OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE CADER P.

INDAR, presifing Judge and Acting presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City and Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, respectively.

FACTS:

This is an administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty against respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj (Judge Indar). This case originated from
reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions,
resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar.To verify, the OCA conducted a judicial auditwhere the Audit Team found that the
list of casesdoes not appear in the records of cases received, pending or disposedthe annulment decisions did not exist in the records. The Audit Team further observed that
the case numbers in the list submitted by the Local Civil Registrars are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the docket books.

The Audit Team made the following conclusions: the cases are not found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in the Regional Trial Court, nor in the
records of the Office of the Clerk of Court. There are apparently decisions of cases which are spurious, as these did not pass through the regular process. There is a
possibility that more of these spurious documents may appear and cause damage to the Courts Integrity.

The OCA recommended that (1) the matter be docketed as a regular administrative matter; (2) the matter be assigned to a Court of Appeals Justice for
Investigation, Report, and Recommendation; and (3) Judge Indar be preventively suspended, pending investigation.

The first notice of hearing directed Judge Indarto to submit in affidavit form his explanation. The LBC records show that this notice, which was delivered to
Judge Indars official stations was received; however, Judge Indar failed to attend the hearings. This Court directed Investigating Justices to conduct further investigation to
determine the authenticity of the questioned decisions allegedly rendered by Judge Indar annulling certain marriages.In compliance with the directive of the Investigating
Justice to verify the authenticity of the records of the listed decisions, judgments and orders, it was issued that the records are bereft of evidence to show that regular and
true proceedings were had on these cases.

The Investigating Justices determined that the cases allegedly decided by the Hon. Judge Indar were clearly doubtful. There is no showing of compliance on the
rules prescribed.In a Report, a certain Justice determined whether the requirements of due process had been complied with since there was no proof that Judge Indar
personally and actually received any of the notices sent to him in the course of the investigation. It was noted that all possible means to locate Judge Indar and to
personally serve the court notices to him were resorted to, and also concluded that the requirements of due process have been complied with. Judge Indar was aware of a
pending administrative case against him. The Investigating Justices proceeded to determine Judge Indars administrative liability, and found the latter guilty of serious
misconduct and dishonesty.

Judge Indars act of issuing decisions on annulment of marriage cases without complying with the stringent procedural and substantive requirements of the Rules
of Court for such cases clearly violates the Code of Judicial Conduct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.

RULING:

The Court agree with the findings of the Investigating Justices. In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert the charges against him. While
there is no proof that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two notices of hearing were received byauthorized
and capable to receive notices on behalf of Judge Indar. Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the administrative investigation against him suspending him was mailed to
him, his preventive suspension was reported in major national newspapers. Thus, there was due notice on Judge Indar of the charges against him. This constitutional
principle requires a judge, like any other public servant and more so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty
and integrity. A judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the people.Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to
these exacting standards.

The Court condemns Judge Indars reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that voided marital unions, without conducting any judicial proceedings. Such
malfeasance not only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-changing consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of truth, justice, and due process.

The Court imposes on Judge Indar the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service. And considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and
dishonesty, constituting violations of the Lawyers Oath, and Code of Professional Responsibility, Judge Indar deserves disbarment.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs . JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.

FACTS:

 This case is made up of three consolidated cases concerning the ability of Judge Floro to serve as a judge due to mental illness.
 In the First Case, Atty. Florentino Floro first applied for judgeship in 1995 but later withdrew his application due to an unfavorable psychological evaluation
revealing evidence of ego disintegration and developing psychotic process. He applied again after 3 years but was evaluated as unfit to be a judge due to his
psychological evaluation that exposed more problems.
 However, because of his impressive academic background, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private
practitioners. The second opinion appeared to be favorable paving the way for Atty. Floro to be appointed as a RTC Judge in Malabon.
 In 1999, he requested an audit of his sala conducted by the OCA. After such audit, the OCA recommended that their report be considered as an administrative
complaint against Judge Floro which the Court adopted in a resolution that placed him under preventive suspension. The report included misbehaviours and
violations of Judge Floro on various Codes of Judicial Conduct.
 Second Case, is one of the subject matter on the first case. Judge Floro allegedly used/took advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss a
Criminal Case (frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement without presence of the trial prosecutor.
 The Third Case, concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN "In Re: Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen
Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei, Petitioner." The resolution disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the reconsideration of the order
denying the petition for naturalization filed by petitioner in that case.

ISSUES:
WON Judge Floro be relieved of his position as Judge due to a medically disabling condition of the mind.

RULING:
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And in fact, the Court's disposition of the 13 charges against him, they have not found him guilty
of gross misconduct or acts of corruption. However, the findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in
competence and independence.
Therefore, the Court is in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTV Judge because of the findings of mental impairment that renders him unfit to
perform the functions of the office. However, the Court and OCA is not qualified to conclude that the Judge is insane as in fact the psychologist and psychiatrists in his
case never said so.

FABELLA V. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. 110379 | Nov. 28, 1997

FACTS: DECS secretary Carino issued a return to work order to all public school teachers who had participated in various walk-outs and strikes which was staged to
demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things. Secretary Carino then filed an
administrative case against the petitioners who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School for taking part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and
regulations and at the same time place the teachers under preventive suspension.
After the administrative hearings started, the petitioners objected to the procedure adopted by the committee for the investigation and imposition of penalties and
filed an injunctive suit with the RTC in Quezon City charging the Committee with fraud and deceit and praying that it be stopped from further investigation and rendering
any decision in the administrative case. RTC did not issue a restraining order. The Teachers then amended their complaint into a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
DECS secretary through the solicitor general, contended that in accordance with the doctrine of primary resort, RTTC should not interfere in the administrative
proceedings. The DECS investigating committee found the teachers guilty as charged and ordered for their dismissal while the RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari
and mandamus for lack of merit.
The teachers filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court which issued a resolution en banc declaring void the trial court’s order of dismissal and
reinstated the petitioner’s action. The hearing of the case in the trial court was conducted ex parte with only the teachers allowed to present their evidence for the failure of
Secretary Carino to obey the courts order for him to personally appear before the court.
RTC rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of the teachers null and void. RTC held that the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers is the primary law that
governs the conduct of investigation in administrative cases filed against public school teachers, with PD no. 807 as its supplemental law. Hence, the committee was
illegally constituted as their composition and appointment was a violation of Sec. 9 of RA 4670. They also stated that the claim of the petitioners that their dismissal was
done without any formal investigation has merit. The court found that the manner of dismissal of the teachers is tainted with illegality and was a dismissal without due
process. The investigation conducted by the committed was done with the intention to dismiss the teachers when they adopted a procedure provided for by law, by shifting
the burden of proof to the petitioners knowing full well that the teachers would boycott the proceedings thereby giving them cause to render judgment ex-parte. The
dismissal is therefore not justified as it is violative of the teacher’s right to due process.
Carino then filed an appeal with the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC that the teachers were denied due process. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUES: Whether or not the teachers were denied due process – YES.
HELD: YES. The resolution of the present case revolves around the question of due process of law and not on the right of government workers to strike. In
administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following:
(1) The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and
(4) A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to
the parties affected.

Under the R.A 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, Sec 9 of the law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers'
administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national
teachers' organization and a supervisor of the division.

In the present case the committees formed by DECS to hear the case of the teachers did not include "a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teacher's organization" as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Thus, the committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction and all
proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers' organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an
impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due
process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.

Carino argues that DECS complied with Sec. 9 of RA 4670 because "all the teachers who were members of the various committees are members of either the
Quezon City Secondary Teachers Federation or the Quezon City Elementary Teachers Federation" and are deemed to be the representatives of a teachers' organization as
required by Section 9 of RA 4670.

The SC disagrees. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers' organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such
organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers' organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be
included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their
underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers' organization as its representative in said committee.

Contrary to Carino’s contentions, RA 4670 is applicable to this case. It has not been expressly repealed by the general law PD 807, which was enacted later, nor
has it been shown to be inconsistent with the latter. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that "repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will
not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist."
Thus, a subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special law, "unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough
to include the cases embraced in the special law." The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate
set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Clearly, private respondents' right to due process of law
requires compliance with these requirements laid down by RA
4670
Furthermore, this Court sees no valid reason to disregard the factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. It is as clear as day to us that the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's decision setting aside the questioned orders of petitioners; and ordering the unqualified reinstatement of
private respondents and the payment to them of salaries, allowances, bonuses and other benefits that accrued to their benefit during the entire duration of their suspension
or dismissal. Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private respondents. Moreover, the
suspension or dismissal meted on them is baseless.

The teachers should, as a consequence, be reinstated and awarded all monetary benefits that may have accrued to them during the period of their unjustified
suspension or dismissal. This Court will never countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, which is a cornerstone of our legal system.

RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for its utter failure to show any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The
assailed Decision is thus AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Procedural Due Process: Judicial and Administrative

Vivo v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 187854, November 2013.
FACTS:
The petitioner was employed by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) on September 9, 1986, and was PAGCOR’s Managing
Head of its Gaming Department at the time of his dismissal from office.
February 21, 2002, he received a letter from Teresita S. Ela, the Senior Managing Head of PAGCOR’s Human Resources Department, advising that he was
being administratively charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence;
that he should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the same time being placed under preventive suspension.
On February 26, 2002, the petitioner’s counsel, replying to Ela’s letter, assailed the propriety of the show-cause memorandum as well as the basis for placing the petitioner
under preventive suspension.
On March 14, 2002, the petitioner received the summons for him to attend an administrative inquiry, instructing him to appear before PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation
Unit (CIU) on March 15, 2002.
At the petitioner’s request, however, the inquiry was conducted at his residence on said date. His statement was taken in a question-and-answer format. He was also
furnished the memorandum of charges that recited the accusations against him and indicated the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. The memorandum
of charges was based on the statements of PAGCOR personnel who had personal knowledge of the accusations against him.
However, when his counsel requested to be furnished copies of the statements, PAGCOR rejected the request on the ground that he had already been afforded
the sufficient opportunity to confront, hear, and answer the charges against him during the administrative inquiry. The petitioner was then allowed to submit his
answer on March 26, 2002.
Thereafter, the CIU tendered its investigation report to PAGCOR’s Adjudication Committee.
The Adjudication Committee summoned the petitioner to appear before it on May 8, 2002 in order to address questions regarding his case. His counsel moved for the re-
scheduling of the meeting because he would not be available on said date, but the Adjudication Committee denied the request upon the reason that the presence of
counsel was not necessary in the proceedings. His counsel moved for the reconsideration of the denial of the request.
The petitioner received the letter dated May 15, 2002 from Ela informing him of the resolution of the PAGCOR Board of Directors in its May 14, 2002 meeting to the
effect that he was being dismissed from the service.
After the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the resolution of the PAGCOR Board of Directors dismissing him from the service was denied, he appealed his
dismissal to the CSC.

In its resolution dated April 11, 2007, the CSC ruled that PAGCOR had violated the petitioner’s right to due process, and accordingly set aside his dismissal
from the service,viz:

In fine, the Commission finds that the right of Vivo to due process was violated when he was ousted from his office without the corresponding Board Resolution
that should have set out the collegial decision of the PAGCOR Board of Directors.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal of Ray Peter O. Vivo is hereby GRANTED. The letters dated May 15, 2002 and June 5, 2002 issued by
Teresita S. Ela, Senior Managing Head, Human Resource Department, Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), are SET ASIDE.12
x xxx
The CSC remanded the case to PAGCOR with the instruction for PAGCOR to complete its reinvestigation within three months from receipt of the resolution.
After the CSC denied its motion for reconsideration, PAGCOR elevated the case to the CA.

On February 27, 2009, the CA promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the CSC upon its finding that the petitioner had been accorded
procedural due process. The CA remanded the case to the CSC for the determination of the appeal of the petitioner on the merits, specifically the issue of whether the
dismissal had been for cause.

ISSUE:
The petitioner raises the following ISSUES, namely:

1. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Petitioner’s right for (sic) due process was not violated transgressed (sic) the fundamental rules in administrative due
process.
2. The Court of Appeals decision in setting aside CSC Resolutions Nos. 070732, dated 01 April 2007, and 071485, dated 01 August 2007, is contrary to the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and settled jurisprudence.14
The petitioner would have the Court hold that PAGCOR’s failure to furnish him a copy of the Board Resolutions authorizing his dismissal and denying his motion for
reconsideration was a fatal and irreparable defect in the administrative proceedings that ultimately resulted in the illegality of his dismissal from the service. He further
argues that he was denied due process by PAGCOR’s refusal to re-schedule the Adjudication Committee meeting in order to enable his counsel to attend the meeting with
him, because the refusal constituted a violation of his right to be represented by counsel.

HELD:
The petitioner was not denied due process of law, for he was afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his side. That, to us, was sufficient to meet the
requirements of due process.29 In Casimiro v. Tandog,30 the Court pronounced:
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case
at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or RULING complained of.
"To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
the Supreme Court held: In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice
of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
It is noteworthy, however, that the petitioner was actually assisted by his counsel from the outset of the administrative case against him. That counsel, Atty. Cesar B.
Jimenea Jr. of the Jimenea and Associates, ensured that the petitioner’s every concern reached PAGCOR, and that he was clarified of any matter affecting his rights all
throughout the investigation and hearings. As the records indicate, his counsel sent to Ela a letter calling attention to supposedly palpable violations of his client’s right to
due process, and objecting to Ela’s right to place his client under preventive suspension. The same counsel filed in behalf of the petitioner the letter-requests to be
furnished certain documents and records of the investigation,22 his answer to the memorandum of charges,23 the letter-request for the re-setting of the conference before
the Adjudication Committee,24 the reconsideration of the letter denying the request,25 and the motion to reconsider the decision of the Board of Directors to dismiss him
from the service.26
In any event, any procedural defect in the proceedings taken against the petitioner was cured by his filing of the motion for reconsideration and by his appealing
the adverse result to the CSC.1âwphi1 The Court held in Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission27 that any defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing
of a motion for reconsideration, and that denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who was afforded the opportunity to be heard. In Autencio v.
Mañara,28 the Court observed that defects in procedural due process may be cured when the party has been afforded the opportunity to appeal or to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in holding that PAGCOR had properly observed the requirements of due process in its administrative proceedings
against the petitioner. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 27, 2009 by the Court of
Appeals; REQUIRES the Civil Service Commission to determine the petitioner's appeal on the merits, particularly the issue of whether the dismissal was for cause; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

NON v DANES II

FACTS:
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, CamarinesNorte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for
leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. They filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their readmission or re-
enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. The trial court likewise dismissed their motion for reconsideration. The trial court applied Alcuaz v. Phil
School of Business Administration when the school was allowed to refuse readmission to students who also participated in a mass demonstration, saying that enrolment is
a contract that lasts only for the duration of the semester.

RULING:
The case is more about the disciplinary action imposed by the school on petitioners exercising their right to vote and not just re-enrolment.
The students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolgate, but must still exercise them in a manner that does not materially disrupt classwork or involve
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. The failing grades of some students cannot justify their non-readmission, for 5 of the 13 petitioners have no failing
grades and only 4 failed in more than 2 subjects. These were not indicated if they were incurred in only one semester.

There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing
of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they
shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case (Guzman v NU). As stated in Malabanan v Ramento, "[i]f the concept
of proportionality between the offense committed and sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes."

Lao Givs Hon Court of Appeals

FACTS :
On September 3, 1958 the Secretary of Justice rendered an opinion 191 stating that Filomeno Chua JralisSiaPengHui is a Filipino citizen as it appears that his father
Filomeno Chia Sr is a Filipino citizen. However on October 3, 1980, Filomeno Chia Sr’s citizenship was revoked on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation.
On March 9, 1981 a charge for deportation was filed with the Commission against Lao Gi, alias Filomeno Chia Sr, his wife and his children. On March 19,1981
an amended charge was filed with the CID alleging that respondent refused to register as aliens despite having required to do so and continued to refuse to register as such.
On September 4, 1982 respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that CID has no authority to open a matter settled under opinion 191. The said motion
was dismissed on the ground thyat it was opposed by the private prosecutor. The CID prosecutor also filed an opposition on the gorund that the citizenship may be
threshed out as the occasion so requires and that due process was duly accorded.
Issue : Whether the constitutional right of due process may be accorded to deportation proceeding
Held : Yes. The constitutional right of such person should not be denied and that the provision of Rules of Court of the Phil must apply to the same

“ No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be
prescribed tby the CI.”
Therefore, before a charge filed in the CID to prosper, there should be a preliminary investigation to determine whether sufficient cause exist. In the present case,
the act of Acting commissioner in compelling that they register as aliens as required in immigration act must come after the determination by the CID that they are aliens
before being required to register as one.
The power to deport an alien is the act of the state. Although deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, considering harsh and
extraordinary nature of this proceeding ( life and liberty is affected) the constitutional right to due process should not be denied.

JARDALEZA V SERENO
G.R. No. 213181 August 19, 2014
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad last May 22, 2014. Before his retirement, the JBC announced
the opening for application or recommendation for the said vacated position.

The JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion of the University of the Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza , incumbent Solicitor
General of the Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was included in the names of candidates.

It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16 and 17, 2014, Jardeleza received telephone callsfrom former Court of Appeals Associate Justice and
incumbent JBC member, Aurora Santiago Lagmanwho informed him that during the meetings held on June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officioChairperson,
Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno,manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009against him. Jardeleza was then directed to "make himself available"
before the JBC on June 30, 2014, during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.Jardaleza was informed that Associate Justice Carpio appeared
before the JBC and disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice Sereno, characterized his integrity as dubious.

Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to defend himself against the integrity ISSUES raised against him. He answered that he
would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying her
objectionsand that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He requested that the same directive should also be imposed on Associate Justice
Carpio.
 Court’s Spokesman, Atty. Theodore Te, revealed that there were actually five (5) nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee could not be
included because of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC rules.

Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), seeking to compel the JBC to include him in the list ofnominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad, on the grounds that the
JBC and Chief Justice Sereno acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number
of votes to qualify for the position.

The JBC counters these by insisting that it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza the right to a hearing in the fulfillment of its duty to recommend. The JBC, as a body, is not
required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the nominees. The process by which an objection is made based on Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 is not judicial,
quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not aim to determine guilt or innocence akin to a criminal or administrative offense but to ascertain the fitness of an applicant vis-
à-vis the requirements for the position.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS AVAILABLE IN THE COURSE OF JBC PROCEEDINGS IN CASES WHERE AN OBJECTION OR
OPPOSITION TO AN APPLICATION IS RAISED.

RULING:
The Court holds that the right to due process is available and thereby demandable asa matter of right.The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature
of JBC proceedings.

In JBC proceedings, an aspiring judge or justice justifies his qualifications for the office when he presents proof of his scholastic records, work experience and
laudable citations. The JBC then takes every possible step to verify an applicant's trackrecord for the purpose ofdetermining whether or not he is qualified for nomination.
It ascertains the factors which entitle an applicant to become a part of the roster from which the President appoints.The fact that a proceeding is sui generisand is impressed
with discretion, however, does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.

On the whole, disciplinary proceedings are actually aimed to verifyand finally determine, if a lawyer charged is still qualifie do benefit from the rights and
privileges that membership in the legal profession evoke.Notwithstanding being "a class of itsown," the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. The Court
subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the
fulfillment of the duty of JBC torecommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due
process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the
JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capriciousassessment of information
brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the
person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

The JBC’s own rules convince the Court to arrive at this conclusion. The subsequent issuance of JBC-010 unmistakably projects the JBC’s deference to the grave
import of the right of the applicant to be informed and corollary thereto, the right to be heard. The provisions of JBC-010, per se, provide that: any complaint or opposition
against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof; the complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible copies;
the Secretary of the Council shall furnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or opposition against him; the candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof
within which to file his comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires; and the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.

While JBC-010 does not articulate a procedure that entails a trialtype hearing, it affords an applicant, who faces "any complaint or opposition," the right to answer
the accusations against him. This constitutes the minimum requirements of due process.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT JARDELEZA WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

RULING:
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination that the application of the "unanimity rule" on integrity resulted in Jardeleza’s
deprivation of his right to due process.

As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied
when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself.Even as Jardeleza was verbally informed of the invocation of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and was later asked to explain himself during the meeting, these circumstances still cannot expunge an immense perplexity that
lingers in the mind of the Court. What is to become of the procedure laid down in JBC-010 if the same would be treated with indifference and disregard?

To repeat, as its wording provides, any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary withinten (10) days from the publication of the
notice and a list of candidates. Surely, this notice is all the more conspicuous to JBC members. Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day periodis only applicable to the
public, excluding the JBC members themselves, this does not discount the fact that the invocation of the first ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting would have raised
procedural ISSUES. To be fair, several members of the Council expressed their concern and desire to hear out Jardeleza but theapplication of JBC-010 did not form part
of the agenda then. It was only during the next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council agreed to invite Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting that would be held on the
same day when a resource person would shed light on the matter.

Had he been privately informed of the allegations against him based on the document and had he been ordered to respond thereto in the same manner, Jardeleza’s
right to be informed and to explain himself would have been satisfied.What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza
to appear before the Council and to instantaneously provide those who are willing to listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is
yes, in the context of his physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he was merely asked to appear in a
meeting where he would be, right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. It would all be too well to remember that the allegations of his extra-marital affair and acts of
insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said ISSUES became the object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not
given the idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances preclude the very idea of due process in which the right to explain oneself is
given, not to ensnare by surprise, but toprovide the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the occasion
becomes anidle and futile exercise.

Needless to state, Jardeleza’s grievance is not an imagined slight but a real rebuff of his right to be informed of the charges against him and his right to answer the
same with vigorouscontention and active participation in the proceedings which would ultimately decide his aspiration to become a magistrate of this Court.

With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of
Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own
rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the "unanimity rule" as it reflects the JBC’s policy and, therefore,
wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza
received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum
requirements of due process.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that Solicitor General Francis I-I. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the shortlist submitted
to the President for consideration as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court vice Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad.

JOSEPH B. TIMBOL, Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS:
This is a Petition1 for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction against the following issuances of the COMELEC: first, Resolution
No. 96102 dated January 11, 2013, declaring petitioner Joseph B. Timbol (Timbol) a nuisance candidate and ordering the removal of his name from the certified list of
candidates;3 and second, Minute Resolution4 dated February 5, 2013, denying his Petition to have his name listed in the certified list of candidates and printed on the
ballots for the May 13, 2013 elections.Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy6 for the position of Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of
Caloocan City. On January 15, 2013, he received a Subpoena7 from COMELEC Election Officer Dinah A. Valencia (Election Officer Valencia), ordering him to appear
before her office on January 17, 2013 for a clarificatory hearing in connection with his Certificate of Candidacy.
Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer Valencia. During the clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance
candidate. He contended that in the 2010 elections, he ranked eighth among all the candidates who ran for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District
of Caloocan City.
 Election Officer Valencia recommended that Timbol's Certificate of Candidacy be given due course, however, Timbol's name was not removed from the list of
nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC's website. In the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, the COMELEC denied the Petition for being moot, considering
that the printing of ballots had already begun

ISSUE:
Whether respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner Timbol's Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates

RULING:
This case is moot and academic.
That this case is moot and academic, however, does not preclude us from setting forth "controlling and authoritative doctrines to be observed by respondent in
motu proprio denying due course to or cancelling certificates of candidacy of alleged nuisance candidates. This motu proprio authority is always subject to the alleged
nuisance candidate's opportunity to be heard — an essential element of procedural due process.
Respondent's power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is subject to the candidate's opportunity to be heard.

Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "[t]he State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service[.]" This, however, does not guarantee
"a constitutional right to run for or hold public office[.]"36 To run for public office is a mere "privilege subject to limitations imposed by law."37 Among these limitations
is the prohibition on nuisance candidates.
Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention
to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This
denial or cancellation may be "motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party,"41 "subject to an opportunity to be heard."
The opportunity to be heard is a chance "to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or RULING complained of. In election
cases, due process requirements are satisfied "when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand”
Respondent commits grave abuse of discretion if it denies due course to or cancels a certificate of candidacy without affording the candidate an opportunity to be
heard. Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued
Resolution No. 9610 on January 11, 2013 when petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013. This was an
ineffective opportunity to be heard.
That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did not cure the defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he
would not have to file the Petition had been given an opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, respondent
denied petitioner's Petition on the sole ground that the printing of ballots had already begun on February 4, 2013.
Petition for Certiorari is DENIED for being moot and academic.

IMBONG v. OCHOA
April 8, 2014 | MENDOZAJ.| ART II. SEC. 12

FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on
December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on
the following grounds:

1. RH Law violates the RIGHT TO LIFE OF THE UNBORN(Imbong v. Ochoa)- implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of
both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.

2. RH Law violates the RIGHT TO HEALTH AND THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION AGAINST HAZARDOUS PRODUCT.(ALFI v. Ochoa) -It violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public
funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.

3. RH Law THREATENS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, IMPRISONMENT AND OTHER FORMS OF
PUNISHMENT -as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full
and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and conviction

a. Implementing rules and regulations of RH law (RH-IRR) provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.
b. RH law providing the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools.
c. Fails to satisfy the “clear and present danger test” and the “compelling state interest test
4. The RH Law VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. It subjects medical practitioners to involuntary
servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women,
under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.
a. Since PhilHealth covers a majority of patients, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of
PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioner’s services.
5. The RH Law VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW. RH law discriminates against poor, for it makes them the primary
target of Gov’t programs that promotes contraceptive use.
a. RH Law should seek to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor instead of promoting reproductive health.
6. The RH Law is “VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
a. Vague – bec. Does not define the type of conduct to be treated as violation of the RH law.
 7. The RH Law VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH.
a. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family
planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their
patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure
8. RH Law INTRUDES INTO THE ZONE OF PRIVACY OF ONE'S FAMILY protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for
mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs
a. RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-
being of their family.
9. The RH Law VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. The petitioners question
the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).
10. The RH Law VIOLATES THE ONE SUBJECT/ONE BILL RULE PROVISION UNDER SECTION 26(1 ), ARTICLE VI of the Constitution. (Task
Force for the family and Life Visayas, Inc v. Ochoa)
11. The RH Law VIOLATES NATURAL LAW. (Pro Life Phil. Foundation v. Ochoa)
12. The RH Law VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUS) AND THE AUTONOMOUS REGION OF
MUSLIM MINDANAO {ARMM). (Echavez v. Ochoa It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government
level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A. No. 9054.
ISSUE/s:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] WoN court can exercise its power of Judicial Review over the controversy. -YES
2] Actual Case or Controversy - YES

3] Facial Challenge - YES

4] Locus StandiYES.
5] Declaratory ReliefYES.
6] WoN RH Law Violates One Subject/One Title Rule- NO.

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] WoN RH Law Violates Right to LifePARTIALLY. YES AND NO.
2] WoN RH Law violates Right to HealthNO.
3] WoN RH Law violates Freedom of Religion -NOand the Right to Free Speech- YES(Therefore, together it is Partially)

4] WoN RH Law violates The Family - YES

5] WoN RH Law violates Freedom of Expression and Academic FreedomUNDECIDED.
6] WoN RH Law violates Due Process -NO
7] WoN RH Law violates Equal Protection clauseNO..
 8] WoN RH Law violates the constitutional prohibition against Involuntary ServitudeNO.
9] WoN the Delegation of Authority to the FDA was valid– YES

10] WoN RH Law infringes upon the power deduced to Autonomy of Local Govemments (LGU’s)/ARMMNO.
11.) WoN the RH law violates Natural Law - NO

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALexcept
with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning
without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider
within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires
and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No.
10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED

RATIO:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

 YES. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branchesto make sure that they have acted in consonance with
their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more
authority of proscribing the actions under review. This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:
 Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights, which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
 Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz :
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) thequestion of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(d) theissue of constitutionality must be the lismota of the case

 All requisites were met

2. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY

 YES. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,
lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
 Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.
They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its
provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial
review of the RH Law is premature.
 For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of the act complained of.
 In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH
Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
  Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the
RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
3. FACIAL CHALLENGE

 YES. Court has authority over Facial Challenge.

 In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts
are externalized.
 Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and
to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the
Filipino people.
4. LOCUS STANDI

 YES. Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of ISSUES upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
 The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the
requisite locus standi.
 In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation
of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the
court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.
 TranscendentalImportance
 Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest."
 Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the ISSUES involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar.One cannot deny that the ISSUES raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
 ISSUES raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health,
the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the ISSUES of contraception and reproductive
health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise ISSUES of transcendental
importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn, which is
primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

5. DECLARATORY RELIEF
  YES.Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has
original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition.

6. ONE SUBJECT-ONE TITLE

 NO. RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
 RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for
reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as
a population control measure.
 To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood"
and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.
 Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is
geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancy-preventing products.
 The manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
 It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of
information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods,
devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
 The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception is the central idea of the RH Law.Removing the provisions that
refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions are already provided for in
the Magna Carta for Women."
 Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis
Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
 It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or
impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
 Theone subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject
where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."
 Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable
human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of
the assailed legislation.

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1. RIGHT TO LIFE
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”

 PARTIALLY.
a. Position of the Petitioners
  it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
 allows access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.
 opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law
and is an affront to the dignity of man.

b. Position of the Respondents

 intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the
said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the
public.
 According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law
was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field,
it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on
determined as an abortive.135
 For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO
show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically
provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.
c. The Court's Position
 Universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life
 Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a
particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
 In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
o Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
 The use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To
Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and
devices which prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the
country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development.
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to
one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health
 Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-
coercion."

d. When Life Begins

 Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided,
at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court
could express their own views on this matter.
  In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
 In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
 Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
 Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to
speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has
arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are
waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
 In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the
other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.

d. Plain and Legal Meaning
 It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning.
 Thetraditional meaning of the word "conception"
o Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that
results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.
o Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in
human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.
 Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality.
 It is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from
the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the
Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
e. Intent of the Framer
 Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."
f. Medical Meaning
 That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as
"the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote”
 Fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops."
g.Conclusion

 The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization
 In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-
defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
 Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.

H. The RH Law and Abortion

 The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature
from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court couldn’t interpret it otherwise.
 Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty
to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed
exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
 Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life
begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of
implantation is not the point of beginning of life. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys
the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
 Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA
that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient.

I. Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

 The Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient.
 The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
o SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
 (a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
 Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
 Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
o a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA. [Emphasis supplied]
 Again in Section 3.0l of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
o j) Contraceptive refers toany safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planningmethod, device, or health product, whether
natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted
in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the FDA.
  Section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172
 This cannot be done.
 In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word"primarily," Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRRmust be struck down for being ultra vires.
 The addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should,
therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way forthe approval of contraceptives which
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.
 With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is
abortion.
 For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-
safe mechanism.
 undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary
action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
 The RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the
RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the
primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."

2. RIGHT TO HEALTH
 NO. RH LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO HEALTH
 Petitioners :RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family
products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national
hospitals.
 Respondent: Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it
were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.
 SC:A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the
right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides: Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
 Article XIII, Sec. 11, 12, & 13. also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people
 Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other
social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
 Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and
research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
 Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.
 Section 9, Article XVI provides: Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.
 These provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory.
There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.
  effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and
devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only
contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public
a. Contraceptives cannot be dispensed and used without prescription
 LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
 In the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the
contraceptives that will be procured shall be from a duly license drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive
drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant
to the RH law, which makes the attack on the law premature.
 Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their
inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated,
and approved by the FDA.
 Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

3. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH

 The petitioners are misguided in the supposition that the state anno enhance its population control program through the RH law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
 However, the Court is of belief that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH law violates the religious belief and conviction of the conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modern reproductive health services, procedures, and methods,
his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs.
 The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another or who declines to perform reproductive health
procedure on a patient because of incompatible religious beliefs, is unconstitutional.
 Under Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR, which does not consider public health officers as conscientious objectors is discriminatory and violates the equal
protection clause.
 The Court also finds no compelling state interest, which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors. Only in the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom.
 The RH law required would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. However, those who receive any
information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide
on matters of family life without the intervention of the state.
 The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual
religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious
beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other
words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and
practices.
 Exception: Life Threatening Cases
 All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to
render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
 practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty.
Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an
emergency."

4. PRIVACY (MARITAL PRIVACY AND AUTONOMY)

 Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and
autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total development
 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the
family.
5. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM -UNDECIDED
 At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that
will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering
the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
 While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health education program provided under
Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE - NO

 In determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health
service provider," viz:
o (n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the
maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness,
disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of
medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has
undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community
after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health
(DOH) .
 The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”.
The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.
 The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by
religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from
giving RH information and procedures.
 The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice
and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

  No. RH law does not violate Equal Protection Clause

 Petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them
the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use .
Pursuant to Sec. 11, Art. XIII of the constitution recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be
given priority in addressing the health and development of the people.
 RH law prioritizes the poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issued and desire to have children. It also sanctions abortion as 3(1)
explains, the “promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health
8. PROHIBITION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
 NO, RH Law does not violate constitutional provision on Involuntary Servitude.
 While petitioners, aver that requiring private and non-gov’t health care service provider to render 48 hours of pro-bono reproductive health services amounts to
involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will, it can hardly be considered as forced labor, as reproductive
health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services.
9. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO THE FDA
 YES. The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation.
 The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government
entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so.
 It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

10. AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVEMMENTS (LGU’S)/ARMM

 NO.It does not infringe on the Autonomy of LGU’s/ ARMM.
 Unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
 In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals
or the training of barangay health workers, it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not
absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the
RH Law.
 The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its
autonomy

11. NATURAL LAW

 NO. The Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law.
 Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a
statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are
mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law
as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present
 At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to
enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily
available to the public, especially to the poor.
 FINAL NOTES OF COURT:

 In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of
society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man
stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
 Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health
laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the
Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the
assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.

Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC September 18, 1995 |Kapunan, J.| Article VI Section 6

PETITIONER: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos RESPONDENTS: COMELEC and Cirilo Roy Montejo
SUMMARY: Imelda Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. She stated in the COC that she is a resident
of Leyte for the past seven months. Montejo filed a petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with the Comelec on the ground that Marcos failed to meet the
constitutional requirement of one-year residency. Comelec granted the petition for disqualification. During the pendency of the case, Imelda Marcos won the election
however the Comelec suspended her proclamation. Imelda then filed a petition before the SC. The SC held that Imelda was a resident of Leyte for not having clear and
positive proof that she really intended to abandon her domicile of origin.
DOCTRINE: Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election,
is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte on March 8, 1995. Private
respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, he contended that
Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in
Voter Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring Marcos disqualified and canceling the
certificate of candidacy." 2. On March 29, 1995, Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood".
Marcos claimed that “seven months” was a result of honest misinterpretation or honest mistake on her part so the amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred
that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not
residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her
domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. 3. The
Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that: This office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is
filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been
filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. Marcos then filed her amended COC with Comelec’s head office in Manila. 4. The Comelec Second Division came up
with a resolution not qualifying Marcos to run and struck off Marcos’s corrected/amended COC. Marcos has not complied with the 1 year residency requirement of the
Constitution. The Comelec found that Marcos continuously lived in Manila where she was a registered voter and later on served as a Governor of Manila. These FACTS
manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban since childhood. 5. During the pendency of the case, Marcos won in the election. However the COMELEC
suspended her proclamation. Marcos thus appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN Marcos was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of 1 year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections. (YES) 2. WoN the Comelec properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying
Marcos (YES) 3. WoN the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner’s qualifications after the
elections – (NO)
HELD: WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO
1. Residence is synonymous with Domicile. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Marcos
was a resident of First District of Leyte for election
1
purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
• An actual removal or an actual change in domicile
• A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one
• Acts which correspond with the purpose In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. In the case at bar, the evidence lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of domicile of choice
indeed occurred. Marcos held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point an intention to abandon
her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
It cannot be correctly argued that Imelda lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to Ferdinand Marcos. A wife does not automatically
gain the husband’s domicile.
2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to
hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
• Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. –Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant
or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
3. As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point
has no jurisdiction over the question.

PEOPLE vs. NAZARIO

FACTS:

 Nazario is an operator of a fishpond in Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon which began its operation since 1959.
 Alvarez, the Municipal Treasurer wrote the accused a letter asking him to pay his taxes and fee for the fishpond operation.
 Accused refuse and fail to pay the municipal taxes from 1964-1966 in the total amount of P362.62 required of him as fishpond operator as provided for under
Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended, in spite of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon.
 The Trial Court finds him guilty for the violation of the ordinance.
 Petitioner contends that the ordinances are:
o "Ambiguous and uncertain". He is a mere lessee of the fishpond thus he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager."
o They are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment. The ordinances are ex post facto measures since it penalizes acts or events occurring before its
passage.
o The power of the municipal council of Pagbilao to tax does not extend to forest products or concessions under Republic Act No. 2264.
ISSUES:

 WoN the Municipal Ordinance is unconstitutional for being vague.

 WoN the Municipal Ordinance is an ex post facto law.

RULING:

Municipal Ordinance is not vague thus constitutional.

 From the very provisions, the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term "manager." He does not deny
the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them.
 While it appears that it is the National Government which owns them, the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. Aside from that the
Government is immune from taxes and for another, since it is not the Government that had been making money from the venture.
 As the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the recipient of profits brought about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal
taxes in question.
 Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. The dates of payment have been definitely established. The fact that the appellant has been allegedly
uncertain about the reckoning dates — as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is concerned — presents a mere problem in computation, but it
does not make the ordinances vague.

Municipal Ordinance is not an ex post facto law.

 "Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955. Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply
retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is 1955 (date of enactment).
 Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the original act,
Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed.
 Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive penalty.

HON. RENATO C. CORONA and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, petitioners, vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA
PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents.
FACTS:

Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) by virtue of Presidential Decree issued revising the PPAs Charter. Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision
of pilots and the pilotage profession, rules mandatethat aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses and must train as probationary pilots in out ports for three months
and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA
itself to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70. Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92, a policy to instill
effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage services: that all existing regular appointments which have
been previously issued shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only
for a term of one (1) year, subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.

Respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 (the policy) before the Department of
Transportation and Communication, but they were informed that the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPAs administrative issuances lies exclusively with its
Board of Directors as its governing body. The PPA issued Memorandum Order which laid down the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor
pilots.

Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of the policy PPA-AO No. 04-92, but insisted on his position that the matter was
within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. The Office of the President (OP), through Hon. Corona issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance
the implementation and concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, mandating it to control, regulate and supervise
pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district.

On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality, the exercise of one’s profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or
interference with, property rights without due process. The OP explained that the policy PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor
pilots of their profession in PPAs jurisdictional area.

Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority’s implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92 is constitutional.

RULING:

The trial court rendered the judgment that the petitioners have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and
arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order. Hence, such Orders are declared null and void. The respondents are permanently enjoined from
implementing PPA Administrative Order

The Court affirmed the judgement of trial court and convinced that the policy PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents right against
deprivation of property without due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied. The Court discussed that in order to fall within the aegis of this
provision of due process, two conditions must concur: (1) there is a deprivation (2) without proper observance of due process.

In this case, their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested
right. Under the terms of the new policy in questioned, it unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. They
enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use
until their retirement, but under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the
outcome of their performance evaluation.

The Court ruled in favor of the respondents in pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a surplusage and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

[G.R. No. 110223. April 8, 1997]

ARMY AND NAVY CLUB OF MANILA, INC., vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:

 Plaintiff: City of Manila (municipal corporation) organized and existing under RA409 represented by incumbent Manila City Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr.; owner
of Army and Navy Club of Manila
 Defendant: corporation with offices occupying the Army and Navy Club Building by virtue of a Contract of Lease (Lessee - defendant; Lessor – plaintiff)
 Defendant violated certain provisions of the Contract of Lease:
Par 1. The LESSEE shall construct at its own expense a P50M (/above) modern multi-storied hotel, which shall automatically belong to the LESSOR upon
the lease agreement’s expiration/termination–construction of hotel commenced w/in 1 year and finished w/in5 years upon date of said agreement’s approval

- Defendant failed /refused to construct said hotel

Par 3. LESEE shall pay annual rent of P250K s.t. necessary rental adjustments

- Defendant reneged on its rental obligation for 7 years

Par 4. LESEE shall pay the realty tax due on the land including improvements, govt license, permits, fees and other prescribed charges + hotel’s operation,
construction and modifications

- Defendant failed to pay the aggregate tax liability amounting to P3.8M

- Plaintiff repeatedly demanded defendant to comply with its contractual obligations, but the latter remained unfazed and still failed to perform such obligations
 As a result, plaintiff rescinded their Contract of Lease and demanded defendant to vacate, but the latter refused to do so
 Petitioner (Corporation) filed a Motion for Leave to File & for Admission of Amended Answer allegedly asserting special and affirmative defences
 The City of Manila filed a Motion for Summary Judgement on the ground that there exists no genuine triable issue in the case
 The MTC denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit, ordering it to vacate the Army & Navy Building, pay the costs of the suit and pay rental arrearages with
legal interest
 The RTC affirmed the MTC’s summary judgement
 CA dismissed the appeal and denied the motion for recon; it likewise denied the City of Manila’s motion for issuance of writ of exec pending appeal
  Petitioner filed the instant petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CA gravely erred in upholding City of Manila (the ouster) of petitioner from the disputed premises w/c is a clear transgression of the formal
declaration of the site as a historical landmark
2. Whether or not CA erred in not holding that petitioner was denied due process by the rendition of summary judgement against it

Held:

1. No. For petitioner’sviolation of the lease contract and after several demands, the City of Manila hadno other recourse but to file the action for illegal detainer and
demand petitioner’s eviction(based on the provisions of the New Civil Code)

While the declaration that it (Army&Navy Club) is a historical landmark is not objectionable, the recognition is specious
Fr. Bernas asamicus curiae inManila Prince Hotel v. GSIS:

The country’s artistic and historic wealth is therefore a proper subject for the exercise of police power:”. . . which the State may regulate.”This is
a function of the legislature. And once regulation comes in,due process also comes into play.When the classification of property into historical treasures
or landmarks will involve the imposition of limits on ownership, the Bill of Rights demands that it be done with due process both substantive and
procedural.In recognition of this constitutional principle, the State in fact has promulgated laws, both general and special, on the subject. x xx R.A. 4846
amended by P.D. No. 374 is the Act that prescribes the manner of classifying historical and cultural properties

There is no showing that PD374 has been complied with.

Thus, the petitioner’s defense regarding the property being a historical landmark was merely an attempt to thwart legal action against it.
Such certification (of being a historical landmark) does not authorize the petitioner to claim ownership/right over said property; nor is the National Historical
Commission allowed to vest such right to the petitioner.
Even assuming that the Natl. Historical Comm.’s recognition is valid, the Club’s historical significance shall not be affected if petitioner’s eviction from the
premises is warranted – and it is warranted, as mentioned above.
2. No. There is clearly no substantial triable issue because its defenses stated below are not substantial ISSUES of fact – they do not alter/affect the ejectment suit;
thus, a summary judgement is proper.
Asummary judgement is one granted by the court upon a party’s motion for an expeditioussettlement of the case (bec. there are NO important questions/ISSUES
of FACTS involved except as to amount of damages).

Petitioner’s defenses/arguments: (1) Failure to fulfill the obligations was due to the 1984 economicrecession due to Ninoy Aquino’s assassination; (2) argument
with regard to the Club being declareda historical landmark.

Petitioner does not deny the existence of the lease contract and its failure to comply with the said contract’sterms & conditions.
 The CA did not err in not admitting the petitioner’s Amended Answer because the defences were entirely in contradiction to its original answer. It initially
admitted in the orig. answer that the City of Manila is the subject property’s registered owner and that it (petitioner) is merely a lessor.

Petitioner cannot deny the respondent’s ownership of the leased premises when the situation calls for it by taking inconsistent position.

SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD v. TORCITA | G.R. No. 130442 | April 6,2000

FACTS: 12 administrative complaints was filed against Chief Inspector Lazaro Torcita by Manuel Puey, Jesus Puey and alex Edwin Del Resoraio. The complaints were
the subject of administrative hearings before the Summary Dismissal Board of the PNP. The complaint stemmed from the incident that occurred between the parties.
Torcita was driving his red Cortina Ford with his aide, PO2 Nehru Java, and his wife with two ladies in the backseat. They were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up
owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and was driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with 4 passengers, namely Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and
Cristina Dawa. A vehicular collision almost took place because of the Mazda pick up when it overtook the Ford and accelerated its speed. Torcita followed the Mazda
until it reached Hacienda Aimee owned by Congressman Puey. Upon reaching the Hacienda, Torcita and his group was approached by two persons in civilian clothes
which prevented them from further proceeding. Thus, moments after, the partrol car of Cadiz PNP arrived and together with Major Torcita they approached Jesus H. Puey
and Alex Edwin del Rosario, inquiring as to the identity of the persons who accosted him.
The complainants alleged that Major Torcita was very drunk and was shouting in a very loud voice, invectives and remarks and that such act was unbecoming of
an officer not worth of respect. They also allege that there was nothing unusual that occurred between the parties and that Torcita has no business pursuing them.
However, the Summary board was able to establish that a vehicular collision almost took place due to reckless driving of the driver of the mazda pick-up. They also stated
that it was the duty of Torcita as the Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as deputy of the Land Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and regulations to prevent chaos
and accidents in roads and highways of the country. It is further supported by the testimony of Reynaldo consejo that he was able to overtake the Ford only after the latter
car hit the shoulder of the road and after overtaking he increased his speed.

The summary board did not find sufficient evidence to establish the fact that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that that a serious confrontation took
place between the parties and that there was no sufficient evidence that the urinating incident took place, and held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal
search were not proven. The Board found that Lazaro Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened; however, he committed a breach
of internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of same. The board suspended Torcita for 20 days and forfeited his salary for the same period.

Torcita then filed for an appeal to the Regional Appellate Board of the PNP but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Torcita filed a petition for
certiorari in the RTC questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged, “which conviction is a nullity because of the lack of procedural
due process of law.” RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the question decision.
The Summary Board appealed with the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC stating the same reason. Hence, this petition filed by the Summary Board.
ISSUES: Whether or not there was a lack of procedural due process of law - YES

HELD: YES.
The board claims that the offense of “Conduct Unbecoming of a Police officer” is broad enough to include any act of an officer which tends to bring dishonor and
disgrace to the PNP organization, and Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty is one act which brings such disgrace and dishonor as contemplated by law.
Moreover, the dismissal has become final and executory and the RTC erred when it proceeded with the petition in violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
However, the Supreme Court finds that such appeal has no merit. The CA did not commit any error in affirming the decision of the RTC.
The administrative disciplinary machinery for dealing with complaints or charges against any member of the PNP is laid down in RA No. 6975, otherwise known
as the "Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990." This law defines the summary dismissal powers of the PNP Chief and Regional Directors, among
others in cases, "where the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer." Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 prescribes the "Rules and Regulations in
the conduct of summary dismissal proceedings against erring PNP members" and defines conduct unbecoming of a police officer under Section 3 (c), Rule II, as:
“any behavior or action of a PNP member, irrespective of rank, done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or otherwise disgracing himself as a
PNP member, seriously compromise his character and standing as a gentleman in such a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of moral
character; it may also refer to acts or behavior of any PNP member in an unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing himself
personally as a gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a PNP member and exhibits himself as morally unworthy to remain as a member of the
organization."
On the other hand, the acts constituting "simple irregularity in the performance of duty" are defined in Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 as a light offense,
incurred, among others, by a member of the PNP who shall, among others, be found to "have the odor or smell of alcohol on his breath while on duty, or possess alcoholic
beverages on his person, police vehicle, post or office."
The board absolved the charge of conduct unbecoming of a police officer but found him guilty of simple irregularity. The theory of the board that the definition of
conduct unbecoming of a police officer is broad enough and that there is "no legal prohibition" which would prevent the Summary Dismissal Board from finding petitioner
guilty of the lesser offense has no merit. While the definition of the more serious offense is broad in finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is
not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the requirements of due process.
The incident happened when Torcita was off-duty and in civilian clothes and was riding in his private vehicle with his family member and that Torcita allegedly
entered the Hacienda without lawful warrant and while inside, belligerently shouted invectives, challenging everyone to a fight, pointed his gun at somebody and urinated
in full view of the persons therein. The Dismissal Board held that Torcita was in the performance of official duty when the incidents happened. "However, he committed
breach of internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of same."
It is apparent from a reading of the titles of the twelve administrative cases that none of the charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of
being drunk while in the performance of official duty. The records do not bear out the specific acts or conduct constituting the charge/offense in the twelve cases which
were consolidated at the pre-hearing conference into a single case of "Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer. There is no indication or warning at all in the summary
dismissal proceedings that C/Insp. Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his
duties.
The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Summary dismissal proceedings
are governed by specific requirements of notification of the charges together with copies of affidavits and other attachments supporting the complaints, and the filing of an
answer, together with supporting documents. It is true that consistent with its summary nature, the duration of the hearing is limited, and the manner of conducting the
hearing is summary, in that sworn statements may take the place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-examination is confined only to material and relevant matters, and
prolonged arguments and dilatory proceedings shall not be entertained.
However, notification of the charges contemplates that respondent be informed of the specific charges against him. Torcita was entitled to know that he was being
charged with being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that he could traverse the accusation squarely and adduce evidence in his defense. Although he was given
an opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad charges initially filed against him, the absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found
guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process.
 It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the litigation was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 specifically prescribes that the decision shall contain "a brief statement of the material FACTS and the
findings of the summary dismissal authority as well as the disposition thereof" (Sec. 6).
The cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should
have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this particular offense. As it turned out, the dismissal Board believed his allegation that he was not drunk and found
that he was in full command of his senses where he tried to apprehend the driver of the maroon Mazda pick-up. Although Torcita did not deny that he had taken a shot of
alcoholic drink at the party which he attended before the incident, the records show that he was then off-duty and the party was at the Municipality of Victorias, which was
outside of his area of police jurisdiction. On the other hand, the hot pursuit incident occurred while he was on in his way home to Cadiz City with the members of his
family. As observed by the Dismissal Board itself, the hot pursuit was motivated by the duty "inherent to the position as Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as Deputy of the
Land Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and regulations, to prevent chaos and accidents in roads and highways" The CA correctly pointed out that even if he
was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not
on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a private trip fetching his wife. Premises considered, we hold that the CA correctly found that the decision of the
petitioners Board was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, as respondent Torcita was found guilty of an offense for which he was not properly charged. A
decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being and that A void judgment never acquires finality
Hence, aforementioned decision cannot be deemed to have become final and executory.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September l, 1997 of the CA is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, 19 Nov. 2001.

FACTS;
Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA
7659..
Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionality infirm. That there was a clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation.
He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the
vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE;
R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
 III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF
EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AND TO
ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN MALA IN SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE
PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
HELD;
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL.
Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

In view of vagueness and ambiguity

Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness
or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover,
it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, 7
unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers — who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers — to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the
following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination — the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual
characters.
Series — a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically
providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1,
par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of
Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As
commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others
conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple
accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a
criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances,
petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the
effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute.
In view of due process
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has
in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec.
1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x xxx
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not
define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive
law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender
that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is
flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law;
after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough.
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec.
1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x xxx
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not
define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive
law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender
that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is
flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law;
after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough.

In view of mens rea

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his
Concurring Opinion — . . . Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy
that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.
[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government
funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without
regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
 PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently,
the petition to declare the law unconstitutional isDISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

GONZALES v NLRC

FACTS:
A letter dated 11 April 1991 informed petitioner Gonzales of the complaints of two (2) parents for her alleged use of corporal punishment on her students. She claimed that
she was not informed of the identity of the parents who filed the complaints, and that she was not confronted about it by private respondent AdDU in 1991 and that it was
only two (2) years after the complaints were made that she discovered, through her students and their parents, that ATENEO was soliciting complainants to lodge written
complaints against her. On 9 June 1993 petitioner was informed of the composition of an investigative committee organized by Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., to look into the
alleged use of corporal punishment by petitioner in disciplining her students. It can be gleaned from the records that she was duly furnished with the rules of procedure,
informed of the schedule of the hearings, and given copies of the affidavits executed by the students who testified against her. She sought to have the rules revised as they
were violative of her rights but the school adopted them still. She was served a Notice of Termination pursuant to the findings and recommendation of the Committee. She
also received a letter from the president of ATENEO demanding her voluntary resignation a week from receipt of the letter, otherwise, she would be considered resigned
from the service.
The Labor Arbiter found her illegally dismissed but the NLRC reversed the decision while granting her retirement benefits.

RULING:
She has the right to demand compliance with the basic requirements of due process: procedural and substantial. Ample opportunity must be afforded the employee to
defend herself either personally and/or with assistance of a representative; to know the nature of her offense; and, to cross examine and confront face to face the witnesses
against her. Likewise, due process requires that the decision must be based on established FACTS and on a sound legal foundation. The adamant refusal of the Committee
to accede to her demand of revising the rules resulted in her failure to confront and cross-examine her accusers. This is not harping at technicalities as wrongfully pointed
out by the NLRC but a serious violation of petitioner's statutory and constitutional right to due process that ultimately vitiated the investigation. The infliction of corporal
punishment was also insufficiently proven.

First class Cadet Cudia vs PMA

FACTS :
Six days before the graduation ceremony of the PMA, petitioner Renato Cudia acting in behalf of his son Jeff P. Cudia and bertelicataluffa filed a petition for
certiorari , prohibition and mandamus with TRO.
1) Cadet Cudia was a member of SIKLAB Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA. He was supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine
Navy Sber as the top navy candidate and to be commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine Navy.
2) On November 14, 2013. CL cadets had lesson examination on operations research under DR. COSTALES schedule (1:30-3:00) while the fifth period class
ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05
3) Five days after, professor from ENG412 Prof Berong issued a delinquency report against Cadet Cudia for being late for 2 minutes
 4) On 12-19-13 Major Hindang the CTO of Cadet 1 Cudia meted out to him the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Majhindang clarified that the basis of
the punishment was a result of his conversation with Dr.Costales that responded that she never dismissed the class late. Cudia was advised to express his appeal
through writing. On the same day, cudia addressed his requrest for reconsideration on the ground that his 4thperiod class was dismissed late making him 2 mins
late on his 5th class.

CUDIA WAS LATER DISMISSED VIOLATING THE HONOR CODE ( lying that he was dismissed late)
Issue : Whether the dismissal of Cudia violates due process
Held : NO . there is no violation of Due process.
The Honor Code of the PMA recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted to investigate an honor code need not be clothed with attributes of a judicial
proceeding. The spirit of the honor code was meted in a way to internalize honor. Hence, technical and procedural misgivings may avert the true essence of the honor
code.

The nature of the military is unique in the sense that its primary business is to fight or be ready to fight wars. Hence, extensive investigation and due process could
sacrifice the simplicity and timeliness of investigation . This would mean that the hearing need not be formal and adversarial.
Therefore, due process in the present case only requires a FAIR AND REAOSNALBLE HEARING at which he is appraised of the specific charge mettered
against him . He must also be given ADEQUATE opportunity to present his defense.
DUE PROCESS IS PRESENT

1) Cudia was notified of violation of honor code by Maj

2) Given the opportunity to explain the report against him. During the formal investigation, he was informed of the charge against him., given theright to enter
his plea and has the right to explain his side, confront the witness and present evidence on his behalf

FE A. YLAYA v. ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT

Adm. Case No. 6475 January 30, 2013
BRION, J.:

FACTS:
For the Court's consideration is the disbarment complaint filed by Fe A. Ylaya (complainant) against Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott (respondent) who allegedly
deceived the complainant and her late husband, Laurentino L. Ylaya, into signing a "preparatory" Deed of Sale that the respondent converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of his relatives. The complainant alleged that the respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory deed of sale" for the sale of the property, but he left blank the
space for the name of the buyer and for the amount of consideration. The respondent then fraudulently – without their knowledge and consent, and contrary to their
understanding – converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001, selling the subject property to Reynold So and Sylvia Carlos So
for ₱200,000.00.
 The IBP Commissioner Anna Caridad Sazon-Dupaya found the respondent administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 (A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct) and Canon 16 ("A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession)
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, The IBP Board of Governors adopted the IBP Commissioner’s finding, but increased the penalty imposed to two (2) years
suspension and a warning.

On May 8, 2008, the respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 21, 2008, attaching, among others, a copy of the complainant’s Affidavit dated
February 27, 2008, admitting the existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Cirilo and Laurentino; the MOA between Laurentino
and Reynold; the Deed of Absolute Sale between Laurentino and Reynold. The IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration for failing to
raise any new substantial matter or any cogent reason to warrant a reversal or even a modification of its Resolution.

On March 14, 2012, the respondent filed a Petition for Review (on appeal) assailing the IBP’s findings, among others:
a) In conveniently concluding that the Deed of Absolute Sale was pre-signed and fraudulently notarized without requiring Fe Ylaya to adduce evidence in a
formal hearing thus, violated the respondent’s right to due process as he was not able to cross-examine her. This is not to mention that the complainant failed to
offer corroborative proof to prove her bare allegations;

ISSUE:
Whether the IBP violated the respondent’s right to due process

RULING: NO.
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. Denial of due process means the total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have one’s day in court. As
a rule, no denial of due process takes place where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to present his case;what is prohibited is the absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.

Although the respondent failed to have a face-to-face confrontation with the complainant when she failed to appear at the required mandatory conference on
October 6, 2005,the records reveal that the respondent fully participated during the entire proceedings and submitted numerous pleadings, including evidence, before the
IBP. He was even allowed to file a motion for reconsideration supported by his submitted evidence, which motion the IBP considered and ruled upon in its Resolution No.
XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010.

In this case, the respondent’s failure to cross-examine the complainant is not a sufficient ground to support the claim that he had not been afforded due process.
The respondent was heard through his pleadings, his submission of alleged controverting evidence, and his oral testimony during the October 6, 2005 mandatory
conference. These pleadings, evidence and testimony were received and considered by the IBP Commissioner when she arrived at her findings and recommendation, and
were the bases for the IBP Board’s Resolution.
 Moreover, "any seeming defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. A denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. Undoubtedly in this case, the requirement of the law was
afforded to the respondent.”

We also note that the respondent, on a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated August 24, 2006, submitted his case to the IBP for its resolution without any
further hearings. The motion, filed almost one year after the mandatory conference on October 6, 2005, significantly did not contain any statement regarding a denial of
due process. In effect, the respondent himself waived his cross-examination of the complainant when he asked the IBP Board of Governors to resolve the case based on the
pleadings and the evidence on record.

In this case, the IBP Commissioner’s findings were twice reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors – the first review resulted in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-
30245 dated December 14, 2007, affirming the IBP Commissioner’s findings, but modifying the penalty; the second review resulted in Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated
October 8, 2010,denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration. In both instances, the IBP Board of Governors found no defect or miscarriage of justice warranting a
remedial action or the invalidation of the proceedings.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.The complainant
in disbarment cases is not a direct party to the case but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.Flowing from its sui generis character, it is not
mandatory to have a formal hearing in which the complainant must adduce evidence.

From all these, we find it clear that the complainant is not indispensable to the disciplinary proceedings and her failure to appear for cross-examination or to
provide corroborative evidence of her allegations is of no merit. What is important is whether, upon due investigation, the IBPBoard of Governors finds sufficient
evidence of the respondent’s misconduct to warrant the exercise of its disciplinary powers.

WHEREFORE, the court finds respondent Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. As a penalty, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.