.R. No.

115381 December 23, 1994

KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER, petitioner,

vs.

HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND

REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1990, DOTC Sec. Oscar Orbos issued Memo Circular to LTFRB Chair
Remedios Fernando to allow provincial bus to change passenger rates w/in a
fare range of 15% above or below the LTFRB official rate for a 1yr. period.
This is in line with the liberalization of regulation in the transport sector which
the government intends to implement and to make progress towards greater
reliance on free market forces.

Fernando respectfully called attention of DOTC Sec. that the Public Service
Act requires publication and notice to concerned parties and public hearing. In
Dec. 1990, Provincial Bus Operators Assoc. of the Phils. (PBOAP) filed an
application for across the board fare rate increase, which was granted by
LTFRB. In 1992, then DOTC Sec. Garcia issued a memo to LTFRB
suggesting a swift action on adoption of procedures to implement the
Department Order & to lay down deregulation policies. Pursuant to LTFRB
Guideline, PBOAP, w/o benefit of public hearing announced a 20% fare rate
increase.

Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move and filed a petition
before LTFRB w/c was denied. Hence the instant petition for certiorari w/
urgent prayer for a TRO, w/c was readily granted by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the authority granted by LTFB to provincial buses to set a fare range
above existing authorized fare range is unconstitutional and invalid.

HELD:
The grant of power by LTFRB of its delegated authority is unconstitutional.
The doctrine of Potestas delegate non delegari (what has been delegated cannot
be delegated) is applicable because a delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate thru instrumentality of his own
judgment. To delegate this power is a negation of the duty in violation of the
trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge such duty. Also, to give
provincial buses the power to charge their fare rates will result to a chaotic
state of affairs ad this would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport
operators who can increase their rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or when
they deem it necessary.
Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 11 SCRA 317 (1964)

FACTS: In an alleged letter-petition, petitioner was charged with black market of electric meters and that
its meters were installed in bad faith to register excessive rates. Petitioner received a communication
from General Auditing Office (GAO) that it will be audited. PSC issued subsequently a subpoena duces
tecum requiring petitioners to produce before PSC, during a conference scheduled for April 10, 1962,
certain book of accounts. Petitioner moved to quash such subpoena. The conference was postponed
twice until it was finally cancelled. In May 1962, PSC issued an order, which after finding that petitioner
had an excess of revenues by 18%, lowered the present meter rates of petitioner. Hence, this petition
for certiorari is instituted.

ISSUE: WON notice and hearing is required

RULING: Yes.

In support to its special defense, respondent PSC maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that
legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice or hearing.
Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates – when such are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines – may partake of legislative character, such is not
the nature of the order complained of. Here, the order exclusively applies to petitioner. What is more, it
is predicated upon the finding of fact, whether the petitioner is making a profit more than 12% of its
invested capital which is denied by the petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the
maker of the said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or
complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusions drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other
words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial
character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.

Indeed, Sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of CA No. 146, explicitly require notice and hearing.

Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order complained of partakes
the nature of quasi-judicial function and that, having been issued without previous notice and hearing,
said order is clearly violative of the due process clause, and hence, null and void.

G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission

Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for
certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the
National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent
(15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was
issued without prior notice and hearing.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public
Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on
June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that
although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant
to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative
character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication.
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other

The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It,
however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to
the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While
respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such
rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of
notice and hearing

The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to
make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In
the Case at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner
EVANGELISTA v. JARENCIO
G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable
Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in
Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations
(PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. Purposedly, he charged the Agency with
the following functions and responsibilities:
 To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions,
smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial
to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President
of the Philippines.
 To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and
3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of
unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
 To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against
the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper
charges with the appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an
investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the
power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony
or evidence relevant to the investigation.
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued
to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad
testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL
AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify
in a certain investigation pending therein."

ISSUE: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its
conduct of fact-finding investigations.

HELD: YES. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact,
the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for all
administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting,
for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for
purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done.
An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a
legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon
which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of
witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils
calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for
actions.

We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive
Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer
oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" with the authority "to require the production of
documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same
restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." Such subpoena
power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-
paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would
have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated
in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal
aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious
activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined
to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its
investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself
(Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena
power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids
differentiation when the law itself makes none.

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn
statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous
transactions fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be .

Political Case: JOSE L. GUEVARA vs. COMELEC G.R. No. L-

12596 July 31, 1958
JOSE L. GUEVARA vs. COMELEC G.R. No. L-12596 July 31, 1958

FACTS:

Guevara was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for
having published in the newspaper an article which tended to interfere with and influence the
COMELEC awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply of ballot boxes; and which article
likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive constitutional function
of this Commission and its Chairman
Petitioner, filed a motion to quash on the following ground that the Commission has no jurisdiction to
punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as neither in the Constitution
nor in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so punish the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against
Guevara in connection with the publication of an article.

RULING:

Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several
dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its
administrative capacity. It only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function.
Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law,
for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: "The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently,
in the administration of justice". We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on
Elections has no power nor authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to
discipline him because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge under consideration.
Tolentino vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA 563

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

(Administrative Law, Contempt Power, Quasi-Judicial Power)

Facts: Private respondent Domingo Cinco filed a verified complaint with the then NLRC charging
petitioner Arcadio Tolentino with violating the Constitution of the Batangas Labor Union (BLU) by
refusing, as its president, to call for the election of officers. NLRC issued an order directing the BLU to
hold its election of officers within 20 days from receipt. BLU filed a petition with the CFI for prohibition
with a writ of preliminary injunction against private respondent Cinco, NLRC and the Sec. Of Labor,
seeking to annul and to prohibit NLRC and the Sec. of Labor from enforcing it.

Setting instead the application for heaving, Judge Jaime delos Angeles afterwards reserved his resolution
on the matter at issue in view of the intricate legal questions raised therein. Private and judge then was
served a copy of a subpoena issued by respondent Inciong requiring them to appear at the NLRC to
explain why they should not be held in contempt for trying to use old society tactics to prevent a union
election duly ordered by the commission.

Issue: WON a labor official’s power to hold a person for contempt for refusal to comply with its order
can be extended to trial court judges.

Held: No. Courts exist precisely to assure that there be compliance with the law, which is the essence of
judicial power. Courts like any other governmental agencies, must observe the limits of its jurisdiction,
thus said judge reserved his resolution in view of the intricacies of the legal questions raised after
hearing the arguments on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.
The proper step for an administrative official then is to seek a dismissal of the case before the court
precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall within the domain of the powers conferred on it.
Citing the judge for contempt is an affront to reason as well as a disregard of well-settled rules.
HARVEY VS DEFENSOR - SANTIAGO (1988)
26 Nov 2017

[162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 June 1988] Constitutional Law| Bill of Rights|
Deportation|

FACTS:
American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and John Sherman 72, Dutch Citizen Adrian Van Den
Elshout, 58, and 19 other foreigners residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna were apprehended at their
residences. The ―Operation Report of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation (CID)
read that Harvey, Sherman and Van Den Elshout, et. al. were suspected pedophiles.

Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two
naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the ―after Mission Report read that two
children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and living with him.
Seized during their apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child
prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other
literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.
The petitioners were apprehended after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID.

Deportation proceedings were then instituted against and warrants of arrest were issued for
violation of the Immigration Act.

ISSUE:
Whether deportation proceedings and warrants of arrest issued are valid.

HELD:
Yes. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close
surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of
articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore
the articles are admissible evidences.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported
upon warrant after a determination of the existence of a ground for deportation against them.

The state has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may
deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of
State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against
undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and the domestic tranquility of the people. Particularly so in this case where the State has
expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.
SALAZAR vs. ACHACOSO AND MARQUEZ
DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE
MARQUEZ, respondents.
FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue
warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting
illegal recruitment.
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against
petitioner. Having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a
recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued
his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order.
There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before
entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain
Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs.
Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with
Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she
was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve
talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more
waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly
receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of
the confiscated properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that
since the house the POEA raided was a private residence, it was robbery.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the
acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition
too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public
interest involved.
ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the
Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under
Article 38 of the Labor Code?
HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search
and arrest. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue
search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial
process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code,
unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia
argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant.
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized,
otherwise, it is null and void
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no
other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens,
whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested,
following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
 THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SEGUNDO BARIAS, Defendant-Appellant.
G.R. No. 7567. November 12, 1912.
Facts:
In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized the Collector of
Customs to regulate the business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business
involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or cascos (small
ships/boats). The said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate
such rules to implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136 provides that in
case a fine is to be imposed, it should not exceed one hundred dollars.
Pursuant to this, the Collector promulgated Circular No. 397.
Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River using a
lighter which is manually powered by bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a
violation of Circular No. 397 because under said Circular, only steam powered
ships should be allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in the
information against Barrias, it was alleged that the imposable penalty against
him should be a fine not exceeding P500.00 at the discretion of the court –
this was pursuant to Circular No. 397 which provides:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons
offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500,
in the discretion of the court.
Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is
entirely different from the penal provision of Act. No. 1136 which only provided
a penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that time the peso-dollar
exchange was more or less equal).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penal provision in the Circular is valid.
HELD:
No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different range of penalty different
from that specified by Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so, then in
effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to legislate penalties. One of
the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to anybody
or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority,
there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be
made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can not
relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the
power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and
patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the people have
seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of
legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. The Collector
cannot exercise a power exclusively lodged in Congress. Hence, Barrias
should be penalized in accordance to the penalty being imposed by Act No.
1136. In this case, the Supreme Court determined that the proper fine is
$25.00.