30.

And Bagong Bayan vs COMELEC – composition of the house of representatives

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.]
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD
OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO!
PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS
MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS &
HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-
UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL
PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.]
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG
AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION,
respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have
less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment
of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the
State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and
groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections
would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
DAHCaI
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these
parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these
petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a
longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and
individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s]
hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22,
2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-
list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties
filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but
denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme
will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate
in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the
number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply
with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for
Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some of
herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in
the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an
alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed.
4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination
against some of herein respondents. 5 PNBcmo
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within three
days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing,
however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9 before this
Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its
Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of
five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also
challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of
the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of
May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the
counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further
orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument
was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda
simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and
organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No.
3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision. ASCTac
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain, speedy
and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed
before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of
Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the
Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for
reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration
and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the
pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the
time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the
Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has
made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where
the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is
indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the
House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently
resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25
 Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the
principle of social justice . . . when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent
and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list
system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political
parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that
the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides that
members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-
list system.
"SECTION 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
"SECTION 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However,
they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants
in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31 Magsasaka, or a regional party in
Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO.
Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at
Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE.
Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to
give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He
explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties
that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each
of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly
even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of
the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . .." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology
or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We
quote the pertinent provision below: STECDc
"xxx xxx xxx
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list
system.
"xxx xxx xxx
Indubitably, therefore, political parties — even the major ones — may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party — or any
organization or group for that matter — may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with
the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission declared
that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was
discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national
history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in
accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise: IaAScD
"SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented
to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style
party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack [of] well-
defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list
election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,
"labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because
representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized
and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-
organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified
with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented"
become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have
less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
Organizations and parties, . . ., to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it
must be applied according to its express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5
of RA 7941, which states:
"SECTION 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified
by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the
sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, Overseas workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of
the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that
words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the
phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized
by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated
by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not
limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends
that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted
during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmariñas Village could
participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the
party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens — specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties — to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list
system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-
rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the
mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them
similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during
the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of
their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical
limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise
more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine
power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give
them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the
masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past — the farm
hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement — to come out and participate, as indeed many of
them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and
desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections normally
dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the
party list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate
in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to enhance the chance of
sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. 45
Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it — those who cannot otherwise
win in regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open
the system to those who have long been within it — those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district
elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory "open
house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only,
not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list
system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would
not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to
enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to
others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries. HDAaIc
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every
discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
 Refutation of the

Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored
mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain
constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the
meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation,
such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or
purpose of the provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason
and purpose of the resulting Constitution . . . only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk,
much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the
system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list
representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous
aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally
states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole . . ." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus,
there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers'
deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the
constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they
remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law
and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its
counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the
party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or
the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of all judicial
and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political
parties — Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP — on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they
have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that
because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll
watchers . . ." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of
district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act
No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents herein and,
for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections,
pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a
government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to
receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify
under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under
the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening
Party-List Participants
 The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and
the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show — through its constitution, articles of incorporation, by laws,
history, platform of government and track record — that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely
on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the
Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN:Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes." 52
Third, in view of the objections 53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly
a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-
list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. . . .In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and
supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had
mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within
this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD.If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can
pierce through the legal fiction." 54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA.When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course,
prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group.
EAcHCI
REV. RIGOS.Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the
Protestant Church et cetera." 55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered." 56 The prohibition
was explained by a member 57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any religious organization
registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it
is the registration of a religious sect as a political party." 58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered." 59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election
laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties . . . to become members of the House of
Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens
and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs
of a party-list candidate is not only illegal 60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
 Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA
7941 reads as follows:
SECTION 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of
age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on
the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also
must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree;
neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give
genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina
explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a
particular district . . ." 61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should have
more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our
people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground,
that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list
system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would
create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing
more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment.
Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary
evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision.
Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its
hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of
Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice
hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any winner" during
the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with
the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ ., concur.
Davide, Jr., J ., concurs in the result.
Ynares-Santiago, J ., abroad on official business.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases. I will presently explain my vote, but before I do so it seems to me necessary
to state briefly the facts and the issues.
THE FACTS
Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party (OFW for short) is the political agency of the Overseas Filipino Workers
Movement, a non-stock and non-profit organization. On the other hand, petitioner Bayan Muna is a political party representing
peasants, workers, women, the youth, and other marginalized sectors. Both were accredited by the Commission on Elections in
connection with the election for party-list representatives on May 14, 2001.
 Petitioners brought these suits — in G.R. No. 147589, for certiorari and, in G.R. No. 147613, for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus — for the purpose of seeking the annulment of the registration of the following parties classified as "political
parties" and "organizations/coalitions" by the Commission on Elections:
Political Parties:
Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP),
Lakas NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP),
Nationalist Peoples' Coalition (NPC),
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),
Aksyon Demokratiko (AKSYON),
Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN),
Liberal Party (LP),
Nacionalista Party (NP),
Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong
Organizations/Coalitions:
Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc. (DRUG WATCH),
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
Go! Go! Philippines Movement (GO, GO PHILIPPINES),
The True Marcos Loyalist (MARCOS LOYALIST),
Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Inc. (PLAM),
Citizens Movement for Justice, Economy Environment and Peace (JEEP),
Chamber of Real Estate Builders Association (CREBA),
Sports and Health Advancement Foundation, Inc. (SHAF),
Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW),
Bagong Bayani Organization (BAGONG BAYANI),
National Federation of Sugar Planters (NFSP)
R.A. No. 7941, §5 provides that any party, organization, or coalition desiring to participate in the party-list system must
apply to the COMELEC for registration not later than 90 days before the election. On the other hand, §4 of the same law requires
that any party, organization, or coalition which is already registered with the COMELEC should declare its intention to participate
in the party-list system 90 days before the election. EaHDcS
In its Resolution No. 3785, dated March 26, 2001, the COMELEC passed upon the applications for registration or
manifestations of intention of several parties, organizations, and coalitions. On March 28, 2001, it issued a certified list of parties,
organizations, or coalitions entitled to participate in the May 14, 2001 elections. All in all, 148 parties, organizations, and coalitions
were accredited, including private respondents herein.
Petitioners OFW and Bayan Muna contend that the party-list system is exclusively for the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors of the Philippine society and that there is no way by which other sectors not so identified, much less the
major political parties, can participate in the party-list elections. Petitioner Bayan Muna in particular calls attention to the fact that
seven of the respondent political parties (PMP, Lakas NUCD-UMDP, NPC, LDP, AKSYON, PDP-LABAN, and LP) are actually
the major political parties in the country today as determined by the COMELEC in its Resolution No. 4073, dated May 3, 2001, and
charges that the rest of private respondents are "pseudo party-list organizations" which are actually satellites of the major political
parties and of big businesses.
Bayan Muna argues that the party-list system is intended to address the problem of ineffective representation of
underprivileged sectors of society and enhance direct people's action and participation in the decision-making process to counter-
balance the territorial representation of 80% of the House of Representatives, and that to allow participation in the party-list system
of respondent political parties and parties/coalitions would be to defeat this purpose because these parties do not represent
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. 1 For this reason, Bayan Muna prays that R.A. No. 7941, §11, par. 2 be declared
unconstitutional on the ground that, by banning the five major political parties from participating in the party-list system only in the
May 1998 elections, it leaves them free to participate in subsequent elections.
On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:
[B]oth the Constitution and the Party-List System Act clearly allow, and they do not prohibit, the participation of
"registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations" to participate in the party-list system, whether or not said parties
or organizations represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. 2
It cites the proviso of Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution that
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector,
as proof that "marginalized" sectors are not entitled to permanent seats in the House of Representatives. In any event, it is
contended that petitioners' recourse is not to this Court but to the COMELEC because whether a party, organization, or coalition
represents "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a question of fact, and this Court is not a trier of facts. The COMELEC
states that, as a matter of fact, petitioner Bayan Muna has pending petitions to disqualify, based on this ground, respondents NPC,
LDP, PMP, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, LP, MAD, CREBA, NFSP, JEEP, and BAGONG BAYANI.
THE ISSUES
The issues in these cases actually come down to the following:
(1) Whether the petitions filed in these cases should be dismissed for failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative
remedies in the COMELEC; and
(2) Whether the party-list system is exclusively for "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors of society.
We shall deal with these issues in the order they are stated.
DISCUSSION
I.
While it is true that petitioner Bayan Muna has filed petitions for the disqualification of respondents, the fact is that when
the petitions in these cases were filed on April 16 and 17, 2001, the elections were just a month away, and there was doubt whether
a resolution of the petitions for disqualifications was forthcoming. In fact, up to the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the cases
were still unresolved. Petitioners, therefore, had no other "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" within
the meaning of Rule 65, §§1-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and were justified in resorting to the extraordinary remedies of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
From another point of view, there is no need for petitioners to await formal resolution of their petitions as the COMELEC
had already indicated in press statements its stand that parties, organizations, or coalitions, whether or not representing
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, could participate in the election for the party-list system — a fact confirmed by it in
its comment and memorandum in these cases. There is thus no basis for insisting that petitioners should have exhausted
administrative remedies before coming to this Court.
Nor are the issues raised in these cases factual as the statement of the second issue above plainly shows. It is only if the
question whether the party-list system is limited to "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is answered in the affirmative will
it be necessary to determine the status of respondents.
II.
At the core of the controversy in these cases is the following provision of the Constitution:
ARTICLE VI, §5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law except the religious sector.
To carry out this provision of the Constitution, Congress enacted the Party-List System Act (R.A. No. 7941), the pertinent
provisions of which read:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Party. — The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
SECTION 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list
system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
"The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from whom the Constitution emanated
is the language in which it is expressed." 3 The text of Art. VI, §5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of
"registered, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations," not for sectoral representation. Only for three consecutive terms
following the ratification of the Constitution and only with respect to one-half of the seats allotted to party-list representatives
does it allow sectoral representation. Textually, Art. VI, §5(1)(2) provides no basis for petitioners' contention that whether it
is sectoral representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive representation for "marginalized sectors," by
which term petitioners mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party list representation is a type of proportional
representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of Representatives in district elections a
chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered "marginalized
and underrepresented.") Under the party-list system, representatives are elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the
number of votes received in contrast to the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9%
of the votes, he gets no seat.
Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in order to win seats in the legislature.
On the other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those
who vote for the winner are represented. To the extent then that it assures parties or candidates a percentage of seats in the
legislature that reflects their public support, the party-list system enables marginalized and underrepresented sectors (such as,
but not limited to, the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors) to obtain seats
in the House of Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list system does not guarantee to these sectors seats in the legislature.
This is the method of representation adopted in the Constitution as answer to the problem of underrepresentation.
In arguing that the party-list system is exclusively for the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors," petitioner
Bayan Muna argues that the constitutional intent in adopting the party-list system must be searched for in the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission.
The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been stated by this Court in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, 4 as follows:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail
as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by
the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof.
It is worth recalling the celebrated comment of Charles P. Curtis, Jr. on the role of history in constitutional exegesis:
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could discover what it was, when it is not
adequately expressed in the Constitution, that is to say, what they meant when they did not say it, surely that has no binding
force upon us. If we look behind or beyond what they set down in the document, prying into what else they wrote and what
they said, anything we may find is only advisory. They may sit in at our councils. There is no reason why we should
eavesdrop on theirs. 5
Be that as it may, the Record of the Constitutional Commission speaks clearly against petitioners' reading of Art. VI,
§5(1)(2). It shows clearly that the Constitutional Commission rejected sectoral representation in preference to proportional
representation. As originally written, §5 of the Draft Article on the Legislative Department read:
SECTION 5. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected from the sectors and party list. The sectoral or party list representatives shall in no case exceed twenty percent of the
entire membership of the House of Representatives.
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, provided,
however, that each city with a population of more than two hundred thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section. 6
As petitioner Bayan Muna states, two proposals for additional representation in the House of Representatives were
submitted by the Committee on Legislative Department: one for sectoral representation, advocated by Commissioner
Villacorta, and another one for party-list system, advocated by Commissioner Monsod. The two are not the same. As
Commissioner Monsod said in explaining his proposal:
MR. MONSOD. . . .
 I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not synonymous
with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and
who constitute the members of the sectors . . . In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that certain
sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And then,
we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers,
fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the
nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had
in trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other
sectors . . . Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers . . . A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a
farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
. . . Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors . . . This can be a regional party, a sectoral
party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants
the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the
COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization — one does not have to be
a political party and register in order to participate as a party — and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of
the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
xxx xxx xxx
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time making sure
that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the National
Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may
not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties
that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth
place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system. 7
Commissioner Monsod, therefore, proposed to amend the phrase "shall be elected from the sectors and party list" in
§5 by replacing it with the following
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES
OR ORGANIZATIONS. 8
Attention should be paid to this proposal because with slight modification it later became the basis of the present
Art. VI, §5(1)(2).
The following exchange took place on the Monsod amendment:
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, before accepting the proposed amendment, the Committee would like to get some
clarifications.
When the proponent speaks of "OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS," is he referring to any sector
which the law may subsequently define?
MR. MONSOD: . . . The party list system that is being advocated by this amendment is a system that opens up the
list to any regional, national or sectoral party . . .
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. The Committee would like to be clarified on this.
Do we understand the proponent correctly that this party list system is not necessarily synonymous to sectoral
representation?
MR. MONSOD: No, it is not necessarily synonymous, but it does include the right of sectoral parties or
organizations to register, but it is not exclusive to sectoral parties or organizations.
MS. AQUINO. And that it does not likewise reserve any institutional seat for any sector? In other words, it only
enables it to be a part of the party list if it has the capacity to do so, but it does not reserve any seat for the sectors.
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, this is not a reserve seat system. 9
The proposed amendment was opposed by a group headed by Commissioner Villacorta, which included
Commissioners Tadeo, Lerum, and Bernas. Lerum said:
MR. LERUM. Madam President, in view of the explanation, I am objecting to this amendment because it is possible
that the labor sector will not be represented considering that those who will vote are all the voters of the Philippines. In other
words, the representative of labor will be chosen by all the electors of the Philippines, and that is not correct. My contention
is that the sectoral representative must be selected by his own constituents, and for that reason, I am objecting to this
amendment. 10
 On the other hand, Tadeo objected on the ground that if allowed to participate in the party-list system, the major
political parties could gobble up the sectoral parties. He said:
MR. TADEO . . . Kapag inilagay natin ang party list, papasukin ng political parties. Mangigibabaw at kakainin din
niyan hanggang mawala ang sektor. 11
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate
the party list at mawawalang saysay din iyong sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko
lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats,
reserved din ito sa political parties. 12
Villacorta said he was objecting to the party-list system because it would not solve the problem of ineffective
representation of the underprivileged sectors. He said:
For too long since our people attained a semblance of self-government at the start of this century, our legislators
were elected based on their promise that they would represent the little people of our land. With the exception of a few
patriotic legislators, some of whom are in our Commission today, members of the National Assemblies, the Congresses, and
the Batasans of the past did not devote themselves enough to the alleviation of the dismal condition of our country's poor and
lower classes.
xxx xxx xxx
These realities convince us that there are no spokesmen and legislators who can best represent the poor, the
underprivileged, the marginalized than those coming from within their ranks. 13
To Commissioner Villacorta, only reserved seats for the sectors would give them effective representation:
MR. MONSOD. My amendment merely says that it is THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED
NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.
My question is: Does the Honorable Commissioner object to this amendment?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, because it does not guarantee that the seats reserved for the party list representatives will
be reserved for the sectors. 14
Because of the impasse, the discussion on Friday, July 25, 1986, on §5 was suspended to allow the commissioners to
come to an agreement. After one week, a compromise formula was reached by the two groups and presented to the plenary
session of the Commission on August 1, 1986. In lieu of the phrase "shall be elected from the sectors and the party list," it
was proposed that the following be inserted in §5 of the Draft Article:
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SECTORAL
PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS AS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL
CONSTITUTE TWENTY PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PROVIDED THAT FOR THE FIRST TWO TERMS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION
TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY
SELECTION OR ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR AND
YOUTH SECTORS.
However, although an agreement had apparently been reached, the advocates of sectoral representation were not
satisfied that it would be allowed only for two terms and only with respect to one-half of the seats allocated for party-list
representatives. Commissioner Aquino proposed instead the following amendment of §5:
ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND
SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS, AS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES
SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED BY
ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, WOMEN AND YOUTH
SECTORS
When put to vote, however, Aquino's proposal was defeated with nineteen (19) voting in favor, and twenty-two (22)
voting against. 15
The Commission then voted on the proposed amendment of Commissioner Monsod. With only a few minor
changes, it was approved by a vote of thirty-two (32) commissioners against none. 16 As finally worded, the amendment
reads:
SHALL BE FILLED AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION, FROM THE LABOR,
PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER
SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR
Thus, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is not limited to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and the youth, but that it is a type of proportional representation intended to give voice to those who
may not have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently numerous to give them a seat nationwide. It,
therefore, misreads the debates on Art. VI, §5(1)(2) to say that "Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod differed in
their proposals as to the details of the party-list system, both proponents worked within the framework that the party-list
system is for the 'marginalized' as termed by Comm. Villacorta and the 'underrepresented' as termed by Comm. Monsod,
which he defined as those which are 'always third or fourth place in each of the districts.'" 17
Indeed, the two proposals put forth by them are basically different, and they do not have the same basis. What the
advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent reserved seats for "marginalized sectors" by which they mean the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, §5(2), these sectors
were given only one-half of the seats in the House of Representatives and only for three terms. On the other hand, the "third
or fourth place(rs)" in district elections, for whom the party-list system was intended, refer to those who may not win seats in
the districts but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to enable them to be represented in the House. They may include
Villacorta's "marginalized" or "underprivileged" sectors, but they are not limited to them. There would have been no need to
give the "marginalized sectors" one-half of the seats for the party-list system for three terms if the two systems are identical.
The objections raised against the accreditation of private respondents are the same ones raised by Commissioners
Villacorta, Tadeo, and Lerum, among others, to the Monsod proposal which became the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2), namely,
that certain sectors, like labor, may not win seats in the House under the party-list system; that the big parties might gobble
up the sectoral parties; that the party-list system will not solve the problem of ineffective representation of the
"underprivileged sectors." These objections, however, did not carry the day, as the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted 32-0 in favor of the Monsod proposal. It is noteworthy that even those who spoke against the Monsod
proposal did not vote against it. To uphold these objections now would be to overrule the Constitutional Commission and in
effect amend the Constitution.
In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-take-all" one-seat
district system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two solutions
were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional representation. The Constitutional Commission
chose the party-list system. This Court cannot hold that the party-list system is reserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth as petitioners contend without changing entirely the meaning of the
Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that
"A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions
of this Article."
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that the party-list system is designed
exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. As Commissioner
Ople said in supporting the Monsod proposal:
In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek common ground.
For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make common goals
with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass
organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is
now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to
which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of
such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass
organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to
all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass
organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where
labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and
the leadership of those parties. 18
With respect to the cancellation of any party registered under the party-list system, §6 of the Party-List System Act
provides:
SECTION 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
 (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
Petitioners' allegations that certain parties or organizations, such as private respondents MAD and Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, are disqualified under this provision are for the COMELEC to determine after due notice and hearing.
They are unfit for resolution in these proceedings.
III.
On the other hand, the majority states:
The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained. In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal
should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of
the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941 . . . Section 2 thereof unequivocally states
that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole . . ."
With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends the meaning of §2 of R.A. No. 7941. The provision reads:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Party. — The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House
of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
What this provision simply states is that the purpose of the party-list system is to promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives and, that to achieve this end, "a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives" shall be guaranteed. Contrary to what the majority claims, §2 does not say that the party-list system is
intended "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation" to win seats in the House of Representatives. What it says is that the policy of the law is "to promote proportional
representation through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House. For while the representation of "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional representation is
to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of winning. These groups are not
necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in §5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups
can possibly include other sectors.
Indeed, how can there be a "full, free and open party system" if the election for the party list system is to be limited
to the sectors which are enumerated in §5 of the law, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, the elderly, handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals? After all, what is
provided for is "a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations" each of which is
separately defined in §3 of the law.
That the party-list system is not limited to these groups is also clear from §5 of the law:
SECTION 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition
for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or
sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws,
platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC
may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. EaScHT
 There would be no need to provide specifically for the sectors if the party-list system is reserved for them.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petitions in these cases should be DISMISSED.
Footnotes 32. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.
1. Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners 33. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 570.
Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Rufino S. B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. 34. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.
Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason Jr. 35. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 561.
2. Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40. 36. Infra.
3. Ibid., pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 48-49. 37. Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997;
4. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 272-273. Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995.
5. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250-263. 38. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 331.
6. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282-283. 39. OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
7. See rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 223. 40. Infra.
8. TSN (GR No. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49. 41. TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147-148.
9. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4-73. 42. Counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko.
10. Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74. 43. TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178-180.
11. Comments were filed by MAD, Bagong Bayani, The True Marcos 44. Supra. See also §6, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which reads: "A
Loyalists, the Comelec, Partido ng Masang Pilipino, the Liberal Party, the Office free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice
of the Solicitor General, CREBA, Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Philippine Local of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article."
Autonomy Movement, Aksyon Demokratiko, Citizens' Drug Watch Foundation, 45. Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: ". . . Towards this end,
Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, Ang Lakas ng OCW, and Sports and Health the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
Foundation. attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
12. Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 3-45. the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
13. Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46. seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
14. These were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Comelec, 46. JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413,
the Bagong Bayani Organization, Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the Philippine February 18, 1970; cited in Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p.
Local Autonomy Movement. 311. See also Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259, 264 (1938).
15. Memoranda were filed by Petitioners Bayan Muna and Ang Bagong 47. See Agpalo, ibid., p. 313.
Bayani-OFW Labor Party; and Respondents Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, 48. 194 SCRA 317, February 22, 1991, per Fernan, CJ; quoting
CREBA, the Bagong Bayani Organization, the Office of the Solicitor General, and Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa 365, 3 Atl 220.
Aksyon Demokratiko. Manifestations instead of memoranda were filed by Lakas- 49. Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v.
NUCD and OCW. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA
16. See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88. 603, September 16, 1999; Garcia v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August 12, 1999.
17. See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organization's Memorandum, pp. 3-4; 50. Veterans Federation Party et al. v. Comelec et al., GR No. 136781,
Aksyon Demokratiko's Memorandum, pp. 2-3; and MAD's Memorandum, pp. 3-6. October 6, 2000.
18. Rules and regulations governing the filing of a petition for 51. See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278, February 18,
registration, a manifestation to participate, and the names of nominees under the 1999; Inciong Jr. v. CA, 257 SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v. NLRC, 257
party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2001 national SCRA 680, June 28, 1996; Heirs of the Late Teodoro Guaring Jr. v. CA, 269
and local elections. SCRA 283, March 7, 1997; Sesbreño v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, 270
19. OSG's Memorandum, pp. 6-14; rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159. SCRA 360, March 24, 1997; PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr., 302 SCRA 217, January 27,
20. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: "Judicial power 1999.
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving 52. TSN, May 17, 2001, p. 180.
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or 53. Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 16; rollo (GR
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of No. 147589), p. 19.
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 54. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 636.
21. "SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. The following 55. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 589.
pleadings are not allowed: 56. §2 (5), Article IX (C).
xxx xxx xxx 57. Christian S. Monsod.
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc 58. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 634.
ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases; 59. See also §11, Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A.
xxx xxx xxx" 60. See §2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o),
22. Docketed as SPA 01-113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also filed before BP 881.
the Comelec a similar Petition, docketed as SPA-01-109. See Annexes 1 and 2, 61. The bicameral conference committee on the disagreeing provision of
Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General; rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250 et Senate Bill No. 1913 and House Bill No. 3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.
seq. and 266 et seq. MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
23. Section 1, Rule 65. See Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222, 1. Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna 17-18.
October 16, 1996; BF Corporation v. CA, 288 SCRA 267, March 27, 1998; GSIS 2. Memorandum for the COMELEC 23-24.
v. Olisa, 304 SCRA 421, March 10, 1999; National Steel Corporation v. CA, GR 3. Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land
No. 134437, January 31, 2000; Sahali v. Comelec, GR No. 134169, February 2, Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596, 627 (1957).
2000. 4. 194 SCRA 317, 337-338 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph,
24. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl. 220 (1886).
Panganiban, J. See also ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission on 5. LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2 (1947) (emphasis in the original).
Elections, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000; Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 6. Committee on Legislative Power, Committee Report No. 22
307, April 11, 1972. (emphasis added).
25. Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per 7. 2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86,
Gutierrez, Jr., J. See also Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; session of Tuesday, July 22, 1986 (emphasis added).
Guingona v. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, March 1, 1993. 8. Id. at 252-253, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.
26. ABS-CBN v. Comelec, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, per 9. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
Panganiban, J. 10. Id. at 254, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.
27. Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 15; rollo (GR 11. Id. at 254.
No. 147589), p. 18. 12. Id. at 257.
28. Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20. 13. Id. at 255.
29. OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244. 14. Id. at 258.
30. Emphasis supplied. See also §§17 and 18, Article VI of the 15. Id. at 584, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.
Constitution. 16. Id. at 589.
31. It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in the 17. Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna 13.
early days of the post-Marcos era, UNIDO was the dominant political party. 18. RECORD 568, section of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.