After the Individual in Society: Lessons on Collectivity from Science, Technology and Society

Author(s): Michel Callon and John Law

Source: The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 22, No. 2
(Spring, 1997), pp. 165-182
Published by: Canadian Journal of Sociology
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After the Individualin Society: Lessons on
Collectivity from Science, Technology and
Society'

Michel Callon and John Law

Abstract.Les sciences sociales ont invent6toute une s6rie de conceptspoursurmonterl'opposition

entre action individuelle et collective. Un des apports de l'anthropologie des sciences et des
techniques (AST) est de montrerque cette opposition ne constitue qu'une des configurations
construitespar l'action et sa distribution.Pourrestituerla diversit6de ces configurationsI'AST a
6labor6quatreprincipes.Le premieraffirmele caractereh6t6rogenedu social. Le deuxiemeconduit
a consid6rerque toute entit6 est une rdalite assimilable au r6seau des el6ments h6t6rogenes.Le
troisieme affirmeque les entites sont a g6om6trievariableet qu'elles reoriententl'action dans des
directionsimpr6visibles.Le quatriemeproposeque tout arrangementsocial stabilis6est a la fois un
point (un individu) et un r6seau (un collectif). L'analyse sociologique, si elle veut surmonter
l'opposition entre individualisme et holisme, doit donc se donner pour objet l'6tude de ces
diff6rentesconfigurationshybrides.

Resume. The social sciences have devised a series of strategiesin orderto overcome the division
betweenindividualandcollective action.However,science,technologyandsociety (STS) has shown
that this distinction is only one possible configurationfor action and its distribution.In orderto
investigate other possible configurations, STS proposes four principles: that the social is
heterogeneous in character;that all entities are networks of heterogeneouselements; that these
networksare both variablein geometryand in principleunpredictable;and thatevery stable social
arrangementis simultaneouslya point (an individual)and a network(a collective). If sociological
analysis is to overcome the individualism/holismdivision it should attendto the range of hybrid
configurations.

1. We are gratefulto the following friendsand colleagues for theircontributionto the arguments
in thispaper:MadeleineAkrich,Geoff Bowker,Bob Cooper,TakashiHarada,AntoineHennion,
BrunoLatour,AnnemarieMol, RollandMunro,Leigh Starand MarilynStrathem.

CanadianJournalof Sociology/Cahierscanadiens de sociologie 22(2) 1997 165

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166 CanadianJoumal of Sociology

"Forattheintersection of allthesefieldswe sensethatthesamebasicmessageis beingconveyed

- a messagethatseemsindeedoverthecourseof thecenturies to havealmostattainedthestatus
of an acceptedtruth.Thisis theassertionthatreality- all reality- canbe conceivedof as a
constructionthatoneshouldbeableto leanon,andassomething thatmustbemanipulated. Artsand
wisdom,as theChineseconceivedof them,shouldbe devotedto thestrategic exploitationof the
propensityinherentin reality;theyshouldbedesignedso asto causea maximaleffect."(Fran,ois
Jullien,LaPropension desChoses,Paris:Seuil,1992,page15)

Introduction
Manyculturesmanageperfectlywell withoutit. Forinstance,thoseof thePapua
New GuineaHighlands(Strathern1991) - or, perhapsless exotically,thatof
the Japanese.Indeed,the very translationof Euro-Americansocial thoughtinto
Japaneseis extraordinarily difficult.Forthe whole idea of the "individual"and
"society"is foreignto Japaneseculture.Thereis a fascinatingstoryto be retold
about the conversion of these terms into Japaneseneologisms - the ugly
neologisms needed to importEuro-Americansocial science and its problems
into Japan.And anotherequallyinterestingstoryto be toldof teachingaboutthe
distinctionbetweenthe individualandsocietyto eighteen-yearolds in Japanese
universities- studentswho tendto come fromplaceswhichperformcontinui-
ties betweenthe collective andthe personal,ratherthandivisionsor dualisms.2
Are the Japanesedisadvantaged?Perhaps.Butperhapsnot.Formaybewhat
appearsto be a Japaneseproblemis reallyone of Euro-Americanmaking.And
one thatshouldbe treatedas a burden,indeedan unnecessaryburden.Such, at
any rate, is the thesis that we explore in this paper.That the Euro-American
distinctionbetweenthe individualandthe collective- currentsince at leastthe
Enlightenment,though no doubt preceding this by many centuries - is
unsatisfactory.And thatthe space createdby the division and the intellectual
games it generates are unnecessary, perhaps even sterile. For since the
Enlightenmentmanyof thestrugglesof Euro-American socialsciencehavebeen
abouthow the divisionmightbe bridged.Or,perhapsmorerecently,abouthow
it mightbe transcended.These arestrugglesthatrunthroughmanydisciplines.
Duesenberrycaughtan importanttruthwhenhe wrote:"Economicsis all about
how people make choices; sociology is all about how they don't have any
choices to make"(Duesenberry1960). So the social science games have been
those of bridge-building.In economics HerbertSimon's notion of bounded
rationalitywas an attemptto set homo economicuswithin a context of inter-
mediaryobjects such as proceduresand routines.And within sociology the
variousinterpretativesociologies have chippedaway at the high social ground

2. We aredeeplygratefulto TakashiHaradaof the KonanWomen'sUniversity, Osaka,for

thesequestions
exploring usthatthedivisionsanddualisms
withus,andgentlyreminding that
we assumein theeducated
Westareformsof provincialism
writlarge.

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 Lessonson Collectivity 167

occupied by such catch-allstructuralconcepts as normsor institutions,instead

arguingthatthe collective is endlessly performedin local interaction.
So disciplines such as economics and sociology have worked in the space
createdby the collective/individualdivide.Andtheyhavecreatedhybridobjects
which try to describe the simultaneousconstitutionof the collective and the
individual,conceptssuch as rules,conventions,tacitknowledgeandapprentice-
ship. But - or so we want to argue - such concepts simply displace the
problem.This is because, even afterthey aremobilised,the same questionsare
still there. Shifted. Re-formulated.Seemingly blunted.But still performinga
logic of dualism. For instance, are rules an emergent product of individual
strategiesor decisions?Ordo they exist independently,actingbothas a resource
and a constraint for agents? In such questions - questions which reflect
contemporarysocial theory- the old problemof the individualandsociety has
not gone away. Instead,it is the vocabularythathas shifted.The dialectic of the
subject and structurehas simply been displaced.
What, then, is to be done? No doubtthis questioncan be answeredin many
ways. For instance, the Japanesemight do well to ignore the dualismscreated
by Western social science. Perhapsthen, in due course, they could teach us
something of the benefits of a monistic social science. But in the meanwhile
perhapswe might make some efforts of our own. Indeed,the argumentof this
paperis that we alreadyhave a powerfulresourceat hand. This comes from a
sociology of science and technology which has abandonedthe individual/
collective dualism in recent work. For instead of asking about the origins of
action (a questionwhich usuallyleads to a version of Westerndualism)it asks,
instead,abouthow knowledgesor devices aredistributedor disseminated.And
this - at any rate in the way it has been practisedin partof the sociology of
science and technology - implies the end of greatdivides. Divisions between
humanand non-human,subjectand object, andagentand structure- all of the
dichotomies generally mobilized to explain the collective have disappeared
(Callon & Latour 1991, Latour 1987).
This, then, is an essay of explication and exploration.It explicates some
argumentsin the recent sociology of science and technology by using brief
descriptionsof exemplarycases studies. And it explores their implicationsfor
the collective/individualdualism.

1. The Heterogeneity of the Social

Stage one. The argumentis thatthe social is materiallyheterogeneous.This is
an argumentmade in many ways. But to make it we'll go to one of the myths
about the social life of primates.3This claims that primates in particular

3. For an analysis of the possible significance of these myths see Haraway(1989).

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168 Canadian
Journalof Sociology

baboons- drawonly on somaticresourceswhen they interactandcooperate.

And that when they are left (as the phraseputs it) to their own devices they
rarelymake tools. An implicationis this: if you want to be leader in baboon
society (a positiongenerallyoccupiedby big males)you cannotmobilizewalls,
rifles or social security numbers.You cannot send letters to your baboon
colleagues. You have no secretpolice. All you have is your own body. If you
want to be chief, you have to be there in person in orderto reproduceyour
authority.Dominationdependsentirelyon face to face confrontation.The use
of the body. Or, perhaps,the use of someone else's body.4This is Shirley
Strum'sargumentin hermagnificentstudyof baboonsociety:thatthe collective
is built by nakedbodies alone. No othermaterialsare involved.5Thereare no
texts or artifacts,and no money circulates.The social glue is somatic, and
somaticalone.6All of whichsuggeststhatmethodologicalindividualismworks
just fine in the society of monkeys that wanderabout on the high plains in
Kenya.But perhapsonly in the society of monkeys.For- this is the argument
- humansocieties aredifferent.They aremadeup of heterogeneousmaterials.
So this is the firstprincipleof the new sociology of science andtechnology:that
what we like to call "thesocial"is materiallyheterogeneous.
Of course everyone knows this. Everyone knows that societies involve
technologies, texts, buildings and money. But what to make of it? Often in
practicewe bracketoff non-humanmaterials,assumingtheyhavea statuswhich
differs from that of the human.So materialsbecome resourcesor constraints;
they are said to be passive;to be active only when they are mobilizedby flesh
and blood actors.But if the social is reallymateriallyheterogeneous,then this
asymmetrydoesn't work very well. Yes, there are differences between con-
versations,texts,techniquesandbodies.Of course.But why shouldwe startout
by assumingthatsome of these have no activerole to play in social dynamics?
The principleof materialheterogeneitysays that there is no reason to do so.
Insteadit says thatall theseelementsandmaterialsparticipatein social ordering.

2. Entitiesare Networksof HeterogeneousMaterials

Scientists and engineersare bricoleurs.They work by linking bits and pieces
together.Heterogeneousbits andpieces. Humanandnon-human.For instance,

4. The story tells that females frequentlyuse their baby's body as a shield to resist attackand
reversepowerpositions.This servesto dissuademales fromcontinuingtheiraggression; they
turnon theirheels.
5. See, for instanceStrum& Latour(1987).
6. This statementneedsto be somewhatqualified.As ShirleyStrumhas shown,the topographyof
the places where the baboonslive, and also the local flora and fauna,enter into in the social
organizationof these primates.

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 Lessonson Collectivity 169

they writeandrevise texts, modifyinstruments,andredefinesocial groups.They

practisewhat is sometimes called "heterogeneousengineering."7But pushedto
its conclusionthis claim has a profoundandcounter-intuitiveconsequence.This
is that there is no difference between the person and the networkof entities on
which it acts. Or (the real point) between the personand the networkof entities
which actsthroughthe person.Networkandperson:they areco-extensive. Such,
at any rate, is the argumentof the sociology of science.
For instance, work by Bruno Latourshows that Pasteurwas nothing more
thana networkof heterogeneouselements (Latour1988). This Pasteur-network
was made of a lot of bits and pieces: laboratories,domesticated strains of
bacteria,notebooks, statistics,and even - as GeraldGeison has treacherously
suggested - vaccines chemically treated by his colleague Joseph-Henri
Toussaint. And one could add many more: the farm at Pouilly le Fort where
sheep lived and died in infected fields; thejournalistswho witnessed Pasteur's
spectacularexperimenton the farm;the Frenchelectors Pasteursought to con-
vince; and so on, andso on. The argumentis thatPasteurwas not a single entity,
not just a body and a soul. Or ratherit is that he was much more than a body
who interactedwith otherbodies. That,instead,he was a combinationof a great
numberof differentelements which producedPasteur-the-great-researcher. So
the argumentis also that outside this networkPasteur-the-great-researcher did
not exist at all. To put it simply, Pasteurwas a network.
Let's press this counter-intuitivelogic one step further,and say thatit works
just as well for technical artifacts:for instance (anotherempiricalstory) for a
militaryaircraft.It was in 1955 thatthe BritishRoyal Air Force (RAF) decided
thatit needed a long rangetacticalstrikeandreconnaissanceaircraft(called the
TSR2) that could fly into EasternEuropeor defend the outposts of the British
empire.8It needed this new aircraftbecause the Russian"threat"had changed.
Now therewere anti-aircraftmissiles, butto escape these the aircraftwould have
to fly very high at Mach 2, andjust below the speed of soundat 500 feet or less.
And since sophisticatedairbases would be destroyedin a nuclearwar, it would
have to take off and land on shortairstrips.
The "threat"was a heterogeneousmixture:political, strategicandtechnical,
all of these were mixed up in it. But so too was the design of the aircraftitself.
This was a complex interactionbetween the laws of aerodynamics,the experi-
ence of teams of engineers,the capacityof Britishindustry,andso on and so on
- the list is endless. For instance, a shorttake-off run suggested the need for
powerful engines and long slenderwings. But againstthis, swept wings would
be best at high altitudesand high speeds, and short wings would work best at

7. See Law (1986b); for a reworkingof the notion of heterogeneitysee Law & Mol (1996).
8. For fuller details see Law & Callon (1992).

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 Journalof Sociology
170 Canadian

high speedsandlow altitudes.Whichmeansthatthe TSR2 was not (simply)an

aircraft.Like Pasteurit was a networkof heterogeneousrelationships.Or,more
precisely,it was a networkthattraceda compromisebetweendifferentconcerns,
considerationsandactors.Technicians,politicians,industrialists,differentkinds
of metal, metal fatigue, the productioncapacitiesof companies,wind-tunnels
andbudgetrestrictions,all of thesewerebuiltintotheTSR2networkandhelped
to give it shape.
People are networks.Devices are networks.But so, too, are texts:

DIVEMA... is a syntheticanionicpolyelectrolyte,which ... initiatesa wide varietyof physiological

responsesincludinginterferonproduction,macrophageactivationandtumorregression.... We have
tested DIVEMAin threedifferentmolecularweight rangesas a potentialmodifierof the pinocytic
uptakeof two substrates.(Law 1986a)

This is an extractfrom a scientific articlepublishedat the beginningof the

1980s. Thereis nothingremarkableaboutthis article- it is like thousandsof
others. We're interestedin it because it can be analysedin the same way as
Pasteuror the TSR2:like these,it is heterogeneous.Thusthesefew wordsdraw
on a webof technicians,instruments,rats,computerprintouts,fundingagencies,
commentsby colleagues, and otherscientific articles.They even drawon the
reader- she is writteninto the text whenthe authorstell herwhatDIVEMAis.
So this is a furtherclaim:texts also reflect,areproducedby, andhelp to create,
a teeming worldof entities(Callonet al. 1993).
So the sociology of science andtechnologymakesthis argument.Entities
human,non-human,andtextual- aren'tsolid. They aren'tdiscrete,or clearly
separatedfrom their context. They don't have well-establishedboundaries.
They aren't,as thejargonputsit, distinctsubjectsand objects.Insteadthey are
sets of relations,for instancein theformof networks.9Andtheyareco-extensive
with those networks.Such, at any rate,arethe assumptionswhich have started
to guide the work of many sociologists of science and technology. As they
follow scientists in action, the creation of scientific statements, and the
constructionof technicalartifactsthey explore the elements that are brought
together.And they look at the way in whichentities- people, technologiesor
texts - come to summariseof the relationsthatmake them up. This, then, is
secondprinciple,one whichstatesthatentities- human,technicalandtextual
-are compoundrealities,the productof a processof composition."'

9. Itis possible thatsome relationsarebetterunderstoodas fluids, flames,or as decentred"partial

connections"ratherthan as networks. Though in the present paper we press the network
metaphor,ourargumentwould apply,with modifications,to othermetaphorsfor relationality.
On the notion of fluid see Mol & Law (1994). On the importanceof partialconnectionssee
Strathern(1991).
10. Thisprocessis sometimescalled"translation" in thesociology of science.Forfurtherdetailssee
Callon (1986).

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 Lessonson Collectivity 171

3. Entitieswith VariableGeometrythat RedirectAction

We've said thatmattersareheterogeneous.This is the firstprinciple.And we've
said thatentities are networks,or networkeffects. Thatis the second principle.
Now we move to the thirdprinciple. This says that the bits and pieces in the
networksare not given in the orderof things.Instead,they arerelationaleffects.
This means that their form, their content, and their propertiesare not fixed.
Rathertheiridentityemerges- andchanges- in thecourseof interaction.The
methodologicallesson is this:thatobjects for instancepeople andtexts- are
processes of transformation,compromiseor negotiation.
But the same is also true for devices. For instance, the British wanted an
aircraftto counter"thethreat'"But how big should it be? The RAF said that it
wanteda largeaircraft;this would be saferwith two enginesratherthanone. The
Royal Navy said that single-enginedaircraftwere perfectly safe, and could fit
into aircraftcarriers.Indeed,they were alreadybuildingjust such an aircraft-
and adaptingthis for the RAF would be cheap. But the RAF said no. The Navy
plane was slow, its rangewas small, and it simply wasn't powerfulenough. An
industrialcontractorcame up with a compromise.Why not create a small but
powerful aircraftwith a single-engine and a long-range?Then everyone would
be happy.But no. It turnedout thatno-one was happy.The Navy said it would
not be in service for years, while the RAF said the single engine was too risky.
This was a big debatethroughmuch of 1957 and 1958. Sometimes the big air-
craftwas on top. At othertimes, especially when the Treasurywas involved, the
smallerNavy aircrafthad the upperhand.And then therewere moments when
the contractor'scompromisenosed ahead.
So what should we make of this? Our answer is that we're looking at a
variablegeometryaircraft,one thatchangedits shapeas the weeks went by. Two
engines, then one, straightwings and then swept wings, these transformations
reflectedcomplexprocessesof interactionbetweenindustry,government,engine
characteristics,aircraftcarriersand the laws of aerodynamics.Each state of the
aircraftwas a network,and the shape of that aircraftreflected the form of the
networkand so of the interactionsout of which it was composed.
So the aircraftwas shaped by its network.But - equally important- the
aircraftalso acted upon the network. That is, it shaped the projects and the
actionsof otherentitiesin the network.Forinstance,we havementionedthatthe
TSR2 was supposed to be able to operatewithoutlarge air bases. Indeed, if it
could fly fromclearingsin Germanforestsit would be simple to hide it from the
Russians.But this would be much easier if it could take off and land vertically.
Was this possible? It turnedout thatthe answerwas, not really. On examination
it appearedthata verticaltake off aircraftwouldrapidlybecome a huge monster
with limited range and huge fuel demands.Here, then, it was the aircraftthat
acted ratherthan the specification. It was the aircraftthat shaped the require-
ment, ratherthan vice versa.

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172 Canadian
Journalof Sociology

The conclusion,thenis thatentitiesmay have variablegeometry- but not

all variationsareequallyfeasible.But also, thatwhatis feasible andwhatis not
is decidedin interaction.For, as in this case, thereis often no way of being sure
how entities will behave withouttryingit out in practice.How could anyone
know beforehandhow a projectfor a verticaltake-off aircraftwould evolve?
Whatform it might take?Whetherit was going to act like a real agent,resist,
andmodify the actionsof others?Orwhether,on the contrary,wouldit simply
conformwith the projectsof others,and so be renderedpassive?
We've made the argumentaboutthe malleabilityof entitiesfor a technical
object.Butthe sameappliesto theshapeof humanbeingsthoughthevocabulary
of analysisis a little different.It is aboutthe malleabilityof goals, projects,pre-
ferencesandidentities,andthe ways in whichthese reflect- andshape- the
heterogeneouselementsthatthey associate.Therearemanycase studiesof the
instabilityandreworkingof identitiesin Englishlanguagesociology.l Andthere
is a substantialFrenchliterature,inspiredby Boudon,Crozierand Friedberg,
which brings out the contingentcharacterof the goals and decision criteria,
which vary dependingon context, concreteaction system, and position. For
instanceFriedbergarguesthatindividualsdo nothave stablegoals, strategiesor
preferences.Insteadthese are constructedlocally in the course of interaction,
and goals and interactionaltertogether(Friedberg1993).
Such sociologicalstudiesareimportant.Buttheyarealso somewhatlimited.
This is becausethey take it for grantedthatthe capacityfor actionis a human
attributealone.Thismeansthattheytryto explainchangein identityby looking
at personalcognitive,interpretativeor strategicresources.They arecommitted
to methodologicalindividualism-like ShirleyStrum'sbaboons.Butthelesson
of the sociology of science is thatthis is an unnecessaryrestriction.
Forinstance,LangdonWinneris the authorof a famousarticlethathas been
so often cited that by now it almost has the status of a cliche. Called "Do
artifactshave politics?"(Winner1980), it tells of RobertMoses, the New York
City plannerbetweenthe two worldwars.Moses designeda parkwaybetween
New York and Jones' Beach State Parkon Long Island.But Moses was also
racist,andwantedto keep blacksout of the Park.But how shouldthis be done?
Moses' answerwas to inventanarchitectureof discriminationin theformof low
bridges.When he designedthese he made surethatthey were high enoughfor
cars,buttoo low for buses. Whichmeantthatif you wererich enoughto own a
car,thenyou coulduse theparkwayget to Jones'Beach,butif you dependedon
the bus then you couldn't.

11. Indeed,analysesof formation,dissolution,andinteractionof partialidentitiesare widespread

in sociology. For a sample from British sociology: Keith & Pile (1993). For variationsin
primatologists' identities see Haraway (1989). For discursive shifts in the formation of
managementperformancessee Law (1994).

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 Lessonson Collectivity 173

This storyis certainlyalarming.But it also shows how the identityof a social

groupmay be constructedandvariedin a processof heterogeneousengineering.
At the beginning there were two actors - Moses and an indeterminateNew
Yorkpopulation,perhapsbest imaginedas a set of individualsunrelatedto each
other. But by the time the Parkway was built a network of heterogeneous
identities had been created. Moses, bridges, buses and cars: these were all
involved. But so too were new social groups:for instance,thatof poor-people-
and-generally-blacks-that-cannot-get-to-Jones' Beach. And it was a groupthat
was relatively stable. Indeed, this is the point of Winner's argument.It was
stable because it was materially heterogeneous. For in these interactions
freeways, the shape of bridges, and the height of cars and buses are just as
importantas Moses with his racistpolitics.'2And since the bridgesare durable,
they still tendperformMoses' politics thoughMoses himself has gone. But only
tend. Because more people can now affordcars - which means thatthe social
groupmade up of those deniedaccess to the beachhas tendedto dissolve. So the
group is stable, but only relatively so. And the argumentis that the individual
and collective identityof Harlemblacksvaries.And thatit variesin interaction
with the othercomponentsin the network.
None ofthese componentsis inflexibly given in the orderof things.The new
social groupof blacks-who-cannot-go-to-the-Long-Island-beaches cannotbe de-
ducedfromthe isolatedindividualsthatexistedbefore.But neitherdoes it follow
from Moses' racism. To move from isolated individualsto blacks-excluded-
from-Long-Island-beacheswe need to addbridgesand freeways.Whichmeans
thatthe new identityof the actorsmapsonto - andis indistinguishablefrom-
the materialheterogeneityof the networkof relations.And the new entities are
createdin ways that cannotbe predictedbeforehand.

4. Distributed Entities that are Also Points

The argument is that subjects or objects don't have fixed boundaries or
attributes:aircraft,humanbeings,texts,social groups,ororganisations:theseare
distributedthrough,a productof, and enact a range of materialsand elements.
But - and this builds on what we have learned in the Moses example -
sometimes,despitethe endless flux andindeterminacy,networksof heterogene-
ous materialsbecome more or less durableand achieve a degree of stability.
Anotherexample:the case of the electric car, the vehicule electrique(VEL)
(Callon 1979, 1981). In 1970, before the oil crisis, EDF (Electricitede France
- the Frenchelectricityutility) announcedthe end of the internalcombustion

12. For a less asymmetricalandmore generalpresentationof the argumentaboutthe inscriptionof

the social in technical artifactssee Akrich(1992, 1993).

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 Journalof Sociology
174 Canadian

engine. Accordingto EDF, cars runningon petrol were noisy, polluting and
spoiling the urbanenvironment.But driverswere readyto give up the charms
of the motor car in favour of more functional means of transport:for the
consumersociety was underattack.Which meant the electric car, which had
been shelved at the turnof the century,was the way to go. It would be small,
silent,non-pollutingandhighlyefficient.The driverin a post-industrialsociety
woulduse it as an matter-of-factway for gettingfromA to B, andnot as a form
of conspicuousconsumption.
Like the TSR2 andthe Harlemblacks,the VEL was heterogeneous.At dif-
ferenttimes and in differentversionsone finds fuel cells, platinumelectrodes,
chassis, town councils, ministriesand automobilemanufacturers.But as the
projectdeveloped the associationstended to stabilise. Indeed,they tendedto
stabiliseto thepointwherepotentialcustomersmightvisit a carshowroom,look
at an object,andhearaboutenergyconsumptionandperformance- and they
might choose between the two-door or the four-doorversion. In short, as it
stabilisedit moved to the pointwherethe VEL was nothingmore thana black
box. Electrodes,catalysts,thefinancialarrangements betweenEDFandRenault,
town councilbylaws,or the standardsimposedby the EnvironmentMinistry-
all of these were containedwithinthe VEL. For the vehicle was the productof
heterogeneousinteractionsand socio-technicalcompromises.But, once they
held togetherand were integratedinto a set of coherenttechnicalchoices and
materials,the VEL was (also) a single product- a simple "car"with batteries
thatneededrechargingevery fifty kilometres.
This is the argument:thata networkwhich is relativelystabilisedalso tends
to become an entity, a blackbox, a blackbox that(as the sociology of science
sometimesputs it) translatesthe variousmaterialsthatmake it up. It translates
them by co-ordinatingthem,by frontingfor them, andby standingfor them in
a simpleandcoherentform.Thismeansthatforthemomentthe frontednetwork
acts as a single unit.It does not fall apart.And (againfor the moment)thatit can
be distinguishedfrom its environment,distinguishedas an objectwith its own
consistentidentity.So - to the extentthatit is stabilised- the VEL represents
its network.It representsits networkin the same way thata trade-unionleader
speaksfor "theworkers"or a presidentfor "thecountry."For the argumentis
identicalin form.Humans,objectsandtextsalike:if they aresuccessfulsuchen-
tities have mobilised,representedandtakenthe formof the networksof entities
which lie behindthem.'3And this is the pointof the fourthargument.Actorsare
both networksandpoints.They areboth individualsandcollectives. The VEL
is both.A text on DIVEMAis both.And so, too, is Pasteur.Forwhenjournalists

13. For more extensive discussion of the diverse characterof representationsee Callon & Law
(1997).

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 Lessonson Collectivity175

and officials visited the farm at Pouilly le Fort, they watched sheep dying of
anthrax,while othershappily grazedin infected fields. Pasteursaid: the dying
sheep have not been vaccinated,whereasthe othershave. And since the sheep
did what Pasteursaid they should be doing - since there were no dissident
voices in the network- Pasteurwas ableto speakas Pasteur-the-great-scientist.
For the momenthe representeda network.He punctualisedit.'4Which is more
thancan be said for EDF - for the VEL projectlasted only a few weeks before
it startedto decompose.
This, then, is the core of the argumentfrom the sociology of science. Stable
social arrangementsare both individual and collective. They are necessarily
possessed of a doublenature.Sometimesit is useful to talkof individualentities:
to imagine that they are discrete objects in an environment.But it is equally
appropriateto treatthem as collective effects - as patternednetworks.And to
explore the characterof that patterning- a patterningthat transcendsthe
division between the individual and the collective. And, indeed often, this
becomes necessary,since the patternedstabilitiesof translationareeroded,and
the components that make up the network decompose into an uncoordinated
cacophony of different voices and actions. The argument,then, is that the
division between the individual and the collective is an effect. Or, to put it
anotherway, thatif homo clausus was a (temporarilyworkable)fiction created
at the time of the Enlightenment,then so too was that of entitasclausa.

5. Working Collectivities
We've built an argumentthat refuses to distinguishbetween humansand non
humans.Or it distinguishesbetween them, but only as outcomes or effects. But
this is controversial.It sounds antihumanistand amoral. So what should we
make of this?
First, note that the materials that make up humans and non-humansare
similar. Pasteur-the-greatscientist includes non-humans(sheep, microbes) -
while TSR2 containshumans.So the fabricof the networksis much the same in
each case. The difference is rather in the spokesperson or representative:
sometimes this takes human form, and sometimes it does not. But even this
division is not straightforward,for thereareendless marginalcases. When does
an embryo become a humanbeing (Casper 1994)? At what point is abortiona
form of murder?When is it properto turnoff a life supportsystem? These are
real enough questions.And they embody decisions - or negotiations- about
what it means to be human.Sometimes this has to do with moral capacity and

14. For a magnificentstudy of the precariousbuildingof boundariesaroundbodies and their more

or less successful punctualisation,see Outram(1989).

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176 Canadian
Journalof Sociology

responsibility.(Whatdoes it mean to accuse dogs but not cars of "attacking"

children?Whatshouldwe makeof the manyanimaltrialsthattook place in the
eighteenthcentury?)Sometimesit hasmoreto do withintellectualandcognitive
skills. (Whatof childrenbornwith severe handicaps?Or of those personsthat
aresaidto be "insane"andhence debarredfromwitnessing- or responsibility
- in legal proceedings?)Sometimesthe questionis theological(all those born
of womanareendowedwith an immortalsoul, whatevertheirotherattributes).
And yet again,sometimesit is a medicalmatter(for instanceto do with genes
or immunesystemreactions"5).So the divisionbetweenhumanandnon-human
is often unclearin practice.Thereis no universalanswer.
But what happensif we move away from the margins,to entities that we
would all agreearehuman?To humansthathave goals, intentionsandstrategic
abilities.The questionis: wheredo these come from?Orbetter,wherearethey
located?Here is anotherstory.
Andrew is directorof a large British laboratory.He is an entrepreneur
active, commandingand energetic. He is, or so those who know him would
agree, an actor. So what does he do? He talks with his subordinates,gathers
information.He periodicallyvisits "HeadOffice"to see what is going on. He
travelsto Londonto exchangeintelligenceandcomparemaltwhiskieswith his
contacts in the corridorsof power. He negotiateswith other membersof the
laboratorybefore flying off to visit the EuropeanCommunityDirectoratesin
Brussels.Everyoneknowsthatit's a hardlife being a lab director!And Andrew
is no different from Pasteur.He tries to combine elements, heterogeneous
materials,and get them hold together.But what would happenif we tried a
thought experiment?What would happen if we were to drop Andrew into
baboonsociety?
Imagine,then, what would happenif we were to take away Andrew's fax
machineandtelephones.If we blockedthereportsandmessagesthatflow across
his desk. If his secretarywere to disappear.If therewere no longer planes or
trainsto Brussels.If his email accountwere closed, andhis personalcomputer
takenaway.If the membersof his laboratorybeganto ignorehim - or, started
to treathim as a porteror secretary.WouldAndrewstill be a strategist?Would
he be capableof enrolling,linking,calculating,decision-making?The answer,
or so we'd suggest, is no. Andrewwould no longerbe a strategist.
Let us give Andrewhis fax machineand his secretariesback. He has called
a meetingof his managementteam.Thereis a crisis looming.The laboratoryis
workingon an important"flagship"projectthatis vital to its future.Buthe feels
thatthingsare not going as they should.In frontof him he has tablesof figures

15. Both of which, to be sure, are endlessly negotiable,and tend to underminethe possibility of
homo clausus.For discussionaboutthe immunesystem see: Haraway(1991).

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 Lessonson Collectivity177

which count the "man years" devoted each project.'6These figures haven't
droppedout of the air. It has takena lot of time and effort to createthem - to
invent the set of procedures,routinesand machines which is called the "man-
power booking system"in the vernacularof the laboratory.But now the system
is working: scientists fill in forms, and these are checked and coded by ad-
ministrators.And the resultis the figureson Andrew'sdesk. But todaythese are
troubling.What they suggest is thatinsufficientmanpoweris being devoted to
the "flagship"project.And, thoughit hasn't startedto show yet, it is likely that
this will fall behind schedule. Andrew wants to take decisive action, action
before it is too late. But he is only able to do this because of the manpower
booking system. For the laboratoryhas been convertedinto a panopticonand it
has created a centre of control - the place where Andrew sits with his
colleagues and worriesaboutthe dismal manpowerfigures (Latour1987, Law
1994), a place where Andrew and his colleagues can take remedialaction.
It is temptingto say that"Andrewis a strategist."But this is a shorthandthat
is dangerouslymisleading.For like all the otheractorsthat we have described,
Andrew-the-strategistis a heterogeneous network: Andrew + fax + fellow
managers+ secretary+ head office + trainsto London + his PC + the work of
scientists and engineers+ the memos thatcirculate+ the time slips filled in by
employees - it is this combination that creates the possibility of strategic
action. So Andrew-the-strategistcannotbe detachedfrom this arrangementof
materials.It is, of course, possible to point to Andrew and insist that "this is
wherethe actionis located."And to pointto all the othermaterialsandinsist that
they arepartof a passive supportsystem. It is possible to distinguishin this way.
But it is misleading.It misleads becausethe capacityfor strategyis an effect of
a more or less stable arrangementof materials.Not somethingthatgrows, as it
were out of one alone.
So our argumentis that strategic action is a collective property- not
somethingundertakenby personsin the collective. But the fact thatwe focus on
strategic action should not mislead. For strategic and reflexive action where
agency is attributedto a single individualis only a single possibility. Thereare
all sorts of other collective configurations. As is obvious, there are also
collectivities - such as nuclearpower plants- which act (or so we hope) like
predictableautomata.And in between these two extremesthere are all sorts of
other possibilities. For instance, KarinKnoff-Cetinashows that the collective
created by high energy physicists depends on the presence of the material
universeof theirexperiments(Knorr-Cetina1991, 1992, 1995). This, to be sure,
is what we would expect given our argumentaboutheterogeneity.But what is
strikingaboutthis is the way in whichthe "knowingindividual"has disappeared

16. In conformitywith laboratorypracticewe will use this genderedterm.

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178 Canadian
Journalof Sociology

in this collectivity. Instead,the scientists participatein experimentsin which

their contributionscan no longer be distinguishedfrom those of the particle
detectors.It is no longer possible to draw a line between humanbeings and
technical apparatus.As a result, scientists no longer attend conferences to
presenttheirown experimentalresults.Rather,the teamorcollectivedesignates
a reporterto presentits work,and this may be someone who played no partin
the experimentsat all. To use thejargon,subjectivity,agency,andresponsibility
- all of these arebeing erodedin the new formsof heterogeneouscollectivity
thatarebeinginventedin partof big science.Here,then,the physicistsareahead
of the sociologists: they have learnedto transcendthe division between the
individualand the collective.

6. Towardsa Sociologyof HybridCollectives

"The Japaneseproblem,"or so we have suggested, is not a problemfor the
Japanese,but rathera problemof our own making.The distinctionbetween
individualandsociety is unnecessary.Indeed,it is seriouslymisleading.Forthe
sociology of science and technologyshows thatthe idea thatsociety is a set of
relationshipsbetweenhumanactorsis a misunderstanding. Insteadit suggests
thatit is betterunderstoodas a collective associationof humanandnon-human
entities. But this implies that we need a quite differenttheoryof action. And
what we've triedto show in this paperis thatthis theorycomes in four parts:
1. Non-humansarenotsimplyresourcesorconstraints.Thoughtheysometimes
act passivelythisdoesn'thaveto do withtheirinnernature,butbecausethey
have been made passive. And, putting extreme cases on one side (cases
whicharetheproductof systematicenrolment,alignmentanddomestication
(Callon 1986)) non-humansinterveneactivelyto push actionin unexpected
directions. The theory of action that is recommendedthus makes no
distinction, in principle, between the human and the non human. The
distinctionis a consequenceor an effect, not primitiveto actionitself.
2. Entitiesareinteractiveeffects- forinstancenetworks.Pasteur,a warplane,
or a scientific paper,these are all associationsof the humanand the non-
human.So to claim that"Pasteurhas developeda vaccineto curerabies"or
"TSR2altersthe balanceof powerbetweenthe West andthe Soviet Union"
is to take a convenientbut deceptiveshortcut.In fact the actionsof Pasteur
or TSR2 arethe effect of a multitudeof heterogeneousentities.And,just as
important,these constituentsdo not fundamentallydiffer from one other:
each containsboth humansand non-humans.
3. Actionis botha relayandit is unpredictable. Forentitiesareinscribedin pre-
existing chains of actions and they relay those actions. But these are not
simplerelays,becauseeach of the entitiesbroughttogetheris also an indefi-
nitelycomplexnetworkof relations.ThusTSR2propagatesanendlessseries

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 Lessonson Collectivity 179

of actions inscribed,and reinscribed,within the RAF, the Treasuryand the

rest.Which meansthatit is dynamicandcontinuous.Thatit is variable.And
thatit unpredictablyacts to transformwhat it bringstogether.And itself."7
4. This means thataction cannotexplained,in a reductionistmanner,as a firm
consequence of any particularprevious action. For instance, we may guess
thatthe prejudicesof RobertMoses werearticulatedsuccessfullynotbecause
of theircontent,but ratherbecause of the specifics of theirmaterialform. A
series of billboardssaying: "Freewayforbiddento underprivilegedblacks"
would not, perhaps,have workedat all. The bridgesweremoreeffective. But
this didn'tnecessarilyhave to be so. Withappropriatepolicing the billboards
might have worked. And with special low buses the bridges might have
failed. The success, or otherwise,of an action is irreduciblyspecific.
The theorythus assumes that action is equivalentto specific and materially
heterogeneousrelations.Or, as we might call them hybrid collectifs.'8 These
relations,humanandnon-human,carryaction,they exert it, and they modify it.
And since theory works from the assumptionthat there are no pre-determined
structuresit also assumes thatif we want to characteriseaction then we might
explorethe patternsof relationsin theirspecificity.We might,for instance,look
at the way in which they are translatedfrom place to place; or from one time to
another;or, indeed,fromone materialformto another.And it suggests thatif we
want to solve the Japaneseproblem- which is, however, our problemrather
thanthatof the Japanese- we will ignorea prioridistinctionsbetweenagency
and structureor between the individualand the collective. For if action has no
identifiable source but is located through heterogeneous patterns, then to
describeit will not be to locate it in a particularplace - the humanagent;social
structure;the divine; or a platonic realm of essences. Ratherit will be to find
ways of characterisingthe patternsin the relationsof influence - the patterns
that make up hybridcollectifs.
Earlierwe identifiedone specific formof action,thatof strategicreflexivity,
with its goals and discretionaryspaces. And we tried to show that this is a
collective productwhich creates and organises humans and non-humansin a
particularway. Thatis an arrangementwhich generatesthe possibility of data-
gathering,calculation,evaluationandstrategicaction. So this particularpattern
is like a cyberneticloop. It feeds backuponandseeks to regulateitself, creating
and distinguishingits own locus of control, and in some measure drawing a
boundarybetweeninside andoutside.But as we have indicated,such a configu-
ration is merely one possibility, a strategicpossibility, indeed one that is an

17. This doublemovement,thatof relayingandgoing beyondhas been well capturedin the concept
of mediation.See Hennion(1993).
18. For furtherdiscussion of this term see Callon and Law (1995).

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 Journalof Sociology
180 Canadian

extremelypopular'9But no doubttherearemanyothers.And thatis the promise

of this new sociology: thatit offersa way of exploringothercollective configu-
rationsanddispersals,the ways they performdifferentkindsof actions,andthe
ways in which they transformthemselves- whatJulliencalls theirpropensi-
ties20- as a resultof theirparticularhumanand non-humanconfigurations.

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