Professional Documents
Culture Documents
STAA
STAA
Summary of findings:
1) Up to 2017 Staar Surgical (“Staar”) was a boring healthcare company, growing revenue at single
digits and occasionally reporting operating profit.
2) In April 2017, CFO unexpectedly left.
3) In May 2017 Staar filed a Prospectus under the “shelf” registration process, outlining plans to
raise capital.
4) Starting from Q3 2017 growth at Staar mysteriously accelerated, and slowed down sequentially
in Q3 and Q4 2018, following $72M secondary share placement in Aug 2018.
5) A single distributor in China – Shanghai Langsheng – accounted for 70% of revenue growth
between 2016 and LTM Q3 2018. In Q3 2018 Shanghai Langsheng accounted for 42% of total
revenue vs just 11% in Q1 2015.
6) Our analysis shows that the acceleration of growth between Q2 2017 and Q2 2018 was driven
by a massive inventory build-up at distributor level, which inflated revenue reported during the
period by at least 17%.
7) We see other red flags supporting our view of aggressive revenue recognition by Staar:
a. Staar cut prices for their core product - ICLs - in 2017 and 9M 2018;
b. Staar permits product returns;
c. Days of sales outstanding ratio has been going up;
d. Staar made several amendments to revenue recognition policy in 2016-2018, each time
making it less conservative;
e. Since 2016 Staar has been reimbursing its customers for marketing and other costs
subject to minimum purchase levels;
f. In 2017 Staar commenced selling ICLs on consignment basis
g. In 2018, Staar changed the description of seasonality of its business.
8) In our opinion, now Staar management faces a hard task to DEFLATE an inventory bubble,
created during 2017-2018. We think because of this, Staar growth and/or profitability will
disappoint investors in 2019.
9) We set a price target at $18 with a 50% downside based on normalized sales for 2019 and
compression of EV/S multiple.
Sell-side analyst asking Staar CEO Caren Mason during Q3 2018 call:
Analyst: And is there any opportunity for your customers to stock? Or are most of the lenses you
shipped implanted within a few weeks?
Caren L. Mason, CEO: The latter. Almost all of our lenses are made and shipped on order.
Analyst: Right. So there's no channel to fill basically. These are all lenses that are implanted or
within a few weeks of shipment?
Caren L. Mason, CEO: The majority are -- most of our distributors pass the order to us when they
get the order. However, in some markets, where there's very high volume and there's a real
strong interest in lessening the lead time on Toric for example, we do have inventory, but we
manage very carefully. And the majority of the time, we have a maximum of 30 days inventory in
any one location.
1|Page
DISCLOSURE
I am/we are short STAA. All information for this report was derived from publicly available information.
Investors are encouraged to conduct their own due diligence into these factors. This report represents
the opinion of the author as of the date of this report. The information set forth in this report does not
constitute a recommendation to buy or sell any security. This report contains certain "forward-looking
statements," which may be identified by the use of such words as "believe," "expect," "anticipate,"
"should," "planned," "estimated," "potential," "outlook," "forecast," "plan" and other similar terms. All
are subject to various factors, any or all of which could cause actual events to differ materially from
projected events. This report is based upon information reasonably available to the author and obtained
from sources the author believes to be reliable; however, such information and sources cannot be
guaranteed as to their accuracy or completeness. This report reflects the author's opinion at the time of
publication. The author makes no representation as to the accuracy or completeness of the information
set forth in this report. The author may also cover his/her short position at any point in time without
providing notice. The author encourages all readers to do their own due diligence.
2|Page
COMPANY DESCRIPTION AND TIMELINE
Staar Surgical (STAA) is a producer of implantable collamer lens (ICL), an alternative to a popular laser
eye surgery called LASIC. ICL surgery is suitable mostly for people with high myopia (> 8.0) and is
substantially more expensive than LASIC. Total addressable market for ICL is thus just a fraction of total
myopia eye surgery market. FDA lists a number of risks associated with ICL surgery, including loss of
vision, risk of cataract, increased intraocular pressure etc.
3|Page
GROWTH ACCELERATION IN 2017-2018
While the average revenue growth between Q1 2011 and Q2 2018 was 7%, in H2 2017 growth
accelerated to 15% and further to 37% in 2018. According to the management of Staar, the acceleration
of growth was a result of “2017 investments in the clinical, quality, regulatory, research and
development, commercial and operations infrastructure”. We think that the recent growth at Staar was
driven by the increase of ICL inventories of distributors, which overstated revenue reported during Q3
2017-Q2 2018 (a period preceding the secondary share placement) by at least 17%. Because of the large
volumes of ICL inventories remaining at distributor level, revenues and/or profitability will fall short of
investors’ expectations in 2019.
Virtually all sales to China go through a single distributor Shanghai Langsheng, which is the largest
customer of Staar, accounting for 42% of revenue in Q3 2018.
4|Page
WE THINK THE ACCELERATION OF GROWTH DURING Q3 2017 – Q2 2018 WAS DRIVEN BY THE
INCREASE IN INVENTORIES OF DISTRIBUTORS, NOT END DEMAND
We collected data points on the total number of implanted ICLs, as reported by STAA between 2010 and
2018 (Appendix 1). Typically, Staar presents these numbers at the bottom of a press release (Appendix
2). Other sources of these data points are Staar website and presentations for investors. The table
below summarizes all data points for implanted ICLs starting from 2010. Dates in the first column show
when Staar disclosed each data point for the first time.
We are highly sceptical regarding the spike in daily implantations between 22 Aug 2018 and 12 Sep 2018
(the last data point). How could have Staar increased implantations by a magnitude of 5-6x within such a
short period? While it took 11 months to increase the number of implanted ICLs from 700,000 to
800,000; and over 4 months to increase the number of implanted ICLs from 800,000 to 850,000; the
increase from 850,000 to 900,000 took just 21 days. We think that by reporting 900K number
prematurely Staar decided to cover up the growing divergence between ICL revenue and the number
of implanted ICLs.
Based on the numbers presented above and ICL unit price data from Exhibit 4 we calculated quarterly
numbers of implanted ICLs, which should reflect the end demand. We also calculated unit sales of ICLs
by dividing total ICL revenue by average selling price.
5|Page
We took the level of ICL inventories held by distributors at the end of Q4 2009 as a starting point and
calculated cumulative change in ICL inventories at distributor level since then (See “ICL inventories held
by distributors” column in Exhibit 3).
Source: Company, own calculations Acceleration of ICL revenue growth during Q3 2017 – Q2 2018 was a result
of the accumulation of 31,600 ICL units at distributor level
We are getting 31.6K figure as a difference between the cumulative inventory levels at the end of the
period (21.8K) and at the beginning of the period (-9.8K). This is equal to $18.2m or 16.7% of all revenue
reported during Q3 2017 – Q2 2018.
In our view, distributors in China and South Korea are the most likely candidates to hold the excessive
ICL inventory, accumulated during 2017-2018, as these are the largest distributor markets for Staar. In
other key markets (Germany, Spain and the US) Staar sells directly.
6|Page
The graph below is a visualization of Exhibit 3:
1) Change of inventories held by distributors show high correlation with ICL revenue growth. This
means that acceleration/deceleration of ICL revenue growth is mostly driven by
accumulation/distribution of inventories by distributors, not changes in the underlying demand.
2) Between Q2 2017 and Q2 2018 ICL inventories held by distributors increased by approximately
31,600 (equal to $18.2m). To put this in perspective, this is more than total ICL sales in Q4 2017.
3) Huge increase in implantations during 21 days in Aug-Sep 2018 (2,381 ICLs per day) has
supposedly ELIMINATED the large part of excess inventories accumulated by distributors. We
think there is no way such volume of ICLs could have been implanted in such a short period of
time given that historically around 200-400 ICLs were implanted per day.
7|Page
OTHER RED FLAGS
Channel stuffing is typically achieved by offering lucrative incentives, including deep discounts,
rebates, and extended payment terms, to persuade distributors and retailers to buy quantities in
excess of their needs. Distributors frequently retain the right to return any unsold inventory which
calls into question whether the transaction is a bona fide sale or more in the nature of goods sent on
consignment. The accounting irregularity in the context of channel stuffing thus occurs from
recording revenues prematurely and from the failure to adequately provide for bad debts and sales
returns that are bound to follow the excess shipments.
Source: LINK
Deep discounts: After a long period of growth ICL prices started declining in 2017 and the decline
accelerated in 9M 2018.
Staar confirmed the decline of ASPs during 2017 and 9M 2018 in its financial statements.
8|Page
Exhibit 5: Decline in ASPs in 2017 and 9M 2018
2017 Gross profit for the year ended December 29, 2017 was $64.3 million, a 10.1% increase compared to the $58.4 million
10-K reported for the year ended December 30, 2016. Gross profit in 2017 increased 10.1%, slightly ahead of the increase
in net sales. Gross profit margin increased to 70.9% of revenue for fiscal year 2017 compared to 70.8% of revenue for
fiscal year 2016, due to an increase in sales mix of Toric ICLs, improved country mix, lower unit costs and the cost of
sales related to the $0.6 million non-cash charge related to the immediate vesting of all unvested equity awards as a
result of the triggering of the “Change of Control” provisions of the Company’s equity incentive plan in 2016 which
was not repeated in 2017, largely offset by the increased mix of lower margin injector and other product sales and
lower ICL and IOL average selling prices.
Q3 2018 Gross profit for the three months ended September 28, 2018 was $23.9 million or 75.1% of sales, an increase of 42%
10-Q from $16.8 million, or 71.8% of sales, reported during the same period of 2017. Gross profit for the nine months
ended September 28, 2018 was $68.5 million or 73.9% of sales, an increase of 46% from $46.9 million, or 71.3% of
sales, reported during the same period of 2017. The improvement in gross margin for both periods resulted
primarily from lower unit costs as a result of significantly increased production volumes resulting in better overhead
absorption, favorable product and country mix, and due to lower freight and inventory provisions, partially offset by
the effect of lower average selling prices.
Rebates: In 2016, Staar added the following paragraph to its revenue recognition policy:
Beginning in 2016, the Company entered into certain strategic cooperation agreements with
customers in which, as consideration for minimum purchase commitments the customers
make, the Company agrees to pay for marketing and support of Company products. The
Company accounts for these arrangements in accordance with ASC 605-50, Revenue Recognition
– Customer Payments and Incentives. The provisions in these arrangements allow for these
payments to be made directly to the customer in lieu of marketing and support or, payments can
be made for distinct marketing and support services provided by the customer or another party.
For payments the Company makes to the customer for which no distinct service is provided, the
Company records these payments as a reduction of revenues as incurred. For payments the
Company makes to another party, or reimburses the customer, for distinct marketing and
support services, the Company recognizes these payments as a sales and marketing expense
as incurred.
Such reimbursements are an easy way to inflate revenue: a customer buys more lenses than can be sold,
and Staar makes reimbursements of “marketing costs” for those lenses bought above normal levels.
The Company generally permits returns of product if the product is returned within the time
allowed by its return policies and records an allowance for estimated returns at the time
revenue is recognized. The Company’s allowance for estimated returns considers historical trends
and experience, the impact of new product launches, the entry of a competitor, availability of
timely and pertinent information and the various terms and arrangements offered, including
sales with extended credit terms.
9|Page
Growing DSO: Growing Days of Sales Outstanding is another indicator of Staar shift towards
aggressiveness in its revenue booking practices.
Changes in revenue recognition between 2016 and 2018: In our view, changes to revenue recognition
policy, made during 2016-2018, make revenue recognition less conservative.
In 2017, Staar commenced selling ICLs on consignment basis. Consignment sales are more
beneficial to customers, as they pay only when goods are sold to end buyer.
In Q1 2018 Staar extended the list of services, for which reimbursements can be made. While in
2017 10-k such list included “marketing and support of the Company’s products”, in Q1 2018 it
was extended to “marketing, educational training and general support of the Company’s
products”. In Q2 Staar disclosed that customers were making additional commitments beyond
just “minimum purchase commitments” as disclosed in Q1 2018.
10 | P a g e
Changes in risk factor disclosures: In 2017, Staar made amendment to a risk factor pointing out
increased credit and collectability risk “with customers in certain international markets”:
Moreover, during 2015-2017 Staar changed text of another risk factor, indicating growing competition
from low-cost producers in Asia.
Change in seasonality pattern in 2018: In 2016 and 2017, Staar disclosed that seasonality did not
materially influence its sales. However, during Q3 2018 call the company disclosed that going forward
sales in the second quarter would be the highest, followed by the third.
To summarize: We think Staar had a strong reason to overstate its reported revenue/profits ahead of
the secondary share placement in Aug 2018. In our view, numerous accounting tricks; various
concessions to customers; growth mostly driven by a single distributor in China; declining ICL prices,
increasing competition are signs of deteriorating fundamentals, not of a strong demand.
11 | P a g e
SIMILARITIES WITH BAUSCH & LOMB CASE
While analysing Staar, we found a textbook case on channel stuffing: Bausch & Lomb in 1993. Because
of improper revenue recognition, 1993 net income was overstated by 11% and B&L subsequently
restated its financials, while the stock declined by 40%. For those interested in this case, SEC presents a
very detailed overview on its website.
We see the following similarities between the cases of Bausch and Lomb and Staar:
Another similarity is that in B&L case a Hong Kong office was largely responsible for inflating sales. We
think in Staar case China and South Korea are the most likely markets where the excess ICL inventory
could be sitting.
12 | P a g e
VALUATION
At present, sell-side analysts are projecting $154M revenue for 2019, which is 24% growth YoY. In its
Jan-2019 presentation, Staar guided for 20% growth, although with certain reservations (see in red).
Source: LINK
In our view, given the need for distributors to sell their elevated inventories, sales in 2019 will be much
lower than what is currently expected by the market.
Source: Company
13 | P a g e
We would like to highlight the following:
As a result, we expect Staar to sell only c. $90m of ICLs, not $130m as currently expected by the market.
Such poor performance of ICL segment should result in total revenue declining by 11% YoY in 2019.
Given that the company has been largely loss making historically, there is no history of P/E or even
EV/EBITDA multiples. Thus, we value company based on EV/S. Over the last five years the average EV/S
multiple has been 5.6x, although this period includes depressed multiple levels following FDA warning
letter in 2015 AND a euphoria period of April-December 2018 after the lift of FDA warning.
At present market values the company at 10x 2019 sales. We apply 8x EV/S multiple to our adjusted
2019 Sales (still a generous multiple for a company given its historical profitability and growth), which
results in $18 target price or 50% downside from the current levels.
USD m
2019 Sales 110
EV/S multiple 8.0
EV 880
Less cash as of 30 Sep 2018 102
Market cap 778
Shares outstanding as of 26 Oct 2018 44.1
Target share price 17.6
14 | P a g e
APPENDIX 1
15 | P a g e
APPENDIX 2
16 | P a g e
APPENDIX 2 – CONTINUED
17 | P a g e