LACSON V.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 128096
FILING OF COMPLAINT

FACTS:
The eleven petitioner who were members of the Anti-Bank robbery and Intelligence task group (ABRITG) of
the Philippine National Police, were charged of murder following the media expose of SPO2 Eduardo Delos
Reyes saying that what actually transpired to one of the operations of ABRITG was a summary execution were
persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng were slain and also after a recommendation from
an organized review board for the said operation were approved by the Ombudsman to charge the petitioner
with murder.
During the proceeding the petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under
the amended information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section
2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where
one or more of the “principal accused” are government officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher or PNP officials
with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However,
pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975. Hence the
instant petition.

ISSUES:
2 of the issue resolve by the Supreme Court are the following;
1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
2) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls
within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

RULING:

With respect to the first issue the High Court ruled in favor of the validity of R.A. 8249,
Petitioner and intervenors’ contention that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection
of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to
warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who
challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when
the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class; all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and under
the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and
intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
For the second issue, the court ruled that the information failed to establish that the crime commited is in
relation to their office
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it
is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his
official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related
to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate
that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The
stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact
offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the
subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
 [G.R. No. UDK-13384. October 18, 2004]

PEOPLE vs. BUNALADI

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated OCT 18 2004.

G.R. No. UDK-13384 (The People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Bunaladi.)

Accused Rodolfo Bunaladi was charged with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 13. The trial court rendered its Decision on 5 May 2004, convicting the accused and imposing upon him the penalty of
death by lethal injection.

Accused timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the factual findings of the trial court, and at the same time
praying that in the event the judgment of conviction is not set aside, the penalty of death be not imposed in view of the age
of the accused who was more than seventy (70) years old at the time of rendition, of the trial court's judgment.

Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court, in its Order dated 2 June 2004, partly reconsidered its
decision and lowered the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. In the same Order, the trial court also directed the
transmittal of the records of the case to this Court "for automatic review."

The instant case deserves to be dismissed.

Section 3(d), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that no notice of appeal is necessary in cases
where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial Court and that the same shall be automatically reviewed by the
Supreme Court as provided in Section 10 thereof.[1] In this case, however, the penalty imposed by the trial court after
cralaw

reconsidering its decision is reclusionperpetua. Under Section 3(c) of Rule 122, an appeal to the Supreme Court in cases
where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua is duly interposed by filing a notice of appeal.

A review of the records of the case shows that no notice of appeal was filed by the accused. Hence, the Court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

Very truly yours,

LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA

Asst. Clerk of Court

Cuyos vs. Garcia
G.R. No. L-46934
FILLING OF COMPLAINT

FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos was charged with homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to
proeperty through reckless imprudence before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Cuyos
entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment and the judge set the case for trial, but before it could
commence, petitioner filed a Motion to Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance. Cuyos claimed that
there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Court and contended that the damages suffered by the
Volkswagen he hit amounted to P18,000.00. He argued that under Art. 365, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code,
the crime would carry a fine in an amount ranging from the amount of the damage to three times the value of
the damage alleged (i.e. 3 x P18,000.00=P54,000.00).
Under §87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the Municipal Court of Pampanga only has jurisdiction over
offenses punishable by a fine not exceeding P6,000.00. Cuyos filed an Urgent Motion to Postpone the Trial.
The municipal judge denied the motion to transfer and set the case for trial. Cuyos’ verbal motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the case
against Cuyos

HELD:

The Court agrees with the position of the Solicitor General that the Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try
the present case. The case at bar involves a complex crime of homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and
damage to property resulting from reckless imprudence. Art. 365, par.2 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that the penalty imposable upon petitioner, if found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence, would
be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. At the time the complaint was filed, the
Municipal Court had jurisdiction to impose a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years or a fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both.
Thus, because the penalty for damage to property through imprudence or negligence as provided in
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code is, “a fine ranging from the amount equal to the value of damages to three
times such value, the case must be forwarded to the Court of First Instance. Art. 365 simply means that if
there is only damage to property, the amount fixed shall be imposed, but if there is also physical injuries,
there should be an additional penalty for the latter.
The applicable rule on allocation of jurisdiction on cases involving cases of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide or physical injuries is summarized by justice Barrera. Barrera stated that in such cases,
Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable, but there may be cases when the imposable penalty is within
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court, while the fine is under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
Since the information cannot be split into two, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the fine
imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless imprudence. The maximum fine imposable
for the crime in this case is P54,000.00 and the maximum imprisonment for homicide is six (6) years.
Therefore, the criminal charge falls outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court and within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court.
The order of the Municipal Court is SET ASIDE as null and void and the Temporary Restraining Order is
made PERMANENT.