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EXIS 322 No. of Pages 12

The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (2017) xxx–xxx

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The Extractive Industries and Society

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Original article

Talvivaara mine and water pollution: An analysis of mining conflict in

Finland
Rauno Sairinen* , Heidi Tiainen, Tuija Mononen
University of Eastern Finland, Finland

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history:
Received 9 October 2016 This article contributes to the growing literature on natural resource management conflicts and mineral
Received in revised form 1 May 2017 related environmental conflicts in particular, focusing on the case of the Talvivaara project in Finland. The
Accepted 1 May 2017 economic and environmental impacts of this mine became a key focus of Finnish politics during 2010–12.
Available online xxx Its performance has sparked a heated discussion about the legitimacy of the mining industry and its place
in Finnish society. The paper analyses the Talvivaara crisis as a process, which began as a local
Keywords: environmental conflict but would become a symbol of national conflict in the mining industry. The policy
Sustainable mining analysis presented here is informed by Pondy’s Model of Organisational Conflict.
Responsible mining
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Environmental conflict
Mining policy
Mining conflict
Water pollution
Mining protests
Natural resources conflicts

1. Introduction problem, focusing on three different questions: 1) How did

This article contributes to the growing literature about natural
resource management conflicts. (e.g. Arsel et al., 2016; Kemp 2011;
Franks et al., 2014; Labonne, 2016; Paredes, 2016). The article is a
case study from a significant mine project “Talvivaara” in Finland.
Through its prolonged and severe environmental and economic
problems, the mine and the company became one of the key issues
in Finnish politics during 2010–12. The case which has been
described widely as “an environmental catastrophe” (e.g. HS,
2012i; SLL, 2017; Savon Sanomat, 2017) has also become a symbol
or prism through which to discuss the development of Finnish
mining as a whole (Tiainen et al., 2014). The significance of the case
can be reflected by the fact that already two documentary films
(Talvivaaran miehet/Men of Talvivaara 2015 and Nälkämaan sampo
(2016) and one fictional film (Jättiläinen/Giant, 2016) has been
produced. The politics of mineral exploration and extraction in the
context of Nordic countries is an under-researched area. This
article, therefore, contributes to the small body of mining research
on Northern European development.
The aim of this article is to analyze the Talvivaara mine case as a
process of social conflict about a complex environmental policy
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: rauno.sairinen@uef.fi (R. Sairinen), heidi.tiainen@uef.fi
(H. Tiainen), tuija.mononen@uef.fi (T. Mononen).
Talvivaara become an environmental issue: what stages did the
Talvivaara conflict process go through? 2) What content, actors,
and features were relevant to the conflict policy process? 3) Which
factors affected the exacerbation of the conflict? The questions will
be answered by analyzing empirical material and making
interpretations of the conflict process. The article examines the
Talvivaara conflict as a process, which took several years, and
turned from a local environmental conflict into a national symbol
of conflict with the mining industry. The revival of mining
operations in Finland in the beginning of 21st century marked
the spectacular growth of a traditional industrial field after a
period of dormancy. As the world price of minerals, metals and
precious metals rose, the mineral deposits in Finland, extensive on
the European scale, began to interest international mining
investors. The new development of mining meant a change in
the actor structure of the field. While Finnish mining operations up
to the 1990 s were generally in state hands, including Outokumpu
Oyj, today most mining operators are foreign corporations.
(Rytteri, 2012.)
Talvivaara Mining Company Plc. was an exception in this
respect. Finnish ownership is significant in this traded company. It
is the only mining company in which the State of Finland has
invested – through its holding company, Solidium Oy. When
Talvivaara experienced financial difficulties in 2012–13, the state
acted to insure the company’s finances. Because of the share

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.05.001
2214-790X/© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article in press as: R. Sairinen, et al., Talvivaara mine and water pollution: An analysis of mining conflict in Finland, Extr. Ind. Soc.
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.05.001
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emission, Solidium Oy became the largest holder of Talvivaara
stock (16.7% in spring 2013). Prior to the emission, its holdings
amounted to 8.9% (YLE, 2013). The Talvivaara Mining Company Plc.
went into bankruptcy in 2015 (Talvivaara, 2015) and, after going
through many stages, is now owned by the state-owned company
Terrafame Oy. The impact of markets, the problems with the new
technology, and environmental problems were all factors in the
bankruptcy. In May 2016, The Finnish government decided that it
would prepare to close down the Talvivaara mine. The Terrafame-
run mine was to be closed over a transitional period, until the end
of the year 2016 (Valtioneuvosto, 2016). At the same time,
however, negotiations continued with private, non-governmental
financing and investment bodies about the possibilities for
continuing mining.
Environmental and natural resource conflicts can be
approached from the various stakeholders and parties perspec-
tives or by examining the reasons behind the discord (Oksanen,
2003). It is possible to deepen the analysis by clarifying these
causes on different (micro and macro) levels or by specifying the
stages of the conflict. Peltonen and Villanen (2004) have indicated
that conflicts can only be understood by examining them as
processes occurring in time. This article focuses on the origin of the
conflict and analyzing its stages of development.
Before analyzing the case, we will define our approach and the
conceptual instruments of research into conflict processes.
Furthermore, we will describe the methods and materials used.
2. Conflicts over natural resources
Our analysis is based on the idea that environmental conflict is a
process initiated when one party observes that the other is
negatively affecting something of concern to the first party
(Thomas, 1992). Contradictions in the interests and values of
different parties are generally recognized as the main cause of
environmental and natural resource conflicts. Interaction and
communication difficulties also trigger environmental conflicts;
differing observations and interpretations of events can play a
significant role (Wilmot and Hocker, 2001). In the Talvivaara case,
various parties have had major differences of opinion about the
existence of problems and their effects.
In our analysis we explore the conflict process and its content.
In policy science, various models of the stages through which a
conflict progresses have been developed from the process
standpoint (, 7–8). Pondy (1967) has attempted to bring together
the structural aspects, the actors’ individual factors, the process,
and the results, all as part of the same course of events, or episodes
(Lewicki et al., 1992). He distinguished five stages of conflict:
1) Latent conflict: No outright conflict exists, but there is a
potential for conflict because of several latent factors.
2) Perceived conflict: Conflict escalates as groups battle over the
cause of conflict.
3) Felt conflict: Actors respond emotionally to each other and
attitudes polarize. What began as a small problem escalates into
huge conflict.
4) Manifest conflict: Fighting and open aggression. Passive
aggression – doing nothing.
5) Conflict aftermath: Conflict is resolved in some way. If sources
of conflict are not resolved, the dispute will arise again.
This rather simplified model has been used extensively but has
also been subject to criticism, correction and addition. Following
the manifestation of the conflict, it is possible to add the stages of
negotiation, mediation and decision-making (Lewicki et al., 1992).
In the analysis it is also possible to add conditions preceding the
conflict before the first stage.
Please cite this article in press as: R. Sairinen, et al., Talvivaara mine and water pollution: An analysis of mining conflict in Finland, Extr. Ind. Soc.
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.05.001
Deutsch (1973) questions the convergence of manifest and
latent conflict. He believes that the subject of dispute between the
parties involved can become a manifest conflict when a deeper,
latent conflict remains unresolved. Reasons for this can include the
complexity of the latent conflict or the sensitive nature of the
conflict. Conflicts, however, are also cyclical in nature. This means
that each previously occurring conflict or dispute in turn affects the
formation of the impending conflict. This intensifying effect is
extremely important if the same parties reemerge later in a new
conflict (Peltonen and Villanen, 2004, 8). This is especially
noticeable in prolonged conflicts, where the difference of opinion
increases and the number of disputes increases over time. The
subject of the conflict can be clearly defined or difficult to
determine. If the former is the case, the conflict is very limited.
When the parties are aware of the actual issue at stake, resolution
is often easier. Lewicki et al. (2003, 45) state that the general
features of unmediated conflicts are exacerbation, polarization,
renewed circles, or cyclicality, and growth in the number of
questions and parties.
The media has played a major role in the Talvivaara case, and the
media source material we collected is important to this analysis,
although it is not a media study. According to Seppänen and
Väliverronen (2012, 170–184), the power of the media partly lies in
its ability to create or define the subjects of public discourse. The
media can decide what comes into the public eye, and how this is
done. Many different actors may be involved in the background to a
conflict, but it only becomes manifest when one party observes or
reveals the fact that another party has prioritized its goals (cf.
Peltonen and Villanen, 2004). According to these sociological and
political perspectives, the media is also a substantive party in
shaping a conflict. On one hand, the media reflects events in
creating a forum for considering the questions of the dispute. On
the other, it has its own powerful role, especially in prolonged
disputes. In the Talvivaara case, the problems were disclosed and
the public mobilized largely as a result of media attention. The
formation of the conflict and its exacerbation, in particular, were
accompanied by extensive media coverage. This is typical of the
media impact on conflict.
3. Materials and methods
We apply document and media analysis to study the stages of
the conflict process. This includes the content of various issues, the
behavior and reactions of policy actors, but it must be emphasized
that we are not analyzing the motivations of different actors or
social construction of various views. In this interpretation, we are
interested in the reasons behind the exacerbation of the conflict
process.
Our approach is qualitative and data is based on a wide range of
media material. Data include newspaper articles, TV programs,
documents of the Talvivaara Mining Company Plc. and environ-
mental authorities, material from civic movements, academic
research, and positions presented at various forums. The key
resource used here is, however, coverage by the Helsingin Sanomat
(HS) national newspaper concerning Talvivaara from 2004 to the
end of 2012(Fig. 1). Other important sources are current affairs
television programs, chiefly YLE (the Finnish Broadcasting
Company) and MTV3 (a commercial broadcaster). Newspaper
articles were collected through a search of the HS digital archives
using the keyword Talvivaara, excluding articles which only
mentioned the mine in passing. The Kainuun Sanomat (KS)
newspaper provided regional media coverage of Talvivaara for
the period 2010–12. We excluded letters to the editor and columns
from the research material. Above all, the media analysis was used
to depict the history of events in the conflict process.
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We also made use of documents from the Talvivaara Mining
Company Plc. and its subsidiary Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd., such as
annual reports, stock exchange and press releases, and the
company’s blog Paikan päällä (“On the Spot”, paikanpaalla.fi).
Administrative documents we reviewed include environmental
permits and decisions from the Vaasa Administrative Court (HAO),
Kainuu Center for Economic Development, Transport and the
Environment (KaiELY), Northern Finland Regional State Adminis-
trative Agency (AVI), and the KaiELY supervisory reports and the
orders given to Talvivaara. Furthermore, we also used thematic
interviews with Talvivaara officials (three in 2011–12) to provide
some background information about the project.
Initially we organized our material around the framework
provided by the course of events. Subsequently, we examined the
stages of the Talvivaara conflict in terms of the central themes
expressed. Our basic assumption is that these key issues arose from
the media coverage of the mine; this permits an examination of the
manifest conflict process.
We applied the content analysis method to the media and other
written sources (Tuomi and Sarajärvi, 2012). Content analysis
attempts to organize the material analytically, in a concentrated
and clear way. We first organized the material chronologically and
then thematically.
Thus we argue that news media can be used to trace a process,
“what happened when”. In this case, many of the stages were
developing “in the public eye”. However, it can be questionable
Fig. 2. The Talvivaara mine and surrounding area. Map: Timo Pakarinen.
Please cite this article in press as: R. Sairinen, et al., Talvivaara mine and water pollution: An analysis of mining conflict in Finland, Extr. Ind. Soc.
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.05.001
3
HS
120
100
80
60
HS
40
20
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Fig. 1. Number of articles in Helsingin Sanomat about Talvivaara 2004–2012
(Tiainen et al., 2014).
whether news media provides fully accurate pictures of different
actors’ perceptions and actions, since media representation is
subject to framing. Hence, there is a risk that this media framing,
rather than the perceptions and actions of the disagreeing parties,
becomes the object of analysis. To overcome this problem, we have
used a very large body of news material (which includes a lot of
commentary by various policy actors) from a range of sources. In
addition to news, we also draw on other types of sources: public
documents, reports and press releases from the Talvivaara
company, various authorities, courts, and ENGOs.
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The article is based on previous research (Tiainen et al., 2014),
so the references here are limited, and we refer the reader to the
full original report for further details. Finally, when analyzing a
public conflict process like this, we think that it is important to
assess how it is represented through media news and discussions.
In the public conflict process, various actors react to descriptions of
events in the media.
4. Features of the Talvivaara mine
The Talvivaara multi-metal mine is located in Kainuu, in the
municipality of Sotkamo, about 35 kilometers from Kajaani (Fig. 2).
Great expectations for employment and regional development
accompanied the inauguration of the Talvivaara mine. In early 2013
the mine employed approximately 550 workers, most of whom
lived in Sotkamo and Kajaani. Kainuu is a region comprising nine
municipalities, dominated by a forested hilly landscape with rivers
and lakes. The population of Kainuu is decreasing and ageing
(Kainuun maakuntaohjelma 2009–2014, 2009Kainuun maakun-
taohjelma 2009–2014, 2009). At the beginning of the 21st century,
economic development in Kainuu was favorable. Unemployment,
however, was decreasing more rapidly than in other regions at that
stage.
The most important metals mined at Talvivaara are nickel and
zinc. The deposits include the largest ore bodies of nickel sulfide in
Europe. Smaller amounts of copper and cobalt have been extracted,
and the company has also applied for a permit to extract uranium.
It is estimated that the ore reserves will suffice for 50–60 years of
production. The Talvivaara mining area comprises approximately
6100 ha.
The mining area is about six kilometers from the nearest village,
Tuhkakylä. The village has 250 inhabitants but no longer has any
services. Sotkamo, the central built-up area of the municipality, is
20 kilometers away. The Vuokatti tourism and sports area is
slightly closer. (Kujala, 2011.)
A few kilometers north of Tuhkakylä at Lahnaslampi is the
Mondo Minerals B.V. talc mine, which began operations in 1968.
The mine experienced serious environmental problems in 1997–98
when it emitted cyanide, nickel and arsenic into Lake Nuasjärvi.
Talvivaara adopted the latest technology. A bioleaching process
is used to extract the metals, which are separated from the ore by
enriched microbes. The ore is crushed finely for the process and
conveyed along a belt to an agglomeration drum, to which a
solution containing bacteria and mild sulfuric acid is then added. In
the drum, the fine particles attach themselves to the surface of
rough particles, which creates a material with good penetration.
The material is conveyed along a belt again to an accumulation
area, where accumulators form bioleaching heaps. The technology
requires extensive areas of land for open-pit mines and bioleaching
heaps (Lapin Vesitutkimus Oy, 2004a,b). A preliminary purification
plan was drawn up for Talvivaara’s environmental permit

Fig. 3. Content of conflict processes at Talvivaara mine. [EIA = environmental impact assessment; SIA = social impact assessment; KHO = Supreme Administrative Court;
Perä = the company’s CEO]. (The original figure in Finnish in the article Tiainen et al. (2014).

Please cite this article in press as: R. Sairinen, et al., Talvivaara mine and water pollution: An analysis of mining conflict in Finland, Extr. Ind. Soc.
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.05.001
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application, but since mining will in all probability continue for
decades, during which techniques will develop markedly, the
purification plan will be updated during operations and the plan
will only be finalized in the end stages of production.
5. Stages of the conflict
We have applied Pondy’s model (1967) for understanding and
interpreting the stages of the Talvivaara conflict process. Our
analysis describes the process in the following stages (explained in
more detail below):

Establishment (2003–06): The planning and foundation stages,
when there was no significant public attention (pre-conflict
conditions);

Glory (2007–09): The inaugural stage, the promise of work and
regional development, awards and recognition (latent conflict);

Emerging problems (2010): Expansion of production, fears and
risks appear locally, the uranium dispute, odor and water
problems (perceived conflict);

Exacerbated problems (2011): Pollution of the water system
(growing conflict), media activation, politicization (ministers
and MEPs enter the discussion, initiation of broader civil
activity), Talvivaara starts improving its processes (felt conflict);

Total conflict (spring 2012): Comprehensive and national
critique of the mine, the company, and the authorities (manifest
conflict);

Crisis (fall 2012): New leakage and crisis situation, talk of shut-
down, nature of the technology revealed, economic sustainabili-
ty of the company also discussed (escalation of conflict).
Pondy’s conflict model can be well adapted to the Talvivaara
case. The process had so many phases that we had to add one more
stage, “escalation”, to describe the features of prolonged problems.
The aftermath of the conflict is also missing, because we are not
analyzing the developments after the escalation phase.
Fig. 3 provides a multi-level overview of the main content of the
conflict up to the end of 2012, where our analysis finishes. A new
leakage occurred in early 2013, which was a clear progression from
the events of fall 2012. This leakage was significantly smaller,
however, and was capped more rapidly.
6. The story of the Talvivaara conflict
Talvivaara’s history begins in 1977, when the Geological Survey
of Finland (GTK) started research in the area. The studies continued
until 1983. The mining concession was granted to Outokumpu Oyj
in 1986, but the company did not believe that exploitation of the
deposit by conventional metal enrichment technologies was
commercially viable (Talvivaara, 2013a,b).
In 2004, Outokumpu Oyj sold the mining concession for just
one euro to the new Talvivaara Mining Company Plc. As part of this
sale, the new company acquired the testing and research
information about the bioheap leaching technique. In the year
following the sale, Lapland Water Research Ltd. carried out the
environmental impact assessment (Lapin Vesitutkimus Oy, 2004a,
b; 2005). Bioheap leaching testing started in 2005. In 2007, The
Talvivaara company received environmental permits for mining
operations (Wiklund, 2007; Talvivaara, 2007a).
The company was listed on the London Stock Exchange on June
1, 2007. During the same year, the Finnish government decided to
support the project by participating in infrastructure investments
of more than EUR 50 million. The Finnish Union of Experts in
Please cite this article in press as: R. Sairinen, et al., Talvivaara mine and water pollution: An analysis of mining conflict in Finland, Extr. Ind. Soc.
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.05.001
5
Science gave the 2007 Scientist of the Year Award to biochemist,
who developed the bioleaching method at Talvivaara (LAL, 2007).
In late 2007, Talvivaara started preparing a new production plan
(Talvivaara, 2007b). The project was described very positively in
news headlines such as “Nickel: A stroke of luck for Kainuu” (HS,
2007). The company was seen as an important new source of
employment in the Kainuu region. There was very little news about
Talvivaara’s possible environmental risks in the years 2005–2007.
Nevertheless, local residents and several other local actors were
concerned about the environmental impact of the mine before it
started operating (KaiELY, 2005).
In 2008, only 18 months after construction had started,
Talvivaara was able to deliver its first metal products. The mine
had nearly 2000 employees including subcontractors and con-
struction workers, a clearer picture of the mineral resources
available, and a predicted lifespan of over 60 years (Talvivaara,
2008).
In June 2009, the mine officially opened. That July, Talvivaara
collected almost EUR 83 million from the share issue and decided
to expand the annual production capacity to 50,000 tons of nickel
by 2012 (Talvivaara, 2010a). Pekka Perä, the CEO, made assurances
that the company was committed to both occupational safety and
environmental responsibility. The media described the company’s
impact on Kainuu’s economy as huge (HS, 2009b,c). Talvivaara was
“the miracle of Sotkamo” (HS, 2009a).
When the mining really started, odors from hydrogen sulfide
emissions were detected within a radius of tens of kilometers. Odor
nuisance was also in the news, for example in the YLE story
“Talvivaara mine stinks despite promises” (YLE, 2009).
In February 2010, Talvivaara announced plans to recover its
uranium as a by-product (Talvivaara, 2010b). This aroused intense
debate as to whether the company management had planned
uranium production from the first (Tiainen et al., 2014). During the
spring and summer of 2010, Talvivaara started the EIA processes
and applied for permits for uranium production.
In March 2010, there was a leak from the mine’s gypsum
sediment pond (Talvivaara, 2010c). The leakage did not cause
emissions outside the mining area. In the fall of 2010, the local
newspaper Kainuun Sanomat was very openly condemning the
Talvivaara mine for its environmental impact (e.g. KS 2010a). The
Kainuu district organization of the Finnish Association for Nature
Conservation made a complaint to the Parliamentary Ombudsman
about Talvivaara’s air emission levels and KaiELY’s failure to
measure these properly (KS, 2010b). In June 2010 web-page for
local environmentalists and residents, talvivaaraymparisto.netti-
sivu.org, was launched.
During the fall of 2010, Talvivaara Mining Company Plc.
discovered that the sodium, sulfate and manganese content of
its wastewater had risen considerably above the required limits.
The main reason for these elevated levels was the change from
water to lye gas scrubbers. The sodium in the lye combines with
the sulfate during the process water purification. The system for
purifying the process water was not designed to eliminate this
form of sodium sulfate. This resulted in salinization of the local
waters. It was possible to reduce sulfate emissions by developing
process water recycling in the metal extraction plant. The peak
load was reached at the end of 2010.
The voices criticizing the company became stronger during
2010, because of the environmental questions and the company’s
problems with environmental management. The neighboring
residents and regional environmental groups make public
complaints about Talvivaara’s communication, carelessness and
environmental monitoring (KS, 2010a,b). Also the Municipality
Council of Sotkamo stated its dissatisfaction with the company’s
poor management of social responsibility (KS, 29.9.2010). Possible
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uranium production also became a big target of both regional and
national critique (KS 18.6.2010).
In May 2011, the regional environmental authority KaiELY made
a statement about Talvivaara’s hydrological impacts on the nearby
lakes (KaiELY, 2011). According to KaiELY, the mine waste and
runoff waters had a visible effect on the quality of the receiving
waters. Bathing or washing in the lake water was not recom-
mended because of elevated concentrations of manganese, sulfate
and iron concentrations (KaiELY, 2011).
In May, KaiELY ordered Talvivaara to reduce the harmful effects
of the mine wastewater on the water system to the environmental
permit levels by no later than October 15, 2011 (KaiELY, 2012a). In
September 2011, the HS reported that KaiELY has made a request to
the Oulu police to investigate the treatment of Talvivaara mine
effluents (HS, 2011b). The local fishing association and the water
cooperative also made investigative requests. The environmental
activism against Talvivaara on a national level became more vocal
during 2011 through demonstrations in Helsinki (HS, 2011g).
Talvivaara submitted an application for uranium extraction to
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy in June 2011
(Talvivaara, 2011). The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
(STUK) issued a positive opinion on granting this permit, which
enabled further progress on this project (STUK, 2011).
In June 2011 the state-owned company Solidium Oy bought
shares in Talvivaara from Outokumpu Oyj, so Solidium then owned
4.3% of the shares in Talvivaara (HS, 2011a).
In November 2011, the HS published an article entitled
“Talvivaara waste changes lake water into sea water”, stating that
the mine’s wastewater contained so much sodium that local lakes
such as Salminen had turned salty (HS, 2011c). This was the
beginning of a month-long period during which the environmental
impact of Talvivaara was discussed extensively and news from the
mine appeared almost daily (Tiainen et al., 2014). The CEO stated
that the company would do its best to minimize the environmental
impact (HS, 2011d).
During 2011, the public debate and environmental groups
focused on the reasons and background causes of environmental
problems in the mine (Tiainen et al., 2014). The expertise of the
supervisory authority and the environmental administration and
their awareness of operating conditions in the mine was called into
question, and the company was accused of recklessness (Suomen
luonto, 2011). The Ministry of the Environment asked KaiELY for
clarification regarding its monitoring of the Talvivaara mine (HS,
2011f).
At the beginning of 2012 the volume of process water
discharged from Talvivaara had decreased significantly, as had
the concentrations of sulfate and manganese in it (Talvivaara,
2012a). This was because the company had started recycling and
purifying the wastewater.
In 2012, despite the reduction in discharge levels, active public
debate continued. Besides sulfate and manganese content, local
people were also concerned about foam in the water (Tiainen et al.,
2014). The company tried to dispel the rumors concerning by
issuing new information (Talvivaara, 2012b). The National Institute
for Health and Welfare (THL) provided updated recommendations
for using the water in the lakes Kalliojärvi and Kivijärvi. THL stated
that the swimming was safe, but because of the increased
manganese content the lake water was not recommended for
use in the sauna (Talvivaara, 2012c). The media pitted the
environmental risks and employment benefits of the Talvivaara
mine against each other in an even more polarized way (HS,
2012e).
The monitoring of Talvivaara featured repeatedly in the media.
The Chairman of the Environment Committee in Parliament Martti
Korhonen (Left Union), considered the environmental criteria to be
insubstantial (HS, 2012a). According to the environment minister
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(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.05.001
Niinistö (Green Party), there was no justification for uranium
production (HS, 2012c). Overall, the public image of Talvivaara had
changed from a blessing into a curse and the environmental
permits were considered insufficient. Many actors and activities
related to Talvivaara’s operations were seen as failures (Tiainen
et al., 2014). These include the permit system, the mine’s own
process expertise, relations with the local population, and control
by the authorities (HS, 2012d). The case also became a more
general weapon in the fight against mining projects (HS, 2012b).
At the end of 2012, the public atmosphere concerning
Talvivaara’s operations calmed down a bit, but flared up again
when the mine’s gypsum sediment pond leaked on November 5,
2012. The leak was located within three days, but it could not be
stopped right away (Talvivaara, 2012d). The emergency and
defense services joined forces to stop the leakage, but water with
high metal concentrations were discharged from the gypsum
sediment pond into the environment for about a week (KaiELY,
2012c).
Because of the leakage KaiELY recommended, as a precaution,
that the surrounding bodies of water should not be put to
recreational or household use, and called for a police investigation
into the leak (KaiELY, 2012c). The Kainuu, Lapland, Northern Savo,
North Karelia and Northern Ostrobothnia Centers for Economic
Development, Transport and the Environment (ELYs) agreed to
cooperate in monitoring the environmental impact of the leak.
The public response and criticism was massive (Tiainen et al.,
2014). Once again, Talvivaara was one of the main topics in the
national media. Environmental NGOs and individual politicians
called for the closure of the mine. This included demands for the
director of KaiELY to be sacked and the mine’s CEO Perä to make a
public statement. Environmental management was also criticized
more intensely than before. Examples of insufficient action and
exceptional situations from years ago were brought to light.
Criticism included questions about whether the administration
possessed sufficient resources and expertise to monitor Talvivaara.
The Ministry of the Environment (YM) also amended Paragraph
95 of the Environmental Protection Law (6/2000) covering
instructions for supervisory authorities concerning the use of
administrative force and other exhortative measures (YM, 2012).
The leaders of the parties in government were of the opinion that
the incident constituted grounds for assessing the need for
legislative changes (HS, 2012h). In addition, stress tests at the
mine were funded (HS, 2012i). The government was also prepared
to cover the costs of the wastewater discharge from Talvivaara.
Experts warned, however, that due to the nature of the technology
the situation could not be controlled if the company went into
bankruptcy. Running down the production and post-processing
was described as difficult, long-term and costly (Tiainen et al.,
2014).
Perä, who had resumed the role of CEO, admitted that mistakes
had been made in Talvivaara and apologized for the environmental
damage (YLE, 2012). He noted that heavy rains had played a large
role in causing the problems and that the extent of environmental
damage would become clear later. Perä also acknowledged the lack
of information sharing.
On November 21, 2012 Talvivaara received permission to restart
metal production, which had been stopped due to the leakage
(KaiELY, 2012d). The permit authorized a new water treatment
plant, in which the process water could be recycled in a closed
system (Talvivaara, 2012e).
Reflection on Talvivaara’s economic situation was one new
feature of the period after the November 2012 leakage. Foreign
donors had begun to withdraw from the project (KS, 2012) and the
long production stoppage caused by the leakage was expected to
put further pressure on the company’s finances. Unresolved
disputes related to the mine came together in the growing conflict
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R. Sairinen et al. / The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
triggered by the leakage. More clearly than ever before, Talvivaara
was marked out as a failure of the Finnish mining industry (HS,
2012g).
7. Key features of the Talvivaara mine project
Based on our process analysis, we found four key features of
Talvivaara. These are new untested technology, the speed of the
project, strong growth orientation and the high personification of
the project (Tiainen et al., 2014).
The technology employed at Talvivaara was new and untested,
both for the metals used and, more importantly, for the northern
conditions. Talvivaara did pioneering work in developing its
technology, for which it received awards. This experience could not
have been gained elsewhere. Controlling the bioleaching process
and water balance was problematic throughout the entire course
of mining activity. The nature of the problems encountered shaped
the search for solutions. Since large-scale operations began, the
risks increased.
Nickel production in Talvivaara progressed at a remarkably
rapid pace since acquiring mining rights in February 2004 (Tiainen
et al., 2014). Whether the company had the organization and
expertise to develop with the speed and extent demanded by such
scale is a compelling question. In particular, the attention and
resourcing devoted to environmental matters and social responsi-
bility appear to have been insufficient. The resources and expertise
of the Talvivaara company were criticized often in public (Tiainen
et al., 2014). The numerous surprises and difficulties in the
technological processes, incorrect assessments and publicity
problems all demonstrate how inadequate environmental exper-
tise and local dialogue was, especially at the project’s inaugural and
planning stage. The company was later forced to engage in
continuous corrective operations, which led to still more problems
(e.g. the water was salinized as a “solution” to the odor problem).
Mining at Talvivaara was strongly oriented toward increased
production (Tiainen et al., 2014). This focus on growth also affected
the features of the conflict. In the first years of operation, the
priority was to accelerate activities. The objective was to achieve
full production by 2010. Processing problems made achieving
production goals difficult, but the company’s management did not
allow this to deflect them. In the early phase of production, one of
the central elements of company strategy and long-term planning
was to “expand corporate operations after the acceleration of
production” (Talvivaara, 2008). This combination of speed and
strong growth orientation was evident in practice in the permit
processes. Talvivaara was an active permit applicant: Several
permit applications were ongoing at the same time (Tiainen et al.,
2014). The applicant was criticized for carelessness and inaccura-
cies, which have specifically been attributed to the hurried
timetable. In the public discussions, the company did not look
like a very responsible actor for a combination of reasons (Tiainen
et al., 2014). It had not resolved the environmental problems and
was also engaged in planned expansion and uranium extraction.
The Talvivaara mining project has been highly personified in the
figure of the company’s founder, and twice CEO, Pekka Perä
(Tiainen et al., 2014). His efficiency, speed and above all personal
charisma were viewed from the outset as a positive force in the
project’s rapid development. In contrast, when the environmental
problems became public, Perä’s colorful statements attracted
negative attention. His persona conveyed the image of a company
representative who played down the mine’s negative environ-
mental effects, and would not humble himself as the problems
mounted. Dismissive attitudes towards environmental matters in
the early stages of the project can also be associated with this
personified corporate management. This in turn can lead to a
Please cite this article in press as: R. Sairinen, et al., Talvivaara mine and water pollution: An analysis of mining conflict in Finland, Extr. Ind. Soc.
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.05.001
7
narrowing of expertise in the organization, which became a major
problem, especially in the planning stages of the operation.
8. Key political dimensions of the Talvivaara conflict
It is possible to distinguish a number of political dimensions in
the Talvivaara mining conflict. These are local contradictions,
angering the citizenry, politicization, issues related to confidence
in the authorities, the role of the media and the formation of
company policy. Each of these brings new actors and actor
relations to the process, and the analysis of these aspects is central
to understanding the conflict.
8.1. Local contradictions
In the early stages a conflict of values was linked to the mine at
the local level; the central actors were the mine and local residents.
On the one hand, from the perspective of the regional economy and
employment, the Talvivaara mine was very welcome in the Kainuu
region. The mine was expected to create new local jobs and
stimulate the region’s industry. On the other hand, the employ-
ment and economic grounds were in conflict with environmental
values. Although the mine was not on a site of significant natural
value, it would alter the local landscape and the area’s recreational
use since it would create noise, dust and odor. Some local residents
considered nature preservation more important than establishing
the mine; this became evident in the mine’s early stages in the YVA
processes and complaints regarding permits.
The main conflict at the local level concerns breaking the
original promises. According to the mining company’s represen-
tatives, one issue continuously recurred at the informational
meetings organized by Talvivaara. Local residents believed that the
company representatives had promised that the mine would not
have any negative impact on the surrounding environment. This
was too much to promise and, as a result, the company lost the
confidence of local residents. Since then it has been difficult to
regain this lost trust as the problems have mounted. The large
leakage from the gypsum sediment basin destroyed confidence in
the company completely.
The problems remained unresolved, which exacerbated the
situation. Despite Talvivaara’s improved process techniques, the
local residents continued to regard the emissions as problematic.
In 2011, the mine’s neighbors still made 156 environmental
complaints to the company. The protracted problems gradually but
increasingly angered the tourism industries of the Kainuu and
Sotkamo areas. The company’s poor handling of these conflicts
may even have weakened its mandate to operate later on.
8.2. The role of citizens and civil action
The Talvivaara mine was the subject of extensive criticism and a
national public discussion in 2010, when the actor field of the
process expanded (Tiainen et al., 2014). The company released a
plan to extract uranium. At the local level, mining emissions had
sparked a debate when production began, but the conflict reached
the national level specifically when the proposal to extract
uranium became public. The company’s plans provoked a strong
reaction, fear and concern. This was also a question of Finland’s
first “uranium mine”. One view put forward in the public debate
was that the company must have been aware of the presence of
uranium in the mining area at the planning stage. Although the
company has systematically denied this, it increased mistrust
among various actors about the company’s operational practices
and motives. The company made no mention of uranium in its
original application for an environmental permit. An intense
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8 R. Sairinen et al. / The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
conflict of values and anger related to the uranium issue existed
among the opponents of the project; this was provoked by the
company’s use of the term “uranium extraction”, which was seen
as misleading and dismissive. When uranium was found in the
mine’s gypsum sediment basin, this later emerged as a serious
indication of the company’s lack of knowledge and responsibility.
Its promises to manage the risks involved in uranium extraction
did not evoke a great deal of public trust.
Other significant events associated with the Talvivaara conflict
intensified the civic debate even further. These include the
leakages at the mine’s gypsum sediment basin, its effects on the
water system and the suspicions directed towards the environ-
mental authorities. Taken as a whole, the multiple environmental
problems weakened the belief of the citizenry, media and many
decision-makers in the company’s ability and desire to protect the
environment responsibly. The prolonged ill effects and potential
threat experienced created permanent mistrust. A person living
near the mine commented on public breakfast television that,
while the residents have no measurement devices, they are
capable of making sensory observations (YLE, 2011). The com-
pany’s annual report made little mention of the exacerbated social
tensions.
The activation of the citizens was visible in letters to the
newspapers, public demonstrations, and environmental permit
processes. The Northern Finland AVI received almost 300
complaints concerning the application for a uranium extraction
permit and updating the environmental permit at Talvivaara. The
authorities also received statements, requests for action and
complaints about the mine. In 2011 the local environmental center
handled 50 public complaints concerning air and water emissions
(KaiELY, 2012b, 3). This was out of 73 public complaints considered
that year, a significant proportion of the total. Following the
wastewater leakage in November 2012, nearly 100 applications for
compensation for water pollution were made to the Northern
Finland AVI (HS, 2012j).
The exacerbation of these environmental problems and
announcement of the uranium extraction project led to the
creation of a national movement, opposing Talvivaara in particular
and the dramatic growth of the mining industry in general. The
Stop Talvivaara movement was in the vanguard of this opposition.
As the conflict intensified, traditional campaigning organizations
like the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation and Green-
peace got involved. The critique gradually expanded to include
actions by the authorities concerning mining and political
decision-making. Green Party ministers, whose ministries were
deeply involved in the matter, also received strong criticism.
The spreading criticism cannot be considered surprising since
Talvivaara was viewed as a pioneer in Finnish mining. From the
perspective of civic activists, fears that the trail blazed by
Talvivaara would bring new problems to various parts of Finland
are well founded. Interpretations by the media were similar in this
respect. Talvivaara thus very rapidly became an image problem for
the entire mining industry.
8.3. Politicization
The scale and prolongation of the Talvivaara case was the
subject of heated debate by political actors. Ministers overseeing
the environment, industry and state ownership have continuously
been forced to take positions concerning the case. The media also
gradually began to demand ministerial statements and interven-
tion. Furthermore, many other politicians and parties were
encouraged or obliged to comment. The individual problem case
then takes on a general significance, weighted in terms of the
general development of the political sector.
Please cite this article in press as: R. Sairinen, et al., Talvivaara mine and water pollution: An analysis of mining conflict in Finland, Extr. Ind. Soc.
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.05.001
This politicization could reflect a general shift, as the issue
developed first into a political discussion and then became a
political football. Both the Minister of Economic Affairs, Häkämies,
and Talvivaara’s CEO Perä criticized the politicization of Talvivaara
(HS, 2011e). In research terms, politicization represents the
questioning or crossing of certain borders (Laine and Peltonen,
2003). Politicization questions a specific mode of operation or
policy where the consequences lead to a dispute or conflict
concerning how the matter should be handled. It results in various
interpretations and concepts.
In the Talvivaara environmental conflict, the object of politici-
zation can be understood to be not only the mine itself or the
approval of its operations, but the mining industry in general and
its rights in Finland. Through Talvivaara, discussion has specifically
focused on the relationship between environmental values and the
mining industry and the ability of societal institutions to govern
the situation. As the conflict progressed these issues were
continuously exacerbated.
In the midst of the mining boom in Finland, many politicians
argued in favor of the industry, stating that mining is one of the few
industries attracting foreign investment, and thus of national
importance despite the environmental risks. In the early stages,
political decision-makers even promoted the mining industry as a
specific indisputable opportunity for the future of the Finnish
regional economy. Like Talvivaara, mines are mainly located in
remote areas plagued by unemployment, which only encouraged
this attitude. As the mine’s problems intensified, this “rhetoric of
necessity” was questioned on many levels (cf. Lappalainen, 2011).
The worsening economic situation has turned Talvivaara into a
financial burden on society.
The broader politicization of the Talvivaara environmental
conflict began when the uranium extraction plan was announced.
This issue also partly became a question of party politics and a
theme in the debates preceding the 2011 parliamentary elections.
Later, the emergence of the harmful effects on the Talvivaara water
system, new wastewater leakages, and prolonged dissatisfaction
with the supervisory measures employed by the authorities all
resulted in the politicization of monitoring the mining industry.
In its planning stage, Talvivaara was the flagship of Finland’s
new mining industry. The mine was marketed as environmentally
friendly and benefiting from new technology. The faith in the
modern technology used at Talvivaara was initially extremely
strong. Due to major shortcomings in water monitoring, bioleach-
ing as a technique has increasingly been called into question. Clean
technology became a very risky process which could not be
stopped using the normal methods. This new experience and
interpretation of bioleaching technology has meant its politiciza-
tion.
In environmental conflicts, time is one politicizing element
(Lindroos and Palonen, 2000). Demands on both the authorities
and the company to provide faster solutions to the emissions
problems increased as the Talvivaara conflict unfolded. The
politicization of time also appeared in the Talvivaara permit
processes. The company sought to move forward rapidly, while
other parties involved wanted more time, for example to increase
citizen awareness and familiarization with the documents (KaiELY,
2010, 13).
Regarding the legislation associated with local environmental
problems, the state authorities and agencies are clearly susceptible
to politicization (Laine and Peltonen, 2003). Questioning the
authorities’ professional skill and expertise is a central aspect of
the Talvivaara conflict. These include recurring demands for KaiELY
to intervene more severely in monitoring the mining activities.
Furthermore, links between political decision-makers and Talvi-
vaara were brought to light on numerous occasions.
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Personification, increasing preconceptions and suspicion of the “was not even suitable for the sauna” (Ilta-Sanomat, 2011), an
process are all typical features of destructive conflicts, which result important cultural border was crossed. The social atmosphere
in deadlock. reached a new level; this should not happen in Finland. As the
problems continued to worsen in 2012, along with the euro crisis,
Talvivaara became a major topic in the news. The massive leakage
8.4. Confidence in authorities and experts
in the fall of 2012 was the unfortunate climax. The shortcomings in
water and environmental administration were even greater than
As the Talvivaara conflict progressed, confidence in the
feared.
authorities has significantly decreased. The most striking criticism
It is also noteworthy that there can be a long delay between
has been directed at KaiELY, the supervisory agency of Talvivaara,
local and national awareness; in this case almost a year. Bringing
for its inadequate oversight, bias and even concealment of results.
the matter onto the national stage means reviewing large amounts
Besides KaiELY, ministers and the consulting firm which performed
of old news. The mining company did not understand this
the environmental studies have also been suspected of biased and
operational mechanism; it began a hopeless battle against the
challengeable positions. Furthermore, the requirements for issuing
logic of the media. The prolongation of old problems and the
environmental permits were considered increasingly insufficient
appearance of new ones indicated that the company had lost
as the environmental impact of Talvivaara emerged. The actions of
control of environmental matters.
the Finnish authorities have also been investigated through
A further frustration to for the company was the errors that
complaints made at the EU level.
appeared in the news. According to a company representative, the
Condemnation of the authorities increased as the environmen-
media played a leading role in Talvivaara’s loss of its social permit.
tal problems of the mine remained unresolved. The conflict
People’s attitudes towards the mine have easily become facts in the
increasingly focused on permit processes and monitoring,
media. The company has also criticized the scale of the coverage of
culminating in the furor over the gypsum sediment basin in
the environmental effects (Kaleva, 2011) and continuing factual
2012, at which point mistrust peaked.
errors. Among other things, the company’s own figures on sulfate
This criticism drew on a range of sources. The citizens and the
emissions differ substantially from those presented in the media.
media were dissatisfied with the actions of KaiELY. The Ministry for
Talvivaara has sought to correct false claims appearing in the
the Environment, ministers and municipalities have all questioned
media through its own press releases and blog. Relations between
the suitability of its supervisory methods. Contributors to the
the media and the company have also been strained by the
broader discussion have proposed the use of administrative force.
reporters’ perspective and desire that the company be more open
When KaiELY and Ministry for the Environment positions
(HS, 2012f). Talvivaara’s attitude to the media has at times been
concerning the supervision of Talvivaara have in part differed,
extreme; for example, it has accused reporters of spying.
this has raised burning questions about the division of responsi-
The themes of newspaper articles concerning Talvivaara
bility.
demonstrate a shift in focus in the struggle to define the situation,
Lack of expertise is another issue in the Talvivaara conflict.
from the seriousness of the environmental effects to a search for
Neither KaiELY nor the mining company has publicly demonstrat-
those responsible and chiefly to questions of administrative
ed their ability to assess the challenges and risks of the mining
responsibility, which became especially noticeable following the
project or respond with appropriate action in hazardous situations.
wastewater leakage in November 2012. This was a turning point in
The case has highlighted the shortcomings in environmental
how the parties viewed the background to the conflict. The
monitoring, which is chiefly based on trust between the mine
visibility of civic action in the media also increased significantly
operator and the supervisory agency. In this context, the company
after the latest accident—for example, the Stop Talvivaara
has the advantage of holding the information and being able to
movement attracted even greater attention. The media addressed
conceal it from the agency. Therefore, a highly charged debate has
issues around uranium and bias by representing the views of
arisen over who is responsible for establishing the mining
politicians and administrators. Criticism of the environmental
industry’s operational environment and the need for regional
effects of the mine was also strongly represented however, raising
administrative reforms.
the question of justice alongside that of administrative responsi-
As a result of the problems at Talvivaara, the Ministry for the
bility.
Environment has given more consideration to regulation in the
mining industry. In an attempt to eliminate suspected bias, it has
forbidden civil servants to take any leave of absence from mining
8.6. Formulating Talvivaara company policy
companies. The ministry also proposed additional resources for the
regional administration, granted extra funding to KaiELY to resolve
The social responsibility of the mining industry is largely a
Talvivaara’s problems (YM and TEM, 2012), and, as mentioned
question of trying to balance the needs of different quarters
above, amended Paragraph 95 of the Environmental Protection
(Jenkins, 2004). Corporate social responsibility seeks to reconcile
Law (6/2000).
the needs of interest groups, consideration of the environment and
the company’s desire for profit. In the Talvivaara case, solving the
production equation of the early years seemed to succeed rather
8.5. Role of the media
well. Talvivaara was a major employer in Kainuu. The mine
represented the new rise of the mining industry in Finland and the
In the construction stage of Talvivaara, the media emphasized
bioleaching technique, which was seen as both efficient and
the mine’s positive effects on employment and the regional
environmentally friendly.
economy. When environmental hazards began to emerge, they
With the emergence of environmental risks, assessments of
gradually appeared in the headlines, initially on the local level and
Talvivaara’s social responsibility changed radically and existing
later in the national media. As the ill effects continued and
local criticism of its operational practices was strengthened by new
multiplied, environmental problems began to define the com-
factors and greater space in the public debate. Some local actors
pany’s public image. A major turning point occurred in late 2011
believed that Talvivaara’s reporting had already been inadequate in
when the effects on the water system were reported at the national
the early stages of production, when odor and dust emissions
level. When a tabloid ran a headline stating that polluted water
spread to nearby areas. The announcement of the uranium

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extraction plan and emergence of wastewater problems called the
company’s operational practices even further into question. The
company’s YVA processes repeatedly highlighted the need to
improve reporting and transparency. Statements and opinions
from both the authorities and the citizenry indicated their concern
about the company’s press releases.
The company was reactive in dealing with public relations,
various actors and problems, and continuously redeveloped its
own policy in response to events. It has sought solutions through
technical improvements and environmental investment, demon-
strating a desire to develop more environmentally friendly mining.
Reporting and social responsibility also improved in the course of
the conflict. Following the reports of water problems Talvivaara
continuously improved dialogue at the local level. During that time
Talvivaara differed from most other mining companies operating in
Finland by reporting on its social responsibility in Finnish (Rytteri,
2012). It is also unique in placing greater emphasis on the company
blog, thus attempting to discuss the mine’s effects in an accessible
way. During the last operating year, the principles of sustainable
development and reducing environmental impact were expressed
more clearly in the company’s annual reports.
Despite the challenges of expanding production and unforeseen
environmental effects, Talvivaara publicly stressed that the mine
employs the best possible technology and expertise. The grand
promises of clean operations made at the outset, to some extent
dismissing and denying the mine’s hazards and downplaying the
significance of uranium extraction, created the image of a company
which would prefer to ignore rather than handle problems. With
the exception of the blog and local discussions, the company’s
overall information strategy emphasizes the technological per-
spective. Social and informational problems were not faced
convincingly.
Talvivaara based often its argumentation on legality. They
believed this makes the furor unwarranted. Since the company’s
credibility had been challenged so extensively, the legality
argument was no longer valid, however, at least in terms of
controlling the conflict. It may even exacerbate it further.
The problems with Talvivaara’s reporting were highlighted by
exceptional situations related to environmental impact. In some
cases the company provided insufficient or otherwise flawed
information, which was reflected in mistrust of its reporting as a
whole. For example, in 2010, the company did not give the actual
date that the gypsum sediment basin leakage was observed
(KaiELY, 2010a, cf. Talvivaara, 2010c). When the effects of the mine
on the water system attracted national media attention in 2011,
Perä claimed the public debate was unnecessary as emissions had
since reduced compared to the previous year (YLE, 2011). When
the company was publicly accused of violating the terms of its
environmental permit, Talvivaara’s response was that this was
impossible, since the permit did not define emission limits for
sulfate.
Talvivaara’s operational policy was for a long time most clearly
directed by the features previously described: The speed of the
project, zealous growth orientation and high personification. In
this equation, environmental factors, open dialogue and humility
in the face of problems were not considered essential. It is obvious
that the mining company did not have sufficient knowledge of
environmental and water matters at the outset nor were they
considered sufficiently. Reporting of problem situations was also
out of control and reactive. In the early stages, the grand promises
and dismissal of problems created further problems, making it
impossible to regain lost confidence. Nor did the company
understand that rather than individual facts, the question involved
overall trust and corporate attitude to issues. It took a relatively
long time before the company publicly admitted that its own
mistakes contributed to the environmental effects of the mine.
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(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.05.001
9. Conclusions
The environmental and natural resources problem and result-
ing conflict at Talvivaara is unique in Finland due to its extent,
complexity and social significance. The case is also interesting for
international and regional comparisons, because there is a lack of
research literature on mining development in the Nordic countries.
It is a quite common assumption that environmental management
and regulation is working efficiently in countries like Finland.
Many people in Finland have also asked how it is possible for a case
like this to develop in the country.
In our analysis we divided the Talvivaara conflict into the
following stages: Establishment (2003–06); glory (2007–09);
emerging problems (2010); exacerbated problems (2011); total
conflict (spring 2012) and crisis (fall 2012). In its overall features,
the case follows Pondy’s model of conflict stages. Regarding
Talvivaara itself, while the conflict has gone through several stages,
the aftermath is not yet clear. After 2012 in the company suffered
big economic problems and went into bankruptcy in 2015. Our
empirical analysis, however, concerned the main phases of
environmental conflict and end to the year 2012 (cf. Tiainen
et al., 2014). After going through many stages, the mine is now
owned by the state-owned company Terrafame Oy. In May 2016,
the Finnish government decided to prepare to close down the
Talvivaara mine.
Based on our process analysis, four key features of the
Talvivaara case as an exacerbated environmental conflict can be
identified: new untested technology, the high speed of the project,
strong growth orientation and the high personification of the
project. In addition to these features, it is possible to distinguish a
number of political dimensions in the Talvivaara conflict: local
contradictions, angering the citizenry, politicization, issues related
to confidence in the authorities, the role of the media and the
formation of company policy.
The Talvivaara environmental conflict began as a local dispute,
which, through various stages, escalated into a conflict of national
proportions. Numerous regional and local actors made complaints
about the company to the police. Local residents demanded
investigations into the company’s practices. Despite these efforts
the emissions problem exacerbated due to the lack of trust and
made the entire affair national. As the conflict snowballed, the
group of actors expanded from local residents and the mining
company to the authorities, political decision-makers and exten-
sive civic action. At the same time, the entire process was highly
personified in the figure of Talvivaara’s managing director.
In the case of Talvivaara, the change in the nature of the conflict
into a destructive one is rather clear. Numerous elements that
exacerbate a conflict are observable in the process. They include
emphasizing binary oppositions, lack of trust, tight schedules,
insufficient background information, and symbolic factors. Media
coverage was intense and certainly at times excessive. When
something is at the mercy of the media, it is difficult to loosen its
stranglehold, especially if problems increase. In retrospect it is easy
to say that the suspected shortcomings in environmental protec-
tion were compellingly confirmed with the massive basin leakage
in the fall of 2012. Following this episode, the authorities were
attacked and the structure and resources of the environmental
administration were found wanting.
Talvivaara is an important case symbolizing the rise of the
Finnish mining industry. It will remain a matter of public debate.
There was a fear in the mining industry that airing of its problems
on television would destroy the industry’s reputation. Through this
case, the industry has learned a great deal about what mining and
its impacts mean in contemporary society and the need to improve
its environmental and social responsibility. Talvivaara raised public
awareness of both the employment and economic advantages
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created by the industry and the accompanying disadvantages, the KaiELY, 2010. Kainuun ELY-keskuksen Lausunto Talvivaara Sotkamo Oy:n uraanin
need for public discussion, overall transparency and participation. talteenoton ympäristövaikutusten arviointiohjelmasta on valmistunut. Press
Release 31.8.2010. [http://ely.combo.fi/fi/tiedotepalvelu/2010/Sivut/
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