Here are select March 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines

on criminal law and procedure:

1. REVISED PENAL CODE

Estafa; elements. The offense of estafa committed with abuse of confidence

has the following elements under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended: (a) that money, goods or other personal property
is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (c)
that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d)there is demand by the offended party to the offender. Esla
Macandog Magtira v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170964, March 7,
2012.

Estafa; elements. The Supreme Court ruled that all the above elements [of
estafa] are present in this case, having been established by the
prosecution’s evidence and by the petitioner’s own admissions. The first
element was established by the evidence showing that the petitioner
received various sums of money from the private complainants to be held in
trust for them under the Paluwagan operation. The petitioner admitted that
she was under obligation, at a fixed date, to account for and to deliver the
Paluwagan funds to the private complainants in the sequential order agreed
upon among them. The second element was established by the evidence
that the petitioner failed to account for and to deliver the Paluwagan funds
to the private complainants on the agreed time of delivery. The third and
fourth elements of the offense were proven by evidence showing that the
petitioner failed to account for and to deliver the Paluwagan funds to the
private complainants despite several demands made upon her by the private
complainants. Each of the private complainants testified as to how they were
prejudiced when they failed to receive their allotted Paluwagan funds. Given
the totality of evidence, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the
petitioner of the crime charged. Esla Macandog Magtira v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 170964, March 7, 2012.

APPLICABLE LAWS
5.1. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on deceit/swindling (estfa)
provides any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned therein shall be punished by the penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of
the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years; provided that the fraud be committed by any of the following
means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
X x x.
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
X x x.
(a) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee,
without prejudice to the action for calumny which the offended
party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case,
the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty.
(b) By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of check.
The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has
been dishonored for lack of insufficiency of funds shall be prima
facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
(As amended by Republic Act No. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)
5.2. Article 316 (other forms of swindling) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not
more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon “any person
who, to the prejudice of another, shall execute any fictitious
contract.”

5.3. Article 318 (other deceits) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the
damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed
upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by “any other
deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.”

5.4. Further, B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) provides:

5.4.1. Any person who makes or draws and issues any

check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment
of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year
or by fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

5.4.2. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any

person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check,
 shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to
cover the full amount of the check if presented within a
period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank.

5.4.3. Where the check is drawn by a corporation,

company or entity, the person or persons who actually
signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable
under this Act.

5.4.4. The making, drawing and issuance of a check

payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the
check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

5.4.5. It shall be the duty of the drawee of any check,

when refusing to pay the same to the holder thereof upon
presentment, to cause to be written, printed or stamped in
plain language thereon, or attached thereto, the reason for
drawee's dishonor or refusal to pay the same: Provided,
That where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with
such drawee bank, such fact shall always be

explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. In all

prosecutions under this Act, the introduction in evidence of
any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's
refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached
thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be
prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said
check, and the due presentment to the drawee for
payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was
properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or
attached by the drawee on such dishonored check.

5.4.6. Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop

payment, the drawee shall state in the notice that there
were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the
payment in full of such check, if such be the fact."

5.5. BP Blg. 22 enumerates the elements of the crime to be

(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the

time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason
 had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.

There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on

the part of the maker, drawer or issuer of insufficiency of funds
in or credit with the drawee bank of the check issued if the
dishonored check is presented within 90 days from the date of
the check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to
make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose.

5.5.1. The statute has created the prima facie

presumption evidently because "knowledge" which involves
a state of mind would be difficult to establish. The
presumption does not hold, however, when the maker,
drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder thereof the
amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in
full by the drawee bank of such check within 5 banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee bank. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly
provides that this presumption arises not from the mere
fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum check; there
must also be a showing that, within five banking days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor, such maker or drawer
failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due
thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in full by
the drawee of such check.

Estafa; elements. The first element of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b), requires that the money,
goods, or other personal property must be received by the offender in trust or on commission, or
for administration or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return it. The second element requires that there be misappropriation or conversion or such
money or property by the offender.

The second element is the very essence of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b). The words “convert”
and “misappropriated” connote an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were
one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To
misappropriate for one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but
also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without a right. Here, the goods received
by petitioner were not held in trust, neither were they intended for sale. Petitioner did not
likewise have any duty to return them as the goods were only intended for use in the fabrication
of steel communication towers. Neither was there any misappropriation as petitioner’s liability
for the amount of the goods arises and becomes due only upon receipt of the proceeds of the sale,
and not prior to the receipt of the full price of the goods. Anthony L. Ng vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 173905, April 23, 2010

Estafa; elements. The elements of estafa in general are: (a) that an accused defrauded another by
abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit; and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused the offended party or third person. Rosita Sy vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 183879, April 14, 2010

Estafa by deceit; elements. The elements of estafa by means of deceit are: (a) that there must be
a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent
representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means
and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended
party suffered damage. Rosita Sy vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183879, April 14, 2010
 Estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts; elements. The act complained of in the instant case is
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, wherein estafa is committed by any
person who shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. It is committed by using fictitious name, or by
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits. Rosita Sy vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 183879, April 14, 2010

Estafa; illegal recruitment. Illegal recruitment and estafa cases may be filed simultaneously or
separately. The filing of charges for illegal recruitment does not bar the filing of estafa, and
vice versa. The acquittal of the accused in the illegal recruitment case does not prove that she is
not guilty of estafa. Illegal recruitment and estafa are entirely different offenses and neither one
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. A person who is convicted of illegal
recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. In the same manner, a person acquitted of illegal recruitment may be held
liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set in because illegal recruitment
is malum prohibitum, in which there is no necessity to prove criminal intent, whereas estafa
is malum in se, in the prosecution of which, proof of criminal intent is necessary. Rosita Sy vs.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183879, April 14, 2010

Estafa; ways of commission. Swindling or estafa is punishable under Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code. The three ways of committing are: (1) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence;
(2) by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent means. The three
ways of committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e., (1) by means of abuse of confidence; or
(2) by means of deceit. Rosita Sy vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183879, April 14, 2010

LATEST APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE: ESTAFA

5.6. In PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGINIA BABY P.

MONTANER, G.R. No. 184053, August 31, 2011, the accused was
convicted for the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph
2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information alleged that on
or about May 17, 1996 in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused Virginia (Baby) P.
Montaner did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one
Reynaldo Solis in the following manner: said accused by means of false
pretenses and fraudulent acts that her checks are fully funded draw, make
and issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis ten (10) Prudential Bank Checks, all
having a total value of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and all
aforesaid checks were postdated June 17, 1996 in exchange for cash
knowing fully well that she has no funds in the drawee bank and when the
said checks were presented for payment the same were dishonored by the
drawee bank on reason of “ACCOUNT CLOSED” and despite demand accused
failed and refused to pay the value thereof to the damage and prejudice of
Reynaldo Solis in the aforementioned total amount of P50,000.00.

To exculpate herself from criminal liability, accused Virginia Baby P.

Montaner denied the allegations that she issued ten (10) checks in private
complainant’s favor claiming that the ten (10) checks were borrowed from
her by one Marlyn Galope because the latter needed money. She gave the
ten checks to Galope, signed the same albeit the space for the date, amount
and payee were left blank so that the checks cannot be used for any
negotiation. She further told Galope that the checks were not funded. When
she learned that a case was filed against her for estafa, she confronted
Marlyn Galope and the latter told her that money will not be given to her if
she will not issue the said checks. She has no knowledge of the notice of
dishonor sent to her by private complainant and claimed that her husband,
who supposedly received the notice of dishonor left for abroad in July 1996
and returned only after a year, that is, in 1997.

In a Decision dated April 8, 2003, the trial court convicted appellant for the
crime of estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced her to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
minimum to twenty-two (22) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum and
to indemnify complainant Reynaldo Solis in the amount of P50,000.00.

Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the adverse ruling
was merely affirmed by the appellate court in its Decision dated February
12, 2008.

Hence, appellant interposed an appeal before the Supreme Court and put
forth a single assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED–APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315, PAR. 2 (D) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.

Appellant maintains that she entrusted the subject checks, purportedly

signed in blank, to Marilyn Galope (Galope) out of pity in order for the latter
to secure a loan. Thus, there is purportedly no certainty beyond reasonable
doubt that she issued the checks purposely to defraud Reynaldo Solis (Solis)
into lending her money. She further claims that no transaction had ever
transpired between her and Solis. Admitting that she may have been
imprudent, she nonetheless insists that her simple imprudence does not
translate to criminal liability.

The Supreme Court was not persuaded.

The Court cited Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts

executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

xxxx

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an

obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The
failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover
his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or
the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting
false pretense or fraudulent act.

According to the Court, the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d),

Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of
a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was
issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage
to the payee.[1]
 In the said case, the prosecution sufficiently established appellant’s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code. According to Solis’s clear and categorical
testimony, appellant issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks,
each in the amount of P5,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00, in his house in
exchange for their cash equivalent.

From the circumstances, the Court held that it was evident that Solis
would not have given P50,000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for her
issuance of the 10 Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were
undoubtedly issued by appellant to induce Solis to part with his cash.
However, when Solis attempted to encash them, they were all dishonored by
the bank because the account was already closed.

Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October 13, 1996 which
was received by appellant’s husband to inform appellant that her postdated
checks had bounced and that she must settle her obligation or else face legal
action from Solis. Appellant did not comply with the demand nor did she
deposit the amount necessary to cover the checks within three days from
receipt of notice. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is
an element of the crime of estafa, constituting false pretense or fraudulent
act as stated in the second sentence of paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code.

As for appellant’s claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the

blank but signed checks imprudently, without knowing that Galope would
give them as a guarantee for a loan, the Court viewed such statements with
the same incredulity as the lower courts.

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a

credible witness, but it must be credible in itself – such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. The Court has no test of the truth of human testimony,
except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside
judicial cognizance.[2]

Appellant wished to impress upon the Court that she voluntarily parted
with her blank but signed checks not knowing or even having any hint of
suspicion that the same may be used to defraud anyone who may rely on
them. Verily, appellant’s assertion defies ordinary common sense and
human experience, the Court stated.

Moreover, the Court added, it is elementary that denial, if

unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-
serving evidence which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[3] It agreed with the
lower courts that appellant’s bare denial cannot be accorded credence for
lack of evidentiary support. As aptly noted by the trial court, appellant’s
failure to produce Galope as a witness to corroborate her story is fatal to her
cause. In all, the Court of Appeals committed no error in upholding the
conviction of appellant for estafa. Hence, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the
two decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court.