First Batch Molave Vs Judge Laron SMC Vs NLRC DY Vs NLRC and PEPSI COLA Vs Martinez

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Batong Buhay Goldmines Inc vs De la Serna , G.R. No.

86963

FACTS:

5 February 1987 - Elsie Rosalinda B. Ty, Antonia L. Mendelebar, Ma. Concepcion O.

Reyes and 1,247 others filed a complaint against Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. for:

1. Non-payment of their basic pay and allowances for the period of 6 July 1983 to 5

July 1984, inclusive, under Wage Order No. 2

2. Non-payment of their basic pay and allowances for the period 16 June 1984 to 5

October 1986, inclusive under Wage Order No. 5

3. Non-payment of their salaries for the period 16 March 1986 to the present

4. Non-payment of their 13th month pay for 1985, 1986 and 1987

5. Non-payment of their vacation and sick leave, and the compensatory leaves of

mine site employees

6. Non-payment of the salaries of employees who were placed on forced leaves

since November, 1985 to the present, if this is not feasible, the affected

employees be awarded corresponding separation pay.

On 27 February 1987, the complainants filed a Motion for the issuance of an inspection

authority.

On 13 July 1987, the Labor Standards and Welfare Officers submitted their report

recommending that an Order of Compliance be issued directing respondent Batong

Buhay Gold Mines Inc. to pay complainants' Elsie Rosalina Ty, et al. (P4,818,746.40) by

way of unpaid salaries of workers from March 16, 1987 to present, unpaid and ECOLA

differentials under Wage Order Nos. 2 and 5 unpaid 13th months pay for 1985 and

1986, and unpaid (sic) vacation/sick/compensatory leave benefits. And on 31 July 1987,

the Regional Director1

adopted the recommendation of the LSWOs and issued an order


directing the respondent to pay the complainants of the said amount

On 31 July 1987, the Regional Director1

adopted the recommendation of the LSWOs and

issued an order directing the respondent to pay the complainants

When the respondent failed to post a cash/surety bond, and upon motion for the

issuance of a writ of execution by the complainants, the Regional Director, on 14

September 1987 issued a writ of execution appointing Mr. John Espiridion C. Ramos as

Special Sheriff and directing him to collect the amount, otherwise he has to execute this

writ by attaching the goods and chattels of BBGMI and not exempt from execution or in

case of insufficiency thereof against the real or immovable property of the respondent.

The Special Sheriff proceeded to execute the appealed Order on 17 September 1987

and seized three (3) units of Peterbuilt trucks and then sold the same by public auction.

Various materials and motor vehicles were also seized on different dates and sold at

public auction by said sheriff.

BBGMI appealed the Order dated July 31, 1987 of Regional Director Luna C. Piezas to

respondent Undersecretary Dionisio de la Serna, contending that the Regional Director

had no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether Regional Director has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the employees of

BBGMI.

HELD:

The Regional Director has jurisdiction over the BBGMI employees who are the complainants.

The subject labor standards case of the petition arose from the visitorial and enforcement

powers by the Regional Director of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Labor

standards refers to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules and

regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and
welfare benefits, including occupational, safety and health standards.4

Labor standards cases

are governed by Article 128(b) of the Labor Code.

Art. 128 (b) Visitorial and enforcement powers —

(b) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the

power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with

the labor standards provisions of this Code based on the findings of labor

regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of

inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the

enforcement of their order, except in cases where the employer contests the

findings of the labor regulations officers and raises issues which cannot be

resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the

ordinary course of inspection.

Respondent Undersecretary Dionisio C. Dela Serna, on the other hand, upheld the jurisdiction

of Regional Director Luna C. Piezas by relying on E.O. 111, to quote:

Considering therefore that there still exists an employer-employee relationship between

the parties; that the case involves violations of the labor standard provisions of the

labor code; that the issues therein could be resolved without considering evidentiary

matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection; and, if only to give

meaning and not render nugatory and meaningless the visitorial and enforcement

powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment as provided by Article 128(b) of the

Labor Code, as amended by Section 2 of Executive Order No. 111 which states:

The provisions of article 217 of this code to the contrary notwithstanding and in

cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Minister of

Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative shall have the
power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with

the labor standards provision of this Code based on the findings of the findings

of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of

inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the

enforcement of their order, except in cases where the employer contests the

findings of the labor regulations officers and raises issues which cannot be

resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the

ordinary course of inspection.

We agree with the complainants that the regional office a quo has jurisdiction to hear and

decide the instant labor standard case.

The Court in reinforcing its conclusion that Regional Director has jurisdiction over labor

standards cases, treated E.O. 111 as a curative statute, ruling as follows:

E.O. No. 111 was issued on December 24, 1986 or three (3) months after the promulgation of

the Secretary of Labor's decision upholding private respondents' salary differentials and ECOLAs

on September 24, 1986. The amendment of the visitorial and enforcement powers of the

Regional Director (Article 128(b)) by said E.O. 111 reflects the intention enunciated in Policy

Instructions Nos. 6 and 37 to empower the Regional Directors to resolve uncontested money

claims in cases where an employer-employee relationship still exists. This intention must be

given weight and entitled to great respect

Republic Act 7730, the law governing the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Labor

Secretary and his representatives reads:

Art. 128 (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the

contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the

Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have

the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of
this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and

enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection.

The Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall issue writs of execution to the

appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the

employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and

raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course

of inspection.

The present law, RA 7730, can be considered a curative statute to reinforce the conclusion that

the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the present labor standards case. Well-settled is the

rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force when the action

was commenced, unless a subsequent statute provides for its retroactive application, as when

it is a curative legislation.

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