBorn.” Sec. 18, Article XI of the Constitution which states that “any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant
Coquilla v. COMELEC of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law” is inapplicable to
Miguel since he acquired such status prior to his election as mayor.
FACTS: Coquilla was born in 1938 of Filipino parents in Eastern Samar. He resided
there until 1965 when he joined the US navy. He was naturalized as a US citizen. Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to him: Any person who is a
From 197073, he visited the Philippines while on leave from the navy. Even after permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
his retirement from the navy in 1985, he remained in the US. run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status
as permanent resident in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in
15 October 1998: Coquilla returned and took out a residence certificate. He the election laws.
continued making trips to the US. He applied for repatriation under RA 8171 to the
Special Committee on Naturalization. It was approved in 2000 and he took his oath The records are bare of proof that he had waived his status before he ran for election
as a citizen. as mayor of Bolinao.
21 November 2000: Petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for office for at least one year
Eastern Samar. It was approved. at the time of filing of the COC is one of the qualifications. Miguel did not possess

that since he was a permanent resident of the US and he resided in Bolinao for only
3 months after his return to the Philippines. ISSUES: WON the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude; WON a grant of
probation affects the applicability of Sec. 40 (a). YES. NO.
Marquez v. COMELEC RATIO:
Moral turpitude has been defined as: an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
FACTS: Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for governor of Quezon in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
1992 elections filed a petition for certiorari questioning the resolution of the the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or
COMELEC which dismissed his quo warranto case against Rodriguez, the winning conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
candidate in their province, for allegedly being a fugitive from justice.
The Court is guided by the general rule that crimes mala in se involve moral
Marquez: At the time Rodriguez filed his COC, a criminal charge against him for 10 turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not. However, the Court admitted that this
counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending guideline is inadequate in providing a clearcut solution. WON a crime involves
before an LA court. moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and depends on the circumstances
surrounding the violation of the statute.
ISSUE: WON a “fugitive from justice” must be a person who has been convicted by
final judgment. NO. Moral turpitude is deducible from the 3 rd element of the crime: The accused knows
or should have known that the said article, item, object, or anything of value has
RATIO: Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991, to been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
the extent that it confines the term “fugitive from justice” to refer only to a person
“who has been convicted by final judgment” is an inordinate and undue The same underlying reason holds even if the “fence” did not have actual knowledge,
circumspection of the law. but merely “should have known” the origin of the property received.
The COMELEC in this case did not make any definite finding on WON, in fact, Petitioner’s conviction of fencing which is a crime of moral turpitude subsists and

Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice” since the quo warranto case was outrightly remains unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. A judgment of
dismissed. This case must be remanded to the COMELEC. conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for
probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for
Rodriguez v. COMELEC probation.
FACTS: Eduardo Rodriguez and Bienvenido Marquez were protagonists for the
gubernatorial post of Quezon in the 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was Magno v. COMELEC
proclaimed governor.
FACTS: Montes filed a case for the disqualification of Magno as mayoralty candidate
Marquez challenged the victory by arguing that Rodriguez left the US where a of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the 2001 elections on the ground that he was
charge is pending against him before the LA Court for fraudulent insurance claims, previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of 4 counts of direct bribery penalized
grand theft, and attempted grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore under Article 210 of the RPC.
a “fugitive from justice” which is a ground for his disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of
the LGC. Petitioner applied for probation and was discharged on 5 March 1998.
COMELEC: … “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee after 7 May 2001: COMELEC granted the petition citing Section 12 of BP 881.
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to
avoid prosecution. This definition finds support from jurisprudence and may be so BP 881 explicitly lifts the disqualification to run for an elective office of a person
conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term. convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude after 5 years from the service of the
sentence.
ISSUE: WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. NO.
RATIO: Magno: Direct bribery does not involve moral turpitude. He also cited the LGC
The definition of “fugitive from justice” indicates that the intent to evade is the which states in Sec. 40 that a person who was sentenced by final judgment for an
compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. offense involving moral turpitude, or for an offense punishable by one year or more
of imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence.
Rodriguez’ case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in
the Philippines from the US preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the LA Lorenzo was proclaimed by the COMELEC as the duly elected mayor.
Court and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by the same foreign
court, by almost 5 months. It was impossible for Rodriguez to have known about ISSUE: WON Magno was disqualified to run for mayor in the 2001 elections. NO.
such felony complaint and arrest warrant a the time he left the US, What
prosecution was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure from RATIO: Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. It depends on the
the US? circumstances surrounding the violation of the law.
The “law of the case” doctrine forbids the Court from crafting an expanded re Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. It can be inferred from the third
definition of “fugitive from justice.” element of bribery. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and
deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in
The legal rule in the Marquez Decision must govern the instant petition. The Court exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to
specifically refers to the concept of “fugitive from justice” as defined in the main renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen.
opinion of Marquez which highlights the significance of an intent to evade. In
Marquez, the Court ruled that “A ‘fugitive from justice’ includes not only those who In David v COMELEC, the SC declared that RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that
flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being specifically applies to local government units. Section 40 thereof specially and
charged, flee to avoid prosecution.” definitely provides for disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions. It is
applicable to them only. Sec. 12 of BP 881 speaks of disqualifications of candidates
Dela Torre v. COMELEC for any public office.
FACTS: Rolando Dela Torre sought to nullify two decisions of the COMELEC in the It deals with the election of all public officers. Thus, Sec. 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it
disqualification case filed against him: governs the disqualification of candidates for local posts, assumes the nature of a
6 May 1995 Resolution: Disqualified him from running for Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna special law which ought to prevail.
in the 1995 elections based on Sec. 40 (a) of the LGC. 14 The COMELEC ruled that
the petitioner was found guilty of violating PD 1612 or the AntiFencing Law. Although the crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner
28 August 1995 Resolution: Denied the MR and the COMELEC denied the nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12
contention of the petitioner that the probation granted to him suspended the of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local
execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences that flowed Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as of 5 March 2000
from it. and he was therefore under no such disqualification anymore when he ran for mayor
of San Isidro in the 2001 elections.
14
Sec. 40. Disqualifications—(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one year or Lingating v. COMELEC
more of imprisonment within two years after serving sentence.
FACTS: FACTS:
3 May 2001: Petitioner filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor in Pagadian Galido and Galeon were candidates for mayor in the January 1988 elections in
City a petition for the disqualification of respondent Sulong pursuant to the LGC GarciaHernandez, Bohol.
which disqualifies from running for any elective local post “those removed from
office as a result of an administrative case.” Galeon filed an election protest before the RTC. The court upheld the proclamation
of Galido by a majority of 11 votes. The COMELEC reversed the RTC ruling. It was
Sulong previously won as mayor of Lapuyan in 1988. He also won in 1992 and in affirmed by the COMELEC en banc. Galido went to the SC to challenge this
1995. COMELEC decision alleging grave abuse of discretion in its appreciation of “marked
ballots.”
Lingating: During Sulong’s first term in 1991, he was administratively charged with
various offenses and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur found ISSUE: WON certiorari can be used to challenge a final order of the COMELEC in a
him guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office. contest involving elective municipal officials. YES.
Sulong: The decision has not become final and executory. I filed a motion for RATIO:
reconsideration and such is still pending. The fact that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the COMELEC in contests
involving elective municipal and barangay officials are final, executory, and not
Sulong was voted for in the elections and was subsequently proclaimed as the duly appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the SC by way of a special civil action for
elected mayor. certiorari.
1 August 2001: COMELEC declared Sulong disqualified. Any person removed from Article IX (A) Sec. 7 of the Constitution states “Unless otherwise provided by this
office by reason of an administrative case is disqualified from running for any Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
elective local office. brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
Provincial Secretary: Issued a certification that the decision in the case has not
become final and executory as the final disposition thereof was overtaken by the
local elections of May 1992. Rivera v. COMELEC
COMELEC en banc reversed the earlier decision. FACTS: Petitioner Juan Rivera and respondent Juan Garcia II were candidates for
the local elections in 1988.
ISSUE: WON respondent was found guilty in the administrative case. NO.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as the duly elected Mayor by
RATIO: a majority of 10 votes. Garcia filed an election protest. The trial court found for
The rule that an elective local officer, who is removed before the expiration of the Garcia.
term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being a candidate for a local
elective position does not apply where the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Rivera appealed to the COMELEC. It sustained the judgment of the RTC. Garcia
finding a local mayor guilty of dishonesty, falsification and malversation of public commenced to discharge the functions of Mayor of Guinobatan.
funds has not become final.
Rivera filed this petition seeking the annulment of the COMELEC en banc decision.
Where there was failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve a local official’s
motion for reconsideration before the elections, it is unfair to the electorate to be told Garcia: The Constitution declares that decisions of the COMELEC on election
after they have voted for said official that after all he is disqualified, especially so contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials to be final, executory,
where at the time of the election, the decision sought to be reconsidered had been and not appealable.
rendered nearly ten years ago.
ISSUE: WON the decisions of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective
There is no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of. local officials, being final and executory and not appealable, preclude the filing of a
special civil action for certiorari. NO.
Flores v. Drilon
RATIO:
FACTS: The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests
Under Sec. 13, par. (d) of RA 7227, Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo was involving local elective officials are final, executory, and not appealable, does not
appointed Chairman and CEO of SBMA. preclude a recourse to the SC by way of a special civil action for certiorari.
The petitioners claim that this is against Sec. 7, Art. IXB of the Constitution which The SC has closely scrutinized the challenged COMELEC decision and found that
states that “no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in the said decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically. A painstaking re
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots was made by the COMELEC en banc. In fact,
14 ballots originally adjudicated in Garcia’s favor were overruled by the Commission
ISSUE: WON Gordon’s appointment pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes en banc, thus reducing the number of votes in his favor to 894 votes out of the 2,445
the Constitution can be sustained. contested ballots. The appreciation and reevaluation of ballots are factual
determinations.
HELD: NO.
It is settled that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies
RATIO: are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations.
In this case, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official,
i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo, to other government posts (Chairman of the Board and Borja v. COMELEC
CEO of SBMA). Since this is prohibited by the Constitution, the law is
unconstitutional. The fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most FACTS:
beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment. Capco was elected vice mayor of Pateros. He became mayor upon the death of the
incumbent Cesar Borja. During the next term, he ran and was elected mayor and
Even though Sec. 94 of the LGC permits the appointment of a local elective o was again reelected. On his third attempt to get elected, petitioner Benjamin Borja
fficial to another post if so allowed by law or the primary functions of his office, it challenged his candidacy on the idea that he would have already served as mayor for
cannot be determinative of the constitutionality of RA 7227 for no legislative act can 3 consecutive terms by 30 June 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for
prevail over the fundamental law of the land. another term.
The phrase “shall be appointed” shows the intent to make the SBMA posts ISSUE: WON a vice mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law
appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of mayor of Olongapo. The appointing and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that
power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his office for the purpose of the three term limit. NO.
judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the
necessary qualifications and eligibilities. RATIO:
To prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy in the
Galido v. COMELEC Constitution—the other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the
people.

ISSUE: WON Talaga served for 3 consecutive terms as contemplated by the
In considering the historical background of Art. X Sec. 8 of the Constitution shows Constitution. NO.
that the members of the Commission were as much concerned with preserving the
freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of RATIO:
political power. The ruling of the COMELEC that private respondent was not elected for three
consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a private citizen.
Not only historical examination but textual analysis supports the ruling that this The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
provision contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a
result of election. If an official is not serving a term for which he was elected because Socrates v. COMELEC
he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be
considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation FACTS:
of office prior to its expiration. 2 July 2002: 312 out of 528 members of the incumbent barangay officials of Puerto
Princesa convened themselves into a preparatory recall assembly.
There is a difference between the case of a vicemayor and that of a member of the
House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes The PRA was convened to initiate the recall of Victorino Docrates who assumed
incapacitated or is removed from office—the vicemayor succeeds to the mayorship office as mayor on 30 June 2001.
by operation of law while the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. The
Representative serves a term for which he was elected. PRA passed Resolution No. 0102 which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates
and called for his recall. COMELEC then gave due course to the resolution and
It is not enough that an individual has served 3 consecutive terms in an elective scheduled a recall election.
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number
of times before the disqualification can apply. 23 August 2002: Edward Hagedorn filed hi COC for mayor in the recall election.
Lonzanida v. COMELEC 17 August 2002: Adovo and Gilo filed a petition to disqualify Hagedorn from running
on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive
FACTS: Romeo Lonzanida was elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for 3 consecutive
of San Antonio prior to the 8 May 1995 elections. In May 1995, he ran and was terms.
proclaimed winner. It was contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an
election protest. COMELEC resolved the case in favor of Alvez. ISSUE: WON a candidacy in a recall election is included in the 3consecutive term
rule. NO.
11 May 1998: Lonzanida again filed his COC for mayor. His opponent Eufemio Muli
filed a case for disqualification against Lonzanida. RATIO:
The SC is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the
Lonzanida: Only served for two consecutive terms and that his assumption to office competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings are patently
in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three erroneous.
term limit for local government officials since he was not the duly elected mayor of
San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. The intent of Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution and under Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 is
that only consecutive terms count in determining the threeterm limit rule;
ISSUE: WON the term of a person who gets disqualified after proclamation is Involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of
included in the counting of the three consecutive term limit. NO. service.
RATIO: After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
Conditions for the application for disqualification: reelection for a 4th term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election
1. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
in the same local government post; election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
2. and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. reasons:
1. A subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate
It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective reelection after three consecutive terms;
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number 2. The intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
of times before the disqualification can apply. continuity of service.
A proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a A recall election midway in the term following the third consecutive term is a
proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.
Board of Canvassers, he is only the presumptive winner who assumes office subject
to the final outcome of the election protest. The winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the fill term of
three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official’s
Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, from terms in office.
May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely
assumed office as a presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned Osmeña v. COMELEC
by the COMELEC when it decided that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections. FACTS:
This petition calls for the determination of the validity of RA 7056, “An Act
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the Providing for the National and Local Election in 1992, Pave the Way for
computation of the threeterm limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning in 1995, and Authorizing
for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an Appropriations Therefor.”
interruption of continuity of service.
ISSUE: WON the law is constitutional. NO.
Adorneo v. COMELEC
RATIO:
FACTS: RA 7056, which provides for the holding of desynchronized election, is violative of
Adormeo and Talaga were the only candidates for mayor of Lucena City in the 2001 the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold synchronized national and local
elections. Talaga was then the incumbent mayor. elections in the second Monday of May 1992.
Talaga was elected mayor in 1992. He was reelected in 19951998. In 1998, he lost to The term of office of the local elective officials, except barangay officials, is fixed by
Tagarao. In the recall election of 12 May 2000, he again won and served the the Constitution at 3 years. The incumbent local officials were elected in January
unexpired term of Tagarao until 30 June 2001. 1988. Their term would have expired on 2 February 1991. But their term was
adjusted to expire at noon of 30 June 1992. The reason for this is to synchronize the
Adormeo: Talaga was elected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms national and local elections. On the other hand, RA 7056 provides for 2 separate
violating Sec. 8 Article X of the Constitution. elections in 1992.

The legislature cannot extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold He alleged that the appointments of the employees were midnight appointments of
over until their successors are elected and qualified where the Constitution has in the former mayor, done in violation of Article VII, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution. 15
effect fixed the term and the day on which the official term shall begin.
Some of the employees filed a claim for payment with the CSC alleging that de
Menzon v. Petilla Rama withheld their salaries.
FACTS: The CSC denied de Rama’s request for the recall of the employees: In the absence of
16 Feb 1988: Since no Governor had been proclaimed in Leyte, Luis Santos (LG Sec) any showing that these appointments were defective in form and substance, nor is
designated the Vice Governor, Leopoldo Petilla, as Acting Governor of Leyte. there evidence presented to show that they were issued in contravention of law or
rules, these are deemed valid and in effect.
Menzon, a senior member of the Sanggunian, was also designated by Secretary
Santos to act as Vice Governor for Leyte. ISSUE: WON the appointments are valid.
ISSUE: WON the appointment of Menzon was valid. YES. HELD: YES.
RATIO:
In the absence of any contrary provision in the LGC, the provisions of RATIO:
Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments
empowering the President to make temporary appointments in case of any vacancy during the last days of their tenure.
in appointive positions, may, in the best interest of public service, also be applied in
case of vacancy in the position of ViceGovernor, as in this case. Upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee’s assumption of the position
in the civil service, “he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by
The appointment of the petitioner is in full accord with the intent behind revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous
the LGC. Here is no question that Sec. 49 in connection with Sec. 52 of the LGC notice and hearing. It is wellsettled that the person assuming a position in the civil
shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of service under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right
the Vice Governor. In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner to the position.
is himself the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest
number of votes. The Dept. Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only
appointment. when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable
provisions of the CSC law and regulations.
Even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local
Government, has no power to appoint petitioner, at the very least, petitioner is a de
facto officer entitled to compensation. David v. COMELEC
Docena v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar
FACTS:
FACTS: As barangay chairman and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas,
Two persons are claiming the same position in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of petitioner Alex David filed a petition for prohibition to prohibit the holding of
Eastern Samar by virtue of separate appointments extended to them by the same barangay elections scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997.
authority. The first appointment was replaced by the second appointment, which
was subsequently withdrawn to reinstate the first appointment, but this was later COMELEC opposed the petition while the SolGen agreed with it.
itself recalled in favor of the second appointment.
In another case, the Liga ng mga Barangay QC Chapter filed a petition seeking to
It arose when Luis Capito died in office and petitioner Agustin Docena was declare the following as unconstitutional:
appointed to succeed him. 1. Sec. 43 (c) of RA 7160: Term of office of bgy officials shall be for 3 years;
2. COMELEC Res. Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of holding of the
On 27 November 1990, Socrates Alar was appointed, also by Secretary Luis Santos, elections;
to the post already occupied by Docena. 3. Budgetary appropriation of P400M for the cost of the elections.
ISSUE: WON Docena is the proper appointee who can serve for the unexpired term.
YES. ISSUE: WON RA 7160 which shortened the term of office of barangay officials
constitutional.
RATIO:
From the tenor of the appointment extended to Docena on 19 November HELD: YES.
1990, it was intended to be permanent, to fill the permanent vacancy caused by
Capito’s death. As such, it was to be valid for the unexpired portion of the term of RATIO:
the deceased member, who was entitled to serve “until noon of June 30, 1992,” in The intent of the legislature is to limit the term of barangay officials to only three
accordance with Article XVIII, Section 2, of the Constitution. years.
The said appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in fact RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. Legis posteriors priores contraries
already assumed office as member of the SPES, as per certification of the provincial abrogant.
secretary. For all legal intents and purposes, the petitioner’s appointment had
already been complete and enforceable at the time it was supposed to have been RA 6679 requires the votesrs to elect seven kagawads and the candidate who gets
superseded by the appointment in favor of Alar. the highest number of votes becomes the punong barangay. The LGC, however,
mandates a direct vote on the barangay chairman.
Docena’s appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and the
petitioner having already assumed office, he could not thereafter be just recalled There is a clear incompatibility between the provisions of these two laws so the
and replaced to accommodate Alar. The appointment was permanent in nature, and earlier one must be deemed to have been repealed.
for the unexpired portion of the deceased predecessor’s term. Docena had already
acquired security of tenure in the position and could be removed only for any of the The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office
causes, and conformably to the procedure, prescribed in the LGC. These could not be for barangay officials, It merely left the determination of such term to the
circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment. lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to
the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of
De Rama v. Court of Appeals public service.
FACTS:
Upon his assumption to the post of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado
de Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14
15
municipal employees. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Petitioners are also estopped from pursuing their petitions. Following the In this case, there is nothing to show that the provincial fiscal is
petitioner’s own theory, the election of Petitioner David was illegal since they were disqualified. Hence, the appearance of herein counsel is without authority of law.
elected under RA 6679.
The fiscal’s refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal
justification for employing the services of private counsel. A fiscal cannot refuse to
Alinsug v. RTCNegros Occidental perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath
of office. The council should have requested the SOJ to appoint an acting provincial
fiscal in place of the fiscal who declined to handle such case.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Zonsayda Alinsug, has been a regular employee of the municipal
government of Escalante.
Ramos v. Court of Appeals
She received an order from the newly proclaimed mayor detailing her to the mayor’s
office. FACTS:
Petitioners Ramos, Perez, and the Baliuag Market Vendors Association filed a
She absented herself from work allegedly to attend to family matters. She asked the petition to declare the nullity of two municipal ordinances and the contract of lease
permission of the personnel officer but not of the mayor. over a commercial arcade to be constructed by the Municipality of Baliuag.
Mayor Ponsica suspended Zonsayda for one month and one day for simple Atty. Romanillos appeared as counsel of the municipality. The petitioners sought to
misconduct. disqualify Romanillos. Atty. Romanillos argued that he was the collaborating
counsel of the provincial fiscal, Atty. Regalado.
Zonsayda filed with the RTC a petition for damages and TRO against the mayor and
the municipal treasurer, alleging that it was an act of political vendetta. ISSUE: WON a private counsel may collaborate with a provincial counsel.
She filed a motion praying that the answer be disregarded since the respondents HELD: NO.
were sued in their official capacities so they should have been represented either by
the municipal legal officer or by the provincial legal officer or prosecutor as provided RATIO:
for in the LGC. None of the exceptions is present here. It may be said that Atty. Romanillos
appeared for respondent municipality inasmuch as he was already counsel of Kristi
ISSUE: WON the respondents can be represented by a private counsel. Corporation which was sued with respondent municipality in this case. The order of
the trial court stated that Atty. Romanillos entered his appearance as collaborating
HELD: YES. counsel of the provincial attorney. This collaboration is contrary to law and should
not have been recognized as legal.
RATIO:
It appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed to collaborate with
when it is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another a private law firm does not legalize the latter’s representation of the municipality.
municipality or city in the province.
Private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own, and neither may
The key to resolving this issue of whether a local government official may secure the they do so even in collaboration with authorized government lawyers.
services of private counsel, in an action filed against him in his official capacity, lies
on the nature of the action and the relief that is sought. Although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in litigation,
in the interest of substantial justice, however, a municipality may adopt the work
When moral and/or exemplary damages are claimed, a mayor may hire a private already performed in good faith by such private lawyer, which work is beneficial to
counsel to defend him at his own personal expense. it provided (1) that no injustice is thereby heaped on the adverse party and (2)
provided that no compensation in any guise is paid therefore by said municipality.
A public official, who, it the performance of his duty acts in such fashion, does so in
excess of authority, and his actions would be ultra vires that can thereby result in
an incurrence of personal liability. All the foregoing considered, we hold that the Salalima v. Guingona
respondents were not improperly represented by a private counsel, whose legal fees
shall be for their own account.
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul and set aside AO No. 153 issued by the Executive
Secretary approving the findings of fact of the Ad Hoc Committee which held that
Municipality of Pililla, Rizal v. Court of Appeals
the petitioners are administratively liable for disregarding the law in several cases,
abuse of authority, oppression and abuse of authority, and negligence.
FACTS:
The petitioners in this case seek the nullification of the resolution of the Court of The petitioners argued that the challenged AO is an oppressive and capricious
Appeals which dismissed their petition for having been filed by a private counsel. exercise of executive power.
ISSUE: WON a private counsel may represent a municipality if the provincial fiscal ISSUE: WON the AO is valid.
refuses to handle its case.
HELD: NO.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
RATIO: An administrative offense means every act or conduct or omission which amounts to,
The CA is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file a or constitutes, any of the grounds for disciplinary action.
petition in behalf of and in the name of the municipality. The matter of
representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled. The RAC There is no grave abuse of discretion in imposing the penalty of suspension,
provides: The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or although the aggregate thereof exceeds six months and the unexpired portion of the
municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction elective official’s term of office where the suspension imposed for each
is vested in the SC or in cases where the municipality or district in question is the administrative offense does not exceed six months and there is an express provision
party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or district that the successive service of the suspension should not exceed the unexpired
in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any of portion of the term of office.
the political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of
the province. A special attorney may be employed by its council in this case. The Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, and the
grant under the LGC of 1991 to the “disciplining authority” of the power to remove
Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that
province of municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The prepared the Rules and Regulations.
municipality’s authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to
situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. Where the province buys the delinquent properties sold in a public auction to satisfy
unpaid real estate taxes and penalties, the municipalities entitled to taxes on said

properties may be considered coowners of such properties to the extent of their FACTS:
respective shares in the real property taxes and the penalties thereon. Petitioner Aguinaldo assails the decision of the Interior Secretary dismissing him as
Governor of Cagayan on the ground that his power has been repealed by the 1987
Public officials could not be subject to disciplinary action for administrative Constitution.
misconduct committed during a prior term.
Petitioner was charged with disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the
Constitution for the acts he committed during the coup.
Artieda v. Santos
ISSUE: WON the power of the Secretary to dismiss a locally elective official has
been repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
FACTS:
In 1988, ten administrative complaints were filed by various city officials against HELD: NO.
Ganzon, elected mayor of Iloilo, on different grounds.
RATIO:
Respondent Secretary Santos issued three separate orders of preventive suspension Reelection renders administrative case moot and academic.
against Ganzon, each to last for 60 days.
Except for criminal acts committed, a public official cannot be removed for
ISSUE: WON the petitioner can be allowed the benefit of simultaneous service of administrative misconduct committed during a prior term.
his third and fourth suspension orders.
Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a LGC which
HELD: YES. provides for the manner of removal of local government officials, is found in the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions, then it cannot be said that BP 337 was repealed by the 1987
RATIO: Constitution.
If simultaneous service of two suspension orders is allowed, this would
work in favor of the local elective official as the balance of his third preventive Sec. 48 (1) of BP Blg 337 grants the Secretary the power to appoint local government
suspension would, in effect, be reduced from 46 days to 17 days. It will be recalled officials in case of incumbent’s removal from office.
that, in the main decision, noting that successive suspensions have been imposed on
Mayor Ganzon, the SC stated that what is intriguing is that respondent Secretary Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required before the petitioner could be
has been cracking down on the mayor piecemeal, apparently to pin him down ten suspended or removed from office. Petitioner in this case is not being prosecuted
times the pain, when the Secretary could have pursued a consolidated effort. criminally under the RPC, but administratively with the end view of removing him
as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan for acts of disloyalty to the Republic.
The LGC provides that in the event that several administrative cases are
filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than
90 days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at
Reyes v. COMELEC
the time of the first suspension.
FACTS:
Espiritu v. Melgar Renato Reyes was the incumbent mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro.
FACTS: 26 October 1994: Administrative complaint was filed against him by a Dr. Manalo.
It was alleged that Mayor Melgar assaulted Ramir Garing, boxing and kicking him
on different parts of his body and that he was ordered arrested and detained in the It was alleged that he exacted and collected P50,000 from each market stall holder
municipal jail without filing any charges against him. in the municipal public market, that certain checks issued to him by the DILG were
never received by the municipal treasurer and that he took 27 heads of cattle from
The Sanggunian required Melgar to answer the charges. the beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the latter had reared the cattle
for seven months.
Governor Espiritu preventively suspended him pursuant to a recommendation made
by the Sanggunian. De Castro sought Reyes’ disqualification as candidate for mayor. Petitioner was
voted for in the next elections. He was later on disqualified by the COMELEC.
ISSUE: WON the suspension of Mayor Melgar was validly done.
ISSUE: WON the disqualification was proper.
HELD: YES.
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
The privincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to preventively RATIO:
suspend the municipal Mayor of Naujan at any time after the issues have been Any agreement to delay service of a decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in
joined when any of the following grounds exist: administrative cases is illegal. The law makes it mandatory that copies of the
1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent has decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall immediately be furnished to
committed the acts complained of; respondent and/ or interested parties.
2. When the evidence of culpability is strong;
3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or The filing of a petition for certiorari does not prevent a decision from attaining
4. When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary
other evidence. period involved in the proceeding.
There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him When the elections were held on 8 May 1995, the decision of the SP had already
are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence. become final and executory. To arrest the course of the principal action during the
pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of
Mayor Melgar’s direct recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court.
remedies was premature.
Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was
Since the 60day preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the committed.
TRO and therefore has already ben served, he is deemed reinstated in office without
prejudice to the continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
against him. proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled.
Aguinaldo v. Santos

Hagad v. GozoDadole Joson v. Executive Secretary
FACTS: FACTS:
Criminal and administrative complaints were filed against the respondents in this Private respondents filed with the OP a complaint charging Joson with grave
case with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas. misconduct and abuse of authority, alleging that he barged into the session hall of
the capitol, kicking the door, chairs, and threatening them for resisting the approval
These public officials of Mandaue City were charged with violating RA 3019, Article of a loan of P150M from the PNB.
170 and 171 of the RPC, and RA No. 6713.
The complaint and the notes were sent to Secretary Barbers. Joson filed a motion for
They challenged the power of the Ombudsman to suspend them alleging that the a formal investigation but it was denied by the DILG noting that submission of
LGC deprived the Ombudsman of the jurisdiction to try, hear, and decide the admin position papers substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due
case of local officials since the power is now vested in the Office of the President. process in administrative proceedings.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman is bereft of jurisdiction to hear administrative cases
against local officials. ISSUE: WON the suspension of Joson was improper.
HELD: NO. HELD: YES.

RATIO: RATIO:
There is nothing in the LGC that indicates that it has repealed the provisions of the The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the
Ombudsman Act. Repeals by implication are not favored. Every statute must be disciplining authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws. itself to investigate complaints against local officials. AO 23 delegates this power to
investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted
Not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed on an by the Disciplining Authority.
official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges
are heard. This is not undue delegation, what is delegated is the power to investigate and not
the power to discipline.
Any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or finding of the
Ombudsman may only be entertained by the Supreme Court, on pure question of An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an
law. accused:
1. Right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel;
2. Right to confront and crossexamine the witnesses against him; and
3. Right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of
Grego v. COMELEC documentary evidence.
Petitioner’s right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint

FACTS: against him was decided on the basis of position papers. Administrative disciplinary
31 October 1981: Basco was removed from his post as Deputy Sheriff. proceedings against local elective government officials are not similar to those
against appointive officials.
He ran as a candidate for Councilor in Manila during the 1988 elections. He won.
He sought reelection in the 1992 elections. He won but was besieged by lawsuits of
his opponents in the polls. Basco ran and won for another term after that.
Pablico v. Villapando
His opponents challenged the third election. The Manila BOC proclaimed Basco as
the duly elected councilor. He immediately took his oath of office. FACTS:
Some SB members filed a complaint against Alejandro Villapando, mayor of San
ISSUE: WON Basco should be removed from office as a result of an administrative Vicente, Palawan, for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution.
case pursuant to the LGC that took effect in 1992.
It was alleged that Villapando entered into a consultancy agreement with Tiape, a
HELD: No. defeated mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections, falling within the 1 year
prohibition under Art. IXB, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
RATIO:
Sec. 40(b) of the LGC does not have any retroactive effect. 1 Feb 2000: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found him guilty and imposed
the penalty of dismissal.
A statute, despite the generality of its language, must not be so construed as to
overreach acts, events, or matters which transpired before its passage. ISSUE: Whether local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on
appeal, validly impose the penalty of dismissal on erring local officials.
Under PD 807, the former Civil Service Decree, the term reinstatement had a
technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position—a public officer HELD: NO.
administratively dismissed then was not therefore barred from running for an
elective position. RATIO:
An elective local official may be remove from office on the grounds
The use of the word “may” in RA 6646 indicates that the suspension of a enumerated above by order of the proper court. It may be decreed only by a court of
proclamation is merely directory and permissive. law.
Absent any determination of irregularity in election returns, as well as an order The power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged

enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is mandatory and exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124(b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and
ministerial for the Board of Canvassers to count the votes based on such returns and Regulations Implementing the LGC, insofar as it vests power on the “disciplining
declare the result. authority” to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being
against the last paragraph of Sec. 60 of the LGC.
A possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared the
winning candidate is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions: The law on suspension and removal of elective public officials must be
1. The one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension
2. The electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s or removal is vested must exercise it in good faith.
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and
candidate. not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by
usurping the power to remove.

Conducto v. Monzon Membership of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level is not
apportioned to political parties.
The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative
Loss of confidence as a ground for recall is a political question.
misconduct committed during a prior term since his reelection to office operates as
a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct committed during a prior term, to
Paras v. COMELEC
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore. The rule, however, finds
no application to criminal cases.
FACTS:
Danilo Paras is the Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won in the last
regular election in 1994.
Evardone v. COMELEC A petition for his recall was filed by registered voters of the barangay.
FACTS: COMELEC: Approved the petition and set the recall election on 13 November 1995.
Felipe Evardone was the mayor of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having
been elected in the 1988 local elections. 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition. The Commission deferred the
election to December 6.
14 February 1990: Apelado, Aclan, and Nival filed a petition for the recall of
Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar. Paras filed with the RTC a petition for injunction. TRTC dismissed the petition.
COMELEC issued a resolution approving the recommendation of Sumbilla, Election Paras: No recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s
Registrar of the municipality. assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. It is
now barred since the 13 January 1996 falls within one year from the SK election on
Evardone: The COMELEC erred since the petitioner was denied due process. The the first Monday of May 1996. Since the SK election is a regular local election, he
COMELEC also erred since the Resolution is null and void for being could not be recalled.
unconstitutional. Since there was, during the period material to the case, no local
government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution ISSUE: WON the SK elections bar the recall election of a barangay official even if it
nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected government officials. falls within one year before the SK election.
There is therefore no basis for the resolution and the recall proceeding is premature.
HELD: NO.
ISSUE: WON Res. No. 2272 is constitutional.
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
RATIO: If the SK election which is set by law to be held every 3 years from May 1996 were to
The Constitution, Article XVIII, Sec. 3 provides that all existing laws not be deemed within the purview of the phrase “regular local election,” then no recall
inconsistent with it shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. RA election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the LGC.
7160, specifically repeals BP 337. But the LGC will take effect only on 1 January
1992. The old LGC is still applicable to the present case. The Constitution requires an effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and
referendum. A statute must be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.
The Election Code contains no special provisions on the manner of conducting
elections for the recall of a local official. It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the LGC to
construe “regular local election” as one referring to an election where the office held
Whether the electorate of the municipality has lost confidence in the incumbent by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by
mayor is a political question. It is valid and has legal effect. the electorate.
Garcia v. COMELEC Angobung v. COMELEC
FACTS: FACTS:
11 May 1992: Petitioner Enrique Garcia was elected governor of Bataan. Petitioner won as Mayor of Tumauini, Isabela in the 1995 elections.
1 July 1993: Some mayors, vicemayors and members of the SB of the 12 September 1996: Petitioner received a copy of a petition for recall.
municipalities of the province met and constituted themselves into a Preparatory
Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of Garcial. COMELEC RO: Recommended the approval of the petition for recall signed by other
qualified voters to garner at least 25% of the total number of registered voters.
A resolution was passed for the recall of Garcia on the ground of “loss of confidence.” COMELEC en banc issued the assailed resolution.
ISSUE: WON Sec. 70 of RA 7160 allowing a preparatory recall assembly is Angobung: The resolution was signed by just one person in violation of the 25%
unconstitutional. minimum; It scheduled the recall election within 1 year from the Barangay
Elections.
HELD: No.
ISSUE:
RATIO: WON a petition for recall signed by just one person is valid.
To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal
showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits; all HELD: No.
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law.
RATIO:
Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his The issue in Sanchez was not the questioned procedure but the legal basis for the
term of office. exercise by the COMELEC of its rulemaking power in the alleged absence of a
statutory grant.
The LGC of 1983 provided only one mode of initiating the recall elections of local
elective officials. In Sanchez and Evardone: The COMELECprescribed procedure of allowing the
recall petition to be filed by at least one person and then inviting voters to sing said
The LGC of 1991 provided for a second mode of initiating the recall process through petition on a date set for that purpose was never put to issue.
a preparatory recall assembly.
Sec. 69(d) of the LGC: Expressly provides that the recall of any elective municipal
There is nothing in the Constitution that remotely suggests that the people have the official may be validly initiated upon petition of at least 25% of the total number of
sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding. registered voters in the LGU concerned.

The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates a recall proceeding. double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 SK
officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of
The phrase “petition of at least 25%” is used and the law does not state that the retraction.
petition must be signed by at least 25%; rather, the petition must be “of” or by, at
least 25% of the registered voters. COMELEC: Dismissed the petition.
Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not yet contain the signatures of 25% ISSUE: WON the dismissal was proper.
of the registered voters, the petition must contain the names of at least 25% of the
total number of registered voters in whose behalf only one person may sign the HELD: YES.
petition in the meantime.
RATIO:
SC: Cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of the recall petition by a number of (1) On the word “recall”
people less than the foregoing 25% statutory requirement, much lesss, the filing Sec. 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. Sec. 69 provides that the
thereof by just one person. power of recall shall be exercised by the registered voters… Since the power vested
on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect
Recall must be pursued by the people, not just one disgruntled loser or a small an official into office, the limitations in Sec. 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the
percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, it will only serve to sitabilize a entire recall proceedings. The term “recall” in par. (b) refers only to the recall
community and disrupt the running of government. election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition of recall
with the COMELEC or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25% of the voters
for a petition for recall.
The limitations in Sec. 74 apply only to the exercise of the power to recall
which is vested in the registered voters. People v. Garcia: Holding of a PRA is not
the recall itself.
As long as the recall election is not held before the official concerned has
completed one year in office, he will not be judged on the performance prematurely.
Malonzo v. COMELEC To construe the term recall as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose of
discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly
FACTS: restrict the constitutional right of speech and assembly of its members.
Malonzo won over Asistio in the 1995 elections.
(2) Whether the phrase “Regular Local Election” includes the election period
7 July 1996: 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members and SK for the regular election or simply the date of such election.
chairmen, constituting a majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall There is a distinction between election period and campaign period. To hold
Assembly, met and upon deliberation and election, voted for the approval of PRA that it includes the entire period would reduce the period to eight months. Such an
Res. No. 0196, expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo and calling for the interpretation would devitalize the right of recall.
initiation of recall proceedings against him.
(3) Whether the Recall Resolution was singed by a majority of the PRA and
Malonzo: There was inadequate service of notices to the members and the PRA must duly verified.
be the one to initiate recall proceedings and not the Liga ng mga Barangay. Yes. Although the term “attendance” appears at the top of the page, it is
apparent that it was written by mistake. It is more probable to believe that it was
ISSUE: WON the recall process was validly initiated. signed to signify their concurrence to the recall resolution.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: Mendez v. CSC
Factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly
supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the FACTS:
absence of a substantial attack on its validity. 7 June 1984: Then Acting Register of Deeds of QC Vicente Coloyan filed an admin
complaint against petitioner, a legal research assistant in the QC Office of the City
The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the PRA. Attorney for Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty for allegedly tearing off a portion of
TCT from the registry book and then pocketing it.
Petitioner’s insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since
it was convened by the Liga, is misplaced. It just so happens that the personalities QC Mayor dismissed it for insufficiency of evidence.
representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the PRA, the
majority of whom met and voted in favor of the resolution for his recall. Coloyan appealed to the MSPB which reversed the decision and found him guilty
with the penalty of dismissal.
Claudio v. COMELEC CSC affirmed it on appeal.
FACTS: ISSUE: WON Coloyan is a party adversely affected by the decision allowed by law
11 May 1998: Jovito Claudio was elected mayor of Pasay City. to file an appeal.
May 1999: Chairs of several barangays gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a HELD: No.
petition for recall against Claudio for loss of confidence.
RATIO:
19 May 1999: At the residence of Mr. Lim, several chairs formed an ad hoc It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be
committee to convene a PRA. exercised only in a manner and in accordance
29 May 1999: 1,073 members of the PRA composed of chairs, kagawads, and SK
chairs of Pasay, adopted Res. No. 01, S1999 to initiate the recall of Claudio for loss Macalincag and Carlos v. Chang
of confidence.
Under Sec. 41 of PD 807, designation of the replacement is not a
2 July 1999: Petition for recall was filed accompanied by an affidavit of service of the requirement to give effect to the preventive suspension.
petition on the Office of the City Mayor.
BP 337 provides for the automatic assumption of the assistant municipal
Claudio: The signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show treasurer or next in rank officer in case of suspension of the municipal treasurer.
attendance at the PRA meeting; most of the signatories were only representatives of
the parties concerned; the convening of the PRA took place within the 1 year period; The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is unquestionably under the
the election case filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in the SC, seeking the annulment of Department of Finance. Hence, the Secretary of Finance is the proper disciplining
the proclamation of Claudio should first be decided; and the recall resolution failed authority to issue the preventive suspension order. More specifically acting Sec. of
to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that 10 were Finance Macalincag, acted within his jurisdiction in issuing that order.

4. Violates the trend of Cory government to veer from monopolistic and crony
economy.
PAGCOR: Given territorial jurisdiction over the entire country. It was to centralize
Garcia v. Pajaro and the City of Dagupan and integrate all games of chance.
The power to discipline is specifically granted by Sec. 47 of the Admin. ISSUE: WON Sec. 13 par. 216 of PD 1896 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City
Code of 1987 to heads of departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, provinces, of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees and WON it violates local autonomy.
and cities. On the other hand, the power to commence administrative proceedings
against a subordinate officer or employee is granted by the Omnibus Rules to the HELD: NO.
secretary of a department, the head of an agency, LGU, the chief of an agency, the
regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint. RATIO:
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the
In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the prohibition does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of
opportunity to explain one’s side; Due process is deemed satisfied if a person is its police power.
granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling.
PD 1869: Enacted to provide funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling
Parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer to close government scrutiny.
charges filed against them cannot complain of a denial of due process.
The City of Manila is a mere Municipal corporation and has no inherent right to
A public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary impose taxes. Its power to tax must yield to a legislative act which is superior
damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear having been passed upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax.”
showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence.
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. If Congress can
Javellana v. DILG and Santos grant Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions
and even take back the power.
FACTS:
Atty. Erwin Javellana was elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. The City’s power to impose license fees on gambling has long been revoked. As early
City Engineer Divinagracia filed an Administrative Case against Javellana for as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of
continuously engaging in the practice of law without securing authority from the “franchise, licenses, or permits” was withdrawn by PD No. 771 and was vested
Regional Director of the DILG. It also alleged that Javellana filed a case against exclusively on the National Government.
Divinagracio for “Illegal Dismilssal and Reinstatement with Damages.”
Only the National Government has the power to issue “licenses or permits” for the
ISSUE: WON Javellana properly engaged in the practice of law. operation of gambling.
Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National

HELD: No.
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government.
RATIO:
In addition to its corporate powers, it also exercises regulatory powers.
LGC, Sec. 90. Sanggunian members may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. Provided,
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and regulate gambling casinos. The latter role
that sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not: Appear as
is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency of the government.
counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
Being an agency of the government, it must be exempt from local taxes, otherwise, it
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party; Collect any
might be impeded or subject to the control of a mere local government.
fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the LGU of which
he is an official.
This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local
governments.
The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against
City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of
GANZON V. CA
Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman.
Hence, judgment against Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the
FACTS:
City Government.
Mayor Ganzon was charged with 10 complaints which included abuse of authority,
oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation,
By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them
culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
to prosecute the claims against Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memo Circular
No. 7458 prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of
Initial hearings were set and conducted at the RO of the DILG in Iloilo City. Finding
his profession, is such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.
probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order
on 11 August 1988 to last until 11 October 1988 for a period of 60 days. Another 60
day preventive suspension was imposed on the Mayor for the prima facie evidence
X. LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE RELATIONS
found to exist in the case of Erbite. The 2nd PS was not enforced due to a TRO.
Local Governments are subject to legislative control. This is limited by the

Ganzon filed a prohibition case against the DILG Secretary in the RTC of Iloilo. He
Constitution.
was given another 60day suspension.
Constitutional limitations:
Ganzon: DILG denied him due process, that the Secretary had been biased against
1. Protect private property;
him. He has no authority to suspend or remove him. 1987 Constitution no longer
2. Previously entered contracts must not be impaired;
gives the President the power to suspend/ remove local officials.
3. Uniform laws
4. Limitations depending on nature of rights and powers exercised by the
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
municipality.
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and
cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the
BASCO V. PAGCOR acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
FACTS:
Petitioners sought to annul PD 1869 on the ff grounds: Ganzon: The deletion of “as may be provided by law” is significant since the power of
1. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a 3 rd person with a right recognized the President is provided by law and no law may provide for it any longer.
by law. It waived the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license
fees;
2. It intruded into an LGU’s right to impose local taxes, violates local autonomy; 16
Exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder, from paying any “tax of any kind
3. Violates equal protection clause since it legalizes PAGCORconducted gambling;
or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever
nature, whether national or local.”
ISSUE: WON the Secretary of the local government can suspend and/or remove local 12 October 1936: Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting it into a city. Sec.
officials. 50 provided that:
“Buildings and properties which the province shall
HELD: NO. abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired
and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price fixed by the Auditor
RATIO: General.”
Despite the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to The properties consisted of 50 lots and some buildings covered by TCTs
divest the legislature of its right—or the President of her prerogative as conferred by in the name of Zamboanga Province.
existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. The
omission signifies local autonomy from Congress. 1945: Zamboanga Province capital was transferred to Dipolog.
1948: RA 286 was approved creating the municipality of Molave making it the new
The Constitution did nothing more insofar as existing legislation authorizing the capital.
President to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution 1949: Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General fixed the value at
contains no prohibition. P1,294,244.00.
1952: RA 711 was approved in dividing the province into Z. del Norte and Z. del Sur.
Legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. “Supervision” Sec. 6 provided that the funds and assets of the province shall be equitably divided
means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate upon the Auditor General’s recommendation.
officers perform their duties. “Investigating” is not inconsistent with “overseeing.”
1955: Auditor General apportioned the assets and obligations: 54.39% for Z. del
In cases where the Court denied the President the power to suspend/ remove, it was Norte and 45.61% for del Sur.
not because it did not think that the President can not exercise on account of his CIR was allowed to deduct 25% of the internal revenue allotment for the city for the
limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. quarter ending 31 March 1960.
The sole objective of a suspension is simply “to prevent the accused from hampering 17 June 1961: RA 3039 was approved providing that all assets of the former
the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible province of Zamboanga located in the city of Zamboanga are transferred to the city
witnesses” or to keep him off “the records and other evidence.” free of charge.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the Finance Secretary ordered the CIR to stop further payments.
accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. Suspension is temporary, it may
be imposed for no more than 60 days. A longer suspension is unjust and ISSUE: WON RA 3039 is constitutional for depriving Z. del Norte of property
unreasonable. without due process and just compensation. WON congress can appropriate the
properties in this case.
HELD: YES, qualified. NO.
CITY OF CEBU V. NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE
AUTHORITY RATIO:
The validity of the law depends on the nature of the properties. If the property is
FACTS: owned by the municipality in its public and governmental capacity, the property is
The City of Cebu filed an action for declaratory relief to prevent NAWASA from public and Congress has absolute control over it. If it is owned in its private or
taking over the ownership, control, supervision and jurisdiction over the Osmeña proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control.
Waterworks System, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 8 of RA 1383. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just
compensation.
Cebu: This deprives us of our property rights in the Osmeña Waterworks System
without due process of law and just compensation. This controversy is more along the domains of Municipal corporations. It results
then that Z. del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City the former’s share in
NAWASA: They system had always been under the control and operation of the the 26 properties which are patrimonial in nature. The share cannot be paid in lump
National Government, its transfer to NAWASA was within the competence of sum, except at to the money already returned to the City.
Congress; it was public property and within the absolute control of Congress;
granting that it was patrimonial, there was proper and just compensation provided Applying the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in
in the law. question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain
patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property
TC: RA 1383 is unconstitutional in so far as it vests NAWASA ownership over the be held and devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public
system without just compensation. education, public health, etc.
ISSUE: WON RA 1383 is constitutional in vesting in NAWASA ownership of the RA 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its

OWS without just compensation. grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites—a total of 24 lots—since these were held by
the former province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the
HELD: NO. absolute control of Congress.
But the law cannot be applied to deprive Z. del Norte of its share in the value of the
RATIO: rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not
RA 1383 provides that the net book value of the properties of the government owned being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes.
water works systems shall be received by the Authority in payment for an equal
value of the assets of NAWASA. All the properties of the OWS are transferred to
NAWASA in exchange for an equal value of the latter’s assets. However, nothing
concrete is said as to what assets are to be traded on the part of NAWASA. MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP. INC. AND PAGCOR
The OWS was established out of the $125,000.00 loan extended to the municipality FACTS:
by the US, payable within 30 years. Cebu applied for and obtained a certificate of PAGCOR decided to open a casino in Cagayan City. It leased a portion of a building
public convenience from the PSC. The System owned properties which are estimated belonging to Pryce Properties and equipped it to be used as a casino.
to be worth P10,000,000.00. The system pays all who pay the charges. It is open to
the public (in this sense it is public service), but upon the payment only of a certain This was met by opposition from various sectors in the locality. The Sangguniang
rental (which makes it proprietary). Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted Ordinances No. 3353 and 337593
which prohibited the operation of gambling casinos within the premises of the city.
The police power is not without limitations, there is the constitutional prohibition
against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. ISSUE:
WON local governments are empowered to suppress all forms of gambling, including
PAGCORsanctioned ones.
PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE V. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA
HELD: NO.
FACTS: Before its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga
used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. RATIO:
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by PD 1869.

every indication that herein charges were collected under both the power to tax and
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. the power to regulate. The name fee is not conclusive—taxes are often called fees.
Tests for a valid ordinance: LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. CA
1. It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute.
2. It must not be unfair or oppressive. FACTS:
3. It must not be partial or discriminatory. RA No. 4850 created the “Laguna Lake Development Authority.”
4. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5. It must not be general and consistent with public policy. PD 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 due to the concern for the rapid
6. It must bot be unreasonable. expansion of Metro Manila, the towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with the current
and prospective use of the lake.
Under the rule noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted
in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. The Authority was granted special powers: “… the Authority shall have exclusive
Accordingly, the SC held that since the word “gambling” is associated with “and jurisdiction to issue new permits for the use of the lake waters for any projects or
other prohibited games of chance,” the word should be read as referring to only activities in or affecting the said lake including navigation, construction and
illegal gambling which, like other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like, and to impose
suppressed. necessary safeguards for lake quality control and management, and to collect
necessary fees…shared between the authority and other government agencies and
Implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and political subdivisions…”
unmistakable showing of such intention. There is no sufficient indication of an
implied repeal of PD 1869. On the contrary, PAGCOR is mentioned as a source of EO 927 was enacted which further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of
funding in two later enactments of Congress, RA 7309, creating a Board of Claims the Authority and named the towns, cities, and provinces encompassed by the term
under the DOJ and RA 7648 providing for measures for the solution of the power “Laguna Bay Region.”
crisis.
RA 7160: LGC of 1991. The municipalities in the region interpreted the provisions to
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of mean that the new law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to
gambling, the illegal and those authorized by law. The ordinances violate PD 1869, issue fishing privileges in their municipal waters since the law provides:
which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed
in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition “Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the
of gambling in general. municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore in accordance with the
provisions of this Section.”
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Municipal governments then assumed authority to issue fishing privileges and
Congress as the national law making body. fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of this occasion to establish
fishpens and cages to the consternation of the Authority. It increased the occupation
The basic relationship between the national legislature and the LGUs from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995.
has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the
policy of local autonomy. The Authority issued a notice that all fishpens and structures erected without a
permit from the Authority shall be demolished. This was challenged in the courts by
the different operators.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. CITY OF MANILA
ISSUE: Which agency of the Government—the Laguna Lake Development Authority
FACTS: or the towns and municipalities comprising the region—should exercise jurisdiction
MERALCO operates 7 steam boilers. As fees for the inspection of the boilers, over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery
plaintiff paid the National Government several amounts. Upon the demand of the privileges is concerned?
city, plaintiff also paid several amounts as fees for the inspection of the boilers by
the City Engineer. HELD: The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the
LLDA.
This is a suit to recover the sum of P4,630 which plaintiff paid to Manila as
inspection fees of its steam boilers, in accordance with the provisions of the City RATIO:
Ordinances. The LGC does not contain any express provision which categorically repeals the
charter of the Authority.
MERALCO: Such provisions have been repealed by subsequent legislation, CA 696
(provides that the Secretary of Labor shall fix and collect reasonable inspection The charter of LLDA constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general law. The
fees). enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have
repealed a special law. Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the
ISSUE: WON the power to levy inspection fees on steam boilers is still lodged in the Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable
City of Manila. development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the authority
to proceed with its mission.
HELD: YES.
“Laguna de Bay cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies
RATIO: where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific
portions of the lake water…”
There was no repeal. The City’s power to tax steam boilers could not have
been affected by the Department of Labor’s power to regulate or inspect them: One The power of local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted
is taxation, the other is regulation. for revenue purposes. The power of the Authority to grant permits is for the purpose
of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the region. It does partake of
The power of inspection of the Labor Secretary does not conflict with that the nature of police power which is the most pervasive and the least limitable and
of the City authorities, since the former is related to the “safety of laborers and the most demanding of all State powers. The charter which embodies a valid
employees” while the City is not limited to such purposes, but is related to the safety exercise of the police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting
and welfare of the inhabitants of the City, particularly of the neighborhood where Laguna de Bay. There should be no quarrel over permit fees since there is a sharing
the boilers are located. mechanism in place.
In the opinion of judicial authorities, there is nothing “inherently

obnoxious in the requirement that a person engaged in a business shall have two MONDANO V. SILVOSA
licenses, one issued by the state and another by a political subdivision or public
corporation.” FACTS:
Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao.
As to the rates, if the City’s power is merely to regulate, then that is
material. However, the City also has the authority to tax steam boilers. There is

27 February 1954: Complaint was filed with the Presidential Complaints and Action 2191: Renders a final decision within 30 days. No final dismissal is made until
Committee accusing Mondano of raping Caridad Mosenda and concubinage for recommended by the Secretary and approved by the President.
cohabiting with Caridad in a place other than the conjugal dwelling.
Laws governing the suspension or removal of public officers, especially those chosen
6 March: Compliant was indorsed to provincial governor for investigation and by the direct vote of the people, must be strictly construed in their favor. When the
report. Governor issued AO No. 8 suspending Mondano from office. procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be
deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express provision to the
Mondano: asked for prohibition to enjoin respondents from proceeding with the contrary. In this case, Hebron was suspended in May 1954. The records of the
hearing of the case against him. investigation were forwarded to the Executive Secretary since 15 July 1954. The
decision has not been rendered as of 13 May 1955. The continued indefinite
Respondents: Invoked Sec. 79 (c) of the Admin Code which clothes the department suspension cannot be reconciled with the letter and spirit of the Admin Code.
head with “direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices
under his juisdiction…” Villena v. Secretary: Upheld the power of the Secretary to Since the powers given to the Presidnet in addition to his general supervisory
conduct at its own initiative investigation charges against local elective municipal authority, the application of those powers to municipal corporations—insofar as they
officials. may appear to sanction the assumption by the Executive of the functions of the
provincial governors and boards—would contravene the constitutional provision
ISSUE: WON the Secretary of the Interior has the power to investigate and suspend restricting the authority of the President over local government to “general
a municipal mayor (same power of control over bureaus under his department) supervision.”
stemming from a charge of rape and concubinage.
If there is any conflict between Sec. 64(b) and (c), 79(c) and 86 of the Admin Code,
HELD: NO. and 2188 and 2191 of the same code, the latter, being specific provisions, must
prevail. The alleged authority of the Executive to suspend a municipal mayor
RATIO: directly without any opportunity on the part of the provincial governor and the
Constitution: President shall have control over all the executive departments… provincial board to exercise the administrative powers of both under sections 23188
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law… and 2190 of the AC, cannot be adopted without conceding that said powers are
subject or repeal or suspension by the President. This cannot be done without
Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over legislation. If neither the Secretary not the President may disapprove a resolution of
all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction but he does not have the same control the Provincial Board, passed within its jurisdiction, because such would connote the
of local governments. assumption of control, it is manifest that greater control would be wielded by said
officers of the national government if they could either assume the powers vested in
Supervision: Overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that said provincial board or act in substitution thereof, such as by suspending municipal
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them officers, without the admin proceedings prescribed in the AC.
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties. The power of the president over LGUs is limited to general supervision and this is
unqualified so it applies to all powers: corporate or political.
Control: The power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for that of the latter. GANZON V. COURT OF APPEALS
The authority of the Department Head over persons under his department does not FACTS:
extend to local governments over which the President exercises only general The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of admin complaints filed
supervision as may be provided by law. against him by city officials in 1988, on various charges.
The charges preferred against the respondent are not malfeasances or any of those An investigation was conducted. Amidst two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon
enumerated in Sec. 2188 of the Admin. Code, since rape and concubinage have filed an action for prohibition against the Interior Secretary in the RTC of Iloilo.
nothing to do with the performance of his duties as mayor nor do they constitute
“neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form of maladministration of Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Ganzon for another 60
office. days, the third time in 20 months.
HEBRON V. REYES Ganzon: DILG denied me due process of law and the Secretary had been biased
against me. He does not have the power to suspend and remove local officials. 1987
FACTS: Constitution no longer allows the President to exercise the power of suspension over
This is a quo warranto case involving the Office of the Mayor of Carmona, Cavite. local officials. The deletion of “as may be provided by law” is significant since the
1951: Elections were held, petitioner Bernardo Hebron, and respondent Eulalio power of the President is “provided by law” and may no longer be provided by law in
Reyes, were elected mayor and vice mayor. Hebron continued to discharge such the present set up.
functions until 1954.
1954: Letter was received from the OP suspending him until the termination fo the ISSUE: WON the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can
admin proceedings against him. suspend and/or remove local officials.
Eulalio Reyes acted as mayor of Carmona and the Provincial Fiscal investigated the
charges. Hebron instituted this case on the ground that Reyes was illegally holding HELD: YES.
the post and that his term as mayor was about to expire.
RATIO:
ISSUE: WON a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic, may Notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not
be removed or suspended directly by the President, regardless of the procedure set intend to divest Congress of its right, or the president of his prerogative to provide
forth in the Admin Code. admin sanctions against local officials. The Constitution did not intend, for the sake
HELD: The procedure prescribed in Sec. 2188 to 2191 of the RAC, for the suspension of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal
and removal of municipal officials is mandatory. The procedure is exclusive. The corporations.
Executive may conduct investigations as a means only to ascertain whether the
governor and the board should take such action. Suspension in this case was null Investigating is not inconsistent with overseeing, although it is a lesser power than
and void. altering. In several cases, the Court denied the President the power to
suspend/remove because the law lodged the power elsewhere and not because the
RATIO: President has no inherent power to remove or suspend local elective Court thought the President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power.
officials.
The Secretary acted under Batas Blg . 337, Sec. 6263.
2188: Governor shall receive and investigate complaints against municipal officers
for offenses involving maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment Sec. 63: Preventive suspension may be meted out by the Minister of Local
of a crime involving moral turpitude. Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial
2189: Trial by municipal board. Preventive suspension shall not be more than 30 governor if the respondent is…
days.
2190: Provincial board then acts by dismissing the charges or by forwarding to the The successive 60day suspension imposed on Ganzon is different. The sole objective
Interior Secretary the record of the case. of suspension is to prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of the

investigation. Under the LGC, such cannot exceed 60 days. Imposing 600 days of there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi
suspension is to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
central government in the manner the law may provide.
Ganzon may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no logner be suspended The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special

for the offenses he was originally charged. agent, but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be
GANZON V. KAYANAN applicable.
FACTS:
25 August 1956: Ernesto Rosales filed a complaint against Ganzon (Iloilo Mayor) Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
with the President alleging violent acts during his work as a radio broadcaster. death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
13 September 1956: Executive Secretary designated respondent to investigate the control or supervision.
complaint.
24 September 1956: Ganzon questioned the authority of the President to order his LGC
investigation. SEC. 24. Liability for Damages. Local government units and their officials are not
exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property.
ISSUE: WON the President has the authority to order the investigation of a city
mayor as regards an administrative complaint and to take disciplinary action San Diego v. Municipality of Naujan
against him if he is found guilty.
FACTS:
HELD: YES. A public bidding was held by the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, for the
lease of its municipal waters.
RATIO:
The pertinent provisions are found in Sec. 64(b) and (c) of the Admin Code. Resolution No. 46 was passed by the council awarding the concession of the Butas
River and the Naujan Lake to Bartolome San Diego.
(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the
offices held by such removed officials… The contract stipulated that San Diego would be the exclusive lessee to erect fish
(c) To order… an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in the corrals for five years with an annual rent of P26,300.00. This annual rental was
Government service… reduced by 20% upon petition by San Diego.
The Council extended the lease for another five years with the condition that San
Constitution: Sec. 10 (1). The President shall have control of all the executive Diego would waive the privilege to seek reduction of the amount of rent which was
departments, bureaus and offices… to be based on the original contract.
It may be clearly inferred that the President may remove an official in the 1952: Municipal Council, now composed of a new set of members, adopted
government service “conformably to law.” Resolution No. 3, revoking Resolution No. 222. The Resolution extending the lease
period was also revoked.
It cannot be disputed that in this case the President is vested with the authority to
order the investigation of petitioner when in his opinion the good of the public San Diego: Resolution No. 3 is unconstitutional.
service so requires, and such being the case, the petitioner cannot now contend that
the designation of respondent as the official to investigate him by Rosales has been Naujan: The resolutions authorizing the original lease contract, reducing the lease
done without the authority of law. rentals and renewing the lease are null and void for not having been passed in
accordance with law (no public bidding).
It cannot be inferred that the power of supervision of the Prez over local officials
does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the TC: Upheld the validity of the lease contract.
public service so requires.
ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 3 is null and void for revoking Resolution No. 222.
As to the cause, considering that the position of mayor of a chartered city may be
fairly compared in category and statute with that of a provincial governor, we are of HELD: No.
the opinion that the former, by analogy, may also be amenable to suspension and
removal for the same causes as the latter, which causes, under Sec. 2078 of the RATIO:
Admin Code, are: Disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression, and misconduct in office. Sec. 2323 of the RAC: Requires that when the exclusive privilege of fishery is ranted
to a private party, the same shall be given to the highest bidder.
Considering the allegations in the complaint to the effect that petitioner took
advantage of his public post as mayor in committing acts of violence and The requirement of competitive bidding is for the purpose of inviting competition
intimidation upon respondent to stop his radio program, the SC held that the acts and to guard against favoritism, fraud, and corruption. The original lease contract in
constitute misconduct in office for which he may be ordered investigated by the this case was awarded to the highest bidder, but the reduction of the rental and the
President within the meaning of the law. extension of the term of the lease have been granted without a prior public bidding.
Statutes requiring public bidding apply to amendments of any contract already

XI. MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS executed in compliance with the law where such amendments alter the original
contract in some vital and essential particular.
XII. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
Since the period in a lease is a vital and essential particular to the contract, its
extension, which was granted without the requisite public bidding, is not in
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render
accordance with law.
aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace
officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be
It is not an impairment of the obligation of contract since the constitutional
subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be
provision on impairment refers only to contracts legally executed. Legally speaking,
independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall
there is no contract abrogated since the extension contract is void and inexistent.
suffice to support such action.
Public biddings are held for the best protection of the public and to give the public
the best possible advantages by means of open competition between bidders.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if

The reduction of the rentals by 20% of the original price is also null and void since it
is a substantial alteration of the contract, making it a distinct and different lease SC: Indicated that a remedy existed in Sec. 608 of the Code.
contract which requires the prescribed formality of a public bidding.
Rivera: Filed this action in his personal capacity pursuant to said provision.
Rivera v. Municipality of Malolos
Trial Court: Dismissed it stating that since in the previous case, the contract was
FACTS: declared null and void by the SC, it cannot produce any legal effect for which
August 1949: Municipality of Malolos called for bids for the supply of road thereafter no recovery can be made.
construction materials to repair the roads of the municipality.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal was proper and WON Maclang can be held liable in his
Rivera’s bid was the lowest. The acting municipal treasurer informed Rivera that personal capacity for the liability to Rivera.
the contract had been awarded to him.
HELD: No. Yes.
It was stipulated that for the sum of P19,235 the petitioner was to furnish and
deliver 2,700 cubic meters of adobe stone and 1,400 cubic meters of gravel. Rivera RATIO:
complied with this. This action is against defendantappellee in his personal capacity based on Sec. 608
of the RAC: A purported contract entered into contrary to the requirements of the
Rivera was not paid so he requested that the sum be included in the appropriations next preceding section hereof shall be wholly void, and the officer assuming to make
for the incoming year 195051 since the fiscal year 194950 had already expired. such contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for any
consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly
Municipal Treasurer: Informed the petitioner that the Council agreed to put said between private parties.
amount as standing obligation of the municipality authorizing payment and
authorizing the Treasurer to pay as soon as funds are available. The liability of Maclang is personal, as if the transaction had been entered into by
him as a private party. The intention of the law in this case is to ensure that public
16 October 1951: Council passed Resolution No. 68 ratifying the bidding called by officers entering into transactions with private individuals calling for the
the treasurer for the supply of construction materials. expenditure of public funds observe a high degree of caution so that the government
may not be the victim of illadvised or improvident action by those assuming to
14 August 1955: Deputy Auditor General denied the petitioner’s claim on the ground represent it.
that there was no sum of money appropriated to meet the obligation incurred before
the execution of the contract, as required by Sec. 607 of the RAC, and that the
contract is void; and that even if a sum was appropriated, the alleged deliveries Palafox, et al v. Province of Ilocos Norte
could no longer be verified by the Provincial Auditor of Bulacan or his
representative. FACTS:
Sabas Torralba was employed as driver of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte
Rivera: Cited Sec. 2165: Municipalities… endowed with faculties of municipal detailed to the office of the District Engineer.
corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal governments
in conformity with law. It shall be competent for them… to contract and be 30 September 1948: While driving his truck in compliance with his duties, he ran
contracted with…” over Proceto Palafox, father of appellants, killing him in the process.
ISSUE: WON the Auditor General validly denied the claim of the petitioner. He was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence.
HELD: YES. Having reserved the right to file a civil action, the heirs later began this proceeding
against the employer province, the District Engineer, the Provincial Treasurer,a nd
RATIO: Torralba.
Sec. 7 Par. 2 of the RAC: Requires that before a contract involving the expenditure
of P2,000 or more may be entered into or authorized, the municipal treasurer must ISSUE: WON the province can be made to pay monetary compensation for an injury
certify to the officer entering into such contract that funds have been duly caused by its employee in the performance of his regular function involving
appropriated for such purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed governmental activities.
contract is available for expenditures on account thereof, and a contract entered into
contrary to these requirements is void. HELD: No.
Sec. 584A of RAC: The provincial auditor or his representative must check up the RATIO:
deliveries made by a contractor pursuant to a contract lawfully and validly entered 1903 Civil Code: To attach liability to the State for the negligence of Torralba, a
into and where there is no check up to show actual delivery, the Auditor General is declaration must be made that he was a special agent and not one upon whom
not duty bound to pass and allow in audit the sum claimed by a contractor. properly devolved the duty of driving the truck on that occasion.
The Motor Vehicle Law invoked by Rivera merely allocates 10% of the money Merrit v. Government of the Philippines: This ruling may not be made since the
collected under its provisions to the road and bridge funds of the different driver was not a special agent of the Government.
municipalities in proportion to the population, as shown in the last available census,
for the repair, maintenance, and construction of municipal roads. This alone is not The principle applies to the Insular, as distinguished from the provincial or
sufficient appropriation and authority to disburse part of the percentage collected municipal governments.
under the law for the purpose of paying the petitioner’s claim.
If the negligent employee was engaged in the performance of governmental duties,
Rivera v. Maclang as distinguished from corporate functions, the government is not liable.
FACTS: The construction of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of
19 August 1949: Malolos called for bids for furnishing and delivering materials to be the accident are admittedly governmental activities.
used in the maintenance and repair of barrio roads.
Appellant won in the bidding and the contract was signed by the appellant and by Mendoza v. De Leon
defendantappellee Carlos Maclang in his capacity as Municipal Mayor. Rivera
delivered gravel and adobe stones valued at P19,235. FACTS:
The Municipal Council of Villasis Pangasinan revoked the lease of an exclusive ferry
16 October 1951: Council of Malolos passed a resolution approving the contract. The privilege awarded to the plaintiff under the provisions of Act No. 1634 of the
price was not paid. Philippine Commission.
Rivera asked for the help of the Presidential Complaint and Action Commission The plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and in pursuance of a resolution adopted by
which referred it to the General Auditing Office. The office turned down the claim. the defendants in this case, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another
person.
GAO: Contract was void since no money had been appropriated to meet the
obligation prior to the execution of the contract as required by Sec. 607 of the RAC. Mendoza filed an action for damages against the individual members of the council.

The test of liability of the municipality for torts depends on whether or not the
ISSUE: WON the council members can be held personally liable for the damages driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or
suffered by the lessee. proprietary functions.
HELD: Yes. Under the evidence of record, that there is no manner of doubt that this Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity: They exercise the right springing
pretext was absolutely without foundation and as there was therefore no occasion from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto,
whatever for rescinding the contract, the defendant councilors are liable personally their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity,
for the damages suffered by Mendoza. though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries
performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of
RATIO: the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or
The Municipal Code confers both governmental and corporate powers upon corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public
municipal corporations. For the exercise of the former, it is not liable to private agencies. Driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his
persons. Its liability to them for the wrongful exercise of the latter is the same as way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San
that of a private corporation or individual. Fernando's municipal streets."
Officers and agents of MCs charged with the performance of governmental duties
which are in their nature legislative, judicial, or quasijudicial, are not liable for Palafox, et. al. v. Province of Ilocos Norte: "the construction or maintenance of roads
consequences of their official acts unless it can be shown that they acted willfully in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly
and maliciously, with the express purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff. governmental activities."
Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee,
The officers of municipalities charged with the administration of patrimonial who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.
property are liable for mismanagement of its affairs as are directors or managing
officers of private corporations, not for mere mistakes of judgment, but only when
Fernando et al v. Court of Appeals and City of Davao
their acts are so far opposed to the true interest of the municipality as to lead to the
clear inference that no one thus acting could have been influenced by any honest
FACTS:
desire to secure such interests.
7 November 1975: Bibiano Morta: Market master of the Agdao Public Market, filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer’s Office for the
The defendant councilors regularly leased an exclusive ferry privilege to the plaintiff
reemptying of the septic tank in Agdao.
for two years. After continuous user of a little more than one year, they forcible
evicted him on the pretext that he was not operating the ferry leased to him.
An invitation to bid was issued to several parties and Bascon won in the bidding.
22 November 1975: Bidder Bertulano, with 4 other companions, were found dead
inside the septic tank.
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme
City Engineer: Investigated and found that the victims entered the tank without
clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. The
FACTS: tank was found empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did the re
16 December 1965: A passenger jeep driven by Barnardo Balagot and owned by the emptying.
Estate of Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Manandeg and owned by
Velasquez and a dump truck of the municipality, driven by Bislig collided. The cause of death was asphyxia caused by the diminution of oxygen in the body
Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. below normal conditions. The lungs of the victims burst due to their intake of toxic
died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4) others suffered varying sulfide gas produced from the waste in the tank.
degrees of physical injuries. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court by ordering the City of Davao to pay
damages. The CA reversed itself upon a motion for reconsideration.
11 December 1966: Compliant for damages was filed by the pvt respondents against
ISSUE: WON Davao City is guilty of negligence in this case and if so, WON that
the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, negligence is the proximate cause of the deaths of the victims.
respectively, of the passenger jeepney. The defendants filed a Third Party Complaint
HELD: No.
against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.
RATIO:
By virtue of a court order, the private respondents amended the complaint wherein Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
time as defendants. demanded, whereby such other person suffers injury.
Municipality: Alleged lack of cause of action, nonsuability of the State, prescription
2176: A person who by his omission causes damage to another, there being
of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a
ISSUE: WON the respondent court validly found the municipality liable for the
claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He
quasidelict committed by its employee.
must prove under 2179 that the defendant’s negligence was the immediate and
HELD: NO.
proximate cause of his injury. While it may be true that the city was remiss in its
duty to reempty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing one.
RATIO:
Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to clean the
The judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its
tank, the city immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service.
judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of nonsuability of the State
in the guise of the municipality. The doctrine of nonsuability of the State is
The absence of any accident was due to the compliance of the city with the sanitary
expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State
and plumbing specifications in constructing the toilet and the septic tank. Hence,
may not be sued without its consent."
the toxic gases from the waste matter could not have leaked out because it was air
Consent takes the form of express or implied consent. Express consent may be tight.
embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the government
enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the
contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public.
counterclaim.
An accident such as toxic gas leakage from the tank is unlikely to happen unless one
removes its covers. The accident occurred because the victims on their own and
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the
without authority from the city opened the tank. The failure of Mr. Bertulano to
State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy
exercise prudence was the proximate cause of the accident.
the sovereign immunity from suit. Suability depends on the consent of the state to
be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance
When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring
that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care
can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
and sill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.

The accident which befell the victims who are not in any way connected with the existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, as long as they performed their
winning bidder happened before the award could be given. Considering that there duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.
was yet no award and order to commence work on the tank, the duty of the market
master or his security guards to supervise the work could not have started. With respect to proprietary functions, a municipal corporation can be held liable to
third persons ex contractu or ex delicto.
The surreptitious way in which the victims did their job without clearance from the
market master or any of the guards goes against their good faith. Sec. 2282 of the Admin Code simply authorizes the municipality to celebrate a
yearly fiesta but it does not impose a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta for
Tuzon and Mapagu v. Court of Appeals whatever purpose is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and
not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a state policy.
FACTS:
14 March 1977: SB of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, adopted Resolution No. 9. It The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but
provided for the compulsory donation of 1% of the palay threshed by the operators to merely to provide entertainment is not a conclusive test.
finance the construction of a Sports and Nutrition Center.
The basic element is that it is governmental in essence. Under the doctrine of
Private respondent Saturnino Jurado did not comply with it so the mayor refused to respondent superior, the municipality is to be held liable for damages for the death
give him a license to operate. of Fontanilla if that was attributable to the negligence 17 of the officers of the
municipality.
Jurado: Mayor and treasurer liable! Art. 27: Any person suffering material or moral
loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to CA: Found and held that there was negligence. Only P100 was appropriated for the
perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the two stages and the posts and braces were only made of bamboo.
latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be
taken. The performance was a donation offered by the respondents, and that when the
Municipality accepted it, the participants in the stage show had the right to expect
ISSUE: WON the petitioners are liable in damages to the private respondent from that the Municipality, through its “Committee” would build a stage strong enough to
having withheld the mayor’s permit and license due to his refusal to comply with support the performance. The Councilors did not directly participate in the
Resolution No. 9. construction of the stage so they could not be held liable.
HELD: No. Teotico v. City of Manila

RATIO: FACTS:
The purpose of Art. 27 is to end the bribery system. Official inaction may be due to 27 January 1958: While attempting to board a jeepney, Genaro Teotico fell inside an
plain indolence or a cynical indifference to the responsibilities of public service. uncovered manhole on P. Burgos Ave. His left eye got injured, he suffered
contusions, abrasions, and allergic reactions (due to the antitetanus shot) because
The provision presupposes that the refusal or omission of a public official to perform of the accident.
his official duty is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. The erring public
officer is justly punishable under this article for whatever loss or damage the He filed a case against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health
complainant has sustained. officer, city treasure, and chief of police.
In this case, it has not even been alleged that Mayor Tuzon’s refusal to act on the Manila: Sec. 4 of RA 409 applies, stating that the City shall not be liable for
respondent’s application was an attempt to compel him to resort to bribery. It damages to persons arising form the failure of its officers to enforce the provisions of
cannot be said that the mayor and the treasurer were motivated by personal spite or any law, or from their negligence while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
were grossly negligent in refusing to issue the permit to Jurado. provisions.
The respondents were not singled out and the resolution was uniformly applied to ISSUE: WON the city of Manila can be held liable for the injuries of Mr. Teotico.
all the threshers in the municipality. The petitioners acted within the scope of their
authority and in consonance with their honest interpretation of the resolution. In HELD: Yes.
the absence of any judicial decision declaring the resolution invalid, its legality
would have to be presumed. RATIO:
2189: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death
The respondent could have taken the prudent course of signing the agreement under of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of roads,
protest and later challenging it in court to relive him of his obligation to “donate.” streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control and
supervision.
Torio v. Fontanilla
The Civil Code and not the Charter of Manila applies in this case. It is true that
FACTS: insofar as territorial application is concerned, the Charter is a special law. However,
21 October 1958: Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution as regards the subject matter of the provisions, the Civil Code constitutes a
No. 159: It resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta. Resolution No. 182 particular prescription. Sec. 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general,
was also passed creating the Town Fiesta Executive Committee. regardless of the object thereof. 2189 governs liability due to “defective streets” in
particular.
It organized a subcommittee on entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as
chairman. P100 was appropriated for the construction of 2 stages: for the zarzuela The Article requires that the province, city, or municipality have either “control or
and the cancionan. Macaraeg supervised the construction of the stage. supervision” over the street. The authority of Manila over the streets has neither
been withdrawn nor restricted by any law.
The zarzuela entitled Midas Extravaganza was donated by an association of
Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan. Fontanilla, one The determination of whether or not P. Burgos Ave. is under the control or
of the performers, died because the stage collapsed and he got pinned underneath. supervision of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection
with its maintenance, is a question of fact which was resolved by the CA in the
Municipality: It performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was affirmative. It is not subject to the review of the SC.
an exercise of its governmental functions for which no liability can arise to answer
for the negligence of its agents.
Abella v. Municipality of Naga
ISSUE: Whether the celebration of a town fiesta is an exercise of a municipality’s
governmental or public function or one of a proprietary character. FACTS:
HELD: Proprietary.
17
RATIO: 2176: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done; 2180: The obligation
duty, no recovery, as a rule, can be had from the municipality unless there is an imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omission,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Naga ordered the closing of a part of a municipal street which ran between the Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals
public market and the plaintiff’s property, and used the closed thoroughfare to
expand the market. FACTS:
20 May 1986: Action for eminent domain was filed by the City of Makati against the
Several kinds of constructions were allowed by the municipality along the sidewalk properties of Admiral Finance, Home Bldg System, and Arceli Jo. The appraised
of the plaintiff’s property depriving the plaintiff’s property of access to P. Prieto value of the property was P5.3M.
Street, retarding her reconstructions.
Private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. This was issued
The CFI of Camarines Sur sentenced the City of Naga to pay the appellee P300 and a notice of garnishment was served upon the manager of PNB Buendia branch.
damages resulting from the closing of a municipal street. However, the sheriff was told that a hold code was placed on the account.
Naga: We acted thru our police power and it was “prompted to preserve the peace Makati: Garnishment must be lifted! The manner of payment in expropriation

and good order of the community and the general welfare.” proceedings should be done in installments.
ISSUE: WON the City can be held liable for damages resulting from the closure of a The Municipality later discovered that PS Bank consolidated its ownership over the
municipal street. property as mortgagee/ purchaser. PSB and private respondent entered into a
compromise agreement where they agreed to divide the compensation due from the
HELD: YES. expropriation proceedings.
RATIO: Trial Court: Approved the compromise and ordered the release of the balance of the
The City was not charged with any unlawful act, or with acting without authority. appraised value of the property.
Makati: On appeal, alleged that it has two accounts with the PNB: One for the
The basis of the lower court’s decision is Sec. 2246 of the RAC which provides that expropriation of the property, another for statutory obligations and other purposes.
no municipal road or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any
person prejudiced thereby. ISSUE: WON the funds in the second account can be the subject of execution.
That Concepcion Abella was economically damaged, the stipulation of facts admits, HELD: NO.
and that the indemnity assessed is within the bounds of the damages suffered, there
is no dispute. RATIO:
The funds deposited in the second PNB account are public funds and the settled rule
The damages seem to be nominal judged by the description of the plaintiff’s interests is that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided
adversely affected by the conversion of P. Prieto Street into a market. for by statue.
Absent a showing that the MC of Makati passed an ordinance appropriating from its
Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due, less the sum of P99T
deposited in the first account, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the
FACTS: second account.
The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo for P42,966.40, being the
purchase price of two strips of land which the council appropriated for widening the Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of
street. a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of
mandamus to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation
CFI of Iloilo: Municipality must pay the amount. ordinance and its corresponding disbursement.
Iloilo was unable to pay due to lack of funds. Tan Toco had a writ of execution issued In this case, the RTC decision is not disputed by Makati. For 3 years now, the city
against the property of the municipality. The sheriff attached two auto trucks used enjoyed possession and use of the property notwithstanding its failure to comply
for street sprinkling, one police patrol car, the police stations on Mabini Street, and with its legal obligation to pay just compensation.
in Molo and Mandurriao, and the concrete structures and lots used by several
markets.
Pasay City Government v. CFI of Manila
The provincial fiscal filed a motion praying that the attachment be dissolved (this
was granted). FACTS:
12 August 1964: VD Isip, Sons and Associates entered into a contract 18 for the
ISSUE: WON municipal properties are exempt from execution. construction of a new city hall with Pasay City represented by Mayor Cuneta.
HELD: YES. The contractor proceeded with the construction. It spent P1.7M for the initial stages
of the work, out of the total contract price of P4.9M. Pasay only paid P1.1 for this
RATIO: initial stage, leaving P613T immediately due.
2165 AC: Municipalities are political bodies corporate, and as such are endowed
with the faculties of municipal corporations, to be exercised by and through their 16 May 1968: Contractor sued for specific performance with damages.
respective municipal government in conformity with law. It shall be competent for
them… to sue and be sued, to contract and be contracted with…” 25 February 1969: Municipal Board of Pasay enacted Ordinance No. 1012 which
approved the Compromise Agreement19 and authorized then Mayor Claudio to
The AC does not specify the kind of property that a municipality can acquire. represent the city. Pasay still failed to pay.
343 Civil Code: Divides the property of provinces and towns into those for public use 9 July 1969: An application for and notice of garnishment were made upon the funds
and patrimonial property. Provincial roads and footpath, squares, streets, of the Pasay City Government with the PNB.
fountains, and public waters, drives and public improvements of general benefit
built at the expense of the said towns, are property for public use. Pasay: It’s premature, the 90day stipulation has not yet expired; the obligations
were reciprocal, the contractor has not yet set up a new performance bond; and
All other property possessed by said MCs is patrimonial and shall be subject to the Sheriff can’t garnish trust funds of the city.
provisions of the Civil Code.
It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a municipality, needed for 18
governmental purposes, may not be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment The contractor shall advance the needed amount for each stage, to be
against the municipality. The reason for this is the character of the public use to reimbursed by the city before the contractor proceeds to the next stage. The city
which such kind of property is devoted. shall also reimburse the contractor for the cost of the work completed as
estimated by the city engineer for each stage before proceeding to the nest.
The necessity for government service justifies that the property of public use of the 19
The contractor shall submit and file a new performance bond in proportion to
municipality be exempt from execution. the remaining value of the unfinished work. The contractor shall finish the
building within 1 year from the approval of the agreement. That Pasay City shall
remit the amount advanced by the contractor.
TC: Contractor complied substantially, garnishment must proceed. from patrimonial properties, for instance, it has been held that shares of stock held
by a municipal corporation are subject to execution.
ISSUE: WON the PNB account can be garnished to pay for the remaining debt of
the city. The fishery or municipal waters of the town are not subject to execution.
They do not belong to the municipality. They are property of the State. What Paoay
HELD: YES. holds is merely a usufruct or the right to use said municipal waters, granted to it by
section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code.
RATIO:
2028: A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It is based merely on a grant, more or less temporary, made by the
Legislature. The Legislature, for reasons it may deem valid or as a matter of public
A compromise agreement not contrary to law, public order, public policy… is a valid policy, may, at any time, repeal or modify said section 2321 and revoke this grant to
contract. coastal towns and open these marine waters to the public. Or the Legislature may
grant the usufruct or right of fishery to the provinces concerned so that said
2041:One of the parties to a compromise has two options:1.Enforce it; 2. provinces may operate or administer them by leasing them to private parties.
Rescind/insist on original demand
All this only goes to prove that the municipality of Paoay is not holding
It is true that all government funds deposited with the PNB by any agency of the this usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent or absolute manner so as to enable it
government remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or to dispose of it or to allow it to be taken away from it as its property through
levy. However, since an ordinance has already been enacted expressly appropriating execution.
the amount of P613T, then this case is covered by the exception.
Another reason for this prohibition is that the buyer would only buy the
Having established that the compromise agreement was final and executory, the rights of the municipality. All that he can do is rent out to private individuals the
Court was in error when it still entertained the supplemental complaint filed by the fishery rights over the lots after public bidding. This, he must do since that is the
respondentappellee for by then the Court no longer had jurisdiction over the subject only right granted by the legislature. It is anomalous since a private individual
matter. would be forced to conduct a public bidding. It will also deprive Paoay of income.
The right or usufruct of the town of Paoay over its municipal waters,
The parties to the compromise contemplated a divisible obligation needing a particularly, the forty odd fishery lots included in the attachment by the Sheriff, is
performance bond in proportion to the uncompleted work. The city was initially not subject to execution.
content with a mere 5% bond, it is strange for it to suddenly demand a 20% bond.
But we hold that the revenue or income coming from the renting of these
The premium of the bond will be sizeable and will eat up the contractor’s profits.
fishery lots is certainly subject to execution. It may be profitable, if not necessary, to
The submission of the bond was not a condition precedent to the payment to the
distinguish this kind of revenue from that derived from taxes, municipal licenses
plaintiff. The P613T has already been collected through execution and garnishment
and market fees are provided for and imposed by the law, they are intended
and the contractor already finished some stages of the construction. The argument
primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities
that it is reciprocal is already moot.
and functions of municipal corporations. In fact, the real estate taxes collected by a
municipality do not all go to it.
Municipality of Paoay v. Manaois
In conclusion, we hold that the fishery lots numbering about forty in the
FACTS: municipality of Paoay, mentioned at the beginning of this decision are not subject to
Manaois obtained a judgment against the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte and a execution. However, the amount of P1,712.01 in the municipal treasury of Paoay
writ of execution against the defendant municipality was issued. representing the rental paid by Demetrio Tabije on fishery lots let out by the
municipality of Paoay is a proper subject of levy, and the attachment made thereon
The Sheriff attached and levied upon the following: (1) P1,712.01 in the Municipal
by the Sheriff is valid.
Treasury representing the rental paid by Mr. Demetrio Tabije of a fishery lot
belonging to the defendant municipality;"(2) About forty fishery lots leased to thirty
five different persons by the Municipality."
26 July 1949: Municipality filed a petition asking for the dissolution of that
attachment or levy of the properties abovementioned arguing that they are for
public use.
1938: The municipal council of Paoay approved a resolution confiscating said six

fishery lots on the ground that a certain Duque failed to comply with the terms of
the lease contract. Municipality awarded the lease of the same lots to Manaois, him
being the highest bidder.
Manaois paid P2,025 as rental for the said lots for the year 1939. However, when
Manaois and his men tried to enter the property in order to exercise his right as
lessee and to catch fish, particularly bañgos fry, he found therein Duque and his
men who claimed that he (Duque) was still the lessee, and despite the appeal of
Manaois to the Municipality of Paoay to put him in possession and the efforts of the
municipality to oust Duque, the latter succeeded in continuing in his possession and
keeping Manaois and his men out. Manaois brought an action against the
Municipality of Paoay to recover not only the sum paid by him for the lease of the
fishery lots but also damages.
ISSUE: WON the properties in this case can be subject to attachment and levy.
HELD: Not all of them.
RATIO:
Properties for public use held by municipal corporations are not subject
to levy and execution. The reason behind this exemption extended to properties for
public use, and public municipal revenues is that they are held in trust for the
people.
If it is patrimonial and which is held by a municipality in its proprietary
capacity, it is treated as the private asset of the town and may be levied upon and
sold under an ordinary execution. The same rule applies to municipal funds derived

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REVIEWER ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT agent, where the sovereign gets changed, the city, as agent of the State, could no

RATIO: A municipal corporation has two powers: Governmental and Private.

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II. Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took ISSUE: WON a reclassification of a city from an independent component city to a

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use shall be temporary.

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Homeowner’s Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of If it was the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by

FACTS: 21 Dec 1963: City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 4841. 9 Circular No. 22 issued by C.J. Fernando: Implementation of the Katarungang

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FACTS: John Wingarts and Ophelia Wingarts filed three letter complaints against FACTS: Atty. Salomon of the Bonifacio Law Office charged Judge Bellosillo of the

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Muñez filed a complaint against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and usurpation There must be proof of willful misrepresentation and deliberate intent to make a

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RATIO: Sec. 12 Art. X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly

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The COMELEC in this case did not make any definite finding on WON, in fact, Petitioner’s conviction of fencing which is a crime of moral turpitude subsists and

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Petitioner’s right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint

Absent any determination of irregularity in election returns, as well as an order The power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged

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Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National

Local Governments are subject to legislative control. This is limited by the

ISSUE: WON RA 1383 is constitutional in vesting in NAWASA ownership of the RA 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its

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In the opinion of judicial authorities, there is nothing “inherently

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Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of

Ganzon may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no logner be suspended The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special

Statutes requiring public bidding apply to amendments of any contract already

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Naga: We acted thru our police power and it was “prompted to preserve the peace Makati: Garnishment must be lifted! The manner of payment in expropriation

1938: The municipal council of Paoay approved a resolution confiscating said six

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