Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Shepherd1994 Music Culture and Interdisciplinarity
Shepherd1994 Music Culture and Interdisciplinarity
http://journals.cambridge.org/PMU
John Shepherd
Introduction
This special issue of Popular Music honours the contribution of a distinguished
musicologist to the study of popular music. It was Wilfrid Mellers who, together
with Charles Hamm, pioneered the study of popular music as a respectable under-
taking within musicology before popular music studies itself began to become a
continuing and critical intellectual tradition in the late 1970s. As with Charles
Hamm, Wilfrid Mellers' contribution to the study of popular music has not been
restricted to scholarship alone. As founding Chair of the Department of Music at
the University of York, Wilfrid Mellers created an intellectual and institutional
environment within which it was possible for undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents alike to undertake the serious academic study of popular music. Without
this environment it is possible that the careers both of Richard Middleton and
myself would have turned out differently.
There is therefore a link between the career of the scholar being honoured
in this special issue and the genesis of popular music studies as a tradition with
its own problematics and trajectories. Mellers' role as an advisory editor of Popular
Music is emblematic of this link. Popular Music has itself played a central role in
establishing popular music studies as an independent and continuing tradition.
But Mellers' career and the genesis of popular music studies as a discipline
were born of different moments in English cultural and intellectual life. Wilfrid
Mellers' orientation as a thinker and writer was fundamentally influenced by the
Leavisite tradition which made such an important impact on intellectual and cul-
tural life in England during the 1930s and 1940s. The establishing of popular music
studies as a continuing and critical intellectual tradition was born of the cultural
contradictions of the 1960s, not only in England but, equally and as importantly,
in the USA and continental Europe.
The honouring of a scholar such as Wilfrid Mellers provides an opportunity
to look back and take stock of a long and distinguished career. It is interesting,
for example, to go back and read again Mellers' contributions to Scrutiny and
other early work such as Music and Society (Mellers 1946). Re-reading this work
emphasises that Mellers' later concern with the study of popular music grew out
of and formed an integral aspect of wider interests to do with relations between
music, culture and society.
127
Cultural dislocation
What I brought with me to Canada was the experience of growing up as a middle-
class teenager in Britain during the early and mid-1960s. This period in Britain
was in some but not all respects equivalent to that of the mid-1950s in the United
States. This period in the United States - the years of Eisenhower - saw the advent
of rock 'n' roll, the musical and cultural phenomenon which has been assumed
by so many to have shaken to the core both the music industry and the established
cultural, moral and social norms of the American mainstream. With the benefit of
hindsight, it is now possible to understand those years in a rather more balanced
manner. Lawrence Grossberg has recently observed that'. . . it is simply mistaken
to assume that rock was, in any significant way, outside of the political mainstream
of American culture'. Rock, he continues, 'did not challenge the ideological con-
sensus of American life but it did attempt to escape the quietism of culture and
everyday life'. This, concludes Grossberg, 'has in fact always been the limits of
rock's politics' (Grossberg 1991, p. 359).
Grossberg's observations apply equally well to the Britain of the early 1960s.
The post-war period in Britain witnessed some major cultural realignments. Britain
was divesting itself of its empire and needed to expand its home markets. I dis-
tinctly remember the advent of consumer credit in the form of the hire-purchase
agreement, and my parents' distaste for this latest form of American commercial-
ism designed specifically to lead the helpless working classes astray. Britain,
indeed, was experiencing an incursion of American mass culture and American-
style mass consumerism at this time, partially as a consequence of the presence
of American troops during the Second World War.
Working-class culture in Britain has a history extending back at least as far
as the nineteenth century. As Iain Chambers has observed, urban popular culture
in Britain had 'borne all the signs of a modern entertainment industry for quite
some time. All the tendencies evident in the contemporary situation', concludes
Chambers (in writing of the 1950s), 'in particular those that go under the rubric
of "commercialism", were already present in urban British popular culture by
1880' (Chambers 1985, pp. 6-7). Credit - and a changing economic situation that
later led Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to observe that the British had never
'had it so good' - resulted in British working-class popular culture becoming more
public and open to middle-class scrutiny. And it became more public in alliance
with the colourful and brash American popular culture which was being fed to
the British through the mass media and the increasingly multinational character
of capital. The working classes in Britain had since the turn of the century
embraced and enjoyed American culture, whether through Hollywood, music or
dance. The middle classes had consistently resisted and denied it, as the history of
the British Broadcasting Corporation to this point illustrates. There was therefore
nothing new about this alliance in the 1950s except its increasingly public character.
It was this alliance, involving the culture of Elvis, rock and jive that led to 'acid
but apprehensive' rebuttals from middle-class cultural critics. In the opinion of
Conservative Charles Curran, the life of the working classes was:
. . . without point or quality, a vulgar world whose inhabitants have more money than is
good for them, barbarism with electric light . . . a cockney tellytopia, a low grade nirvana
of subsidised houses, hire purchase extravagance, undisciplined children, gaudy domestic
squalor, and chips with everything (quoted in Chambers 1985, p. 4).
It was in the context of this shifting cultural terrain that my own generation and
class of young people entered adolescence in the early 1960s. We had two things
in common with our American peers of the mid-1950s. We entered adolescence in
a period of new prosperity and in the presence of a unified discipline and cultural
homogeneity that was the legacy of the Second World War and not of our own
making. I remember the 1950s as cold, grey and depressing. My father and other
men like him went to work in dark grey suits, white shirts, subdued monochrome
ties, polished black shoes and short back and sides as if public morality itself
depended on it. The breakthrough was in the early 1960s, when my father was
allowed to wear a sports jacket, grey flannel trousers, brown shoes (polished, of
course), checked shirts and slightly brighter ties to attend work - but only on
Saturday mornings. The short back and sides remained.
The conservative attitudes and conservative values of our parents' generation
seemed curiously out of step to us. There was little biographical experience in
terms of which to understand the traditional British middle-class reaction to Amer-
ican culture and to the attraction it held for the British working classes. There
seemed to be nothing intrinsically wrong with colour and fun, and no need to be
so unremittingly serious. For many of us there was a curious feeling of cultural
dislocation. The cultures of other classes and other societies held more attraction
for us than the culture of our parents' generation. This was the dislocation that
fuelled the marketplace for the Beatles, Carnaby Street and Twiggy. Life's ques-
tions and life's experiences did not seem to be addressed adequately by the diet
of unexceptionably 'highbrow' culture fed to us by the education system and the
British Broadcasting Corporation. Another form of expression was required that
would relocate the mainstream of British and, more specifically, English life to
accommodate the shifting cultural terrain of the late 1950s and early 1960s. That
was what the Beatles achieved with a musical and cultural synthesis rooted so
cleverly in the safety and sentimentality of British music hall and the colour and
sexuality of recent American culture. The scale of the Beatles' success, observes
Chambers:
not unconnected to their rapid acceptance into the existing canons of taste, was built upon
a tangential jolting of the public musical cliche. They did not dramatically tear up Tin Pan
Alley and previous popular music. Their music was described as 'fresh' and 'exciting', not
'alien' and 'offensive'. Masterfully working through black and white pop traditions they
offered a novel, synthetic focus: an altered perspective, not a foreign landscape. (Chambers
1985, p. 63)
The Beatles, concludes Chambers, quickly became 'a symbolic embodiment of the
healthy, zany exuberance of British youth, Prime Minister Harold Wilson, and the
Establishment' (ibid., p. 68).
Intellectual consequences
The 1960s provided a powerful but contradictory context for any young man for
whom music formed an important aspect of both his intellectual and personal
lives. It is as a consequence of this context that, while music has always been a
part of me, the study of music has not. I was one of the first people at my second-
ary school to study music as a graduating subject. This, at a British public school
in the early 1960s, was liable to mark one out as a certain kind of person. I did
not fit the mould. For a start, I played rugby. My experience of studying something
half of each volume was a biography of the great composer, and the second half
a technical analysis of his music. There was never any explanation of how the
reader was supposed to connect the two halves of each volume. I have a suspicion
that such an explanation did not exist. As I left Carleton, I became increasingly
aware that the absence of the social in academic music was a symptom of the
solution to my problem. The social was the absent ground that would join history
and theory and make each significant to the other. Music and the individuals who
practised it were, in other words, both to be regarded as constituted socially.
If the question was formed at Carleton, then the answers began to come as
I undertook doctoral work in Britain. When I went to the University of York I was
lucky enough to live in the college that housed the Department of Sociology and
Anthropology. I did not know it at the time, but I could hardly have arrived in a
more propitious intellectual and cultural environment. The early 1970s were the
heady days of the National Deviancy Conferences, the new sociology of education
and the rise to pre-eminence of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at
the University of Birmingham. My love-hate relationship with academic music
surfaced once more. I spent more time talking to graduate sociology students and
reading books on sociology and anthropology than I did in the Department of
Music or reading books on music. I did not know it at the time, but I had disco-
vered cultural studies.
It was certainly an error to suppose that values or art-works could be adequately studied
without reference to the particular society within which they were expressed, but it is
equally an error to suppose that the social explanation is determining, or that the values
and works are mere by-products. We have got into the habit, since we realised how deeply
works or values could be determined by the whole situation in which they are expressed,
of asking about these relationships in a standard form: 'what is the relation of this art to
this society?' But 'society', in this question, is a specious whole. If the art is part of the
society, there is no solid whole, outside it, to which, by the form of our question, we
concede priority. (Williams 1965, p. 61)
If art is social, in other words, it is social in its own way, on its own terms, and
by way of making its own distinctive yet contingent contribution within specific
social and historical circumstances.
This passage has always stayed with me as a leitmotif. While music has
formed an important part of the biography of many cultural theorists, and while
many of these cultural theorists have written extensively about music and its
attendant cultures and subcultures, it is a curious fact that the development of
cultural studies has been little affected by cultural theoretical analyses of music.
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, little cultural theoretical work in music
is concerned with music's sounds. Although cultural theorists are aware of the
traditional semiological model of how sound in language works, they feel insecure
confronted with 'the forbiddingly special character of music'. Second, a majority
of cultural theoretical writings on popular music have been stamped indelibly
with the hallmark of British subcultural theory and the concept of the structural
homology, the concept according to which cultural styles and social groups are
taken to have a necessary connection. Within this tradition, the legacy of 'folk'
and 'popular' discourses can lead to the conclusion that the sounds of music
(which still remain unanalysed) are in a fixed relation to the external meanings
they articulate from within themselves. If the sounds change, then so must the
meanings. That is how music becomes inauthentic. Music, in other words, remains
answerable to extrinsic social and cultural forces.
Cultural theorists have since become rightfully suspicious of British subcul-
tural theory and the application of the structural homology to the analysis of music
as cultural style, and for two reasons. Firstly, the notion of the fixity of music's
meanings within music's sounds squares far too comfortably with the traditional
'high culture' view that music is an autonomous art form. According to this view,
both the meaning and value of music as a work of art are intrinsic to music's
sounds. Contact between the work of art and everyday social forces can result
only in the contamination of music's tonal values and therefore in inauthentic
music. This connection between the discourse of 'classical' music and the dis-
courses of the 'folk' and the 'popular' provides another illustration of the pervasive
influence of 'high culture' discourses on the understanding of other cultural forms.
As Frith has so rightly observed, 'a comparative sociology would reveal far less
clear distinctions between these worlds than their discursive values imply' (Frith
1990, p. 101).
The second reason for cultural theorists' distrust of the structural homology
is that it does not seem to allow for the negotiability of meaning necessary if
cultural style is to be understood as a social construct. The reason for this distrust
in the context of music is linked to cultural theorists' awareness of the traditional
semiological model of how sound in language works. According to this model,
the sound of a word has no necessary connection to the word's conventional
meaning. The sound of the word 'bird', for example, has nothing 'bird-like' about
it. The sound 'oiseau' calls forth the same generalised mental image with just as
much success. And it is possible to conceive of an international agreement whereby
English-language and French-language countries could arbitrarily decide to trade
the words without damage either to the underlying deep structures of the English
or French languages or the ability of these languages to successfully evoke images
of animals which fly in the sky. The sounds of language work fundamentally by
convention, in other words, and while the history of language carries with it an
imposing weight of the conventional, it nonetheless remains the case that human
worlds are constructed by people to a considerable but not exclusive extent
through language and through the way that they mutually decide to associate the
sounds of language with mental images. Language is heavily implicated in the
social. It is not separable from it, and is thus not answerable to society - to use
the words of Williams - as a 'solid whole, outside it, to which, by the form of our
question, we concede priority'.
The idea common to nearly all discourses on music - that the meanings and
values of music are somehow bound intrinsically to music's sounds - becomes a
problem for cultural theorists because this seems to imply that music's meanings,
as social constructs, are non-negotiable, a condition that paradoxically denies a
central characteristic of social behaviour. The only alternative to this idea has
seemed to be to treat sound in music as if it were sound in language. However,
to apply the traditional semiological model of how sound in language signifies to
'Ordinary' listeners are not concerned about the question of the supposedly
immanent meanings of music, in other words. They are concerned about what the
music means to them. What Frith seems to be suggesting is that if the meaning
and value of music are not located in the materials of music themselves, then the
only alternative is to locate them within the contradictory discourses through
which people make sense of and assign value to music. If the nature of this
assigning is as contentious and contradictory as it so often is, he concludes, 'if the
meaning of "good music" is so unstable how can we possibly assign it to the notes
alone?' (ibid., p. 101).
To return to the insight of Williams, it is difficult to see how music can be
social in its own way, on its own terms, and by way of making its own distinctive
yet contingent contribution within specific social and historical circumstances. A
solution to this conundrum has been provided by Peter Wicke (Wicke 1989, 1990).
Wicke has argued that music is a social medium in sound. What Wicke means by
this is that the sounds of music provide constantly moving and complex matrices
of sounds in which individuals may invest their own meanings. The critical ele-
ment in his theory is that while the matrices of sounds which seemingly constitute
an individual 'piece' of music can accommodate a range of meanings, and thereby
allow for negotiability of meaning, they cannot accommodate all possible mean-
ings. The meanings that can be successfully invested in a Beethoven symphony
would probably have a hard time with black rap music. This means that while the
meanings and values of music are not intrinsic to music's sounds - they are
intrinsic to the individuals who invest them in the sounds - music's sounds are
nonetheless heavily implicated in the construction and investment of those mean-
ings and values. The sounds of music are a medium in the scientific sense. They
do not cause meanings and they do not determine meanings. They do not even
carry meanings. The most that we can say is that they call forth meanings. How-
ever, no sounds, no meanings!
Wicke's formulation has a number of advantages. First, it dispenses with the
troublesome notion of 'authenticity', of original meaning, of the faithful expression
in sounds of something extrinsic to those sounds. In this sense, the sounds of
music communicate nothing. They can only be authentic to the particular moment
of meaning construction in which they are implicated. There can be no question
of an ultimate court of appeal for value located in the composer's presumed inten-
tions or the collective reality of a subcultural group. In this sense historical musico-
logy does have something to learn from ethnomusicology in beginning to carry out
fieldwork into the various uses of 'classical' music in different social and historical
circumstances.
Secondly, Wicke's formulation makes it extremely difficult to conceive of any
music as a 'work of art', discrete and decontextualised from particular social and
historical circumstances. While the sounds of music can travel, their meanings and
values cannot. Wicke's formulation avoids the classic error made by the majority
of academic musicians and nearly all discourses on music, and pinpointed so
accurately by Frith. Wicke does not reduce music to the condition of its sounds,
thereby implicitly removing people from the musical process and turning them
into passive consumers, able only to accept or reject music's supposedly intrinsic
meanings. Music is not an object. It is a process which occurs between the sounds
of music and the people who invest in those sounds their own meanings and
values. No people, no music!
Thirdly, Wicke's formulation demonstrates how music can be so powerful
subjectively and socially, how this power is not made up of separate antipathies,
and how the subjective and social in music are mutually necessary complements
of one another. The sounds of music encourage and restrict both idiosyncrasies
and commonalities. They provide the ground on which negotiations between the
two can be played out. In this sense, it is helpful to reformulate our language,
and to think of the sounds of music as providing the ground on which negotiations
can be played out between the internal, which is to say, subjective social world,
and the external, which is to say, public social world. The sounds of music are
both inside us and outside us at the same time.
mately the seat and the core of all social and cultural activity. The sounds of music
are ideally suited to coding homologously, and therefore to evoking powerfully
yet symbolically, the structures, rhythms and textures of the inner life of the
individual. Sound, the basis of music, reflects and articulates the internal physical
properties, the movements and the surface textures of the bodies that generate it,
whether these bodies are human bodies or bodies that result from human techno-
logy. As it goes out into the world, sound is further shaped by the structures,
movements and surface textures of the physical objects that reflect and amplify it.
The sounds of music are ideally structured to coding homologously, and therefore
to evoking powerfully yet symbolically, the structures, rhythms and textures of
the external social world. In connecting the structures, movements and textures
of the internal and external physical worlds, the sounds of music can act, homolog-
ously and symbolically, as a code, a concrete ground and pathway, for the evoca-
tion of the relationships between the inner and outer social worlds.
Our bodies, as generators and amplifiers of sounds, react sympathetically
and empathetically to sounds as produced by others. Sound is the only major
channel for human expression that vibrates actively within the human body. The
sound of the voice could not be amplified and projected were it not for chambers
or resonators of air inside the human body (the lungs, the sinus passages, the
mouth) that vibrate in sympathy with the frequencies of the vocal chords. Equally,
the human experience of sound involves, in addition to the sympathetic vibration
of the eardrums, the sympathetic vibration of the resonators of the body. Sound
is thus felt in addition to being 'heard'. As a consequence it transcends actual tactile
sensations in the sense that interpersonal tactile awareness and the particular form
of erotic experience that flows from it is generally an awareness at the surface of
the body which then finds internal resonance. Sound, however, enters the body
and is in the body.
It is possible to extrapolate from the relationship of sound and the human
body in creating music to the relationship of musical instruments and sound.
Afro-American musics have been instructive in this regard, as Middleton points
out:
One of the importances of Afro-American music lies in the fact that often the voice seems
to be treated more as an 'instrument' (the body using its own resources to make sounds) . . .
From work-song grunts through 1930s jazz styles (Louis Armstrong singing 'like a trumpet';
Billie Holiday 'like a sax') to the short mobile vocal phrases of funk and scratch textures
(used like percussion, bass or synthesiser), we hear vocal 'personality' receding as the voice
is integrated into the processes of the articulating human body. Of course, at the same
time, instruments in this tradition often sound like voices. But the often noted importance
of 'vocalised' tone is only part of a wider development in which 'instrumental' and 'vocal'
modes meet on some intermediate ground; while it is true that the instrument-as-machine
(technological extensions of the body) becomes a gesturing body (the 'voice' of the limb),
at the same time the voice-as-a-person becomes a vocal body (the body vocalising).
(Middleton 1990, p. 264)
Roland Barthes has recognised the special relationship of sound, the body and its
technological extensions in music's particular mode of articulation. However, I
find it difficult to agree with Barthes that in music the body 'speaks, it declaims,
it redoubles its voice, it speaks but says nothing: because as soon as it is musical,
speech - or its instrumental substitute - is no longer linguistic, but corporeal; it
only says and nothing else: my body is put into a state of speech: quasi parlando'
(Barthes 1975, p. 222). In referring to 'a second semiology, that of the body in a
It is not the task of music as a discipline to protect 'good' music from commercial
forces. 'Good' music is not a sanctified icon requiring protection from the hostile
forces of industrial capitalism. As Frith has observed, 'the flaw in this argument
is the suggestion that music is the starting point of the industrial process - the
raw material over which everyone fights - when it is, in fact, the final product'.
' "The industrialization of music"', concludes Frith, 'can't be understood as some-
thing that happens to music, but describes a process in which music is made -
the process, that is, which fuses (and confuses) capital, technical and musical
arguments' (Frith 1987b, p. 54).
The point here is not to valorise commercialism for its own sake any more
than it is to criticise it for its own sake. The point is that the discipline of academic
music must in principle be concerned with all the world's musics in both historical
and contemporary social circumstances. The point of value judgement is not to
decide which musics are worthy of study. Rather, the point of study is to lay an
informed basis for value judgement. In order to achieve this, the academic musi-
cian cannot restrict himself or herself purely to the notes, to biography or the
minutiae of historical circumstance. Music as opposed to its sounds can only be
understood by references to the whole range of human activity: political, eco-
nomic, religious, educational and so on. The academic musician needs to be a
polymath, not a pedant.
In becoming so, the academic musician needs to exercise a sense of the eth-
ical. In the field of ethnomusicology as in that of cultural anthropology and art
historical examinations of the work of aboriginal peoples, much has been written
and spoken on the responsibility of the scholar to his or her informants. If musico-
logists are to move from the historical to the contemporary in understanding the
social circumstances of the music they examine, then they must be equally respons-
ible. Ethnomusicologists have long since learnt that they cannot simply package
their work as what Charles Keil has termed ' "ethnographic presents" given from
one anthropologist to others in an endless kula ring of professional reciprocity'
(Keil 1979, p. 5). Equally, if we as musicologists are to understand the practice of
all kinds of music in contemporary and specific political and economic circum-
stances, then we must be prepared to be interrogated by those with whom we
work, be they in various levels of government, in technological industries or, for
that matter, in tourism. And we must be prepared to share the knowledge that
we gain, allowing the questions we ask and the answers we formulate to be shaped
by the everyday world as much as they are by the exigencies of our own
disciplines.
These observations bring the discussion close to the current rhetoric of 'social
usefulness'. This rhetoric originates from a different quarter and in a different time
from the 1960s rhetoric of 'relevance'. However, I believe they have much in
common. The notion of 'relevance' was one which tried to capture the need for a
new mainstream, for a new set of questions and for a different set of answers. I
trust I have been able to demonstrate that this need had secure roots in significant
shifts in major cultural formations. The need was not a temporary or superficial
one. This is not to say that much of a superficial nature did not come out of those
times. Nothing, perhaps, is worse than forms of interdisciplinarity which amount
to little more than mechanical mixes of seemingly common material from different
disciplines. Again, it is doubtful if students can benefit fully from interdisciplinar-
ity unless they have a secure grounding in the medium of at least one artistic or
cultural medium which makes the need for interdisciplinarity that much more
clear and evident. One thing I hope I have been able to demonstrate is that areas of
intellectual activity such as cultural studies or semiotics with clear interdisciplinary
implications and uses have to be interrogated by the disciplines to which they are
applied if, indeed, they are to be genuinely useful. Indeed, they cannot develop
without such interrogation any more than disciplines can continue to grow and
flourish without external interrogation of an interdisciplinary character. Notwith-
standing these qualifications, the point nonetheless remains that the cultural shifts
which brought these areas to the fore in the academic world had lasting
implications.
If the irritant and catalyst of the 1960s was that of trying to understand and
develop these areas against a background of intellectual conservatism, that of the
1980s and early 1990s has been that of attempting to maintain them against a
background of populist conservatism. The rhetoric of 'social usefulness' originates
in this context. However, for the reasons I have indicated, I believe that in relation
to the study of music and culture it is a rhetoric that is well taken. Once again,
the work and activities that flow from this rhetoric cannot be allowed to become
superficial or a response to the moment. Yet there is no denying that the social
and cultural shifts we have witnessed over the last fifteen years have implications
which are just as lasting and which stand up to critical examination just as much
as those of ten to twenty years previously. The academy cannot expect to have a
monopoly in interrogation when it critically examines the artistic and cultural
world around it. It must be willing to open its doors, to allow critical examination
from the outside world, and to respond in a responsible and considered manner
to such interrogation.
This discussion has been grounded in the somewhat idiosyncratic and
curious relationship I have had to my own discipline. I do not know enough to
generalise with certainty to other disciplines in art and culture. I know enough,
however, to know that the issues I have raised will carry certain resonances. There
is one resonance of which I am certain. Music is not the only academic discipline
in the arts and humanities to deal with a form of human expression that is signific-
antly iconic and 'extra-linguistic'. Having said that, however, it is clear that the
majority of disciplines in the arts and humanities, and some well established and
powerful ones at that, have objects of study which reside overwhelmingly in lan-
guage. I would argue that unless there is a balanced and fruitful dialogue between
those disciplines and disciplines such as music, art history, film studies, theatre
and dance, a valuable dimension of human awareness will not receive the attention
it should. Analyses of human expressiveness will be focused too heavily on the
cerebral at the expense of the total person in their everyday existence. Interdiscipli-
narity is not only important in ensuring that the study of art and culture remains
related to the realities of the everyday world. It is important also in ensuring that
the study of these relationships can be of intellectual consequence in their own
ways and on their own terms.
Endnote
1 This paper was first given as the Davidson inviting me to give this lecture and thus provid-
Dunton Research Lecture, Carleton University, ing me with an opportunity to reflect on aspects
1992. I am grateful to Carleton University for of the current state of my discipline.
References
Barthes, R. 1975. 'Rasch', in Langue, discours, societe, ed. J. Kristeva, J.C. Milner and N. Ruwet (Paris),
pp. 217-28
Blacking, J. 1977. 'Towards an anthropology of the body', in The Anthropology of the Body, ed. J. Blacking
(London), pp. 1-28
Chambers, I. 1985. Urban Rhythms: Pop Music and Popular Culture (New York)
Frith, S. 1987a. 'Towards an aesthetic of popular music', in Music and Society: The Politics of Composition,
Performance and Reception, ed. R. Leppert and S. McLary (Cambridge), p p . 133-50
1987b. 'The industrialisation of music', in Popular Music and Communication, ed. J. Lull (Newbury
Park), pp. 53-77
1990. 'What is good music?', in Alternative Musicologies/Les Musicologies Alternatives, ed. J. Shepherd,
special issue (10:2) of the Canadian University Music Review, p p . 92-102
Grossberg, L. 1991. 'Rock, territorialisation and power', in The Music Industry in a Changing World, ed.
W. Straw and J. Shepherd, special issue (5:3) of Cultural Studies, p p . 358-67
Keil, C. 1979. Tiv Song (Chicago)
McClary, S. 1990. 'Towards a feminist criticism of music', in Alternative Musicologies/Les Musicologies
Alternatives, ed. J. Shepherd, special issue (10:2) of the Canadian University Music Review, pp. 9-18
Mellers, W. 1946. Music and Society: England and the European Tradition (London)
Middleton, R. 1990. Studying Popular Music (Milton Keynes)
Shepherd, J. 1993. 'Popular music studies: challenges for musicology', Stanford Humanities Review, 3:2,
pp. 17-35
Wicke, P. 1989. 'Rockmusik - Dimension eines Massenmediums', Weimar Betrage, 35:6, p p . 885-906
1990. 'Rock Music: dimensions of a mass medium - meaning production through popular music',
in Alternative Musicotogies/Les Musicologies Alternatives, ed. J. Shepherd, special issue (10:2) of the
Canadian University Music Review, pp. 137-56
Williams, R. 1965. The Long Revolution (Harmondsworth)