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Falkenstein - Kant's Empiricism
Falkenstein - Kant's Empiricism
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM
LORNE FALKENSTEIN
The Review of Metaphysics 50 (March 1997): 547-589. Copyright ? 1997 by The Review of
Metaphysics
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548 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 549
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550 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
such as the rule that unsupported heavy bodies fall down, and that as
these rules are discovered only by induction, they are subject to con
tinued confirmation by experience. However, Kant is widely reputed
to have refuted empirical approaches to causal reasoning, and to have
established the a priori validity of certain causal laws, such as the laws
of Newtonian physics.
Despite this reputation, however, Kant did not entirely reject the
empirical approach to causal reasoning, and the scope that he took a
priori laws and principles to play in natural science, at least in his
work in the 1780s, is a carefully restricted and nuanced one. Consider,
for example, the following remark:
We are accustomed to say of many items of knowledge that have been
derived from experiential sources that we are capable of acquiring them
a priori, because we do not derive them immediately from experience,
but from a general rule, even though we have derived this general rule it
self from experience. Thus, one says of a person who has undermined
the foundation of his house that he could have known a priori that it
would collapse, that is, that he did not have to wait for experience to
show that it would actually collapse. But he could not know this com
pletely a priori. For that bodies are heavy, and thus that they must fall
when their support is removed, had to have been taught to him previ
ously by experience.6
This passage comes from the B edition Preface to the Critique of Pure
Reason, written in 1787?two years after Kant had claimed, in his
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, that universal gravita
tion, including the attraction of undermined foundation stones to the
earth below them, can be assumed a priori. The two texts are not nec
essarily contradictory, for even if gravitation can be assumed a priori,
there might be other forces, about which we can only learn empiri
cally, that mitigate, cancel, or even reverse its effects. Smoke rises,
and undermining the foundations of a house will not cause it to col
lapse if its structure is rigid enough. Yet this passage from the B Pref
ace serves to show that the Kant of the canonical critical text, the B
Critique, took there to be a degree of empirical determination in our
reasoning about some purportedly universal cause and effect rela
tions.7 Just how much of a degree is a question I now turn to address.
6B2.
7For more on this, see A171-2/B212-13, A206-7/B253, A766/B794.
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 551
II
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552 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 553
While Hume was right that I cannot, prior to experience, tell what
the effect of a given cause will be, or what the cause of a given effect
must have been, I can know, prior to experience, that there must be
some cause, and I can know, prior to experience, that whatever this
cause might be, whenever it occurs, it must be followed by the effect.15
Transcendental logic, by examining the conditions for the possibility
of any experience whatsoever, is able to demonstrate that everything
that happens has to have been preceded by some other event, and that
this other event is one upon which the subsequent event "follows in
accord with a constant law." (More precisely put, transcendental
logic is able to demonstrate that it is a law that whatever happens
must belong to a type or class of event, that it must be preceded by
some other event that likewise belongs to a type of class of event, and
that all the members of the latter class must be followed by members
of the former class.) Though I may not be able to determine what this
antecedent event is, I can be assured a priori that it must exist. This is
a point that is seconded in the general proof of the three Analogies,
and again in the Prolegomena, where Kant remarks that it is
14A766/B794.
15Causes and effects must therefore belong to types or classes of events,
at least in principle. This observation has also been made by Michael Fried
man, "Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science," in The Cam
bridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer
sity Press, 1992), 170-1, who has employed it to powerful effect to attack the
distinction, long popular among Kant commentators, between "every event
some cause" and "same cause same effect" versions of the causal principle.
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554 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 555
ously unseen causes from their given effects. This is a point that is not
just made in the Polemic, but in the Anticipations, the Second Anal
ogy, and the Prolegomena as well.20 And, like Hume, Kant conceives
of causes in terms of succession in time rather than in terms of effica
cious power. This is a point that is also made elsewhere in the Cri
tique, in the definition of the schema of the concept of cause in the
schematism chapter and the phenomena and noumena chapter, in the
statement of the principle of the Second Analogy, and in certain re
marks that Kant makes about the impossibility of knowing fundamen
tal forces in the Anfangsgr?nde.21 The differences Kant takes himself
to have with Hume focus just on the manner in which this succession
in time is conceived. Kant conceives the succession as neces
sary?succession "in accord with a constant law"?though this ne
cessity is not underwritten by the demonstrated existence of any
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556 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 557
23Those passages are B5, where Kant faults Hume for being unable to
preserve necessity in the connection between cause and effect, and a strict
universality of causal rules; B19-20, which again takes the necessity of the
connection between a cause and its effect to be at the crux of Hume's mis
take; A91/B123?4, where Kant charges that appeals to experience can never
establish the true necessity to the connection between cause and effect; the
introduction to the Prolegomena, already discussed in note 20 above; and
??27?30 of the Prolegomena, which focus on "removing Hume's doubt" pre
cisely concerning the principle of the necessity of the connection between
causes and their effects.
24B2-3. Compare with Friedman, "Causal Laws," 174-5, who also main
tains that specific causal rules are mixed and impurely a priori. However,
Friedman seems to take it that particular causal rules are first established by
induction and then have necessity subsequently attached to them by being
subsumed under transcendental principles, so that there is at least a
two-stage process involved (Friedman, 178, 180, 185). This does not fit well
with the argument of the Second Analogy, which claims that necessary con
nection needs to be taken as axiomatic as a condition of localizing events in
time?in effect, that there can be no purely inductive first stage (A196/B241).
See also Henry Allison, "Causality and Causal Laws in Kant," in Kant and
Contemporary Epistemology, ed. Paolo Parrini (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994),
291^307, esp. 301-302; and Philip Kitcher, "The Unity of Science and the
Unity of Nature," in the same volume, 253?72, esp. 258.
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558 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
the true cause, whatever it is, and its effect (but that does not promise
that we have ever correctly identified the true cause).25
Kant occasionally refers to the a priori component of a specific
causal rule as the "exponent" ofthat rule.26 Klaus Reich notes that, as
Kant would have found it explained in the work of K?stner, H?gel, or
Euler, an exponent is not a number indicating the degree of a power,
but a feature of the Euclidean doctrine of proportion.27 The exponent
is the number by which the first member of a proportion must be mul
tiplied in order to yield the second. It is thus not exactly analogous to
the a priori component of a causal rule, since that component does not
allow us to determine the nature of an unknown cause from the nature
of its given effect, but just to determine the necessity of its existence.28
However, like an exponent, the a priori component of a causal rule
holds between two variables, one of which must first be "given" some
how before the other can be determined, and when the one is given, it
allows us to determine something (albeit bare existence) about the
other.
Ill
25This is also why Kant claims in the Critique of Judgment that specific
causal rules are contingent, and that we can fail to see their necessity. It is
not contingent that every type of event has some type of cause, but it is a con
tingent matter whether we have correctly identified this cause. While the
true cause is necessarily followed by its effect, we have no a priori insight
into why and so cannot deduce the identity of the true cause but must instead
rely upon experience to inform us. See Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urtheilsk
raft, ed. Wilhelm Windelband, in vol. 5 of Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Ber
lin: Reimer, 1913), 183:14?28. All translations are my own.
26For references to the exponent of a rule, see A159/B198, A216/B263,
A331/B387, and A414/B441.
27Reich, Kant's Table of Judgments, 76; 128, n. 23.
28A215-16/B262-3.
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 559
29A650-l/B678-9.
30A654/B682.
31A650/B678 and A652-3/B680-1. The example drawn from psychology
is an especially powerful one, given that elsewhere (Anfangsgr?nde
471:11-37) Kant remarks that psychological phenomena can only be studied
"historically," not predictively, since even specific empirical rules cannot be
reliably formulated or tested where psychological phenomena are concerned.
That we should hold there to be unity among the psychic forces in the face of
such clear evidence of our inability to take even the first step toward articu
lating it is a true testament to the fact that "reason does not here beg but com
mand."
32A651-2/B679-80.
33A651/B679.
^648/6677; see also A661/B689.
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560 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
This is why, in the very section where Kant argues for an objec
tively valid (or perhaps merely regulative) "transcendental" principle
of parsimony, he also devotes considerable energy to articulating the
operation of a hypothetical or "logical" use of this principle.37 Kant de
scribes how, proceeding from the bottom up, this "logical" use groups
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 561
^647/6675.
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562 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 563
39For a third version of the nature of the transition problem in Kant, see
Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge: Harvard, 1992),
256?7. While Kant may well have come to perceive this third sort of gap in
his system in his later years, I question whether it is serious or whether he
should have been bothered by it. For more on this, see section VI, below.
40See Friedman, "Causal Laws," 181-6, for more detail.
41For an example of an argument along the former line see Friedman,
"Causal Laws," 175?80. For one along the latter line, see Kitcher, "Unity of
Science," 259-62.
42This is suggested by Friedman, "Causal Laws," 186.
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564 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
IV
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 565
causes in nature? Why should it not have turned out that our experi
ence is in such disorder that no one thing could ever be found to regu
larly precede any other, and no casual rules ever be formulated?
Kant was sensitive to both of these questions.45 Yet he devoted
most of his attention?the two introductions to and the teleology of
the Critique of Judgment, following upon the Appendix to the Dialec
tic?to responding to the first of them. In contrast, he barely touched
on the second question in his published work?and did so only in a
single text?the A Deduction?that was subsequently withdrawn. In
this he has been followed by the majority of commentators, who have
focused almost exclusively on his worries about the unification of spe
cific rules under general laws, rather than the conformity of particular
types of events to specific rules.
I propose instead to concentrate on the second question, both be
cause I consider Kant's answer to the first to have been well worked
out,46 but also because I consider it to be less of a problem. As has al
ready been shown, the Critique of Pure Reason does not just demon
strate the existence of general, synthetic a priori principles, such as
the principles of the necessary existence of causes and the conserva
tion of matter, but also provides an a priori "exponent" for each and
every specific causal rule?something that warrants our belief in the
necessity of the connection between that specific cause and its effect.
While Kant consistently maintained that the very possibility of experi
ence depends, not just on this, but on bridging the gap between gen
eral and specific levels with a systematic account of the laws of na
ture, it is hard to follow him at all sympathetically in this view.47
Kant's own account in the Second Analogy would appear to entail
45For the first, see Critique of Judgment, 185:23-34, and "First Introduc
tion," 203:4-12, 209:8-19, 213:8-15. For the second, see A89-91/B122-3.
46Butts, "Kant's Metaphysics of Science," 180-7.
47The claim is made most notoriously by the wishful-thinking argument,
A650^/B678-82, but see also Critique of Judgment, 179:31-180:5,
183:28-184:2, 185:19-22; "First Introduction," 203:12-21, 209:20-30. Guyer,
"Reason and Reflective Judgment," 19, implicitly suggests that Kant might
have been worried that a failure to discover systematic unity in nature would
break the unity of apperception, in effect inducing a kind of multiple person
ality disorder in those who are unable to fit all of their experiences under a
single law and a single genus. Kant may have had this worry at the back of
his mind, and his occasional retreats from a merely regulative understanding
of the principle of uniformity may have been due to it. However, if this was
so, his worry was misplaced. At its most extreme, the unity of apperception
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566 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
that, in the words of Philip Kitcher, "Those who are quite ignorant of
Newtonian mechanics, to say nothing of Kant's foundational deriva
tions of its principles, can, nonetheless, be justified in claiming that
the boat has moved downstream."48 The inquiry into the ground and
extent of systematic unity in nature is an "add-on"?an entirely extra
neous worry that does not have to be solved as a part of the explana
tion of the critical account of knowledge. The inquiry into the ground
and extent of the conformity of the intuited manifold to rules, in con
trast, goes to its very heart.
Let us review the nature of the latter, causal-rule problem. Ac
cording to Kant, every event must be of a type that is preceded by
some other event in accord with a rule. Yet while this is something I
must assume a priori, only experience can reveal what this other event
is. In accord with the schema of the concept of cause, I look for this
other event by trying to identify something that can be supposed to al
ways be followed by the effect I am considering, and I take this (provi
sionally on continued confirmation by subsequent experience) to be
the cause.49 However, since the sensible quality and the intensive
magnitude of experience is precisely what cannot be anticipated in ad
vance,50 it is at least possible that my experience might reveal no such
thing to me. I might find all sorts of types of antecedent events, but
none that appear to regularly precede the type I am considering.51
In fact, however, our experience does reveal regular antecedents
to us?moreover, it does so in all the cases we can describe. Appear
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 567
anees do not simply "crowd in upon the soul" but exhibit a rule-gov
erned order in their manner of occurrence. At first sight, this ought to
appear extraordinary. Why should things that are as distinct and ap
parently unrelated to one another as the variety of events we discover
in nature always proceed in a certain order? There is, after all, no ob
vious contradiction in these events occurring independently of one an
other.
Kant refers to this extraordinary phenomenon as the affinity (Af
finit?t) of nature.52 This is a term that has been widely misunder
stood, so two explanatory comments are in order.
First, the term is employed by Kant in two senses, whether he is
using the Latin (Affinit?t) or the Teutonic (Verwandschaft) form. In
its more frequent, colloquial usage, "affinity" means family resem
blance or similarity.53 However, in the chemistry of Kant's day, the
term had a special sense. "Affinity" was the name for the selective
52A113, A122. At least it is plausible to read him in this way. Kant also
makes certain remarks that indicate that he might have taken there to be two
kinds of affinity, "empirical" affinity, which consists in the fact that different
appearances are associable in virtue of resemblance, contiguity, and regular
succession (the sort of phenomenon I have been discussing), and a higher,
"transcendental" affinity that makes the empirical possible by ensuring that
all events, however disparate, will belong to the unity of apperception and so
will be such that we can compare them with one another (A113?14, A123).
The question I am worried about here, however, is that of how it is that the
manifold exhibits such a high degree of so-called empirical affinity. If Kant
was not in fact concerned with this question in the A Deduction, but was in
stead aiming to exhibit the role of "productive imagination" in effecting some
dark, "transcendental" affinity that serves to bring appearances together so
that we can associate them, then what follows is that he nowhere discussed
what I have referred to as the causal-rule problem. In that case, the conclu
sion that I will go on to draw in this section?that Kant takes so-called empir
ical affinity to be a brute fact that has no transcendental ground and that is
rather a "favor" that nature does for us?will be even more inevitable. Be
fore leaping to that conclusion, however, it is proper to consider whether the
A Deduction might not in fact have been designed to explain "empirical" af
finity. That is what I proceed to do.
53Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches W?rterbuch (Leipzig: S. Horzel,
1956), s.v. Verwandschaft, includes "gemeinsame Abstammung, Zuge
h?rigkeit zu einer Familie im ethnologischen und naturwissenschaftlichen
Sinn, ?hnlichkeit, ?bereinstimmung im Eigenschaften und Wesenart, Wech
selwirkung." The use of Affinit?t to stand for relation through marriage
(Heiratsverwandschaft, Schw?gerschaft; compare Theodor Heinsius, Volk
th?mliches W?rterbuch der Deutschen Sprache [Hanover: Hanschen Hof
buchhandlung, 1818]), also mentioned by Grimm as a sense of Verwand
schaft, is probably derivative. Kant himself defines Verwandschaft as "die
Vereinigung aus der Abstammung des Mannigfaltigen von einem Grunde" in
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568 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 569
so ist jene Affinit?t eine Folge theils der Einbildungskraft, die alle Erschei
nungen so apprehendirt, da? Einheit des mannigfaltigen empirischen Be
wu?tseyns in einem einzigen entspringen kann, worinnen alles zusammen
h?ngt, theils der Categorien, als verschiedener Aeusserungen und Formen
unsres Selbstbewu?tseyns. Sie hei?t a) empirisch, sofern sie wahrgenom
men wird; b) transcendental sofern man ihr eine Notwendigkeit a priori
beylegt. Diese macht jene m?glich und ist ein notwendiges Erforderni?
einer Natur. Crit. I. 100. 113. ff. 122. der ersten Ausg. (2) soviel als Continu
it?t, St?tigkeit z.B. da? alle Dinge, ihre Eigenschaften und Kr?fte stufenweise
von einer Species zur anderen ?bergehen, als h?chst mannigfaltig und zugle
ich als h?chst gleichartig von der Vernunft gedacht werden m?ssen. Crit. I.
685. 688."
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570 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
56A121-2,A112.
57A113-14,A122-3.
58A114, A125-7. Compare A650-4/B678-82, A656/B684, A660/B688.
59A127.
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 571
things of that type precede those of the other type in accord with a
constant law. Thus, to explain the phenomenon of affinity by saying
that there must be something?be it the action of affecting objects or
the will of God or the activity of the subject?that makes events hap
pen in a regular sequence reduces to saying that there must be some
thing that precedes our experiences of affinity in accord with a con
stant law. The only way we can know that affecting objects or God or
we ourselves cause affinity, therefore, is by discovering through expe
rience that one or other of these things always precedes the occur
rence of cases of affinity. Yet, even supposing that an experience of
such objects were possible, far from explaining how affinity is possi
ble, such experience would merely constitute another instance of it.
These considerations should have been no less present for Kant
when he wrote the first edition of the Critique, in apparent innocence
of the charges of unqualified idealism that his work later raised, than
when he wrote the second, and was deeply concerned to distance him
self from those charges.60 In light of both considerations, we ought to
wonder just how idealistically Kant intended his remarks on affinity
and the laws of nature in the A Deduction to be taken.
Unfortunately, this is a very difficult question to answer, because
the central texts are ambiguous. Kant argues for the necessity of affin
ity by means of a reductio ad absurdum that makes a crucial appeal
to the notion that we could not be conscious of appearances unless
they are in affinity with one another.
Were it the case that perceptions were not associable, there would be a
collection of perceptions, and even an entire form of sensory experi
ence, in which much empirical consciousness was to be found in my
mind, but in separation and without belonging to a consciousness of my
self. But that is impossible. For only insofar as I count all perceptions
as belonging to one consciousness (of original apperception) is it possi
ble for me to say of any of them that I am conscious of them.61
We can find [the ground of] this affinity nowhere other than in the prin
ciple of the unity of apperception concerning all cognition that might
pertain to me. According to this, all appearances, must so come to be in
60Indeed, his sensitivity to the first of the two considerations I have men
tioned is made explicit in the last lines of A127.
61A122.
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572 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 573
65A114, A125, A127. Here, however, there is at least one text, the last
few lines of A127, that clearly rejects the first alternative.
66B165, cited above.
67Critique of Judgment, 184:16?21.
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574 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 575
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576 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
VI
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 577
73Anfangsgr?nde, 469-70.
^Anfangsgr?nde, 470:2-3.
75This general position is repeated in this context at Anfangsgr?nde,
470:19-20.
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578 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
^Anfangsgr?nde, 470:2-3,470:23-6.
77The role of this demand is most evident at Anfangsgr?nde, 509?10,
but this argument is implicit throughout.
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 579
not an object in its own right.78 This is because there can be no way to
reidentify things that exist only in time?no way to distinguish a re
peated encounter with the same temporal object from a successive en
counter with a number of distinct, but resembling objects. In effect,
therefore, nothing endures in time, and everything in inner sense is in
constant flux.79 It is only spatial experiences that can satisfy the First
Analogy, and thus the study of purely temporal experiences (psychol
ogy) can never be more than a history of empirical occurrences, not a
study of objects that have any a priori features beyond those already
accounted for in the Analytic.80
Granting, however, that spatial objects are reidentifiable, these
objects must now, insofar as they are the subject matter for a priori
principles, be thought in virtue of features that can be represented or
constructed in pure intuition (that is, in virtue of spatial or spatiotem
poral features). For this purpose, bare location in space is not
enough. An object that has no other feature than location in space
(for example, a mathematical point) cannot be reidentified from one
moment to the next, unless we make the further, empirically false sup
position that the universe is static. In a universe of moving point-ob
jects, there is nothing to distinguish between one object and another,
especially when one seeks to establish which point has followed
which trajectory after a collision.
Point-objects that have sensible qualities in addition to location,
like minima visibilia with contrasting colors or stars with differing
spectral profiles, would have some marks that (assuming they are rel
atively constant for individual minima and sufficiently various for dif
ferent ones) might allow some degree of individuation and reidentifi
cation. Yet since sensible qualities cannot be constructed a priori in
pure intuition, sensible point-objects could only be the subject matter
for specific a priori principles with reference to their motions. The lat
ter can be represented or "constructed" as points traveling with a cer
tain speed along lines in space. Though even here the points and lines
in question have to be tacitly ascribed contrasting sensible qualities in
78Kant later made this explicit in B: "All our inner perceptions are such
that we must determine the time over which they last, or the time at which
they occur, by taking it from that which is presented to us as altering in [en
during] outer things" (B156). See also B291-4.
79B291.
Anfangsgr?nde, All.
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580 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 581
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582 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
521-2). Thus, there is not a single point where the body is within a larger
sphere where it acts, but body is rather taken to be at every point within the
sphere of its repulsive force. When rarefaction or condensation occurs, we
are not to represent the infinitesimally small spheres of force around each
point as increasing or decreasing in size, but to simply attribute a proportion
ally lesser or greater quantity of repulsive force to all of the points within the
increased or diminished volume of the body. Here, far from saying that the
activity of repulsive force cannot be constructed, Kant is saying that it can
be?his point is just that the construction is awkward and unnatural and is
not as easy to conceive as the expansion or contraction of spheres around
points.
The third text does not say that repulsive (or attractive) forces cannot
be constructed, but that Kant himself felt unable to provide a general formula
or procedure for calculating how the repulsive and attractive forces can com
bine in a given body to determine its size and shape. Kant had given an ac
count of how two different motions are to be represented as combined in a
single body in the phoronomy chapter, and he was to go on to apply this ac
count to represent how the motions of two different bodies will be combined
and distributed after collision in the mechanics chapter. However, when it
came to the task of providing a general formula for calculating the point
where a given attractive force, continuously diminishing in strength with the
square of the distance, cancels the influence of a given repulsive force, con
tinuously diminishing in strength with the volume (that is, the place where
the surface of a body is located), he felt simply unable to manage the mathe
matics involved. This was a problem that he (quite rightly) felt could be as
signed to someone with more training in mathematics, and it certainly has no
bearing on his claim that we can construct the concept of a repulsive force or
an attractive force in isolation. (For what it is worth, the problem might be
resolved by representing the attractive force as a field emanating from the
center of mass of the body, at every point of which vectors representing the
strength and direction of the force at that point could be drawn. Note that
Kant may have been precluded from even starting this story if he lacked an
appropriate vector concept, as Brittan, "Kant's Two Grand Hypotheses," 86n.,
has suggested. The repulsive force would have to be represented as a series
of potential vector fields, varying with volume in the way discussed in the
previous paragraph. [It would be simpler, though less true to what Kant
takes to be the necessary facts of the case, to also represent the repulsive
force as a field of vectors, diminishing in intensity with distance from a cen
tral point.] Since the attractive force decreases with the square of the dis
tance whereas the repulsive force decreases with the volume, there is only
one distance at which the vectors describing the attractive force are of the
same length as the vectors describing the repulsive force would be, were the
body compressed within that volume. The surface of the body must enclose
that volume.)
The final text mentions a further problem: that the coefficient of repul
sion?the specific degree of repulsive force characterizing any given kind of
material?needs to be determined empirically and cannot be anticipated a
priori. This is a profound point that will be explored in more detail below,
but it has no bearing on the issue of whether or not repulsive forces can be
constructed. The forces can well be constructed. What is more, each differ
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 583
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584 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
from one moment to the next. We can draw lines on paper to repre
sent possible motions without having to worry about whether the ac
tually moving objects, like the lines, are black or whether their exten
sions, like the paper, are white, or whether the sensible qualities of the
actually moving objects will have any bearing on our results.
However, this method of generating the specific a priori result
that all bodies must exercise repulsive and attractive forces is not
without consequences. Since "the movable" can only be identified em
pirically, the speed and direction of motion of any actually existing
body can only be known empirically. This is why Kant's phoronomy
does not allow us to determine the existence of a single motion in na
ture, but has as its "sole principle" a thesis concerning the manner in
which the (empirically given) motion of a body may be represented as
a composite of two or more motions.87 (In effect, the Phoronomy is
devoted to defining an exponent.)
The implications of the empirical status of motion reach beyond
the phoronomy chapter. Because the speed and direction of motion
can only be determined empirically, we can only know a priori that
the motion of compressing bodies will be impeded, not how it will be
impeded?whether it will be stopped dead at the point of contact by
an overwhelming (in effect, infinite or, as Kant puts it, "absolute") re
pulsive force, or whether the repulsive force will only gradually ap
proach infinity as the body is compressed to a point?and if the latter,
with what rate the force will approach infinity per unit of decrease in
volume.88 The coefficient of resistance (the strength of the repulsive
force field) of any given body can therefore only be determined by ex
perience.89 Because different bodies might be found to have different
coefficients of resistance, it becomes an empirical question whether
there might not be specifically different kinds of matter, varying in
^Anfangsgr?nde, 495:5-10.
^Anfangsgr?nde, 524:3-4, 533:36-534:5.
89There are two quite distinct notions of the strength of a repulsive force
in Kant. According to one, the strength of a repulsive force is a function of
the volume of a body and increases as a body's volume is decreased. How
ever, Kant also takes it that the rate at which a repulsive force increases with
decreases in volume could vary for different kinds of body, so that some bod
ies might have stronger repulsive forces, not because they have been com
pressed, but because similar quantities of those bodies contained in similar
volumes exert a greater resistance to compression than do other kinds of
body. I will use the expression "field strength" to distinguish this second
kind of strength from the first, but I do not mean anything more by the term
"field" than what has just been said. The modern concept of a field is one
that is only dimly present in Kant's work (as, for example, at Anfangsgr?nde,
520-1 and 521-2).
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 585
90A661/B689.
^Anfangsgr?nde, 525:7-10, 525:20-1. It may, however, be a regulative
principle (that of affinity or continuity of species) that we must assume there
to be, somewhere in nature, a kind of body with each and every kind of repul
sive force. See A658-61/B686-9.
^Anfangsgr?nde, 524:10-17.
^Anfangsgr?nde, 535:7-10.
94This last point is explicitly acknowledged by Kant at Anfangsgr?nde,
524:40-525:7, though he nonetheless regarded the hypothesis of atoms and
void as one to be shunned?chiefly because it involves the concept of void,
which he regarded as empty and fictitious ("der absoluten Undurchdringlich
keit" at Anfangsgr?nde 525:14 should probably read "des leeren Raumes,"
but see also 524:13-14 and 532:11-13), but also because absolute hardness is
an "occult quality" that cannot be described by a law of the approach and re
treat of bodies (See Anfangsgr?nde, 533:21?4: motion resulting from the
collision of absolutely hard bodies would not be continuous, but abrupt and,
in effect, magical, as there would be no reason why collision should result in
one kind of motion of the colliding bodies rather than another.).
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586 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 587
^Anfangsgr?nde, 526:33-5.
"Anfangsgr?nde, 526:20-5, 526:27-33. This is not a very persuasive
reason, unless, like Kant, one is antecedently convinced of the transcendental
objectivity of the principle of the parsimony of forces.
^Anfangsgr?nde, 563:39-564:5, 534:5-11.
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588 LORNE FALKENSTEIN
mere hypothesis and that nothing can be known a priori about the
causes of cohesion.101
It is for this reason that Kant maintains that chemistry is merely
an empirical study102?and thereby that the lion's share of the forces
responsible for physical phenomena on earth are intractable by the a
prioristic methods of the Anfangsgr?nde. While Kant might have
changed his mind about this in his last years, his final attempts to es
cape the need to rely on experience in order to do chemistry were not
crowned with success, and it is hard to see how they could have been.
The specific forces of cohesion cannot be known without first deter
mining the specific motions of specific bodies. Yet to determine the
specific motion of a specific body requires that that body be reidenti
fied over time. The only way to reidentify a body over time is by refer
ence to its sensible qualities. And sensible qualities are a posteriori.
The only way Kant could provide an a priori foundation for chemistry
is by giving up his position on the essentially empirical status of mo
tion, and with that the a posteriori status of sensible qualities.
To sum up, the general laws of the Anfangsgr?nde define only
the broadest features of nature, and the method of the Anfangsgr?nde
does not hold out the hope for much progress in deriving yet more
specific ones. The Phoronomy and the Mechanics do not determine
the existence of a single motion in nature but only provide rules for
the mathematical construction of motions, in the first case, and the
(idealized) deduction of consequent motions from antecedent (empiri
cally given) motions, in the second.103 The Dynamics only tells us that
all bodies must exert repulsive and attractive forces; it does not tell us
how strong these forces are, whether the proportion of the one to the
other can vary in different kinds of body, and if so, how many such dif
ferent kinds of body there might actually be in nature. These dynami
cal results turn back and infect the purportedly a priori mechanical
deductions as well: Since the actual motions of bodies will be influ
enced by the gravitational forces of all the other bodies in the uni
verse, and the actual collisions of bodies will be influenced by repul
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KANT'S EMPIRICISM 589
^^Anfangsgr?nde, 522:24-38.
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