Juradora, Ralph E.

February, 2, 2019

Special Proceedings LLB- III

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Reyes v. Rosenstock and BPI v. Conception

(G.R. No. 23718) and (G.R. No. 27701)

Facts:

In the former case, petitioner obtained a judgment against the testator who appointed
herein defendant as executor of his estate. The said judgment was obtained when the testator
was still alive. Before the testator died a sale of a real estate mortgage (which was tied with the
judgment previously obtained) such was confirmed and attained finality since no appeal was
taken. Petitioner then presented a proof of claim which was opposed by herein defendant but
was subsequently permitted by the committee which led to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the court.

On the latter case, a promissory note was executed by therein defendant in favor of the
petitioner and such was conditioned to be payable on demand, it was also secured with a 700
shares of PNB (which served as collaterals) in addition was a mortgage of 5,680 square meters
of land. Upon default therein petitioners tried to foreclose said mortgage. Pending the said
circumstance herein defendants negotiated with a certain Henry Elser who agreed that the
defendants will be relieved from liability. Subsequent to such agreement Elser wrote to the
bank regarding the foreclosure sale but tere was no reply obtained.

Issue:

WON on both cases the claims are contingent.

Held:

In the first case the court held on the negative stating such was not a contingent claim.
A subsisting demand against the estate of a deceased person which matured and being
enforced when he was still alive is not a contingent claim as in this case. The court does not
subscribe to the defendants contention, because said claim was rendered by the court when
the testator was still alive and pending the appeal of the defendant-executor, on his own
motion, was made defendant as such, and the final judgment upon which the property was sold
was rendered against defendant as an executor.

In the latter case, the claim on the mortgaged property was a contingent claim. The
foreclosure of a mortgaged property pertaining to the estate of the deceased person, the
deficiency cannot be determined before the foreclosure sale and demand for its payment is a
contingent claim This deficiency must be presented to the committee whom appointed by the
court. If the contingent claim is valid, the executor or administrator may be required to retain in
his possession sufficient assets to pay the claim.

Both cases dwell on the issue of the claims being contingent or not. In the first case it
was held as not contingent, as ruling otherwise would nullify the second provision of Sec. 708 of
the Code of Civil Procedure and the claims arising from the judgment against testator, and
which was enforced while he was still living. On the latter case, the claim was contingent since
the amount of the deficiency must be determined first before the foreclosure sale. Demand
Payment is now contingent dependent to the foreclosure sale.
 Bautista v. Tiongson and Albano v. Agtarap

(G.R. No. 4232) and (G.R. No. 7075)

Facts:

In the latter case, there was a deceased named Silverio Agtarap who was one of the four
sons of the late Lucio Agtarap. It was held that Silverio was denied with his share of the
properties of his late father. Silverio's widow instituted a special special proceedings for
settlement of the intestate estate which resulted to Albano being appointed as administrator fo
the estate of Silverio.

In the first case, a property in the Province of Bulacan is the center of the dispute
between the administrator of the estate of Ciriaco Tiongson against Aquilina Tiongson. It was
argued whether there was a share on the part of the estate of Ciriaco for one parcel of land
that was claimed exclusively by Aquilina.
Rulings Compared:
In the first case, the court categorically stated that an administrator is not authorized to
bring an action demanding the partition of real estate owned pro indiviso by the deceased. The
court did not allow petitioner being the administrator of Ciriaco Tiongson to institute
proceedings on behalf of the estate against the disputed property with the defendant. It must
be noted that in the latter case the ruling is much recent rather than the ruling in this first case.
In the latter case, the court agreed with the decision of the lower court in granting share
of the testator to the properties of his late father while highlighting that the need for special
proceedings in determining the claim of the administrator of the said intestate estate on behalf
of Juana Domingo for her “legalportion as widow”, as well as the proceedings or proving that
Eugenia Agtarap is a legitimate daughter. The court in this case was not categorical as to
whether and administrator is allowed to bring an action on behaf of the estate on behalf of the
pro-indiviso share of the estate to the property.
 CASE DIGESTS
Echaus v. Blanco
(G.R. No. L-30453; December 4, 1989)
Facts:

Angelina Echaus, the administratrix of her father’s estate filed a complaint against C.N.
Hodges for the recovery of profits and remaining assets of their business covering Ba-Ta
Subdivision in the CFI of Negros Occidental. During the trial, C.N. Hodges died and was
substituted with Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) as administrator of the
estate.

On March of 1963, a notice to creditors was published in Yuhum which is a newspaper

of general circulation. On 1966, a judgment was rendered in favor of Echaus ordering PCIB in its
capacity as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges to pay the sum of P851,472.83 with legal
interest thereon from the date of judgment until paid. Echaus filed a writ of execution which
was not enforced since she filed a motion in the estate proceedings of the deceased C.N.
Hodges for the payment of the judgment on 1967.

Consequently, opposition has been filed and the heirs have filed a motion to intervene.
It in effect resulted to the holding in abeyance of the resolution for the payment of the
judgment. Meanwhile, the respondents contended that the judgment being a money claim
should have been dismissed in the estate proceedings since it is already barred by the statute of
non-claims since it has been filed for more than 4 years from the publication of said notice.
Issue:
WON the judgment claim in the estate proceedings is barred by the statute of non-
claims.
Held:
The court ruled on the negative stating that the Rules of Court allows a creditor
to file his claim after the period set by the court in the notice to creditors, provided the
conditions stated in the rules are present. The period prescribed in the notice to creditors is not
exclusive and that money claims against the estate may be allowed any time before an order of
distribution is entered, at the discretion of the court for cause and upon such terms as are
equitable.

In this case, it must be noted that at the time petitioner's motion to direct payment of
the judgement credit was filed, no order of distribution was issued yet. Moreover, the record
does not show that the administrator objected thereto upon the ground that it was filed out of
time. The court is also persuaded to say that the pendency of the case is a good excuse for
tardiness in the filing of the claim.
PNB v. CA
(G.R. No. 121597; June 29, 2001)
Facts:
The case involves a foreclosure of mortgage arising out of a settlement of estate,
wherein the administrator mortgaged a property belonging to the estate of the decedent,
pursuant to an authority given by the probate court. In this case, a parcel of land was owned by
the Chua spouses, the husband died and the land was part of the settlement of estate of the
decedent. The spouses’s son, was appointed as administrator, and was given the authority to
obtain a loan from PNB. Later on, the administrator (the son), defaulted so PNB extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage, but there was still a deficiency so they filed a claim against the estate
of the decedent. The RTC and CA dismissed the claim of PNB.
Issue:
WON the PNB can claim the deficiency.
Held:
The court ruled on the negative stating that Rule 86 Sec 7 grants to the mortgagee three
distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the
mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as
an ordinary claim;
 (2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim;
and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is
barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency.
In this case, since PNB elected the 3rd remedy, it resulted to a waiver of their right to
claim the deficiency of the loan.
Lopez v. Lopez

(G.R. No. 45736; May 26, 1939)

Facts:

Emeterio Lopez died intestate, leaving no legitimate descendants, ascendants or widow.

Concepcion Lopez filed a petition in the intestate proceedings of the deceased, claiming to be
the acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased and prayed that she be declared his
universal heiress entitled to a summary award of his estate, which was valued at less than 6,000
pesos. The oppositors- appellants filed an opposition, denying petitioner’s claim and praying
that, as they are nephews and nieces of the deceased, they be adjudged entitled to the
property left by him. The court declared the petitioner, Concepcion Lopez, an acknowledged
natural daughter of the deceased and entitled to the rights accorded to her by law.
Issue:
WON Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged natural daughter of Emeterio Lopez.
Held:
Contrary to the appellants’ contention, it is a well settled rule that a person claiming to
be an acknowledged natural child of a deceased need not maintain a separate action for
recognition but may simply intervene in the intestate proceedings, by alleging and proving
therein his or her status as such, and claiming accordingly the right to share in the inheritance.
Inasmuch as the recognition of her status is a prerequisite to her right to heirship, her prayer
that she be declared universal heiress implies like a prayer that she be recognized as an
acknowledged natural child.
 Lopez v. Garcia Lopez

(G.R. No. 13823; September 22, 1919)

Facts:

On March 31, 1901 testator Juaquin Guerrero died and left a will, he was survived by his
wife and seven children. However, despite the existence of such will was not probated, instead
the heirs agreed that for two years the properties will be commonly owned by them.

As times passed a series of selling of interest in the estates were executed by two of the
heirs and such communal ownership was then again extended to another 5 years.
Subsequently, herein petitioner Maria Lopez filed a petition for probate of the will which was
approved by the court and appointed herein petitioner as administratrix.

Upon appointment both herein petitioner together with the remaining heirs executed a
document wherein they gave to defendant several properties in payment of her share in the
undivided property and for her to renounce renounce her right ti intervene in the settlement of
the estates particularly in objecting the accounts which might be rendered.

Subsequent thereof upon rendering of the account of herein petitioner, defendant objected to
such account but petitioner is of the position that the court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the
account and to entertain such objection. Hence this petition

Issue:
WON the court has the power to require judicial administrator to account for acts done
in the capacity of manager or administrator for the period elapsing from the opening of the
succession and formal qualification of the administrator.
Held:
The High Court answered in the affirmative stating that when the estate of a
deceased person is brought into judicial administration every person having any of the
property of the decedent in his hands is required to surrender it to the lawful executor
or administrator, and anyone who may have squandered assets of the estate or
converted the same to his own use is liable to answer for the value thereof. When it
occurs, as here, that the person qualifying as administrator is the same as the one who
acted as custodian and manager prior to the inception of the administration proceedings,
his duty to account is no less insistent and inevitable.

It is true that section 672 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which deals with the annual
accounting by the administrator, contemplates that he shall account only for such
property as may come to his hands as administrator; but this has nothing to do with
the initial accounting which should be required of an administrator with respect to
property which may have come to his hands as manager prior to the issuance of letters
of administration.

Marschall v. Antholtz

(G.R. No. 31672; February 14, 1930)

Facts:

Walter Toehl was the Manila manager of Behn, Meyer & Co., H. Mij., a foreign
corporation engaged in business in the Philippine Islands. At the same time Carl Antholtz was a
chemist and oil technologist, also living in Manila. Toehl appears to have been the owner of a
parcel of land, with a building thereon, located in the barrio of Punta, in the District of Santa
Ana, Manila. Being desirous of using this property in a profitable way, Toehl contracted for the
services of Antholtz as manager of an oil mill to be operated on said property. The agreement
between them was that Toehl would furnish the capital necessary for the business, which was
estimated at P25,000, and Antholtz would act as Toehl's agent and manager at a salary of P500
per month.

After Toehl's death, or shortly prior thereto, it was found that he was short in his
accounts with Behn, Meyer & Co., H. Mij., to the extent of about P150,000. After Toehl's death
the then manager of Behn, Meyer & Co., H. Mij., procured Eugen Marschall to be appointed
administrator of the estate, and the present action was instituted by him the recover
possession of the oil mill property above-mentioned and to hold Antholtz personally liable for
certain personal property pertaining to the oil mill and products of the same which have been
sold by Antholtz in the continuation of his duties as manager.

The plaintiff's case supposes that Toehl and Antholtz were in collusion and that the
latter was cognizant of the fact that the money which Toehl had put into the oil business in
Santo Ana had been feloniously embezzled by Toehl from his employer. As a consequence of
this supposed collusion, it is insisted for the plaintiff that Antholtz is liable for everything which
Toehl had taken from Behn, Meyer & Co., H. Mij., and placed in the oil mill business, as well as
for the proceeds of the things sold by Antholtz after the death of Toehl.

The trial court found that there is no sufficient proof of collusion between Antholtz and
Toehl in the matter of the misappropriation of any of the funds of Behn, Meyer & Co., H. Mij.

Issue:
WON Antholtz liable for the proceeds of certain effects sold by him after the death of
Toehl, as well as the proceeds of the output of the mill while Antholtz continued in the
management?

Held:
The higher court held ruled in the negative stating that in section 711 of the Code of
Civil Procedure it is declared that if any person, before the granting of letters testamentary or
of administration on the estate of a deceased person, embezzles, or alienates, any of the
effects of such deceased person, such person shall be liable to an action in favor of the executor
or administrator of such estate for double the value of the property sold, embezzled, or
alienated, to be recovered for the benefit of the estate.
 In this case, the provision has reference primarily to funds that are lost by
embezzlement or alienation, and it cannot be understood as making the manager of a going
concern liable for proceeds of sales applied by him to the proper uses of the business, as
occurred in this case. The proof shows that the personal property other than the products of
the mill, sold by Antholtz in the manner mentioned, was sold with the consent of the manager
of Behn, Meyer & Co., H. Mij., and with the consent of the administrator of Walter Toehl, and
the proceeds of these sales, as well as the proceeds of the products of the mill, were applied by
Antholtz to the obligations incurred by him in running the business, without the improper
diversion of a single cent.
Ingersoll v. Chui-Tian Lay
(G.R. No. 4238; November 4, 1908)
Facts:
Plaintiff is the administrator of the estate of Jose. He filed an action alleging in his
complaint that after the death of the said Jose Carlos, and on the same day, the defendants
embezzled and appropriated to their own use P53,140 which belonged to the estate, and he
asked that, in accordance with the provisions of section 711 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
judgment be entered against them for double that amount, or P106,280. The defendants
denied all the allegations in the complaint.

The lower court acquitted the defendants Ventura and Lim Li but ordered judgment
against Chun Gun Pan for an amount double the amount which the court said belonged to the
estate which he converted to his own use and for which he failed to account to the estate.

Thus, Chun Gun Pan appealed.

So far as the appeal of the plaintiff is concerned, the question presented is purely one of
fact. Three witnesses for the plaintiff testified that about four days before the death of Jose
Carlos, his son, Chung Kiat, at the request of the deceased, opened the safe in the room where
they were and took therefrom a sum of money which he, Chung Kiat, counted and which
amounted to P53,000, and that he then replaced the money in the safe. Jose Carlos died about
4 o’clock in the morning of October 19, 1905.

Two witnesses testified that the defendants came there during that forenoon, opened
the safe, took this amount of money therefrom, wrapped up the bills, amounting to P50,000 in
a handkerchief, and carried it away. These two witnesses and four others testified that as the
defendant Chun Gun Pan, who had the bills wrapped up in a handkerchief, got into the vehicle
which was waiting for them in the street, the handkerchief struck against a post of the
carromata and the bills fell to the ground.

Six witnesses, including in this number two of the defendants, testified that the three
defendants were present in the house of Jose Carlos in the forenoon of October 19; that the
defendants Chun Gun Pan and Chui-Tian Lay were relatives of the deceased, and that the
persons there assembled had a conference in which it was decided that the safe be opened for
the purpose of seeing what money there was with which to defray the funeral expenses.
Thereupon Chun Gun Pan opened the safe, its contents were taken out, and an inventory then
made by Keh Yong Keng in a small book, which inventory was signed by these persons and
which was produced and identified in court.

The witnesses for the defense testified that the defendants carried away from the house
no money or other property.

The defendant Chun Gun Pan further testified that the deceased sent for him and told
him to take care of his business after he died, and then gave him the key to the safe.

Issue:
WON the defendant is guilty of embezzlement and appropriation the moneys and
properties belonging to the estate.
Held:
The court ruled on the negative stating that Section 711 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
under which this action is brought, is as follows:

"If a person, before the granting of letters testamentary or of administration on the estate of a
deceased person, embezzles, or alienates any of the money, goods, chattels, or effects of such
deceased person, such person shall be liable to an action in favor of the executor or
administrator of such estate for double the value of the property sold, embezzled, or alienated,
to be recovered for the benefit of such estate."

Defendants, acting under instructions given by the deceased the day before his death,
took possession of some of the property belonging to the estate and administered it until a
regular administrator was appointed. Held, That this fact does not prove an embezzlement of
the property within the terms of section 711 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

When the testimony of the other witnesses is examined, it is seen that no one of them
states that Chun Gun Pan carried away this money or any part of it. On the contrary, the
witness Hermenegildo testified that after it had been counted, all of it, including the other
property, was returned to the safe; that the safe was locked, and that the defendant Chun Gun
Pan kept the key thereof. Chun Gun Pan testified that he had never taken any amount of
money belonging to the deceased and appropriated it to his own use.

It does appear, however, that Chun Gun Pan took possession of the business and carried
it on for some time until an administrator was appointed but that he did this at the request of
the deceased made the day before his death. The property that he, thus took in charge
included not only the money in the safe but that connected with the foundry business. There is
no evidence to show that he appropriated any part of this property, either the money in the
safe or that connected with the foundry, to his own use. It appears on the contrary that he was
holding the same merely as the agent of the persons interested therein.