FACTS:

Jan 26, 1970, Congress opened. Student demonstration in front of the Congress, followed by a series of
demonstrations, rallies, marches and pickets, many of which ended in the destruction of public and private
property, loss of a few lives, and injuries to a score of other persons. Schools, offices and many stores were
forced to close.

Feb 24 1970, Petitioner, Nelson Navarro, acting in behalf of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines, an
association of students, workers and peasants wrote a letter to respondent, Mayor of Manila Antonio
Villegas, applying for a permit to hold a rally (at the Plaza Miranda on Feb 26 [Tuesday], from 4:00-
11:00pm).

On the same day, respondent denied his request saying that “In the greater interest of the community, this
office, guide by a lesson gained from the events of the past few weeks, has temporarily adopted the policy
of not issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or demonstration during weekdays.” He
suggested that they use the Sunken Gardens and to hold the rally earlier during the day in order that it
may end before dark.

Petitioner filed a suit contesting the Mayor’s action on the ground that it is violative of the petitioner’s right,
among others, to peaceably assemble and to petition. In reply to the contention of the responded that the
permit to hold a rally was not being denied and in fact the Sunken Gardens was offered as a place of said
rally, the petitioner argued that for obvious reasons the right to peaceful assembly cannot be fully enjoyed
without the corresponding right to use public places for the purpose and that therefore, a denial of the use
of public place amounts to the violation of the freedom of assembly. For the complete enjoyment of the
right, it may be necessary that a particular public place be used for purposes of greater publicity and
effectiveness.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a denial of the right to freedom of Assembly. NO.

RATIO:
Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine the streets or public places to be used in order to
secure convenient use thereof and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder
and maintain public safety and order.

(Note that the Mayor expressed his willingness to grant permits for assemblies at Plaza Miranda during
weekends and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities
of the community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative.) The court believes in the
Mayor’s appraisal that a public rally at the Plaza Miranda, as compared to the Sunken Gardens, poses a
clearer and more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of peace, and criminal acts. Noting that
every time such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a state of fear and tension
that offices are closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and
transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the public.

Villamor, concurring:
The right to freedom of assembly is not denied, but this right is neither unlimited nor absolute. The Mayor
did not refuse to grant the permit, he offered an alternative which is not unreasonable. There being no
arbitrary refusal, petitioner is not entitled to the writ.

Castro and Fernando, dissenting:

The right to freedom of assembly, while not unlimited is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and
respect. The effect of the Mayor’s ground for refusal amounts to one of prior restraint of a constitutional
right, which is not allowable. Laws subjecting freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow,
objective and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional.

NOTES:
Right of Assembly – a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs.
Right to Petition – any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate
branch or office of the government for redress of grievances.
Guide to interpretation – The spirit of our free institutions allows the broadest scope and widest latitude in
public parades and demonstrations, whether religious or political. The vital need in a constitutional
democracy for freedom of expression is undeniable whether as a means of assuring individual self-
fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by the people in social including political
decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change.
Limitations – any citizen may criticize his government and government officials. However, such criticism
should be specific and therefore constructive, specifying particular objectionable actuations of the
government; it being reasoned or tempered, and not of contemptuous condemnation of the entire
government set-up. Criticism is within the range of liberty of speech unless the intention and effect be
seditious. When the intention and effect is seditious, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech
and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige
of constituted authority, the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws and the existence of the State.
These rights are subject to regulation, termed the sovereign “police power.”
Criterion for permissible restriction – The “Dangerous Tendency” rule is explained as “if the words uttered
create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is
not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence or unlawfulness be advocated. It is
sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be
reasonable calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the
natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body seeks to prevent.”
This doctrine was later superseded by the “Clear and Present Danger” rule which lays down the test:
“whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.” It means that
the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before the utterance can be punished. Clear: a causal connection with the danger of the
substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present: imminent, urgent and impending. Danger:
requires an unusual quantum of proof.

Assembly & Petition

PRIMCIAS vs. FUGOSO

FACTS:

Petitioner Cipriano Primicias is the campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties. Respondent
Valeraino Fugoso is the Mayor of Manila. Primicias would like to compel Fugoso, by means of a mandamus,
to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting in Plaza Miranda, as respondent Fugoso has denied
the request.

ISSUE: WON the denial of the permit for holding a public meeting is proper.

HELD: No it is not.

RATIO:

The court first states the importance of the right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, stating,
however, that these rights have their limits in that they should not be injurious to the rights of the
community or society.

Then they discuss the other side, the right to regulate these rights. This brings a discussion of police power,
saying that the legislature delegated police power to the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, giving it
regulatory powers regarding the use of public places. These powers, however, according to the court, are
not absolute. If these powers were absolute, then the Municipal or City government would have sole and
complete discretion as to what to allow and what not to allow. This would be wrong as it would leave
decisions open to the whims of those in power. While these rights should be regulated, they should be
regulated in a reasonable manner, and giving unbridled deciding power to the government is not reasonable.

Also, looking at the ordinance Sec. 1119, the courts said there there were 2 ways to interpret such an
ordinance:

1) The mayor has unregulated discretion

2) Applications are subject to reasonable discretion to determine which areas to use to avoid confusion
and minimize disorder

The court took the 2nd interpretation.

To justify their stand, the court went through a series of U.S. cases that handled similar circumstances.
Many of these cases struck down ordinances and laws requiring citizens to obtain permits for public
meetings, events, parades, processions, and the like.

Lastly, the court states that there is no reasonable reason to deny this public meeting. As such, the
mandamus is granted.

Note: SEC. 1119 Free for use of public — The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and
clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same shall only
be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by ordinance or regulation: Provided, that the holding
of athletic games, sports, or exercise during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or public
places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district in question, may be permitted by means of a
permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places or portions thereof, where
such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And provided, further, That the holding of any parade
or procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the
Mayor who shall, on every such ocassion, determine or specify the streets or public places for the formation,
route, and dismissal of such parade or procession: And provided, finally, That all applications to hold a
parade or procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than twenty-four hours prior to the holding
of such parade or procession.

HILADO DISSENT:

The dissent of J. Hilado is divided into 4 parts: a, b, c and d.

a) Right not absolute but subject to regulation. Mainly says that the right to freedom of speech and
assembly are not absolute rights. After citing U.S. cases, J. Hilado moves to the case at bar and
points out that the Mayor of Manila had the “duty and power” to grant or deny permits. Moreover,
he says that the government has the right to regulate the use of public places. Pointing to the case
at bar, Plaza Miranda is a public place in that it is a high traffic area, whether for vehicles or
pedestrians. As such, holding the meeting there would have caused an “inconvenience and interfere
with the right of the people in general”. He again states that the right is not absolute, but “subject
to regulation as regards the time, place and manner of its exercise”.
b) No constitutional right to use public places under government control, for the right of assembly
and petition, etc. Here, J. Hilado explains that the action that the Mayor of Manila took was not
one of denying the public meeting and regulating the right to speech and assembly, but was merely
one of denying the use of a public place in the conducting of the meeting. In this interpretation,
there was no constitutional right infringed.
c) Here J. Hilado goes through his own list of U.S. cases to cite as authority. I don’t think dean will
make us enumerate them. Anyways the summaries in the case are short.
d) Mandamus unavailable. Here, J. Hilado cites section 2728 of Municipal Corporations, 2 nd ed., a
source of American municipal rules. In this rule, it is stated that in the issuance of permits, if the
power is discretionary, it cannot ordinarily be compelled by mandamus. The refusal must be
arbitrary or capricious so as to warrant mandamus. He then points to certain allegations of the
Mayor of Manila pointing to the high possibility of trouble that would result from the meeting taking
place. His reason in denying the permit is that of peace and order. As such, the refusal was not
capricious or arbitrary and does not warrant a mandamus.