Πολυτροπία as exegetical criterion according to Antisthenes: a brief history of ἀλήθεια and δόξα

José Manuel Durón-García

1. « If the wise men are clever in discourse, they also know how to speak the same thought in
many ways: and, knowing many ways of accounts about the same thing they would be
polytropic. And if the wise are also good, for this reason he [Homer] says that Odysseus, being
wise, is polytropic, because he of course knew how to converse with people in many ways »

εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ δεινοί εἰσι διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ ἐπίστανται τὸ αὐτὸ νόημα κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους
λέγειν· ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ πολλοὺς τρόπους λόγων περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πολύτροποι ἂν εἶεν . εἰ δὲ οἱ
σοφοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί εἰσι, διὰ τοῦτό φησι τὸν Ὀδυσσέα Ὅμηρος σοφὸν ὄντα πολύτροπον εἶναι, ὅτι
δὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἠπίστατο πολλοῖς τρόποις συνεῖναι. (Antisthenes, 51 DC = 187 Prince)

2. « Zeno blames none of the verses of Homer, but in the course of setting them out in detail he
teaches that Homer has written some according to opinion and other according to truth, in order
that he not appear to be contradicting himself in certain verses that seem to be said in opposition
to each other. That principle is previously from Antisthenes, that some things have been said by
the poet in opinion and some in truth. But he did not work it out, whereas he [Zeno] showed it
according to each of the parts ».

ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ Ὁμήρου ψέγει, ἅμα διηγούμενος κα ὶ διδάσκων ὅτι τ ὰ μ ὲν κατ ὰ
δόξαν τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν, ὅπως μὴ φαίνηται αὐτὸς αὑτῷ μαχόμενος ἔν τισι
δοκοῦσιν ἐναντίως εἰρήσθαι. ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος, Ἀντισθένους ἐστὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δόξῃ, τ ὰ
δὲ ἀληθείᾳ εἴρηται τῷ ποιητῇ· ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐξειργάσατο αὐτόν, ὁ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐπ ὶ
μέρους ἐδήλωσεν. (Antisthenes, 58 DC = 194 Prince)

3. « How after calling the Cyclopes outrageous and lawless and violent, dos he [the poet] say thay
good things belong to them, unenvied, from the gods? It must be said that they are called
“outrageous” on account of their preminence of the body, and that those peoples who do not use
a written law that are called “lawless” because each person rules his own things: indeed, “each
lays ordinances for his children and wife”, which is itself a sign of good governance. And
Antisthenes says that only Polyphemus is unjust: for he is truly a disdainer of Zeus: the rest,
then, are just: for because of this also the earth produces everything for them spontaneously: not
to work the earth is a just deed »

πῶς ὑπερφιάλους καὶ ἀθεμίστους καὶ παρανόμους εἰπὼν τοὺς Κύκλωπας ἄφθονα παρὰ θεῶν
αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν λέγει τὰ ἀγαθά; ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι ὑπερφιάλους μὲν διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχ ὴν το ῦ
σώματος, ἀθεμίστους δὲ τοὺς μὴ νόμῳ χρωμένους ἐγγράφῳ διὰ τὸ ἕκαστον ἴδιον ἄρχεσθαι·
“θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἠδ’ ἀλόχου”, ὅπερ ἀνομίας σημεῖον. Ἀντισθένης δέ φησιν ὅτι
μόνον τὸν Πολύφημον εἶναι ἄδικον· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τοῦ Διὸς ὑπερόπτης ἐστίν. οὐκο ῦν οἱ λοιποὶ
δίκαιοι· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῖς τὰ πάντα ἀναδιδόναι αὐτόματον, κα ὶ τὸ μὴ
ἐργάζεσθαι αὐτὴν δίκαιον ἔργον ἐστίν (Antisthenes 53 DC = 189A-1 Prince)

4. « It is the seeming that masters the truth »

τὸ δοκεῖν καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται (Scholia in Euripidem Orest. 236 ; Platon, Resp., 365 c1-2)
5. « It is right that you learn all things—
both the unshaken heart of well-persuasive1 Truth
and the beliefs of mortals, in which there is no true trust.
But nevertheless you will learn these too—how it were
right that the things that seem
be reliably, being indeed, the whole of things. »

χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι,

ἠμὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, τῇς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.
ἀλλ᾿ ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα
χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα. (Parmenides, DK Fr. 1, 28a-32)

5. « Certainly, for that has a semblance of health;

and the semblance is preferable, though it is far from the truth. »

μάλιστα· δόξαν γὰρ τόδ’ ὑγιείας ἔχει·

κρεῖσσον δὲ τὸ δοκεῖν, κἂν ἀληθείας ἀπῆι. (Euripides, Orestes, 235)