Institution of Heirs
Austria v. Reyes
Facts
Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the
respondents, all have been declared by the former as her legally adopted
children.
During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was
opposed by the petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The opposition
was dismissed and the will was allowed.
In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging
that they were the nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondent had not
been in fact adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, hence the
latter were strangers with no right to succeed as heirs.
The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the
institution of heirs. It held that the testator was possessed of testamentary
capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery
or undue influence.
Issue
Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid.
Ruling
Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the
testamentary institution does not affect the validity or efficacy of the
institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity will set aside the
institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs
will be annulled under Art. 850, the following requisites must concur; 1) the
cause must be stated in the will, 2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it
must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made
such institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover, testacy is favored and
doubts are resolved on its side especially when the will shows a clear
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate
as in this case.
Substitution of Heirs
Rabadilla v. CA
Facts
A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as
a devisee to a 511,855 hectare land. A condition was however imposed to
the effect that:
1. The naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. He shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of
Aleja, during the lifetime of said Maria Belleza;
3. That in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the
near descendants, shall continue delivering the fruits to Maria
Belleza;
4. That the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold
only to a relative of Belleza.
In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny Rabadilla.
In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny to
reconvey the said land to the estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that
Johnny failed to comply with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny
failed to deliver the fruits; and that the land was mortgaged to the Philippine
National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of
Aleja pertains to the near descendants of Aleja and not to the near
descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near descendants at
the time of his death, no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to
deliver the fruits of the devised land.
Issue
Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is obliged to comply with the terms of the
Will left by Aleja Belleza.
Ruling
Yes. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The “near
descendants” being referred to in the will are the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla.
Ownership over the devised property was already transferred to Dr.
Rabadilla when Aleja died. Hence, when Dr. Rabadilla himself died,
ownership over the same property was transmitted to Johnny Rabadilla by
virtue of succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property,
rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations
not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
It is clear therefore, that Johnny should have continued complying with the
terms of the Will. His failure to do so shall give rise to an obligation for him to
reconvey the property to the estate of Aleja.
PCIB v. Escolin
Facts
In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made
a will. In May 1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines, she died.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton
Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her will that should her husband later
die, said estate shall be turned over to her brothers and sisters.
In December 1962, Charles died. Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles
filed a motion before the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on
the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the
administratrix of the estate. Magno was the trusted employee of the Hodges
when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will
but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime,
he’d like to have Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin
approved the motion.
Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for
the said will. Since said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as
admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the
probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually, the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to
turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the
property to Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is her will, the same
must be respected.
Issue
Whether or not there is substitution.
Ruling
No. legally speaking, Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or vulgar
substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary
substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein
because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the
designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the
inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a
fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is imposed
thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone
else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as
PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore
inoperative and invalid.
We hold that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her
brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition,
however, that the latter would have complete rights of dominion over the
whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the former would be
only the remainder thereof at the time of Hodges' death. In other words,
whereas they are not to inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on the
other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly
then, the essential elements of testamentary substitution are absent; the
provision in question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous institution
of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory
condition the operative contingency of which is coincidental with that of the
suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law,
which manner of institution is not prohibited by law.
Palacios v. Ramirez
Facts
The testator instituted Wanda as the first heir, and Juan and Horacio as
second heir in a fideicommissary substitution. Juan and Horacio are strangers
to Wanda.
Issue
Whether or not the fideicommissary substitution is valid.
Ruling
No, because the second heirs are not within one degree relationship or
strangers to Wanda.
A fideicommissary substitution is void if first heir is not related in the 1st
degree to the second heir.—As regards the substitution in its
fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void
for the following reasons: The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace
V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art 863 of
the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution “provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted.”
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino
as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation,
substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has
decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view,
there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the
substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell
and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as
generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this
interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go
beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code
thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and
be one generation from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a
parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation
or degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
Perez v. Garchitorena
Facts
Carmen Perez is in possession of P21,428.58 deposited by La Urbana as the
final payment of Ana Alcantara against Andres Garchitorena. Mariano, son of
Andres, sought attachment on said amount after obtaining judgment worth
P7,872.23 against Joaquin Alcantara, husband of Carmen. Carmen contends
that said amount belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of Ana. The lower
court ruled that the money belongs to Carmen’s children as fideicommissary
heirs of Ana.
Crisologo vs Singson
Facts
Donya Leona left a will stating that upon Consolacions Crisologo's death—
whether this happens before or after that of Donya Leona's death—
Consolacion's share shall belong to the brothers of the Donya Leona.
Issue
Whether or not such substitution is a fideicommissary substitution.

Issue
Whether or not the money was the property of Carmen’s children as
fideicommissary heirs.
Ruling
Yes. The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, between the
parties are clauses IX, X, and XI.
Fideicommissary substitution has four requisites: a first heir called primarily
to the enjoyment of the estate; an obligation clearly imposed upon him to
preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate; a
second heir; and, the fideicommissarius be entitled to the estate from the
time the testator dies, since he is to inherit from the latter and not from the
fiduciary.
The clause merely provides for enjoyment and not disposal. This is an
indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution. Another
clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution is the
provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's
children, meaning the heiress shall preserve the whole estate, without
diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs.
Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary
substitution, when a provision is therein made in the event the heiress
should die after the testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the case where
the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and after receiving and
enjoying the inheritance.
Ruling
No, it is not fideicommissary substitution.
A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that
the substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the
fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that
appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the
property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the
brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon
appellee's death—whether this happens before or after that of the
testatrix—her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.
Designation of heirs; Purpose of fideicommissary substitution.—It is of the
essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be clearly
imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or
part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening
of a particular event.
The last will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere
sustitucion vulgar, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of
the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of the former,
whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.

In this instance, all the requisites of fideicommissary substitution are present.

A first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the
plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate,
according to clause IX of the will. An obligation clearly imposed upon the
heir to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the
estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which provides that the
"whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving children;"
thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will,
or of leaving the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, said clause
not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also
provides for the disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.
Lastly, a second heir – such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are
referred to as such second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.

Therefore, the money belongs to Carmen’s children as fideicommissary heirs.

Vda de Kilayko v. Tengco
Facts
The testator died without an issue leaving her last will and testament to her
niece, Eustaquia Lizarez. The will was probated and the project of partition
was granted. The decree of distribution became final. However, there were
errors in the distribution as alleged by Kilayko et al, alleging that there was a
substitution.
Issue
Whether or not the errors in the distribution warrants the reopening of the
estate of the testator.
Ruling
No, the error will not cause the reopening of the succession.
A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the
title to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it
should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its
binding effect is like any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for
lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of
distribution and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the
project of partition becomes irrelevant.
The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have
a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence.
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is
that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than
once, that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been
given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
Granting that res judicata has not barred, the allegation of a fideicommissary
substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is also baseless as said
paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a clear obligation to preserve the
estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may said paragraphs
be considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.
Legitime
Manongsong v. Estimo
Facts
Allegedly, Agatona Guevarra (“Guevarra”) inherited a property from Justina
Navarro, which is now under possession of the heirs of Guevarra. Guevarra
had six children; one of them is Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner
Milagros Lopez Manongsong (“Manongsong”). The respondents, the
Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez claimed that the property was actually
sold to them by Justina Navarro prior to her death. The respondents
presented deed of sale dated October 11, 1957. Milagros and Carlito
Manongsong (“petitioners”) filed a Complaint on June 19, 1992 praying for
the partition and award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5), by
right of representation. The RTC ruled that the conveyance made by Justina
Navarro is subject to nullity because the property conveyed had a conjugal
character and that Agatona Guevarra as her compulsory heir should have the
legal right to participate with the distribution of the estate under question to
the exclusion of others. The Deed of Sale did not at all provide for the
reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect
against Agatona Guevarra and should be declared a nullity ab initio.
Issue
Whether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by the
alleged sale of the property by Justina.
Ruling
No. The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public,
is a public document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due
execution. To assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized
document, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant. Otherwise the authenticity and due execution of the
document should be upheld.
There is no basis for the trial court’s declaration that the sale embodied in
the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes.
As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid
sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller.
When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of
the estate but merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is
replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration. The Property was sold in
1957 for P250.00.
The trial court’s conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the sale is
void ab initio was not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” The presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. There was no evidence presented to
establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage.
Sps. Joaquin v. CA
Facts
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents
of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants
Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed
JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in this action by their
respective spouses. Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain
deeds of sale covering 6 parcels of land executed by defendant parents
Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant
children and the corresponding certificates of title issued in their names. In
seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and
certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver that the purported sale
of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to
unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their
legitime.
Issue
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the
Deeds of Sale
Ruling
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the
Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners’ right to their
parents’ properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents’
death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their
properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime,
petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does
not affect the value of their parents’ estate. While the sale of the lots
reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the lots taken from the
estate.
Raymundo v. Vda de Suarez
Facts
Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez' marriage was blessed with both material
wealth and progeny in herein respondents, namely, Danilo,Eufrocina,
Marcelo Jr., Evelyn, and Reggineo, all surnamed Suarez. During their
marriage, governed by the conjugal partnership of gains regime, they
acquired numerous properties, After the death of Marcelo Sr. in 1955,
Teofista and herein respondents, as well as Elpidio Suarez, executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, partitioning Marcelo Sr.'s estate,
Curiously, despite the partition, title to the foregoing properties, explicitly
identified in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate as forming part of
Marcelo's and Isagon's property regime, remained in the couple's name. In
1975, Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal Realty) and Teofista, the latter owning
ninety percent (90%) of the former's shares of stock, were sued by petitioner
Valente Raymundo, his wife Violeta, Virginia Banta and Maria Concepcion
Vito in consolidated cases for Rescission of Contract and Damages, docketed
as Civil Case Nos. 21736 to 21739.
Thereafter, in 1975, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 1,
rendered judgment against Teofista. When the judgment of the CFI became
final and executory, herein subject properties were levied and sold on
execution on June 24, 1983 to satisfy the judgment against Teofista and Rizal
Realty. Parenthetically, before expiration of the redemption period, or on
June 21, 1984, herein respondents filed a reinvidicatory action against
petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, for the
annulment of the auction sale and recovery of ownership of the levied
properties.
Issue
Whether or not respondents must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr.
before they can file action to annul the judicial sale of what is the conjugal
property of Teofista and Marcelo, Sr.
Ruling
No. In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration
of nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed for failure of the petitioners to
demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance of it" that they had been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In
stark contrast, the records of this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein
respondents as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs. The same
document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying
Teofista's paraphernal properties, and separates the properties she owns in
common with her children, herein respondents. Plainly, there is no need to
re-declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case
interminably.
Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion,
became owners of the subject properties only by virtue of an execution sale
to recover Teofista's judgment obligation. This judgment obligation is solely
Teofista's, and payment therefor cannot be made through an execution sale
of properties not absolutely owned by her. These properties were evidently
conjugal properties and were, in fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr.
married to Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.'s death, by virtue of compulsory
succession, Marcelo Sr.'s share in the conjugal partnership was transmitted
by operation of law to his compulsory heirs.
Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not categorized
as such in Article 778 of the Civil Code. It reserves a portion of the net estate
of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or combination of
heirs, prevailing over all kinds of succession. The portion that is so reserved is
the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code defines legitime as "that part of the
testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved
it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Herein
respondents are primary compulsory heirs, excluding secondary compulsory
heirs,46 and preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in the distribution
of the decedent's estate.
Baritua v. CA Preterition
Facts
Aznar v. Duncan (1966)
Bienvenido Nacario was driving a tricycle with a passenger when he was hit
Facts
with a bus driven by Edgar Bitancor and owned by Jose Baritua. Bienvenido
Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court
and his passenger died and the tricycle was damaged.
declared that Helen Garcia was a natural child of the deceased. The Court of
First Instance equally divided the properties of the estate of Christensen
There was an extra-judicial settlement negotiation wherein Beienvenido’s
between Lucy Duncan (whom testator expressly recognized in his will as his
estranged wife, Alicia, with whom he has a child, received P18, 500. With
daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was
that, she executed a “Release of Claim” discharging Bitancor, Baritua, and the
preterited in the will thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was
bus insurer from all actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident.
annulled and the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased died
She also executed an affidavit of desistance manifesting her lack of interest
intestate.
in instituting any case, civil or criminal, against them.
Issue
After a year and ten months from the date of accident, the parents of
Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided
Bienvenido filed a complaint for damages against Bitancor and Baritua. They
or whether the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely
alleged that they were the ones who spent for their son’s funeral and loaned
reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia,
to him the purchase price of the damaged tricycle. Claiming that it is them
equivalent to ¼ of the entire estate.
who suffered damages, they shall be indemnified for their son’s death.
Ruling
Issue
The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of
Whether the spouse was entitled to receive the petitioner’s payment.
Helen Garcia.
Ruling
Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter and
Yes. Under Article 1240 of the Civil Code, payment shall be made to the
limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a forced
person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor
heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the
in interest, or any person authorized to receive it. Certainly, Alicia and her
legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to
son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred to by law as the
other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be
persons authorized to receive payment.
annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.
Further, Articles 887 and 985 of the Civil Code provide that the parents of the
deceased succeed only when the person dies without a legitimate
descendant. Since it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Nuguid v. Nuguid
Alicia and that they begot a child, the parents are not successors-in-interest Facts
of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. Even if Alicia had been Rosario died single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving
estranged from Bienvenido, mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the were her legitimate parents, Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. One of
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. the siblings filed a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario 11 years
before her death and prayed that she be admitted to the probate and be
Neither could the parents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and appointed administrator. The parents opposed saying that they are the
compensation from the petitioners. Such are mere money claims against the compulsory heirs of the decedent in the direct ascending line and that the
estate of their deceased son, which had been released by the agreement of will should be void on the ground of absolute preterition.
the extra-judicial settlement concluded with Alicia, the victim's widow and
heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. Issue
Is the will void on the ground of preterition?

Valdes v. RTC Ruling

YES. The decedent left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line - her parents. And, the will
completely omits both of them; thus receiving nothing by the testament,
depriving them of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited.
This is a clear case of preterition. Note that A. 854 of the NCC merely nullifies
the “institution of heir”. Considering that the will presented solely provides
for the institution of the petitioner as universal heir and nothing more, the
result is the same. The will is null and void.
Escuin v. Escuin
Facts
The decedent designated in his will his father and his wife as his sole heirs.
He ignored his recognized natural child.
Issue
Whether or not the will is valid.
Ruling
The will is partly valid. It is valid with respect to the 2/3 of the properties
which the testator can freely dispose. The 1/3 should be given to his
recognized natural child.
The above-mentioned will neither null, void, nor illegal in so far as the
testator leaves two-thirds of his property to his father and wife;
testamentary provisions impairing the legal portion of a general heir shall be
reduced in so far as they are illegal or excessive.
The late testator did not leave a recognized natural child, the appellant
minor, and a widow; that the said minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is the general
heir of his natural father, the said testator who recognized him while living,
and in the present case is entitled to one-third of his estate, which amount
constitutes the legal portion of a natural child; and for the reason that the
minor was ignored by his natural father in his will, the designation of heirs
made therein was, as matter of fact annulled by force of law, in so far as legal
portion of the said minor was thereby impaired. Legacies and betterments
shall be valid, in so far as they are not illegal, for the reason that a testator
cannot deprive the heirs of their legal portions, except in the cases expressly
indicated by law.
Lajom v. Leuterio (1960)
Facts
Maximo Viola died on September 3, 1933. Judicial proceedings of his testate
estate were instituted in the Court of First Instance. An agreement of
partition and distribution was executed by and between Jose P. Viola, Rafael
Viola and Silvio Viola, legitimate children of Maximo Viola and Juana Toura,
whereby the properties left by their father, Maximo Viola, were divided
among themselves.
Donato Lajom filed a complaint praying, among other things, that he be
declared a natural child of Maximo Viola, impliedly recognized and
acknowledged in accordance with the laws in force prior to the Civil Code,
thereby being a co-heir of Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola; that the
agreement of partition and distribution executed in 1935 by these three
legitimate children of Maximo Viola be declared null and void and that there
be a new partition with 1/7 of the estate of Maximo given to him and 2/7 to
each of the other heirs.
CFI of Nueva Ecija found in favour of Donato and ordered the partition
among Jose, Rafael and Silvio as null and void and asked for the collation of
properties in question.
Jose and Silvio were ordered to submit liquidation of fruits and products of
the 3 parcels of land that have come under their administration. Partition
was ordered: 1/7 of said properties and products to Donato and 2/7 each to
Jose, Silvio and Rafael. This decision of the CFI of Nueva Ecija was affirmed
by the SC.
The case was remanded to lower court where Donato filed a motion for
execution of judgement. Judge Leuterio claimed it wasn’t clear what the
properties of Maximo are because in the original complaint of Donato, 75
parcels of land were enumerated while the partition among Jose, Rafael and
Silvio only enumerated 47 parcels of land and now, Donato enumerated 84
parcels of land.
As starting point, he said that undoubtedly ½ of the 47 parcels belonged to
Maximo (since conjugal property) so “accordingly, the defendants, who are
in possession of each and every one of these 47 parcels, are hereby ordered
to deliver the same to the judicial administrator to be hereinafter appointed,
for his administration until the final partition in accordance with the decision
of this Court.”
Rafael filed a report of what he received under the partition. Donato noticed
that his report did not contain the fruits of a Riceland with an area of 215
hectares allegedly donated by Maximo to Rafael.
Donato wanted Rafael to include (collate) said Riceland to the redistribution
of estate. Rafael objected saying that the riceland was not mentioned or
included in the complaint filed in this case.
Judge Leuterio sided with Rafael saying that only the donations to Jose and
Silvio were questioned in the complaint and the decision’s dispositive portion
only ordered those 2 to collate. Properties donated to Rafael had not been
put into questioned and therefore cannot be deemed to have been
embraced in the dispositive requiring collation.
Issue
Whether or not the Civil Case for annulment of partition became a special
proceeding .
Ruling
No. It is alleged that petitioner having been the victim of preterition, the
institution of heirs made by the deceased Dr. Maximo Viola became
ineffective, and that Civil Case No. 8077 was thereby converted into an
intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate. This contention is
clearly untenable. There might have been merit therein if we were dealing
with special proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of a
deceased person, which, in consequence of said preterition, would thereby
acquire the character of a proceeding for the settlement of an intestate
estate, with jurisdiction over any and all properties of the deceased. But, Civil
Case No. 8077 is an ordinary civil action, and the authority of the court
having jurisdiction over the same is limited to the properties described in the
pleadings, which admittedly do not include the aforementioned riceland.
Balanay v. Martinez (1975)
Facts
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12,
1973 in Davao City at the age of 67. She was survived by her husband, Felix
Balanay, Sr., and 6 legitimate children: Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio,
Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B.
Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court for the probate of his mother's
notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English where
Leodegaria Julian declared (a) she was the owner of the "southern half of 9
conjugal lots (b) she was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land which she
inherited from her father (c) it was her desire that her properties should NOT
be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their
legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (d) after her
husband's death (age of 82 in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the
conjugal lands should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in
that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they
were all owned by her.
Although initially opposing, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed a Conformation of
Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights manifesting that out of
respect for his wife's will he waived and renounced his hereditary rights in
her estate in favor of their 6 children. In that same instrument he confirmed
the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that
their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her
will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the
affidavit and conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void for illegally
claiming the conjugal lands.
David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz
B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon filed a motion for
leave of court to withdraw probate of the will and requesting authority to
proceed by intestate estate proceeding also referring to the provisions
relating to the conjugal assets as compromising the future legitimes
Solano v. CA (1983)
Facts
Bienvenido and Emeteria, claiming to be illegitimate children of Dr. Meliton
Solano, filed an action for recognition against him. During the pendency of
the case, Solano died, and his daughter, Zonia substituted him while asking
for the probate of the will of the decedent. RTC specified the legal issues as
1) the recognition of Garcias, 2) correct status of Zonia, 3) the hereditary
share of each of them in view of the probated will. In deciding, RTC declared
Garcias as illegitimate children of late Meliton; the institution of Sonia as sole
heir declared null and void, and the 3 children shall share equally the estate
CA affirmed.
Issue
Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the
institution of sole heir from decedent’s will.
Ruling
That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Meliton’s will,
and as a result, Sonia’s institution as sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art.
854.
“The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir, but the
devises and legacies shall be valid…”
The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his
property which the testator had the right to such so that it should be upheld
as to the one-half portion of the property that the testator could freely
dispose of Sonia’s share is hereby declared to be 4/6 of the estate and
Garcias 1/6 each. The usufruct in favor of will should not be invalidated all
together.

Lower Court: Will was void and converted to intestate proceedings

Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, asked for the
reconsideration of the lower court's order on the ground that Atty. Montaña
had NO authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will

Lower Court on motion for reconsideration: Denied and clarified that it

declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its
provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.

Issue
Whether or not the will should be void and interstate proceeding should
follow.

Ruling
No. An illegal declaration does NOT nullify the entire will and may be
disregarded. Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights
and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership but insofar as it partakes
of a donation, it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750
and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to
the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should
be respected.

The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it
does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution
and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In
the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the
children and the surviving spouse.

The preterition of surviving spouse did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he

signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.
Acain v. IAC (1987)
Facts
Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio.
The will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife
shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). In case
Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundo’s children.
Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.
The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the
latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(1) The petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these
proceedings;
(2) He is merely a universal heir and
(3) The widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
Issue
Whether or not there was preterition.
Ruling
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not
ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even
if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she
is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal
adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption
gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of
the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited
in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were
not expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally
adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not
result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they
should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are
concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters
to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any
other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written.
In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding
he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or
a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift
of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive.
At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. However,
intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child
and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the
testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left
by the deceased.
JLT Agro v. Balansag (2005)
Facts
Don Julian contracted two marriages. He had two children with the first wife
Antonia and 4 children on the second wife Milagros. The present controversy
involves a parcel of land which was originally registered in the name of Don
Julian and Antonia. Don Julian married Milagros without partitioning the
properties in his first marriage. To avoid conflict, the parties entered into a
Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the properties
of Don Julian. The above parcel of land was included to be the share of
Milagros and her children. Milagros took possession of the said property
which was subsequently sold to respondents herein. Respondents, upon
registering the said land discover that the title to the above land was on the
name of Petitioner herein.
Don Julian after the execution of the Compromise Agreement executed a
Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities to petitioner
which transfers the ownership of the subject land in favor to the petitioner.
Don Julian died intestate.
Issue
Whether or not a future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and
reserved prior to the death of the testator.
Ruling
Yes. Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are
not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The
exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future
inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos
referred to in Article 1080 which states that: “Should a person make a
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory
heirs.”
The partition will, of course, be effective only after death. It does not
necessarily require the formalities of a will for after all, it is not the partition
that is the mode of acquiring ownership. Neither will the formalities of a
donation be required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the
ownership here after death; since no will has been made it follows that the
mode will be succession (intestate succession). Besides, the partition here is
merely the physical determination of the part to be given to each heir.
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid
pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally
operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the
second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise
agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to
the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the
interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the
interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never
exist.
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering
Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the
property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs
from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the
subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his
lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children
on the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the
compromise agreement. However, it was proven that there was no evidence
showing the acceptance by the petitioner as the donee. Such acceptance will
never be presumed being Don Julian as the Majority stockholder of such
Corporation.
Reserva Troncal Edroso v. Sablan
Facts
Chua v. CFI (1977)
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on
Facts
September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro who at his
In the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia Militar he sired three
father’s death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15,
children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel. When Patricia S. Militar died,
1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of
Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre
land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the
with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel, one of
hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her
the children of Jose in his first marriage, died without leaving any issue.
ownership.
Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate. In the intestate proceeding,
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan — that is, two uncles german of
Consolacion and Juanito got 1/2 each of Lot No. 399. Jose’s children in the
Pedro Sablan — appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming
first marriage got cash.
one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, “or that if granted
to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died
registration of each parcel.”
intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de la
Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. Then on March 5,
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration.
1966, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in
the descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land
in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved
In the “Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre,” the petitioners herein,
and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the
Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and dominador and Remedios Chua,
names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of
the first marriage filed the complaint praying that the one-half (1/2) portion
Issue
of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to JuanitoFrias but which passed to
Whether or not the Court of Land Registration erred in denying the
Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter’s death, be declaredas a reservable
registration of the reservable properties by reservista, Edroso.
property.
Ruling
Issue
Yes. The Court held that applicant is entitled to register in her own name the
Whether or not the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion
two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording
of Lot 399 which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already
in the registration the right required by the law to be reserved to either or
prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966, or 14 years after the death of
both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive
Juanito (prepositus).
her.
Ruling
The reservista has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy,
No. The Court held that the petitioners herein are claiming as reservees did
dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and
not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March
in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition.
1966. When the petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the
one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.
The ascendants who inherits from descendants, whether by the latter’s wish
or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly
transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership
belong to him exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery.

During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right
required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives
within the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them
has been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even
have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.
Seines v. Esparcia (1961)
Facts
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa
Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana,
while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named
Francisco. OCT No. 10275 covering Lot 3368, his inheritance, was issued in
the name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his
mother administered the property.
When Francisco died single and without any descendant, his mother Andrea,
as his sole heir, executed an EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE
whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00
she sold the property in question to appellants.
When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her
husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of OOCT No. 10275 — which was in
their possession — the latter refused.
Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco,
and who as such had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951
executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes.
Issue
Whether or not the sale made by the reservista Andrea was void there being
no right to dispose the same.
Ruling
No. The Court held that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life
usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but
subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee
being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the
death of the reservista.
Florentino v. Florentino
Facts
In 1890, Apolonio II died leaving a notarial will. He was survived by his ten
children and his widow as heirs. Apolonio III received in the partition of the
subject property. When Apolonio III died, the said property were inherited by
his mother Severina, who later died, leaving a will instituting her only
daughter as her universal heiress. Herein appellants demands from Mercedes
to deliver their corresponding share in the reservable property but Mercedes
refused. CFI dismissed the complaint of specific performance.
Ruling
REVERSED. Even if Severina left in her will said property together with her
own property to her only daughter, nevertheless, this property had not lost
their reservable nature in as much as it originated from the common
ancestor of herein appellants. The property was inherited by the son and was
transmitted by operation of law to his mother.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property while there
are living within the 3rd degree relative of the latter, is nothing but a life
usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. But if
afterwards, all of such relative die, the said property become free property
by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the
ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his legal succession.
There are seven reservatoris who are entitled to the reservable property left
at the death of Apolonio III:
(1) 3 children of the 1st marriage;
(2) 3 children who are represented by their own children
(nephews/ nieces);
(3) Mercedes
All of the appellants are the relatives of the posthumous son within the third
degree. Hence, they are entitled as reservatarios to the property which came
from the common ancestors.

The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject
to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by
virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any
person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea
Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes
inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants
became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof
passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters
Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by
law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the
reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition
being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present
case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea
Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the
absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea’s death.
Padura v. Baldovino (1958)
Facts
Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime. With his first
wife Gervacia Landig, he had one child, Manuel Padura. With the second
wife, Benita Garing, he had two children, Fortunato and Candelaria Padura.
Agustin died on Apr 26, 1908, leaving a last will and testament, duly
probated, wherein he bequeathed his properties among his three children
and his surviving spouse, Benita Garing.
Fortunato was adjudicated four parcels of land. He died unmarried on May
28, 1908, without having executed a will; and not having any issue, the
parcels of land were inherited exclusively by his mother Benita. Benita was
issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, subject to the condition that
the properties were reservable in favor of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came.
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of
ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and
nephews are entitled to share double that of brothers and nephews of half-
blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of
degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to aply, the rule
of double share for immedaite collaterals of the whole blood should likewise
be operative.
In other words, reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives
(reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that
group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the
applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art 891 does not
specify otherwise. The reserva being an exceptional case, its application
should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the
law.

On Aug 26, 1934, Candelaria died, leaving as her heirs her four legitimate
children: Cristeta, Melania, Anicia, and Pablo Baldovino (Oppositors-
appellants). On Oct 6, 1940, Manuel also died, survived by his legitimate
children Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino
Padura (Petitioners-appellees) Upon the death of Benita (the reservista) on
Oct 15, 1952, the heirs took possession of the reservable properties. CFI
Laguna declared the children of Manuel and Candelaria to be the rightful
reservees, and as such, entitled to the reservable properties (the original
reservees, Candelaria and Manuel, having predeceased the reservista)
The Baldovino heirs filed a petition seeking to have the properties
partitioned, such that one-half be adjudicated to them, and the other half to
the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherited by right of
representation from their respective parents, the original reservees.
Padura heirs opposed, maintaining that they should all be deemed as
inheriting in their own right, under which, they claim, each should have an
equal share.
Even during the reservista’s lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate
acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the
reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right:
and for this purpose they can compel the annotation of their right in the
Registry of Property even while the reservista is alive. This right is
incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs
of the reservista. It is also clear that the reservable property is not part of the
estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of them by will, so long as
there are reservatarios existing. The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the
reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios
are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive
the reservista.

(In essence, the Baldovino heirs, who are whole blood relatives of the
reservista, were contending that they should get more than their half-blood
relatives, the Padura heirs. They anchor their claim on Articles 1006 and 1008
of the Civil Code)

RTC declared all the reservees, without distinction, “co-owners, pro-indiviso,

in equal shares of the parcels of land.”

Issue
Whether or not the reserved properties should, as the trial court held, be
apportioned among the heirs equally.

Ruling
No. The nephews of the whole blood should take a share twice as large as
that of the nephews of the half blood. The reserva troncal is a special rule
designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the
third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the
inheriting ascendant (reservista). Article 891 of the Code provides:
ART 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came.

The purpose of the reserva troncal is accomplished once the property has
devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on,
there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between one
reservatario and another of the same degree, there is no call for applying Art
891 any longer; the respective share of each in the reversionary property
should be governed by the ordinary rules of interstate succession.

Florentino v Florentino (as restated in the case): upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the
reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree to the
descendant (prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote
degree... And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant
(prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews.
Gonzales v. CFI (1981)
Facts
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died in
Manila on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow Filomena and their
seven children: four daughters and three sons.
The real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three
equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his
deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F.
Legarda. Filomena Legarda died intestate and without issue on March 19,
1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating to herself
the properties, which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena
Legarda, which were the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the
affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Roces Legarda succeeded her deceased
daughter as co-owner of the properties held pro indiviso by her other six
children.
Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten identical documents wherein she
disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter in favor of
her son’s children, a total of 16 grandchildren all in all. Mrs. Legarda and her
six surviving children partitioned all the properties consisting of the 1/3 share
in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason, which the children inherited, in
representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died and her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda, a daughter of the testatrix filed a
motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother’s estate the properties,
which she inherited from her deceased daughter on the ground that said
properties are reservable properties, which should be inherited by
FilomenaLegarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on the motion, Beatriz filed an ordinary civil
action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother’s
estate for the purpose of serving a declaration that said properties are
reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her will to
her grandchildren to the exclusion of her sons and daughters.
Issue
Whether or not the subject properties are subject to Reserva Troncal
Ruling
In reserva troncal:
• A descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property
from an ascendant or from a brother or sister;
• The same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from said descendant, and
• The said ascendant should reserve the said property for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the
deceased descendants (prepositus) and who belong to the line
from which the said properties came.
So three transmissions are involved:
• A first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation)
from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased
descendant;
• A posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate
succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante
de la reserva) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or
reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation; and,
• A third transmissions of the property (in consequence of the
reservation) from the reservor to the reserves (reservatarios) or
the relatives within the third degree from the deceased
descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or
sister of the deceased descendant.
THUS, if there is only two transmission there is no reserva.
The persons involved in reservatroncal are:
• The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was
received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
• The descendant or prepositus who received the property;
• The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the
property from the prepositus by operation of law; and,
• The reservee who is within the third degree from the prepositus
and who belongs to the line (linea or tronco) from which the
property came and for whom the property should be reserved by
the reservor.
• The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by
descent. He is called the propositus.
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely:
• The death of the ascendant obliged to reserve; and,
• The survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which the property came.
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the
reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the
reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The
transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The
transferee’s rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time
of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees
predecease the reservor.
The reservor’s alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory
condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor’s death, there are
reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. If
there are no reservees at the time of the reservor’s death, the transferee’s
title would become absolute. On the other hand, the reservee has only an
inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right would disappear
if he predeceased the reservor. It would become absolute should the
reservor predecease the reservee.
Even during the reservista’s lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate
acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the
reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right,
and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in the
registry of property even while the reservista is alive.
The reservable property is not part of the estate of the reservista who may
not dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing. The
reservatarios, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but frm the
descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.
Hence, upon the reservista’s death, thereservatario nearest to the propositus
becomes automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property. The reservee CANNOT impugn any conveyance made by the
reservor BUT he can require that the reservable character of the property be
recognized by the purchaser. In this case, the properties in question were
indubitably reservable property in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly,
she was a reservor. The reservaton became a certainty when at the time of
her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus
Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
De Papa v. Camacho (1986)
Facts
Appellees and appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho have as a common
ancestor, the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana
Tioco), father of appellees and great grandfather of defendant. During her
lifetime, Romana gratuitously donated four parcels of land to her niece
Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of appellees). When Toribia died, she was
survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children
Faustino and Trinidad (mother of Dalisay). The 4 parcels of land were left as
inheritance of Toribia‟s two children in equal pro-indiviso shares. They too
inherited 3 parcels of land which was supposed to be the inheritance of the
late Toribia Tioco from her father Balbino. However, when Faustino died
intestate, single and without issue, the ½ pro-indiviso share in the 7 parcels
of land was left to his father Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who
received the said property subject to a reserve troncal. Subsequently,
Trinidad died intestate and her rights and interests in the parcels of land
were inherited by her only legitimate childe, appellant Dalisay. Eustacio
thereafter died intestated, survived by his only legitimate defendant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho.
The lower Court declared that the appellees as well as appellant Dalisay were
entitled as reservatarios to ½ of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal
proportions.
Issue
Whether or not all relatives of the prepositus (Faustino) within the third
degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable
property upon the death of the reservista.
Ruling
No. Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on
intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right
thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the
prepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the
defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same
degree as the latter. As held in the case of Abellana v. Ferraris, under the
Article 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.)
being called to the succession. Hence, a decedent’s uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive
and are willing and qualified to succeed, similar to the case at hand.
Sumaya v. IAC (1991)
Facts
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets
of properties subject of this case: 1) 1/3 interest of a parcel of land from his
father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) 1/7 interest from his
maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950. On
June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only
his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to
the subject real properties.
Vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication
of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were
inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr. and from his maternal
grandmother, Luisa Bautista.
Vda de Balantakbo sold the property to Sumaya which was subsequently sold
to Villa Honorio Development Corporation. Villa then transferred and
assigned its rights over the property to Agro Industrial Coconut Cooperative.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described
properties do not contain any annotation of its reservable character.
On March 4, 1970, five brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and three
surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the
first named Balantakbos, filed civil cases to recover the subject properties
which they claimed were subject to a reservatroncal in their favor.
Issue
Whether or not the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo
stating the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable nature of
the properties is sufficient annotation of the reservable nature of the same.
Ruling
NO. The Court disagreed with the disposition of the appellate court that
there is no need to register the reservable character of the property, if only
for the protection of the reservees (reservatarios), against innocent third
persons.
In this case, the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo Vda. de
Balantakbo which contained a statement that the property was inherited
from a descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited by the latter from
another ascendant, was registered with the Registry of Property. The failure
of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property
in the certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.
As to the sale of subject properties, the Court affirmed the order of lower
courts against plaintiff Agro Industrial Coconut Cooperative to convey the
subject properties back to reservatarios. The Court held that there is
sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the reservable
character of the properties before they bought the same from Consuelo as
evidenced by the Deed of Sale executed by the parties.
Moreover, the Court a quo found that the petitioners and private
respondents were long time acquaintances and that they knew all along that
the properties litigated in this case were inherited by Raul Balantakbo from
his father and from his maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. De
Balantakbo inherited these properties from his son Raul.
Solivio v. CA (1990)
Facts
On October 11, 1959, Esteban Javellana, Jr.’s mother Salustia died leaving all
her property, including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, to him. Esteban
Jr,” died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
petitioner CeledoniaSolivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother,
SalustiaSolivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
Pursuant to an agreement between Concordia and Celedonia, the latter
would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the
foundation. Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed
for a Special Proceeding for her appointment as special administratrix of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr., praying that letters of administration be
issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after
payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate
be adjudicated to her.
Concordia filed a civil case in the RTC of Iloilo for partition, recovery of
possession, ownership and damages. Celedonia averred that the estate of
Esteban Jr. was subject to reservatroncal and thus it should redound to her
as a relative within the 3rd degree on his mother side.
Issue
Whether or not the estate of the deceased was subject to reservatroncal and
that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his
mother’s side
Ruling
No. There is no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the estate of the
deceased was subject to reservatroncal, and that it pertains to her as his only
relative within the third degree on his mother’s side. The reservatroncal
provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which said property came.
The persons involved in reservatroncal are:
• The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the
ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his
descendants.
• The persons for whom the property is reserved are the
reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree
counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the
line from which the property came.
• The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous
title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by
operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable
property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his
mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question.
Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of
his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his
mother’s side. The reservatroncal applies to properties inherited by an
ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a
brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant
from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Cano v. Director (1959)
Facts
Land Registration Case No. 12: CFI of Sorsogon decreed the registration of
Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre under the
following conditions: that the two parcels of land described in plan SWO-
24152, known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Cadastral Survey of Juban,
with their improvements, be registered in the name of Maria Cano
(reservista), Filipina, 71 years of age, widow and resident of Juban, province
of Sorsogon, with the understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to the
right of reservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of
the Civil Code. Decision being final, the decree and Certificate of Title (No. 0-
20) were issued in the name of Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal in
favor of Eustaquia Guerrero.
Counsel for the reservee (reservatorio) Guerrero filed a motion with the
Cadastral Court, alleging the death of the original registered owner and
reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and praying that the original
Certificate of Title be ordered cancelled and a new one issued in favor of
movant Eustaquia Guerrero
This was opposed by the sons of the reservista. who contended that the
application and operation of the reserva troncal should be ventilated in an
ordinary contentious proceeding, and that the Registration Court did not
have jurisdiction to grant the motion.
The lower court granted the petition for the reason that the death of the
reservista vested the ownership of the property in the petitioner as the sole
reservatario troncal.
The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the
order, insisting that the ownership of the reservatario cannot be decreed in a
mere proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496, but requires a judicial
administration proceedings.
In this connection, appellants argue that the reversion in favor of the
reservatario requires the declaration of the existence of the following facts:
a. The property was received by a descendant by gratuitous title
from an ascendant or from a brother or sister
b. Said descendant dies without issue;
c. The property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of
law; and
d. The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which said property came.
Issue
Whether Guererro is entitled to the land in question.
Ruling
Yes. The requisites enumerated by appellants have already been declared to
exist by the decree of registration wherein the rights of the appellee as
reservatario troncal were expressly recognized.
Lot No. 1799 was acquired by the applicant Maria Cano by inheritance from
her deceased daughter, Lourdes Guerrero who, in turn, inherited the same
from her father Evaristo Guerrero and, hence, falls squarely under the
provisions of Article 891 of the Civil Code
Eustaquia Guerrero, being the nearest of kin, excludes all the other private
oppositors, whose degree of relationship to the decedent is remoter.
This decree having become final, all persons are barred thereby from
contesting the existence of the constituent elements of the reserva.
The only requisites for the passing of the title from the reservista to the
appellee are: (1) the death of the reservista; and (2) the fact that the
reservatario has survived the reservista
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista,
the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this case)
becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property.
It is equally well settled that the reservable property cannot be transmitted
by a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa, (like appellants
herein) so long as a reservatorio within the third degree from the prepositus
and belonging to the line whence the property came, is in existence when
the reservista dies.
The rights of the reservataria Eustaquia Guerrero have been expressly
recognized, and it is nowhere claimed that there are other reservatarios of
equal or nearer degree. It is thus apparent that the heirs of the reservista are
merely endeavoring to prolong their enjoyment of the reservable property to
the detriment of the party lawfully entitled thereto.
Legacies and Devices
Fernandez v. Dimagiba (1967)
Belen v. Bank of PI (1960)
Intestate Succession
Rosales v. Rosales (1987)
Facts
On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by
her husband Fortunato Rosales and their two children Magna Rosales Acebes
and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her,
leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C.
Rosales, the herein petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The trial court
ordered that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio be entitled each
to ¼ share in the estate of decedent. Irenea, on the other hand, insisted in
getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the
late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory
heir of her mother-in-law.
Issue
Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.
Ruling
No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups,
namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the
right of representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states
that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The
law has already meticulously enumerated the intestate heirs of a decedent.
The Court held that Irenea misinterpreted the provision of Article 887
because the provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which
case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate
of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a third
person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
De los Santos v. De la Cruz (1971)
Facts
The parties admit that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the
extrajudicial partition agreement, was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate;
that defendant-appellant (De la Cruz)is a nephew of the said decedent; that
plaintiff-appellee (De los Santos) is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her
mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece who predeceased said Pelagia de
la Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to
divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
Issue
What is the effect of an extra-judicial partition which included a person who
is not an heir of the deceased?
Ruling
The extrajudicial partition agreement is void with respect to plaintiff-
appellee.
Article 1105 of the Civil Code provides: “A partition which includes a person
believed to be a heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such
person.” Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit
from the deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was
an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the
rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and
void. A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the
right to have its terms enforced.
Bagunu v. Piedad (2000)
Facts
Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants.
Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of
the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the
deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent. Ofelia Hernando Bagunu
moved to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Piedad.
Issue
Whether intervenor-appellant as a collateral relative within the fifth civil
degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her
intervention.
Ruling
No. By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is,
by operation of law, “raised to the same place and degree” of relationship as
that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative
thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not
from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented
would have succeeded. In the direct line, right of representation is proper
only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the
right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their
uncles or aunts. The right of representation does not apply to “other
collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree” (to which group both
petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference
following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the
legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and
descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and
sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives,
except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring
with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962,
aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule.
Abellana-Bacayo v. Ferraris-Borromeo (1965)
Facts
Melodia Ferraris was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening
her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs. She left
properties in Cebu City, consisting of1/3 share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa
Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00. The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving
direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral
relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of
decedent’s father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita,
and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the
children of Melodia’s only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-
deceased her. These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate
heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
Corpuz v. Corpuz (1978)
Sayson v. CA (1992)
Facts
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot 5 children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Teodoro married Isabel. Upon the death of Teodoro
and Isabela, their properties were in the possession of Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel, their children. The plaintiffs filed for partition of the intestate estate
of Teodoro and Isabela. It was opposed by of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel
alleging their successional rights to the estate as the lawful descendants.
Subsequently, of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed for partition of intestate
estate of Eleno and Rafaela as they are titled to inherit Teodoro’s share in his
parents’ estate by right of representation because of Delia and Edmundo are
adopted children and of Doribel was legitimate daughter.
The RTC found the defendants qualified to inherit from E and R by right of
representation. The CA found De and E disqualified from inheriting from E
and R.
Issue
Whether or not of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel may inherit from the estate
of Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation
Ruling
As to Doribel, YES, for she was a legitimate daughter of T and thus
granddaughter of E and R. She has right to represent her deceased father in
the distribution of intestate estate of her grandparents. She is entitled to the
share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall
be equal to the shares of her grandparents’ other children.
As to of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers,
cannot inherit by representation. While it is true that the adopted child shall
be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter,
these rights do not include right of representation. The relationship created
by the adoption is between the adopting parents and the adopted child and
does not extend to the blood relative of either party.

Issue
Whether or not a decedent’s uncles and aunts may succeed ab intestato
while nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed.

Ruling
No. in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other
collaterals from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001,
1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Art. 1009,
the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a
precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the
succession. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of
brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth
degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any affection to merit
the succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the
fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article
should be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest
relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal
parts, there being no right of representation. They succeed without
distinction of lines or preference among them on account of the whole blood
relationship.
Manuel v. Ferrer Order of Intestate Succession
Facts
Leonardo v. CA (1983)
The petitioners in this case were the legitimate children of spouses Antonio
Facts
Manuel and Beatriz Guiling. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an
Francisca Reyes died intestate on July 12, 1942 and was survived by two
extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista, from which Juan Manuel was born.
daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In
son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo
consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of
died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue. On
land was registered in his name. He would later buy two parcels and register
October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of
the same under his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their
the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum
own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private
of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking
respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as
judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca
their own “daughter”.
Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with
defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislao Manuel a Deed
properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint,
of Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land. Juan
partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an
Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04
accounting of all the income derived from said properties from the time
February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall have been
made, delivering to him his share therein with legal interest. Answering the
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed
complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership
an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land
over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child
Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislao Manuel a Deed of
who cannot succeed by right of representation. For his part, the other
Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of
defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said properties
the land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of
are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had
Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well
subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly
with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court, the
mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in
petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the instruments.
September 1963.
Issue
Issue
Whether or not petitioners had the legal personality to contest the actions of
Whether or not petitioner, as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, has
Modesta.
legal right to inherit by representation.
Ruling
Ruling
No. Petitioners, not being the real “parties-in-interest” in the case, had
No. Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he
neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the
deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of
Although inn her answer to the complaint, Modesta admitted that she was
Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he
not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel because she was adopted without the
was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother
benefit of formal or judicial adoption and therefore was neither a
were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father’s first marriage
compulsory nor a legal heir, the court still reiterated the following rules:
was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has
a. where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were
no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
legitimate, the latter had no right to the former’s inheritance
his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the
b. the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed
Philippines.)
from her illegitimate child
c. a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the
succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent
d. the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her
deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father
e. an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father
Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista (1992)
Facts
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged
natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood
brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. Don Andres Pascual died
intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged
natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by Adela Soldevilla de
Pascual assurviving spouse, children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of
the full blood of the deceased, children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half
blood of the deceased, acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual,
brother of the full blood of the deceased and te intestate of Eleuterio T.
Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented by his
heirs. Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don
Andres Pascual, filed for administration of the intestate estate of her late
husband. all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S.
Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual.
Issue
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of
the deceased.
Ruling
No. Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate
family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former,
and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in
the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child
but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Clearly the term “illegitimate”
refers to both natural and spurious.
Santillon v. Miranda (1965)
Facts
Pedro Santillon died without a will, leaving his wife, Perfecta Miranda and
one son, Claro. 4 years after Pedro’s death, Claro filed a petition for letters of
administration which was opposed by his mother and spouses Benito
Miranda and Rosario Corrales.
Upon partition, Claro filed a motion to declare share of heirs and to resolve
conflicting claims of the parties invoking Art.892 of the New Civil Code
insisting that after deducting ½ from the conjugal properties (conjugal share
of Perfecta), the remaining ½ must be divided as follows: ¼ for her and ¾ for
him.
Perfecta (mother) claimed besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under
Art. 996 of the NCC to another ½ of the remaining half.
Issue
Whether or not Art. 892 or Art. 996 applies.
Ruling
Article 996 specifically applies to intestate succession while Art. 892 which is
found in the chapter of testamentary succession, applies to such type of
succession.
Surviving spouse concurring with a legitimate child is entitled to one-half of
the intestate estate.
When an intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with only one
legitimate child of the deceased is entitled to one-half of the estate of the
deceased spouse under Art. 996 of the Civil Code.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as
to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated
differently, in the negative. It may be said that the law may be harsh but that
is the law. DUREX LEX SED LEX
Bicomong v. Almanza (1977)
Facts
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas and were born three
children namely: Perpetua Bagsic, Igmedia Bagsic, and Ignacio Bagsic.
Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic
remarried Silvestra Glorioso. Of this second marriage were born two
children, Felipa Bagsic and Maura Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic and Silvestra
Glorioso died. Ignacio Bagsic died leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his
only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio
Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino. Perpetua Bagsic died and
was survived by her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad
Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also leaving no
heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of
the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five
(5) months before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta
Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the defendant herein Engracio
Manese and her father Geronimo Almanza. The subject matter concerns the
one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5)
parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra
Glorioso. Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959,
namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos,
children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio
Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the
defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of
their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
Parish Priest of Victoria v. Rigor
Facts
Father Rigor died leaving a will naming as devisees the testator’s three
sisters. The will also contained a bequest to be given to the nearest male
relative who shall pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as
priest. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the
administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria
had no right to administer the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that
ecclesiastic.
Issue
Whether the testator’s nearest male relative who took the priesthood after
the testator’s death falls within the intention of the testator in providing to
whom the bequest is to be given.
Ruling
NO. The Court held that the said bequest refers to the testator’s nearest
male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time
thereafter. “In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee
must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper” (Art. 1025, Civil Code).Inasmuch as the
testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or
inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the rice lands by the parish
priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will was likewise inoperative.

Issue
Whether or not the nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own
right.

Ruling
Yes. In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that
Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her
ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving
collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the
ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in
accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code. By virtue of
said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to
inherit in their own right.

Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to

whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and
without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by
whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not
exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their
right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of
the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece
of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood.
Acceptance and Repudiation of Inheritance Guy v. CA (2006)
Facts
Borromeo-Herrera v. Borromeo (1987)
The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima
Facts
Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged
Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitime being an illegitimate son of the
that they are the acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died
deceased, by incorporating a Waiver of Hereditary Rights supposedly signed
intestate. The minors were represented by their mother Remedios Oanes
by the rest of the Borromeo’s. In the waiver, of the 9 heirs relinquished to
who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration before the
Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The petitioners opposed this
RTC of Makati City.
Waiver for reason that this is without force and effect because there can be
no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid
Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving
acceptance of the inheritance from the heirs who intend to transfer the
spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no
same.
debts hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters
administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that
Issue
the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by
Whether or not a Waiver of Hereditary Rights can be executed without a
Remedios and not by counsel.
valid acceptance from the heirs in question.
Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by
Ruling
reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial
YES. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that “the
and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor
properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as
children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.
belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
continue the personality of the former. The heirs succeed the deceased by
The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the
the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of
supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted
the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the
guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver.
hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the
It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum
moment of the death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The
shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court.
right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the
Hence, this petition.
corresponding hereditary portion.
Issue
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards

Ruling
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians
must necessarily obtain judicial approval. repudiation of inheritance must
pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not
having been authorized by the court, the release or waiver is therefore void.
Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their supposed
right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the
decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right
which, according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.

As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs:

The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of

the claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters
administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to
the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship included. As
held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in
one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to claim
inheritance. (Briz v. Briz)
Collation Partition and Distribution of Estate

Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon Tuason v. Araneta (1951)

De Roma v. CA Doromal v. CA (1975)

Facts
Facts
Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She died
A parcel of land in Iloilo were co-owned by 7 siblings all surnamed Horilleno.
intestate. When administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was
5 of the siblings gave a SPA to their niece Mary Jimenez, who succeeded her
appointed administratrix and filed an inventory of the estate. Opposed by
father as a co-owner, for the sale of the land to father and son Doromal. One
Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties donated by their mother to
of the co-owner, herein petitioner, Filomena Javellana however did not gave
Buhay and fruits thereof had not been included. The Parcels of Land totaled
her consent to the sale even though her siblings executed a SPA for her
P10,297.50 and the value is not disputed. The TC issued an order in favor of
signature. The co-owners went on with the sale of 6/7 part of the land and a
Buhay because when Candelaria donated the properties to Buhay she said in
new title for the Doromals were issued.
the Deed of Donation “sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na din a mababawing
muli” which the TC interpreted as a prohibition to collate and besides the
Respondent offered to repurchase the land for 30K as stated in the deed of
legitimes of the two daughters were not impaired. On appeal, it was reversed
sale but petitioners declined invoking lapse in time for the right of
as it merely described the donation as irrevocable not an express prohibition
repurchase. Petitioner also contend that the 30K price was only placed in the
to collate.
deed of sale to minimize payment of fees and taxes and as such, respondent
should pay the real price paid which was P115, 250.
Issue
Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.
Issue
Whether or not the period to repurchase of petitioner has already lapsed.
Ruling
The pertinent Civil Code provisions are:
Ruling
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
Period of repurchase has not yet lapsed because the respondent was not
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
notified of the sale. The 30-day period for the right of repurchase starts only
property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
after actual notice not only of a perfected sale but of actual execution and
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
delivery of the deed of sale.
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of
The letter sent to the respondent by the other co-owners cannot be
the partition. (1035a)
considered as actual notice because the letter was only to inform her of the
intention to sell the property but not its actual sale. As such, the 30-day
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if
period has not yet commenced and the respondent can still exercise his right
the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donee
to repurchase.
should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be
reduced as inofficious. (1036)
The respondent should also pay only the 30K stipulated in the deed of sale
because a redemptioner’s right is to be subrogated by the same terms and
The SC affirmed the appellate court’s decision and that it merely described
conditions stipulated in the contract.
the donation as irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not
necessarily exempt the donated properties from collation as required under
the provisions of the NCC. Given the precise language of the deed of
donation the decedent donor would have included an express prohibition to Bautista v. Grinio-Aquino (1988)
collate if that had been the donor’s intention. Absent such indication of that
intention, the rule not the exemption should be applied.
Cua v. Vargas (2006)
Facts
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San
Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On
February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was
executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs, partitioning and adjudicating
unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11
square meters. The heirs Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however,
did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario
signed it.

An Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was again executed by
and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same
sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed
the document and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were
sold to Joseph Cua.

Gloria Vargas came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Sale only when the original house built on the lot was being demolished
sometime in May 1995. She also claimed she was unaware that an earlier
Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the
same property had been published in the Catanduanes Tribune.

After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner Cua, Gloria
Vargas tried to redeem the property from Joseph Cua but the offer was
refused. Gloria Vargas filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement
and Legal Redemption of the lot against Joseph Cua.

Issue
Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of
their failure to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and
partition of estate when the extrajudicial settlement and partition has been
duly published;

Ruling
NO. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding.
The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had
no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It
contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of
settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested
parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as
what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of
extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their
hereditary rights to third persons even before the partition of the estate. The
heirs who actually participated in the execution of the extrajudicial
settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares
in the subject property, are bound by the same.