Pe “Guat he) 4" $ ve . . ot } ; The Cambridge Handbook of : Thinking and Reasoning . bee ea / Et Edited by : : Keith J. Holyoak ays and Robert G. Morrison « 153.4. CAM ‘ia we . ‘ AMBRIDGE=~———-~- Gamer i oe | Ao Bil . | PrecisTON Dye CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY Px Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Singapore, Sio Paulo, Deihi. Tokyo, Mexico City b Cambridge University Press : \mericas, New York, 8¥°10013-247}4 0A 32 Avenue of the wirweambrilge.org Information on this tite: www.eambride is! orglo7Sosznsatoxs, © Cainbridge University Press 2005 oe ha pT ‘This publication isin eopyrighe. Subject to statutory: eSceprion and to the pesisions of relevane collective licensing agreements, no seprodstion of any part may take place withoi the wriceen : permission of Cambridge UniversisyPeéss! “fe A ge DP Dgye'e Se vel First published 2005" Reprinted 2007, 2009 (ewiee}, 2511 A catalog record for this publication is available from the Britesh Library. Libra af Congress Cataloging in Publicition Dara The Cambridge handhook of thinking andl f€as and Robert G. Morrison. po em, : Jncludes bibliographical references. 1SbN 0-5 21-82417-6 [hardoover) ~ ISBN o-521253 101-2 (pbk.) 4 +. Thought and thinking. 1ys0~ Ib Morrison, Robert Ga, Jt, 1966 IIL. Tile BP 44r. 2005 usa 004016029 978-0-521-82417% Hardback pn 978-0;521-53201-6 Paperbacks Cambridge University Press has no'cesponsibiliry for the persistence or: part litetner Web sites referee! to inthis publication and doesnot guaea sites is, oF will feria, agoyrate oF appeopeiag iu edited by Keith’ J. Holyoak Reasoning (Psychology) iL Holyoak, Keith James, avy of URLS for external or third- ee that any content on sich WebCHAPTER 7 y Thinking and Reasoning: ’ A Reader’s Guide Keith J. Holyoak’ one) Robert G. Morrison “Cogito, efgo sum," the French philosopher René Descartes famously declared, “I think, therefore | am.” Every normal human adult shares a sense that the ability to think, to rea son, is a part of their fundamental identity. A person may be struck blind or deaf, yet we still recognize his or her core cognitive capacities as intact. Even loss of language, the gift often claimed as the sine quar non of homo sapiens, does not take away a per= son’s essential humanness. Unlike language ability, which is essentially unique to our species, the rudimentary ability to think and reason is apparent in nonhuman primates (see Call & Tomasello, Chap. 25); and yet it is thinking, not language,'that lies closest to the core of our individual identity. A person who loses language but can still make intel- ligent decisions, as demonstrated by actions, is viewed as mentally intact. In contrast, the kinds of brain damage that rob an individ- ual of the capacity to think and reason are considered the harshest blows that can be struck against a sense of personhood. Cogito, ergo sum. What Is Thinking? We can start to answer this question by look- ing at the various .ways the word “think- ing” is uséd in everyday language. ‘I think that water is necessary for life” and “George thinks the Pope is a communist” both ex- press beliefé-(of varying degrees of appar- cent plausibility), that is, explicit-claims of what someone takes to be a truth about the world, “Anne is sure to think of a solution” carties us into the realm of problem solv- ing, the mental construction of an action plan to achieve a goal. The complaint "Why didn’t you think before you went ahead with your half-baked scheme?” emphasizes that thinking can be a kind of foresight, a way of “seeing” the possible future.’ "What do you think about it?” calls for a judgment, an assessment of the desirability of an op- tion. Then there's “Albert is lost in thought,” where thinking becomes some sort of mental meadow through which a person might me- ander on 4 rainy afternoon, oblivious to the world outside.