REMEDIAL LAW is that branch oflaw which prescribes the respondent was late in filing his protest because
in filing his protest because he filed the protest
method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion
[Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640]. It is also known as
Adjective Law. SUBSTANTIVE LAW is one which creates,
defines, and regulates rights.
Substantive law is the set of laws that governs how members
of a society are to behave. Substantive law defines rights and
responsibilities in civil law, and crimes and punishments in
criminal law. It may be codified in statutes or exist through
precedent in common law.
I. Judicial Power
1. 012 Angara vs. Electoral Commission
[G.R. L-45081; July 15, 1936 ]
TOPIC: Judicial Review; Theory and Justification of Judicial Review
PONENTE: Laurel, J.
FACTS:
1. In the election of Sept. 17, 1935, Angara (herein petitioner) and
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, Dionision Mayor (Respondents) were
candidates voted to be members of the national assembly (NA) for
the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
2. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA
for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of
office.
3. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No.
8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly
against whom no protest had thus far been filed.
4. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a
“Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935,
the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the
last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the NA.
5. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA
proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest (the prescribed period for
filing of protests had already ended on December 3, and the
after December 3.).
6. Ynsua calims that there was no constitutional or legal provision
which stated that members of the NA cannot be contested after
confirmationof the NA.. EC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
Petitioner then files a protest to the Supreme Court (SC) questioning
EC’s jurisdiction over the case. ( Petitioner argues that, EC could
only regulate proceedings, that SC has jurisdiction to pass upon
fundamental questions in the issue since it is an interpretation of the
constitution)
7. The Solicitor General (SolGen) argues that EC is a constitutional
body which has jurisdiction to try all contested cases re:elections and
said acts is beyond SC. Further, Res #8 did not deprive EC of its
jurisdiction. Since EC acquired jurisdiction over the election protest,
the Motion to dismiss filed in EC is not reviewable by the SC.
2. Tolentino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971
Ponente: Barredo, J.
FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional
Convention held on November 10, 1970, the convention held
its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning
of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic
Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V
of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On
September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite
together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971.
Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against
COMELEC and prayed that Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts
in obedience to the resolution be null and void.
ISSUE:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?
HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs.
Comelec, the issue of whether or not a resolution of
Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the
constitution is a justiciable one and thus subject to judicial
review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior
to the Convention but they are both subject to the
Constitution.
2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a
single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec.
1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all
amendments must be submitted to the people in a single
election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided
sufficient time and ample basis to assess the amendment in
relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately
but together.
3. Javellana vs Executive Secretary et al. GR No. L-36142
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme
Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana
filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them
from implementing any of the provisions of the
proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935
Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino
citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a
class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and
voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the
President had announced the immediate
implementation of the new constitution, thru his
Cabinet, respondents including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground the that the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to
create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to
approve proposed constitution; without power to
proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the
proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the
proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null
and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of
Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and
proclamation which have the same import and
objective.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political
question, and therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified
validly conforming to the applicable constitutional
and statutory provisions.
 3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has
been acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for
relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the
1971 Constitutional Convention in force.
HELD:
First. To determine whether or not the new constitution
is in force depends upon whether or not the said new
constitution has been ratified in accordance with the
requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled
that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the
constitution should be settled applying the provisions of
the constitution in force at the time of the alleged
ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has
been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article
XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as
jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we
patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.
Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or
anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications
and having the disqualifications mentioned in the
Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render
the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void.
Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were
fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the
1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the
invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be
separated or segregated from those of the qualified
voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must
be considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is
void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with
the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots – not
orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in
plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the
early years of the American regime, we had adopted the
Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics,
namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished
by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the
advantage of keeping records that permit judicial
inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the
election returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been
conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void.
The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were
held took place without the intervention of the
COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of
the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of
Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein
mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable
means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by
the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is
another patent violation of Article X of the 1935
Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme
set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to
insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the
people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the
Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the
same are claimed to have ratified the revised
Constitution.
Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of
ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places
COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections," independently of the
Executive. But there is not even a certification by the
COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the
citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No.
1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged
president of the Federation of Provincial or City
Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments
had certified to the President the alleged result of the
citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The
citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed
constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial
knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s
assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to
say, also, in other parts of the Philippines.
Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the
acts the officers and offices of the Executive
Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102,
connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed
Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its
own acts. Recognition normally connotes the
acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another.
Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress
do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the
members have performed said acts in session duly
assembled. This is a well-established principle of
Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers.
The compliance by the people with the orders of martial
law government does not constitute acquiescence to
the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court
prepared to declare that the people's inaction as
regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance
with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or
instructions, some or many of which have admittedly
had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto,
amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said
Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and
inaction or obedience of the people, under these
conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or
acquiescence.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the
"enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the same
refers to a document certified to the President for his
action under the Constitution by the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to
by the respective Secretaries of both Houses,
concerning legislative measures approved by said
Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the
President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the
proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the
1935 Constitution denies the executive department of
the Government.
In all other respects and with regard to the other
respondent in said case, petitions therein should be
given due course, there being more than prima facie
showing that the proposed Constitution has not been
ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935
Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been
acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that
said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and
that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law
of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said
proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for
its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V,
X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of
the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such
plebiscite.
Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is
in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4
members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon
on the premise stated in their votes on the third
question that they could not state with judicial certainty
whether the people have accepted or not accepted the
Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely,
Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not
in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to
declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
4. Francisco vs. House of Representatives,
G.R. No 160261, November 10, 2003
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018
FACTS:
In late 2001 House of Representatives (HOR) of the 12th Congress
adopted its Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings. The new
rules superseded impeachment Rules of the 11th Congress. Secs. 16
and 17 of these Rules state that impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if House Committee on Justice deems the complaint
sufficient in substance, or (2) if the House itself affirms or overturns
the findings of the House Committee on Justice on the substance of the
complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the HOR Secretary
General by one-thirds of the members of the House.
A few months later, HoR passed a resolution directing the Committee
on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by Chief Justice Davide of
the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).”
In June 2003, former President Estrada files the first impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and 7 Associate Justices of SC
for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and
other high crimes.” The complaint was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
On October 13, 2003, the HOR Committee on Justice found the first
impeachment complaint “sufficient in form.” However, it also voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. Ten days later, on October 23,2003, Teodoro and
Fuentebella filed a second impeachment complaint against CJ Davide,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry on the JDF.
The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
Several petitions were filed with the SC by members of the bar,
members of the House of Representatives, as well as private
individuals, all asserting their rights, among others, as taxpayers to
stop the illegal spending of public funds for the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice. The petitioners contend that
Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution bars the filing of the
second impeachment complaint. The constitutional provision states
that “(n)o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.”
Speaker Jose de Venecia submitted a manifestaiton to the SC stating
that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case as it
would mean an encroachment on the power of HoR, a co-equal branch
of government.
ISSUES/HELD:
1.) Whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint violates
Sec. 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution—YES
2) Whether Sec. 16 & 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings approved by the HoR are unconstitutional –
YES
3.) Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be
invoked – YES
RATIO:
1. The second impeachment complaint falls under the one-year bar
under the Constitution.
2. Sec 16 and 17 of House Impeachment Rule V are unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court employed three principles in deciding the case:
1) Whenever possible, the words in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning (verbal egis);
2) If there is ambiguity, the Constitution must be interpreted according
to the intent of the framers; and
3) The Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.
Applying these principles, to “initiate” in its ordinary acceptation
means simply to begin. The records of the debates by the framers
affirm this textual interpretation. From the records of the
Constitutional Convention and the amicus curiae briefs of its two
members (Maambong and Regalado), the term “to initiate” in Sec 3(5),
Art. XI of the Constitution refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with taking initial action by Congress on the
complaint.
By contrast, Secs. 16 and 17 state that impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1) if House Committee on Justice deems the
complaint sufficient in substance, or (2) if the House itself affirms or
overturns the findings of the House Committee on Justice on the
substance of the complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the
HOR Secretary General by one-thirds of the members of the House.
In this light, Secs. 16 and 17 of the House Rules of Procedure for
Impeachment are unconstitutional because the rules clearly contravene
Sec. 3 (5), Art. XI since the rules give the term “initiate” a different
meaning from filing and referral.
Hence, the second impeachment complaint by Teodoro and
Fuentebella violates the constitutional one-year ban.
3. The certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked.
The Supreme Court, in exercising its expanded power of judicial
review, only carried out its duty as stated in Section 1, Article VIII,
which mandates the judicial department to look into cases where there
has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the different
branches of government. Here, it only reviewed the constitutionality of
the Rules of Impeachment against the one-year ban explicitly stated in
the Constitution. Consequently, the contention that judicial review
over the case would result in a crisis is unwarranted.
The judiciary, with the Supreme Court at its helm as the final arbiter,
effectively checks on the other departments in the exercise of its power
to determine the law. It must declare executive and legislative acts
void if they violate the Constitution. The violation of Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution is thus within the competence of the
Court to decide.
5 . Belgica v. Executive Secretary
FACTS:
HISTORY
In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English
origin) has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary
funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”).
However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive.
The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public
Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects
during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and
Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development
Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph Estrada
administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the
present Benigno Aquino III administrations.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE
2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation
of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design
prepared by each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference
shall be given to projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities
or indigents identified under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this
purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said
priority list, standard or design within ninety (90) days from effectivity
of this Act.
All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and
scholarships, identified by a member of the House of Representatives
outside of his/her legislative district shall have the written
concurrence of the member of the House of Representatives of the
recipient or beneficiary legislative district, endorsed by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives.
3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified
by legislators shall be as follows:
a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty
Million Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed
under Item A and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for infrastructure
projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project
menu of Special Provision No. 1; and
b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft
programs and projects listed under Item A and One Hundred Million
Pesos (P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B,
the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision
No. 1.
Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable
Special Provisions on the use and release of fund, only fifty percent
(50%) of the foregoing amounts may be released in the first semester
and the remaining fifty percent (50%) may be released in the second
semester.
4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be
allowed once. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy,
Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works
and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and
Industry are also authorized to approve realignment from one
project/scope to another within the allotment received from this
Fund, subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects,
realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project
category as the original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet
been obligated for the original project/scope of work; and (iii) request
is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM must be
informed in writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar days
from approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under this
Fund shall be limited within the same classification of soft or hard
programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications and revisions of
projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall certify
that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have been
deposited back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project
identification shall be submitted to the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case
may be.
5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be
supported by the documents prescribed under Special Provision No.
1 and favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. Funds
shall be released to the implementing agencies subject to the
conditions under Special Provision No. 1 and the limits prescribed
under Special Provision No. 3.
PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include
the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The
Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8,
Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to
help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts
relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of
indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The
Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD
1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The
Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding
facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management
Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to
priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget.
It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.
* ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the
consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy
2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of
policy subject to judicial review
3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue
4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the
Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers
Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of
constitutionality of the “pork barrel system” under the principles
of res judicata and stare decisis
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate
the principles of/constitutional provisions on…
1.) …separation of powers
2.) …non-delegability of legislative power
3.) …checks and balances
4.) …accountability
5.) …political dynasties
6.) …local autonomy
C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
WON the phrases:
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and
(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund,
are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power
* HELD AND RATIO:
A. Procedural Issues
No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless
there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy
in these cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal
rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the
parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel
System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe
for adjudication since the challenged funds and the
provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013
GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are
currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related
thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the
reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot
when there is no more actual controversy between the
parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing
upon the merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item
budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor
diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is
geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013
PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains
legally effective and existing. Neither will the President’s
declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the
issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority to nullify or
annul its legal existence.
Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence
dictates that “the ‘moot and academic’ principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a
case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This
is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they
essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with
respect to the principles of separation of powers, non-
delegability of legislative power, checks and
balances, accountability and local autonomy.
ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved: This is also
apparent from the nature of the interests involved
the constitutionality of the very system within which
significant amounts of public funds have been and
continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a
situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount
public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a
time when the system’s flaws have never before been
magnified. To the Court’s mind, the coalescence of the CoA
Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and
the government’s own recognition that reforms are
needed “to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which
only underscores the importance of the matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not
merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight
accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the
constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. if only for
the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings
under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public: This is applicable largely due to
the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s
constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate controlling
principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution
of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that
the government may be guided on how public funds should be
utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. This is called for by the recognition that the preparation
and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional
imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The myriad of
issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are
spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of
repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel
System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of
– the political branches of government but rather a legal
one which the Constitution itself has commanded the
Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along
constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government
are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of
judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not
only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but
essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution).
3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant
cases. Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective
capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they
“dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” As
taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to
question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel
System” under which the taxes they pay have been and
continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules.
Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in
these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing
requirement given that the issues they have raised may be
classified as matters “of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.” The CoA Chairperson’s statement during the Oral
Arguments that the present controversy involves “not [merely] a
systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of controls” amplifies the
seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute.
4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on
the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first
and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action. This required identity is not
attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional
challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article
respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader
constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel System”. Also, the
ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural
technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits. Thus, res
judicata cannot apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to re-litigate where the same questions relating to the
same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as
in a previous case litigated and decided by a Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded post-
competent court. Absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be
decided alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of
powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-
enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On
the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic
examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and
PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire
“Pork Barrel System” as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-
enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF
Article, including not only those related to the area of
project identification but also to the areas of fund release and
realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal
analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as
a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale
application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was
actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full
resort to stare decisis. Since the Court now benefits from
hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA Report), it
must partially abandon its previous ruling
in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment
identification authority of Members of Congress on the
guise that the same was merely recommendatory.
Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and,
hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current
application to the substantive issues in these cases, stare
decisis would not apply.
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently
accorded post-enactment authority to identify the
projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional
Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory
authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be
construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of
enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special
Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special
Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized
to participate in “the various operational aspects of
budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in
violation of the separation of powers principle. That the
said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does
not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this
end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The
Court also points out that respondents have failed to substantiate
their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of
recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of
post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of
the budget, the Court also declared that informal practices,
through which legislators have effectively intruded into
the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed
as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-
delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power
of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in
Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only
through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
The power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting
apart by law a certain sum from the public revenue for (b)
a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum
fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from
such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that
they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise
the exercise of the power of appropriation as described
in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes
individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred
the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79
Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since
the said amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations
and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the
GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means
that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not
have been written into the General Appropriations Bill
and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind
of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget”
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment
and consequently impairs the President’s power of item
veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide
between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation
without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or
may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate
projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the
2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed
since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be
treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple
purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions,
assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials,
construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that
the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts
and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President’s
power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson
relays, “limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and
information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization
of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line
by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project,
and per implementing agency.”
4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would
be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this
very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “…
[A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account
of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases
of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.
However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same post-
enactment authority and/or the individual legislator’s control of his
PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a
matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a
case-to-case basis.
Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close
operational proximity between legislators and the Executive
department, through the former’s post-enactment participation, may
affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on
the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel
System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject
of judicial assessment.
5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as
not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by
law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide
a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since
there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on
political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling
on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score
to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated
how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political
dynasties.
6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system
which actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the
unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a
result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets
the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung
rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared
to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that
even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years,
even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive
funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control
underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the
various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally
mandated to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the
direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering
that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially
geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and
resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making
authority except only when acting as a body.
C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”
under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President’s authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads,
the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect,
allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy
resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government” under the principle
of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is
to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin
to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase
“energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government” states a singular and general
class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of
specific things from which the general phrase “for such other
purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also
exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development
programs of the government; and, third, the Executive
department has used the Malampaya Funds for non- 6. LANSANG VS. GARCIA [42 SCRA 448; L-
energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby
contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to
33964; 11 Dec 1971]
“energy resource development and exploitation programs and Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
projects of the government.” Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the
Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at
legally effective and subsisting. about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the
Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD
Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its
1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social
Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure candidates in the general elections scheduled for
development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
thrown at the platform where said candidates and
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.”
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the other persons were. Eight persons were killed and
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued
purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated
purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to
by the President suspending privilege of writ of
use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may habeas corpusstating that there is a conspiracy of
so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not
supply a definition of “priority infrastructure
rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize
development projects” and hence, leaves the President without political power. Petitions for writ of
any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who
project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of
a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of have been arrested without a warrant.
facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects” must be stricken
down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the
– it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient proclamation was that it is to be applied to
standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally,
provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains
legally effective and subsisting. Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment,
inserting the word “actually staging”. Proc. 889-B
was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege
II. Political Question
in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities.
Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the
in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). existence of the factual bases for the
Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 proclamations. Now the Court resolves after
provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub- conclusive decision reached by majority.
provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was
suspended. Petitioners maintained that
Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the Issues:
existence of actual "invasion insurrection or
rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it (1) Whether or Not the authority to decide
became moot and academic since it was whether the exigency has arisen requiring
amended. Petitioners further contend that public suspension (of the privilege of the writ of
safety did not require the issuance of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his
proclamations stating: (a) that there is no decision is final and conclusive upon the courts
rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the and upon all other persons.
suspension of the privilege, the Government was
functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that (2) Whether or Not public safety require the
no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged suspension of the privilege of the writ of
July-August Plan, has actually taken place after habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-
August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged A.
apprehension, because of said plan, is non-
existent and unjustified; and (e) that the
Communist forces in the Philippines are too small Held: The President has authority however it is
and weak to jeopardize public safety to such subject to judicial review. Two conditions must
extent as to require the suspension of the concur for the valid exercise of the authority to
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must
be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public
having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it safety" must require the suspension of the

privilege. President has three (3) courses of
action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to
suspend the privilege of the writ
habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law. He had,
already, called out the armed forces, proved
inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the
suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has
ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20
barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there
were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents
in the Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has
managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine
major labor organizations; has exploited the (11)
major student or youth organizations; about thirty
(30) mass organizations actively advancing the
CPP.
Other facts:
FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus
in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that
there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently,
Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and
investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of the
writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional
requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was
of subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had the
power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if
no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted
to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in
which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the
members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end,
after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic
Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as
no claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold t5he suspension
of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
7. CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA OF
2ND DISTRICT OF BATAAN v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, GR No. 157584, 2009-04-02
Facts:
After years of imposing significant controls over the
downstream oil industry in the Philippines, the
government decided in March 1996 to pursue a
policy of deregulation by enacting Republic Act No.
8180 (R.A. No. 8180) or the "Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Act of
1996."
R.A. No. 8180,... this Court concluded... the law as
invalid because the three key provisions intended
to... promote free competition were shown to
achieve the opposite result;
R.A. No. 8180's provisions on tariff differential,
inventory requirements, and predatory pricing
inhibited fair competition, encouraged monopolistic
power, and interfered with the free... interaction of
market forces.
Congress responded... by enacting
R.A. No. 8479... excluded the offensive provisions
found in the invalidated law
Nonetheless, petitioner Garcia again sought to
declare the new oil... deregulation law
unconstitutional on the ground that it violated
Article XII, Section 19 of the Constitution.
prescribed the period for removal of price control
on gasoline and... other finished petroleum products
and set the time for the full deregulation of the
local downstream oil industry.
Petitioner Garcia contended that implementing full
deregulation and removing price control at a time
when the market is still dominated and controlled
by an oligopoly[5] would be contrary to public
interest, as it would only provide an opportunity for
the
Big 3 to engage in price-fixing and overpricing.
Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 is "glaringly pro-
oligopoly, anti-competition, and anti-people," and
thus asked the Court to declare the provision
unconstitutional.
Issues:
invokes the exercise by this Court of its power of
judicial review,... calling for the exercise of judicial
power.
Ruling:
The petition fails to satisfy the very first of these
requirements - the existence of an actual case or
controversy
An actual case or controversy is one that involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims... susceptible of judicial resolution;...
the case must not be moot or academic or based on
extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice.
the issue involved must be susceptible of judicial
determination.
Excluded from these are questions of policy or
wisdom, otherwise referred to as political
questions:... political questions refer "to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative... or executive
branch of government."
Principles:
For a court to exercise this power, certain
requirements must first be met, namely:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.[13]... if an issue is clearly
identified by the text of the Constitution as matters
for discretionary action by a particular branch of
government or to the people themselves then it is
held to be a political question.
8 . MAMBA, ET AL. VS. LARA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 165109, December 14,2009
Doctrine:
Decision to entertain a taxpayer’s suit is discretionary
upon the Court. When the issue hinges on the illegal
disbursement of public funds, a liberal approach should be
preferred as it is more in keeping with truth and justice.
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed a
resolution authorizing Governor Edgar R. Lara to engage the
services of and appoint Preferred Ventures Corporation as
financial advisor or consultant for the issuance and flotation of
bonds to fund the priority projects of the governor without cost
and commitment. It also ratified the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) entered into by Gov. Lara and Preferred
Ventures Corporation which provides that the provincial
government of Cagayan shall pay Preferred Ventures
Corporation a one-time fee of 3% of the amount of bonds
floated. In addition, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, authorized
Gov. Lara to negotiate, sign and execute contracts or agreements
pertinent to the flotation of the bonds of the provincial
government in an amount not to exceed P500 million for the
construction and improvement of his priority projects, including
the construction of the New Cagayan Town Center, to be
approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Subsequently, Lara
issued the Notice of Award to Asset Builders Corporation, giving
to the latter the planning, design, construction and site
development of the town center project.
Petitioners Manuel N. Mamba, Raymund P. Guzman and
Leonides N. Fausto filed a Petition for Annulment of Contracts
and Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the respondents
(Gov. Lara et al.). The RTC, however, dismissed their petition
on the grounds that the (1) petitioners have no locus standi to
file a case as they are not party to the contract and (2) that the
controversy is in the nature of a political question, thus, the
court can’t take cognizance of it.
Issues:
 Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi to sue as
taxpayers
 Whether or not the controversy is in the nature of a
political question
Ruling:
 Yes, the petitioners have legal standing to sue as
taxpayers.
  No, the controversy is not a political question but a
justiciable one.
Ratio Decidendi:
 A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law.
For a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met: (1)
public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political
subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated
or some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is
directly affected by the alleged act.
In the case at bar, although the construction of the town center
would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the bonds,
which respondents insist are not taxpayers’ money, a
government support in the amount of P187 million would still be
spent for paying the interest of the bonds. The governor
requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to appropriate an
amount of P25 million for the interest of the bond. So clearly,
the first requisite has been met.
As to the second requisite, the Supreme Court explained that the
court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test
bearing in mind that locus standi is a procedural technicality. By
invoking transcendental importance, paramount public interest,
or far-reaching implications, ordinary citizens and taxpayers
were allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury. In
cases where serious legal issues were raised or where public
expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the court did
not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers.
It argued that, to protect the interest of the people and to
prevent taxes from being squandered or wasted under the guise
of government projects, a liberal approach must be adopted in
determining locus standi in public suits.
A political question is a question of policy, which is to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or by the
legislative or the executive branch of the government to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated. A justiciable
question on the other hand, calls upon the duty of the courts to
settle actual controversies wherein there are rights involved
which are legally demandable and enforceable. It is one which is
proper to be examined or decided in courts of justice because its
determination would not involve an encroachment upon the
legislative or executive power. In simple terms, a political
question refers to the wisdom, while a justiciable question refers
to the legality of the acts complained of.
In the case at bar, the issues raised in the petition do not refer to
the wisdom but to the legality of the acts complained of. Thus,
the Supreme Court found the instant controversy within the
ambit of judicial review.
Also, in the present case, petitioners alleged grave abuse of
discretion and clear violations of law by public respondents.
They put in issue the overpriced construction of the town center;
the grossly disadvantageous bond flotation; the irrevocable
assignment of the provincial governments annual regular
income, including the IRA, to respondent RCBC to cover and
secure the payment of the bonds floated; and the lack of
consultation and discussion with the community regarding the
proposed project, as well as a proper and legitimate bidding for
the construction of the town center.
Thus, the high court said that, even if the issues were political in
nature, it would still come within their powers of review under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon them by Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which includes the authority to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch
or instrumentality of the government.
9 . VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the
DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a
non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the
SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the
victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached
the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and
OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department
declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position
that the individual claims of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied by
Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court
to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in
refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against them; and
(b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against
Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines
and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in
the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral
Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the
Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support
programs for former comfort women. Over the next five
years, these were implemented by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse
of discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against
Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective,
the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative
to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims
against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure.”
One type of case of political questions involves
questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that
“the conduct of the foreign relations of our government
is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative–‘the political’–departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in
the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and
involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should
be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the
people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present
political questions, and courts certainly possess the
authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements. However, the question whether
the Philippine government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to
the political branches. In this case, the Executive
Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals
for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of
1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts
to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity
of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He
has his confidential sources of information. He has his
agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other
officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking
up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations
with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive
Department’s determination would mean an
assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to make
that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie.
As a general principle, where such an extraordinary
length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s
conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must
be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from
the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners
and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if
apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are
appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means
available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual
is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on
the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of
its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State
is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the
person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State
may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means
and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right
that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal
person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their
rights are not adequately protected, they have no
remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to
national law, if means are available, with a view to
furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these
questions remain within the province of municipal law
and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga
omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners
have not shown that the crimes committed by the
Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the
time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to
prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga
omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus
cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in
international law has been used as a legal term
describing obligations owed by States towards the
community of states as a whole. Essential distinction
should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and
those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former
are the concern of all States. In view of the importance
of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a
legal interest in their protection; they are obligations
erga omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers
to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens
norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they
are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of
equivalent authority
10 . Fortun and Angeles vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012, ABAD, J
Facts:
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling
Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57
innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao.
In response to this, on November 24, 2009 President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a “state of emergency” in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and
suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.
On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified
areas of the MILF.
Two days later, December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her
report to Congress in accordance with sec. 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which required her, within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in person or in
writing of her action. In her report, President Arroyo said that she
acted based on her finding that lawless men have taken up arms in
Maguindanao and risen against the government. The President
described the scope of the uprising, the nature, quantity, and quality
of the rebels’ weaponry, the movement of their heavily
armed units in strategic positions, the closure of the Maguindanao
Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal
Hall, and 14 other municipal halls, and the use of armored vehicles,
tanks, and patrol cars with unauthorized "PNP/Police" markings.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant
to sec. 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of
the President’s action.
But, two days later or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could
act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting
martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao.
Petitioners’ contention:
Petitioners Fortun and the other petitioners brought the present
actions to challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s
Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao on the following grounds:
1. For gross insufficiency of the factual basis in proclaiming a state of
martial law and suspending the [writ] in the Province of
Maguindanao.
2. It is patently illegal and unconstitutional for lack of any factual
basis.
3. The validity of Proclamation No. 1959, declaring a state of martial
law in the province of Maguindanao, except for the identified areas of
the MILF, and suspending the writ in the same area.
Respondents’ contention:
President Arroyo’s issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial
law and restoring the writ in the province of Maguindanao, rendered
the issues raised in the present petitions moot and academic.
Respondents maintain that the petitions have ceased to present an
"actual case or controversy" with the lifting of martiallaw and the
restoration of the writ, the sufficiency of the factual basis of which is
the subject of these petitions. Proclamation No. 1963 is allegedly a
"supervening event" that rendered of no practical use or value
the consolidated petitions.
Issue:
Respondents’ also questioned the legal standing of the petitioners.
WON the issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial law and
restoring the writ in the province of Maguindanao, rendered the
issues raised in the petitions moot and academic.
Held:
Yes. The court said that Proclamation No. 1963 in the petitions raised
moot and academic because the court has nothing to review. The
Proclamation on Martial Law and Writ of habeas corpus was already
lifted through Proclamation No. 1963 before the Congress could
perform its duty to review and validate.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the
Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial
law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They
exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since,
after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension,
only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation
of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not
have.
11 . IDEALS, INC. vs. PSALM
GR No. 192088 | Oct. 9, 2012 | J. Villarama, Jr.

FACTS
Respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation (PSALM) is a GOCC created by virtue of Republic
Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA). Said law mandated PSALM to
manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC
generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and
Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts with the objective
of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract
costs in an optimal manner, which liquidation is to be completed
within PSALM’s 25-year term of existence.
In August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the
246-megawatt (MW) Angat Hydro-electric Power Plant
(AHEPP), forming part of the Angat Complex, which includes
the Angat Dam, Angat Reservoir and the outlying watershed
area. This is partly owned by respondent Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). The Angat Dam
and AHEPP are utilized for power generation, irrigation, water
supply and flood control purposes. Because of its multi-
functional design, the operation of the Angat Complex involves
various government agencies, namely: (1) NPC; (2) National
Water Resources Board (NWRB); (3) MWSS; (4) respondent
National Irrigation Administration (NIA); and (5) Philippine
Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services
Administration (PAG-ASA).
On December 15, 2009, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved
the Bidding Procedures for the privatization of the AHEPP. The
two auxiliary units owned by MWSS were excluded from the bid.
Pertinent portions of the Bidding Package include: “The priority
of water usage under Philippine Law would have to be observed
by the Buyer/Operator. The Winning Bidder/Buyer shall be
requested to enter into an operations and maintenance
agreement with PSALM for the Non-Power Components…the
Buyer will be required to enter into the said water protocol
agreement as a condition to the award of the Asset.”
Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-Water) had the winning
bid and was consequently given the Notice of Award.
The present petition was filed by the Initiatives for Dialogue and
Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc.
(IDEALS), Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC), AKBAYAN
Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN) and Alliance of Progressive
Labor, seeking to permanently enjoin the sale of the AHEPP to
K-Water. SC issued Status Quo Ante Order.
ISSUES
1) WON petitioners’ right to information was violated
2) Which entity exercises jurisdiction over AHEPP?
3) WON privatization of the power generation process of AHEPP
amounted to a violation of Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution
4) WON it violated Water Code provisions on the grant of water
rights
HELD
1) PSALM advised petitioners that their letter-re quest was
referred to the counsel of K-Water. We find such action
insufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement and
inconsistent with the policy under EPIRA to implement the
privatization of NPC assets in an “open and transparent”
manner. PSALM’s evasive response to the request for
information was unjustified because all bidders were required to
deliver documents such as company profile, names of
authorized officers/representatives, financial and technical
experience.
2) AHEPP is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy
through NPC. PSALM was authorized to take title to and
possession of, those assets transferred to it. EPIRA mandated
that all such assets shall be sold through public bidding with the
exception of Agus and Pulangui complexes in Mindanao, the
privatization of which was left to the discretion of PSALM in
consultation with Congress.

The operation and maintenance of a hydroelectric power plant is
not among the statutorily granted powers of MWSS. Since the
sale of AHEPP by PSALM merely implements the legislated
reforms for the electric power industry through schemes that
aim “to enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the
ownership base of the power generation, transmission and
distribution sectors,” the proposed transfer to MWSS which is
another government entity contravenes that State policy.
3) & 4) The Water Code limits the grant of water rights only to
Filipino citizens and juridical entities duly qualified by law to
exploit and develop water resources, including private
corporations with sixty percent of their capital owned by
Filipinos. In the case of Angat River, the NWRB has issued
separate water permits to MWSS, NPC and NIA.
Under the EPIRA, the generation of electric power, a business
affected with public interest, was opened to private sector.
Power generation shall not be considered a public utility
operation, and hence no franchise is necessary. Foreign
investors are likewise allowed entry into the electric power
industry. However, there is no mention of water rights in the
privatization of multi-purpose hydropower facilities.
Operation of a Hydroelectric Power Plant
Hydroelectric energy is produced by the force of falling
water. The capacity to produce this energy is dependent
on both the available flow and the height from which it
falls. Building up behind a high dam, water accumulates
potential energy. This is transformed into mechanical
energy when the water rushes down the sluice and
strikes the rotary blades of turbine. The turbine's rotation
spins electromagnets which generate current in
stationary coils of wire. Finally, the current is put through
a transformer where the voltage is increased for long
distance transmission over power lines.
Under the Water Code concept of appropriation, a foreign
company may not be said to be “appropriating” our natural
resources if it utilizes the waters collected in the dam and
converts the same into electricity through artificial devices.
Since the NPC remains in control of the operation of the dam by
virtue of water rights granted to it, there is no legal impediment
to foreign-owned companies undertaking the generation of
electric power using waters already appropriated by NPC, the
holder of water permit.
There is no provision in the EPIRA itself authorizing the NPC to
assign or transfer its water rights in case of transfer of operation
and possession of multi-purpose hydropower facilities. Since
only the power plant is to be sold and privatized, the operation
of the non-power components such as the dam and reservoir,
including the maintenance of the surrounding watershed, should
remain under the jurisdiction and control of NPC which continue
to be a government corporation. There is therefore no necessity
for NPC to transfer its permit over the water rights to K-Water.
Pursuant to its purchase and operation/management contracts
with K-Water, NPC may authorize the latter to use water in the
dam to generate electricity.
NPC shall continue to be the holder of the water permit even as
the operational control and day-to-day management of the
AHEPP is turned over to K-Water under the terms and
conditions of their APA and O & M Agreement, whereby NPC
grants authority to K-Water to utilize the waters diverted or
collected in the Angat Dam for hydropower generation. Further,
NPC and K-Water shall faithfully comply with the terms and
conditions of the Memorandum of Agreement on Water Protocol,
as well as with such other regulations and issuances of the
NWRB governing water rights and water usage.
IDEALS VS PSALM (2012)
20 Oct 2017
Law on Natural Resources| Foreign-owned Corporation|
Government Agreements| Water Code
Background of the case. A petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking to permanently enjoin the sale of
the Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea
Water Resources Corporation (K-Water) which won the
public bidding conducted by the Power Sector Assets
and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM).
FACTS:
Respondent PSALM is a government-owned and
controlled corporation created by virtue of RA 9136, also
known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001” (EPIRA). The EPIRA provided a framework for the
restructuring of the electric power industry, including
the privatization of the assets of the NAPOCOR, the
transition to the desired competitive structure, and the
definition of the responsibilities of the various
government agencies and private entities. PSALM is
mandated to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and
privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and
other disposable assets, and Independent Power
Producer (IPP) contracts with the objective of liquidating
all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs
in an optimal manner, which liquidation is to be
completed within PSALM’s 25-year term of existence.
On 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the
246-megawatt hydro electric power plant located in San
Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, which will form part of
the Angat Complex which includes the Angat Dam,
Angat Reservoir and the outlying watershed area.
On 2009, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved the
Bidding Procedures for the privatization of the Hydro
Electric Power Plant. An Invitation to Bid was published
in three major national newspapers where six
competing firms enjoined, namely:
 K-Water US$
440,880,000.00
 First Gen Northern Energy
365,000,678.00
 San Miguel Corporation
312,500,000.00
 Aboitiz Power-Pangasinan, Inc.
256,000,000.00
 Trans-Asia Oil & Energy Dev.
Com 237,000,000.00
 DMCI Power Corporation
188,890,000.00
After a post-bid evaluation, PSALM approved and
confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the
highest bidder, K-Water.
Contention of the petitioner:
That the participation in the bidding of and award of
contract to K-Water which is a foreign corporation,
PSALM clearly violated the constitutional provisions on
the appropriation and utilization of water as a natural
resource, as implemented by the Water Code of the
Philippines limiting water rights to Filipino citizens and
corporations which are at least 60% Filipino-owned.
Further considering the importance of the Angat Dam
which is the source of 97% of Metro Manila’s water
supply, as well as irrigation for farmlands in 20
municipalities and towns in Pampanga and Bulacan,
petitioners assert that PSALM should prioritize such
domestic and community use of water over that of
power generation.
ISSUE:
Whether PSALM violated Sec. 2, Art. XII of the
Constitution and the Water Code provisions on the grant
of water rights.
RULING:
It is clear that the law limits the grant of water rights
only to Filipino citizens and juridical entities duly
qualified by law to exploit and develop water resources,
including private corporations with sixty percent of their
capital owned by Filipinos.
Under the Water Code concept of appropriation, a
foreign company may not be said to be “appropriating”
our natural resources if it utilizes the waters collected in
the dam and converts the same into electricity through
artificial devices. Since the NPC remains in control of the
operation of the dam by virtue of water rights granted
to it, as determined under DOJ Opinion No. 122, s. 1998,
there is no legal impediment to foreign-owned
companies undertaking the generation of electric power
using waters already appropriated by NPC, the holder of
water permit. Such was the situation of hydropower
projects under the BOT contractual arrangements
whereby foreign investors are allowed to finance or
undertake construction and rehabilitation of
infrastructure projects and/or own and operate the
facility constructed. However, in case the facility
requires a public utility franchise, the facility operator
must be a Filipino corporation or at least 60% owned by
Filipino.
Foreign ownership of a hydropower facility is not
prohibited under existing laws. The construction,
rehabilitation and development of hydropower plants
are among those infrastructure projects which even
wholly-owned foreign corporations are allowed to
undertake under the Amended Build-Operate-Transfer
(Amended BOT) Law (R.A. No. 7718).
C. Declaratory Relief