[1]
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person.
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity
as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA
BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ
DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Commission on Human Rights; Court
declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no jurisdiction on adjudicatory
powers over certain specific type of cases like alleged human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.—The threshold question is whether or not the
Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether
or not, like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine,
certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations in volving civil or
political rights. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such
power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of
the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The most that may be conceded to the Commission
in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights.—The most that may be conceded to the Commission. in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings
of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusion in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may
be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution clearly and categorically
grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations
invoking civil and political rights.—As should at once be observed, only the first of
the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in
cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of
Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may
grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession
of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It
may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such
remedy as may be required by its findings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It cannot try and decide cases (or hear and
determine causes) as courts of justice or even quasi-judicial bodies do.—But it cannot
try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-
judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the
popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct
meanings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Commission on Human Rights
having merely the power to investigate cannot and should not try and resolve on the
merits the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90–775.—Hence it is
that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power “to investigate,”
cannot and should not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved
in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90–775, as it has announced it means to do; and
it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS,
their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The matters are undoubtedly
and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education and also
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.—These are matters
undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education,
being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil
Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION of certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the
Commission on Human Rights.
NARVASA, J.:
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar,
instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the
relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case
consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued
by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial
Page 1 of 49
functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that
relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law
within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for
purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take
cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and
adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are
hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal
questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with others
involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise
undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook
what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight"
their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention.
According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted
actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14,
1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate
the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes,
converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc.
Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions
were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24
hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply
and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass
actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that
followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8)
private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School,
Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private
respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's
report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D.
807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An
investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in
accordance with P.D. 807. 5
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which
CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo,
Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed
separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for
suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the
Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary
restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order
dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also
denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November
14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying
their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted
in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated December 17, 1990, rendered after
evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents
submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of
Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy
and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed
(unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme
Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the)
alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable
assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar
petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both
petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few
named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly
situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be
impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements
dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain
that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly
learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended
by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) — were docketed as "Striking
Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission
scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to
Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein. 11
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether
he (Sec. Cariño) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . .
(the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio
R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the
complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due
Page 2 of 49
process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not
join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the
cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they
(CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an
Order 13reciting these facts and making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly
guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that
these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their
wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga,
school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon
Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and
enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M.
and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the
allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter.
Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of
complainants' evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño sought and
was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss
was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the
complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over
the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss,
judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases,
as aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary
Cariño in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the
service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of
Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos.
95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any
appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the
Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter
alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue
return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants,
preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec.
Cariño's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to
submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or
without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers"
"were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced
without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a
violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was
empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the
Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case
decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this
Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and
95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the
Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cariño, has commenced the present
action of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not
feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and
95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case
(i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in
other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise
jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just
cause exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them
by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of
MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants)
sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine
with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been
passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports,
subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as
aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the
Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights
has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of
justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory
powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain
specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or
political rights.
Page 3 of 49
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power;
and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-
judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions
of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered
such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the
powers of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent
office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the
Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite
for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human
rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing
abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to
the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote
human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations
of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international
treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony
or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it
or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by
law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The
Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power
to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it
may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution
to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request
the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance
of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy
as may be required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts
of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate
or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have
well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or
delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to
search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an
official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to
find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts
inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
Page 4 of 49
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step
by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to
examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire;
to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,
judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the
term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on
the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act
as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with
judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a
fact, and the entry of a judgment."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power
"to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775,
as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim
that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in
question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has
no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass
concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or
otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking
part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those
actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the
Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations
warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the
grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done
by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be
imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers
granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken
cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals
have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service
Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said
issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the
Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately
based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves
are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and
whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed
upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the
Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be
reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of
things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the
Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going
over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on
the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been
the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment
of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they
anticipated would be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would
serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions
contrary to those reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have no power anyway
to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by
the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the
Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to
refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for
assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate
unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human
Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and
resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
Page 5 of 49
[2]
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND
GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS
JOHN DOES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Human Rights; Commission on Human
Rights; Creation of.—The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. It was formally constituted by then President Corazon
Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her
legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase “human rights” is
so generic a term that any attempt to define it could at best be described as
inconclusive.—It can hardly be disputed that the phrase “human rights” is so generic
a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be
described as inconclusive. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or more
specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human
rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual’s social,
economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the
term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what
is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost
all aspects of life.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Civil Rights”, defined.—The term “civil
rights,” has been defined as referring—“(to) those (rights) that belong to every citizen
of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected
with the organization or administration of government. They include the rights of
property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as
otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his
citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to
rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.” Also quite often
mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Political Rights”, explained.—Political
rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage,
the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the right appurtenant
to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitutional Commission delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more
severe cases of human rights violations.—Recalling the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more
severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such
areas as the “(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners
and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances,
(5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious.”
While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more
than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone
it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily
making a conclusive delineation of the CHR’s scope of investigatorial jurisdiction.
They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that “Congress may provide for other
cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission, taking into account its recommendation.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia
does not fall within the compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and
political rights” intended by the Constitution.—In the particular case at hand, there is
no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land
which is planned to be developed into a “People’s Park.” More than that, the land
adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of,
is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be
likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have
been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact,
extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order
for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of “human rights violations involving
civil and political rights” intended by the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contempt; The CHR is constitutionally authorized
to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt.—On its contempt powers,
the CHR is constitutionally authorized to “adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court.” Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised
rules, its power “to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose
the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for
in the Rules of Court.” That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood
to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure
essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for
contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said
body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons,
and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
Page 6 of 49
 Same; Same; Same; Same; An “order to desist”, however, is not investigatorial
in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that the CHR does not
possess.—The “order to desist” (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the
instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an
adjudicative power that it does not possess.
Prohibition; Moot and Academic; Prohibition not moot simply because the
hearings in the proceedings sought to be restrained have been terminated where
resolution of the issues raised still to be promulgated.—The public respondent
explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and
academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully
heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition
is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended
to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. Here, however, said Commission
admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant
petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely
doing that.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for prohibition.
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights
("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for
a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit
public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No.
90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by
Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer
of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office
of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being
the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of
three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned
premises of North EDSA.1Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the
private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should
be removed to give way to the "People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group,
led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang
Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late
CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then
Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The
complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On 23 July 1990, the
CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the
stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters'
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear
before the CHR.4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on
31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on
28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents'
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August
1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than
P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing
materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the
petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of
said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest."6
A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's
jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners)
of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-
Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the
dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium
referred to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the
structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but
independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office
admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are
indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land,
particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City;
. . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive
discretion and authority whether or not a certain business
establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of
Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon
grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance.8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for
postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990
Page 7 of 49
had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would
bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the
petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as
being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights,
and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political
rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business."9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for
resolution, along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by
the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the
ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved).10
In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in
contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00
on each of them.
On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to
dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional
mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-
vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and
constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional)
Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and
political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the
power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights
of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to
development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently
ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the
same time for the basic rights of women and children, and their health,
safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and
traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a
violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.
In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was
subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in
which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to
"CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580."17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private
respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance
and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors
affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was
excused from filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus
filed its own comment,18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its
Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of
private respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the
resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon
Aquino via Executive Order No. 163,20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise
of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well,
the Presidential Committee on Human Rights.21
The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987
Constitution, thus: to —
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite
for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court;
Page 8 of 49
 (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human
rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing
abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to
the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote
human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations
of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international
treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony
or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it
or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by
law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR
theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission
is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body.23 This view, however, has not
heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human
Rights,24 the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres
Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that
resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself.
The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not
a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject
to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the
other kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's
investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term
that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be
described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in
the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of
the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by
"human rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the society,
have given the following varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his
humanity. They are the same in all parts of the world, whether the
Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or
Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and
property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom,
and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as
the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form
political associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the
right to an education, employment, and social services.25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from
the sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights
are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by
it.26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27
Page 9 of 49
 Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human.
They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope
of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's
social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely
identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an
individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and
inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our
1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human
rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights?
It may of value to look back at the country's experience under the martial law
regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in
our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices,
aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties,
who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the
Philippines,"29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of
Rights most of the human rights expressed in the International Covenant,
these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21
September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the
thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and
held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until
ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The
right to petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since group
actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were
subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence
and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were
required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the
acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as
declared by international bodies like Amnesty International and the
International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we
can see the following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view
of the importance of human rights and also because civil and political rights
have been determined by many international covenants and human rights
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill
of Rights and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide
territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task,
hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the
commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political
rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political
rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political
right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear
in the language of human rights advocates, as well as in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the
right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and
so on. These are very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many
international documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and
political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and
economic rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens which can
be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions,
and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized to take under
its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the
jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the
government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to
define the specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered
by the international standards governing the behavior of governments
regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of
Page 10 of 49
 political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced
during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what
we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all
those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined
as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution. They are integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under
the Bill of Rights covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I
would like to state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of
human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter
of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent
housing and a life consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political
rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points
raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could
act effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of
prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of
disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed
against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we
should, in order to make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as
much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the
concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually
disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to
the rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although
later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after
mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or
linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other
convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of
Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the
other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified
in that other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering
whether it would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms
like "convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the
Committee, before the period of amendments, could specify to us which of
these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political
rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional
article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights
would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises.
For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner
Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a
social right. It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil
and political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this provision
— freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to
fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings,
hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related
crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of
individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.
Page 11 of 49
 MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is
no longer linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on Human
Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, I was referring to an international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every
specific article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically
related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction
between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International
Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the
different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing,
shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the
committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human
rights, I cannot stress more on how much we need a Commission on Human
Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very
few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones
more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very
delicate — torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest,
massacre — and the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power
like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human
Rights Commission must be independent.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission,
especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help
and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political
violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have
no place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . .30 (emphasis
supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987
Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to
"investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country,
or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government. They include the
rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of
contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights
capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude,
religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment
for debt.32
Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the
right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in
general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of
government.34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is
readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human
Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights
violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances,
(5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the
religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is,
nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did
not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of
the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of
Page 12 of 49
human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into
account its recommendation."35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be
demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary
shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North
EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy
national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be
likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed
to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if
it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove
discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not
prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights"
intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR
acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or
hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate
penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the
Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be
understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and
rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To
exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons
who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant
information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining
order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but
prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export
Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court,
speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or
need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction
on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services"
mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial
remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the
CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of
human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR
itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any
court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . .
A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is
available only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a party
thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action,
its findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of government.37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by
way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an
appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on
the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly,
the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to
initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the
petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR
Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely
awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to
restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a
remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission
admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The
instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR
from precisely doing that.39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The
Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding
with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for
contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is
made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 13 of 49
[3]
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON
REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
DECISION
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; The enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive.—As we explicitly ruled
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA 698
(2001), “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive.” The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.
Same; Same; Same; Aside from Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) moral
objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the
respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list
organization under any of the requisites under Republic Act No. 7941 or the guidelines
in Ang Bagong Bayani.—We find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in
the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to
register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the
guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang
Ladlad’smorality, or lack thereof.
Same; Same; Same; It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify
the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.—Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that
“[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that
it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Same; Same; Same; Through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval.—We are not
blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not
difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure—religious beliefs, convictions
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the
Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these “generally accepted public morals” have not been convincingly transplanted into
the realm of law.
Election Law; Party-List System; Civil Law; “Nuisance,” Defined.—Article
694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or
any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.
Same; Same; Evidence; A mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.—A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code,
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly
needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a
mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
Same; Same; Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list
system.—We hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give
rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves
as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause;
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right
nor targets a suspect class, the Supreme Court will uphold the classification as long
as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.—Recent
jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets
a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end. In Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 (2004), we declared
that “[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x
have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Law of general application should apply with equal
force to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs), and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
Page 14 of 49
represented sectors.—From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list
system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in
this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with
equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the
same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Freedom of expression constitutes one of
the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to
those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.—
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also
to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is
not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise
stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason
than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Association; Only if a political party incites
violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall
outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.—A political group
should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political
issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. Only if a
political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.
Same; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; The principle of non-
discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be
applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.—The principle of non-
discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied
equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is
not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the
ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to “sex”
in Article 26 should be construed to include “sexual orientation.” Additionally, a
variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.
Same; Same; Same; Yogyakarta Principles; Using even the most liberal of
lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, are—at best—de lege ferenda—and do not constitute
binding obligations on the Philippines.—Using even the most liberal of lenses,
these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, are—at best—de lege ferenda—and do not constitute
binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international
law is characterized by the “soft law” nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of
principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the
support of either State practice or opinio juris.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the
existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette[1]
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others
may make different choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we
may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However,
choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right
to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value
protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition
of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the
definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are
concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal.
Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications about what is moral are
indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court
recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates;
accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This
will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at
least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009[2] (the First Assailed Resolution) and
December 16, 2009[3] (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL)
(collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs
refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA)
No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.[4]
Page 15 of 49
 Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
Petition[5] for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because
of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-
point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
v. Commission on Elections.[6] Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its
platform of governance.[7]
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds.
Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector
that is particularly disadvantaged because of their
sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound
emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to,
and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals
of a different gender, of the same gender, or more
than one gender.
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that
petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In
Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile
affections, for even their women did change the
natural use into that which is against nature: And
likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of
the woman, burned in their lust one toward
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
another; men with men working that which is
unseemly, and receiving in themselves that
recompense of their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to
women ye are indeed a people transgressing
beyond bounds. (7.81) And we rained down on
them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was
the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!
(7:84) He said: O my Lord! Help Thou me against
people who do mischief (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment
dated October 2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual
immorality as indicated in the Petitions par. 6F:
Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays
and lesbians who are already of age. It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves
for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with
Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated
as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history
of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract,
permit, license, relationship, or accreditation.
Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and
the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the
requirement to be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the
Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks,
defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil
Code: The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not
Page 16 of 49
 contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code
provides that Contracts whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy are inexistent and
void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as
follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows.
The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging
from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or
both such imprisonment and fine, shall be
imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim
doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published
with their knowledge in any form; the editors
publishing such literature; and the
owners/operators of the establishment selling the
same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs
or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral
plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood
that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral
plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in
film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall
include those which: (1) glorify criminals or
condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to
satisfy the market for violence, lust or
pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4)
tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs;
and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals,
good customs, established policies, lawful orders,
decrees and edicts.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit
films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature
which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for
advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful
when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives
have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections.
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing
our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings
of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in
the U.S.A. said in one article that older practicing homosexuals are
a threat to the youth. As an agency of the government, ours too is
the States avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the
Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual
degradation.[8]
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,[9] three commissioners voted to
overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene
V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang
Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito
N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and
speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed
Resolution, stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-
list system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-
representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a
whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose
of the party-list system of electing congressional representatives is
to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-
represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
Page 17 of 49
 benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability
of an organization to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found themselves into the
party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law.
The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons.
Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of
aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also
the nations only that their interests have not been brought to the
attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until
the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed
sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to
the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list
system will remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades
Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays,
homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a special class of
individuals. x x xSignificantly, it has also been held that
homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right,
and that nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable
intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of
homosexual relations, as in the case of race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of
LGBTs is elevated, there can be no denying
that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will
remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of
Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian
or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are
being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally
accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a
society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of
Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral
precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society
and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the
law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the
penalty of prision mayor upon Those who shall publicly expound
or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals. It penalizes
immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and
indecent shows. Ang Ladlad apparently falls under these legal
provisions. This is clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F: Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already
of age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves
for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in
the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694
of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission x x x or
anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality x x x. These are all unlawful.[10]
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court
annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang
Ladlads application for accreditation.Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of
a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously
announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections
by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11,
2010.[11] Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension,
requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.[12] Somewhat
surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners
application.[13] Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its
position, we required it to file its own comment.[14] The COMELEC, through its Law
Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.[15]
Page 18 of 49
 In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary
restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from
implementing the Assailed Resolutions.[16]
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed
a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-
in-Intervention.[17]The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral
grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to
intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to
Intervene[18] which motion was granted on February 2, 2010.[19]
The Parties Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred
in denying petitioners application for registration since there was no basis for
COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own
special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC
as a separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners
freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained
that there had been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition
was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the
LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941,
and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
Compliance with the
Requirements of the
Constitution and Republic Act
No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the
ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941,
nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related
to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,[20] the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and
affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field
personnel, it was shown that save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner
does not exist in almost all provinces in the country.[21]
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when
it alleged its national existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that
petitioner was not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself,
is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were
already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed
Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a
change in respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural
due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory
perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each
province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in
the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100
affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic
Page 19 of 49
discussion group.[22] Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be a national LGBT
umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the
following LGBT networks:
Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality
(GALANG) Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP)
Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City[23]
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT
or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in
any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be believed, petitioner does
not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of
business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated
its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in
the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to
register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the
guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang
Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for
Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads
Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in
religious matters.[24] Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.[25] We thus find that it was grave violation
of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran
to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed
Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance
some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious
doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that
have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[26]
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily
secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds.
"Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence
the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only
on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government
relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and
morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity
to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The
non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a
standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a
"compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if
Page 20 of 49
 government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly
approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove
contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the
policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious
freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose
beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of
immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must
have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this
conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"
and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one
religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based
on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in
public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral
disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be
adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral
codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind
endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of
society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven.
Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or
utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the
religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the
Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however,
the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but
a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the
same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the
morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests.[27]
Public Morals as a Ground to
Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for
Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of
homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been
transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their
group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the
people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the
government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in
having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad
example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our
civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in
danger of losing its own existence.[28]
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is
not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions
about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that
the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently,
therefore, these generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.[29]
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed
by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a finding by the
COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral
acts.[30] The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same
gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but mere
attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide
between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral
thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full
of disqualification cases against both the straights and the gays.
Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.[31]
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of
course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters
concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the
government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to
society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the
loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without
Page 21 of 49
bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the
notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality
will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal
and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies
for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a
civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.[32] A violation of Article 201
of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation
of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest.Respondents blanket justifications give
rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves
as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act.It is this selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which
provides nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws, courts have
never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. Equality,
said Aristotle, consists in the same treatment of similar persons.[33] The equal
protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and in like circumstances.[34]
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right
nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.[35] In Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[36] we declared that [i]n our
jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed
the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications
and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution.[37]
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population
considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes
sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the
Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize
homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed,
even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the
asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a
legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal
protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim
that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit
the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for
a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same
basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally
burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as
other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating
LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply
that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under
different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection
clause.[38] We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting
special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this
effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has
merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups
similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.
Freedom of Expression and
Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda
and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal
democratic means.[39] It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and
differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v.
Escritor:[40]
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral
ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every
Page 22 of 49
 opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral
discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate
the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion,
including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these
citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative
democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which
convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public
deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the
people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle
in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on
moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely
reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the
mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of
adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies
including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority,
however small not only for a majority, however large but for each
of us" the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It
promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod
over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably
received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this
sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling
state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the
populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with
speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct
is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones
homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT
individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even
overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality
does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.[41] European and United Nations
judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and
equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and
international texts.[42] To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions
that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine
courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have
ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive
conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public
institutions must show that their actions were caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint.[43]
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and
beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for
a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and
democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic
principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing
order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper
opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such
ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the
population.[44]A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to
publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of
satisfying everyone concerned.[45] Only if a political party incites violence or puts
forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the
protection of the freedom of association guarantee.[46]
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express
that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe
with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally
equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that
view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the
religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration
the values of other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights
litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy
between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral
sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal,
reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither
attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this
Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent
punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their
Page 23 of 49
right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of
expression or association. The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any
assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to
review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party
applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise
of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III
of the Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the
members of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of
elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In
fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which
cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner
contends that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the clear and
immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity
of its members to fully and equally participate in public life through
engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is
not a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x
x[47]
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its
qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself
the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by
law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of
COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and
participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified
party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners
fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and
International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and
promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its
attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human
rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in
domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal,
standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to
protect and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle
of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in
the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of
general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of
sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a
status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights
Committee has opined that the reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to
include sexual orientation.[48] Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have
declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under
various international agreements.[49]
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Page 24 of 49
 Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity,
without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public
service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to
electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General
Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the
right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the
right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public
service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the
Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an
effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at
the core of democratic government based on the consent of the
people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the
opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled
to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right
to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on
objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible
to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or
discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or
descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer
discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's
candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from
elective office.[50]
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international law obligations, the
blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer
now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of
International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity),[51] which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta
Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations
and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state
of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.[52] Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these
alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of
society wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary
human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate
that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs
that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international
law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real
human rights, and is a result of the notion that if wants are couched in rights language,
then they are no longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting
of a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are at best de lege
ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much
of contemporary international law is characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony,
and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning
desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.[53]
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by
this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric
and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its
own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as
best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our
democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
Page 25 of 49
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP
No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed
to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.

Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1 Page 26 of 49

[4]
G.R. No. 162994 September 17, 2004
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A.
TECSON, petitioners,
vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Labor Law; Dismissals; Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a
relationship with an employee of a competitior company is a valid exercise of
management prerogative.—No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of
Appeals when it ruled that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a
relationship with an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of
management prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from
competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly
competitive pharmaceutical industry.
Same; Same; While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on
social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute
will be decided in favor of the workers; The law also recognizes that management has
rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.—
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such
a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and
growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on
social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will
be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights
which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
Same; Same; The challenged company policy does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.—The challenged company policy does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously
suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are
addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it
has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection
clause erects no shield against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or
wrongful. The only exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or
actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private
conduct. Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this case.
Same; Same; Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against
relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies; What the
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the
company that may arise out of such relationships.—From the wordings of the
contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo
does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees
and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships
with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to
avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise
out of such relationships.
Same; Same; Constructive Dismissal; Definition of Constructive Dismissal.—
The Court finds no merit in petitioners’ contention that Tecson was constructively
dismissed when he was transferred from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales
area to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was
excluded from attending the company’s seminar on new products which were directly
competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is
defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued
employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion
in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain
by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are
present in the instant case. The record does not show that Tecson was demoted or
unduly discriminated upon by reason of such transfer.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
TINGA, J.:
Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel question, with constitutional
overtones, involving the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company
prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor
company.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated May
19, 2003 and the Resolution dated March 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 62434.2
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome
Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after
Tecson had undergone training and orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among
others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to
disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity
or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and
should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of
interest, to resign from the company.
Page 27 of 49
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee
is expected to inform management of any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug
companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict
between such relationship and the employee’s employment with the company,
the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a "transfer to
another department in a non-counterchecking position" or preparation for
employment outside the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines
Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an
employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals3(Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was
Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and
medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for
Astra in that area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his
District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with
Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in
September 1998.
In January 1999, Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy
gave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecson’s superiors reminded him that he and
Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs, although
they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because he
was performing his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering
into a relationship with an employee of a competitor company. He explained
that Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was planning to merge with Zeneca, another
drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package
to be offered by Astra. With Bettsy’s separation from her company, the
potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. At the same time, they would
be able to avail of the attractive redundancy package from Astra.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem.
In September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxo’s milk division,
thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of
interest would be eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxo’s
"least-movement-possible" policy.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-
Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but
his request was denied.
Tecson sought Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the
matter to Glaxo’s Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its
decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer
order. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his
salary, but was not issued samples of products which were competing with
similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also not included in product
conferences regarding such products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery
level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson
a separation pay of one-half (½) month pay for every year of service, or a total
of ₱50,000.00 but he declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as
valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its employees and persons
employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer
Tecson to another sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals
assailing the NCMB Decision.
On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying
the Petition for Review on the ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering
its Decision. The appellate court held that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its
employees from having personal relationships with employees of competitor
companies is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives.4
Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate
court’s Decision, but the motion was denied by the appellate court in
its Resolution dated March 26, 2004.5
Petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing therein that (i) the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the NCMB’s finding that the Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its
employees from marrying an employee of a competitor company is valid; and
(ii) the Court of Appeals also erred in not finding that Tecson was constructively
dismissed when he was transferred to a new sales territory, and deprived of
the opportunity to attend products seminars and training sessions.6
Page 28 of 49
Petitioners contend that Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying
employees of competitor companies violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions among employees on
account only of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees’
right to marry.7
They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as shown by the
following circumstances: (1) he was transferred from the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte sales area to the Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales area, (2) he
suffered a diminution in pay, (3) he was excluded from attending seminars and
training sessions for medical representatives, and (4) he was prohibited from
promoting respondent’s products which were competing with Astra’s
products.8
In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the company policy
prohibiting its employees from having a relationship with and/or marrying an
employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives and does not violate the equal protection clause; and that
Tecson’s reassignment from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area
to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area does not
amount to constructive dismissal.9
Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of
pharmaceutical products, it has a genuine interest in ensuring that its
employees avoid any activity, relationship or interest that may conflict with their
responsibilities to the company. Thus, it expects its employees to avoid having
personal or family interests in any competitor company which may influence
their actions and decisions and consequently deprive Glaxo of legitimate
profits. The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from
gaining access to its secrets, procedures and policies.10
It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only
proscribes existing or future relationships with employees of competitor
companies, and is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause. It
maintains that considering the nature of its business, the prohibition is based
on valid grounds.11
According to Glaxo, Tecson’s marriage to Bettsy, an employee of Astra, posed
a real and potential conflict of interest. Astra’s products were in direct
competition with 67% of the products sold by Glaxo. Hence, Glaxo’s
enforcement of the foregoing policy in Tecson’s case was a valid exercise of
its management prerogatives.12 In any case, Tecson was given several
months to remedy the situation, and was even encouraged not to resign but to
ask his wife to resign form Astra instead.13
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer question the assailed
company policy because when he signed his contract of employment, he was
aware that such policy was stipulated therein. In said contract, he also agreed
to resign from respondent if the management finds that his relationship with an
employee of a competitor company would be detrimental to the interests of
Glaxo.14
Glaxo likewise insists that Tecson’s reassignment to another sales area and
his exclusion from seminars regarding respondent’s new products did not
amount to constructive dismissal.
It claims that in view of Tecson’s refusal to resign, he was relocated from the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City
and Agusan del Sur sales area. Glaxo asserts that in effecting the
reassignment, it also considered the welfare of Tecson’s family. Since
Tecson’s hometown was in Agusan del Sur and his wife traces her roots to
Butuan City, Glaxo assumed that his transfer from the Bicol region to the
Butuan City sales area would be favorable to him and his family as he would
be relocating to a familiar territory and minimizing his travel expenses.15
In addition, Glaxo avers that Tecson’s exclusion from the seminar concerning
the new anti-asthma drug was due to the fact that said product was in direct
competition with a drug which was soon to be sold by Astra, and hence, would
pose a potential conflict of interest for him. Lastly, the delay in Tecson’s receipt
of his sales paraphernalia was due to the mix-up created by his refusal to
transfer to the Butuan City sales area (his paraphernalia was delivered to his
new sales area instead of Naga City because the supplier thought he already
transferred to Butuan).16
The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) Whether the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying
employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said
policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (2) Whether
Tecson was constructively dismissed.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
The stipulation in Tecson’s contract of employment with Glaxo being
questioned by petitioners provides:
…
10. You agree to disclose to management any existing or future
relationship you may have, either by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies. Should it
Page 29 of 49
 pose a possible conflict of interest in management discretion, you
agree to resign voluntarily from the Company as a matter of Company
policy.
…17
The same contract also stipulates that Tescon agrees to abide by the existing
company rules of Glaxo, and to study and become acquainted with such
policies.18 In this regard, the Employee Handbook of Glaxo expressly informs
its employees of its rules regarding conflict of interest:
1. Conflict of Interest
Employees should avoid any activity, investment relationship, or
interest that may run counter to the responsibilities which they owe
Glaxo Wellcome.
Specifically, this means that employees are expected:
a. To avoid having personal or family interest, financial or
otherwise, in any competitor supplier or other businesses
which may consciously or unconsciously influence their
actions or decisions and thus deprive Glaxo Wellcome of
legitimate profit.
b. To refrain from using their position in Glaxo Wellcome or
knowledge of Company plans to advance their outside
personal interests, that of their relatives, friends and other
businesses.
c. To avoid outside employment or other interests for income
which would impair their effective job performance.
d. To consult with Management on such activities or
relationships that may lead to conflict of interest.
1.1. Employee Relationships
Employees with existing or future relationships either by consanguinity
or affinity with co-employees of competing drug companies are
expected to disclose such relationship to the Management. If
management perceives a conflict or potential conflict of interest, every
effort shall be made, together by management and the employee, to
arrive at a solution within six (6) months, either by transfer to another
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
department in a non-counter checking position, or by career
preparation toward outside employment after Glaxo Wellcome.
Employees must be prepared for possible resignation within six (6)
months, if no other solution is feasible.19
No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that
Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an
employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management
prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors,
especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive
pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo
only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be
denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to
adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth.20 Indeed, while our laws endeavor
to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of
labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the
workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also
entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.21
As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case,22 it is a legitimate business practice to
guard business confidentiality and protect a competitive position by even-
handedly disqualifying from jobs male and female applicants or employees
who are married to a competitor. Consequently, the court ruled than an
employer that discharged an employee who was married to an employee of an
active competitor did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.23 The
Court pointed out that the policy was applied to men and women equally, and
noted that the employer’s business was highly competitive and that gaining
inside information would constitute a competitive advantage.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle
that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the
state or those acting under color of its authority.24 Corollarily, it has been held
in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection
Page 30 of 49
clause erects no shield against merely private conduct, however,
discriminatory or wrongful.25 The only exception occurs when the state29 in
any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined
or involved in the wrongful private conduct.27 Obviously, however, the
exception is not present in this case. Significantly, the company actually
enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the
policy. Indeed, the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-
handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in
its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute
prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of
competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with
and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to
avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may
arise out of such relationships. As succinctly explained by the appellate court,
thus:
The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An
employee of the company remains free to marry anyone of his or her
choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative
that belongs only to the individual. However, an employee’s personal
decision does not detract the employer from exercising management
prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and business success. . .28
The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy
which forms part of respondent’s Employee Code of Conduct and of its
contracts with its employees, such as that signed by Tescon, was made known
to him prior to his employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction
when he signed his employment contract and when he entered into a
relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered into
a contract of employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of
law between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith."29 He is
therefore estopped from questioning said policy.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners’ contention that Tescon was
constructively dismissed when he was transferred from the Camarines Norte-
Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur
sales area, and when he was excluded from attending the company’s seminar
on new products which were directly competing with similar products
manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an
involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes
impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or
diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an
employer becomes unbearable to the employee.30 None of these conditions
are present in the instant case. The record does not show that Tescon was
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of such transfer. As found by
the appellate court, Glaxo properly exercised its management prerogative in
reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area:
. . . In this case, petitioner’s transfer to another place of assignment
was merely in keeping with the policy of the company in avoidance of
conflict of interest, and thus valid…Note that [Tecson’s] wife holds a
sensitive supervisory position as Branch Coordinator in her employer-
company which requires her to work in close coordination with District
Managers and Medical Representatives. Her duties include
monitoring sales of Astra products, conducting sales drives,
establishing and furthering relationship with customers, collection,
monitoring and managing Astra’s inventory…she therefore takes an
active participation in the market war characterized as it is by stiff
competition among pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, and this is
significant, petitioner’s sales territory covers Camarines Sur and
Camarines Norte while his wife is supervising a branch of her
employer in Albay. The proximity of their areas of responsibility, all in
the same Bicol Region, renders the conflict of interest not only
possible, but actual, as learning by one spouse of the other’s market
strategies in the region would be inevitable. [Management’s]
appreciation of a conflict of interest is therefore not merely illusory and
wanting in factual basis…31
In Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,32 which involved a complaint filed by a medical representative
against his employer drug company for illegal dismissal for allegedly
terminating his employment when he refused to accept his reassignment to a
new area, the Court upheld the right of the drug company to transfer or
reassign its employee in accordance with its operational demands and
requirements. The ruling of the Court therein, quoted hereunder, also finds
application in the instant case:
By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or medical
representative is expected to travel. He should anticipate
reassignment according to the demands of their business. It would be
a poor drug corporation which cannot even assign its representatives
or detail men to new markets calling for opening or expansion or to
areas where the need for pushing its products is great. More so if such
reassignments are part of the employment contract.33
As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo
impartially and disinterestedly for a long period of time. In the case at bar, the
record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict
of interest brought about by his relationship with Bettsy. When their
relationship was still in its initial stage, Tecson’s supervisors at Glaxo
Page 31 of 49
constantly reminded him about its effects on his employment with the company
and on the company’s interests. After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave him
time to resolve the conflict by either resigning from the company or asking his
wife to resign from Astra. Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in
its employ because of his satisfactory performance and suggested that he ask
Bettsy to resign from her company instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his
repeated requests for more time to resolve the conflict of interest. When the
problem could not be resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was
constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by
his wife for Astra. Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson from
employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home
province, Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting Tecson’s transfer, Glaxo
even considered the welfare of Tecson’s family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels
any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo.34

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against

petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1 Page 32 of 49

[5]
G.R. No. 164774 April 12, 2006
STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN
CHUA, Petitioners,
vs.
RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E.
ESTRELLA, Respondents.
DECISION
Labor Law; Management Prerogatives; Employer Policies; Nepotism; It is true
that the policy of the petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in the same
company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy.—It is true that the
policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in the same company
takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy. Companies adopt these
policies to prevent the hiring of unqualified persons based on their status as a relative,
rather than upon their ability. These policies focus upon the potential employment
problems arising from the perception of favoritism exhibited towards relatives. With
more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting employment policies
specifically prohibiting spouses from working for the same company. We note that
two types of employment policies involve spouses: policies banning only spouses from
working in the same company (no-spouse employment policies), and those banning
all immediate family members, including spouses, from working in the same
company (anti-nepotism employment policies).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Two Theories of Employment Discrimination—
Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact; Words and Phrases; Under the disparate
treatment analysis, the employer must prove that an employment policy is
discriminatory on its face; To establish disparate impact, the complainants must prove
that a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular class.—
Unlike in our jurisdiction where there is no express prohibition on marital
discrimination, there are twenty state statutes in the United States prohibiting marital
discrimination. Some state courts have been confronted with the issue of whether no-
spouse policies violate their laws prohibiting both marital status and sex
discrimination. In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United
States, complainants utilize two theories of employment discrimination: the disparate
treatment and the disparate impact. Under the disparate treatment analysis, the
plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its face. No-
spouse employment policies requiring an employee of a particular sex to either quit,
transfer, or be fired are facially discriminatory. For example, an employment policy
prohibiting the employer from hiring wives of male employees, but not husbands of
female employees, is discriminatory on its face. On the other hand, to
establish disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a facially neutral policy
has a disproportionate effect on a particular class. For example, although most
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
employment policies do not expressly indicate which spouse will be required to
transfer or leave the company, the policy often disproportionately affects one sex.
Same; Same; Same; Marital Status Discrimination; The courts narrowly
interpreting marital status to refer only to a person’s status as married, single,
divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature intended a broader definition it
would have either chosen different language or specified its intent.—The
courts narrowly interpreting marital status to refer only to a person’s status as
married, single, divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature intended a broader
definition it would have either chosen different language or specified its intent. They
hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is married rather than to whom one is married.
They construe marital status discrimination to include only whether a person is single,
married, divorced, or widowed and not the “identity, occupation, and place of
employment of one’s spouse.” These courts have upheld the questioned policies and
ruled that they did not violate the marital status discrimination provision of their
respective state statutes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The courts that have broadly
construed the term “marital status” rule that it encompassed the identity, occupation
and employment of one’s spouse, and strike down the no-spouse employment policies
based on the broad legislative intent of the state statute, and further hold that the
absence of a bona fide occupational qualification invalidates a rule denying
employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the other spouse in the
same office; This is known as the bona fide occupational qualification exception.—
The courts that have broadly construed the term “marital status” rule that it
encompassed the identity, occupation and employment of one’s spouse. They strike
down the no-spouse employment policies based on the broad legislative intent of the
state statute. They reason that the no-spouse employment policy violate the marital
status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against all spouses of present
employees without regard to the actual effect on the individual’s qualifications or work
performance. These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for
failure of the employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than the
general perception that spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the
business.They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational
qualification invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current
employment of the other spouse in the same office. Thus, they rule that unless the
employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction
based on marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which
would better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate
against an employee based on the identity of the employee’s spouse. This is known as
the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Occupational Qualifications; To justify a bona fide
occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the
employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job
involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of
Page 33 of 49
the job.—We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification
justifies an employer’s no-spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and
narrowly by these state courts. There must be a compelling business necessity for
which no alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice. To justify a bona
fideoccupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the
employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job
involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of
the job. The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not foreign in our
jurisdiction. We employ the standard of reasonableness of the company policy which
is parallel to the bona fide occupational qualification requirement. In the recent case
of Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro Tecson v. Glaxo Wellcome
Philippines, Inc., we passed on the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company
prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The cases of Duncan Association of
Detailment-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 162994, 17
September 2004, 438 SCRA 343, and Philippine Telegraphy and Telephone Company
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118978, 23 May 1997, 272 SCRA
596, instruct that the requirement of reasonableness must be clearly established to
uphold a questioned employment policy.—The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us
that the requirement of reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the
questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden to prove the existence of
a reasonable business necessity. The burden was successfully discharged
in Duncan but not in PT&T.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; That the “company did not just want to have
two (2) or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or
consanguinity” is lame—the policy is premised on the mere fear that employees
married to each other will be less efficient; If the court were to uphold the questioned
rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven
presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security
of tenure.—Petitioners’ sole contention that “the company did not just want to have
two (2) or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or
consanguinity” is lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first
paragraph of the questioned rule is evidently not the valid reasonable business
necessity required by the law. It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents
were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they
married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a
Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking
Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners explain
how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production
Helper in the Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the
cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to
each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid
justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a
perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security of tenure.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The failure to prove a legitimate business
concern in imposing an employer policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be
free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working
together in one company.—Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when
one employee marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-
employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor
Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the
only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the
discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a
legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the
employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of
married persons working together in one company.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The protection given to labor in this jurisdiction is
vast and extensive that the Supreme Court cannot prudently draw inferences from the
legislature’s silence that married persons are not protected under the Constitution and
declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype.—The absence of a statute
expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the
petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that
we cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislature’s silence that married
persons are not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a
prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of
a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid
exercise of management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents
Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.
Same; Illegal Dismissals; Voluntary Resignation; In voluntary resignation, an
employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to disassociate himself from
employment—it is done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by
the act of abandonment.—The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to
resign because she got impregnated by a married man and she could not stand being
looked upon or talked about as immoral is incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid
embarrassment and humiliation, she would not have gone back to work at all. Nor
would she have filed a suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. We have
held that in voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to
dissociate himself from employment. It is done with the intention of relinquishing an
office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to
resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient
evidence on the part of petitioners that the resignation was voluntary, Estrella’s
dismissal is declared illegal.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
PUNO, J.:
Page 34 of 49
We are called to decide an issue of first impression: whether the policy of the
employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates the
rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid
exercise of management prerogative.
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated August 3, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed
the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in
trading principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the
Personnel and Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its
Managing Director.
The evidence for the petitioners show that respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol
(Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all
regular employees of the company.[1]
Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met
Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company, whom he married on June 27,
1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they
decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy
promulgated in 1995,[2] viz.:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case
he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship,
already employed by the company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one
male and another female) developed a friendly relationship
during the course of their employment and then decided to get
married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy
stated above.[3]
Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy.[4]
Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard
Comia, a co-employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise
reminded them that pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they
decide to get married. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.[5]
Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuiga (Zuiga), also a co-
worker. Petitioners stated that Zuiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant.
The company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality
but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.[6]
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They
stated therein that they have no money and property accountabilities in the
company and that they release the latter of any claim or demand of whatever
nature.[7]
Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and Comia
allege that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view
of an illegal company policy. As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she
had a relationship with co-worker Zuiga who misrepresented himself as a
married but separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he
was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid
dismissal due to the company policy. On November 30, 1999, she met an
accident and was advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to
recuperate for twenty-one (21) days. She returned to work on December 21,
1999 but she found out that her name was on-hold at the gate. She was denied
entry. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where one of the
staff handed her a memorandum. The memorandum stated that she was being
dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the memorandum because
she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a chance
to explain. The management asked her to write an explanation. However, after
submission of the explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the
company. Due to her urgent need for money, she later submitted a letter of
resignation in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.[8]
Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive
dismissal, separation pay and attorneys fees. They averred that the
aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the
Labor Code. They also contended that they were dismissed due to their union
membership.
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit, viz.:
[T]his company policy was decreed pursuant to what
the respondent corporation perceived as management
prerogative. This management prerogative is quite broad and
encompassing for it covers hiring, work assignment, working
method, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used,
processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off
of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.
Except as provided for or limited by special law, an employer
is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and
judgment all the aspects of employment.[9] (Citations omitted.)
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter on January 11, 2002. [10]
Page 35 of 49

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC
in a Resolution[11] dated August 8, 2002. They appealed to respondent
court via Petition for Certiorari.
In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed
the NLRC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 31, 2002
(sic)[12] Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is
entered as follows:
(1) Declaring illegal, the petitioners dismissal
from employment and ordering private
respondents to reinstate petitioners to their
former positions without loss of seniority
rights with full backwages from the time of
their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and
(2) Ordering private respondents to pay
petitioners attorneys fees amounting to 10%
of the award and the cost of this suit.[13]
On appeal to this Court, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that:
1. X X X THE SUBJECT 1995 POLICY/REGULATION IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
TOWARDS MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY OF EMPLOYEES
AND OF ARTICLE 136 OF THE LABOR CODE; AND
2. X X X RESPONDENTS RESIGNATIONS WERE FAR
FROM VOLUNTARY.[14]
We affirm.
The 1987 Constitution[15] states our policy towards the protection of
labor under the following provisions, viz.:
Article II, Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary
social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare.
xxx
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility
between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor
to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of
enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to
expansion and growth.
The Civil Code likewise protects labor with the following provisions:
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not
merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest
that labor contracts must yield to the common good.
Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on
labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,
closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and
similar subjects.
Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent
living for the laborer.
The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting
labor. The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a
woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise
prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her
marriage.
Page 36 of 49
Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the above
provision. Petitioners allege that its policy may appear to be contrary to Article
136 of the Labor Code but it assumes a new meaning if read together with the
first paragraph of the rule. The rule does not require the woman employee to
resign. The employee spouses have the right to choose who between them
should resign. Further, they are free to marry persons other than co-
employees. Hence, it is not the marital status of the employee, per se, that is
being discriminated. It is only intended to carry out its no-employment-for-
relatives-within-the-third-degree-policy which is within the ambit of the
prerogatives of management.[16]
It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in
the same company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy.
Companies adopt these policies to prevent the hiring of unqualified persons
based on their status as a relative, rather than upon their ability. [17] These
policies focus upon the potential employment problems arising from the
perception of favoritism exhibited towards relatives.
With more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting
employment policies specifically prohibiting spouses from working for the
same company. We note that two types of employment policies involve
spouses: policies banning only spouses from working in the same
company (no-spouse employment policies), and those banning all
immediate family members, including spouses, from working in the same
company (anti-nepotism employment policies).[18]
Unlike in our jurisdiction where there is no express prohibition on marital
discrimination,[19] there are twenty state statutes[20] in the United
States prohibiting marital discrimination. Some state courts[21] have been
confronted with the issue of whether no-spouse policies violate their laws
prohibiting both marital status and sex discrimination.
In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States,
complainants utilize two theories of employment discrimination:
the disparate treatment and the disparate impact. Under the disparate
treatment analysis, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is
discriminatory on its face. No-spouse employment policies requiring an
employee of a particular sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially
discriminatory. For example, an employment policy prohibiting the employer
from hiring wives of male employees, but not husbands of female employees,
is discriminatory on its face.[22]
On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the complainants must
prove that a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular
class. For example, although most employment policies do not expressly
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
indicate which spouse will be required to transfer or leave the company, the
policy often disproportionately affects one sex.[23]
The state courts rulings on the issue depend on their interpretation of the scope
of marital status discrimination within the meaning of their respective civil rights
acts. Though they agree that the term marital status encompasses
discrimination based on a person's status as either married, single, divorced,
or widowed, they are divided on whether the term has
a broader meaning. Thus, their decisions vary.[24]
The courts narrowly[25] interpreting marital status to refer only to a person's
status as married, single, divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature
intended a broader definition it would have either chosen different language or
specified its intent. They hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is married rather
than to whom one is married. They construe marital status discrimination to
include only whether a person is single, married, divorced, or widowed and not
the identity, occupation, and place of employment of one's spouse. These
courts have upheld the questioned policies and ruled that they did not violate
the marital status discrimination provision of their respective state statutes.
The courts that have broadly[26] construed the term marital status rule that it
encompassed the identity, occupation and employment of one's spouse. They
strike down the no-spouse employment policies based on the broad legislative
intent of the state statute. They reason that the no-spouse employment policy
violate the marital status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against
all spouses of present employees without regard to the actual effect on the
individual's qualifications or work performance.[27] These courts also find the
no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to present any
evidence of business necessity other than the general perception that
spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the business.[28] They
hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification[29]
invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current
employment of the other spouse in the same office.[30] Thus, they rule that
unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business
require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or
acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an
employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of
the employees spouse.[31] This is known as the bona fide occupational
qualification exception.
We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies
an employers no-spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly
by these state courts. There must be a compelling business necessity for
which no alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice.[32] To justify
a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors:
(1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential
operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing
Page 37 of 49
that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable
to properly perform the duties of the job.[33]
The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not foreign in our
jurisdiction. We employ the standard of reasonableness of the company
policy which is parallel to the bona fide occupational qualification requirement.
In the recent case of Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro
Tecson v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,[34] we passed on the validity of
the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from
marrying employees of any competitor company. We held that Glaxohas a
right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies
and other confidential programs and information from competitors. We
considered the prohibition against personal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees reasonable
under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of Glaxo. In laying down the assailed company
policy, we recognized that Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the
possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and
procedures.[35]
The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable under the
circumstances to qualify as a valid exercise of management prerogative was
also at issue in the 1997 case of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Company v. NLRC.[36] In said case, the employee was dismissed in violation
of petitioners policy of disqualifying from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage. We held that the company policy violates the right against
discrimination afforded all women workers under Article 136 of the Labor
Code, but established a permissible exception, viz.:
[A] requirement that a woman employee must remain
unmarried could be justified as a bona fide occupational
qualification, or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of
the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a
general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in
the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid
provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance.[37] (Emphases
supplied.)
The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the requirement of
reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the questioned
employment policy. The employer has the burden to prove the existence of a
reasonable business necessity. The burden was successfully discharged
in Duncan but not in PT&T.
We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
Petitioners sole contention that the company did not just want to have
two (2) or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity
and/or consanguinity[38] is lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give
teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule[39] is evidently not the valid
reasonable business necessity required by the law.
It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired
after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married
a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a
Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the
Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither
did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in the case
of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who
married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is
premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less
efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid justification, the
employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a
perceived danger at the expense of an employees right to security of tenure.
Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee
marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-
employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the
Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate
impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it
is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The
failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the
questioned policy cannot prejudice the employees right to be free from
arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working
together in one company.[40]
Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital
discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection
given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently
draw inferences from the legislatures silence[41] that married persons are not
protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a
prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed
proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is
an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to
whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become
moot and academic.
As to respondent Estrella, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their
ruling on the singular fact that her resignation letter was written in her own
handwriting. Both ruled that her resignation was voluntary and thus valid. The
respondent court failed to categorically rule whether Estrella voluntarily
resigned but ordered that she be reinstated along with Simbol and Comia.
Page 38 of 49
 Estrella claims that she was pressured to submit a resignation letter
because she was in dire need of money. We examined the records of the case
and find Estrellascontention to be more in accord with the evidence. While
findings of fact by administrative tribunals like the NLRC are generally given
not only respect but, at times, finality, this rule admits of exceptions, [42] as in
the case at bar.

Estrella avers that she went back to work on December 21, 1999 but
was dismissed due to her alleged immoral conduct. At first, she did not want
to sign the termination papers but she was forced to tender her resignation
letter in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.

The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign

because she got impregnated by a married man and she could not stand being
looked upon or talked about as immoral[43] is incredulous. If she really wanted
to avoid embarrassment and humiliation, she would not have gone back to
work at all. Nor would she have filed a suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for
reinstatement. We have held that in voluntary resignation, the employee is
compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate himself from employment. It is
done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of
abandonment. [44] Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a
complaint for illegal dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the part
of petitioners that the resignation was voluntary, Estrellas dismissal is
declared illegal.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

SP No. 73477 dated August 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1 Page 39 of 49

[6]
G.R. No. 168081 October 17, 2008
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Common Carriers; Air
Transportation; Weight Standards; Obesity; An employee may be dismissed the
moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight
standards—the dismissal would fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.—A
reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that
they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job.
Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with
his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee
would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA: x x x
[T]he standards violated in this case were not mere “orders” of the employer; they
were the “prescribed weights” that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for
and keep his or her position in the company. In other words, they were standards that
establish continuing qualifications for an employee’s position. In this sense, the
failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express
terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The
failure to meet the employer’s qualifying standardsis in fact a ground that does not
squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article
282(e)—the “other causes analogous to the foregoing.” By its nature, these “qualifying
standards” are norms that apply prior to and afteran employee is hired. They
apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must
initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must
continue to meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this
perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed
pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the employee can be dismissed simply
because he no longer “qualifies” for his job irrespective of whether or not the failure
to qualify was willful or intentional. x x x
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The obesity of a cabin crew, when
placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause
under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service—
his obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary.—In fine, We hold that
the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant,
becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his
dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless
voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means that the just
cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282,
whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual
neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element
of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
(BFOQ) Defense; Words and Phrases; Employment in particular jobs may not be
limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer
can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing
the job—qualification referred to as bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).—
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex,
religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national
origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called
a bona fideoccupational qualification (BFOQ). In the United States, there are a few
federal and many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an
employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when
the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a business or
enterprise.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Meiorin Test”; The
Constitution, the Labor Code, and RA No. 7277 or the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons contain provisions similar to Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ);
The test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ)—Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
(BFOQ) is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance; Under the “Meiorin Test,” (1) the employer must show
that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of
the job, (2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to
the accomplishment of that work-related purpose, and, (3) the employer must establish
that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-
related purpose.—Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not
exist if there is no statute providing for it. Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute
that could justify his dismissal. Both arguments must fail. First, the Constitution, the
Labor Code, and RA No. 7277 or the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons contain
provisions similar to BFOQ. Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee
Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and Service
Employee’s Union (BCGSEU), 3 SCRA 3 (1999), the Supreme Court of Canada
adopted the so-called “Meiorin Test” in determining whether an employment policy is
justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for
a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; (2) the employer must
establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that work-
related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably
necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly,
in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, 487 SCRA 228 (2006), this Court held that in
order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment
qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and
(2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting
Page 40 of 49
the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. In short,
the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ.
BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance.”
Same; Same; Same; Civil Law; A common carrier, from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence
for the safety of the passengers it transports.—There is no merit to the argument that
BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supporting statute. Too, the Labor Arbiter, NLRC,
and CA are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common
carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to
observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports. It is
bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances. The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a
common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show
its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of
being a common carrier.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The weight standards of an airline should be viewed
as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees—the primary objective of
said airline in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety,
for it cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in
order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when
something goes wrong.—The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has
committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must
necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are
on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict
norms of discipline upon its employees. In other words, the primary objective of PAL
in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be
gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire
passenger confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes
wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common carriers,
thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People, especially the riding
public, expect no less than that airline companies transport their passengers to their
respective destinations safely and soundly. A lesser performance is unacceptable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not
limited to serving meals or attending to the whims and caprices of the passengers—
passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant; On board an aircraft,
the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to consider in case
of emergency—aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit
doors.—The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or
attending to the whims and caprices of the passengers. The most important activity of
the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft
when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin
attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
open emergency doors, the agility to attend to passengers in cramped working
conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules. On board an
aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to consider
in case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and
exit doors. Thus, the arguments of respondent that “[w]hether the airline’s flight
attendants are overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission of transporting
passengers to their destination”; and that the weight standards “has nothing to do with
airworthiness of respondent’s airlines,” must fail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; That an obese cabin attendant
occupies more space than a slim one is an unquestionable fact which courts can
judicially recognize without introduction of evidence—it would also be absurd to
require airline companies to reconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the aisles and
exit doors just to accommodate overweight cabin attendants; The biggest problem with
an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding passengers from
evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for it—being overweight necessarily
impedes mobility.—There is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform
their task. That an obese cabin attendant occupies more space than a slim one is an
unquestionable fact which courts can judicially recognize without introduction of
evidence. It would also be absurd to require airline companies to reconfigure the
aircraft in order to widen the aisles and exit doors just to accommodate overweight
cabin attendants like petitioner. The biggest problem with an overweight cabin
attendant is the possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft, should
the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily
get the passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes
mobility. Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are what cabin attendants are
dealing with, not minutes. Three lost seconds can translate into three lost lives.
Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-bodied cabin attendant is blocking
the narrow aisles. These possibilities are not remote.
Estoppel; Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be done.—
Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL
were made known to him prior to his employment. He is presumed to know the weight
limit that he must maintain at all times. In fact, never did he question the authority of
PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod
convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be done. Kung ang
tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.
Administrative Law; Appeals; Factual findings of administrative agencies do
not have infallibility and must be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.—
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC, are accorded respect, even finality. The reason is simple:
administrative agencies are experts in matters within their specific and specialized
jurisdiction. But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only applies if the findings
of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that
administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature so as to compel
a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be reversed.
Page 41 of 49
Factual findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set
aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.
Bill of Rights; Equal Protection Clause; In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked—the Bill
of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.—To make his
claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty of the
Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is
not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, which is the source of our
equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no
shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions,
no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.
Labor Law; Payroll Reinstatement; The option to exercise actual reinstatement
or payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer.—The law is very clear. Although
an award or order of reinstatement is self-executory and does not require a writ of
execution, the option to exercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs
to the employer. It does not belong to the employee, to the labor tribunals, or even to
the courts.
Same; Separation Pay; Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally
dismissed employee as an act “social justice,” or based on “equity”—in both
instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct, and (2)
does not reflect on the moral character of the employee.—A legally dismissed
employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may be deduced from the language of
Article 279 of the Labor Code that “[a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits
or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.” Luckily for petitioner, this is not
an ironclad rule. Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed
employee as an act “social justice,” or based on “equity.” In both instances, it is
required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does not reflect
on the moral character of the employee. Here, We grant petitioner separation pay
equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service. It should include
regular allowances which he might have been receiving. We are not blind to the fact
that he was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect
on his moral character. We also recognize that his employment with PAL lasted for
more or less a decade.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
REYES, R.T., J.:
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward
who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of
the airline company.
He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari
claiming that he was illegally dismissed. To buttress his stance, he argues that
(1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing
adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide
occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against
because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being
disciplined.
After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the
legality of dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of
the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because
his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
character.
The Facts
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight
steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches
(58) with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and
body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds,
as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual[1] of PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL
advised him to go on an extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to
March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to
meet the companys weight standards, prompting another leave without pay
from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.
After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to
work. But petitioners weight problem recurred. He again went on leave without
pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his
ideal weight. In line with company policy, he was removed from flight duty
effective May 6, 1989to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim down
to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several
dates. He was also told that he may avail of the services of the company
physician should he wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be
evaluated on July 3, 1989.[2]
Page 42 of 49
 On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was
discovered that he gained, instead of losing, weight. He was overweight at 215
pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status
was retained.
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally
visited petitioner at his residence to check on the progress of his effort to lose
weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous
weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitment[3] to reduce weight in a
letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in
full, reads:
Dear Sir:
I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a
weight loss from 217 pounds to 200 pounds from today
until 31 Dec. 1989.
From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a
reasonable percentage until such time that my ideal weight is
achieved.
Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office
at the designated time schedule you will set for my weight
check.
Respectfully Yours,
F/S Armando Yrasuegui[4]
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal
weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed
of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he
satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to
report every two weeks for weight checks.
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given
one more month to comply with the weight requirement. As usual, he was
asked to report for weight check on different dates. He was reminded that his
grounding would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight
standards.[5]
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was
seen submitting his passport for processing at the PAL Staff Service Division.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated
refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was
given another set of weight check dates.[6] Again, petitioner ignored the
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
directive and did not report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner
was required to explain his refusal to undergo weight checks.[7]
When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212
pounds. Clearly, he was still way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up
his case requesting for leniency on the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219
pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of
Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight
requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within
which to file his answer and submit controverting evidence.[8]
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer.[9] Notably, he
did not deny being overweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his
violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL since no action has been
taken by the company regarding his case since 1988. He also claimed
that PAL discriminated against him because the company has not been fair in
treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated.
On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where
petitioner manifested that he was undergoing a weight reduction program to
lose at least two (2) pounds per week so as to attain his ideal weight.[10]
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due
to his inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost leniency
extended to him which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5)
years, his services were considered terminated effective immediately.[11]
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,[12] petitioner filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL.
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions
On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled[13] that
petitioner was illegally dismissed. The dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs
as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered, declaring the complainants dismissal illegal,
and ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his former
position or substantially equivalent one, and to pay him:
Page 43 of 49
 a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his
dismissal on June 15, 1993 until reinstated, which for
purposes of appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up
to August 15, 1998 at P651,000.00;
b. Attorneys fees of five percent (5%) of the total
award.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are
reasonable in view of the nature of the job of petitioner.[15] However, the weight
standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight
did not hamper the performance of his duties.[16] Assuming that it did, petitioner
could be transferred to other positions where his weight would not be a
negative factor.[17] Notably, other overweight employees, i.e., Mr. Palacios, Mr.
Cui, and Mr. Barrios, were promoted instead of being disciplined.[18]
Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).[19]
On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution
directing the reinstatement of petitioner without loss of seniority rights and
other benefits.[20]
On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied[21] the Motion to Quash
Writ of Execution[22] of PAL.
On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to
the NLRC.[23]
On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment[24] in the following
tenor:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision
of the Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as modified by our
findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part of the
dispositive portion of said decision concerning complainants
entitlement to backwages shall be deemed to refer to
complainants entitlement to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent instead of simply backwages, from date of
dismissal until his actual reinstatement or finality hereof.
Respondent is enjoined to manifests (sic) its choice of the
form of the reinstatement of complainant, whether physical or
through payroll within ten (10) days from notice failing which,
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
the same shall be deemed as complainants reinstatement
through payroll and execution in case of non-payment shall
accordingly be issued by the Arbiter. Both appeals of
respondent thus, are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.[25]
According to the NLRC, obesity, or the tendency to gain weight
uncontrollably regardless of the amount of food intake, is a disease in
itself.[26] As a consequence, there can be no intentional defiance or serious
misconduct by petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.[27]
Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to
be reasonable. However, it found as unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding
that petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as flight steward
despite being overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should
have limited himself to the issue of whether the failure of petitioner to attain his
ideal weight constituted willful defiance of the weight standards of PAL.[28]
PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.[29] Thus, PAL elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[30]
By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed[31] the NLRC:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby
GRANT the petition. The assailed NLRC decision is declared
NULL and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private
respondents complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[32]
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NLRC because it looked at wrong and irrelevant considerations [33] in
evaluating the evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight
standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employees
position.[34] The failure to adhere to the weight standards is an analogous
cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code
in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed
to suggest.[35] Said the CA, the element of willfulness that the NLRC decision
cites is an irrelevant consideration in arriving at a conclusion on whether the
dismissal is legally proper.[36] In other words, the relevant question to ask is
not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard and whether
or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify under this standard.[37]
Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards
of PAL are reasonable.[38] Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he
repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards.[39] It is obvious that
Page 44 of 49
the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of
escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.[40]
On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[41] Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA held that the weight
standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational qualification which, in case of
violation, justifies an employees separation from the service. [42]
Issues
In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER
PARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE
BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ)
DEFENSE;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT
UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS
DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN
ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR
PROMOTED;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE
PETITIONERS CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND]
WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING MOOT AND
ACADEMIC.[43] (Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article
282(e) [44] of the Labor Code.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion
than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to
keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is
unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight
standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e)
of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere
orders of the employer; they were the prescribed weights that
a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep
his or her position in the company. In other words, they
were standards that establish continuing qualifications for
an employees position. In this sense, the failure to maintain
these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose
express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be
a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the
employers qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does
not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one
that falls under Article 282(e) the other causes analogous to
the foregoing.
By its nature, these qualifying standards are norms that
apply prior to and after an employee is hired. They
apply prior to employment because these are the standards
a job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired. They
apply after hiring because an employee must continue to
meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his
job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the faults
for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a)
to (d) of Article 282; the employee can be dismissed simply
because he no longer qualifies for his job irrespective of
whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or
intentional. x x x[45]
Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that
obesity is a physical abnormality and/or illness.[46] Relying
on Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,[47] he says his dismissal is illegal:
Conscious of the fact that Naduras case cannot be made to
fall squarely within the specific causes enumerated in
subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of
subparagraph 1(f) and says that Naduras illness occasional
attacks of asthma is a cause analogous to them.
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under
consideration is sufficient to convince anyone that, as the trial
Page 45 of 49
 court said, illness cannot be included as an analogous cause
by any stretch of imagination.
It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-
paragraph 1(a), all the others expressly enumerated in the law
are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the
employee. How Nadurasillness could be considered as
analogous to any of them is beyond our understanding, there
being no claim or pretense that the same was contracted
through his own voluntary act.[48]
The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is
substantially different from the case at bar. First, Nadura was not decided
under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No.
1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale
there cannot apply here. Third, in Nadura, the employee who was
a miner, was laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner
was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not
dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is whether
or not the dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and
damages. Here, the issue centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner
for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the
employee was not accorded due process. Here, petitioner was accorded
utmost leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to comply with the
weight standards of PAL.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners
claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from
1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the
proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during
the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that
[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then
the answer is yes. I can do it now.[49]
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him a lot of
expenses.[50] However, petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have
easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice
of PAL.[51] He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to
report when required to undergo weight checks, without offering a valid
explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather
than an illness.
Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of
Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals,[52] decided by the United States
Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from 1978 to 1980
and from 1981 to 1986 as an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded
at the Ladd Center that was being operated by respondent. She twice resigned
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
voluntarily with an unblemished record. Even respondent admitted that her
performance met the Centers legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook re-
applied for a similar position. At that time, she stood 52 tall and weighed over
320 pounds. Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintiff
compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of emergency and it also
put her at greater risk of serious diseases.
Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to
discrimination on the basis of a handicap. This was in direct violation of Section
504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,[53] which incorporates the remedies
contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed,
however, that morbid obesity could never constitute a handicap within the
purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesity is a mutable
condition, thus plaintiff could simply lose weight and rid herself of concomitant
disability.
The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a
disability under the Rehabilitation Act and that respondent discriminated
against Cook based on perceived disability. The evidence included expert
testimony that morbid obesity is a physiological disorder. It involves a
dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the neurological appetite
suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing adverse effects within
the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the
Court stated that mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of
the limitation flowing from a given impairment, thus mutability only precludes
those conditions that an individual can easily and quickly reverse by behavioral
alteration.
Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words
of the District Court for the District of Rhode Island, Cook was sometime before
1978 at least one hundred pounds more than what is considered appropriate
of her height. According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed over 320 pounds
in 1988. Clearly, that is not the case here.At his heaviest, petitioner was only
less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the
context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under
Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the
service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As
the CA correctly puts it, [v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is
solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or
controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article
282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it
lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).[54]
Page 46 of 49
 II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide
occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex,
religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or
national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification
is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). [55] In the United States,
there are a few federal and many state job discrimination laws that contain an
exception allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of
prohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to
the normal operation of a business or enterprise.[56]
Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist
if there is no statute providing for it.[57] Further, there is no existing BFOQ
statute that could justify his dismissal.[58]
Both arguments must fail.
First, the Constitution,[59] the Labor Code,[60] and RA No. 7277[61] or
the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons[62] contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission
(BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and Service Employees
Union (BCGSEU),[63] the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-
called Meiorin Test in determining whether an employment policy is
justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the
standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the
job;[64] (2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably
necessary[65] to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the
employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to
accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper
Corporation v. Simbol,[66] this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the
employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably
related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is
factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. [67]
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used
because it is parallel to BFOQ.[68] BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an inherent
quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.[69]
In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome
Philippines, Inc.,[70] the Court did not hesitate to pass upon the validity of a
company policy which prohibits its employees from marrying employees of a
rival company. It was held that the company policy is reasonable considering
that its purpose is the protection of the interests of the company against
possible competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and procedures.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied
if it has no supporting statute. Too, the Labor Arbiter,[71] NLRC,[72] and
CA[73] are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A
common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public
policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers it transports.[74] It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.[75]
The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a
common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight standards of
PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by
law by virtue of being a common carrier.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed
itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must
necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew
who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed
as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the
weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin
attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger
confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes
wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common
carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People,
especially the riding public, expect no less than that airline companiestransport
their passengers to their respective destinations safely and soundly. A lesser
performance is unacceptable.
The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving
meals or attending to the whims and caprices of the passengers. The most
important activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and
the evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety
goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin
attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the
agility to attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina
to withstand grueling flight schedules.
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant
are important factors to consider in case of emergency. Aircrafts have
constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the
arguments of respondent that [w]hether the airlines flight attendants are
overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission of transporting
passengers to their destination; and that the weight standards has nothing to
do with airworthiness of respondents airlines, must fail.
Page 47 of 49
 The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell[76] relied upon by
petitioner cannot apply to his case. What was involved there were two (2)
airline pilots who were denied reassignment as flight engineers upon reaching
the age of 60, and a flight engineer who was forced to retire at age 60. They
sued the airline company, alleging that the age-60 retirement for flight
engineers violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Age-
based BFOQ and being overweight are not the same. The case of overweight
cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped cabin space and
narrow aisles and emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin
attendant would certainly have difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area.
In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform
their task. That an obese cabin attendant occupies more space than a slim one
is an unquestionable fact which courts can judicially recognize without
introduction of evidence.[77] It would also be absurd to require airline
companies to reconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the aisles and exit doors
just to accommodate overweight cabin attendants like petitioner.
The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the
possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft, should the
occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to
speedily get the passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being overweight
necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are
what cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost seconds can
translate into three lost lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-
bodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles. These possibilities are
not remote.
Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight
standards of PAL were made known to him prior to his employment. He is
presumed to know the weight limit that he must maintain at all times. [78] In
fact, never did he question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly
asked to trim down his weight. Bona fides exigit ut quodconvenit fiat. Good
faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be
done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.
Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight
limitations based on height and body frame for both male and female cabin
attendants. A progressive discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant cabin
attendants sufficient opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-
cut rules obviate any possibility for thecommission of abuse or arbitrary action
on the part of PAL.
III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was
discriminated against by PAL.
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a
convenient excuse to discriminate against him.[79] We are constrained,
however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that [t]he element of
discrimination came into play in this case as a secondary position for the
private respondent in order to escape the consequence of dismissal that being
overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance position that impliedly
admitted the cause of dismissal, including the reasonableness of the
applicable standard and the private respondents failure to comply.[80] It is a
basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.[81]
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an
affirmative allegation, petitioner has to prove his allegation with particularity.
There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of
discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply
naming the supposed cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly situated
with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly
situated and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the
similarity of his situation with other employees.
Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin
attendants, petitioner miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights;
weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite
their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the
discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant data that could
have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the
words of the CA, PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to
meet.[82]
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies,
like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are accorded respect, even finality.[83]
The reason is simple: administrative agencies are experts in matters within
their specific and specialized jurisdiction.[84] But the principle is not a hard and
fast rule. It only applies if the findings of facts are duly supported by substantial
evidence. If it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated
evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their
findings of facts must necessarily be reversed. Factual findings of
administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set aside when
they fail the test of arbitrariness.[85]
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated
evidence. We thus annul their findings.
To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal
protection clause guaranty[86] of the Constitution. However, in the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be invoked.[87] Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals.[88] Indeed, the United States Supreme
Page 48 of 49
Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,[89] which is the source of our
equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection
erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful.[90] Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal
protection guarantee.[91]
IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are
moot.
As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and
wages have not been mooted. He is entitled to reinstatement and his full
backwages, from the time he was illegally dismissed up to the time that the
NLRC was reversed by the CA.[92]
At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the
reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be
executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either
be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at
the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.
The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement provided herein.
The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is
self-executory and does not require a writ of execution,[93] the option to
exercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the
employer. It does not belong to the employee, to the labor tribunals, or even
to the courts.
Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL did everything under
the sun to frustrate his immediate return to his previous position,[94] there is
evidence that PAL opted to physically reinstate him to a substantially
equivalent position in accordance with the order of the Labor
Arbiter.[95] In fact, petitioner duly received the return to work notice on February
23, 2001, as shown by his signature.[96]
Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a
case[97] that [t]he unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the dismissed
employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the
employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution[98]
and even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the
wages of the employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher
Human Rights Law – Assignment No. 1
court.[99] He failed to prove that he complied with the return to work order of
PAL. Neither does it appear on record that he actually rendered services for
PAL from the moment he was dismissed, in order to insist on the payment of
his full backwages.
In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being
overweight, petitioner in effect wants to render the issues in the present case
moot. He asks PAL to comply with the impossible. Time and again, the Court
ruled that the law does not exact compliance with the impossible.[100]
V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.
Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation
pay. This may be deduced from the language of Article 279 of the Labor Code
that [a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him
up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Luckily for petitioner, this is not an
ironclad rule.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed
employee as an act social justice,[101] or based on equity.[102] In both instances,
it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2)
does not reflect on the moral character of the employee.[103]
Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2)
months pay for every year of service.[104] It should include regular allowances
which he might have been receiving.[105] We are not blind to the fact that he
was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect
on his moral character. We also recognize that his employment with PAL
lasted for more or less a decade.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in that petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled
to separation pay in an amount equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for
every year of service, which should include his regular allowances.
SO ORDERED.
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