Republic of the Philippines directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation.
The involuntary guests were
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which
this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be
met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents
no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of
popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the
courts, as an independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary
question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a
government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might
prove profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate
vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted
for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25,
1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police.
Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with
the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some
government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with
the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the
police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor
of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170
inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their
arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently
were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao.
They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither
received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a
detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers
sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed
and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by
Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear
as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who
had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and
the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not
essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the
women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others
went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared,
and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were
putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of
the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme
Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to
include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same
questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including them. The
application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the
women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown
parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for
the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration
and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners
were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First
Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not
have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did
not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached
to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good
salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal
admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been
sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of
November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann,
chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao,
and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacenderoof Davao, to bring before the court the persons
therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own
expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk
of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order,
December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were
produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had
been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the police
and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the
facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the
original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial
governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the
Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain
affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not
wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to
fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his
control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had
married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did
not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him
to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918,
promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with
the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and
therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by
respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the
women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of
Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should
demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further
stated that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later
be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of
certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken
before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court
of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the
respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the
city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the
respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the
facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas
corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives
and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that
eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could
return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that
fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to
find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal
were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila,
Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau
of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city
fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents'
memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ
of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women
were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any
opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board
steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that
the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere
fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and
that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy
acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of
what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress
these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We
turn to the statutes and we find —
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of
congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a
hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of
the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment
by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes
the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy,
to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment
to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law!
Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place
a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But
one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of
the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the
Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society
are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional
guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer
who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change
his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so
important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American
constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence
and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction.
Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United
States, who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has
no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the
executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor
and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of
motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of
police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If
these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can do the
same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as
much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no
law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same
club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be
taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn
him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man,
we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111,
1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law.
The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish
official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of
government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only
the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations
which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882],
106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in
another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or
any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to
be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery
itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in
issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning
that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or
a government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of
the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup
money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but
it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now
before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands
provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more
than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of
the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three
hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty
pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a
general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to
change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of
not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers
find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will
institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the
same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the
persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To
quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to — "It would be
a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be
restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime,
and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished
therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15
Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left
untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at
liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three
specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a
defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction,
and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It
was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city
of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women
from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were
relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city
officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was
consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous
regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ
of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is
unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor.
(Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First
Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general
rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions
for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance.
But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall
be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the
discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this
instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or
that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the
other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original
respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved
parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still
be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to
accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the
appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to
grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ
was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no
restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor
and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable
position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of
the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who
handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived
these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned.
Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from
exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty
which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and
released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private
citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called
upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person
was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other
municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to
undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party
to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the
application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the
chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city
of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile
and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be
easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for
decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities
fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however
very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as
to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a
person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under
guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State.
The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was
composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On
the question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred
Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most
distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J.,
held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a
large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter
appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent
passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the
present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries
and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood
shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare
in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that
 he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities
by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be
discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty,
which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If
it is so, it is important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may
apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being
brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case
of imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a
misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in
England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce
this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to
compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this
writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his
jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person
who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the
court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The
whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the
means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and
imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other
means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The
place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is
within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to
release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the
confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may
affect it. The important question is, where the power of control exercised? And I
am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts.
(Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac.
Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had
been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the
Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing
the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain
date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the
issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his
custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in
contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22.
That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge
in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the
writ, together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command
to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful
reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be
shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the
child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce
the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is
bound to produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for
not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in
argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the
purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a
contempt. But the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the
writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it
was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The
Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the
Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The
Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was
directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three
colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated
on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as
he believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the
writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody.
The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he
suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be
evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis
being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to
the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise
discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released
upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and
been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the
term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See
also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by
the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of
the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did
not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco
Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on
December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus
given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record
discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before
sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao
women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so
because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of
the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open:
(1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of
the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity
those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have
presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right
to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of
the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of
performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by
those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women
were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by
the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable
number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is
demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either
returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the
respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted
summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to
jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were
far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all
tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example,
in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court,
said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he
must take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get
the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he
must advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do
everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court would only accept
clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did
not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents.
That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to
see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and
the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to
demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become
more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao,
placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up
the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While
charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and
while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our
mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding
to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy
incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive
an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it
can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with
it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose
Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila,
Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of
Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and
not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent
power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter
or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not
do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge
the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined.
An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas
corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex
parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human
imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of
the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority.
Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their
chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely,
it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to
have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic
communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than
to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent
of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the
memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable
position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the
official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the
police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the
constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later,
as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the
unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His
intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His
regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly
acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof
to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each,
which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a
contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be
possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second
order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the
court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the
correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court
tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his
later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at
once command such respect without being unduly oppressive — such an amount is
P100.
In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is
necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are
found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court
and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of
one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the
record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted.
Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the
hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government
of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.
Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.
Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The undersigned does not entirely agree to the opinion of the majority in the decision of
the habeas corpusproceeding against Justo Lukban, the mayor of this city.
There is nothing in the record that shows the motive which impelled Mayor Lukban to
oblige a great number of women of various ages, inmates of the houses of prostitution
situated in Gardenia Street, district of Sampaloc, to change their residence.
We know no express law, regulation, or ordinance which clearly prohibits the opening of
public houses of prostitution, as those in the said Gardenia Street, Sampaloc. For this
reason, when more than one hundred and fifty women were assembled and placed
aboard a steamer and transported to Davao, considering that the existence of the said
houses of prostitution has been tolerated for so long a time, it is undeniable that the
mayor of the city, in proceeding in the manner shown, acted without authority of any legal
provision which constitutes an exception to the laws guaranteeing the liberty and the
individual rights of the residents of the city of Manila.
We do not believe in the pomp and obstentation of force displayed by the police in
complying with the order of the mayor of the city; neither do we believe in the necessity
of taking them to the distant district of Davao. The said governmental authority, in
carrying out his intention to suppress the segregated district or the community formed by
those women in Gardenia Street, could have obliged the said women to return to their
former residences in this city or in the provinces, without the necessity of transporting
them to Mindanao; hence the said official is obliged to bring back the women who are still
in Davao so that they may return to the places in which they lived prior to their becoming
inmates of certain houses in Gardenia Street.
As regards the manner whereby the mayor complied with the orders of this court, we do
not find any apparent disobedience and marked absence of respect in the steps taken by
the mayor of the city and his subordinates, if we take into account the difficulties
encountered in bringing the said women who were free at Davao and presenting them
before this court within the time fixed, inasmuch as it does not appear that the said
women were living together in a given place. It was not because they were really
detained, but because on the first days there were no houses in which they could live
with a relative independent from one another, and as a proof that they were free a
number of them returned to Manila and the others succeeded in living separate from their
companions who continued living together.
To determine whether or not the mayor acted with a good purpose and legal object and
whether he has acted in good or bad faith in proceeding to dissolve the said community
of prostitutes and to oblige them to change their domicile, it is necessary to consider not
only the rights and interests of the said women and especially of the patrons who have
been directing and conducting such a reproachable enterprise and shameful business in
one of the suburbs of this city, but also the rights and interests of the very numerous
people of Manila where relatively a few transients accidentally and for some days reside,
the inhabitants thereof being more than three hundred thousand (300,000) who can not,
with indifference and without repugnance, live in the same place with so many
unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution.
If the material and moral interests of the community as well as the demands of social
morality are to be taken into account, it is not possible to sustain that it is legal and
permissible to establish a house of pandering or prostitution in the midst of an
enlightened population, for, although there were no positive laws prohibiting the
existence of such houses within a district of Manila, the dictates of common sense and
dictates of conscience of its inhabitants are sufficient to warrant the public administration,
acting correctly, in exercising the inevitable duty of ordering the closing and
abandonment of a house of prostitution ostensibly open to the public, and of obliging the
inmates thereof to leave it, although such a house is inhabited by its true owner who
invokes in his behalf the protection of the constitutional law guaranteeing his liberty, his
individual rights, and his right to property.
A cholera patient, a leper, or any other person affected by a known contagious disease
cannot invoke in his favor the constitutional law which guarantees his liberty and
individual rights, should the administrative authority order his hospitalization, reclusion, or
concentration in a certain island or distant point in order to free from contagious the great
majority of the inhabitants of the country who fortunately do not have such diseases. The
same reasons exist or stand good with respect to the unfortunate women dedicated to
prostitution, and such reasons become stronger because the first persons named have
contracted their diseases without their knowledge and even against their will, whereas
the unfortunate prostitutes voluntarily adopted such manner of living and spontaneously
accepted all its consequences, knowing positively that their constant intercourse with
men of all classes, notwithstanding the cleanliness and precaution which they are wont
to adopt, gives way to the spread or multiplication of the disease known as syphilis, a
venereal disease, which, although it constitutes a secret disease among men and
women, is still prejudicial to the human species in the same degree, scope, and
seriousness as cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, pest, typhoid, and other contagious
diseases which produce great mortality and very serious prejudice to poor humanity.
If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or works suitable to her sex,
which can give her sufficient remuneration for her subsistence, prefers to put herself
under the will of another woman who is usually older than she is and who is the manager
or owner of a house of prostitution, or spontaneously dedicates herself to this shameful
profession, it is undeniable that she voluntarily and with her own knowledge renounces
her liberty and individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, because it is evident that
she can not join the society of decent women nor can she expect to get the same respect
that is due to the latter, nor is it possible for her to live within the community or society
with the same liberty and rights enjoyed by every citizen. Considering her dishonorable
conduct and life, she should therefore be comprised within that class which is always
subject to the police and sanitary regulations conducive to the maintenance of public
decency and morality and to the conservation of public health, and for this reason it
should not permitted that the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution evade the just
orders and resolutions adopted by the administrative authorities.
It is regrettable that unnecessary rigor was employed against the said poor women, but
those who have been worrying so much about the prejudice resulting from a
governmental measure, which being a very drastic remedy may be considered arbitrary,
have failed to consider with due reflection the interests of the inhabitants of this city in
general and particularly the duties and responsibilities weighing upon the authorities
which administer and govern it; they have forgotten that many of those who criticize and
censure the mayor are fathers of families and are in duty bound to take care of their
children.
For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that when the petitioners, because of
the abnormal life they assumed, were obliged to change their residence not by a private
citizen but by the mayor of the city who is directly responsible for the conservation of
public health and social morality, the latter could take the step he had taken, availing
himself of the services of the police in good faith and only with the purpose of protecting
the immense majority of the population from the social evils and diseases which the
houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street have been producing, which houses
have been constituting for years a true center for the propagation of general diseases
and other evils derived therefrom. Hence, in ordering the dissolution and abandonment
of the said houses of prostitution and the change of the domicile of the inmates thereof,
the mayor did not in bad faith violate the constitutional laws which guarantees the liberty
and the individual rights of every Filipino, inasmuch as the women petitioners do not
absolutely enjoy the said liberty and rights, the exercise of which they have voluntarily
renounced in exchange for the free practice of their shameful profession.
In very highly advanced and civilized countries, there have been adopted by the
administrative authorities similar measures, more or less rigorous, respecting prostitutes,
considering them prejudicial to the people, although it is true that in the execution of such
measures more humane and less drastic procedures, fortiter in re et suaviter in forma,
have been adopted, but such procedures have always had in view the ultimate object of
the Government for the sake of the community, that is, putting an end to the living
together in a certain place of women dedicated to prostitution and changing their
domicile, with the problematical hope that they adopt another manner of living which is
better and more useful to themselves and to society.
In view of the foregoing remarks, we should hold, as we hereby hold, that Mayor Justo
Lukban is obliged to take back and restore the said women who are at present found in
Davao, and who desire to return to their former respective residences, not in Gardenia
Street, Sampaloc District, with the exception of the prostitutes who should expressly
make known to the clerk of court their preference to reside in Davao, which manifestation
must be made under oath. This resolution must be transmitted to the mayor within the
shortest time possible for its due compliance. The costs shall be charged de officio.
ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:
I regret to dissent from the respectable opinion of the majority in the decision rendered in
these proceedings, with respect to the finding as to the importance of the contempt
committed, according to the same decision, by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
and the consequent imposition upon him of a nominal fine of P100.
In the said decision, it is said:
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann,
Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ
before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918.
The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply
with the writ. As far as the record disclosed, the mayor of the city of Manila
waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial
governor of Davao. According to the response of the Attorney for the Bureau of
Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired
to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having
contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties
in question being brought before the court on the day named.
In accordance with section 87 of General Orders No. 58, as said in the same decision,
the respondents, for the purpose of complying with the order of the court, could have, (1)
produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; (2) shown by
affidavits that on account of sickness or infirmity the said women could not safely be
brought before this court; and (3) presented affidavits to show that the parties in question
or their lawyers waived their right to be present. According to the same decision, the said
respondents ". . . did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was
granted; did not show impossibility of performance; and did not present writings, that
waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead, a few stereotyped affidavits
purporting to show that the women were contented with their life in Davao, some of
which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That
through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could
have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated by the fact that during this time they
were easily to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either
returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the
respondents."
The majority opinion also recognized that, "That court, at the time the return to its first
order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondent guilty
of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their
excuses for the non production of the persons were far from sufficient." To corroborate
this, the majority decision cites the case of the Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case
([1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283) and added "that the return did not show that every possible
effort to produce the women was made by the respondents."
When the said return by the respondents was made to this court in banc and the case
discussed, my opinion was that Mayor Lukban should have been immediately punished
for contempt. Nevertheless, a second order referred to in the decision was issued on
December 10, 1918, requiring the respondents to produce before the court, on January
13, 1919, the women who were not in Manila, unless they could show that it was
impossible to comply with the said order on the two grounds previously mentioned. With
respect to this second order, the same decision has the following to say:
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have
become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched
to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police
joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to
Manila was provided. While charges and countercharges in such a bitterly
contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record
might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude
that there is a substantial compliance with it.
I do not agree to this conclusion.
The respondent mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, let 17 days elapse from the
date of the issuance of the first order on November 4th till the 21st of the same month
before taking the first step for compliance with the mandate of the said order; he waited
till the 21st of November, as the decision says, before he sent a telegram to the
provincial governor o f Davao and naturally this half-hearted effort, as is so qualified in
the decision, resulted in that none of the women appeared before this court on
December 2nd. Thus, the said order was not complied with, and in addition to this
noncompliance there was the circumstances that seven of the said women having
returned to Manila at their own expense before the said second day of December and
being in the antechamber of the court room, which fact was known to Chief of Police
Hohmann, who was then present at the trial and to the attorney for the respondents,
were not produced before the court by the respondents nor did the latter show any effort
to present them, in spite of the fact that their attention was called to this particular by the
undersigned.
The result of the said second order was, as is said in the same decision, that the
respondents, on January 13th, the day fixed for the protection of the women before this
court, presented technically the seven (7) women above-mentioned who had returned to
the city at their own expense and the other eight (8) women whom the respondents
themselves brought to Manila, alleging moreover that their agents and subordinates
succeeded in bringing them from Davao with their consent; that in Davao they found
eighty-one (81) women who, when asked if they desired to return to Manila with free
transportation, renounced such a right, as is shown in the affidavits presented by the
respondents to this effect; that, through other means, fifty-nine (59) women have already
returned to Manila, but notwithstanding the efforts made to find them it was not possible
to locate the whereabouts of twenty-six (26) of them. Thus, in short, out of the one
hundred and eighty-one (181) women who, as has been previously said, have been
illegally detained by Mayor Lukban and Chief of Police Hohmann and transported to
Davao against their will, only eight (8) have been brought to Manila and presented before
this court by the respondents in compliance with the said two orders. Fifty-nine (59) of
them have returned to Manila through other means not furnished by the respondents,
twenty-six of whom were brought by the attorney for the petitioners, Mendoza, on his
return from Davao. The said attorney paid out of his own pocket the transportation of the
said twenty-six women. Adding to these numbers the other seven (7) women who
returned to this city at their own expense before January 13 we have a total of sixty-six
(66), which evidently proves, on the one hand, the falsity of the allegation by the
respondents in their first answer at the trial of December 2, 1918, giving as one of the
reasons for their inability to present any of the said women that the latter were content
with their life in Mindanao and did not desire to return to Manila; and, on the other hand,
that the respondents, especially the first named, that is Mayor Justo Lukban, who acted
as chief and principal in all that refers to the compliance with the orders issued by this
court, could bring before December 2nd, the date of the first hearing of the case, as well
as before January 13th, the date fixed for the compliance with the second order, if not
the seventy-four (74) women already indicated, at least a great number of them, or at
least sixty (60) of them, as is said in the majority decision, inasmuch as the said
respondent could count upon the aid of the Constabulary forces and the municipal police,
and had transportation facilities for the purpose. But the said respondent mayor brought
only eight (8) of the women before this court on January 13th. This fact can not, in my
judgment, with due respect to the majority opinion, justify the conclusion that the said
respondent has substantially complied with the second order of this court, but on the
other hand demonstrates that he had not complied with the mandate of this court in its
first and second orders; that neither of the said orders has been complied with by the
respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, who is, according to the majority
decision, principally responsible for the contempt, to which conclusion I agree. The
conduct of the said respondent with respect to the second order confirms the contempt
committed by non-compliance with the first order and constitutes a new contempt
because of non-compliance with the second, because of the production of only eight (8)
of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who have been illegally detained by
virtue of his order and transported to Davao against their will, committing the twenty-six
(26) women who could not be found in Davao, demonstrates in my opinion that,
notwithstanding the nature of the case which deals with the remedy of habeas corpus,
presented by the petitioners and involving the question whether they should or not be
granted their liberty, the respondent has not given due attention to the same nor has he
made any effort to comply with the second order. In other words, he has disobeyed the
said two orders; has despised the authority of this court; has failed to give the respect
due to justice; and lastly, he has created and placed obstacles to the administration of
justice in the said habeas corpus proceeding, thus preventing, because of his notorious
disobedience, the resolution of the said proceeding with the promptness which the nature
of the same required.
Contempt of court has been defined as a despising of the authority, justice, or
dignity of the court; and he is guilty of contempt whose conduct is such as tends
to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard. . .
." (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 488.)
It is a general principle that a disobedience of any valid order of the court
constitutes contempt, unless the defendant is unable to comply therewith. (Ruling
Case Law, vol. 6, p. 502.)
It is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the judgment of the court, or to
obstruct or attempt to obstruct the service of legal process. If a person hinders or
prevents the service of process by deceiving the officer or circumventing him by
any means, the result is the same as though he had obstructed by some direct
means. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 503.)
While it may seem somewhat incongruous to speak, as the courts often do, of
enforcing respect for the law and for the means it has provided in civilized
communities for establishing justice, since true respect never comes in that way,
it is apparent nevertheless that the power to enforce decorum in the courts and
obedience to their orders and just measures is so essentially a part of the life of
the courts that it would be difficult to conceive of their usefulness or efficiency as
existing without it. Therefore it may be said generally that where due respect for
the courts as ministers of the law is wanting, a necessity arises for the use of
compulsion, not, however, so much to excite individual respect as to compel
obedience or to remove an unlawful or unwarranted interference with the
administration of justice. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 487.)
The power to punish for contempt is as old as the law itself, and has been
exercised from the earliest times. In England it has been exerted when the
contempt consisted of scandalizing the sovereign or his ministers, the law-
making power, or the courts. In the American states the power to punish for
contempt, so far as the executive department and the ministers of state are
concerned, and in some degree so far as the legislative department is
concerned, is obsolete, but it has been almost universally preserved so far as
regards the judicial department. The power which the courts have of vindicating
 their own authority is a necessary incident to every court of justice, whether of fortifications of an orderly Government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
record or not; and the authority for issuing attachments in a proper case for encroachments.
contempts out of court, it has been declared, stands upon the same immemorial
usage as supports the whole fabric of the common law. . . . (Ruling Case Law,
vol. 6, p. 489.)

The undisputed importance of the orders of this court which have been disobeyed; the
loss of the prestige of the authority of the court which issued the said orders, which loss
might have been caused by noncompliance with the same orders on the part of the
respondent Justo Lukban; the damages which might have been suffered by some of the
women illegally detained, in view of the fact that they were not brought to Manila by the
respondents to be presented before the court and of the further fact that some of them
were obliged to come to this city at their own expense while still others were brought to
Manila by the attorney for the petitioners, who paid out of his own pocket the
transportation of the said women; and the delay which was necessarily incurred in the
resolution of the petition interposed by the said petitioners and which was due to the fact
that the said orders were not opportunately and duly obeyed and complied with, are
circumstances which should be taken into account in imposing upon the respondent
Justo Lukban the penalty corresponding to the contempt committed by him, a penalty
which, according to section 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should consist of a fine
not exceeding P1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding months, or both such fine and
imprisonment. In the imposition of the penalty, there should also be taken into
consideration the special circumstance that the contempt was committed by a public
authority, the mayor of the city of Manila, the first executive authority of the city, and
consequently, the person obliged to be the first in giving an example of obedience and
respect for the laws and the valid and just orders of the duly constituted authorities as
well as for the orders emanating from the courts of justice, and in giving help and aid to
the said courts in order that justice may be administered with promptness and rectitude.

I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there should be
imposed upon the respondent Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred pesos (P500), and all
the costs should be charged against him. Lastly, I believe it to be my duty to state here
that the records of this proceeding should be transmitted to the Attorney-General in order
that, after a study of the same and deduction from the testimony which he may deem
necessary, and the proper transmittal of the same to the fiscal of the city of Manila and to
the provincial fiscal of Davao, both the latter shall present the corresponding informations
for the prosecution and punishment of the crimes which have been committed on the
occasion when the illegal detention of the women was carried into effect by Mayor Justo
Lukban of the city of Manila and Chief of Police Anton Hohmann, and also of those
crimes committed by reason of the same detention and while the women were in Davao.
This will be one of the means whereby the just hope expressed in the majority decision
will be realized, that is, that in the Philippine Islands there should exist a government of
laws and not a government of men and that this decision may serve to bulwark the
 Republic of the Philippines "Experience is the oracle of truth."1
SUPREME COURT
Manila -James Madison

EN BANC
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.
GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER
ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN
M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity
as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and
HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
Before the Court are consolidated petitions 2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity
of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the system‘s conceptual
underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its
usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with
pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the
porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of
their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of
American legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their
districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel
obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a
legislator‘s district and constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel"
refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects
and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's
district.7Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control
of local appropriations.8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature, 9 although, as will be later
discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.

G.R. No. 209251 II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial
Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO
BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the
earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the
utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-
enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release,
Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works
projects13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives.
"The committee from each House may also authorize one of its members
 to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same
section provides that the said secretary, "with the approval of said joint
committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes
of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of
appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator
participation broadened from the areas of fund release and realignment
to the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the
public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of
choosing projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of
projects selected by Members of Congress, they ‘being the
representatives of the people, either on their own account or by
consultation with local officials or civil leaders.‘" 16 During this period, the
pork barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil
groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for
projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s
allocation, and the amount each legislator would eventually get is
determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then
integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of
Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the
House of Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it
was signed into law by the President – the Public Works Act.17 In the
1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the
stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate. 18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently
discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when "one
man controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By
1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local
Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local
Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the
practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began,
with each assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter,
assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to the
Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry
would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments,
which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers
in the assemblyman‘s locality. It has been further reported that
"Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover
not only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft
projects",21 or non-public works projects such as those which would fall
under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood. 22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of
Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the
form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas
Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of
₱480 Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of
development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has
been documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon
legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the
"Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the
1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local
infrastructure and other priority community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with
the approval of the President, to be released directly to the implementing
agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of projects
and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the
amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their
participation in the identification of projects, it has been reported 26 that by
1992, Representatives were receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each, without any limitation or
qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or
infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft
projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships. 27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release
of CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects
and activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the
first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-
President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million each
in CDF funds, Senators, ₱18 Million each, and the Vice-President, ₱20
Million.
 In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions
on project identification and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF
Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases
made from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-
President, in consultation with the implementing agency concerned, were
directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded
from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a)
the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in
the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations,
in the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the
remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The
same article also stated that the project list, which would be published by
the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds
appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list
herein required."
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the
required lists and endorsements were reproduced, except that the
publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself
sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel"
at that time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly
fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or
"CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political agenda. 37 It has
been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of
executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus
harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as
the finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as
the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions. 38 Examples of these CIs
are the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the
Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño
Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the School
Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be made upon prior consultation with
the representative of the legislative district concerned.” 40 Similarly, the
legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3)
separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the
"Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44and the "Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program Fund," 45 all of which contained a
special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of
Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund"
(PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with
the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were
directly released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly
stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any
expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no
amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel
benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view
of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely
contained a single special provision ordering the release of the funds
directly to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned,
without further qualifications. The following year, 2003, 50 the same single
provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express
authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of
the Department of Public Works and Highways 51 (DPWH) and the
DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on the
aspects of implementation delegation and project list submission,
respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund
priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the national
government and shall be released directly to the implementing agencies."
It also introduced the program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list
of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular
PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority.
The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the
same bases. In similar regard, the program menu concept was
consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect
to the specific amounts allocated for the individual legislators, as well as
their participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to
 be funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions
under the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget,
similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the
concerned Member of Congress61anent certain aspects of project
implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal
participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the
implementation of government projects were introduced. In the
Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for
school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For
such purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at least ₱250 Million of
the ₱500 Million allotted for the construction and completion of school
buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of
Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its
"Operation Barrio School" program, with capability and proven track
records in the construction of public school buildings x x x." 62 The same
allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs
under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government
Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007
dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the
implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the Government
Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated
procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68(the
implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum of agreement with
an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an
amount to be specifically contracted out to NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the
201170 PDAF Article included an express statement on lump-sum
amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President:
Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken down into ₱40
Million for "hard projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200
Million was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a
₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a
provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification
that it may be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the
Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development,
Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources,
Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the
further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing
unit and same project category as the original project, for infrastructure
projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original
scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence
of the legislator concerned.71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification
of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority
list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority
list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the
individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the
said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were
included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the
Vice-President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had
been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be
identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability
to implement the projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify
programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and
scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures
the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district,
endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of
PDAF funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as
requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed
by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee
on Finance, as the case may be.79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent
controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term‘s usage has
expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under
Section 880 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law,
Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen,
and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and
development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. 82 Due to
the energy-related activities of the government in the Malampaya natural gas
field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the
 special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya
Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12,
Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11,
1983. More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly
issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law.
As it stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special
funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff
through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and
projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR. 88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased
tremendously,89 owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly
used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support. 90 It was in 1996
when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former
Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous
source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government money that regularly went
into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks." 91 He said that "the
kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among legislators and
ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project,
which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and
construction of school buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo
identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days
later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted
pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about congressional
initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a
Congressman, sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the
PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for
lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form
of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
Congress," the petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the government has been defrauded
of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the
pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost
projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-
blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim
Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for
"ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade.
While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the
whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘ private
accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal
complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5)
lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct
Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs
-of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a
three-year audit investigation99covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to
2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose
of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and
the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP) 100 by the DBM, the
application of these funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate
implementing agencies and several government-owned-and-controlled
corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted to
₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%,
respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been
made nationwide during the audit period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings
contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects
(VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as follows: 103
● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of
legislators significantly exceeded their respective allocations.
● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of
sponsoring members of the Lower House.
● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount
appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these
having been turned over to the government.
 ● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without
the latter‘s endorsement and without considering their mandated
functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects.
● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the
implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the
proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any
appropriation law or ordinance.
● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred
seventy two (772) projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found
questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to
liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.
● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of
goods and services reportedly used in the projects were not compliant
with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900
Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy
NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan
(CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one
consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds. 105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the
Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount,
the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social
Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents
Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the
incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further
taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in
whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further
releases pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez,
Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr.
(Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition),
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of
the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in
their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents,
for them to immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they
pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the
public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and
VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity
and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of
the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013,
specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations
with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including,
but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566. 110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a
Petition dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be
declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President
Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing
such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority
projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with
the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the
Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the
National Economic Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed
as UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all
cases; (b) requiring public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c)
issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the
Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1)
the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2)
Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of
"financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government‖ under the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral
Arguments on October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated
Comment (Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the
alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and medical assistance
purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions
be dismissed for lack of merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners
to reply to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the
Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September
27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated
September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply
dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be
observed by the parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of
the technicality of the issues material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General
Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral
Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able to
competently and completely answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting
process and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was appointed as amicus
curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7)
days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the
main issues for the Court‘s resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of
policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the
Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and
113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez" 114 (Philconsa) and
Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly
and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management" 115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of
the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res
judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative
power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local
autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance
the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition,
the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the
Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, 117 namely:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most
important119and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.120 This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x
x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. 121 In
other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." 122 Related to the requirement of
an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the
questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture,
and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself
as a result of the challenged action." 123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon
constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the
questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged
funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the
PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of
these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had
been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case
becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. 125 Differing from this
description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme
would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution
since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article
which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will
the President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues
on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the
annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage
of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive
on this point is the following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio
(Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law, 127 correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General
Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for
example of the PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the
outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the
release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that …
(interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he
has the power to stop the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38
of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the
President can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional,
can he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific
case of the PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and
this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the
report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty ….
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are
anomalies, you stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that
mean that PDAF has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress
passes a law to repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases
supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the
moot and academic‘ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there
is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners
– they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the
principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and
balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests
involved
– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds
have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of
exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present
petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never before
been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts
of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that reforms are
needed "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF" 130 demonstrates a prima facie
pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this
finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or
hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the
CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos
Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of
irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government
funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the
government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit
power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance
system inherent in our form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of
the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws
they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only
respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x
x x. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be
sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need
for a definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral
Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances
will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In
this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed
out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts. 132 Accordingly, there is
a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein
in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution
of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may
be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional
principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the
preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair
of annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease
with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel
System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a
semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a
different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the government had already
backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition
but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re-
emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of
issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at
this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial
review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries
the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches
of government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political
question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, 139applies when
there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light,
respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to
perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands
of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this
stage."140
The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal
questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." 141 The intrinsic
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom
of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself
has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along
constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of
rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the
present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power
but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto, 142 the expanded concept of
judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine
was explained as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the
Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision,
however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the
Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments;
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution." 144 To a
great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal
branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully
perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these
cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other
branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm
constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great
branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a
holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court
cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing." 145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers
and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National
Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the
validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been
and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to
suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably,
taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, 147 as in
these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given
that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."148 The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments that the
present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown
of controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of
the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the
illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law
by the enforcement of an invalid statute. 150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus
standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere
(or simply, stare decisis which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what
has been settled") are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects
of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar,
the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in
Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on
the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a
subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 151 This required identity is not,
however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas
the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel
System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural
technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein
failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct
releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to
their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of
PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of the presumption of
constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to
review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the
foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases
are concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle,
entrenched under Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake
of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that
follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions
relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a
bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel
provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand
its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the Members of Congress
to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an
appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification
of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof,
the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution." 154 In deference to the
foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one, under the
Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to
Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project
or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad
as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by
Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the
Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem,
specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to
Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic
examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other,
formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of
post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including
not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund
release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses
herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason
against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with
inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to
stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s
fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of
projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of
appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the
contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of
appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby
lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such
authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the
prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA
has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force
of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring
Opinion in the same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it
be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as
it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress
in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court
now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the
CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it
validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the
guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious
constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such
mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the
recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155(Abakada) has effectively
overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the
separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada
rule will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural
technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current
application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not
apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first
define the terms "Pork Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential
Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the
Legislative and Executive branches of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds
in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its distribution as
political largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel
System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process to an
individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the
funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in
the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are
intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help
the political careers of the disbursing official by yielding rich patronage benefits. 157 They
further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary
public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the
PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the
Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993.159
Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal
history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and
practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily
intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the
Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork
Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-
sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized
into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization
through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners
consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel
since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield
a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-
sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its
utilization. For reasons earlier stated, 161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to
refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive
issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara
v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of government,
through Congress,164belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of
government, through the President, 165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the
judicial branch of government, through the Court, 166 belongs the power to interpret laws.
Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this
respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within
its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere." 167 Thus, "the legislature has no
authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." 168 The
principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem
from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of
these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch
from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. 169 To achieve this
purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that
are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack
of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the
arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others. 170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one
branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court
decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2)
ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its
constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated
when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another." 172 In
other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a)
interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is
indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the
Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague 173 (Guingona, Jr.),
the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various operational
aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other
related activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle. 174 This is rooted in the
principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a
grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise,
the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go
into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any
other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its
members, should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as
earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr.,
the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the
budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own
judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process
established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the
Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and
passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from
there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur
the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with
details for implementation by the Executive." 176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the
Court held that "from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains
to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still
exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the
Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined
to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond
oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada: 178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation.1âwphi1 In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the
following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments
to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by
the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others,
the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political
branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it
should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed." 179 They state that the
findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute
and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers." 180 Further, they point out
that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that
individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually
dictate their implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been
violated since the President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the
GAA‖ and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators‘ proposals.182 They
maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of
members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and
identification are recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special
Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa framework, and hence,
remains constitutional."184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-
enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or
program menus187 – have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to
identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel
allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well
as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1
embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows
individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls
under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides
that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to
Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by
implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same
provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as
long as the representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile,
Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by
legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects
identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any
modification and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." From the
foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been
accorded post-enactment authority to identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-
enactment authority in the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, the statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund release
through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly
states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents
prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee
on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be"; while
their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first ,
paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any
realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and
the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special
Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior
and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social
Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from
one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to
among others (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification,
fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight
and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to
the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been,
in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the
various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the
separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in
Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition,
to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this
end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the
conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory
and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate
their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory
import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the statements of the Solicitor General
during the Oral Arguments – have admitted that the identification of the legislator
constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding
source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget
execution process:192
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can
the PDAF of the legislator be utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the
individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then
there is no identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was
implemented without the identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no
specific examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is
a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an
identification from the legislator.
xxxx
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were
replying to a question, "How can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF
Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense, Your Honor.
Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district
would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases
supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as
well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of
post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated
to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have
effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence,
accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and
have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially
disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice
Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of
Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this
research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the
question of constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process.
In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both
Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things
are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to
codify in one section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain
sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through
formal measures written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government
agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested
as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, 194 legislative power shall be
exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In
particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative
and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a
bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may
constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle
of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would
be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice,
are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; 196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted
exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency,197or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions
as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to
delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either
filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199The
conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case
of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the
principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative
powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the
public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers
post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of
non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That
the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand
what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the
setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal
lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would
go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these
two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in
Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to
perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to
legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013
PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the
similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and
distinct does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power
to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by
Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The President‘s
item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads
as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which
he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may
exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the Constitution. 204 As
stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill
to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required
publication."205
Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the
legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained that: 206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief
Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly
known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of
the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in
passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the
government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The
Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative
power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It
follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in
exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or
hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every
intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will
presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature.
(Emphases supplied)
The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals
such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature,
as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary process.208 In
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized
the President‘s item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to
guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body";
phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community
against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design." 209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists
a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of
appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of
the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the
Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as
follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into
an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the
President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific
appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters
of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item
characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular
amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This
treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific
appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the
same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund
and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a
specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are
rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be
validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that
each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such
component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly
pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by
accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE
(maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall
be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power.
Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the
constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular
correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that
Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations
bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds
actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds,
Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject
to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide
for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple
purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both
the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which
must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that
the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence,
without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the
President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire
appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the
entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may
not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues
considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the
actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the
foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the
implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation
of the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a
lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of
the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on." 212 Accordingly, they
submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills
adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a
process which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such,
lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations which are barely
foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create
some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As
these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed
and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which
subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described
system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion
PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or
may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the
detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects. 215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013
PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a
prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-
sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for
multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc.
This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes
of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the
CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and
information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said
Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount
per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency." 217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as
well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional.
That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for
future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires.
Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not
justify even commendable ends.218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel operate defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of
checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork
Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of
the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested
partners."219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF
excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs
the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate
the decisions of senators.‘"220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states
that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality
of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the
principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The
notion of a public trust connotes accountability, 221 hence, the various mechanisms in the
Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public
funds may be checked is the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in
Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny
based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted
in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power
of confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws
pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on
congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment
roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight
would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,
would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it
must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs
afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear
as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation
– a matter before another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking
undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority
and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate
himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use
thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election
purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-
case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity
between legislators and the Executive department, through the former‘s post-enactment
participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the
domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic
constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the
2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are
deemed as unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are
members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power,
in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution 225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-
executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said
provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action. 226 Therefore, since there
appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely
speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System
would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and
Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system
of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum,
allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating
to the organization and operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160, 227 otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more
specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this
end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units
shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government
units.
 xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental
and people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any
project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the
State to empower local government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-
sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy. As explained by the Court
in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the
policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and
encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant
communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics
from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will
enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them
with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic.
This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national government in
purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such
political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent
laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution. 229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against
the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives,
who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local
development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that
"it is also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President
and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of
their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project." 231 Drawing
strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating
that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel
complement and link the national development goals to the countryside and grassroots
as well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are
preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the
"abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the
Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which is to
enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned
cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the
system which actually belies the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In
particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is
based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division
limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a district
representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a
district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
"underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that
even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-
President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional
Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s
original intent which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had
become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them
on the sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and
PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs)
which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting
the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts
within its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose
functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, 235 their programs,
policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators,
who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a
body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority
conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise: 236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and
initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type
of personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall
development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure
planning and coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters
and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to
the substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now,
amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the
"primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the
National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation
law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy
Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental
thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a
valid appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely
incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of
the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose
that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states
that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or
determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public
purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very
definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to
a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the
legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe
any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an
appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as Congress
wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As
held in the case of Guingona, Jr.: 241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of
words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall
be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or
appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time
horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations)
as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present
Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific
terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a
general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special
application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the
questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention
clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing
Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave: 242
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the
designated purpose. The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a
particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the
setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of
words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested.
(Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the
appropriation must be the "primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid
appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or
determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular public purpose,
then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient
to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the
Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts
from service contracts and agreements such as application and processing fees,
signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected from
concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the
Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals,
production share on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration,
development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to
be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as
Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross
earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings
be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be
concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all
fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all
sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b)
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, "after
deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate
gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to finance
the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of
the President of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal
appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly
deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely
because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create
a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the
actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual
legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court
observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79
Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made
by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law.
Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made by law"
since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation
of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to
determine for what purpose the funds will be used." 243 Respondents, on the other hand,
urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus,
construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government." 244
The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public
purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain
adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the
Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the
law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2)
fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are
indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a
law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient
standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 247 To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative
policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented. 248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the
said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" under
the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned, 249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the
phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a
statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase "for such other
purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents,
namely energy development programs of the government; 250 and, third, the Executive
department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes
under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is
limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the
completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its
text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as
unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8,
insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains legally
effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the
aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used –
as it should be used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD
910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section
12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘
submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be
readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to
resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose
adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund
only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose,
however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure
project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of
"priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President without
any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of
"infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any
kind of facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the
underlying framework of a system, especially public services and facilities (such as
highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce
as well as economic and residential development." 253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional
since – similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are
severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
remains legally effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the
Court did so in the context of its pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners
equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the
CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of
their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the
project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"
(PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary
funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the
recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" 255 (Presidential Pork Use
Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a
petition for mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission:256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation
by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of
public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part
of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the
discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be
rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional
duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus
in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right
to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the
Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this
case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the
constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr. 257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified
that the right to information does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential
that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded
and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence,
without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for
information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted: 258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled
to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their
desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant
has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the
respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R.
No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344,
August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part
of respondent to prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of
mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or
the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report.
Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the
bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners
pray that said information be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the
CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before
the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any official document
relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes that the
information requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to ensure
that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the
equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘ prayer
on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the
CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to
be furnished with such schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the
general public, access to official documents which are already existing and of public
record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition,
access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court
denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by
petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the documents sought for by the
latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.: 259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by
the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the
manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may
be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may
be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be
insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta,
80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be
done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the
then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with
the Congress of all presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not
limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and
the PCSO or the Executive‘s Social Funds." 260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which
is generally left to the prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the
Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their prayer on this score.
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the
concept of released funds. In response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that
enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued
Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which
pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has
been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may
continually be implemented and disbursements thereto effected by the agencies
concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation
and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and,
second, that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned prior
to the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO
does not yet involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by
the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]." 261 As such, PDAF disbursements,
even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and
unobligated allotments." They explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated
by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are
already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they cannot be considered as ‘remaining
PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM. 262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September
10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential
effect of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the
promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among
others, is now permanently enjoined.
The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless,
be resolved as it has a practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In
particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by
obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed
following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason
that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal
contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific
authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount
during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the
release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to
separate approval or clearance by competent authority." 263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an
obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the
direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing
authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will
prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is
brought about by the issuance of the NCA, 264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a
SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the
Oral Arguments:265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies
to obligate or to enter into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal
to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO;
so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the
authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the
projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the
SAROs issued are withdrawn by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds
which have been "released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF
funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs
issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently
reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto
cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing
of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which
have been obligated but not released – meaning, those merely covered by a SARO –
under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential
Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether
declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted
to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding
special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the
unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other
Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of
PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in
effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in
an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such
act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be
properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 266 the doctrine merely "reflects
awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the
final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time
may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice
then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication." 267 "In
the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘" 268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles
of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To
recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-
oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has
violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators
the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they
are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly
violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a
system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has
flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the
President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of
congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an
aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system
has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who
are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of
capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again,
insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by
law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other
public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development
projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious
unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should
never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form, by any
semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a
system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the
people and its co-stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change
and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public
debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the
wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged
by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from
its course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and no other‘s.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional
violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past
and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF
Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators –
whether individually or collectively organized into committees – to intervene, assume or
participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as
but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project
identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of
congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various
Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators
from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d)
all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be
acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the
phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority SO ORDERED.
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power. Associate Justice

Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby WE CONCUR:
declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF
funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds See Concurring Opinion
sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Chief Justice
Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time See Concurring Opinion NO PART
this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby Associate Justice Associate Justice
ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not
be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general
fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall I concur and also join the concurring I join the Opinion of Justice Carpio,
remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared opinion of Justice Carpio. subject to my Concurring &
as unconstitutional. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE Dissenting Opinion.
CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court
hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the
Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the Associate Justice Associate Justice
availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘ access to
official documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds I join the concurring opinion of J. A.T.
must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Carpio of the ponencia
regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD
to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to Associate Justice
pursue through a separate petition.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of Associate Justice Associate Justice
these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to
the prerogative of the political branches of government.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within Associate Justice Associate Justice
the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government
officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular,
See Concurring Opinion
improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
System.
Associate Justice
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*Dropped as a party per Memorandum dated October 17, 2013 filed by counsel
for petitioners Atty. Alfredo B. Molo III, et al. Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 388.
** No part.
1 October 17, 2013). See also Llanes, Jonathan, "Pork barrel – Knowing the
The Federalist Papers, Federalist No. 20.
2 baguio/opinion/2013/09/05/llanes-pork- barrel-knowing-issue-301598> (visited
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 3-51; rollo (G.R. No. 208493), pp. 3-11; and rollo
(G.R. No. 209251), pp. 2-8.
3 Entitled "AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR PUBLIC WORKS,"
"’Pork barrel spending,‘ a term that traces its origins back to the era of slavery
before the U.S. Civil War, when slave owners occasionally would present a barrel
of salt pork as a gift to their slaves. In the modern usage, the term refers to
congressmen scrambling to set aside money for pet projects in their districts."
(Drudge, Michael W. "’Pork Barrel‘ Spending Emerging as Presidential Campaign
Issue," August 1, 2008
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2008/08/20080801181504lcnirell
ep 0.1261713.html#axzz2iQrI8mHM> [visited October 17, 2013].)
4 types of roads and bridges, artesian wells, wharves, piers and other shore
Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 2003 Edition, p. 786, citing Bernas, "From Pork
Barrel to Bronze Caskets," Today, January 30, 1994.
5
Heaser, Jason, "Pulled Pork: The Three Part Attack on Non-Statutory
Earmarks," Journal of Legislation, 35 J. Legis. 32 (2009).
<http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=&handle
=hein.journals/jleg35&div=6&id=&page=> (visited October 17, 2013).
6
Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C., House of Representatives of the
Philippines, "Understanding the ‘Pork Barrel,‘" p. 2.
<http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/14th/pork_barrel.pdf> (visited October
17, 2013).
7
Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork is a Political, Not A
Developmental, Tool." <http://pcij.org/stories/2004/pork.html> [visited October 22,
2013].) See also rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 328-329.
8
Morton, Jean, "What is a Pork Barrel?" Global Granary, Lifestyle Magazine and
Common Place Book Online: Something for Everyone, August 19, 2013.
<http://www.globalgranary.org/2013/08/19/what-is-a-pork-barrel/#.UnrnhFNavcw
> (visited October 17, 2013).
9
Jison, John Raymond, "What does the 'pork barrel' scam suggest about the
Philippine government?" International Association for Political Science Students,
September 10, 2013. <http://www.iapss.org/ index.php/articles/item/93-what-
does-the-pork-barrel-scam-suggest-about-the-philippine-government> (visited
issue," Sunstar Baguio, October 23, 2013. <http://www.sunstar.com.ph/
October 17, 2013).
10
approved on March 10, 1922.
11
"Act 3044, the first pork barrel appropriation, essentially divided public works
projects into two types. The first type—national and other buildings, roads and
bridges in provinces, and lighthouses, buoys and beacons, and necessary
mechanical equipment of lighthouses—fell directly under the jurisdiction of the
director of public works, for which his office received appropriations. The second
group—police barracks, normal school and other public buildings, and certain
protection works, and cable, telegraph, and telephone lines—is the forerunner of
the infamous pork barrel. Although the projects falling under the second type
were to be distributed at the discretion of the secretary of commerce and
communications, he needed prior approval from a joint committee elected by the
Senate and House of Representatives. The nod of either the joint committee or a
committee member it had authorized was also required before the commerce
and communications secretary could transfer unspent portions of one item to
another item." (Emphases supplied) (Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B.,
"Pork by any name," VERA Files, August 23, 2013. <http://verafiles.org/pork-by-
any-name/> [visited October 14, 2013]).
12
Sec. 3. The sums appropriated in paragraphs (c), (g), (l), and (s) of this Act
shall be available for immediate expenditure by the Director of Public Works, but
those appropriated in the other paragraphs shall be distributed in the discretion of
the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, subject to the approval of a
joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. The
committee from each House may authorize one of its members to approve the
distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, who with
the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof may,
for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of
appropriation. (Emphases supplied)
13
Those Section 1 (c), (g), (l), and (s) of Act 3044 "shall be available for
immediate expenditure by the Director of Public Works."
14
Section 3, Act 3044.
15
Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork by any name," VERA Files,
August 23, 2013. <http://verafiles.org/pork-by-any-name/> (visited October 14,
2013).
16
Id.
17
Id.
23
Ilagan, Karol, "Data A Day; CIA, CDF, PDAF? Pork is pork is pork,"
Moneypolitics, A Date Journalism Project for the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism, August 1, 2013 <http://moneypolitics.pcij.org/data-a-
day/cia-cdf-pdaf-pork-is-pork-is-pork/> (visited October 14, 2013).
24
Republic Act No. (RA) 6831.
25
Special Provision 1, Article XLIV, RA 7078 (1991 CDF Article), and Special
Provision 1, Article XLII (1992), RA 7180 (1992 CDF Article) are similarly worded
as follows: Special Provision 1.
Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein appropriated shall be
used for infrastructure and other priority projects and activities upon
approval by the President of the Philippines and shall be released directly
to the appropriate implementing agency [(x x x for 1991)], subject to the
submission of the required list of projects and activities. (Emphases
supplied)
26
Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork by any name," VERA Files,
August 23, 2013. <http://verafiles.org/pork-by-any-name/> (visited October 14,
2013).
27
Id.

18 28
Id. Special Provision 1, Article XXXVIII, RA 7645 (1993 CDF Article) provides:
19
Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C., House of Representatives of the Special Provision
Philippines, "Understanding the ‘Pork Barrel,‘"
<http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ 14th/pork_barrel.pdf > (visited October 1. Use and Release of Funds.
17, 2013).
20
The amount herein appropriated shall be used for infrastructure and other
Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork by any name," VERA Files, priority projects and activities as proposed and identified by officials
August 23, 2013. <http://verafiles.org/pork-by-any-name/> (visited October 14, concerned according to the following allocations: Representatives,
2013). ₱12,500,000 each; Senators ₱18,000,000 each; Vice-President,
₱20,000,000. The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by way
21
Id. of Advice of Allotment and Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the
assigned implementing agency not later than five (5) days after the
22 beginning of each quarter upon submission of the list of projects and
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures
including Local Projects (VILP), Special Audits Office Report No. 2012-03, activities by the officials concerned. (Emphases supplied)
August 14, 2013 (CoA Report), p. 2.
29
See Special Provision 1, 1993 CDF Article; id.
30
Special Provision 1, Article XLI, RA 7663 (1994 CDF Article) provides:
Special Provisions
1. Use and Release of Funds.
The amount herein appropriated shall be used for infrastructure,
purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and
activities, and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed and
identified by officials concerned according to the following allocations:
Representatives, ₱12,500,000 each; Senators ₱18,000,000 each; Vice-
President, ₱20,000,000; PROVIDED, That, the said credit facilities shall
be constituted as a revolving fund to be administered by a government
financial institution (GFI) as a trust fund for lending operations. Prior
years releases to local government units and national government
agencies for this purpose shall be turned over to the government financial
institution which shall be the sole administrator of credit facilities released
from this fund.
The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by way of Advice of
Allotments and Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the assigned
implementing agency not later than five (5) days after the beginning of
each quarter upon submission of the list of projects and activities by the
officials concerned. (Emphases supplied)
31
Special Provision 1, Article XLII, RA 7845 (1995 CDF Article) provides:
Special Provisions
1. Use and Release of Funds.
The amount herein appropriated shall be used for infrastructure,
purchase of equipment and other priority projects and activities as
proposed and identified by officials concerned according to the following
allocations: Representatives, ₱12,500,000 each; Senators ₱18,000,000
each; Vice-President, ₱20,000,000.
The fund shall be automatically released semi-annually by way of Advice
of Allotment and Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the designated
implementing agency not later than five (5) days after the beginning of
each semester upon submission of the list of projects and activities by
the officials concerned. (Emphases supplied)
32
Special Provision 1, Article XLII, RA 8174 (1996 CDF Article) provides:
Special Provisions
1. Use and Release of Fund.
The amount herein appropriated shall be used for infrastructure,
purchase of equipment and other priority projects and activities, including
current operating expenditures, except creation of new plantilla positions,
as proposed and identified by officials concerned according to the
following allocations: Representatives, Twelve Million Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱12,500,000) each; Senators, Eighteen Million Pesos
(₱18,000,000) each; Vice-President, Twenty Million Pesos
(₱20,000,000).
The Fund shall be released semi-annually by way of Special Allotment
Release Order and Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the designated
implementing agency not later than thirty (30) days after the beginning of
each semester upon submission of the list of projects and activities by
the officials concerned. (Emphases supplied)
33
Special Provision 2 of the 1994 CDF Article, Special Provision 2 of the 1995
CDF Article and Special Provision 2 of the 1996 CDF Article are similarly worded
as follows:
2. Submission of [Quarterly (1994)/Semi-Annual (1995 and 1996)]
Reports. The Department of Budget and Management shall submit within
thirty (30) days after the end of each [quarter (1994)/semester (1995 and
1996)] a report to the House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance on the releases made from this Fund. The
report shall include the listing of the projects, locations, implementing
agencies [stated (order of committees interchanged in 1994 and 1996)]
and the endorsing officials. (Emphases supplied)
34
Special Provision 2, Article XLII, RA 8250 (1997 CDF Article) provides:
Special Provisions
xxxx
2. Publication of Countrywide Development Fund Projects. Within thirty
(30) days after the signing of this Act into law, the Members of Congress
and the Vice-President shall, in consultation with the implementing

agency concerned, submit to the Department of Budget and
Management the list of fifty percent (50%) of projects to be funded from
the allocation from the Countrywide Development Fund which shall be
duly endorsed by the Senate President and the Chairman of the
Committee on Finance in the case of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations in the case of the House of Representatives, and the
remaining fifty percent (50%) within six (6) months thereafter. The list
shall identify the specific projects, location, implementing agencies, and
target beneficiaries and shall be the basis for the release of funds. The
said list shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation by the
Department of Budget and Management. No funds appropriated herein
shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list herein required.
(Emphases supplied)
35
See Special Provision 2, 1997 CDF Article; id.
36
Special Provision 2, Article XLII, RA 8522 (1998 CDF Article) provides:
Special Provisions
xxxx
2. Publication of Countrywide Development Fund Projects. x x x
PROVIDED, That said publication is not a requirement for the release of
funds. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
37
Chua, Yvonne T. and Cruz, Booma, B., "Pork by any name," VERA Files,
August 23, 2013. <http://verafiles.org/pork-by-any-name/> (visited October 14,
2013).
38
Id.
49
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 335-336, citing Parreño, Earl, "Perils of Pork,"
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, June 3-4, 1998. Available at
<http://pcij.org/stories/1998/pork.html>
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
RA 8745 entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM
JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED NINETY
NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
43
Special Provision 1, Article XLII, Food Security Program Fund, RA 8745
provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of Fund. The amount herein authorized shall be used
to support the Food Security Program of the government, which shall
include farm-to-market roads, post harvest facilities and other agricultural
related infrastructures. Releases from this fund shall be made directly to
the implementing agency subject to prior consultation with the Members
of Congress concerned. (Emphases supplied)
44
Special Provision 1, Article XLIX,
Lingap Para sa Mahihirap
Program Fund, RA 8745 provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of Fund. The amount herein appropriated for the
Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Program Fund shall be used exclusively to
satisfy the minimum basic needs of poor communities and disadvantaged
sectors: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the
implementing agency upon prior consultation with the Members of
Congress concerned. (Emphases supplied)
45
Special Provision 1, Article L, Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure
Program Fund, RA 8745 provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of Fund. The amount herein authorized shall be used
to fund infrastructure requirements of the rural/urban areas which shall be
released directly to the implementing agency upon prior consultation with
the respective Members of Congress. (Emphases supplied)
46
Special Provision 1, Article XLIX, RA 8760 (2000 PDAF Article) provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be
used to fund priority programs and projects as indicated under Purpose
1: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the
implementing agency concerned upon prior consultation with the
respective Representative of the District: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That
the herein allocation may be realigned as necessary to any expense
category: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That no amount shall be used to fund
personal services and other personal benefits. (Emphases supplied)
47
See Special Provision 1, 2000 PDAF Article; id.
48
Section 25 (7), Article VI, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (1987
Constitution) provides that
"if, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass
the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed
reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress." (Emphasis supplied)
49
Special Provision 1, Article L, RA 9162 (2002 PDAF Article) provides:
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall
be used to fund priority programs and projects or to fund counterpart for
foreign-assisted programs and projects:
PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the
implementing agency or Local Government Unit concerned. (Emphases
supplied)
50
Special Provision 1, Article XLVII, RA 9206, 2003 GAA (2003 PDAF Article)
provides:
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall
be used to fund priority programs and projects or to fund the required
counterpart for foreign-assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That
such amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency or
Local Government Unit concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the
allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any expense class, if
deemed necessary: PROVIDED, FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of
ten percent (10%) of the authorized allocations by district may be used
for the procurement of rice and other basic commodities which shall be
purchased from the National Food Authority.
51
Special Provision 1, Article XVIII, RA 9206 provides:
Special Provision No. 1 – Restriction on the Delegation of Project
Implementation The implementation of the projects funded herein shall
not be delegated to other agencies, except those projects to be
implemented by the Engineering Brigades of the AFP and inter-
department projects undertaken by other offices and agencies including
local government units with demonstrated capability to actually
implement the projects by themselves upon consultation with the
Members of Congress concerned. In all cases the DPWH shall exercise
technical supervision over projects. (Emphasis supplied)
52
Special Provision 3, Article XLII, RA 9206 provides:
Special Provision No. 3 – Submission of the List of School Buildings
Within 30 days after the signing of this Act into law, (DepEd) after
consultation with the representative of the legislative district concerned,
shall submit to DBM the list of 50% of school buildings to be constructed
every municipality x x x. The list as submitted shall be the basis for the
release of funds. (Emphasis supplied)
53
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 557.
54
Special Provision 1, Article L, RA 9336 (2005 PDAF Article) provides:
Special Provision(s)
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount appropriated herein shall
be used to fund priority programs and projects under the ten point
agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to the
implementing agencies as indicated hereunder, to wit:
PARTICULARS PROGRAM/PROJECT IMPLEMENTING
AGENCY
 59
A. Education Purchase of IT Equipment DepEd/TESDA/ See Special Provision 1, Article XLIX, RA 9524.
CHED/SUCs/LGUs 60
See Special Provision 1, Article XLVII, RA 9970.
Scholarship TESDA/CHED/
SUCs/LGUs 61
For instance, Special Provisions 2 and 3, Article XLIII, RA 9336 providing for
B. Health Assistance to Indigent Patients Confined at the DOH/Specialty the 2005 DepEd School Building Program, and Special Provisions 1 and 16,
Hospitals Under DOH Including Specialty Hospitals Hospitals Article XVIII, RA 9401 providing for the 2007 DPWH Regular Budget respectively
state: 2005 DepEd School Building Program Special Provision No. 2 – Allocation
Assistance to Indigent Patients at the Hospitals LGUs of School Buildings: The amount allotted under Purpose 1 shall be apportioned
Devolved to LGUs and RHUs as follows: (1) fifty percent (50%) to be allocated pro-rata according to each
legislative districts student population x x x; (2) forty percent (40%) to be
Insurance Premium Philhealth
allocated only among those legislative districts with classroom shortages x x x;
C. Livelihood/ Small & Medium Enterprise/Livelihood DTI/TLRC/DA/CDA (3) ten percent (10%) to be allocated in accordance x x x.
CIDSS
Special Provision No. 3 – Submission of the List of School Buildings:
Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social DSWD Within 30 days after the signing of this Act into law, the DepEd after
Services
consultation with the representative of the legislative districts concerned,
D. Rural Barangay/Rural Electrification DOE/NEA shall submit to DBM the list of fifty percent (50%) of school buildings to be
Electrification constructed in every municipality x x x. The list as submitted shall be the
basis for the release of funds x x x. (Emphases supplied)
E. Water Supply Construction of Water System DPWH
Installation of Pipes/Pumps/Tanks LGUs 2007 DPWH Regular Budget

F. Financial Specific Programs and Projects to Address the Pro- LGUs Special Provision No. 1 – Restriction on Delegation of Project
Assistance Poor Programs of Government Implementation: The implementation of the project funded herein shall
G. Public Work Construction/Repair/ Rehabilitation of the following: DPWH not be delegated to other agencies, except those projects to be
Roads and Bridges/Flood Control/School buildings implemented by the AFP Corps of Engineers, and inter-department
Hospitals Health Facilities/Public Markets/Multi- projects to be undertaken by other offices and agencies, including local
Purpose Buildings/Multi-Purpose Pavements government units (LGUs) with demonstrated capability to actually
implement the project by themselves upon consultation with the
H. Irrigation Construction/Repair/ Rehabilitation of Irrigation DA-NIA representative of the legislative district concerned x x x.
Facilities
Special Provision No. 16 – Realignment of Funds: The Secretary of
(Emphasis supplied) Public Works and Highways is authorized to realign funds released from
appropriations x x x from one project/scope of work to another:
55
Id. PROVIDED, that x x x (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the
legislator concerned
56
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 558.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
57
See Special Provision 1, Article XLVII, RA 9401. 62
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566) , p. 559, citing Section 2.A of RA 9358, otherwise
58 known as the "Supplemental Budget for 2006."
See Special Provision 1, Article XLVI, RA 9498.
63
Id. at 559-560.
64
"As a primary aspect of the Philippine Government's public procurement
reform agenda, the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) was
established by virtue of Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. 9184) as an independent
inter-agency body that is impartial, transparent and effective, with private sector
representation. As established in Section 63 of R.A. 9184, the GPPB shall have
the following duties and responsibilities: 1. To protect national interest in all
matters affecting public procurement, having due regard to the country's regional
and international obligations; 2. To formulate and amend public procurement
policies, rules and regulations, and amend, whenever necessary, the
implementing rules and regulations Part A (IRR-A); 3. To prepare a generic
procurement manual and standard bidding forms for procurement; 4. To ensure
the proper implementation by the procuring entities of the Act, its IRR-A and all
other relevant rules and regulations pertaining to public procurement; 5. To
establish a sustainable training program to develop the capacity of Government
procurement officers and employees, and to ensure the conduct of regular
procurement training programs by the procuring entities; and 6. To conduct an
annual review of the effectiveness of the Act and recommend any amendments
thereto, as may be necessary.
x x x x" <http://www.gppb.gov.ph/about_us/gppb.html> (visited October 23,
2013).
65
Entitled "AMENDMENT OF SECTION 53 OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES
AND REGULATIONS PART A OF REPUBLIC ACT 9184 AND PRESCRIBING
GUIDELINES ON PARTICIPATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT," approved June 29, 2007.
66
Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MODERNIZATION,
STANDARDIZATION AND REGULATION OF THE PROCUREMENT
ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
67
Sec. 48. Alternative Methods. - Subject to the prior approval of the Head of the
Procuring Entity or his duly authorized representative, and whenever justified by
the conditions provided in this Act, the Procuring Entity may, in order to promote
economy and efficiency, resort to any of the following alternative methods of
Procurement:
xxxx
(e) Negotiated Procurement - a method of Procurement that may be
resorted under the extraordinary circumstances provided for in Section
53 of this Act and other instances that shall be specified in the IRR,
whereby the Procuring Entity directly negotiates a contract with a
technically, legally and financially capable supplier, contractor or
consultant.
xxxx
68
As defined in Section 5(o) of RA 9184, the term "Procuring Entity" refers to any
branch, department, office, agency, or instrumentality of the government,
including state universities and colleges, government-owned and/or - controlled
corporations, government financial institutions, and local government units
procuring Goods, Consulting Services and Infrastructure Projects.
69
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 564, citing GPPB Resolution 12-2007.
70
Special Provision 2, Article XLIV, RA 10147 (2011 PDAF Article) provides:
2. Allocation of Funds. The total projects to be identified by legislators
and the Vice-President shall not exceed the following amounts:
a. Total of Seventy Million Pesos (₱70,000,000) broken down into Forty
Million Pesos (₱40,000,000) for Infrastructure Projects and Thirty Million
Pesos (₱30,000,000) for soft projects of Congressional Districts or Party
List Representatives;
b. Total of Two Hundred Million Pesos (₱200,000,000) broken down into
One Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000) for Infrastructure Projects
and One Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000) for soft projects of
Senators and the Vice President.
71
See Special Provision 4, 2011 PDAF Article.
72
Special Provision 2, Article XLIV, RA 10155 (2012 PDAF Article) provides: 2.
Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries
shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each
implementing agency. Furthermore, preference shall be given to projects located
in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified under the National
Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction by the DSWD.
For this purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said
priority list, standard or design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of
this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
73
RA 10352, passed and approved by Congress on December 19, 2012 and
signed into law by the President on December 19, 2012. Special Provision 2,
Article XLIV, RA 10352 (2013 PDAF Article) provides:
2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of
beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared
by each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference shall be
given to projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents
identified under the NHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the
implementing agency shall submit to Congress said priority list, standard
or design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis
supplied)
74
The permissive treatment of the priority list requirement in practice was
revealed during the Oral Arguments (TSN, October 10, 2013, p. 143):
Justice Leonen: x x x In Section 2 meaning, Special Provision 2, it
mentions priority list of implementing agencies. Have the implementing
agencies indeed presented priority list to the Members of Congress
before disbursement?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: My understanding is, is not really, Your
Honor. Justice Leonen: So, in other words, the PDAF was expended
without the priority list requirements of the implementing agencies?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: That is so much in the CoA Report, Your
Honor.
75
See Special Provision 3 of the 2012 PDAF Article and Special Provision 3 of
the 2013 PDAF Article.
76
Special Provision 6 of the 2012 PDAF Article provides:
6. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be
allowed once. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy,
Environment and Natural Resources, Health, Interior and Local
Government, Public Works and Highways, and Social Welfare and
Development are also authorized to approve realignment from one
project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund,
subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects, realignment is within
the same implementing unit and same project category as the original
project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original
project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the
legislator concerned. The DBM must be informed in writing of any
realignment approved within five (5) calendar days from its approval.
Special Provision 4 of the 2013 PDAF Article provides:
4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be
allowed once. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior
and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and
Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are
also authorized to approve realignment from one project/scope to another
within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to the following: (i)
for infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same implementing
unit and same project category as the original project; (ii) allotment
released has not yet been obligated for the original project/scope of work;
and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The
DBM must be informed in writing of any realignment approved within five
(5) calendar days from approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any
realignment under this Fund shall be limited within the same classification
of soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications and
revisions of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned
shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have
been deposited back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification
shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the DBM or
the implementing agency, as the case may be. (Emphases supplied)
77
Special Provision 1 of the 2013 PDAF Article provides:
Special Provision(s) 1. Use of Fund. The amount appropriated herein
shall be used to fund the following priority programs and projects to be
implemented by the corresponding agencies:
xxxx
PROVIDED, That this Fund shall not be used for the payment of
Personal Services expenditures: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That all
procurement shall comply with the provisions of R.A. No. 9184 and its
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations: PROVIDED, FINALLY,
That for infrastructure projects, LGUs may only be identified as

implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement
the same. (Emphasis supplied)
78
Special Provision 2 of the 2013 PDAF Article provides:
2. Project Identification. x x x.
xxxx
All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and
scholarships, identified by a member of the House of Representatives
outside of his/her legislative district shall have the written concurrence of
the member of the House of Representatives of the recipient or
beneficiary legislative district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
79
See Special Provision 4 of the 2013 PDAF Article; supra note 76.
80
Sec. 8.
Appropriations. The sum of Five Million Pesos out of any available funds
from the National Treasury is hereby appropriated and authorized to be
released for the organization of the Board and its initial operations.
Henceforth, funds sufficient to fully carry out the functions and objectives
of the Board shall be appropriated every fiscal year in the General
Appropriations Act.
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources
including receipts from service contracts and agreements such as
application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus,
production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires,
representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the
Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing
royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and similar
payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy
resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President. (Emphasis supplied)
81
Entitled "CREATING AN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT BOARD, DEFINING ITS
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS, THEREFOR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES."
82
See First Whereas Clause of PD 910.
83
See <http://malampaya.com/> (visited October 17, 2013).
84
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent
as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the
aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise shall be
immediately set aside and allocated to fund the following infrastructure and
socio-civil projects within the Metropolitan Manila Area:
(a) Flood Control
(b) Sewerage and Sewage
(c) Nutritional Control
(d) Population Control
(e) Tulungan ng Bayan Centers
(f) Beautification
(g) Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) projects; provided, that
should the aggregate gross earning be less than ₱150,000,000.00, the
amount to be allocated to fund the above-mentioned project shall be
equivalent to sixty (60%) percent of the aggregate gross earning.
In addition to the priority infrastructure and socio-civic projects with the
Metropolitan Manila specifically enumerated above, the share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings derived by the Corporate
from this Franchise may also be appropriated and allocated to fund and
finance infrastructure and/or socio-civic projects throughout the
Philippines as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines.
85
Entitled "CONSOLIDATING AND AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NOS.
1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 AND 1632, RELATIVE TO THE FRANCHISE
AND POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION (PAGCOR)."
86
Entitled "AMENDING SECTION TWELVE OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
1869-CONSOLIDATING AND AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NOS.
1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 AND 1632, R ELATIVE TO THE F RANCHISE …………… P 2,500,000,000.00 (Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program
AND POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND G AMING Fund)
CORPORATION (PAGCOR)." While the parties have confined their discussion to
Section 12 of PD 1869, the Court takes judicial notice of its amendment and …………… P 5,458,277,000.00 (Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure
perforce deems it apt to resolve the constitutionality of the amendatory provision. Program Fund)
87
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, now reads: 2000…………… P 3,330,000,000.00

Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) 2001…………… 2000 GAA re-enacted
percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this 2002…………… P 5,677,500,000.00
Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than
₱150,000,000.00 shall immediately be set aside and shall accrue to the
2003…………… P 8,327,000,000.00
General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects
and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the 2004…………… 2003 GAA re-enacted
President of the Philippines.
2005…………… P 6,100,000,000.00
88
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 301.
2006…………… 2005 GAA re-enacted
89
CDF/PDAF ALLOCATION FROM 1990 -2013.
2007…………… P 11,445,645,000.00
1990…………… ₱2,300,000,000.00
2008…………… P 7,892,500,000.00
1991…………… P 2,300,000,000.00
2009…………… P 9,665,027,000.00
1992…………… P 2,480,000,000.00
2010…………… P 10,861,211,000.00
1993…………… P 2,952,000,000.00
2011…………… P 24,620,000,000.00
1994…………… P 2,977,000,000.00
2012…………… P 24,890,000,000.00
1995…………… P 3,002,000,000.00
2013…………… P 24,790,000,000.00
1996…………… P 3,014,500,000.00 90
"Pork as a tool for political patronage, however, can extend as far as the
1997…………… P 2,583,450,000.00 executive branch. It is no accident, for instance, that the release of the
allocations often coincides with the passage of a Palace-sponsored bill.
1998…………… P 2,324,250,000.00
That pork funds have grown by leaps and bounds in the last decade can
be traced to presidents in need of Congress support. The rise in pork was
1999…………… P 1,517,800,000.00 (Food Security Program Fund)
particularly notable during the Ramos administration, when the president
and House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. used generous fund releases to

convince congressmen to support Malacañang-initiated legislation. The
Ramos era, in fact, became known as the ‘golden age of pork.‘
Through the years, though, congressmen have also taken care to look
after their very own. More often than not, pork-barrel funds are funneled
to projects in towns and cities where the lawmakers' own relatives have
been elected to public office; thus, pork is a tool for building family power
as well. COA has come across many instances where pork-funded
projects ended up directly benefiting no less than the lawmaker or his or
her relatives."(CHUA, YVONNE T. and CRUZ, BOOMA, "Pork is a
Political, Not A Developmental, Tool."
<http://pcij.org/stories/2004/pork.html> [visited October 22, 2013].)
91
With reports from Inquirer Research and Salaverria, Leila, "Candazo, first
whistle-blower on pork barrel scam, dies; 61," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August
20, 2013, <http://newsinfo. inquirer.net/469439/candazo-first-whistle-blower-on-
pork-barrel-scam-dies-61> (visited October 21, 2013.)
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and
Management, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373, 387.
96
Carvajal, Nancy, " NBI probes ₱10-B scam," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 12,
2013 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/443297/nbi-probes-p10-b-scam> (visited
October 21, 2013).
97
Id.
98
See NBI Executive Summary. <http://www.gov.ph/2013/09/16/executive-
summary-by-the-nbi-on-the- pdaf-complaints-filed-against-janet-lim-napoles-et-
al/> (visited October 22, 2013).
99
Pursuant to Office Order No. 2010-309 dated May 13, 2010.
100
During the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson referred to the VILP as "the
source of the so called HARD project, hard portion x x x "under the title the
Budget of the DPWH." TSN, October 8, 2013, p. 69.
101
These implementing agencies included the Department of Agriculture, DPWH
and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). The GOCCs
included Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC)/Technology
Resource Center (TRC), National Livelihood Development Corporation (NLDC),
National Agribusiness Corporation (NABCOR), and the Zamboanga del Norte
Agricultural College (ZNAC) Rubber Estate Corporation (ZREC). CoA
Chairperson‘s Memorandum. Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 546. See also CoA
Report, p. 14.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 546-547.
104
Carvajal, Nancy, ―Malampaya fund lost ₱900M in JLN racket‖, Philippine
Daily Inquirer, July 16, 2013 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/445585/malampaya-
fund-lost-p900m-in-jln-racket> (visited October 21, 2013.)
105
TSN, October 8, 2013, p. 119.
106
Rollo (G.R. No. 208493), pp. 9 and 341.
107
The Court observes that petitioners have not presented sufficient averments
on the remittances from the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office‖ nor have
defined the scope of "the Executive‘s Lump Sum Discretionary Funds" (See rollo
[G.R. No. 208566], pp. 47-49) which appears to be too broad and all-
encompassing. Also, while Villegas filed a Supplemental Petition dated October
1, 2013 (Supplemental Petition, see rollo [G.R. No. 208566], pp. 213-220, and
pp. 462-464) particularly presenting their arguments on the Disbursement
Acceleration Program, the same is the main subject of G.R. Nos. 209135,
209136, 209155, 209164, 209260, 209287, 209442, 209517, and 209569 and
thus, must be properly resolved therein. Hence, for these reasons, insofar as the
Presidential Pork Barrel is concerned, the Court is constrained not to delve on
any issue related to the above-mentioned funds and consequently confine its
discussion only with respect to the issues pertaining to the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund.
108
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 48-49.
109
Id. at 48.
110
To note, Villegas‘ Supplemental Petition was filed on October 2, 2013.
111
Rollo, (G.R. No. 208566), p. 342; and rollo (G.R. No. 209251), pp. 6-7.
112 125
Re-docketed as G.R. No. 209251 upon Nepomuceno‘s payment of docket Baldo, Jr. v. Commision on Elections, G.R. No. 176135, June 16, 2009, 589
fees on October 16, 2013 as reflected on the Official Receipt No. 0079340. Rollo SCRA 306, 310.
(G.R. No. 209251) p. 409.
126
TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 79-81.
113
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566) p. 97.
127
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 17. The President
114
G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 & 113888, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
506. ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
115 128
Supra note 95. Sec. 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. – Except as otherwise
provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the
116 public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office
Entitled "CREATING AN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT BOARD, DEFINING ITS
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS, THEREFOR, AND FOR concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of
OTHER PURPOSES." funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General
Appropriations Act, except for personal services appropriations used for
117
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541, permanent officials and employees.
August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA 568, 575. 129
Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, G.R. No. 166886, July 30, 2008, 560 SCRA 504,
118
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 514, citing Constantino v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 140656 and
7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 148. 154482, September 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 205, 219-220.
130
119
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, supra note 117, at Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 292.
575. 131
G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013.
120
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 132
G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, and 179461, October 5, TSN, October 10, 2013, p. 134.
2010, 632 SCRA 146, 175.
133
Section 22, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
121
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, Sec. 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days
183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 450. from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general
appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
122 including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
Id. at 450-451.
123 134
Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 294.
and 183599, October 19, 2010, 633 SCRA 470, 493, citing Province of North
135
Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Id. at 5.
Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and
183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 405. 136
G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656.
124 137
Id. at 492, citing Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346 (1913). Id. at 665.
138 156
See Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, supra note 123, at 492. Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 325.
139 157
369 US 186 82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962]. Id.

140 158
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 295-296. Id. at 329.
141 159
Tañada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil. 1101 (1957) unreported case. Id. at 339.
142 160
406 Phil. 1 (2001). Id. at 338.

143 161
Id. at 42-43. See note 107.
144 162
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936). Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra note 144, at 139.
145 163
La Bugal- B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 890 Id. at 157.
(2004).
164
Section 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
146
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 349.
165
Section 1, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
147
Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Honorable Vicente Q. Roxas, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 227, G.R. No. 125509, January 166
Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
31, 2007, 513 SCRA 457, 470.
167
148
Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra note 144, at 156.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870,
November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 421. 168
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Springer, 277 U.S. 189, 203 (1928).
149
TSN, October 8, 2013, pp. 184-185. 169
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the
150
Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937). Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012, 678 SCRA 1, 9-10, citing Carl Baar,
Separate But Subservient: Court Budgeting In The American States 149-52
151
See Lanuza v. CA, G.R. No. 131394, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 54, 61-62. (1975), cited in Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court
Funding, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 Md. L. Rev. 217 (1993).
152
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
170
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. Id. at 10, citing Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court
Funding, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 Md. L. Rev. 217 (1993).
153
Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association o f the Philippine Islands v.
171
Remington Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 159422, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 180, See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 441-446 and
197-198. 451-452 (1977) and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), cited in Justice
Powell‘s concurring opinion in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,
154 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra note 114, at 522.
155
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.
172 187
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952), See PDAF Article for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011,
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 203 (1928) cited in Justice Powell’s and 2013.
concurring opinion in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983). 188
Also, in Section 2.1 of DBM Circular No. 547 dated January 18, 2013 (DBM
Circular 547-13), or the "Guidelines on the Release of Funds Chargeable Against
173
273 Phil. 443 (1991). the Priority Development Assistance Fund for FY 2013," it is explicitly stated that
the "PDAF shall be used to fund priority programs and projects identified by the
174 Legislators from the Project Menu." (Emphasis supplied)
Id. at 461. "3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of
the budget process covers the various operational aspects of budgeting. The
189
establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial To note, Special Provision 4 cannot – as respondents submit – refer to
plans for individual activities, the continuing review of government fiscal position, realignment of projects since the same provision subjects the realignment to the
the regulation of funds releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, condition that the "allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original
and other related activities comprise this phase of the budget cycle." project/scope of work". The foregoing proviso should be read as a textual
reference to the savings requirement stated under Section 25(5), Article VI of the
175 1987 Constitution which pertinently provides that "x x x the President, the
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note 118, at 158.
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
176
Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, supra note 173, at 460-461. Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law
177 for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at 294-296.
appropriations. In addition, Sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 of DBM Circular 547-
178 13, the implementing rules of the 2013 PDAF Article, respectively require that: (a)
Id. at 287. "the allotment is still valid or has not yet lapsed"; (b) "requests for realignment of
179
unobligated allotment as of December 31, 2012 treated as continuing
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 179. appropriations in FY 2013 shall be submitted to the DBM not later than June 30,
2013"; and (c) requests for realignment shall be supported with, among others, a
180
Id. at 29. "certification of availability of funds." As the letter of the law and the guidelines
related thereto evoke the legal concept of savings, Special Provision 4 must be
181
Id. at 24. construed to be a provision on realignment of PDAF funds, which would
necessarily but only incidentally include the projects for which the funds have
182
Id. at 86. been allotted to. To construe it otherwise would effectively allow PDAF funds to
be realigned outside the ambit of the foregoing provision, thereby sanctioning a
183
Id. at 308. constitutional aberration.
190
184
Id. Aside from the sharing of the executive‘s realignment authority with legislators
in violation of the separation of powers principle, it must be pointed out that
185 Special Provision 4, insofar as it confers fund realignment authority to
See CDF Articles for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, department secretaries, is already unconstitutional by itself. As recently held in
and 1998. Nazareth v. Villar (Nazareth), G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA
186
385, 403-404, Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, limiting the
See PDAF Article for the year 2000 which was re-enacted in 2001. See also authority to augment, is "strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive" in favor
the following 1999 CIAs: "Food Security Program Fund," the " Lingap Para Sa of the high officials named therein. As such, the authority to realign funds
Mahihirap Program Fund," and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure allocated to the implementing agencies is exclusively vested in the President,
Program Fund." See further the 1997 DepEd School Building Fund. viz.:
It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials
named in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution limiting the authority
to transfer savings only to augment another item in the GAA is strictly but
reasonably construed as exclusive. As the Court has expounded in Lokin,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections:
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of
the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed.
The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than
the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with
exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not
even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that
an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in
determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular
case, it accords with reason and justice.
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt
something from the scope of the general words of a statute, which is
otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words.
Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the
intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions
are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be
resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception.
Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many
circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is
limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
The cogence of the Nazareth dictum is not enfeebled by an invocation of
the doctrine of qualified political agency (otherwise known as the "alter
ego doctrine") for the bare reason that the same is not applicable when
the Constitution itself requires the President himself to act on a particular
matter, such as that instructed under Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution. As held in the landmark case of Villena v. Secretary of
Interior (67 Phil. 451 [1987]), constitutional imprimatur is precisely one of
the exceptions to the application of the alter ego doctrine, viz.:
After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the
government in this case on the board proposition, albeit not suggested,
that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted
and considering the departmental organization established and continued
in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where
the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally,
the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
191
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at 294-296.
192
TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 16, 17, 18, and 23.
193
TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 72-73.
194
Aside from its conceptual origins related to the separation of powers principle,
Corwin, in his commentary on Constitution of the United States made the
following observations:
At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the
principle that legislative power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine
of separation of powers: Why go to the trouble of separating the three
powers of government if they can straightway remerge on their own
motion? The second is the concept of due process of law, which
precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to private persons. Lastly,
there is the maxim of agency "Delegata potestas non potest delegari,"
which John Locke borrowed and formulated as a dogma of political
science . . . Chief Justice Taft offered the following explanation of the
origin and limitations of this idea as a postulate of constitutional law: "The
well-known maxim ‘delegata potestas non potest delefari,‘ applicable to
the law of agency in the general common law, is well understood and has
had wider application in the construction of our Federal and State
Constitutions than it has in private law . . . The Federal and State
Constitutions than it has in private law . . . The Federal Constitution and
State Constitutions of this country divide the governmental power into
three branches . . . In carrying out that constitutional division . . . it is a
breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives up its
legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial
branch, or if by law it attempts to invest itself or its members with either
executive power of judicial power. This is not to say that the three
branches are not co-ordinate parts of one government and that each in

the field of its duties may not invoke government and that each in the
field of its duties may not invoke the action of the two other branches in
so far as the action invoked shall not be an assumption of the
constitutional field of action of another branch. In determining what it may
do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character
of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the
inherent necessities of the governmental coordination. (Emphases
supplied)
195
Section 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
196
See Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 702 (1919).
197
See Section 23(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
198
See Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
199
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at 288.
200
169 Phil. 437, 447-448 (1977).
201
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra note 114, at 522.
202
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, 62 Phil. 912, 916 (1936).
203
Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra note 144, at 156.
204
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155, at 287.
205
Id. at 292.
206
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, supra note 202, at 916-
917.
207
"Log-rolling legislation refers to the process in which several provisions
supported by an individual legislator or minority of legislators are combined into a
single piece of legislation supported by a majority of legislators on a quid pro quo
basis: no one provision may command majority support, but the total package
will.” See Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 420, citing Briffault, Richard, ―The Item
Veto in State Courts,‖ 66 Temp. L. Rev. 1171, 1177 (1993).
208
Passarello, Nicholas, "The Item Veto and the Threat of Appropriations
Bundling in Alaska," 30 Alaska Law Review 128 (2013), citing Black‘s Law
Dictionary 1700 (9th ed. 2009). <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/alr/vol30/iss1/5>
(visited October 23, 2013).
209
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
210
299 U.S. 410 (1937).
211
To note, in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. (G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990,
191 SCRA 452, 465), citing Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 S.E., 2d 120, 176 Va.
281), the Court defined an item of appropriation as "an indivisible sum of money
dedicated to a stated purpose." In this relation, Justice Carpio astutely explained
that an "item" is indivisible because the amount cannot be divided for any
purpose other than the specific purpose stated in the item.
212
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 421.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 316.
215
Id. at 421.
216
Id. at 566.
217
Id. at 567.
218
"It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble
intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But
then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: ‘The end does not
justify the means.‘ No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of
an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply
irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. The
Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold
the Constitution and its enshrined principles. ‘The Constitution must ever remain
supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be
allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.‘" (Biraogo v.
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra note 118, 177; citations omitted)
219
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 406.
220
Id. at 407. direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.
221
Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
235
Philippines: A Commentary, 2003 Edition, p. 1108. See Section 109 of the LGC.
222 236
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155. Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 423.
223 237
See Section 22, Article VI, 1987 Constitution. Id. at 427.

224 238
See Section 21, Article VI, 1987 Constitution. Id. at 439-440.
225 239
Rollo (G.R. No. 208493), p. 9. Id. at 434 and 441.

226 240
See Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004, See Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, supra note 173, where the Court upheld the
427 SCRA 96, 100-101. constitutionality of certain automatic appropriation laws for debt servicing
although said laws did not readily indicate the exact amounts to be paid
227 considering that "the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative
Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF
1991." parameters provided in the decrees"; hence, "the Executive is not of unlimited
discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing." To note, such
228
230 Phil. 379, 387-388 (1986). laws vary in great degree with the way the 2013 PDAF Article works considering
that: (a) individual legislators and not the executive make the determinations; (b)
229 the choice of both the amount and the project are to be subsequently made after
Id.
the law is passed and upon the sole discretion of the legislator, unlike in
230 Guingona, Jr. where the amount to be appropriated is dictated by the
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 95-96. contingency external to the discretion of the disbursing authority; and (c) in
231
Guingona, Jr. there is no effective control of the funds since as long as the
Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra note 114, at 523. contingency arises money shall be automatically appropriated therefor, hence
what is left is merely law execution and not legislative discretion.
232
Nograles, Prospero C. and Lagman, Edcel C., House of Representatives of
the Philippines, "Understanding the ‘Pork Barrel,‘" 241
Id. at 462.
<http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ 14th/pork_barrel.pdf > (visited October
17, 2013). 242
23 Nev. 25 (1895).
233
<http://www.gov.ph/2013/08/23/english-statement-of-president-aquino-on-the- 243
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 438.
abolition-of-pdaf-august-23-2013/> (visited October 22, 2013).
244
234 Id. at 300.
Section 106 of the LGC provides:
245
The project identifications made by the Executive should always be in the
Sec. 106. Local Development Councils. – (a) Each local government unit nature of law enforcement and, hence, for the sole purpose of enforcing an
shall have a comprehensive multi-sectoral development plan to be existing appropriation law. In relation thereto, it may exercise its rule-making
initiated by its development council and approved by its sanggunian. For authority to greater particularize the guidelines for such identifications which, in
this purpose, the development council at the provincial, city, municipal, or all cases, should not go beyond what the delegating law provides. Also, in all
barangal level, shall assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the
cases, the Executive‘s identification or rule-making authority, insofar as the field
of appropriations is concerned, may only arise if there is a valid appropriation law
under the parameters as above-discussed.
246
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, supra note 155.
247
See Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Edition, pp. 686-687, citing Pelaez v. Auditor
General, 15 SCRA 569, 576-577 (1965).
248
Id. at 277.
249
§ 438 Ejusdem Generis ("of the same kind"); specific words; 82 C.J.S.
Statutes § 438.
250
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 437, citing § 438 Ejusdem Generis ("of the same
kind"); specific words; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 438.
251
Based on a July 5, 2011 posting in the government’s website
<http://www.gov.ph/2011/07/05/budget-secretary-abad-clarifies-nature-of-
malampaya-fund/>; attached as Annex "A" to the Petitioners‘ Memorandum), the
Malampaya Funds were also used for non-energy related projects, to wit:
The rest of the 98.73 percent or ₱19.39 billion was released for non-
energy related projects: 1) in 2006, ₱1 billion for the Armed Forces
Modernization Fund; 2) in 2008, ₱4 billion for the Department of
Agriculture; 3) in 2009, a total of ₱14.39 billion to various agencies,
including: ₱7.07 billion for the Department of Public Works and
Highways; ₱2.14 billion for the Philippine National Police; ₱1.82 billion for
[the Department of Agriculture]; ₱1.4 billion for the National Housing
Authority; and ₱900 million for the Department of Agrarian Reform.
252
For academic purposes, the Court expresses its disagreement with
petitioners‘ argument that the previous version of Section 12 of PD 1869
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since it allows the President
to broadly determine the purpose of the Presidential Social Fund‘s use and
perforce must be declared unconstitutional. Quite the contrary, the 1st paragraph
of the said provision clearly indicates that the Presidential Social Fund shall be
used to finance specified types of priority infrastructure and socio-civic projects,
namely, Flood Control, Sewerage and Sewage, Nutritional Control, Population
Control, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Beautification and Kilusang Kabuhayan at
Kaunlaran (KKK) projects located within the Metropolitan Manila area. However,
with regard to the stated geographical-operational limitation, the 2nd paragraph
of the same provision nevertheless allows the Presidential Social Fund to finance
"priority infrastructure and socio-civic projects throughout the Philippines as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." It
must, however, be qualified that the 2nd paragraph should not be construed to
mean that the Office of the President may direct and authorize the use of the
Presidential Social Fund to any kind of infrastructure and socio-civic project
throughout the Philippines. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis , (meaning,
that a word or phrase‘s "correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is
associated"; see Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17,
2012, 676 SCRA 579, 598-599) the 2nd paragraph should be construed only as
an expansion of the geographical-operational limitation stated in the 1st
paragraph of the same provision and not a grant of carte blanche authority to the
President to veer away from the project types specified thereunder. In other
words, what the 2nd paragraph merely allows is the use of the Presidential Social
Fund for Flood Control, Sewerage and Sewage, Nutritional Control, Population
Control, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Beautification and Kilusang Kabuhayan at
Kaunlaran (KKK) projects even though the same would be located outside the
Metropolitan Manila area. To deem it otherwise would be tantamount to unduly
expanding the rule-making authority of the President in violation of the sufficient
standard test and, ultimately, the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
253
Black‘s Law Dictionary (7th Ed., 1999), p. 784.
254
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), pp. 48-49.
255
Id.
256
234 Phil. 521, 533-534 (1987).
257
252 Phil. 264 (1989).
258
Id. at 279
259
Id. at 278.
260
Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 463.
261
Id. at 459-462.
262
Id. at 304-305.
263
<http://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/BESE/BESE2013/Glossary.pdf>
(visited November 4, 2013).

264
Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA). Cash authority issued by the DBM to central,
regional and provincial offices and operating units through the authorized
government servicing banks of the MDS,* to cover the cash requirements of the
agencies.

*MDS stands for Modified Disbursement Scheme. It is a procedure

whereby disbursements by NG agencies chargeable against the account
of the Treasurer of the Philippines are effected through GSBs.**

** GSB stands for Government Servicing Banks. (Id.)

265
TSN, October 10, 2013, pp. 35-36.
266
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, G.R.
No. 187485, October 8, 2013, citing Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine National
Bank, 148 Phil. 443, 447-448 (1971).
267
Id.
268
Id.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON
S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B.
GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON.
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner
of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). 3 It
covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status. 4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their
revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and
Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and
allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess
collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue. 5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of
Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of the National
Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the
Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two
representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the officials
nominated by their recognized organization. 6
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the
service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3)
terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a
system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of
rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress. 7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked
to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, 8 to be
approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose. 9
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a
system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only
in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites
corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and
employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only
to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such
a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue
targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b)
and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the
service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does
not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue
targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore
be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss
BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the
ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function
is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law,
the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in
the implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the
petition for being premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners
have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate the exercise of this Court’s
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public policy requires the
resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert that the
allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does
not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA
9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform
are distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities.
Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that will guide the executive in the
implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures
the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of
power on the part of the executive and the implementing agencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds
that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of
RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed.
Actual Case And Ripeness
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication. 10 A closely related requirement is
ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question
is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. 11Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the
petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself
that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court. 12
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial
controversy by the mere enactment of the law even without any further overt
act,13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to
demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show a
personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this account,
their petition is procedurally infirm.
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues
raised by petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the
presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And where an action of the legislative
branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 14
Accountability of
Public Officers
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice, and lead modest
lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal
gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding
accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and
justice, all government officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to the
needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This
presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA
9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation
capability and collection.15
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be
overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court
do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared public
policy.
Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and
employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and
legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and equivocal one.16 To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners’ baseless
supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also
of the executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded
for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set
expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In
fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to
public service of deserving government personnel.
In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to
officers of the customs as well as other parties an amount not exceeding one-half of the
net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer
v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court said:
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and
reward their zeal and industry in detecting fraudulent attempts to evade payment
of duties and taxes.
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward
when, as a consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they
exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that
the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary
activity" or the product of the irregular performance of official duties. One of these
precautionary measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law:
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC.
– The officials, examiners, and employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate
this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or
misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their
duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business
establishment or taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse,
malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Equal Protection
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same
conditions and among persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not
similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial differences in
relation to the object to be accomplished.19When things or persons are different in fact or
circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers’ Union,20 this Court declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely
as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require
that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to
things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to
operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality.
The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting
laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a
wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on
scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it
necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence,
legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions,
for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from
recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they
may appear.21 (emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that
has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. 22 With respect to RA
9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or
sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the
law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary
function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of
taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. – The Bureau of Internal Revenue,
which shall be headed by and subject to the supervision and control of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the President
 upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following
functions:
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all
revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its
functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units;
and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. 24
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:
Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. – The Bureau of Customs which shall be
headed and subject to the management and control of the Commissioner of
Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of
the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall
have the following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and
penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds
within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of
vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under
its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. 25
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the
special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of
its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane
and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment
accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal
protection.
Undue Delegation
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness
test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. 26 It lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot.27 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.28
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law.
Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose
of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" 29 the delegated power to
the President to fix revenue targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. – A Rewards and Incentives Fund,
hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the
 collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets
of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating
Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:
Excess of Collection of the Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to
Excess the Revenue Targets Accrue to the Fund
30% or below – 15%
More than 30% – 15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the
remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately
following the year when the revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be
released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection
expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the
Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the
President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the
distribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated among its revenue
districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the BOC.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected
respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC
and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. 30 Thus, the
determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also
undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies
the conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short
of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board in the agency shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least
seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant
factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations
promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and
regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process:
Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not
exceeding two years in operation, as has no historical record of collection
performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent
transferee in the middle of the period under consideration unless the
transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential
nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the
district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs officials or
employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about by
natural calamities or force majeure or economic causes as may be
determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after
careful and proper review by the Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That such decision shall be immediately
executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the
separation of an official or employee from service under this Act shall be
without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on accountability
of public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act;
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee
cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and
only after due process is accorded the employee. 31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays down
a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target
by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of
collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service
laws.32 The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations
and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public
interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy
and welfare."33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
Separation Of Powers
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby created a
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the
Senate and seven Members from the House of Representatives. The Members
from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two
senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of
Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two members
representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus
officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose
of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM,
NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it
became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment
on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot
and academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the
issue of the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of
congressional oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections34 is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken
by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over
the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to
monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine
whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive
waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative
power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. x x x x x x x x x
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased
frequency to check the perceived "exponential accumulation of power" by the
executive branch. By the beginning of the 20th century, Congress has delegated
an enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the
administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure
that the administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority
delegated to them. x x x x x x x x x
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers
may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of
attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine
economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the
exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and
report from the other branches of government. It can give
recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency
involved.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking
at the facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves
a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct
investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21,
Article VI, xxx xxx xxx
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its
oversight power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a
continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee
regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both
congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive
branch actions in order to influence future executive branch
performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the
exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part
of that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto
power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an
executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law.
These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed
regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any
regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide
that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain
period of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the
regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed
regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it.
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance
of power between the legislative and the executive branches of government as it
offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the executive branch or to
independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of
such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They
contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides
legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One
proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too
deeply embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the
complexities of modern government have often led Congress-whether by
actual or perceived necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals
and general statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy options to
the discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates legislative
aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties who may
or may not have participated in or agreed with the development of those
aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of
our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the
Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to
enact new legislation or to change existing law. But without some means
of overseeing post enactment activities of the executive branch,
Congress would be unable to determine whether its policies have been
implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether
legislative intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment
upon the executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment
measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend that
legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the President’s veto
authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial
branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances
separation of powers as it prevents the executive branch and independent
agencies from accumulating too much power. They submit that reporting
requirements and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to
scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow
Congress to review executive proposals before they take effect and they do not
afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding expressions of congressional
intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to participate prospectively
in the approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the
executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. They further
argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response by Congress to the accretion
of policy control by forces outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority,
they point out that legislative veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet
devised to retain control over the evolution and implementation of its policy as
declared by statute."
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court
resolved the validity of legislative veto provisions. The case arose from the
order of the immigration judge suspending the deportation of Chadha pursuant to
§ 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States House of
Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to §
244(c)(2) authorizing either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the
decision of the executive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain
in the United States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation
proceedings to implement the House order and the alien was ordered deported.
The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the alien’s appeal, holding that it
had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress. The United States
Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the House was without constitutional
authority to order the alien’s deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated the
constitutional doctrine on separation of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But
the Court shied away from the issue of separation of powers and instead
held that the provision violates the presentment clause and bicameralism. It held
that the one-house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As
such, it is subject to the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution
 requiring the passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the
President. x x x x x x x x x
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum
decision, two lower court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act of 1980. Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated
statutes containing legislative veto provisions although some of these provisions
required the approval of both Houses of Congress and thus met the
bicameralism requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions
were not even exercised.35(emphasis supplied)
In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional
oversight and considering the nature and powers of a constitutional body like the
Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the provision in RA 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee. The
committee was tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said
law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the
Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the
constitutional independence of the Commission on Elections. 36
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se,
meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It
may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation
of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative
sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. 37 It
may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial
power.38 And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the
Constitution,39 including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the
following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments
to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of confirmation40 and
(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 42
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by
the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress
which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to
approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative
veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-
turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny
and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad
powers.43 It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of
power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its
own laws.44
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the
broad horizons of its legislative competence. 45 It can itself formulate the details or it can
assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial
decisions in conformity with those standards. 46 In the latter case, the law must be
complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature.47 Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative
agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual
operation (contingent rule-making).48
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret
the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to
respect.49 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute50 and are just as
binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and
effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set
aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. 51 Congress, in the guise
of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them
to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established
by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335,
Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by
the Constitution.
Considered Opinion of
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga
Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval
by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional
principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment. 52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws)53 is vested in
Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of
Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers.
Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a
committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto,
both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are
invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a
law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it,
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with
the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and
if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law.
In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays,
and the names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in its
Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where
it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto.
In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become
a law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature
and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the
force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if approved by both
chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by
both Houses of Congress.54 Second, it must be presented to and approved by the
President.55 As summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz 56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57,
the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the
Senate except for some measures that must originate only in the former
chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure
and its referral by the Senate President or the Speaker to the proper committee
for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval,
with or without amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held
thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all be
consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this
stage that the bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended
when desired. The second reading is the most important stage in the passage of
a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies
thereof are distributed at least three days before the third reading. On the third
reading, the members merely register their votes and explain them if they are
allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will
also undergo the three readings. If there are differences between the versions
approved by the two chambers, a conference committee58 representing both
Houses will draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and the
House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his
consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter
authenticated with the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the
Secretaries of their respective chambers…59
The President’s role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it
takes effect as law after the required publication. 60
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted
pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in
all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it
may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it becomes effective
because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become
available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable
requisite of publication under the due process clause,61 the determination as to when a
law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress. 62 As such, it is only upon its
effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and
powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch,
particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law. 63
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under
this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as
is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the
law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as
unconstitutional. While there may be similar provisions of other laws that may be
invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from invalidating them
wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case assailing those
provisions is brought before us.64
The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of Section
12 of RA 9335 on the other provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law
unconstitutional? No.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by
a competent court, the remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such
declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and effect.
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,65 the Court laid down the following
rules:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a
statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather
than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be
so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not
constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so
mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements,
or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the
parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the
legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have
enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all
the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with
them.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and
detach any invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in
force and effect. The valid portions can stand independently of the invalid section.
Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a complete, intelligible and
valid law which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of rewards
and sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR
of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general
circulation66 and became effective 15 days thereafter. 67 Until and unless the contrary is
shown, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335
creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules
and regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335
is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force
and effect.
SO ORDERED.
 13
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio- See La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, 01
Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de- December 2004, 445 SCRA 1.
Castro, Brion, JJ., concur.
14
Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 (1997).

15
Section 2, id.

Footnotes 16
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R.
No. 148208, 15 December 2004, 446 SCRA 299.
* Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied
Workers. 17
173 U.S. 381 (1899).
1 18
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 74 U.S. 166 (1868).
2 19
An Act to Improve Revenue Collection Performance of the Bureau of Internal Black’s Law Dictionary, Special De Luxe 5th Edition, West, p. 481.
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) Through the Creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund and of a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board 20
158 Phil. 60 (1974).
and for Other Purposes.
21
3 Id. Citations omitted.
Section 2, RA 9335.
22
4 Ambros v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 159700, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA
Section 3, id. 572.
5
Section 4, id. 23
Section 2, RA 9335.
6
Section 6, id. 24
Section 18, Chapter 4, Title II, Book IV, Administrative Code of 1987.
7
Section 7, id. 25
Section 23, id.
8
Section 11, id. 26
Pelaez v. Auditor General, 122 Phil. 965 (1965).
9
Section 12, id. 27
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, G.R. No. L-76633, 18 October 1988,
10
166 SCRA 533.
Cruz, Isagani, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1995 edition, p. 23.
28
11
Cruz, Isagani, Philippine Political Law, 1991 edition, p. 97.
Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, 1996 edition, pp. 848-849. 29
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
12
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904 30
Section 5, Rule II, Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9335.
(2000). (Vitug, J., separate opinion)
31
De Guzman, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 391 Phil. 70 (2000).
32 49
See Section 46(b)(8), Chapter 6, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V, Administrative Eslao v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 108310, 01 September 1994, 236
Code of 1987. SCRA 161; Sierra Madre Trust v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 206 Phil. 310 (1983).
33
Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 152214,
50
19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 295. People v. Maceren, 169 Phil. 437 (1977).

34 51
453 Phil. 586 (2003). Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno’s separate opinion See Eslao v. Commission on Audit, supra.
was adopted as part of the ponencia in this case insofar as it related to the
creation of and the powers given to the Joint Congressional Oversight 52
It is also for these reasons that the United States Supreme Court struck down
Committee. legislative vetoes as unconstitutional in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha (462 U.S. 919 [1983]).
35
Id. (italics in the original)
53
Nachura, Antonio B., Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2006 edition, p. 236.
36
Id.
54
Section 26, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
37
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991). Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
38
Id.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
39
Id. passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
40
See Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno’s separate opinion in Macalintal. passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
41
E.g., by requiring the regular submission of reports. last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
42 the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
See Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno’s separate opinion in Macalintal.
55
43 See Bernas, supra note 48, p. 762.
See Tribe, Lawrence, I American Constitutional Law 131 (2000).
56
44 Philippine Political Law, 2002 edition, Central Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc.,
Id.
pp. 152-153.
45
Id. at 141. 57
The Philippine Constitution for Ladies, Gentlemen And Others, 2007 edition,
46 Rex Bookstore, Inc., pp. 118-119.
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Airport Noise, supra. 58
The conference committee consists of members nominated by both Houses.
47 The task of the conference committee, however, is not strictly limited to
Edu v. Ericta, 146 Phil. 469 (1970). reconciling differences. Jurisprudence also allows the committee to insert new
48
provision[s] not found in either original provided these are germane to the subject
Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A of the bill. Next, the reconciled version must be presented to both Houses for
Commentary, 2003 edition, p. 664 citing Wayman v. Southward, 10 Wheat 1 ratification. (Id.)
(1852) and The Brig Aurora, 7 Cr. 382 (1813)).
59
Supra note 56. law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and
regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement
60 legislative policy." (Id., at 686, citing Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law, 2003
Supra note 57.
Edition, at 24.) Law book authors are likewise virtually unanimous that the power
61
See Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. In Tañada v. Tuvera (230 Phil. of the executive branch to promulgate implementing rules arises from legislative
528), the Court also cited Section 6, Article III which recognizes "the right of the delegation. Justice Nachura defines the nature of the rule-making power of
people to information on matters of public concern." administrative bodies in the executive branch as "the exercise of delegated
legislative power, involving no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely
62 the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out
As much is recognized in Article 2 of the Civil Code which states that "Laws
in the law itself." (A.E. Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law [2000 ed.], at
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
272.) He further explains that rules and regulations that "fix the details in the
either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
execution and enforcement of a policy set out in the law" are called
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided." Tañada recognized that "unless it is
"supplementary or detailed legislation". (Id., at 273.) Other commentators such
otherwise provided" referred to the date of effectivity. Simply put, a law which is
as Fr. Bernas (Bernas, supra note 48, at 611), De Leon and De Leon (H. De
silent as to its effectivity date takes effect fifteen days following publication,
Leon & H. De Leon, Jr., Administrative Law: Text and Cases (1998 ed), at 79-80;
though there is no impediment for Congress to provide for a different effectivity
citing 1 Am. Jur. 2d 891) and Carlos Cruz (C. Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law
date.
(1998 ed), at 19-20, 22, 23) have similar views.
63
It has been suggested by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio that Section 12 of RA
The Congress may delegate the power to craft implementing rules to the
9335 is likewise unconstitutional because it violates the principle of separation of
President in his capacity as the head of the executive branch, which is tasked
powers, particularly with respect to the executive and the legislative branches.
under the Constitution to execute the law. In effecting this delegation, and as with
Implicit in this claim is the proposition that the ability of the President to
any other delegation of legislative powers, Congress may impose conditions or
promulgate implementing rules to legislation is inherent in the executive branch.
limitations which the executive branch is bound to observe. A usual example is
the designation by Congress of which particular members of the executive
There has long been a trend towards the delegation of powers, especially of branch should participate in the drafting of the implementing rules. This set-up
legislative powers, even if not expressly permitted by the Constitution. (I. Cortes, does not offend the separation of powers between the branches as it is
Administrative Law, at 12-13.) Delegation of legislative powers is permissible sanctioned by the delegation principle.
unless the delegation amounts to a surrender or abdication of powers. (Id.)
Recent instances of delegated legislative powers upheld by the Court include the
Apart from whatever rule-making power that Congress may delegate to the
power of the Departments of Justice and Health to promulgate rules and
President, the latter has inherent ordinance powers covering the executive
regulations on lethal injection (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 358 Phil. 410
branch as part of the power of executive control ("The President shall have
[1998]); the power of the Secretary of Health to phase out blood banks (Beltran v.
control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices…" Section 17,
Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 133640, 133661, & 139147, 25 November 2005,
Article VII, Constitution.). By its nature, this ordinance power does not require or
476 SCRA 168); and the power of the Departments of Finance and Labor to
entail delegation from Congress. Such faculty must be distinguished from the
promulgate Implementing Rules to the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
authority to issue implementing rules to legislation which does not inhere in the
Act. (Equi-Asia Placement v.DFA, G.R. No. 152214, 19 September 2006, 502
presidency but instead, as explained earlier, is delegated by Congress.
SCRA 295.)
The marked distinction between the President’s power to issue intrabranch
The delegation to the executive branch of the power to formulate and enact
orders and instructions or internal rules for the executive branch, on one hand,
implementing rules falls within the class of permissible delegation of legislative
and the President’s authority by virtue of legislative delegation to issue
powers. Most recently, in Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy
implementing rules to legislation, on the other, is embodied in the rules on
Industries (G.R. Nos. 164171, 164172 &168741, 20 February 2006, 482 SCRA
publication, as explained in Tañada v. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December
673), we characterized such delegation as "confer[ring] upon the President
1986, 146 SCRA 446). The Court held therein that internal regulations applicable
quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by the
to members of the executive branch, "that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties." (Id., at 454) The dispensation
with publication in such instances is rooted in the very nature of the
issuances, i.e., they are not binding on the public. They neither create rights nor
impose obligations which are enforceable in court. Since they are issued
pursuant to the power of executive control, and are directed only at members of
the executive branch, there is no constitutional need for their publication.
However, when the presidential issuance does create rights and obligations
affecting the public at large, as implementing rules certainly do, then publication
is mandatory. In explaining why this is so, the Court went as far as to note that
such rules and regulations are designed "to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant to a valid delegation." (Id., at 254.) The Court would not have
spoken of "valid delegation" if indeed the power to issue such rules was
inherent in the presidency. Moreover, the creation of legal rights and
obligations is legislative in character, and the President in whom legislative
power does not reside cannot confer legal rights or impose obligations on the
people absent the proper empowering statute. Thus, any presidential issuance
which purports to bear such legal effect on the public, such as implementing
rules to legislation, can only emanate from a legislative delegation to the
President.
The prevalent practice in the Office of the President is to issue orders or
instructions to officials of the executive branch regarding the enforcement or
carrying out of the law. This practice is valid conformably with the President’s
power of executive control. The faculty to issue such orders or instructions is
distinct from the power to promulgate implementing rules to legislation. The latter
originates from a different legal foundation – the delegation of legislative power to
the President.
Justice Carpio cites an unconventional interpretation of the ordinance power of
the President, particularly the power to issue executive orders, as set forth in the
Administrative Code of 1987. Yet, by practice, implementing rules are never
contained in executive orders. They are, instead, contained in a segregate
promulgation, usually entitled "Implementing Rules and Regulations," which
derives not from the Administrative Code, but rather from the specific grants in
the legislation itself sought to be implemented.
His position does not find textual support in the Administrative Code itself.
Section 2, Chapter 2, Title 1, Book III of the Code, which defines "Executive
orders" as "[a]cts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent
character in the implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory
powers". Executive orders are not the vehicles for rules of a general or
permanent character in the implementation or execution of laws. They are the
vehicle for rules of a general or permanent character in the implementation or
execution of the constitutional or statutory powers of the President himself.
Since by definition, the statutory powers of the President consist of a specific
delegation by Congress, it necessarily follows that the faculty to issue executive
orders to implement such delegated authority emanates not from any inherent
executive power but from the authority delegated by Congress.
It is not correct, as Justice Carpio posits, that without implementing rules,
legislation cannot be faithfully executed by the executive branch. Many of our key
laws, including the Civil Code, the Revised Penal Code, the Corporation Code,
the Land Registration Act and the Property Registration Decree, do not have
Implementing Rules. It has never been suggested that the enforcement of these
laws is unavailing, or that the absence of implementing rules to these laws
indicates insufficient statutory details that should preclude their enforcement.
(See DBM v.Kolonwel Trading, G.R. Nos. 175608, 175616 & 175659, 8 June
2007, 524 SCRA 591, 603.)
In rejecting the theory that the power to craft implementing rules is executive in
character and reaffirming instead that such power arises from a legislative grant,
the Court asserts that Congress retains the power to impose statutory conditions
in the drafting of implementing rules, provided that such conditions do not take on
the character of a legislative veto. Congress can designate which officers or
entities should participate in the drafting of implementing rules. It may impose
statutory restraints on the participants in the drafting of implementing rules, and
the President is obliged to observe such restraints on the executive officials,
even if he thinks they are unnecessary or foolhardy. The unconstitutional nature
of the legislative veto does not however bar Congress from imposing conditions
which the President must comply with in the execution of the law. After all, the
President has the constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws.
64
This stance is called for by judicial restraint as well as the presumption of
constitutionality accorded to laws enacted by Congress, a co-equal branch. It is
also finds support in Pelaez v. Auditor General (122 Phil. 965 [1965]).
65
346 Phil. 321 (1997). Emphasis in the original.
66
In particular, the Philippine Star and the Manila Standard.
67
Section 36, IRR of RA 9335.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the
Philippine Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO
as members of the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P.
PERLAS and HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN
FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT,
DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and
PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as
non-governmental organizations, petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI,
HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI
GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON
REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their
respective capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National
Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and
Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture;
ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO
ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the
membership thereto of the vast majority of countries has revolutionized international
business and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world
towards trade liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization,
deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new
borderless world of business by sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore
traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export
subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls.
Finding market niches and becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven
and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies
that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods and services.
In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, "Increased
participation in the world economy has become the key to domestic economic growth
and prosperity."
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War,
plans for the establishment of three multilateral institutions — inspired by that grand
political body, the United Nations — were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton
Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and
the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and
predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite
challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons, including
its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off.
What remained was only GATT — the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT
was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with
no institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable system of dispute
settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy
Round, the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that
administering body — the World Trade Organization — with the signing of the "Final Act"
in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members.1
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member
with the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate
(infra), of improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and
industrial products." The President also saw in the WTO the opening of "new
opportunities for the services sector . . . , (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty
associated with exporting . . . , and (the attraction of) more investments into the country."
Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines —
and this is of special interest to the legal profession — will benefit from the WTO system
of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent WTO settlement
bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade
disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived at
frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak and
underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and
products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and
(2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both
Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO
Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods."
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine
integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These
are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on
constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by
the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its
implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the
assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government
properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned
therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December
14, 1994.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of
Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act,2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
agreed:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration
of their respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval
of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated
August 11, 1994 from the President of the Philippines, 3 stating among others that "the
Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant
to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution."
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from
the President of the Philippines4 likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among
others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution."
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the
immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." 5
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which
"Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization."6 The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of
Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and
includes various agreements and associated legal instruments (identified in the said
Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral
Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
ANNEX 1
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of he
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
General on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
 Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating
Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights
ANNEX 2
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed7 the Instrument of
Ratification, declaring:
NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of
the Republic of the Philippines, after having seen and considered the
aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
and the agreements and associated legal instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are
integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do
hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article and Clause thereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is
composed of the Agreement Proper and "the associated legal instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts
thereof."
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the
WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996, 8 the Solicitor General describes
these two latter documents as follows:
The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations
and decisions on a wide range of matters, such as measures in favor of
least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on technical
barriers to trade and on dispute settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on,
among other things, standstill or limitations and qualifications of
commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access,
national treatment, and definitions of non-resident supplier of financial
services, commercial presence and new financial service.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on
respondents' comment and petitioners' reply thereto, the Court resolved on December
12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their
respective memoranda. The court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the
Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit
a paper, hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper," 9 for brevity, (1) providing a historical
background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:
(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the
matter in controversy and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in the
Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of
Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO
Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of
the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the
Final Act, as soon as possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case
submitted for resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor
General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various
"bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments involving derogation of
Philippine sovereignty." Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their Compliance dated
January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as
follows:
A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not
justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the
deliberations and voting leading to the concurrence are estopped from
impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization or of the validity of the concurrence.
C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs.
10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty
specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987
Philippine Constitution is "vested in the Congress of the Philippines";
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization interfere with the exercise of judicial power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they voted
for concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they
concurred only in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, and not with the Presidential submission which
included the Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents "synthesized the
several issues raised by petitioners into the following": 10
1. Whether or not the provisions of the "Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal
Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement" cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the
letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict
or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise
of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of
evidence.
4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate "in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization" implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final
Act.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the
Solicitor General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents
a political question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the
Senate (Wigberto E. Tañada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining
this suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of
discretion when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the WTO Agreement.
The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three issues thus:
(1) The "political question" issue — being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter
that probes into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case — was
deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the
respondents have effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any
event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not cause the petition's
dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to
the defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators
will be taken up as an integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by the
Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not
question the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the
benefit of such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues,
expenditures of public funds and serious international commitments of the nation are
involved here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues
be met head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by procedural
matters. 11
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION
INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS
NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS
THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS.
10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES
LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH
THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN
PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO
AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID,
CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT,
MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE
UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court
Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant
case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide." 13
14
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly
set out in the 1987 Constitution, 15 as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government
including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. 16As explained by former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, 17 "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature."
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, 18 it will not shirk,
digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in
matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding
that this petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled
upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we
have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not
review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the
country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy
espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the
government's economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative
restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional
duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO
Agreement and its three annexes.
Second Issue: The WTO Agreement
and Economic Nationalism
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution
mandating "economic nationalism" are violated by the so-called "parity provisions" and
"national treatment" clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement
and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the
following WTO provisions quoted in their memorandum: 19
a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS,
for brevity):

Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec 19, Article II, and Article 2
Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as follows:
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
Article II
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any TRIM that is
AND STATE POLICIES inconsistent with the provisions of Article II or Article XI of
GATT 1994.
xxx xxx xxx
2. An illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national the obligations of general elimination of quantitative
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of
GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this Agreement."
xxx xxx xxx (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol.
27, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 22121,
Article XII emphasis supplied).

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY The Annex referred to reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx ANNEX

Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment
provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those
which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under
administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an
advantage, and which require:

xxx xxx xxx (a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of

domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether
specified in terms of particular products, in terms of
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of
domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that
volume or value of its local production; or
help make them competitive.
 (b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported
products be limited to an amount related to the volume or
value of local products that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination
of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of
GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under
domestic laws or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which
is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or
related to the local production that it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or
related to its local production by restricting its access to
foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise; or
(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of
particular products, in terms of volume or value of
products, or in terms of a preparation of volume or value
of its local production. (Annex to the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round
Legal Documents, p. 22125, emphasis supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as
follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use, the provisions of this paragraph shall
not prevent the application of differential internal
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the
economic operation of the means of transport and not on
the nationality of the product." (Article III, GATT 1947, as
amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article
XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in
relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments p. 177, emphasis supplied).
(b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other
Members treatment no less favourable than that it
accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection
of intellectual property. . . (par. 1 Article 3, Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol.
31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 25432
(emphasis supplied)
(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to
any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each
Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of
any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting
the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than
it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by
according to services and service suppliers of any other
Member, either formally suppliers of any other Member,
either formally identical treatment or formally different
treatment to that it accords to its own like services and
service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall
be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the
conditions of completion in favour of services or service
suppliers of the Member compared to like services or
service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII,
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28,
Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p. 22610 emphasis
supplied).
It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of
the WTO Agreement "place nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the
Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by
Filipinos." The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context
of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity
of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in
the annexed agreements. 20 Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene
constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the
preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such
Charter provisions are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that
these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read
in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs.
1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with
Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect
developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade
liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles
Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state
policies." The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic
political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. 22 These principles in Article II are
not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. 23They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power
of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading
case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 24 the principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They
do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor 25 that broad constitutional principles need
legislative enactments to implement the, thus:
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal
Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13
(Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are
merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are basically
not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to
clearly define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They were rather
directives addressed to the executive and to the
legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to
heed the directives of the article, the available remedy
was not judicial but political. The electorate could express
their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the
legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas,
Vol. II, p. 2).
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of board
constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the
lack of judicial authority to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making." Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa
vs. Factoran, Jr., 26 explained these reasons as follows:
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show
a more specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly
lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is
or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public
respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render
judgment grating all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court
should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal
right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general
policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the
Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given
petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting
the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential
component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather
than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One
is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded
is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be
unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words,
there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific
violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved,
petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of
judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
 Sec. 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and
healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of
environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to
special technical competence and experience and professional
qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and
executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity
to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement
them before the courts should intervene.
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with
Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain
Balanced Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general
principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and
understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13
thereof which read:
Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in
the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit
of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the
quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on
sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries
that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and
which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However,
the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of
the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis
of equality and reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national
economic development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for
the benefit of the people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the
underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic
nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony" 27 and
in the use of "Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) by
mandating the State to "adopt measures that help make them competitive; 28 and (3) by
requiring the State to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos." 29 In similar language, the Constitution takes into
account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the
basis of equality ad reciprocity"; 30 and speaks of industries "which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of "Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices."
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance
System, et al., 31 this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is
enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It
refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of
Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there
are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that
are unfair. 32 In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of
the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.
In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to
Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in
advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority
of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto
powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of
sovereign equality, with each member's vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is
no WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council.
WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of
the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall be taken by the
majority of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the
Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member which would require
three fourths vote. Amendments would require two thirds vote in general.
Amendments to MFN provisions and the Amendments provision will
require assent of all members. Any member may withdraw from the
Agreement upon the expiration of six months from the date of notice of
withdrawals. 33
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the
WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO,
developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more
decisively than outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances
but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO
Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to "share in
the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development." These basic principles are found in the preamble 34of the WTO
Agreement as follows:
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade
in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development,
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs
and concerns at different levels of economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to
ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed
among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable
multilateral trading system encompassing the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of
the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives
underlying this multilateral trading system, . . . (emphasis supplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos
Protect Developing Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing
basic principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient
treatment, giving their domestic industries some protection from the rush of foreign
competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is given to
developing countries in terms of the amount of tariff reduction and the period within
which the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an average
tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected within a period of six
(6) years while developing countries — including the Philippines — are required to effect
an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic
support to agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for
developing countries to be effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries
to reduce their budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export volumes
receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For developing
countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for developed
countries and a longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and
trade practices including anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and
safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair
foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly
therefore any basis for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and
enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of control of the
economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the
Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in
joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their discretion. True, they have
made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic
liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, simply because we disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other
economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this case will not
pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic
policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Does Not
Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national
economy" 35 does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the
international community." As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that
is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its
most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion;
rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the
national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the
development of natural resources and public utilities. 36
The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without
discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of
equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade
policy based on "equality and reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law encourages industries
that are "competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a
clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the
gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign
markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and
tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino
entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to
grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers,
Not Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or
enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies
should be pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand,
respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino consumer the
best goods and services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices.
Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general
welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to
reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos' general welfare because it will — as
promised by its promoters — expand the country's exports and generate more
employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the
most reasonable rates to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for
which they are answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such
questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on
grave abuse of discretion.
 Constitution Designed to Meet
Future Events and Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was
drafted and ratified in 1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily
flawed in the sense that its framers might not have anticipated the advent of a borderless
world of business. By the same token, the United Nations was not yet in existence when
the 1935 Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then
Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of
sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering
part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN organs like the
Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the
vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and
unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand
the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of
change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and
respected jurist 38explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root
and not the blossom, the base and frame-work only of the edifice that is
yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a
twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly "in the crucible of
Filipino minds and hearts," where it will in time develop its sinews and
gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the
Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the
brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an
instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and
march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes
of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a
petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power
The WTO Agreement provides that "(e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its
laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the
annexed Agreements." 39 Petitioners maintain that this undertaking "unduly limits,
restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under
Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because this
means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest
and general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which
not only relates to the trade in goods . . . but also to the flow of investments and money .
. . as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters . . . 40
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to
tax, which is lodged in the Congress. 41 And while the Constitution allows Congress to
authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is subject to "specified limits
and . . . such limitations and restrictions" as Congress may provide, 42 as in fact it did
under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Sovereignty Limited by
International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed
their arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed
absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions
and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a
member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a
hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." 43 By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law,
which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. 44 One of the oldest and
most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international
agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken." 45
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty.
By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in
exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all,
states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted
objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise
absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between States
concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the
sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities,
the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims,
the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of
international organizations. 46 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in
reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations
imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations
imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, "Today, no nation can
build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of
interdependence is here." 47
UN Charter and Other Treaties
Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it
consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-
limitation."47-A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll members shall give the United
Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter,
and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is
taking preventive or enforcement action." Such assistance includes payment of its
corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but also in expenditures for
the peace-keeping operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20,
1961, the International Court of Justice held that money used by the United Nations
Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were "expenses of the United
Nations" under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its members must
bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress
is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate funds whether it
agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the said
Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities,
thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty of members within their own territory.
Another example: although "sovereign equality" and "domestic jurisdiction" of all
members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter, such provisos are
however subject to enforcement measures decided by the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A final
example: under Article 103, "(i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under
any other international agreement, their obligation under the present charter shall
prevail," thus unquestionably denying the Philippines — as a member — the sovereign
power to make a choice as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts
— both bilateral and multilateral — that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty.
These are enumerated by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24,
1996, as follows:
(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on
income, where the Philippines agreed, among others, to exempt from tax,
income received in the Philippines by, among others, the Federal
Reserve Bank of the United States, the Export/Import Bank of the United
States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the United
States. Likewise, in said convention, wages, salaries and similar
remunerations paid by the United States to its citizens for labor and
personal services performed by them as employees or officials of the
United States are exempt from income tax by the Philippines.
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the
avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of
double taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of
double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines
agreed to exempt from all customs duties, inspection fees and other
duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare
parts and supplies arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines
agreed to exempt from customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and
other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts,
regular equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on
Philippine soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines
granted Belgian air carriers the same privileges as those granted to
Japanese and Korean air carriers under separate air service agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas
where the Philippines exempted Israeli nationals from the requirement of
obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not
exceeding 59 days.
(i) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the
requirement of obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn not
exceeding 59 days.
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines
agreed that premises of Special Missions in the Philippines are inviolable
and its agents can not enter said premises without consent of the Head
of Mission concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs
duties, taxes and related charges.
 (k) Multilateral convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the
Philippines agreed to be governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The International Court of
Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation
of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact
which, if established, would constitute a breach "of international
obligation."
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its
sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying
consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the
other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines,
its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine
commitments under WTO-GATT.
International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human
rights, the environment, the law of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic
political sovereignty through the assumption of external obligations. But
unless anarchy in international relations is preferred as an alternative, in
most cases we accept that the benefits of the reciprocal obligations
involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss of political
sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure relations by reference to
durable, well-defined substantive norms and objective dispute resolution
procedures reduce the risks of larger countries exploiting raw economic
power to bully smaller countries, by subjecting power relations to some
form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to
gain disproportionately from trade liberalization. This is due to the simple
fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of potential new
trading relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced
success to the smaller country's market. 48
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be
waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations."
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic
Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) 49 intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedures. 50
51
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, it will be fruitful to restate
its full text as follows:
Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of
the rights of the owner referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of Article 28, if the
subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial
authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that
the process to obtain an identical product is different from the patented
process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least one of the
following circumstances, that any identical product when produced
without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is
new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical
product was made by the process and the owner of the
patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to
determine the process actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated
in paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if the condition
referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred
to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of
defendants in protecting their manufacturing and business secrets shall
be taken into account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (not the
words "in the absence of proof to the contrary") presumption that a product shown to be
identical to one produced with the use of a patented process shall be deemed to have
been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product
obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is "substantial likelihood" that
the identical product was made with the use of the said patented process but the owner
of the patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical
product. Hence, the "burden of proof" contemplated by Article 34 should actually be
understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such presumption.
Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to the "burden of evidence" (burden of
going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that his
product was produced without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of proof" since,
regardless of the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still
has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it
is "identical" to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of
"newness" of the genuine product or the fact of "substantial likelihood" that the identical
product was made by the patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the
present law on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the
Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented design
or utility model, thus:
Sec. 60. Infringement. — Infringement of a design patent or of a patent
for utility model shall consist in unauthorized copying of the patented
design or utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or
product and in the making, using or selling of the article or product
copying the patented design or utility model. Identity or substantial
identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute evidence
of copying. (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable
presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process in NEW or
(2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process
and the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the
process used. Where either of these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be
free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within
their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue
— derogation of legislative power — will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say
that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists.
Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due
process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents,
trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not
be substantial. 52
Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and
Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes
— but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial
Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services
— is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that
such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a
rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro,
in representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend that the
second letter of the President to the Senate 53 which enumerated what constitutes the
Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate.
"A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the
winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a
reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts
agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference." 54 It is not
the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference
which may have taken place over several years. The text of the "Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations" is contained in just
one page 55 in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
By signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the
Philippines undertook:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration
of their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval
of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final
Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO
Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for
ratification. They were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT
which provides that representatives of the members can meet "to give effect to those
provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to
facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement." 56
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh
does not apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which "have
indicated in their respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of
monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary entry
of personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with
respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinancing available in the normal
course of business."57
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements
are deemed included as its integral parts, 58 as follows:
Article II
Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional frame-work for the
conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters to the
agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to
this Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in
Annexes 1, 2, and 3, (hereinafter referred to as "Multilateral
Agreements") are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all
Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4
(hereinafter referred to as "Plurilateral Trade Agreements") are also part
of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are
binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not
create either obligation or rights for Members that have not accepted
them.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in
annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1994") is legally distinct from
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947,
annexed to the Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second
Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified, amended or
modified (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1947").
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown
by the members' deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President
Ramos dated August 11, 1994, 59 the senators
60
of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows:
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the
submission came up in the first day hearing of this Committee yesterday.
Was the observation made by Senator Tañada that what was submitted
to the Senate was not the agreement on establishing the World Trade
Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round which is not the same
as the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization? And on
that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of order which, however, he
agreed to withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for an
alternative solution at that time was acceptable. That suggestion was to
treat the proceedings of the Committee as being in the nature of briefings
for Senators until the question of the submission could be clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new . .
. is he making a new submission which improves on the clarity of the first
submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there
should be no misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify all matters
by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Tañada and later on Senator
Tolentino since they were the ones that raised this question yesterday?
Senator Tañada, please.
SEN. TAÑADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear
that what is being submitted to the Senate for ratification is not the Final
Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade
Organization as well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and
the Understanding and Commitments in Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President
Ramos.
SEN. TAÑADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tañada. Can we hear from
Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator
Lina.
SEN. TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission
actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it
now complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final
Act itself . The Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It
requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now being submitted. The
Final Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to with the
governments of the participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit
as appropriate the WTO Agreement for the consideration of the
respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures.
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to
the governments for ratification or acceptance as whatever their
constitutional procedures may provide but it is the World Trade
Organization Agreement. And if that is the one that is being submitted
now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act itself .
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator
Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a
matter of record. And they had been adequately reflected in the journal of
yesterday's session and I don't see any need for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante
cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you
want to make any comment on this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by
Senator Gonzales out of the abundance of question. Then the new
submission is, I believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have no
further comment to make.
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement,
petitioners are invoking this Court's constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate
Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of
discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is
amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 61 Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 62 Failure on the part of
the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the
petition. 63
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under
review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect
in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its
actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and
persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will
resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave
abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senate's processes, this
Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate's
exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of
Article VII of the Constitution. 64
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to
develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to
protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced
goods. But it is equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial and
legislative guides — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there
are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which
mandate the pursuit of a "trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity" and the
promotion of industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,"
thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of
sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption
of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its
consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it "a part of the law of the land" is a
legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross"
arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It
is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even
agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down
Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse
in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a
valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable
is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected
policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march
toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should
determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows
withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an
Asian Renaissance 65 where "the East will become the dominant region of the world
economically, politically and culturally in the next century." He refers to the "free market"
espoused by WTO as the "catalyst" in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at
present about 31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for
membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on
national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading
and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The alternative to
WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original
membership, keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its
on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the Philippines now
straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic prosperity and stability
in the new millennium. Let the people, through their duly authorized elected officers,
make their free choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla and Vitug, JJ., concur in the result.
Footnotes
1 In Annex "A" of her Memorandum, dated August 8, 1996, received by
this Court on August 12, 1996, Philippine Ambassador to the United
Nations, World Trade Organization and other international organizations
Lilia R. Bautista (hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper") submitted a
"46-year Chronology" of GATT as follows:
1947 The birth of GATT. On 30 October 1947, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
signed by 23 nations at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.
The Agreement contained tariff concessions agreed to in
the first multilateral trade negotiations and a set of rules
designed to prevent these concessions from being
frustrated by restrictive trade measures.
The 23 founding contracting parties were members of the
Preparatory Committee established by the United Nations
Economic and Social Council in 1946 to draft the charter
of the International Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO
was envisaged as the final leg of a triad of post-War
economic agencies (the other two were the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for
Reconstruction — later the World Bank).
In parallel with this task, the Committee members decided
to negotiate tariff concessions among themselves. From
April to October 1947, the participants completed some
123 negotiations and established 20 schedules containing
the tariff reductions and bindings which became an
integral part of GATT. These schedules resulting from the
first Round covered some 45,000 tariff concessions and
about $10 billion in trade.
GATT was conceived as an interim measure that put into
effect the commercial-policy provisions of the ITO. In
November, delegations from 56 countries met in Havana,
Cuba, to consider the to ITO draft as a whole. After long
and difficult negotiations, some 53 countries signed the
Final Act authenticating the text of the Havana Charter in
March 1948. There was no commitment, however, from
governments to ratification and, in the end, the ITO was
stillborn, leaving GATT as the only international
instrument governing the conduct of world trade.
1948 Entry into force. On 1 January 1948, GATT entered
into force. The 23 founding members were: Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China,
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United
Kingdom and the United States. The first Session of the
Contracting Parties was held from February to March in
Havana, Cuba. The secretariat of the Interim Commission
for the ITO, which served as the ad hoc secretariat of
GATT, moved from Lake Placid, New York, to Geneva.
The Contracting Parties held their second session in
Geneva from August to September.
1949 Second Round at Annecy. During the second
Round of trade negotiations, held from April to August at
Annecy, France, the contracting parties exchanged some
5,000 tariff concessions. At their third Session, they also
dealt with the accession of ten more countries.
1950 Third Round at Torquay. From September 1950 to
April 1951, the contracting parties exchanged some 8,700
tariff concessions in the English town, yielding tariff
reduction of about 25 per cent in relation to the 1948
level. Four more countries acceded to GATT. During the
fifth Session of the Contracting Parties, the United States
indicated that the ITO Charter would not be re-submitted
to the US Congress; this, in effect, meant that ITO would
not come into operation.
1956 Fourth Round at Geneva. The fourth Round was
completed in May and produced some $2.5 billion worth
of tariff reductions. At the beginning of the year, the GATT
commercial policy course for officials of developing
countries was inaugurated.
1958 The Haberler Report. GATT published Trends in
International Trade in October. Known as the "Haberler
Report" in honour of Professor Gottfried Haberler, the
chairman of the panel of eminent economists, it provided
initial guidelines for the work of GATT. The Contracting
Parties at their 13th Sessions, attended by Ministers,
subsequently established three committees in GATT:
Committee I to convene a further tariff negotiating
conference; Committee II to review the agricultural
policies of member governments and Committee III to
tackle the problem facing developing countries in their
trade. The establishment of the European Economic
Community during the previous year also demanded
large-scale tariff negotiations under Article XXIV: 6 of the
General Agreement.
1960 The Dillon Round. The fifth Round opened in
September and was divided into two phases: the first was
concerned with negotiations with EEC member states for
the creation of a single schedule of concessions for the
Community based on its Common External Tariff; and the
second was a further general round of tariff negotiations.
Named in honour of US Under-Secretary of State
Douglas Dillon who proposed the negotiations, the Round
was concluded in July 1962 and resulted in about 4,400
tariff concessions covering $4.9 billion of trade.
1961 The Short-Term Arrangement covering cotton
textiles was agreed as an exception to the GATT rules.
The arrangement permitted the negotiation of quota
restrictions affecting the exports of cotton-producing
countries. In 1962 the "Short Term" Arrangement became
the "Long term" Arrangement, lasting until 1974 when the
Multifibre Arrangement entered into force.
1964 The Kennedy Round. Meeting at Ministerial level, a
Trade Negotiations Committee formally opened the
Kennedy Round in May. In June 1967, the Round's Final
Act was signed by some 50 participating countries which
together accounted for 75 per cent of world trade. For the
first time, negotiations departed from the product-by-
product approach used in the previous Rounds to an
across-the-board or linear method of cutting tariffs for
industrial goods. The working hypothesis of a 50 per cent
target cut in tariff levels was achieved in many areas.
Concessions covered an estimated total value of trade of
about $410 billion. Separate agreements were reached
on grains, chemical products and a Code on Anti-
Dumping.
1965 A New Chapter. The early 1960s marked the
accession to the general Agreement of many newly-
independent developing countries. In February, the
Contracting Parties, meeting in a special session,
adopted the text of Part IV on Trade and Development.
The additional chapter to the GATT required developed
countries to accord high priority to the reduction of trade
barriers to products of developing countries. A Committee
on Trade and Development was established to oversee
the functioning of the new GATT provisions. In the
preceding year, GATT had established the International
Trade Centre (ITC) to help developing countries in trade
promotion and identification of potential markets. Since
1968, the ITC had been jointly operated by GATT and the
UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
1973 The Tokyo Round. The seventh Round was
launched by Ministers in September at the Japanese
capital. Some 99 countries participated in negotiating a
comprehensive body of agreements covering both tariff
and non-tariff matters. At the end of the Round in
November 1979, participants exchanged tariff reductions
and bindings which covered more than $300 billion of
trade. As a result of these cuts, the weighted average
tariff on manufactured goods in the world's nine major
industrial markets declined from 7.0 to 4.7 per cent.
Agreements were reached in the following areas:
subsidies and countervailing measures, technical barriers
to trade, import licensing procedures, government
procurement, customs valuation, a revised anti-dumping
code, trade in bovine meat, trade in dairy products and
trade in civil aircraft. The first concrete result of the Round
was the reduction of import duties and other trade barriers
by industrial countries on tropical products exported by
developing countries.
1974 On 1 January 1974, the Arrangement Regarding
International Trade in Textiles, otherwise known as the
Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), entered into force. It
superseded the arrangements that had been governing
trade in cotton textiles since 1961. The MFA seeks to
promote the expansion and progressive liberalization of
trade in textile products while at the same time avoiding
disruptive effects in individual markets and lines of
production. The MFA was extended in 1978, 1982, 1986,
1991 and 1992. MFA members account for most of the
world exports of textiles and clothing which in 1986
amounted to US$128 billion.
1982 Ministerial Meeting. Meeting for the first time in
nearly ten years, the GATT Ministers in November at
Geneva reaffirmed the validity of GATT rules for the
conduct of international trade and committed themselves
to combating protectionist pressures. They also
established a wide-ranging work programme for the
GATT which was to lay down the groundwork for a new
Round 1986. The Uruguay Round. The GATT Trade
Ministers meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, launched
the eighth Round of trade negotiations on 20 September.
The Punta del Este Declaration, while representing a
single political undertaking, was divided into two sections.
The first covered negotiations on trade in goods and the
second initiated negotiation on trade in services. In the
area of trade in goods, the Ministers committed
themselves to a "standstill" on new trade measures
inconsistent with their GATT obligations and to a
"rollback" programme aimed at phasing out existing
inconsistent measures. Envisaged to last four years,
negotiations started in early February 1987 in the
following areas tariffs, non-tariff measures, tropical
products, natural resource-based products, textiles and
clothing, agriculture, subsidies, safe-guards, trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights including trade in
counterfeit goods, and trade-related investment
measures. The work of other groups included a review of
GATT articles, the GATT dispute settlement procedure,
the Tokyo Round agreements, as well as the functioning
of the GATT system as a whole.
1994 "GATT 1994" is the updated version of GATT 1947
and takes into account the substantive and institutional
changes negotiated in the Uruguay Round GATT 1994 is
an integral part of the World Trade Organization
established on 1 January 1995. It is agreed that there be
a one year transition period during which certain GATT
 1947 bodies and commitments would co-exist with those
of the World Trade Organization.
2 The Final Act was signed by representatives of 125 entities, namely
Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentine Republic, Australia,
Republic of Austria, State of Bahrain, People's Republic of Bangladesh,
Barbados, The Kingdom of Belgium Belize, Republic of Benin, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, People's Republic of
China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Kingdom of Denmark, Commonwealth of
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Arab Republic of Egypt, El Salvador,
European Communities, Republic of Fiji, Finland, French Republic,
Gabonese Republic, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana,
Hellenic Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Republic of Guinea-Bissau,
Republic of Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland,
India, Indonesia, Ireland, State of Israel, Italian Republic, Jamaica,
Japan, Kenya, Korea, State of Kuwait, Kingdom of Lesotho, Principality
of Liechtenstein, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Macau, Republic of
Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Malaysia, Republic of Maldives,
Republic of Mali, Republic of Malta, Islamic Republic of Mauritania,
Republic of Mauritius, United Mexican States, Kingdom of Morocco,
Republic of Mozambique, Union of Myanmar, Republic of Namibia,
Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Republic of Niger,
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Kingdom of Norway, Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Potuguese Republic,
State of Qatar, Romania, Rwandese Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Kingdom of Spain, Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Republic of Surinam, Kingdom of
Swaziland, Kingdom of Sweden, Swiss Confederation, United Republic of
Tanzania, Kingdom of Thailand, Togolese Republic, Republic of Trinidad
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America,
Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Venezuela, Republic of Zaire, Republic of
Zambia, Republic of Zimbabwe; see pp. 6-25, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
3 11 August 1994
The Honorable Members
Senate
Through Senate President Edgardo Angara
Manila
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I have the honor to forward herewith an authenticated copy of the
Uruguay Round Final Act signed by Department of Trade and Industry
Secretary Rizalino S. Navarro for the Philippines on 15 April 1994 in
Marrakesh, Morocco.
The Uruguay Round Final Act aims to liberalize and expand world trade
and strengthen the interrelationship between trade and economic policies
affecting growth and development.
The Final Act will improve Philippine access to foreign markets,
especially its major trading partners through the reduction of tariffs on its
exports particularly agricultural and industrial products. These
concessions may be availed of by the Philippines, only if it is a member
of the World Trade Organization. By GATT estimates, the Philippines can
acquire additional export from $2.2 to $2.7 Billion annually under
Uruguay Round. This will be on top of the normal increase in exports that
the Philippines may experience.
The Final Act will also open up new opportunities for the services sector
in such areas as the movement of personnel, (e.g. professional services
and construction services), cross-border supply (e.g. computer-related
services), consumption abroad (e.g. tourism, convention services, etc.)
and commercial presence.
The clarified and improved rules and disciplines on anti-dumping and
countervailing measures will also benefit Philippine exporters by reducing
the costs ad uncertainty associated with exporting while at the same time
providing means for domestic industries to safeguard themselves against
unfair imports.
Likewise, the provision of adequate protection for intellectual property
rights is expected to attract more investments into the country and to
make it less vulnerable to unilateral actions by its trading partners (e.g.
Sec. 301 of the United States' Omnibus Trade Law).
In view of the foregoing, the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby O
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, S
Article VII of the Constitution.
4 11 August 1994
A draft of a proposed Resolution giving its concurrence to the aforesaid
Agreement is enclosed. The Honorable Members

V Senate
e
r Through Senate President Edgardo Angara
y
Manila
t
r
u Ladies and Gentlemen:
l
y I have the honor to forward herewith an authenticated copy of the
Uruguay Round Final Act signed by Department of Trade and Industry
y Secretary Rizalino S. Navarro for the Philippines on 13 April 1994 in
o Marrakech (sic), Morocco.
u
r Members of the trade negotiations committee, which included the
s Philippines, agreed that the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
, Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services embody the results
( of their negotiations and form an integral part of the Uruguay Round Final
S Act.
G
D By signing the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Philippines, through
. Secretary Navarro, agreed:
)
(a) To submit the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
F to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
I Constitution; and
D
E (b) To adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
L
The Uruguay Round Final Act aims to liberalize and expand world trade
V and strengthen the interrelationship between trade and economic policies
.
affecting growth and development.
R
A The Final Act will improve Philippine access to foreign markets,
M especially its major trading partners through the reduction of tariffs on its
exports particularly agricultural and industrial products. These y
concessions may be availed of by the Philippines, only if it is a member
of the World Trade Organization. By GATT estimates, the Philippines can y
acquire additional export revenues from $2.2 to $2.7 Billion annually o
under Uruguay Round. This will be on top of the normal increase in the u
exports that the Philippines may experience. r
s
The Final Act will also open up new opportunities for the services sector ,
in such areas as the movement of personnel, (e.g., professional services
and construction services), cross-border supply (e.g., computer-related (
services), consumption abroad (e.g., tourism, convention services, etc.) S
and commercial presence. G
D
The clarified and improved rules ad disciplines on anti-dumping and .
countervailing measures will also benefit Philippine exporters by reducing )
the costs and uncertainty associated with exporting while at the same
time providing a means for domestic industries to safeguard themselves F
against unfair imports. I
D
Likewise, the provision of adequate protection for intellectual property E
rights is expected to attract more investments into the country and to L
make it a less vulnerable to unilateral actions by its trading partners (e.g.,
Sec. 301 of the United States Omnibus Trade Law). V
.
In view of the foregoing, the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement
R
Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations
A
and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
M
Services, as embodied in the Uruguay Round Final Act and forming and
O
integral part thereof are hereby submitted to the Senate for its
S
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.

A draft of a proposed Resolution giving its concurrence to the aforesaid

Agreement is enclosed.

V
e 5 December 9, 1994
r
y HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA

t Senate President
r
u Senate Manila
l
Dear Senate President Angara: L

Pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 26 (2) Article VI of the Constitution, I V

hereby certify to the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083 .
entitled:
R
CONCURRING IN THE RATIFICATION OF THE A
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE M
ORGANIZATION O
S
to meet a public emergency consisting of the need for immediate
membership in the WTO in order to assure the benefits to the Philippine 6 Attached as Annex A, Petition; rollo, p. 52. P.S. 1083 is the forerunner
economy arising from such membership. of assailed Senate Resolution No. 97. It was prepared by the Committee
of the Whole on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade chaired by
Sen. Blas F. Ople and co-chaired by Sen. Gloria Macapagal-
V
Arroyo; see Annex C, Compliance of petitioners dated January 28, 1997.
e
r
y 7 The Philippines is thus considered an original or founding member of
WTO, which as of July 26, 1996 had 123 members as follows: Antigua
t and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
r Barbados, Belguim, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei
u Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African
l Republic, Chili, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus,
y Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, European Community, Fiji, Finland, France,
y Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea
o Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Honkong, Hungary, Iceland, India,
u Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait,
r Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macau, Madagascar, Malawi,
s Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco,
, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands — for the Kingdom in
Europe and for the Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
(
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and
S
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra
G
Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South
D
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland,
.
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
)
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See Annex A, Bautista Paper, infra.
F
I
D 8 Page 6; rollo p. 261.
E
9 In compliance, Ambassador Bautista submitted to the Court on August
12, 1996, a Memorandum (the "Bautista Paper") consisting of 56 pages
excluding annexes. This is the same document mentioned in footnote no.
1.
10 Memorandum for Respondents, p. 13; rollo, p. 268.
11 Cf . Kilosbayan Incorporated vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, July 17,
1995 for a discussion on locus standi. See also the Concurring Opinion of
Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 473,
April 6, 1995, as well as Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr.,
239 SCRA 386, 414, December 23, 1994.
12 Aquino, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196, September 17, 1974,
cited in Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, 795, September 26, 1991.
13 Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, 337, March 1, 1993.
14 See Tañada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et al., 103 Phil. 1051 for a
discussion on the scope of "political question."
15 Section 1, Article VIII, (par. 2).
16 In a privilege speech on May 17, 1993, entitled "Supreme Court —
Potential Tyrant?" Senator Arturo Tolentino concedes that this new
provision gives the Supreme Court a duty "to intrude into the jurisdiction
of the Congress or the President."
17 I Record of the Constitutional Commission 436.
18 Cf . Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496, December 21, 1989.
19 Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 14-16; rollo, pp. 204-206.
20 Par. 4, Article XVI, WTO Agreement, Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Vol. 1. p. 146.
21 Also entitled "Declaration of Principles." The nomenclature in the 1973
Charter is identical with that in the 1987's.
22 Philippine Political Law, 1962 Ed., p. 116.
23 Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II,
1988 Ed., p. 2. In the very recent case of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, p. 8, it was held that "A provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing."
24 246 SCRA 540, 564, July 17, 1995. See also Tolentino vs. Secretary
of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 and consolidated cases, August 25, 1995.
25 197 SCRA 52, 68, May 14, 1991.
26 224 SCRA 792, 817, July 30, 1993.
27 Sec. 10, Article XII.
28 Sec. 12, Article XII.
29 Sec. 19, Art. II.
30 Sec. 13, Art. XII.
31 G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, pp. 13-14.
32 Sec. 1, Art. XII.
33 Bautista Paper, p. 19.
34 Preamble, WTO Agreement p. 137, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Emphasis supplied.
35 Sec. 19, Article II, Constitution.
36 III Records of the Constitutional Commission 252.
37 Sec. 13, Article XII, Constitution.
38 Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 Ed., p. 13,
quoting his own article entitled, "A Quintessential Constitution" earlier
published in the San Beda Law Journal, April 1972; emphasis supplied.
39 Par. 4, Article XVI (Miscellaneous Provisions), WTO Agreement, p.
146, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
40 Memorandum for the Petitioners, p. 29; rollo, p. 219.
41 Sec. 24, Article VI, Constitution.
42 Subsection (2), Sec. 28, Article VI, Constitution.
43 Sec. 2, Article II, Constitution.
44 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 Ed., p. 55.
45 Salonga and Yap, op cit 305.
46 Salonga, op. cit., p. 287.
47 Quoted in Paras and Paras, Jr., International Law and World Politics,
1994 Ed., p. 178.
47-A Reagan vs. Commission of Internal Revenue, 30 SCRA 968, 973,
December 27, 1969.
48 Trebilcock and Howse. The Regulation of International Trade, p. 14,
London, 1995, cited on p. 55-56, Bautista Paper.
49 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 31, p. 25445.
50 Item 5, Sec. 5, Article VIII, Constitution.
51 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 31, p. 25445.
52 Bautista Paper, p. 13.
53 See footnote 3 of the text of this letter.
54 Salonga and Yap, op cit., pp. 289-290.
55 The full text, without the signatures, of the Final Act is as follows:
Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
1. Having met in order to conclude the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, representatives of the governments and of the
European Communities, members of the Trade Negotiations Committee,
agree that the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(referred to in the Final Act as the "WTO Agreement"), the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services, as annexed hereto, embody the results of their
negotiations and form an integral part of this Final Act.
2. By signing to the present Final Act, the representatives agree.
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the
consideration of their respective competent authorities
with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in
accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
3. The representatives agree on the desirability of acceptance of the
WTO Agreement by all participants in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (hereinafter referred to as "participants") with a view
to its entry into force by 1 January 1995, or as early as possible
thereafter. Not later than late 1994, Ministers will meet, in accordance
with the final paragraph of the Punta del Este Ministerial Declarations, to
decide on the international implementation of the results, including the
timing of their entry into force.
4. the representatives agree that the WTO Agreement shall be open for
acceptance as a whole, by signature or otherwise, by all participants
pursuant to Article XIV thereof. The acceptance and entry into force of a
Plurilateral Trade Agreement included in Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement
shall be governed by the provisions of that Plurilateral Trade Agreement.
5. Before accepting the WTO Agreement, participants which are not
contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade must
first have concluded negotiations for their accession to the General
Agreement and become contracting parties thereto. For participants
which are not contracting parties to the general Agreement as of the date
of the Final Act, the Schedules are not definitive and shall be
subsequently completed for the purpose of their accession to the General
Agreement and acceptance of the WTO Agreement.
6. This Final Act and the texts annexed hereto shall be deposited with the
Director-General to the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade who shall promptly furnish to each
participant a certified copy thereof.

DONE at Marrakesh this fifteenth day of April one thousand nine hundred
and ninety-four, in a single copy, in the English, French and Spanish
languages, each text being authentic.

56 Bautista Paper, p. 16.

57 Baustista Paper, p. 16.

58 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. I, pp. 137-138.

59 See footnote 3 for complete text.

60 Taken from pp. 63-85, "Respondent" Memorandum.

61 Zarate vs. Olegario, G.R. No. 90655, October 7, 1996.

62 San Sebastian College vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 138, 144,
May 15, 1991; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, 195 SCRA 444, 458 March 20, 1991; Simon vs. Civil Service
Commission, 215 SCRA 410, November 5, 1992; Bustamante vs.
Commissioner on Audit, 216 SCRA 134, 136, November 27, 1992.

63 Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, 192 SCRA 84, 94, December
4, 1990.

64 Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and

effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate."

65 Reader's Digest, December 1996 issue, p. 28.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners,
vs.
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for she
sovereign acts, of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal
workings of the Senate. Where no provision of the Constitution or the laws or even the
Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked,
grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their
competence and authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will
remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
The Case
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted
an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking
the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the
declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and
the solicitor general "to file COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of fifteen
(15) days from notice." On August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor general
submitted their respective Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated
September 1, 1998, petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998.
Noting said pleading, this Court gave due course to the petition and deemed the
controversy submitted for decision, without need of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent
jurisdiction1 to hear and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts
impels a filing of such petitions in the lower tribunals. 2 However, for special and
important reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the
present case, this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine. 3 In fact, original
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of
legislative officers like the Senate President4 and the Speaker of the House 5 have
been recognized as exceptions to this rule.
The Facts
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmeña as presiding
officer, convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh
Congress. At the time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition of the Senate
was as follows: 6
10 members — Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members — Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United
Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP)
1 member — Liberal Party (LP)
1 member — Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member — People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member — Gabay Bayan
2 members — Independent
——
23 — total number of senators 7 (The last six members are all
classified by petitioners as "independent".)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F.
Ople to the position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen.
Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam
Defenser Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, 8 Senator Fernan was declared the duly
elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and
Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of
minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan
comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing
nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan
M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party
— numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The
following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators
Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the
Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a
letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators,9 stating that they had
elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the
Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject
petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader,
a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for
resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
The Court's Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings 10 and a careful deliberation on the
arguments, pro and con, the Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or
grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of and the assumption into
office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.
First Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in arguing that this Court has
jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They
submit that the definitions of "majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation of
the Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof, stating that "[t]he
Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members."
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in
common that the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal
matter pertaining exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over which the Court
cannot exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of separation of
powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the fundamental law
does not provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The legislature
alone has the full discretion to provide for such office and, in that event, to
determine the procedure of selecting its occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no
question involving an interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or
even the Rules of the Senate; neither are there "peculiar circumstances" impelling
the Court to assume jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor general adds that
there is not even any legislative practice to support the petitioners' theory that a
senator who votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from becoming
the minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated
on the various important cases involving this very important and basic question,
which it has ruled upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Court's
power of judicial review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or
application of a provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of
either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over
questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature,
whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies." 12
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of
who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy
falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for
reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the
light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the
resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision
on the presence of a quorum to hold a session 13 and therein elect a Senate
President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with the majority
that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present . . . so as to establish in
this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to
see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution,
not only in justiceable but political questions as well." 14
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the
upper chamber of Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in
the House of Representatives. It has already involved the President
of the Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national
crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from any
quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the
people for an effective settlement are pinned. 15
. . . This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can
settle or decide if this Court should refuse to decide them. 16
. . . The constitutional question of quorum should not be left
unanswered. 17
In Tañada v. Cueno, 18 this Court endeavored to define political question. And we
said that "it refers to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government.' It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
[the] legality, of a particular measure." 19
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these
members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was
subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. 20 Thus, the Court held that not
only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection
proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia, 21 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
wrote that the Court "had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the
factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of
the writ [of habeas corpus]." This ruling was made in spite of the previous
pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker 22 and Montenegro v. Castañeda 23 that "the
authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege . . .) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive'
upon the courts and upon all other persons." But the Chief Justice cautioned: "the
function of the Court is merely to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or to
ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of
his act."
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive
Secretary: 24
The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of
similar character are justiciable, not political, is plain and simple.
One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called
political questions is the principle of separation of powers —
characteristic of the presidential system of government — the
functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their
nature, into three (3) categories, namely, 1) those involving the
making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department; 2)
those concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of
judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which
belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing with the
settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights,
duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable,
which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere —
but only within such sphere — each department is supreme and
independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only
to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of
the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the
 advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or
decisions made by the other departments — provided that such
acts, measures or decisions are within the area allocated thereto by
the Constitution.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or
subject to limitations, the issue of whether or not the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations
respected is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem
being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom.
Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations —
particularly those prescribed by the Constitution — would be set at
naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the
settlement thereof are the main functions of the courts of justice
under the presidential form of government adopted in our 1935
Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its
basic predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority
nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under
the ineluctable obligation — made particularly more exacting and
peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the
land, to support and defend the Constitution — to settle it. This
explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it
was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power," to
determine whether another branch of the government has
"kept within constitutional limits."
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the
scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the
courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. 25
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements
of the Court. Daza v. Singson, 26 Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr. 27 and Guingona Jr. v.
Gonzales 28 similarly resolved issues assailing the acts of the leaders of both
houses of Congress in apportioning among political parties the seats to which
each chamber was entitled in the Commission on Appointments. The Court held
that the issue was justiciable, "even if the question were political in nature," since
it involved "the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission
on Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution."
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Tañada v. Angara, 29 wherein the
petitioners sought to nullify the Senate's concurrence in the ratification of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: "Where an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute." The Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over
petitions questioning, an act of the political departments of government, it will not
review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it down only
on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of
discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 30 (HRET), the
Court refused to reverse a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that
said tribunal had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority had been conferred upon the
electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and of the Senate as sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, the returns, and the qualifications of
their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive. 31 The Court
may inquire into a decision or resolution of said tribunals only if such "decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion" 32
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia, 33 was asked to reexamine the
enrolled bill doctrine and to look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives that the bill, which was later enacted as Republic Act
8240, was properly approved by the legislative body. Petitioners claimed that
certain procedural rules of the House had been breached in the passage of the bill.
They averred further that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House rules
was a violation of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of
concerned the internal procedures of the House, with which the Court had no
concern. It enucleated: 34
It would-be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as
void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own
rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena
to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been
 invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real
or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess
of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of discretion
were it to do so. . . . In the absence of anything to the contrary, the
Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and
deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
In the instant controversy, the petitioners — one of whom is Senator Santiago, a
well-known constitutionalist — try to hew closely to these jurisprudential
parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the constitution, has not
been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the
Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part
of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint
or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief
asserted. 35 In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this
Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction
of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of
their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue:
Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial
question: In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did
the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the
Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the
constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President "by majority
vote of all members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of
"majority" and "minority," as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue
that "majority" in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of
senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted
committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee
and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to
determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent
Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he voted for Respondent
Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not belong to the minority,
having voted for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear
support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from
practices of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring
to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the number
greater than half or more than half of any total."36 The plain and unambiguous
words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President
must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any
construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority," much less the
"minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our
Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it
does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso
facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily,
no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become
the minority leader.
The Comment 37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents,
which were not contested in petitioners' Reply. During the eighth Congress, which
was the first to convene after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
nomination of Sen. Jovito R Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a
member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. 38 During the ninth regular
session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a
consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to all senators,
including those belonging to the minority. 39 This practice continued during the
tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was allowed to chair a
committee. 40 History would also show that the "majority" in either house of
Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of
lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to a party with a lesser
number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority
may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of
votes," 41 not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as
plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number
of votes or adherents than the majority." 42 Between two unequal parts or numbers
comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority
while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal
groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the
leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system
such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could
be several minority parties, one of which has to be indentified by the Comelec as
the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the general elections. In the
prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different
political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision
prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a
combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and
a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To our mind,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by
this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to
determine the rules of its proceedings." 44 Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated
and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal affairs. 45 Pertinent to the instant
case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
Sec 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a
President, a President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-
Arms.
These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the
discharge of their duties.
Rule II
ELECTION OF OFFICER
Sec. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority
vote of all its Members. Should there be more than one candidate
for the same office, a nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the
elections shall be by viva voce or by resolution.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such
offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders
thereof, At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually
extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the
acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of
separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its
work. 46 Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of
the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion
and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene. 47
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints
of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them." 48 Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern
to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body 49 at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide
for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and
discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This
Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive
realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect
and uphold — the very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect
and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this
Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court
will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in
upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to
judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the
practice of the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been lodged in the
legislative department, this Court may still inquire whether an act of Congress or
its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion. 50 This is the plain
implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers
upon the judiciary the power and the duty not only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but likewise "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part: 51
. . . the powers of government are generally considered divided into
three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary.
Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy[, the] power to determine
whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of
this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions,
first, of Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue:
Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of
power 52 by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. 53 A quo
warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to
the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. 54 The action
may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor 55 or any person
claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held
or exercised by another. 56 The action shall be brought against the person who
allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding of exercising such
office. 57
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must
show that he or she has aclear right to the contested office or to use or exercise
the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the
respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in
determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid
down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has
been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality
or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption and exercise of the
powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority
leader.
Fourth Issue:
Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" is
restricted only by the definition and confines of the term "grave abuse of
discretion."
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. 59
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his
discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties
in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of
this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate
President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least
two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to
articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be
accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the
Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to
have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot
be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo, Puno, Martinez, Quisumbing and Pardo, JJ.,
concur.
Romero, J., Please see separate opinion.
Bellosillo, J., No part. Did not take part in deliberation.
Vitug, J., Pls. see separate opinion.
Kapunan, J., I concur with Justice Mendoza's concurring and dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., Please see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Purisima, J., Join concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Mendoza.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part;
I concur in the judgment of the Court, but I disagree that "[it] has jurisdiction over
the petition [in this case] to determine whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the
exercise of their functions and prerogatives."1
The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The question who constitute the
minority in the Senate entitled to elect the minority leader of that chamber is
political. It respects the internal affairs of a coequal department of the government
and is thus addressed solely to that august body.
Courts have no power to inquire into the internal organization and business of a
house of Congress except as the question affects the rights of third parties or a
specific constitutional limitation is involved.
For this reason this Court has declined to take cognizance of cases involving the
discipline of members2 of the legislature and the application and interpretation of
the rules of procedure of a house.3 For indeed, these matters pertain to the
internal government of Congress and are within its exclusive jurisdiction.
Dean Sinco has pointed out that the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate are not state officers. They do not attain these
positions by popular vote but only by the vote of their respective chambers. They
receive their mandate as such not from the voters but from their peers in the
house. While their offices are a constitutional creation, nevertheless they are only
legislative officers. It is their position as members of Congress which gives them
the status of state officers. As presiding officers of their respective chambers,
their election as well as removal is determined by the vote of the majority of the
members of the house to which they belong.4 Thus, Art VI, §16(1) of the
Constitution provides:
The Senate shall elect its President and the of Representatives its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
This is likewise true of the "other officers" of each house whose election
and removal rest solely within the prerogative of the members and is no
concern of the courts.
Indeed, in those cases in which this Court took cognizance of matters pertaining
to the internal government of each house, infringements of specific constitutional
limitations were alleged.
In Avelino v. Cuenco,5 the question was whether with only 12 senators present
there was a quorum for the election of the Senate President, considering that, of
the 24 members, one was in the hospital while another one was abroad. The case
called for an interpretation of Art. VI, §10(2) of the 1935 Constitution which
provided that "A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.
. . ." While initially declining to assume jurisdiction, this Court finally took
cognizance of the matter. As Justice Perfecto, whose separate opinion in support
of the assumption of jurisdiction was one of the reasons which persuaded the
Court to intervene in the Senate imbroglio, stated, "Whether there was a quorum
or not in the meeting of twelve Senators . . . is a question that calls for the
interpretation, application and enforcement of an express and specific provision of
the Constitution."6 In his view, "The word quorum is a mathematical word. It has,
as such, a precise and exact mathematical meaning. A majority means more than
one-half (1/2)." 7
In Tañada v. Cuenco,8 the question was whether the majority could fill the seats
intended for the minority party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal when there are not
enough minority members in the Senate. Again, the question was governed by a
specific provision (Art. VI, §11) of the 1935 charter which provided that the
Electoral Tribunals of each house should be composed of "nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court . . . I and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen by each House, three upon the nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second
largest number of votes therein." There was, therefore, a specific constitutional
provision to be applied.
The cases9 concerning the composition of the Commission on Appointments
likewise involved the mere application of a constitutional provision, specifically
Art. VI, §18 of the present Constitution which provides that the Commission shall
be composed of "twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein." Undoubtedly, the Court had
jurisdiction over the cases.
On the other hand, as long as the proportional representation of political parties
and organizations is observed the Court has held itself to be without jurisdiction
over the choice of nominees. In Cabili v. Francisco, 10 it declined to take
cognizance of a quo warranto suit seeking to annul the recomposition of the
Senate representation in the Commission and to reinstate a particular senator
after satisfying itself that such recomposition of the Senate representation was not
a "departure from the constitution mandate requiring proportional representation
of the political organizations in the Commission on Appointments."
It is true that in Cunanan v. Tan 11 this Court took cognizance of the case which
involved the reorganization of the Commission as a result of the realignment of
political forces in the House of Representatives and the formation of a temporary
alliance. But the Court's decision was justified because the case actually involved
the right of a third party whose nomination by the President had been rejected by
the reorganized Commission. As held in Pacete v. The Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments. 12 where the construction to be given to a rule
affects persons other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is judicial in character.
In contrast to the specific constitutional limitations involved in the foregoing
cases, beyond providing that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall
elect a President and Speaker, respectively, and such other officers as each house
shall determine "by a majority vote of all [their] respective Members," the
Constitution leaves everything else to each house of Congress. Such matters are
political and are left solely to the judgment of the legislative department of the
government.
This case involves neither an infringement of specific constitutional limitations
nor a violation of the rights of a party not a member of Congress. This Court has
jurisdiction over this case only in the sense that determining whether the question
involved is reserved to Congress is itself an exercise of jurisdiction in the same
way that a court which dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction must in a narrow
sense have jurisdiction since it cannot dismiss the case if it were otherwise. The
determination of whether the question involved is justiciable or not is in itself a
process of constitutional interpretation. This is the great lesson ofMarbury v.
Madison 13 in which the U.S. Supreme Court, while affirming its power of review, in
the end held itself to be without jurisdiction because the Judiciary Act of 1789
granting it jurisdiction over that case was unconstitutional. In other words, a court
doing a Marbury v. Madison has no jurisdiction except to declare itself without
jurisdiction over the case.
I vote to dismiss the petition in this case for lack of jurisdiction.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion;
"Loyalty to petrified opinion never yet broke a chain or freed a human soul."
These words vividly inscribed just beneath Mark Twain's bust at the Hall of Fame
veritably speaks about the creativity and dynamism which ought to characterize
our perspective of things. It instructs us to broaden our horizon that we may not
be held captive by ignorance. Free and robust thinking is the imperative.
But there are times when one has to render fealty to certain fundamental precepts
and I believe that this occasion presents an opportunity to do so. Thus, as I join
the majority and cast my vote today for the denial of the instant petition, may I just
be allowed to reiterate jurisprudential postulates which I have long embraced, not
for the sake of "loyalty to petrified opinion" but to stress consistency in doctrine
in the hope that all future disputes of this nature may be similarly resolved in this
manner.
This is not actually the first time that the Court has been invited to resolve a matter
originating from the internal processes undertaken by a co-equal branch of
government, more particularly the Senate in this case. Earlier, in the landmark
case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al.,1 we were confronted, among other
things, by the issue of whether a significant tax measure namely, Republic Act.
No. 7716 (Expanded Value-Added Tax Law), went through the legislative mill in
keeping with the constitutionally-mandated procedure for the passage of bills.
Speaking through Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the majority upheld the tax
measure's validity, relying on the enrolled bill theory and the view that the Court is
not the appropriate forum to enforce internal legislative rules supposedly violated
when the bill was being passed by Congress. I took a different view, however, from
the majority because of what I felt was a sweeping reliance on said doctrines
without giving due regard to the peculiar facts of the case. I underscored that
these principles may not be applied where the internal legislative rules would
breach the Constitution which this Court has a solemn duty to uphold. It was my
position then that the introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral
Committee Report violated the constitutional proscription against any amendment
to a bill upon the last reading thereof and which this Court, in the exercise of its
judicial power, can properly inquire into without running afoul of the principle of
separation of powers.
Last year,2 Arroyo, et al. v. de Venecia, et al.3 presented an opportunity for me to
clarify my position further. In that case, Congressman Joker Arroyo filed a petition
before the Court complaining that during a session by the House of
Representatives, he was effectively prevented from raising the question of quorum
which to him tainted the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, or the so-called "sin
taxes" law. The Court, speaking again through Justice Mendoza, dismissed Mr.
Arroyo's petition, arguing in the main that courts are denied the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with
its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. Concurring with the
majority opinion, I discerned a need to explain my position then because of
possible misinterpretation. I was very emphatic that I did not abandon my position
in Tolentino, the facts as presented in Arroyo being radically different from the
former. In keeping with my view that judicial review is permissible only to uphold
the Constitution, I pointed out that the legislative rules allegedly violated were
purely internal and had no direct or reasonable nexus to the requirements and
proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of a bill which would otherwise
warrant the Court's intervention.
In the instant case, at the risk of being repetitious, I again take a similar stand as
the ones I made in the two cited cases.
Although this case involves the question of who is the rightful occupant of a
Senate "office" and does not deal with the passage of a bill or the observance of
internal rules for the Senate's conduct of its business, the same ground as I
previously invoked may justify the Court's refusal to pry into the procedures of the
Senate. There is to me no constitutional breach which has been made and, ergo,
there is nothing for this Court to uphold. The interpretation placed by petitioners
on Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution clearly does not find support
in the text thereof. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an
end to that which is implied. The majority vote required for the election of a Senate
President and a Speaker of the House of Representatives speaks only of such
number or quantity of votes for an aspirant to be lawfully elected as such. There is
here no declaration that by so electing, each of the two Houses of Congress is
thereby divided into camps called the "majority" and the "minority." In fact, the
"offices" of Majority Floor Leader and Minority Floor Leader are not explicitly
provided for as constitutional offices. As pointed out by my esteemed colleague,
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who penned the herein majority opinion, even on
the theory that under paragraph 2, Section 16 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution,
each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary, still "the
method of choosing who will be such officers is merely a derivative of the exercise
of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision." With the
prerogative being, therefore, bestowed upon the Senate, whatever differences the
parties may have against each other must be settled in their own turf and the
Court, conscious as it is of its constitutionally-delineated powers, will not take a
perilous move to overstep the same.
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
The 1987 Constitution, like the counterpart 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, has
continued to be implicit in its recognition of the time-honored precept of
separation of powers which enjoins upon each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary — proper acknowledgment and respect for each other.
The Supreme Court, said to be holding neither the "purse" (held by Congress) nor
the "sword" (held by the Executive) but serving as the balance wheel in the State
governance, functions both as the tribunal of last resort and as the Constitutional
Court of the nation.1 Peculiar, however, to the present Constitution, specifically
under Article VII, Section 1, thereof, is the extended jurisdiction of judicial power
that now explicitly allows the determination of "whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government."2 This expanded concept of
judicial power seems to have been dictated by the martial law experience and to
be an immediate reaction to the abuse in the frequent recourse to the political
question doctrine that in no small measure has emasculated the Court. The term
"political question," in this context, refers to matters which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in
regard to which discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government.
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, should not be thought of as having been tasked
with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. I find it here
opportune to reiterate what I have stated inTolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,3 viz:
I cannot yet concede to the novel theory, so challengingly
provocative as it might be, that under the 1987 Constitution the
Court may now at good liberty intrude, in the guise of the people's
imprimatur, into every affair of government. What significance can
still then remain, I ask, of the time honored and widely acclaimed
principle of separation of powers if, at every turn, the Court allows
itself to pass upon at will the disposition of a co-equal, independent
and coordinate branch in our system of government. I dread to think
of the so varied uncertainties that such an undue interference can
lead to. The respect for long standing doctrines in our
jurisprudence, nourished through time, is one of maturity, not
timidity, of stability rather than quiescence.
Pervasive and limitless, such as it, may seem to be, judicial power still
succumbs to the paramount doctrine of separation of powers. Congress is
the branch of government, composed of the representatives of the people,
that lays down the policies of government and provides the direction that
the nation must take. The Executive carries out that mandate. Certainly, the
Court will not negate that which is done by these, co-equal and co-ordinate
branches merely because of a perceived case of grave abuse of discretion
on their part, clearly too relative a phrase to be its own sentinel against
misuse, even as it will not hesitate to wield the power if that abuse
becomes all too clear. The exercise of judicial statesmanship, not judicial
tyranny, is what has been envisioned by and institutionalized in the 1987
Constitution.
There is no harnbook rule by which grave abuse of discretion may be determined.
The provision was evidently couched in general terms to make it malleable to
judicial interpretation in the light of any contemporary or emerging millieu. In its
normal concept, the term has been said to imply capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, amounting, to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or at the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner such as by reason of passion or
personal hostility. When the question, however, pertains to an affair internal to
either of Congress or the Executive, I would subscribe to thedictum, somewhat
made implicit in my understanding of Arroyo vs. De Venecia,4 that unless an
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court
will not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two
branches of government. Verily, in this situation, it is an impairment or a clear
disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel
door for judicial intervention.
In the instant settings, I find insufficient indication to have the case hew to the
above rule.
Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part;
I concur in the judgment of the Court, but I disagree that "[it] has jurisdiction over
the petition [in this case] to determine whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the
exercise of their functions and prerogatives."1
The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The question who constitute the
minority in the Senate entitled to elect the minority leader of that chamber is
political. It respects the internal affairs of a coequal department of the government
and is thus addressed solely to that august body.
Courts have no power to inquire into the internal organization and business of a
house of Congress except as the question affects the rights of third parties or a
specific constitutional limitation is involved.
For this reason this Court has declined to take cognizance of cases involving the
discipline of members2 of the legislature and the application and interpretation of
the rules of procedure of a house.3 For indeed, these matters pertain to the
internal government of Congress and are within its exclusive jurisdiction.
Dean Sinco has pointed out that the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate are not state officers. They do not attain these
positions by popular vote but only by the vote of their respective chambers. They
receive their mandate as such not from the voters but from their peers in the
house. While their offices are a constitutional creation, nevertheless they are only
legislative officers. It is their position as members of Congress which gives them
the status of state officers. As presiding officers of their respective chambers,
their election as well as removal is determined by the vote of the majority of the
members of the house to which they belong.4 Thus, Art VI, §16(1) of the
Constitution provides:
The Senate shall elect its President and the of Representatives its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
This is likewise true of the "other officers" of each house whose election
and removal rest solely within the prerogative of the members and is no
concern of the courts.
Indeed, in those cases in which this Court took cognizance of matters pertaining
to the internal government of each house, infringements of specific constitutional
limitations were alleged.
In Avelino v. Cuenco,5 the question was whether with only 12 senators present
there was a quorum for the election of the Senate President, considering that, of
the 24 members, one was in the hospital while another one was abroad. The case
called for an interpretation of Art. VI, §10(2) of the 1935 Constitution which
provided that "A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.
. . ." While initially declining to assume jurisdiction, this Court finally took
cognizance of the matter. As Justice Perfecto, whose separate opinion in support
of the assumption of jurisdiction was one of the reasons which persuaded the
Court to intervene in the Senate imbroglio, stated, "Whether there was a quorum
or not in the meeting of twelve Senators . . . is a question that calls for the
interpretation, application and enforcement of an express and specific provision of
the Constitution."6 In his view, "The word quorum is a mathematical word. It has,
as such, a precise and exact mathematical meaning. A majority means more than
one-half (1/2)." 7
In Tañada v. Cuenco,8 the question was whether the majority could fill the seats
intended for the minority party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal when there are not
enough minority members in the Senate. Again, the question was governed by a
specific provision (Art. VI, §11) of the 1935 charter which provided that the
Electoral Tribunals of each house should be composed of "nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court . . . I and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen by each House, three upon the nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second
largest number of votes therein." There was, therefore, a specific constitutional
provision to be applied.
The cases9 concerning the composition of the Commission on Appointments
likewise involved the mere application of a constitutional provision, specifically
Art. VI, §18 of the present Constitution which provides that the Commission shall
be composed of "twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein." Undoubtedly, the Court had
jurisdiction over the cases.
On the other hand, as long as the proportional representation of political parties
and organizations is observed the Court has held itself to be without jurisdiction
over the choice of nominees. In Cabili v. Francisco, 10 it declined to take
cognizance of a quo warranto suit seeking to annul the recomposition of the
Senate representation in the Commission and to reinstate a particular senator
after satisfying itself that such recomposition of the Senate representation was not
a "departure from the constitution mandate requiring proportional representation
of the political organizations in the Commission on Appointments."
It is true that in Cunanan v. Tan 11 this Court took cognizance of the case which
involved the reorganization of the Commission as a result of the realignment of
political forces in the House of Representatives and the formation of a temporary
alliance. But the Court's decision was justified because the case actually involved
the right of a third party whose nomination by the President had been rejected by
the reorganized Commission. As held in Pacete v. The Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments. 12 where the construction to be given to a rule
affects persons other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is judicial in character.
In contrast to the specific constitutional limitations involved in the foregoing
cases, beyond providing that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall
elect a President and Speaker, respectively, and such other officers as each house
shall determine "by a majority vote of all [their] respective Members," the
Constitution leaves everything else to each house of Congress. Such matters are
political and are left solely to the judgment of the legislative department of the
government.
This case involves neither an infringement of specific constitutional limitations
nor a violation of the rights of a party not a member of Congress. This Court has
jurisdiction over this case only in the sense that determining whether the question
involved is reserved to Congress is itself an exercise of jurisdiction in the same
way that a court which dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction must in a narrow
sense have jurisdiction since it cannot dismiss the case if it were otherwise. The
determination of whether the question involved is justiciable or not is in itself a
process of constitutional interpretation. This is the great lesson ofMarbury v.
Madison 13 in which the U.S. Supreme Court, while affirming its power of review, in
the end held itself to be without jurisdiction because the Judiciary Act of 1789
granting it jurisdiction over that case was unconstitutional. In other words, a court
doing a Marbury v. Madison has no jurisdiction except to declare itself without
jurisdiction over the case.
I vote to dismiss the petition in this case for lack of jurisdiction.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion;
"Loyalty to petrified opinion never yet broke a chain or freed a human soul."
These words vividly inscribed just beneath Mark Twain's bust at the Hall of Fame
veritably speaks about the creativity and dynamism which ought to characterize
our perspective of things. It instructs us to broaden our horizon that we may not
be held captive by ignorance. Free and robust thinking is the imperative.
But there are times when one has to render fealty to certain fundamental precepts
and I believe that this occasion presents an opportunity to do so. Thus, as I join
the majority and cast my vote today for the denial of the instant petition, may I just
be allowed to reiterate jurisprudential postulates which I have long embraced, not
for the sake of "loyalty to petrified opinion" but to stress consistency in doctrine
in the hope that all future disputes of this nature may be similarly resolved in this
manner.
This is not actually the first time that the Court has been invited to resolve a matter
originating from the internal processes undertaken by a co-equal branch of
government, more particularly the Senate in this case. Earlier, in the landmark
case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al.,1 we were confronted, among other
things, by the issue of whether a significant tax measure namely, Republic Act.
No. 7716 (Expanded Value-Added Tax Law), went through the legislative mill in
keeping with the constitutionally-mandated procedure for the passage of bills.
Speaking through Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the majority upheld the tax
measure's validity, relying on the enrolled bill theory and the view that the Court is
not the appropriate forum to enforce internal legislative rules supposedly violated
when the bill was being passed by Congress. I took a different view, however, from
the majority because of what I felt was a sweeping reliance on said doctrines
without giving due regard to the peculiar facts of the case. I underscored that
these principles may not be applied where the internal legislative rules would
breach the Constitution which this Court has a solemn duty to uphold. It was my
position then that the introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral
Committee Report violated the constitutional proscription against any amendment
to a bill upon the last reading thereof and which this Court, in the exercise of its
judicial power, can properly inquire into without running afoul of the principle of
separation of powers.
Last year,2 Arroyo, et al. v. de Venecia, et al.3 presented an opportunity for me to
clarify my position further. In that case, Congressman Joker Arroyo filed a petition
before the Court complaining that during a session by the House of
Representatives, he was effectively prevented from raising the question of quorum
which to him tainted the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, or the so-called "sin
taxes" law. The Court, speaking again through Justice Mendoza, dismissed Mr.
Arroyo's petition, arguing in the main that courts are denied the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with
its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. Concurring with the
majority opinion, I discerned a need to explain my position then because of
possible misinterpretation. I was very emphatic that I did not abandon my position
in Tolentino, the facts as presented in Arroyo being radically different from the
former. In keeping with my view that judicial review is permissible only to uphold
the Constitution, I pointed out that the legislative rules allegedly violated were
purely internal and had no direct or reasonable nexus to the requirements and
proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of a bill which would otherwise
warrant the Court's intervention.
In the instant case, at the risk of being repetitious, I again take a similar stand as
the ones I made in the two cited cases.
Although this case involves the question of who is the rightful occupant of a
Senate "office" and does not deal with the passage of a bill or the observance of
internal rules for the Senate's conduct of its business, the same ground as I
previously invoked may justify the Court's refusal to pry into the procedures of the
Senate. There is to me no constitutional breach which has been made and, ergo,
there is nothing for this Court to uphold. The interpretation placed by petitioners
on Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution clearly does not find support
in the text thereof. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an
end to that which is implied. The majority vote required for the election of a Senate
President and a Speaker of the House of Representatives speaks only of such
number or quantity of votes for an aspirant to be lawfully elected as such. There is
here no declaration that by so electing, each of the two Houses of Congress is
thereby divided into camps called the "majority" and the "minority." In fact, the
"offices" of Majority Floor Leader and Minority Floor Leader are not explicitly
provided for as constitutional offices. As pointed out by my esteemed colleague,
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who penned the herein majority opinion, even on
the theory that under paragraph 2, Section 16 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution,
each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary, still "the
method of choosing who will be such officers is merely a derivative of the exercise
of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision." With the
prerogative being, therefore, bestowed upon the Senate, whatever differences the
parties may have against each other must be settled in their own turf and the
Court, conscious as it is of its constitutionally-delineated powers, will not take a
perilous move to overstep the same.
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
The 1987 Constitution, like the counterpart 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, has
continued to be implicit in its recognition of the time-honored precept of
separation of powers which enjoins upon each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary — proper acknowledgment and respect for each other.
The Supreme Court, said to be holding neither the "purse" (held by Congress) nor
the "sword" (held by the Executive) but serving as the balance wheel in the State
governance, functions both as the tribunal of last resort and as the Constitutional
Court of the nation.1 Peculiar, however, to the present Constitution, specifically
under Article VII, Section 1, thereof, is the extended jurisdiction of judicial power
that now explicitly allows the determination of "whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government."2 This expanded concept of
judicial power seems to have been dictated by the martial law experience and to
be an immediate reaction to the abuse in the frequent recourse to the political
question doctrine that in no small measure has emasculated the Court. The term
"political question," in this context, refers to matters which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in
regard to which discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government.
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, should not be thought of as having been tasked
with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. I find it here
opportune to reiterate what I have stated inTolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,3 viz:
I cannot yet concede to the novel theory, so challengingly
provocative as it might be, that under the 1987 Constitution the
Court may now at good liberty intrude, in the guise of the people's
imprimatur, into every affair of government. What significance can
still then remain, I ask, of the time honored and widely acclaimed
principle of separation of powers if, at every turn, the Court allows
itself to pass upon at will the disposition of a co-equal, independent
and coordinate branch in our system of government. I dread to think
of the so varied uncertainties that such an undue interference can
lead to. The respect for long standing doctrines in our
jurisprudence, nourished through time, is one of maturity, not
timidity, of stability rather than quiescence.
Pervasive and limitless, such as it, may seem to be, judicial power still
succumbs to the paramount doctrine of separation of powers. Congress is
the branch of government, composed of the representatives of the people,
that lays down the policies of government and provides the direction that
the nation must take. The Executive carries out that mandate. Certainly, the
Court will not negate that which is done by these, co-equal and co-ordinate
branches merely because of a perceived case of grave abuse of discretion
on their part, clearly too relative a phrase to be its own sentinel against
misuse, even as it will not hesitate to wield the power if that abuse
becomes all too clear. The exercise of judicial statesmanship, not judicial
tyranny, is what has been envisioned by and institutionalized in the 1987
Constitution.
There is no harnbook rule by which grave abuse of discretion may be determined.
The provision was evidently couched in general terms to make it malleable to
judicial interpretation in the light of any contemporary or emerging millieu. In its
normal concept, the term has been said to imply capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, amounting, to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or at the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner such as by reason of passion or
personal hostility. When the question, however, pertains to an affair internal to
either of Congress or the Executive, I would subscribe to thedictum, somewhat
made implicit in my understanding of Arroyo vs. De Venecia,4 that unless an
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court
will not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two
branches of government. Verily, in this situation, it is an impairment or a clear
disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel
door for judicial intervention.
In the instant settings, I find insufficient indication to have the case hew to the Sen. Juan M. Flavier — Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
above rule.
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago — People's Reform Party
Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition. (PRP)

Footnotes Sen. Sergio R. Osmeña — Liberal Party (LP)

1 § 21 (1), BP 129; § 5 (1), Art. VIII, Constitution. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad — PRP

2 See Manalo v. Gloria, 236 SCRA 130, 138-139, September 1, Sen. Gregorio B. Honasan — LP (Independent)
1994; citing People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415, 423-24, April 18,
1989, and Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633, 651-652, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile — LP (Independent)
January 27, 1993.
Sen. Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng — LAMP
3 Uy v. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167, September 26, 1994; Vergara Sr. v.
Suelto, 156 SCRA 753, December 21, 1987. Sen. Loren Legarda-Leviste — Lakas-NUCD-UMDP

4 Avelino v. Cueno, 83 Phil 17 (1949); Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, 214 Sen. Renato L. Cayetano — Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
SCRA 789, October 20, 1992.
Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III — LAMP
5 Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997.
Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimemtel, Jr. — LAMP
6 The solicitor general, in his Comment dated August 21, 1998,
attributed to the 23 members of the Senate the following party
Sen. Robert Z. Barbers — Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
affiliations:
Sen. Rodolfo G. Biazon — LAMP
"Senate President Marcelo B. Fernan — Laban ng Masang
Pilipino(LAMP)
Sen. Blas F. Ople — LAMP
Sen. Raul S. Roco — Aksyon Demokratiko
Sen. John Henry R. Osmeña — LAMP
Sen. Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr. — Lakas-National Union of
Sen. Robert S. Jaworski — LAMP
— Christian Democrats-
Sen. Ramon B. Revilla — Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
United Muslim Democrats
Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. — Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
of the Philippines, (Lakas-
Sen. Tessie Aquino-Oreta — LAMP"
NUCD-UMDP)
(Rollo, pp. 63-64. See also Comment of Respondent
Guingona, Jr., rollo, p. 41.)
Sen. Franklin M. Drilon — LAMP
7 One position was vacant, because of the election of the
incumbent, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, as the Vice President of the
Philippines.
8 Senator Fernan abstained from voting. (Petition, p. 4; rollo, p. 6.
Comment of the solicitor general, p. 2; rollo, p. 63.)
9 Senators Robert Z. Barbers, Renato L. Cayetano, Juan M. Flavier,
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., Loren Legarda-Leviste, Ramon B.
Magsaysay Jr., and Ramon B. Revilla.
10 The Petition was signed by both petitioners; the Comment of
Senate President Fernan, by Senator Fernan himself and Attys. Mary
Jane L. Zantua and Lani Grace R. Songco; the Comment of Senator
Guingona, by Atty. Ricardo G. Nepomuceno Jr.; the Comment of the
OSG, by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Carlos N.
Ortega and Associate Solicitor Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag; while the
Consolidated Reply, by Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago.
11 83 Phil 17 (1949).
12 Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, Vol. II, 1988 ed., p. 282.
13 § 10 (2), Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution, reads:
"(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and
under such penalties as such House may provide."
14 Supra, p. 72.
15 At p. 76.
16 At p. 78.
17 At p. 79.
18 103 Phil 1051, 1068 (1957), per Concepcion, J.
19 Ibid., p. 1067, citing 16 CJS 413.
20 § 11, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution.
21 42 SCRA 448, December 11, 1971.
22 5 Phil 87 (1905).
23 91 Phil 882 (1952).
24 50 SCRA 30, 84, 87, March 31, 1973.
25 Art. VIII, § 1, par. 2.
26 180 SCRA 496, December 21, 1989, per Cruz, J.
27 187 SCRA 377, July 12, 1990, per Griño-Aquino, J.
28 214 SCRA 789, October 20, 1992, per Campos Jr., J.
29 272 SCRA 18, 47, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
30 199 SCRA 692, July 30, 1991, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
31 Citing Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391, 1988.
32 Citing Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780, 1990.
33 277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997, per Mendoza, J.
34 At p. 299.
35 Alleje v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 495, January 25, 1995;
Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 108, November 16, 1995;
Times Broadcasting Network v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 366,
June 19, 1997; Chico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122704, January
5, 1998.
36 Perez v. De la Cruz, 27 SCRA 587, 603 (1969), citing Webster's
International Dictionary, Unabridged; Concurring Opinion of J.
Perfecto in Avelino v. Cueno, supra, p. 80. See also Petition, rollo, p.
12, citing Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., 1990.
37 P. 15; rollo, p. 55.
38 Citing Record of the Senate, 8th Congress, Vol. I, No. 14, p. 9.
39 Citing Record of the Senate, 9th Congress, Vol. III, No. 47-A, pp.
88-94.
40 Then Minority Leader Ernesto C. Maceda chaired the Committees
on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws; and
on Foreign Relations. Senator Honasan chaired the Committees on
Agrarian Reform; on Peace, Unification and Reconciliation; and on
Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement. Senator Coseteng was
the chair of the Committees on Civil Service and Government
Reorganization; and on Labor, Employment and Human Resources.
(See footnote 40 of Respondent Guingona's Comment, supra.)
41 Webster's New World Dictionary, 2nd college ed., 1972.
42 Ibid.
43 § 16 (1), second par., Art. VI of the Constitution.
44 § 16 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution.
45 Rules of the Senate (see Appendix "A," Guide to the Senate by
Reginald M. Pastrana and Demaree J.B. Raval).
46 New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Steingut, 353
NE2d 558.
47 Concurring Opinion in Oposa v. Factoran Jr., 224 SCRA 792, 818,
July 30, 1993.
48 Osmeña Jr. v. Pendatun, 109 Phil 863, 870-871 (1960), citing 76
CJS 870. See also Arroyo v. De Venecia, supra.
49 Ibid. See also Enrique M. Fernando, Constitution of the
Philippines Annotated, 1977, pp. 188-189.
50 Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656, 681, September 5,
1997.
51 I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436.
52 91 CJS 551, citing State ex rel Daniel v. Village of Mound, 48
NW2d 855, 863.
53 67 CJS 317, citing Wheat v. Smith, 7 SW 161.
54 Lota v. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 715, 718, June 30, 1961.
55 § 2, Rule 66, Rules of Court.
56 § 5, ibid. See also Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez
Sr., 239 SCRA 11, 18, December 6, 1994; Tarrosa v. Singson, 232
SCRA 553, 557, May 25, 1994.
In this regard, the Court notes that Petitioner Santiago has no
standing to bring the instant petition for quo warranto, for she does
not claim to be rightfully entitled to the position of Senate minority
leader. We have ruled in the past:
"Nothing is better settled than that a petitioner, in
a quo warranto proceeding to try title to a public
office, must be able to show that he is entitled to said
office. Absent such an element, the petition must be
dismissed. This is a principle that goes back to
Acosta v. Flor [5 Phil 18, 22], a 1905 decision. There,
the doctrine has been laid down that: 'No individual
can bring a civil action relating to usurpation of a
public office without averring that he has a right to
the same; and at any stage of the proceedings, if it be
shown that such individual has no right, the action
may be dismissed because there is no legal ground
upon which it may proceed when the fundamental
basis of such action is destroyed.' This has been the
exacting rule, since then, followed with stricter
firmness in Cuyegkeng v. Cruz [108 Phil 1147], where
this Court held that one who does not claim to be
entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully
held or exercised by, another, but who 'merely
asserts a right to be appointed' thereto, cannot
question the latter's title to the same by quo warranto.
In other words, one whose, claim is predicated solely
upon a more or less remote possibility, that he may
be the recipient of the appointment, has no cause of
action against the office holder." (Garcia v. Perez, 99
 SCRA 628, 633-34, September 11, 1980, per De 4 VICENTE G. SINCO, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 171-172 (11th ed.
Castro, J.) 1962).

However, any question on standing has been rendered moot by the 5 83 Phil. 17 (1949).
inclusion of Petitioner Tatad, who claims to have the right to the
contested office. 6 Id., at 50.

57 § 1, Rule 66, Rules of Court. In relation to this rule, Respondent 7 Id., at 79.
Fernan claims that he is not a proper party to the case, because he
did not usurp nor is he unlawfully holding or exercising the office of 8 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
minority leader. While the action commenced by petitioners was
denominated aquo warranto petition under Rule 66, the Court notes
9 Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989); Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr., 187
that among the principal averments made was that Respondent
SCRA. 377 (1990); Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789 (1992).
Fernan committed grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader. Such
averment brings the petition within the purview of 10 88 Phil. 654 (1951).
a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65. A basic principle in remedial
law states that it is not the title given by the parties to the action 11 115 Phil. vii (1962).
which determines its nature, but the averments made in the
pleadings. The case may, thus, be treated as a 12 40 SCRA 58 (1971).
joint certiorari and quo warranto action and, as such, Respondent
Fernan is a proper, if not necessary, party thereto. 13 Cranch 137, 2L.Ed. 60 (1803).

58 Batario Jr. v. Parentela Jr., 9 SCRA 601, November 29, 1963; ROMERO, J., separate opinion;
Caraon-Medina v. Quizon, 18 SCRA 562, October 29, 1966.
1 235 SCRA 630.
59 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 257
SCRA 200, 209, June 4, 1996, per Kapunan, J.; citing Philippine 2 August 14, 1997.
Airlines, Inc. v. Confesor, 231 SCRA 41, March 10, 1994, and other
cases. See also Imutan v. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 286, 292
3 G.R. No. 127255; 277 SCRA 268 (1997).
January 27, 1981.
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
MENDOZA, J., concurring and dissenting opinion;
1 Justice Jose C. Vitug, The court and its Ways, The Court System
1 Majority Opinion. p. 18.
Journal, June 1998, Volume 3 No. 2.
2 Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924) (suspension of senator 2 Sec. 1, Article VIII.
for disorderly conduct for assaulting a fellow senator): Osmeña v.
Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960) (suspension of senator for disorderly
behavior for imputing bribery to President Garcia) 3 235 SCRA 630, 720.

3 Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997) (power of each house 4 277 SCRA 268, 289.
to determine its rules of proceedings)

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 162230 August 13, 2014
ISABELITA C. VINUY A, VICTORIA C. DELA PENA, HERMINIHILDA MANIMBO,
LEONOR H. SUMA WANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG,
MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M.
ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO,
MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M.
DELA PENA, EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT, CECILIA SANGUYO, ANA
ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI, ROSARIO M. ALARCON, RUFINA C. GULAPA,
ZOILA B. MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A. GULAPA, TEODORA M.
HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PENA, MARIA DELA PAZ B. CULALA,ESPERANZA
MANAPOL, JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M. GUEVARRA, MAXIMA ANGULO,
EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R. PUNZALAN, JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B.
BALINGIT, BELEN A. CULALA, PILAR Q. GALANG, ROSARIO C. BUCO,
GAUDENCIA C. DELA PENA, RUFINA Q. CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO,
PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA 0. DELA CRUZ,
ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA
A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M. BUCO, PATRICIA A. BERNARDO, LUCILA H.
PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA
C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA
PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S.
TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA,
CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al. in their
capacityand as members of the "Malaya Lolas Organizations," Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGOALBERT, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE
HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration1 and a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration,2 praying that the Court reverse its decision of April 28, 2010, and grant
their petition for certiorari.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argue that our constitutional and
jurisprudential histories have rejected the Court’s ruling that the foreign policy
prerogatives ofthe Executive Branch are unlimited; that under the relevant jurisprudence
and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international human
rights and international conventions of which the Philippines is a party; that the Court, in
holding that the Chief Executive has the prerogative whether to bring petitioners’ claims
against Japan, has read the foreign policy powers of the Office of the President in
isolation from the rest of the constitutional protections that expressly textualize
international human rights; that the foreign policy prerogatives are subject to obligations
to promote international humanitarian law as incorporated intothe laws of the land
through the Incorporation Clause; that the Court must re-visit its decisions in Yamashita
v. Styer3 and Kuroda v. Jalandoni4 which have been noted for their prescient articulation
of the import of laws of humanity; that in said decision, the Court ruled that the State was
bound to observe the laws of war and humanity; that in Yamashita, the Court expressly
recognized rape as an international crime under international humanitarian law, and in
Jalandoni, the Court declared that even if the Philippines had not acceded or signed the
Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare, the Rules and
Regulations formed part of the law of the nation by virtue of the Incorporation Clause;
that such commitment to the laws ofwar and humanity has been enshrined in Section 2,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides "that the Philippines…adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
nations."
The petitioners added that the statusand applicability of the generally accepted principles
of international law within the Philippine jurisdiction would be uncertain without the
Incorporation Clause, and that the clause implied that the general international law forms
part of Philippine law only insofar as they are expressly adopted; that in its rulings in The
Holy See, v. Rosario, Jr.5 and U.S. v. Guinto6 the Court has said that international law is
deemed part of the Philippine law as a consequence of Statehood; that in Agustin v.
Edu,7 the Court has declared that a treaty, though not yet ratified by the Philippines, was
part of the law of the land through the Incorporation Clause; that by virtue of the
Incorporation Clause, the Philippines is bound to abide by the erga omnesobligations
arising from the jus cogensnorms embodied in the laws of war and humanity that include
the principle of the imprescriptibility of war crimes; that the crimes committed against
petitioners are proscribed under international human rights law as there were undeniable
violations of jus cogensnorms; that the need to punish crimes against the laws of
humanity has long become jus cogensnorms, and that international legal obligations
prevail over national legal norms; that the Court’s invocation of the political doctrine in
the instant case is misplaced; and that the Chief Executive has the constitutional duty to
afford redress and to give justice to the victims ofthe comfort women system in the
Philippines.8
Petitioners further argue that the Court has confused diplomatic protection with the
broader responsibility of states to protect the human rights of their citizens, especially
where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnesobligations and pertain to jus
cogensnorms; that the claims raised by petitioners are not simple private claims that are
the usual subject of diplomatic protection; that the crimes committed against petitioners
are shocking to the conscience of humanity; and that the atrocities committed by the
Japanese soldiers against petitionersare not subject to the statute of limitations under
international law.9
Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and declare: (1) that
the rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual violence committed against
the Filipina comfort women are crimes against humanity and war crimes under
customary international law; (2) that the Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace
with Japan, insofar as the waiver of the claims of the Filipina comfort women against
Japan is concerned; (3) that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort
women; and (4) that petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against the respondents.
Petitioners also pray that the Court order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Executive Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women for an official
apology,legal compensation and other forms of reparation from Japan. 10
In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that it was highly
improper for the April 28, 2010 decision to lift commentaries from at least three sources
without proper attribution – an article published in 2009 in the Yale Law Journal of
International Law; a book published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and an
article published in 2006 in the Western ReserveJournal of International Law – and make
it appear that such commentaries supported its arguments for dismissing the petition,
when in truth the plagiarized sources even made a strong case in favour of petitioners’
claims.11
In their Comment,12 respondents disagree withpetitioners, maintaining that aside from
the statements on plagiarism, the arguments raised by petitioners merely rehashed those
made in their June 7, 2005 Memorandum; that they already refuted such arguments in
their Memorandumof June 6, 2005 that the Court resolved through itsApril 28, 2010
decision, specifically as follows:
The Court DENIESthe Motion for Reconsiderationand Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration for being devoid of merit.
1. The contentions pertaining tothe alleged plagiarism were then already lodged
withthe Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards of the Court; hence, the
matter of alleged plagiarism should not be discussed or resolved herein. 13
2. A writ of certioraridid not lie in the absence of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, in view of the failureof
petitioners to show any arbitrary or despotic act on the part of respondents,the
relief of the writ of certiorariwas not warranted.14
3. Respondents hold that the Waiver Clause in the Treaty of Peace with Japan,
being valid, bound the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the international
law principle of pacta sunt servanda.The validity of the Treaty of Peace was the
result of the ratification by two mutually consenting parties. Consequently, the
obligations embodied in the Treaty of Peace must be carried out in accordance
with the common and real intention of the parties at the time the treaty was
concluded.15
4. Respondents assert that individuals did not have direct international remedies
against any State that violated their human rights except where such remedies
are provided by an international agreement. Herein, neither of the Treaty of
Peace and the Reparations Agreement,the relevant agreements affecting herein
petitioners, provided for the reparation of petitioners’ claims. Respondents aver
that the formal apology by the Government of Japan and the reparation the
Government of Japan has provided through the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) are
sufficient to recompense petitioners on their claims, specifically:
a. About 700 million yen would be paid from the national treasury over the next
10 years as welfare and medical services;
b. Instead of paying the money directly to the former comfort women, the
services would be provided through organizations delegated by governmental
bodies in the recipient countries (i.e., the Philippines, the Republic of Korea,and
Taiwan); and
c. Compensation would consist of assistance for nursing services (like home
helpers), housing, environmental development, medical expenses, and medical
goods.16
Ruling
1. Petitioners did not show that their resort was timely under the Rules of Court.
Petitioners did not show that their bringing ofthe special civil action for certiorariwas
timely, i.e., within the 60-day period provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
Section 4. When and where position filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) daysfrom notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner receives the
assailed judgment, final order or resolution, or the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial timely filed, whether such motion is required or not. To
establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari, the date of receipt of the assailed
judgment, final order or resolution or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new
trial must be stated in the petition;otherwise, the petition for certiorarimust be dismissed.
The importance of the dates cannot be understated, for such dates determine the
timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari. As the Court has emphasized in
Tambong v. R. Jorge Development Corporation: 17
There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought
under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
was received; second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and third,
when notice of the denial thereof was received. Failure of petitioner to comply with this
requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Substantial
compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance with the Rules.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court has further said in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 18
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to
be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorariwas filed forty-one (41) days from
receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of
Appeals was notin any position to determine when this period commenced to run and
whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates
were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later
than fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the
ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases
and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy ofliberal construction. 19
The petition for certioraricontains the following averments, viz:
82. Since 1998, petitioners and other victims of the "comfort women system,"
approached the Executive Department through the Department of Justice in
order to request for assistance to file a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations
in the Philippines;
83. Officials of the Executive Department ignored their request and refused to file
a claim against the said Japanese officials and military officers;
84. Undaunted, the Petitioners in turnapproached the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Department of Justice and Office of the of the Solicitor General to file
their claim against the responsible Japanese officials and military officers, but
their efforts were similarly and carelessly disregarded; 20
The petition thus mentions the year 1998 only as the time when petitioners approached
the Department ofJustice for assistance, but does not specifically state when they
received the denial of their request for assistance by the Executive Department of the
Government. This alone warranted the outright dismissal of the petition.
Even assuming that petitioners received the notice of the denial of their request for
assistance in 1998, their filing of the petition only on March 8, 2004 was still way beyond
the 60-day period. Only the most compelling reasons could justify the Court’s acts of
disregarding and lifting the strictures of the rule on the period. As we pointed out inMTM
Garment Mfg. Inc. v. Court of Appeals:21
All these do not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at
will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly
administration of justice, namely: to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive
rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or
whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that
substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or as often
suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it would
result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.
As we have repeatedly stressed, the right to file a special civil action of certiorariis
neither a natural right noran essential element of due process; a writ of certiorariis a
prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, and never issued except in the
exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorarimust apply for it
only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the
Rules.
Herein petitioners have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule and the
requirements under current jurisprudence. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
2. Petitioners did not show that the assailed act was either judicial or quasi-judicial on the
part of respondents.
Petitioners were required to show in their petition for certiorarithat the assailed act was
either judicial or quasi-judicial in character. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Courtrequires such showing, to wit:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order, or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. However, petitioners did notmake such a showing.
3. Petitioners were not entitled to the injunction.
The Court cannot grant petitioners’ prayer for the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. Preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy that is adjunct to the
main case, and is subject to the latter’s outcome. It is not a cause of action itself. 22 It is
provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency
of the action; and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon
the result of the main action.23Following the dismissal of the petition for certiorari, there is
no more legal basis to issue the writ of injunction sought. As an auxiliary remedy, the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be issued independently of the principal
action.24
In any event, a mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular
act.1âwphi1 Hence, it is an extreme remedy,25to be granted only if the following
requisites are attendant, namely:
(a) The applicant has a clear and unmistakable right, that is, a right in esse;
(b) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; and
(c) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant; and no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent
the infliction of irreparable injury.26
In Marquez v. The Presiding Judge (Hon. Ismael B. Sanchez), RTC Br. 58, Lucena
City,27 we expounded as follows:
It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of
the applicant which should be protected. It is an extraordinary, peremptory remedy
available only on the grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3, Rule 58
of the Rules of Court. Moreover, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of
such discretion. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law
permits it and the emergency demands it. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue
a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of
irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of
multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions,
the relief of injunction should be refused. 28
Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign
relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim against the
Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the
Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the
conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct
the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign
relations with Japan in a certain manner.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
 4
83 Phil. 171 (1949).
Associate Justice Associate Justice
5
G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994, 238SCRA 524.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO 6
G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
7
No. L-49112, February 2, 1979, 88 SCRA 195.
(no part)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA 8
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Supra note 1.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
9
Id. at 426-427.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
10
Associate Justice Associate Justice Id. at 427-428.
11
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES Id. at 436.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
12
Id. at 665-709.
No part 13
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. Id. at 684-685.
Associate Justice LEONEN
14
Associate Justice Id. at 686-690.
15
Id. at 690-702.
CERTIFICATION
16
Id. at 703-706.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the 17
G.R. No. 146068, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 399, 403-404.
writer of the opinion of the Court.
18
G.R. No. 141947, July 5, 2001, 360 SCRA 521, 527-528.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice 19
Id. at 527-528.
20
Rollo, p. 18.
21
Footnotes G.R. No. 152336, June 9, 2005, 460 SCRA 55, 66.
22
1
Rollo, pp. 419-429. Buyco v. Baraquia, G.R. No. 177486, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 699,
703-704.
2
Id. at 435-529. 23
Id. at 704.
3
75 Phil. 563 (1945).
24
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Antonio-Valenzuela, G.R. No.
184778, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 698, 715, citing Lim v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 134617, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 326, 331.
25
I Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Seventh Revised Edition, p. 638.
26
Philippine Leisure and Retirement Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
156303, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 85,99-100.
27
G.R. No. 141849, February 13, 2007, 515 SCRA 577.
28
At 589.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 144463 January 14, 2004
SENATOR ROBERT S. JAWORSKI, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION and SPORTS AND
GAMES ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeks to nullify the "Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting
and Internet Gaming," executed by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as PAGCOR) in favor of respondent Sports and
Games and Entertainment Corporation (also referred to as SAGE).
The facts may be summarized as follows:
PAGCOR is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under
Presidential Decree No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then President
Ferdinand Marcos. Pertinent provisions of said enabling law read:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared to be the policy
of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not
heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order
to attain the following objectives:
xxx xxx xxx
b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement
and recreation, including sports, gaming pools (basketball,
football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and
recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by
law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which
will: x x x (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, the evils,
malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent in the
conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without
direct government involvement.
xxx xxx xxx
TITLE IV – GRANT OF FRANCHISE
Sec.10. Nature and term of franchise. – Subject to the terms and conditions established
in this Decree, the Corporation is hereby granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years,
renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the rights, privileges and authority to
operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement
places, sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball, football, lotteries, etc. whether on land or
sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.
On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an instrument denominated
as "Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet
Gaming", which granted SAGE the authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting
station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and
international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate
safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the
games.
On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia Ll. Reyes, and
SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its President,
Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named document.
Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations by
conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and
redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.
Petitioner, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, files the instant petition, praying that the
grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not
authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet
for the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet
gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet
inexistent and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space. Further, he
argues that the internet, being an international network of computers, necessarily
transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of
authority to operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation in PAGCOR’s franchise,
under Section 14 of P.D. No. 1869 which provides:
Place. – The Corporation [i.e., PAGCOR] shall conduct gambling activities or
games of chance on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic
of the Philippines. x x x
Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the
categories of the authorized gambling activities enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No.
1869 which grants PAGCOR the "right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain
gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming
pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines." 1 He contends
that internet gambling could not have been included within the commonly accepted
definition of "gambling casinos", "clubs" or "other recreation or amusement places" as
these terms refer to a physical structure in real-space where people who intend to bet or
gamble go and play games of chance authorized by law.
The issues raised by petitioner are as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT PAGCOR IS AUTHORIZED UNDER P.D.
NO. 1869 TO OPERATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES ON THE INTERNET;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
ITS JURISDICTION, OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT AUTHORIZED
RESPONDENT SAGE TO OPERATE INTERNET GAMBLING ON THE BASIS
OF ITS RIGHT "TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN GAMBLING CASINOS, CLUBS
AND OTHER AMUSEMENT PLACES" UNDER SECTION 10 OF P.D. 1869;
III. WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED AUTHORITY
TO SAGE TO OPERATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES IN THE INTERNET.
The above-mentioned issues may be summarized into a single pivotal question: Does
PAGCOR’s legislative franchise include the right to vest another entity, SAGE in this
case, with the authority to operate Internet gambling? Otherwise put, does Presidential
Decree No. 1869 authorize PAGCOR to contract any part of its franchise to SAGE by
authorizing the latter to operate Internet gambling?
Before proceeding with our main discussion, let us first try to hurdle a number of
important procedural matters raised by the respondents.
In their separate Comments, respondents PAGCOR and SAGE insist that petitioner has
no legal standing to file the instant petition as a concerned citizen or as a member of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that he is not a real party-in-interest entitled to the avails
of the suit. In this light, they argue that petitioner does not have the requisite personal
and substantial interest to impugn the validity of PAGCOR’s grant of authority to SAGE.
Objections to the legal standing of a member of the Senate or House of Representative
to maintain a suit and assail the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions,
rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities are not without
precedent. Ordinarily, before a member of Congress may properly challenge the validity
of an official act of any department of the government there must be an unmistakable
showing that the challenged official act affects or impairs his rights and prerogatives as
legislator.2 However in a number of cases,3we clarified that where a case involves an
issue of utmost importance, or one of overreaching significance to society, the Court, in
its discretion, can brush aside procedural technicalities and take cognizance of the
petition. Considering that the instant petition involves legal questions that may have
serious implications on public interests, we rule that petitioner has the requisite legal
standing to file this petition.
Respondents likewise urge the dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition
because under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, these remedies
should be directed to any tribunal, board, officer or person whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. They maintain that in exercising its legally-
mandated franchise to grant authority to certain entities to operate a gambling or gaming
activity, PAGCOR is not performing a judicial or quasi-judicial act. Neither should the act
of granting licenses or authority to operate be construed as a purely ministerial act.
According to them, in the event that this Court takes cognizance of the instant petition,
the same should be dismissed for failure of petitioner to observe the hierarchy of courts.
Practically the same procedural infirmities were raised in Del Mar v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporationwhere an almost identical factual setting obtained.
Petitioners therein filed a petition for injunction directly before the Court which sought to
enjoin respondent from operating the jai-alai games by itself or in joint venture with
another corporate entity allegedly in violation of law and the Constitution. Respondents
contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to take original cognizance of a petition for
injunction because it was not one of the actions specifically mentioned in Section 1 of
Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondents likewise took exception to
the alleged failure of petitioners to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. In
brushing aside the apparent procedural lapse, we held that "x x x this Court has the
discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition at bar if compelling reasons, or the
nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its
jurisdiction."4
In the case at bar, we are not inclined to rule differently. The petition at bar seeks to
nullify, via a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed directly before this Court, the
"Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet
Gaming" by virtue of which SAGE was vested by PAGCOR with the authority to operate
on-line Internet gambling. It is well settled that averments in the complaint, and not the
nomenclature given by the parties, determine the nature of the action. 5 Although the
petition alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent PAGCOR, what it
primarily seeks to accomplish is to prevent the enforcement of the "Grant of Authority
and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming." Thus, the
action may properly be characterized as one for Prohibition under Section 2 of Rule 65,
which incidentally, is another remedy resorted to by petitioner.
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants
that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at
bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence
on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper
and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. 6
Having disposed of these procedural issues, we now come to the substance of the
action.
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a
privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be
reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by
public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on
them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which
the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to
whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the
quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in
exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language.7
After a circumspect consideration of the foregoing discussion and the contending
positions of the parties, we hold that PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its
authority when it passed on or shared its franchise to SAGE.
In the Del Mar case where a similar issue was raised when PAGCOR entered into a joint
venture agreement with two other entities in the operation and management of jai alai
games, the Court,8 in an En Banc Resolution dated 24 August 2001, partially granted the
motions for clarification filed by respondents therein insofar as it prayed that PAGCOR
has a valid franchise, but only by itself (i.e. not in association with any other person or
entity), to operate, maintain and/or manage the game of jai-alai.
In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby the former
grants the latter the authority to operate and maintain sports betting stations and Internet
gaming operations. In essence, the grant of authority gives SAGE the privilege to actively
participate, partake and share PAGCOR’s franchise to operate a gambling activity. The
grant of franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a right and a duty to be performed
by the grantee. The grantee must not perform its activities arbitrarily and whimsically but
must abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its terms and
conditionalities. A corporation as a creature of the State is presumed to exist for the
common good. Hence, the special privileges and franchises it receives are subject to the
laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. There is therefore a reserved right of
the State to inquire how these privileges had been employed, and whether they have
been abused.9
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management
contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise,
much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not
delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest,
inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized
to do so. In Lim v. Pacquing,10 the Court clarified that "since ADC has no franchise from
Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit
from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila." By the same token,
SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not "ride on" PAGCOR’s
franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet gambling.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The "Grant
of Authority and Agreement to Operate Sports Betting and Internet Gaming" executed by
PAGCOR in favor of SAGE is declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1
Rollo, p. 18.

2
Philippine Constitutional Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113888, 19 August
1994, 235 SCRA 506; Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora, G.R.
No. 138570, 10 October 2000, 342 SCRA 450.
3
Kilosbayan Inc. v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 110;
Lopez, et al. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc, et al., G.R. No.
155661, 5 May 2003.

4
Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 138298,
29 November 2000, 346 SCRA 501; citing Fortich, et al. v. Corona, et al., G.R.
No. 131457, 24 April 1998, 289 SCRA 624.

5
Abad v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Br. VIII, G.R. Nos. 58507-08, 26
February 1992, 206 SCRA 567, 579; Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 337
Phil. 605 (1997).
6
Serrano v. Galant Maritime Services, et al., G.R. No. 151833, 7 August 2003.
7
Supra, note 3.

8
Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, et al., 416 Phil. 172
(2001).
9
Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. PCGG, G.R. No. No L-75885, 27
May 1987, 150 SCRA 181.
10
310 Phil. 722 (1995).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45127 May 5, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial Fiscal of
Leyte, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S. MATONDO, SEGUNDINO
A, CAVAL and CIRILO M. ZANORIA, respondents.
The Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Involved in this special civil action is the unique situation, to use an euphemistic phrase,
of an alternative penal sanction of imprisonment imposed by law but without a
specification as to the term or duration thereof.
As a consequence of such legislative faux pas or oversight, the petition at bar seeks to
set aside the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch IV, dated
September 8,1976, 1 penned by herein respondent judge and granting the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by herein private
respondents and docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5428, as well as his resolution of
October 19, 1976 2 denying the motions for reconsideration filed by the parties therein.
Subject of said decision were the issues on jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act
No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and the
constitutionality of Section 32 thereof.
In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4, 1975, herein
private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria,
public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang,
Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555 thereof for violation of Republic Act No. 4670. The case
was set for arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975. At the arraignment, the herein private
respondents, as the accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Immediately
thereafter, they orally moved to quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the
offense allegedly due to the correctional nature of the penalty of imprisonment prescribed
for the offense. The motion to quash was subsequently reduced to writing on June 13,
1975. 3 On August 21, 1975, the municipal court denied the motion to quash for lack of
merit. 4 On September 2, 1975, private respondents filed a motion for the reconsideration
of the aforesaid denial order on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with the
further allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense considering that
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void for being unconstitutional. In an
undated order received by the counsel for private respondents on October 20,1975, the
motion for reconsideration was denied. 5
On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petitions 6 for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VIII,
where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-622, to restrain the Municipal Judge,
Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of
said Criminal Case No. 555 upon the ground that the former Municipal Court of Hindang
had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Subsequently, an amended
petition 7 alleged the additional ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense since the penal provision, which is Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional for
the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of
imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment
being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative
department of the Government.
On March 30, 1976, having been advised that the petition of herein private respondents
was related to Criminal Case No. 1978 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 442
previously transferred from Branch VIII to Branch IV of the erstwhile Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Judge Fortunate B. Cuna of the former branch transferred the said
petition to the latter branch for further proceedings and where it was subsequently
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5428. 8 On March 15, 1976, the petitioner herein filed
an opposition to the admission of the said amended petitions 9 but respondent judge
denied the same in his resolution of April 20, 1976. 10 On August 2, 1976, herein
petitioner filed a supplementary memorandum in answer to the amended petition. 11
On September 8, 1976, respondent judge rendered the aforecited challenged decision
holding in substance that Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for
its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts, and remanding the
case to the former Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte only for preliminary investigation.
As earlier stated, on September 25, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. 12 Likewise, private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the
lower court's decision but the same was limited only to the portion thereof which sustains
the validity of Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670. 13 Respondent judge denied both
motions for reconsideration in a resolution dated October 19, 1976. 14
The instant petition to review the decision of respondent judge poses the following
questions of law: (1) Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over
violations of Republic Act No. 4670; and (2) Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No.
4670 is constitutional.
We shall resolve said queries in inverse order, since prior determination of the
constitutionality of the assailed provision of the law involved is necessary for the
adjudication of the jurisdictional issue raised in this petition.
1. The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. — A person who shall wilfully interfere with,
restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by
this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of
the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of
not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or
by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied).
Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging
from P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has no
prescribed period or term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment. While a minimum
and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there is no equivalent provision
for the penalty of imprisonment, although both appear to be qualified by the phrase "in
the discretion of the court.
Private respondents contend that a judicial determination of what Congress intended to
be the duration of the penalty of imprisonment would be violative of the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power, and that the absence of a
provision on the specific term of imprisonment constitutes that penalty into a cruel and
unusual form of punishment. Hence, it is vigorously asserted, said Section 32 is
unconstitutional.
The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity
of legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional measure is thereby
created. In every case where a question is raised as to the constitutionality of an act, the
court employs this doctrine in scrutinizing the terms of the law. In a great volume of
cases, the courts have enunciated the fundamental rule that there is a presumption in
favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. 15
It is contended that Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional on the ground that the
imposable but indefinite penalty of imprisonment provided therein constitutes a cruel and
unusual punishment, in defiance of the express mandate of the Constitution. This
contention is inaccurate and should be rejected.
We note with approval the holding of respondent judge that —
The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized by
statute is not cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the
offense unless it is a barbarous one unknown to the law or so wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense
of the community. Based on the principle, our Supreme Court has
consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the punishment of
fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and
unusual. (Legarda vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 146; U.S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil. 386;
People vs. Garay, 2 ACR 149; People vs. Estoista 93 Phil. 647; People
vs. Tiu Ua. 96 Phil. 738; People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299). The
language of our Supreme Court in the first of the cases it decided after
the last world war is appropriate here:
The Constitution directs that 'Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.' The
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally
aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather
than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and
apply to punishments which never existed in America, or
which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete
(15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance there (sic) inflicted at
the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake,
breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15
Am. Jur. Supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). Fine and
imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.'
(People vs. de la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906). 16
The question that should be asked, further, is whether the constitutional prohibition looks
only to the form or nature of the penalty and not to the proportion between the penalty
and the crime.
The answer thereto may be gathered from the pronouncement in People vs.
Estoista, 17 where an "excessive" penalty was upheld as constitutional and was imposed
but with a recommendation for executive clemency, thus:
... If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present
case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared
unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the
legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small
transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are, like small
fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that
 courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for
clemency or reduction of the penalty...
That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare
the law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. 18 In
addition, what degree of disproportion the Court will consider as obnoxious to the
Constitution has still to await appropriate determination in due time since, to the credit of
our legislative bodies, no decision has as yet struck down a penalty for being "cruel and
unusual" or "excessive."
We turn now to the argument of private respondents that the entire penal provision in
question should be invalidated as an 49 "undue delegation of legislative power, the
duration of penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the
lattter were the legislative department of the government."
Petitioner counters that the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts to
determine the period of imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and not an
undue delegation of legislative power. It is contended that the prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative power is concerned only with the delegation of power to make
laws and not to interpret the same. It is also submitted that Republic Act No. 4670 vests
in the courts the discretion, not to fix the period of imprisonment, but to choose which of
the alternative penalties shall be imposed.
Respondent judge sustained these theses of petitioner on his theory that "the principle of
separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of
sentence or amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of
crime. In such instance, the exercise of judicial discretion by the courts is not an attempt
to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the
administration of justice and the application of existing laws to the facts of particular
cases." 19 What respondent judge obviously overlooked is his own reference to penalties
"between designated limits."
In his commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Corwin wrote:
.. At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the
principle that legislative power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine
of separation of powers: Why go to the trouble of separating the three
powers of government if they can straightway remerge on their own
motion? The second is the concept of due process of laws which
precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to private persons. Lastly,
there is the maxim of agency "Delegata potestas non potest delegari." 20
An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative
authority to the courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is
clear, however, that when the courts are said to exercise a discretion, it must be a mere
legal discretion which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and which,
when discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow. 21
So it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the principle of separation
of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or
the amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of a
crime. 22
In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since
the penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is
endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. We cannot
agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no
points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation
presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a
term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits
provided by law, the absence of which designated limits well constitute such exercise as
an undue delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of
imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the
legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term
of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the
duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life
span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power
and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does
violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative
powers. This time, the preumption of constitutionality has to yield.
On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof
should be, as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional.
It follows, therefore, that a ruling on the proper interpretation of the actual term of
imprisonment, as may have been intended by Congress, would be pointless and
academic. It is, however, worth mentioning that the suggested application of the so-
called rule or principle of parallelism, whereby a fine of P1,000.00 would be equated with
one year of imprisonment, does not merit judicial acceptance. A fine, whether imposed
as a single or as an alternative penalty, should not and cannot be reduced or converted
into a prison term; it is to be considered as a separate and independent penalty
consonant with Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code. 23 It is likewise declared a discrete
principal penalty in the graduated scales of penalties in Article 71 of said Code. There is 5 Ibid., 37-38.
no rule for transmutation of the amount of a fine into a term of imprisonment. Neither
does the Code contain any provision that a fine when imposed in conjunction with 6 Ibid., 19-24.
imprisonment is subordinate to the latter penalty. In sum, a fine is as much a principal
penalty as imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to the other. 24 7 Ibid., 56-61.

2. It has been the consistent rule that the criminal jurisdiction of the court is determined 8 Ibid., 5.
by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 25
9 Ibid., 62-63.
With the deletion by invalidation of the provision on imprisonment in Section 32 of
Republic Act No. 4670, as earlier discussed, the imposable penalty for violations of said
10 Ibid., 64-62.
law should be limited to a fine of not less than P100.00 and not more than P1,000.00, the
same to serve as the basis in determining which court may properly exercise jurisdiction
thereover. When the complaint against private respondents was filed in 1975, the 11 Ibid., 68-79.
pertinent law then in force was Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No.
3828, under which crimes punishable by a fine of not more than P 3,000.00 fall under the 12 Ibid., 106-112.
original jurisdiction of the former municipal courts. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555
against herein private respondents falls within the original jurisdiction of the Municipal 13 Ibid., 113-116.
Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte.
14 Ibid., 117-138.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is 15 16 Am. Jur. 2d, 631.
hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on
the merits. 16 Rollo, 98-99.

SO ORDERED. 17 93 Phil. 647 (1953).

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, 18 24 C.J.S. 1187-1188.
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
19 Rollo, 98.

20 Cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,

Footnotes Vol. II, 1988 Ed., 73.

1 Rollo, 80-105. 21 16 Am. Jur. 2d, 902.

2 Ibid., 117-138. 22 Ohio ex rel. Lloyd vs. Dollison 194 U.S. 445, cited in 16 Am. Jur. 2d,
903.
3 Ibid., 25-30.
23 People vs. Basalo 101 Phil. 57 (1957).
4 Ibid., 31.
24 People vs. Crisostomo, 5 SCRA 1048 (1962); People vs. Ignacio, 13
SCRA 153 (1965).

25 People vs. Paderna 22 SCRA 273 (1968); People vs. Mariano, et al.,
71 SCRA 600 (1976); Lee, et al. vs. Hon. Presiding Judge, etc., et al.,
145 SCRA 408 (1986).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995
CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District, South Cotobato)
ADELBERT W. ANTONINO (First District, South Cotobato), WILFREDO G.
CAINGLET (Third District, Zamboanga del Norte), HILARION RAMIRO, JR. (Second
Division, Misamis Occidental), ERNESTO S. AMATONG (Second District,
Zamboanga del Norte), ALVIN G. DANS (Lone District, Basilan), ABDULLAH M.
DIMAPORO (Second District, Lanao del Norte), and CONGRESSWOMAN MARIA
CLARA A. LOBREGAT (Lone District, Zamboanga City) petitioners,
vs.
HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary; COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SEC.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR
REGIONS X AND XII, CHAIRMAN OF THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
FOR REGION X, CHAIRMAN JESUS V. AYALA, CABINET OFFICERS FOR
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS XI and XII, DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
SECRETARIAT, PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT STAFF, HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT; and
HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCUM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.
IMMANUEL JALDON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR M. ORBOS, HON. FIDEL RAMOS, HON.
SECRETARY LUIS SANTOS, AND HON. NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALINA
CAJUCOM, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines
to "merge" by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment
of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to
such authority, "Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao."
A temporary restraining order prayed for by the petitioners was issued by this Court on
January 29, 1991, enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Executive Order and
statute in question.
The facts are as follows:
Pursuant to Art. X, §18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to
be held in the provinces of Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan,
Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. In
the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of
creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these
provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the
Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, § 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides,
That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites
shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions. Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.
Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued on October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "providing for the Reorganization
of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao." Under this Order, as amended by E.O. No.
439 —
(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of
Region IX.
(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of
Region X will become parts of Region IX.
(3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of
Region XII.
(4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of
Region XII.
 (5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of
Region IX.
(6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become
part of Region IX.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 are, or at least at the time of the filing of their petition,
members of Congress representing various legislative districts in South Cotobato,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City. On November 12,
1990, they wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that
There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces
and cities within the existing regions — some of which did not even take
part in the plebiscite as in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental
and the cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz — and restructure them
to new administrative regions. On the other hand, the law (Sec. 13, Art.
XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that "the provinces and
cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions."
The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to
Region IX; Lanao del Norte from Region XII to Region IX, and South
Cotobato from Region XI to Region XII are alterations of the existing
structures of governmental units, in other words, reorganization. This can
be gleaned from Executive Order No. 429, thus
Whereas, there is an urgent need to reorganize the
administrative regions in Mindanao to guarantee the
effective delivery of field services of government agencies
taking into consideration the formation of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao.
With due respect to Her Excellency, we submit that while the authority
necessarily includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge does
not include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's
authority under RA 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be construed
to include the authority to reorganize them. To do so will violate the rules
of statutory construction.
The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is actually a
restructuring (reorganization) of administrative regions. While this
reorganization, as in Executive Order 429, does not affect the
apportionment of congressional representatives, the same is not valid
under the penultimate paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of R.A. 6734 and
Ordinance appended to the 1986 Constitution apportioning the seats of
the House of Representatives of Congress of the Philippines to the
different legislative districts in provinces and cities. 1
As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New
Administrative Region IX were scheduled on January 26, 1991, petitioners brought this
suit for certiorari and prohibition.
On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a resident of
Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity of taxpayer and citizen of the Republic of
the Philippines.
Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, §13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional
because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to
"merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no
standard for the exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power granted is not
expressed in the title of the law.
In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the
ground that the power granted by Art. XIX, §13 to the President is only to "merge regions
IX and XII" but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and
certainly not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to
Pagadian City.
The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O. No. 429
as merely the exercise of a power "traditionally lodged in the President," as held
in Abbas v. Comelec,2 and as a mere incident of his power of general supervision over
local governments and control of executive departments, bureaus and offices under Art.
X, §16 and Art. VII, §17, respectively, of the Constitution.
He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the
power to "fill up" or provide the details of legislation because Congress did not have the
facility to provide for them. He cites by analogy the case of Municipality of Cardona
v. Municipality of Binangonan,3 in which the power of the Governor-General to fix
municipal boundaries was sustained on the ground that —
[such power] is simply a transference of certain details with respect to
provinces, municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created,
and all of them subject to a more or less rapid change both in
development and centers of population, the proper regulation of which
might require not only prompt action but action of such a detailed
 character as not to permit the legislative body, as such, to take it
efficiently.
The Solicitor General justifies the grant to the President of the power "to merge the
existing regions" as something fairly embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734, to wit, "An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,"
because it is germane to it.
He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in which the
provinces and cities which took part in the plebiscite are located but that it extends to all
regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous region.
Finally, he invokes P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which provides:
1. The President of the Philippines shall have the continuing authority to
reorganize the National Government. In exercising this authority, the
President shall be guided by generally acceptable principles of good
government and responsive national government, including but not
limited to the following guidelines for a more efficient, effective,
economical and development-oriented governmental framework:
(a) More effective planning implementation, and review
functions;
(b) Greater decentralization and responsiveness in
decision-making process;
(c) Further minimization, if not, elimination, of duplication
or overlapping of purposes, functions, activities, and
programs;
(d) Further development of as standardized as possible
ministerial, sub-ministerial and corporate organizational
structures;
(e) Further development of the regionalization process;
and
(f) Further rationalization of the functions of and
administrative relationships among government entities.
For purposes of this Decree, the coverage of the
continuing authority of the President to reorganize shall
be interpreted to encompass all agencies, entities,
instrumentalities, and units of the National Government,
including all government owned or controlled corporations
as well as the entire range of the powers, functions,
authorities, administrative relationships, acid related
aspects pertaining to these agencies, entities,
instrumentalities, and units.
2. [T]he President may, at his discretion, take the following actions:
xxx xxx xxx
f. Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge, or integrate
entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and units of the
National Government, as well as expand, amend, change,
or otherwise modify their powers, functions and
authorities, including, with respect to government-owned
or controlled corporations, their corporate life,
capitalization, and other relevant aspects of their charters.
g. Take such other related actions as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes and objectives of this Decree.
Considering the arguments of the parties, the issues are:
(1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, as
petitioners contend, or whether it is executive in character, as respondents claim it is,
and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, §13 is invalid because it contains no standard to
guide the President's discretion;
(2) whether the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute; and
(3) whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the
provinces and cities in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of
the Autonomous Region or did not vote in favor of it; and
(4) whether the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the
regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis and
purpose for their creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A. No. 5435 was passed
"authorizing the President of the Philippines, with the help of a Commission on
Reorganization, to reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices,
agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial
institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it." The purpose was to promote
"simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government." 4 The Commission on
Reorganization created under the law was required to submit an integrated
reorganization plan not later than December 31, 1969 to the President who was in turn
required to submit the plan to Congress within forty days after the opening of its next
regular session. The law provided that any reorganization plan submitted would become
effective only upon the approval of Congress. 5
Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated Reorganization
Plan which divided the country into eleven administrative regions. 6 By P.D. No. 1, the
Plan was approved and made part of the law of the land on September 24, 1972. P.D.
No. 1 was twice amended in 1975, first by P.D. No. 742 which "restructur[ed] the regional
organization of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi" and later by P.D. No. 773 which
further "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao and divid[ed] Region IX into
two sub-regions." In 1978, P.D. No. 1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX
from Jolo to Zamboanga City.
Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by
the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President
the power "to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely
followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of
administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical
because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the
administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments
which the law requires should have regional offices. As this Court observed in Abbas,
"while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments
[seeArt. X, §4 of the Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial and political
divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." 7 The power conferred on the
President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries 8 which has been
described in Pelaez v. Auditor General9 or as "administrative in nature."
There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on
the President the power to merge administrative regions. The question is whether
Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the
exercise of the power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is
included in the subject expressed in the title of the law.
First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may
simply be gathered or implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it
may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged
legislation. 11
With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be
found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the
power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy
and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national
goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the
transaction of the public business." 12 Indeed, as the original eleven administrative
regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in
authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing
regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now
constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the
original basis for the organization of administrative regions.
Nor is Art. XIX, §13 susceptible to charge that its subject is not embraced in the title of
R.A. No. 6734. The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" 13 has
always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The title is not
required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of
the statute are germane to that subject. 14 Certainly the reorganization of the remaining
administrative regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to the
reorganization of administrative regions in which some of the provinces and cities which
voted in favor of regional autonomy are found, because Art. XIX, §13 provides that those
which did not vote for autonomy "shall remain in the existing administrative regions."
More specifically, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 claims:
The questioned Executive Order No. 429 distorted and, in fact,
contravened the clear intent of this provision by moving out or
transferring certain political subdivisions (provinces/cities) out of their
legally designated regions. Aggravating this unacceptable or untenable
situation is EO No. 429's effecting certain movements on areas which did
not even participate in the November 19, 1989 plebiscite. The
unauthorized action of the President, as effected by and under the
questioned EO No. 429, is shown by the following dispositions: (1)
Misamis Occidental, formerly of Region X and which did not even
participate in the plebiscite, was moved from said Region X to Region IX;
(2) the cities of Ozamis, Oroquieta, and Tangub, all formerly belonging to
 Region X, which likewise did not participate in the said plebiscite, were
transferred to Region IX; (3) South Cotobato, from Region XI to Region
XII; (4) General Santos City: from Region XI to Region XII; (5) Lanao del
Norte, from Region XII to Region IX; and (6) the cities of Marawi and
Iligan from Region XII to Region IX. All of the said provinces and cities
voted "NO", and thereby rejected their entry into the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao, as provided under RA No. 6734. 15
The contention has no merit. While Art. XIX, §13 provides that "The provinces and cities
which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions," this provision is subject to the qualification that "the President
may by administrative determination merge the existing regions." This means that while
non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the
creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with
contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may
require.
The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or
redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the
administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the
efficient delivery of essential services. There will be no "transfer" of local governments
from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like
Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the
division or merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the
right of people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be
overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces
for administrative purposes, not for political representation.
Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces and cities
which voted for inclusion in the Autonomous Region are located, can be "merged" by the
President.
To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, §13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental
reason is that the President's power cannot be so limited without neglecting the
necessities of administration. It is noteworthy that the petitioners do not claim that the
reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429 is irrational. The fact is that, as they
themselves admit, the reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based
on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (2) transportation and
communication facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and
population; (5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-
economic development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.
What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center from Zamboanga
City to Pagadian City. Petitioners contend that the determination of provincial capitals
has always been by act of Congress. But as, this Court said in Abbas, 16 administrative
regions are mere "groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, . . .
[They] are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays." There is, therefore, no basis for contending that only Congress can change
or determine regional centers. To the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773
and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize administrative regions carries with it the
power to determine the regional center.
It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to
Pagadian City may entail the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of
buildings and other infrastructure to house regional offices. That contention is addressed
to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality and it is settled that courts are not
the arbiters of the wisdom or expediency of legislation. In any event this is a question
that we will consider only if fully briefed and upon a more adequate record than that
presented by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 23-24, Petition (G.R. No. 96754).
2 179 SCRA 287 (1989).
3 36 Phil. 549 (1917).
4 R.A. No. 5435, § 1.
5 §4.
6 INTEGRATED REORGANIZATION PLAN, Ch. II, Art. I, §1.
7 Supra note 2 at 300-01. Abbas in fact sustained the constitutionality of
Art. XIX, §13 of R.A, No. 6734 against claims that it contravened Art. X,
§10 of the Constitution which requires approval by a majority of the votes
in a plebiscite of the merger of provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays.

8 Act No. 1748.

9 122 Phil. 965, 973-4 (1965). See also Government of the Philippine
Islands v. Municipality of Binangonan, 34 Phil. 518 (1916); Municipality of
Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 (1917).

10 Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970).

11 See Rabor v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 111812, May

31,1995.

12 R.A. No. 5435, §1.

13 Art. VI, §26(1).

14 Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288 (1941); Association of Small

Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175
SCRA 365 (1992).

15 Petitioner's Memorandum, G.R. No. 96673, pp. 5-6.

16 Supra note 2 at 300.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007
ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST
CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN), Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC),
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER
UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC.
(PECO),Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist
Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come before this Court in this original
action praying that Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the
"Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA), imposing the Universal
Charge,1and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) 2 which seeks to implement the
said imposition, be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray that the Universal
Charge imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents to refrain
from implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge. 3 The assailed provision of
law reads:
SECTION 34. Universal Charge. — Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, a
universal charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on
all electricity end-users for the following purposes:
(a) Payment for the stranded debts4 in excess of the amount assumed by the
National Government and stranded contract costs of NPC 5 and as well as
qualified stranded contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from the
restructuring of the industry;
(b) Missionary electrification;6
(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or renewable
sources of energy vis-à-vis imported energy fuels;
(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo per kilowatt-
hour (₱0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to an environmental fund to be used
solely for watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund shall be managed
by NPC under existing arrangements; and
(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not
exceeding three (3) years.
The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which shall be passed on and
collected from all end-users on a monthly basis by the distribution utilities. Collections by
the distribution utilities and the TRANSCO in any given month shall be remitted to the
PSALM Corp. on or before the fifteenth (15th) of the succeeding month, net of any
amount due to the distribution utility. Any end-user or self-generating entity not
connected to a distribution utility shall remit its corresponding universal charge directly to
the TRANSCO. The PSALM Corp., as administrator of the fund, shall create a Special
Trust Fund which shall be disbursed only for the purposes specified herein in an open
and transparent manner. All amount collected for the universal charge shall be
distributed to the respective beneficiaries within a reasonable period to be provided by
the ERC.
The Facts
Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect. 7
On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities
Group8 (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a
petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary
Electrification, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-165.9
On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-
194, praying that the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental
charge of ₱0.0025 per kilowatt-hour (/kWh), or a total of ₱119,488,847.59, be approved
for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent Power Sector
Assets and
Liabilities Management Group (PSALM)10 for the rehabilitation and management of
watershed areas.11
On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order 12 in ERC Case No. 2002-165
provisionally approving the computed amount of ₱0.0168/kWh as the share of the NPC-
SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and authorizing the
National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the
same from its end-users on a monthly basis.
On June 26, 2003, the ERC rendered its Decision13 (for ERC Case No. 2002-165)
modifying its Order of December 20, 2002, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the provisional authority granted to
petitioner National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) in
the Order dated December 20, 2002 is hereby modified to the effect that an additional
amount of ₱0.0205 per kilowatt-hour should be added to the ₱0.0168 per kilowatt-hour
provisionally authorized by the Commission in the said Order. Accordingly, a total
amount of ₱0.0373 per kilowatt-hour is hereby APPROVED for withdrawal from the
Special Trust Fund managed by PSALM as its share from the Universal Charge for
Missionary Electrification (UC-ME) effective on the following billing cycles:
(a) June 26-July 25, 2003 for National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO);
and
(b) July 2003 for Distribution Utilities (Dus).
Relative thereto, TRANSCO and Dus are directed to collect the UC-ME in the amount of
₱0.0373 per kilowatt-hour and remit the same to PSALM on or before the 15th day of the
succeeding month.
In the meantime, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit, not later than April 30, 2004, a
detailed report to include Audited Financial Statements and physical status (percentage
of completion) of the projects using the prescribed format.1avvphi1
Let copies of this Order be furnished petitioner NPC-SPUG and all distribution utilities
(Dus).
SO ORDERED.
On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the ERC,
among others,14 to set aside the above-mentioned Decision, which the ERC granted in
its Order dated October 7, 2003, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the "Motion for Reconsideration" filed
by petitioner National Power Corporation-Small Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 26, 2003 is hereby modified
accordingly.
Relative thereto, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit a quarterly report on the following:
1. Projects for CY 2002 undertaken;
2. Location
3. Actual amount utilized to complete the project;
4. Period of completion;
5. Start of Operation; and
6. Explanation of the reallocation of UC-ME funds, if any.
SO ORDERED.15
Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No. 2002-194, authorizing the
NPC to draw up to ₱70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation
Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the
Universal Charge.16
On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc.
(PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal
Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July
2003.17
Hence, this original action.
Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to
implement the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to
be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is
to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power
to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to
any executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving
the same unlimited authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the
Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence
leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority.
2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds
collected should be used.
 3) The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and
confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation as the consumers
were not given a chance to be heard and represented. 18
Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is
collected to fund the operations of the NPC. They argue that the cases 19 invoked by the
respondents clearly show the regulatory purpose of the charges imposed therein, which
is not so in the case at bench. In said cases, the respective funds20 were created in order
to balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act as buffer to counteract the
changes and adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and other variables which cannot
be adequately and timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a need to
delegate powers to administrative bodies.21 Petitioners posit that the Universal Charge is
imposed not for a similar purpose.
On the other hand, respondent PSALM through the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) contends that unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for
public purposes, such as support of the government, administration of the law, or
payment of public expenses, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for a specific
regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power
industry. Thus, it is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police power. On
this premise, PSALM submits that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to
the ERC since the latter merely exercises a limited authority or discretion as to the
execution and implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA. 22
Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), share the same view that the Universal Charge is not a tax
because it is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of
the country's electric power industry, and is, therefore, an exaction in the exercise of the
State's police power. Respondents further contend that said Universal Charge does not
possess the essential characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound to the
benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public, and that its rate is uniformly
levied on electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual
taxpayer's ability to pay. Moreover, respondents deny that there is undue delegation of
legislative power to the ERC since the EPIRA sets forth sufficient determinable
standards which would guide the ERC in the exercise of the powers granted to it. Lastly,
respondents argue that the imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive and
confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power of the State and it complies with
the requirements of due process.23
On its part, respondent PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the
amount pertaining to the Missionary Electrification and Environmental Fund components
of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERC
Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165. Otherwise, PECO could be held liable under Sec.
4624 of the EPIRA, which imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions or
its IRR.25
The Issues
The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:
1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is
a tax; and
2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part
of the ERC.26
Before we discuss the issues, the Court shall first deal with an obvious procedural lapse.
Petitioners filed before us an original action particularly denominated as a Complaint
assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA imposing the Universal Charge and
Rule 18 of the EPIRA's IRR. No doubt, petitioners havelocus standi. They impugn the
constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA because they sustained a direct injury as a
result of the imposition of the Universal Charge as reflected in their electric bills.
However, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when they filed this
"Complaint" directly with us. Furthermore, the Complaint is bereft of any allegation of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the ERC or any of the public respondents, in
order for the Court to consider it as a petition for certiorari or prohibition.
Article VIII, Section 5(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution27 categorically provides that:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the rules of court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
But this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the regional trial courts and
the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum
from which to seek such relief.28 It has long been established that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment
of a remedy within and call for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. 29 This
circumstance alone warrants the outright dismissal of the present action.
This procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we opt to resolve the constitutional issue raised
herein. We are aware that if the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is not resolved
now, the issue will certainly resurface in the near future, resulting in a repeat of this
litigation, and probably involving the same parties. In the public interest and to avoid
unnecessary delay, this Court renders its ruling now.
The instant complaint is bereft of merit.
The First Issue
To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to distinguish the State’s power of taxation from
the police power.
The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range,
acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be
found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency that is to pay it.30 It is based on the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of
the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need. 31 Thus,
the theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without
taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-
being of the people.32
On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. 33 It is the most pervasive, the
least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State.
The justification is found in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of
the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your
property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty
which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of
instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its
regulatory powers.34 We have held that the power to "regulate" means the power to
protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and
foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. 35
The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose
for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and
regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary
purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax. 36
In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's
police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced from
Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is
imposed37 and which can be amply discerned as regulatory in character. The EPIRA
resonates such regulatory purposes, thus:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State:
(a) To ensure and accelerate the total electrification of the country;
(b) To ensure the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of
electric power;
(c) To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of electricity in a regime of free
and fair competition and full public accountability to achieve greater operational
and economic efficiency and enhance the competitiveness of Philippine products
in the global market;
(d) To enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the ownership base of
the power generation, transmission and distribution sectors;
(e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of public and private sector
entities in the process of restructuring the electric power industry;
(f) To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates and services of
electric utilities and other providers of electric power;
(g) To assure socially and environmentally compatible energy sources and
infrastructure;
(h) To promote the utilization of indigenous and new and renewable energy
resources in power generation in order to reduce dependence on imported
energy;
(i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of the assets and
liabilities of the National Power Corporation (NPC);
 (j) To establish a strong and purely independent regulatory body and system to
ensure consumer protection and enhance the competitive operation of the
electricity market; and
(k) To encourage the efficient use of energy and other modalities of demand side
management.
From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Charge
is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare is
surely promoted.
Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an
implement of police power.38 In Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al. 39 and
in Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,40 this Court held that the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions made in the
exercise of the police power. The doctrine was reiterated in Osmeña v. Orbos41 with
respect to the OPSF. Thus, we disagree with petitioners that the instant case is different
from the aforementioned cases. With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF)
is also created under the administration of PSALM. 42 The STF has some notable
characteristics similar to the OPSF and the SSF, viz.:
1) In the implementation of stranded cost recovery, the ERC shall conduct a
review to determine whether there is under-recovery or over recovery and adjust
(true-up) the level of the stranded cost recovery charge. In case of an over-
recovery, the ERC shall ensure that any excess amount shall be remitted to the
STF. A separate account shall be created for these amounts which shall be held
in trust for any future claims of distribution utilities for stranded cost recovery. At
the end of the stranded cost recovery period, any remaining amount in this
account shall be used to reduce the electricity rates to the end-users.43
2) With respect to the assailed Universal Charge, if the total amount collected for
the same is greater than the actual availments against it, the PSALM shall retain
the balance within the STF to pay for periods where a shortfall occurs.44
3) Upon expiration of the term of PSALM, the administration of the STF shall be
transferred to the DOF or any of the DOF attached agencies as designated by
the DOF Secretary.45
The OSG is in point when it asseverates:
Evidently, the establishment and maintenance of the Special Trust Fund, under the last
paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No. 9136, is well within the pervasive and non-waivable
power and responsibility of the government to secure the physical and economic survival
and well-being of the community, that comprehensive sovereign authority we designate
as the police power of the State.46
This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an
exaction imposed primarily in pursuit of the State's police objectives. The STF
reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which
the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of the country's electric
power industry.
The Second Issue
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of
powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin
maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be
delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes
not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of
his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. 47
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to
various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this
principle.48 Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if
the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly
to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies -
the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields - the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies.
All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be
not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These
requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have
to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot.49
The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34
thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient
standards.
Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that "within one (1) year from the
effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC,
shall be imposed on all electricity end-users," and therefore, does not state the specific
amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the
legislative parameters provided in the law itself. For one, Sec. 43(b)(ii) of the EPIRA
provides:
SECTION 43. Functions of the ERC. — The ERC shall promote competition, encourage
market development, ensure customer choice and penalize abuse of market power in the
restructured electricity industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC is authorized to issue
cease and desist order after due notice and hearing. Towards this end, it shall be
responsible for the following key functions in the restructured industry:
xxxx
(b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate and enforce, in
accordance with law, a National Grid Code and a Distribution Code which shall include,
but not limited to the following:
xxxx
(ii) Financial capability standards for the generating companies, the TRANSCO,
distribution utilities and suppliers: Provided, That in the formulation of the financial
capability standards, the nature and function of the entity shall be considered: Provided,
further, That such standards are set to ensure that the electric power industry
participants meet the minimum financial standards to protect the public interest.
Determine, fix, and approve, after due notice and public hearings the universal charge, to
be imposed on all electricity end-users pursuant to Section 34 hereof;
Moreover, contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude
of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Sec. 51(d) and (e) of the
EPIRA50 clearly provides:
SECTION 51. Powers. — The PSALM Corp. shall, in the performance of its functions
and for the attainment of its objective, have the following powers:
xxxx
(d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded contract costs of
NPC which shall form the basis for ERC in the determination of the
universal charge;
(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the proceeds from
sales and other property contributed to it, including the proceeds from the
universal charge.
Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative
power.
As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following: "interest of law and order;"51 "adequate and efficient instruction;"52 "public
interest;"53 "justice and equity;"54 "public convenience and welfare;"55 "simplicity,
economy and efficiency;"56 "standardization and regulation of medical education;" 57 and
"fair and equitable employment practices."58 Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among
others, "to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security
and affordability of the supply of electric power"59 and "watershed rehabilitation and
management"60 meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the
limitations on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERC's conferred powers were
challenged. In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission,61 the
Court had occasion to say:
In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the provisions of the EPIRA
must not be read in separate parts. Rather, the law must be read in its entirety, because
a statute is passed as a whole, and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Its
meaning cannot to be extracted from any single part thereof but from a general
consideration of the statute as a whole. Considering the intent of Congress in enacting
the EPIRA and reading the statute in its entirety, it is plain to see that the law has
expanded the jurisdiction of the regulatory body, the ERC in this case, to enable the
latter to implement the reforms sought to be accomplished by the EPIRA. When the
legislators decided to broaden the jurisdiction of the ERC, they did not intend to abolish
or reduce the powers already conferred upon ERC's predecessors. To sustain the view
that the ERC possesses only the powers and functions listed under Section 43 of the
EPIRA is to frustrate the objectives of the law.
In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion62 in the same case, then Associate Justice,
now Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of police power in relation
to the delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions over electric power as
a vital public utility, to wit:
Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer limited to the
preservation of public health, safety and morals, which used to be the primary social
interests in earlier times. Police power now requires the State to "assume an affirmative
duty to eliminate the excesses and injustices that are the concomitants of an
unrestrained industrial economy." Police power is now exerted "to further the public
welfare — a concept as vast as the good of society itself." Hence, "police power is but
another name for the governmental authority to further the welfare of society that is the
basic end of all government." When police power is delegated to administrative bodies
with regulatory functions, its exercise should be given a wide latitude. Police power takes
on an even broader dimension in developing countries such as ours, where the State
must take a more active role in balancing the many conflicting interests in society. The
Questioned Order was issued by the ERC, acting as an agent of the State in the exercise
of police power. We should have exceptionally good grounds to curtail its exercise. This
approach is more compelling in the field of rate-regulation of electric power rates. Electric
power generation and distribution is a traditional instrument of economic growth that
affects not only a few but the entire nation. It is an important factor in encouraging
investment and promoting business. The engines of progress may come to a screeching
halt if the delivery of electric power is impaired. Billions of pesos would be lost as a result
of power outages or unreliable electric power services. The State thru the ERC should be
able to exercise its police power with great flexibility, when the need arises.
This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v.
Energy Regulatory Commission63 where the Court held that the ERC, as regulator,
should have sufficient power to respond in real time to changes wrought by multifarious
factors affecting public utilities.
From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of
legislative power to the ERC.
Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that the
imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory, and
amounts to taxation without representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived or
abandoned per Resolution64 of August 3, 2004.65 Moreover, the determination of whether
or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially
involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same. 66
As a penultimate statement, it may be well to recall what this Court said of EPIRA:
utilization of existing generation capacity; extremely high and uncompetitive power rates;
poor quality of service to consumers; dismal to forgettable performance of the
government power sector; high system losses; and an inability to develop a clear
strategy for overcoming these shortcomings.
Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry, including the
privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a
competitive structure, and the delineation of the roles of various government agencies
and the private entities. The law ordains the division of the industry into four (4) distinct
sectors, namely: generation, transmission, distribution and supply.
Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and its transmission business
spun off and privatized thereafter.67
Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not
one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. 68Indubitably, petitioners failed to
overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the
Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule
18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in recent years is the LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
EPIRA. It established a new policy, legal structure and regulatory framework for the Associate Justice Associate Justice
electric power industry. The new thrust is to tap private capital for the expansion and
improvement of the industry as the large government debt and the highly capital-
intensive character of the industry itself have long been acknowledged as the critical ANGELINA SANDOVAL-
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
constraints to the program. To attract private investment, largely foreign, the jaded GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
structure of the industry had to be addressed. While the generation and transmission Associate Justice
sectors were centralized and monopolistic, the distribution side was fragmented with over
130 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic. The pervasive flaws have caused a low MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
 4
Sec. 4 [vv] of the EPIRA provides that Stranded Debts of NPC refer to any
Associate Justice Associate Justice unpaid financial obligations of NPC which have not been liquidated by the
proceeds from the sales and privatization of NPC assets.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
5
Associate Justice Associate Justice Sec. 4 [uu] of the EPIRA also provides that Stranded contract costs of NPC or
distribution utility refer to the excess of the contracted cost of electricity under
DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO eligible contracts over the actual selling price of the contracted energy output of
Associate Justice Associate Justice such contracts in the market. Such contracts shall have been approved by the
ERB as of December 31, 2000.
CANCIO C. GARCIA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. 6
Rule 4 (ddd) of the IRR provides that Missionary Electrification refers to the
Associate Justice Associate Justice
provision of basic electricity service in Unviable Areas with the ultimate aim of
bringing the operations in these areas to viability levels.
CERTIFICATION 7
Manila Electric Company, Inc. v. Lualhati, G.R. Nos. 166769 and 166818,
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the December 6, 2006.
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the 8
writer of the opinion of the Court. IRR, Rule 4 (bbbb) states that Small Power Utilities Group or SPUG refers to
the functional unit of NPC created to pursue Missionary Electrification function.
REYNATO S. PUNO 9
Chief Justice ERC Record for ERC Case No. 2002-165, pp. 1-7.
10
PSALM is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Sec.
49 of the EPIRA, which shall take ownership of all existing NPC generation
assets, liabilities, IPP contracts, real estate and all other disposable assets. All
Footnotes outstanding obligations of the NPC arising from loans, issuances of bonds,
securities and other instruments of indebtedness shall be transferred to and
1 assumed by the PSALM.
Sec. 4 (ddd) of the EPIRA provides that the Universal Charge refers to the
charge, if any, imposed for the recovery of the stranded cost and other purposes 11
pursuant to Section 34 hereof. ERC Record for ERC Case No. 2002-194, pp. 1-5.
12
2
Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 9136, entitled "Electric Supra note 9, at 110-122.
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001, (IRR) approved on February 27, 2002, 13
particularly Rule 4 (rrrr) provides that the "Universal Charge" refers to the charge, Id. at 215-224.
if any, imposed for the recovery of the Stranded Debts, Stranded Contract Costs
14
of NPC, and Stranded Contract Costs of Eligible Contracts of Distribution Utilities NPC-SPUG's Motion for Reconsideration dated August 13, 2003 also prayed
and other purposes pursuant to Section 34 of the EPIRA. that it be allowed (1) to have flexibility in the utilization of UC-ME considering its
mandate to implement the MEDP responsive to the needs and constraints of
3 missionary electrification; (2) to authorize it to re-prioritize its CAPEX and its
Particularly denominated as Complaint dated September 15, 2003; rollo, pp. 3-
15. OPEX to the extent possible, for CY 2003; and (3) to give it the flexibility to
reallocate available UC-ME funds among the revised priority activities/projects for
CY 2003, Id. at 225-236.
15
Id. at 237-239.
16
Supra note 11, at 110-122.
17
Rollo, p. 8.
18
Supra note 3.
19
Osmeña v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993, 220 SCRA 703; Valmonte
v. Energy Regulatory Board, G.R. Nos. L-79601-03, June 23, 1988, 162 SCRA
521; and Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, No. L-77194, March 15, 1988, 158
SCRA 626.
20
These funds are the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and Sugar
Stabilization Fund (SSF).
21
Petitioners' Memorandum dated October 6, 2004; rollo, pp. 123-138.
22
PSALM's Memorandum dated December 8, 2004; id. at 154-167.
23
OSG's Memorandum dated January 4, 2005; id. at 168-187.
24
SECTION 46. Fines and Penalties. — The fines and penalties that shall be
imposed by the ERC for any violation of or non-compliance with this Act or the
IRR shall range from a minimum of Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) to a
maximum of Fifty million pesos (₱50,000,000.00).
Any person who is found guilty of any of the prohibited acts pursuant to
Section 45 hereof shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor and a fine
ranging from Ten thousand pesos (₱10,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(₱10,000.000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court.
The members of the Board of Directors of the juridical companies
participating in or covered in the generation companies, the distribution
utilities, the TRANSCO or its concessionaire or supplier who violate the
provisions of this Act may be fined by an amount not exceeding double
the amount of damages caused by the offender or by imprisonment of
one (1) year or two (2) years or both at the discretion of the court. This
rule shall apply to the members of the Board who knowingly or by neglect
allows the commission or omission under the law.
If the offender is a government official or employee, he shall, in addition,
be dismissed from the government service with prejudice to
reinstatement and with perpetual or temporary disqualification from
holding any elective or appointive office.
If the offender is an alien, he may, in addition to the penalties prescribed,
be deported without further proceedings after service of sentence.
Any case which involves question of fact shall be appealable to the Court
of Appeals and those which involve question of law shall be directly
appealable to the Supreme Court.
The administrative sanction that may be imposed by the ERC shall be
without prejudice to the filing of a criminal action, if warranted.
To ensure compliance with this Act, the penalty of prision correccional or
a fine ranging from Five thousand pesos (₱5,000.00) to Five million
pesos (₱5,000,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court, shall be
imposed on any person, including but not limited to the president,
member of the Board, Chief Executive Officer or Chief Operating Officer
of the corporation, partnership, or any other entity involved, found guilty
of violating or refusing to comply with any provision of this Act or its IRR,
other than those provided herein.
Any party to an administrative proceeding may, at any time, make an
offer to the ERC, conditionally or otherwise, for a consented decree,
voluntary compliance or desistance and other settlement of the case. The
offer and any or all of the ultimate facts upon which the offer is based
shall be considered for settlement purposes only and shall not be used
as evidence against any party for any other purpose and shall not
constitute an admission by the party making the offer of any violation of
the laws, rules, regulations, orders and resolutions of the ERC, nor as a
waiver to file any warranted criminal actions.
In addition, Congress may, upon recommendation of the DOE and/or
ERC, revoke such franchise or privilege granted to the party who violated
the provisions of this Act.
25
PECO's Memorandum dated April 18, 2005; rollo, pp. 205-210.
26
Supra note 21, at 125.
27
Emphasis supplied.
28
Francisco, Jr. v. Fernando, G.R. No. 166501, November 16, 2006, citing
People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415, 423-424 (1989).
29
Lacson Hermanas, Inc. v. Heirs of Cenon Ignacio, G.R. No. 165973, June 29,
2005, 462 SCRA 290, 294 and Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90,
January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 652.
30
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, 330 Phil. 392, 404
(1996).
31
Proton Pilipinas Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165027,
October 16, 2006, citing Province of Tarlac v. Alcantara, 216 SCRA 790, 798
(1992).
32
National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, 449 Phil. 233, 248 (2003).
33
Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc. (DESAMA) v.
Gozun, G.R. No. 157882, March 30, 2006, 485 SCRA 586, 604, citing U.S. v.
Torribio, 15 Phil. 85, 93 (1910) and Rubi v. The Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39
Phil. 660, 708 (1919).
34
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095,
August 5, 1996, 260 SCRA 319, 324.
35
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Hon. Ruben D. Torres, G.R.
No. 101279, August 6, 1992, 212 SCRA 298, 304, citing Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218 (1989).
36
Progressive Development Corporation vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 36081, April
24, 1989, 172 SCRA 629, 635, citing Manila Electric Company v. El Auditor
General y La Comision de Servicios Publicos, 73 Phil. 133 (1941); Republic v.
Philippine Rabbit Lines, 143 Phil. 158, 163 (1970).
37
The purposes are:
(a) Payment for the stranded debts in excess of the amount assumed by
the National Government and stranded contract costs of NPC and as well
as qualified stranded contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from
the restructuring of the industry;
(b) Missionary electrification;
(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or
renewable sources of energy vis-à-vis imported energy fuels;
(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo per
kilowatt-hour (₱0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to an environmental
fund to be used solely for watershed rehabilitation and management.
Said fund shall be managed by NPC under existing arrangements; and
(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not
exceeding three (3) years.
38
Osmeña v. Orbos, supra note 19, at 710, Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,
supra note 19, at 632, Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, No. L-75697, June
18, 1987, 151 SCRA 208, 216, and Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148 (1955).
39
Supra note 19, at 539; Decided jointly with Citizen's Alliance for Consumer
Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board., G.R. Nos. L-78888-90, and Kilusang
Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Energy Regulatory, Board., G.R. Nos. L-79690-92.
40
Supra note 19, at 632-633.
41
Id. at 710-711.
42
Last paragraph, Sec. 34, EPIRA provides: The PSALM Corp., as administrator
of the fund, shall create a Special Trust Fund which shall be disbursed only for
the purposes specified herein in an open and transparent manner. All amount
collected for the universal charge shall be distributed to the respective
beneficiaries within a reasonable period to be provided by the ERC.
IRR of the EPIRA, Rule 18, SECTION 6, also provides:
(a) Pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 34 of the Act, PSALM shall
act as the administrator of the funds generated from the Universal
Charge. For this purpose, the PSALM shall create a STF to be
established in the Bureau of Treasury (BTr) or in a Government
Financing Institution (GFI) that is acceptable to the DOF. Separate STFs
shall be established for each of the intended purposes of the Universal
Charge. Funds shall be disbursed in an open and transparent manner
and shall only be used for the intended purposes specified in Section 3 of
this Rule.
43
EPIRA, Sec. 33, last paragraph and IRR, Sec. 5 (f), Rule 17.
44 55
IRR, Sec. 6 (f), Rule 18. Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726, 733 (1940).

45 56
IRR, Sec. 4, Rule 21. Cervantes v. Auditor General, 91 Phil 359, 364 (1952).

46 57
Supra note 23, at 177-178, citing Osmeña v. Orbos, supra note 19. Tablarin v. Gutierrez, No. L-78164, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 731.
47 58
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas
168463 and 168730, September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 10, 115-116. Employment Administration, supra note 49.

48 59
The recognized exceptions to the general principle are as follows: Sec. 2(a) and (b), Declaration of Policies of the EPIRA.
60
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Supra note 37.
Article VI of the Constitution;
61
G.R. No. 161113, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 157, 182.
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2)
of Article VI of the Constitution; 62
Id. at 219-220 (Emphasis supplied).

(3) Delegation to the people at large; 63

G.R. No. 163935, February 2, 2006, 481 SCRA 480, 515-516, citing Freedom
from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission, supra note 61.
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
64
Rollo, pp. 108-109
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. Abakada Guro Party List v.
Ermita, supra note 47, at 117 and Santiago v. Comelec, 336 Phil. 848, 65
Republic v. Kalaw, G.R. No. 155138, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 401, 406.
897-898 (1997), citing People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
66
49
Lopez v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 127139, February 19, 1999, 303 SCRA 448,
Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. DFA, G.R. No. 152214, September 19, 2006, 460, citing Ty v. Trampe, 250 SCRA 500 (1995).
citing Beltran v. Secretary of Health, 476 SCRA 168, 191 (2005); The
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. Philippine Overseas Employment 67
Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission, supra note
Agency, 313 Phil. 592, 606 (1995); and Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine 61, at 171-172.
Overseas Employment Agency, G.R. No. L-76633, October 18, 1998, 166 SCRA
533, 543. 68
Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. Nos. 152895 & 153151, June 15, 2004, 432
50 SCRA 136, 142, citing Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, 361 Phil. 251, 263
Emphasis supplied. (1999).
51
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra note 33, at 706.

52
Philippine Association of Colleges and University v. Secretary of Education, 97
Phil. 806, 814 (1955).
53
People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328, 342 (1939).

54
Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, 70 Phil. 340 (1940).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46570 April 21, 1939
JOSE D. VILLENA, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, respondent.
Vicente del Rosario for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the
Secretary of the Interior to restrain him and his agents from proceeding with the
investigation of the herein petitioner, Jose D. Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, which was
scheduled to take place on March 28, 1939, until this case is finally determined by this
court. The respondent was required to answer, but the petition for preliminary injunction
was denied.
It appears that the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, upon the
request of the Secretary of the Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the
petitioner, as a result of which the latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion,
malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession. The
respondent, therefore, on February 8, 1939, recommended to the President of the
Philippines the suspension of the petitioner to prevent possible coercion of witnesses,
which recommendation was granted, according to the answer of the Solicitor-General of
March 20, 1939, verbally by the President on the same day. The Secretary of the Interior
suspended the petitioner from office on February 9, 1939, and then and thereafter wired
the Provincial Governor of Rizal with instruction that the petitioner be advised
accordingly. On February 13, 1939, the respondent wrote the petitioner a letter,
specifying the many charges against him and notifying him of the designation of Emiliano
Anonas as special investigator to investigate the charges. The special investigator
forthwith notified the petitioner that the formal investigation would be commenced on
February 17, 1939, at 9 a. m., but due to several incidents and postponements, the same
had to be set definitely for March 28, 1939. Hence, the petition for preliminary injunction
referred to in the beginning of this opinion.
Petitioner prays this Honorable Court:
The petitioner contends in his petition:
(1) That the Secretary of the Interior has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend
and much less to prefer by himself administrative charges against the petitioner
and decide also by himself the merits of the charges as the power to suspend
municipal elective officials and to try and punish them for misconduct in office or
dereliction of duty is lodged in some other agencies of the government;
(2) That the acts of the respondent in suspending the petitioner from office and in
preferring by himself charges against him and in designating a special
investigator to hear the charges specified in Exhibit A are null and void for the
following reasons:
(a) Because the Secretary of the Interior, by suspending the petitioner,
has exercised control over local governments when that power has been
taken away from the President of the Philippines by the Constitution for
the to abrogate and the power to abrogate means the power to power to
control has been interpreted to include the power usurp and the power to
usurp necessarily includes the power to destroy;
(b) Because even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of
supervision over local governments, that power, according to the
constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law
and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective
municipal officials are those contained in section 2188 of the
Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the
Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has
that power under existing law, in accordance with section 2188 of the
Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provision govern the
procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local
officials while section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the general law
which must yield to the special law;
(c) Because the respondent Secretary of the Interior is exercising an
arbitrary power by converting himself into a complainant and at the same
time judge of the charges he has preferred against the petitioner;
(d) Because the action of the respondent Secretary of the Interior is not
based on any sworn statement of any private person or citizen of this
government when section 2188 of the Administrative Code requires the
complaint against elective municipal officials to be under oath in order to
merit consideration by the authorities.
 (a) To issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondent restraining
him, his agents, attorneys and all persons acting by virtue of his authority from
further proceeding against the petitioner until this case is finally determined by
this court;
(b) To declare, after the hearing of this petition, that the respondent is without
authority or jurisdiction to suspend the petitioner from the office of mayor of
Makati and to order his immediate reinstatement in office;
(c) To declare that the respondent has no authority to prefer charges against the
petitioner and to investigate those charges for the grant him that power the
respondent would be acting as prosecutor and judge of the case of his own
creation.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor-General contends in his answer:
1. That section 79 (C) in relation with section 86 of the Revised Administrative
Code expressly empowers the respondent as Secretary of the Interior to "order
the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau
or office under his department" and in connection therewith to "designate an
official or person who shall conduct such investigation"; (Par. 4.)
2. That although section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, invoked by
the petitioner, empowers the provincial governor to `receive and investigate
complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office', said section
does not preclude the respondent as Secretary of the Interior from exercising the
power vested in him by section 79 (C) in relation with section 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code; and that, moreover, said section 2188 must be read in
relation with section 37 of Act No. 4007, known as the Reorganization Law of
1932; (Par. 4 [b].)
3. That at the commencement of the investigation the petitioner did not question
the power or jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior to investigate the
administrative charges against him but merely contended that the filing of said
charges was not in accordance with law for the reason that they did not bear the
oaths of the complainants; (Par. 5.)
4. That the authority of a department head order the investigation of any act or
conduct of any person under his department necessarily carries with it by
implication the authority to take such measures as he may deem necessary to
accomplish the purpose of the investigation, such as by suspending the officer
under investigation to prevent coercion of witnesses; and that, furthermore, the
suspension from office of the herein petitioner by the respondent was authorized
by the Chief Executive, who is empowered by section 64 (B) of the Administrative
Code to remove officials from office; (Par. 7.)
5. That the petition does not allege facts and circumstances that would warrant
the granting of the writ of preliminary injunction under section 164 of the Code of
Civil Procedure; (Par. 8.)
6. That it is a well-settled rule "that courts of equity have no power to restrain
public officers by injunction from performing any official act which they are by law
required to perform, or acts which are not in excess of the authority and
discretion reposed in them." (Par. 9)
The issues presented in this case may be reduced to an inquiry into the legal authority of
the Secretary of the Interior (a) to order an investigation, by a special investigation
appointed by him, of the charges of corruption and irregularity brought to his attention
against the mayor of the municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, who is the petitioner
herein, and (b) to decree the suspension of the said mayor pending the investigation of
the charges.
Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code provides as follows:
The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over
all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing
law to the contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions of the chiefs
of said bureaus of offices when advisable in the public interest.
The Department Head may order the investigation of any act conduct of any
person in the service of any bureau of office under his department and in
connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person
who shall conduct such investigations, and such committee, official, or person
may summon, witness by subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, administer oath
and take testimony relevant to the investigation.
The above section speaks, it is true, of direct control, direction, and supervision over
bureaus and offices under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but this section
should be interpreted in relation to section 86 of the same Code which grants to the
Department of the Interior "executive supervision over the administration of provinces,
municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions." In the case
of Planas vs. Gil (37 Off. Gaz., 1228), we observed that "Supervision is not a
meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least
implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and
effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal,
it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after
careful study and investigation." The principle there enunciated is applicable with equal
force to the present case.
We hold, therefore, that the Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to order the
investigation of the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for
that purpose.
As regards the challenged power of the Secretary of the Interior to decree the
suspension of the herein petitioner pending an administrative investigation of the charges
against him, the question, it may be admitted, is not free from difficulties. There is no
clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality
who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial
governor by section 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that "The provincial
governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of
office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. For minor
delinquency he may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to
be desirable he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board,
furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail,
and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending
action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the
officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected, the written charges against the
officer shall be filed with the board within five days." The fact, however, that the power of
suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the
provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes
the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel for the
petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself
suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as
amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the
President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official, it would be
a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the
incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to
remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be
without the power to suspend a municipal official. Here is, parenthetically, an instance
where, as counsel for petitioner admitted, the power to suspend a municipal official is not
exclusive. Upon the other hand, it may be argued with some degree of plausibility that, if
the Secretary of the Interior is, as we have hereinabove concluded, empowered to
investigate the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for
that purpose, preventive suspension may be a means by which to carry into effect a fair
and impartial investigation. This is a point, however, which, for the reason hereinafter
indicated, we do not have to decide.
The Solicitor-General argues that section 37 of Act No. 4007, known as the
Reorganization Law of 1932, by providing, "the provisions of the existing law to the
contrary notwithstanding," that "whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or
activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be
understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have
authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify or revoke any decision
or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service", should be interpreted to
concede to the Secretary of the Interior the power to suspend a mayor of a municipality.
The argument is so generally sweeping that, unless distinctions are made, the effect
would be the complete abrogation at will of the powers of provincial and municipal
officials even in corporate affairs of local governments. Under the theory suggested by
the Solicitor-General, the Secretary of the Interior could, as observed by able counsel for
the petitioner, enter into a contract and sign a deed of conveyance of real property in
behalf of a municipality against the opposition of the mayor thereof who is the local
official authorized by law to do so (sec. 2196, Revised Administrative Code), or in behalf
of a province in lieu of the provincial governor thereof (sec 2068, Ibid.), and otherwise
exercise powers of corporate character mentioned in sections 2067 and 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code and which are lodged in the corresponding provincial and
municipal officials. And if the power of suspension of the Secretary of the Interior is to be
justified on the plea that the pretended power is governmental and not corporate, the
result would be more disastrous. Then and thereunder, the Secretary of the Interior, in
lieu of the mayor of the municipality, could directly veto municipal ordinances and
resolutions under section 2229 of the Revised Administrative Code; he could, without
any formality, elbow aside the municipal mayor and himself make appointments to all
non-elective positions in the municipal service, under section 2199 of the Revised
Administrative Code; he could, instead of the provincial governor, fill a temporary
vacancy in any municipal office under subsection (a), section 2188, as amended, of the
said Code; he-could even directly appoint lieutenants of barrios and wrest the authority
given by section 2218 of the Revised Administrative Code to a municipal councilor.
Instances may be multiplied but it is unnecessary to go any further. Prudence, then,
dictates that we should hesitate to accept the suggestion urged upon us by the Solicitor-
General, especially where we find the path indicated by him neither illuminated by the
light of our own experience nor cemented by the virtuality of legal principles but is, on the
contrary, dimmed by the recognition however limited in our own Constitution of the right
of local self-government and by the actual operation and enforcement of the laws
governing provinces, chartered cities, municipalities and other political subdivisions. It is
not any question of wisdom of legislation but the existence of any such destructive
authority in the law invoked by the Government that we are called upon to pass and
determine here.
In the deliberation of this case it has also been suggested that, admitting that the
President of the Philippines is invested with the authority to suspend the petitioner, and it
appearing that he had verbally approved or at least acquiesced in the action taken by the
Secretary of the Interior, the suspension of the petitioner should be sustained on the
principle of approval or ratification of the act of the Secretary of the Interior by the
President of the Philippines. There is, to be sure, more weight in this argument than in
the suggested generalization of section 37 of Act No. 4007. Withal, at first blush, the
argument of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it should be
observed that there are certain prerogative acts which, by their very nature, cannot be
validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain
constitutional power and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be
exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the
exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and
the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem). Upon the
other hand, doubt is entertained by some members of the court whether the statement
made by the Secretary to the President in the latter's behalf and by his authority that the
President had no objection to the suspension of the petitioner could be accepted as an
affirmative exercise of the power of suspension in this case, or that the verbal approval
by the President of the suspension alleged in a pleading presented in this case by the
Solicitor-General could be considered as a sufficient ratification in law.
After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in
this case on the board proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type
of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization
established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our
Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents
of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive. (Runkle vs. United States [1887], 122 U. S., 543; 30 Law.
ed., 1167: 7 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1141; see also U. S. vs. Eliason [1839], 16 Pet., 291; 10 Law.
ed., 968; Jones vs. U. S. [1890], 137 U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691; 11 Sup. Ct., Rep., 80;
Wolsey vs. Chapman [1880], 101 U. S., 755; 25 Law. ed., 915: Wilcox vs. Jackson
[1836], 13 Pet., 498; 10 Law. ed., 264.)
Fear is expressed by more than one member of this court that the acceptance of the
principle of qualified political agency in this and similar cases would result in the
assumption of responsibility by the President of the Philippines for acts of any member of
his cabinet, however illegal, irregular or improper may be these acts. The implications, it
is said, are serious. Fear, however, is no valid argument against the system once
adopted, established and operated. Familiarity with the essential background of the type
of government established under our Constitution, in the light of certain well-known
principles and practices that go with the system, should offer the necessary explanation.
With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose
which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight,
and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article
VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the
enunciation of the principles that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of
the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the
Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments
occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of
Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford
ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General,
453), "are subject to the direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance of
the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of
that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice
Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must
be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is
required by law to exercise authority" (Myers vs. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at
30; 272 U. S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160). Secretaries of departments, of course,
exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way affect the
constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a matter of executive
policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by
mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular
field. If the President, then, is the authority in the Executive Department, he assumes the
corresponding responsibility. The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he
controls and directs his acts; he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the
executive, not any of his secretaries. It is therefore logical that he, the President, should
be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire Executive Department before
his own conscience no less than before that undefined power of public opinion which, in
the language of Daniel Webster, is the last repository of popular government. These are
the necessary corollaries of the American presidential type of government, and if there is
any defect, it is attributable to the system itself. We cannot modify the system unless we
modify the Constitution, and we cannot modify the Constitution by any subtle process of
judicial interpretation or constitution.
The petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring in the result:
I concur in the result. The Secretary of the Interior is nowhere given the power to
suspend a municipal elective officer pending charges, and in the absence of such power
he may not suspend him. The power to suspend cannot be implied even from an
arbitrary power to remove, except where the power to remove is limited to cause; in such
case, the power to suspend, made use of as a disciplinary power pending charges, is
regarded as included within the power of removal (46 Corpus Juris, sec. 142, page 982).
Provincial governors alone are expressly empowered to suspend municipal officers
under certain conditions by section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, and the
President of the Philippines by section 2191, as amended, of the same Code. Though
the suspension of the petitioner by the Secretary of the Interior was unauthorized, the
implied approval by the President of the Philippines validated such suspension.
IMPERIAL, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result because in my opinion (1) the President of the Philippines, under
sections 64 (b), and 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the latter has been
amended, and section 11 (1), Article VII, of the Constitution, is vested with the power to
expel and suspend municipal officials for grave misconduct, and it appears that the
suspension was ordered by virtue of that authority; and (2) the Secretary of the Interior
acted within the powers conferred upon him by section 79 (C), in connection with section
86, of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, in ordering an administrative
investigation of the charges against the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor of the
municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal.
It is a fact that, as a result of the investigation conducted by the Division of Investigation
of the Department of Justice, the respondent, in turn, ordered the administrative
investigation of the petitioner and recommend his temporary suspension to the President
of the Philippines to preclude him from exerting pressure upon the witnesses who would
testify in the investigation, and that the President of the Philippines, through Secretary
Jorge B. Vargas, stated that he had no objection to the suspension. The act of the
President of the Philippines, in my opinion, was an exercise of his power to suspend the
petitioner and the statement that he had no objection was, at bottom, an order of
suspension. The circumstance that in the communication which the respondent
addressed to the petitioner it appeared as though the suspension had been ordered by
him, is immaterial and does not alter the merits of the case, as the facts disclose that the
order of suspension came directly from the President of the Philippines.
However, I dissent from the conclusion of the majority that, under the existing
presidential system of government and in view of the fact that the department secretaries
are, in the last analysis, agents of the executive, the acts of the said officials are
presumptively deemed the acts of the executive and that, consequently, the suspension
of the petitioner directed by the respondent should be considered, under the same
theory, as the suspension decreed by the President of the Philippines. I believe that the
principle thus enunciated is at once dangerous and without legal sanction. Under the law
each of these officials has his own powers and duties and I doubt seriously if it has ever
been the intention of the legislative to confuse their duties and prerogatives, for
otherwise it would be difficult, if not impossible, to limit and fix responsibility. The
respondent himself could not have so understood the law when, under the facts, in order
to suspend the petitioner he found it necessary to obtain the express authority of the
President of the Philippines.
MORAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result.
The ratio dicidendi of the case is contained in the following paragraph of the majority
decision:
. . ., that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and
considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by
paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads
of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. . . .
If by this proposition it is meant that the power of suspension residing in the President
may validly be exercised by the Secretary of the Interior in his own name, and his act,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the President, is presumptively the act of the
President, I disagree. The implications involved in the proposition are serious. Suppose
the Secretary of Justice, pending proceedings against a judge of first instance, suspends
him temporarily, a power vested in the President (section 173, Adm. Code), is the
suspension valid in the silence of the President? Suppose the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications removes the Director of Posts , is the removal the act of the
President if not disapproved by the latter? Suppose the Secretary of the Interior grants
conditional pardon to a prisoner, is the pardon valid unless reprobated by the President?
The answer are self-evident.
It is true that the majority decision makes exception of the powers which the Chief
Executive, by Constitution, by law, or by the exigencies of the situation, should exercise
in person. The distinction, however, thus sought to be established between the powers
which the President should exercise in person and those which he may exercise thru the
department secretaries, if it exists at all, is extremely shadowy and in fact can nowhere
be found in the Constitution, in the law or practices of administration. On the contrary, the
weight of wisdom and authority is that powers committed or intrusted by the Constitution
or by law to the President must be exercised by him positively and in person. The only
functions of the President which, in my opinion, may be performed by the department
secretaries are those which are preliminary or preparatory to the exercise of his powers,
such as, in investigation, research and other inquiries which may be necessary for a wise
and judicious exercise of his judgment or discretion. This opinion finds corroboration in
section 79-A of the Administrative Code.
The proposition contained in the majority decision is even of much wider scope than is
above stated, for it conveys the idea that all the functions of the executive branch of the
government are in the President, with the executive departments as mere adjuncts to
him and the department secretaries his mere assistants or agents with no authority,
function or responsibility of their own, except those emanating from the President, and
that, therefore, as they cannot act but at the will of the President, all their acts, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the President, are presumptively the acts of the
Presidents. This sweeping statement is undoubtedly inspired by section 1, Article VII, of
the Constitution, which provides that "the executive power shall be vested in a President
of the Philippines." It disregards, however, the true meaning of other provisions of the
Constitution, such as paragraph 1 of section 12 of the same article, which provides that
"executive departments of the present Government of the Philippine Islands shall
continue as now authorized by law until the National Assembly shall provide otherwise."
(Emphasis supplied.)
According to section 74 of the Administrative Code ". . . the departments are established
for the proper distribution of the work of the executive, for the performance of the
functions expressly assigned to them by law, and in order that each branch of the
administration may have a chief responsible for its direction and policy." (Emphasis
supplied.) To give effect to this provision, each department head is expressly vested with
broad as well as specific powers commensurate with his responsibility, such as the
powers to ". . . promulgate, whenever he may see fit to do so, all rules, regulations,
orders, circulars, . . . necessary to regulate the proper working and harmonious and
efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his department,
and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under
the jurisdiction of said department" (section 79-B, Adm. Code); the power of direction
and supervision over such bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction, and to repeal or
modify the decisions of the chief of said bureaus or offices when advisable in the public
interest (section 79-C, Adm. Code; section 37, Act No. 4007); the power to appoint
subordinate officers and employees whose appointment is not expressly vested by law in
the President, and to remove and punish them except as specially provided otherwise in
accordance with the Civil Service Law (section 79-D, Adm. Code), etc. All these powers
are continued in force by the Constitution.
Thus, while in one provision the Constitution vests in the President of the Philippines the
executive power of the government, in another the same Constitution recognizes the
powers of the department secretaries conferred upon them by law. The apparent conflict
between the two provisions is reconciled by the Constitution itself by means of the power
of control vested in the President over the executive departments. That power of control
could not have been intended to wipe out or supersede all the powers of the department
secretaries, for, otherwise, those powers would not have been continued in force by the
Constitution. It would certainly be an absurdity in the Constitution to recognize and at the
same time abrogate those powers. On the contrary, the creation of the power of control
implies the preservation, not the destruction, of all the powers conferred by law upon the
department secretaries. In fact, the majority admits the existence of those powers,
subject, of course, to the powers of control of the President. Now, the power of control
may or may not be exercised. If not exercised, the acts of the department secretaries in
pursuance of their powers would remain in full force and effect, and are their own acts
and not the President's. If exercised, by way of disapproval or reprobation of the acts of
the department secretaries, the acts so reprobated are still their acts and not the
President's.
There is more theory than law in the statement that the personally of the department
secretaries is but the projection of that of the President. There is more truth in the
language used by Chief Justice Taft, as quoted in the majority opinion, to the effect that
"each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of
that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority" (emphasis
supplied.). For it is only when the President exercises his authority and powers that the
department secretaries act merely as his assistants, agents or advisers, and, in such
cases, their acts are his. But when they act in accordance with the powers vested in
them by law, they act with a personality separate from and no less distinct than that of
the President himself, if the recognition accorded to their powers by the Constitution is to
mean anything at all. And the fact that the government we have instituted is a
presidential one in no wise destroys what the law has created and the Constitution has
recognized. The presidential system of government could not have been intended to
supersede a government of laws for a government of men.
If, as stated by the majority, all the official acts of the secretaries of the departments are
presumptively the acts of the President, it must follow that the President is presumptively
responsible therefor. That this corrollary proposition cannot be maintained is obvious. At
every instance, he would be called upon to accountability for acts of which he might not
have any knowledge at all and for which he could in no wise be held responsible. In the
complicated activities of each department, multifarious official acts have to be performed
from time to time. Very often these acts are performed in pursuance of powers and
duties expressly lodged in them by law; and, occasionally, upon authority and direction of
the President in the latter's exercise of his power of control. In the performance of such
acts, executive and administrative discretion had to be exercised for which responsibility
must accordingly be exclusive and purely personal. To hold the President presumptively
responsible for such acts would suggest, in effect, the necessity on the part of the
President to exercise constant and unrelaxing vigilance over all the official acts of the
secretaries of the departments, under hazard of being involved in endless difficulties.
The manifold exigencies of government render such a suggestion inconceivable.
My view, therefore, is that the department secretaries may act in a purely advisory
capacity or under the direction and authority of the President in the latter's exercise of his
constitutional power of control, and, in such cases, the proposition contained in the
majority decision applies, because then, the department secretaries act purely for the
Chief Executive. However, they may also act in pursuance of the powers and duties
conferred upon them by law and continued in force by the Constitution, and, unless the
President desires to intervene, in appropriate cases, by interposing his constitutional
power of control, the acts of the department secretaries are exclusively their own, and
they are likewise exclusively responsible therefor. It follows that when a department
secretary acts in his own name and not by order or authority of the President, he is
presumed to be so acting in pursuance of a power conferred upon him by law, and when
the power is not thus conferred, his act is null and void. And if the power is conferred
expressly upon the President, he must exercise it positively and in person with such
assistance, advice and recommendation of the corresponding department head, as he
himself may choose to demand. Accordingly, the bare statement made by the President
of his non-objection to the action taken by the Secretary of the Interior in the present
case is not a sufficient exercise of his power to suspend, for it may mean neither
approval nor disapproval. The President probably believed, and indeed rightly as I shall
hereafter show, that the power to suspend the petitioner also resided in the Secretary of
the Interior, and called upon to exercise his power of supervision, he confined himself to
making a mere statement of non-objection to the latter's exercise of his power. This, in
my opinion, is the most rational explanation of the passive attitude thus observed by the
President. I am almost sure that had he intended to exercise his own power to suspend,
he would have done so, as usually, in a manner that would not admit of any possibility of
doubt.
Moreover, besides the written statement of non-objection made by the President, it is
claimed by the Solicitor-General that the President expressly and orally approved the
order of suspension issued by the Secretary of the Interior. Such supposed oral approval
alleged in the respondent's answer is, however, deemed controverted by the petitioner,
according to section 104 of Act No. 190, and, not being supported by proof, it cannot be
considered as true fact in the disposition of this case.
If I agree with the result, it is not therefore on the broad proposition relied upon by the
majority, but from what is necessary implied from express provisions of law. Section 37
of Act No. 4007 provides:
The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a
specific power, authority, duty, function or activity is entrusted to a chief of
bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be understood as also
conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority to act
directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify or revoke any decision or
action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service.
There can be no question that the word "division" in the above provision has no other
reference than to provinces and municipalities (Chapter 2 and section 86, Adm. Code). It
is then evident that this provision confers upon the Secretary of the Interior the power
residing in the provincial governor (section 2188, Adm. Code) to decree the suspension
of the petitioner pending an administrative investigation of the charges against him. That
this is the true meaning of the law, the majority does not question.
Fear, however, has been expresses in the majority opinion that this view may result in
the complete abrogation of the powers of provincial and municipal officials even in
corporate affairs of local governments. Instances are cited in which the Secretary of the
Interior may exercise for himself the powers vested by law in provincial governors and
municipal mayors as to matters of both governmental and corporate functions of
provinces and municipalities, such as, the power to veto, the power to appoint, and the
power to enter into contracts. Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior can thus
exercise the powers vested by law in provincial and municipal executives in the
instances cited, to the complete abrogation of provincial and municipal autonomy, is a
question which I need not discuss now. Other provisions of law and a number of
collateral questions may have to be inquired into if any safe conclusion is to be formed.
But even if, as feared, the law has the effect of nullifying the powers conferred upon
provincial and municipal executives, can there be any doubt that the law can do so? The
same authority that creates those powers may withdraw or qualify them at will or provide
effective measures of supervision over their exercise. The extent or even the existence
of local autonomy is a matter which lies within the exclusive prerogative of the
Legislature to define. If the law is clear, or duty to apply it is just as clear, irrespective of
how destructive it may be of the autonomy of local governments. To refuse to apply a
law, which is otherwise applicable and is valid and constitutional, simply because it does
violence to our theory of government, would, in effect, be imposing ourselves upon the
legislature department of the government and an intrusion into its own sphere of
constitutional authority.
Moreover, the law is not of such "destructive authority" as the majority has pictured it to
be. The philosophy behind this provision is apparent. It is intended to supply possible
omissions or inactions on the part of the subordinate officers concerned by reason of the
entanglement arising from partisan activities. The power which the law confers upon the
department head is undoubtedly susceptible of abuses. But what power is not
susceptible of abuse? In the enactment of the law, the legislature undoubtedly relied
much on the sense of patriotism and sound judgment of the department head. It is
perhaps the intention of the law that the department head should exercise his power in a
manner compatible with the autonomy given the local governments, and that he should
act directly only when the exigencies of the situation require him to act in the interest of
the Nation. Thus, the department head is given ample discretion. The possibility of a
mischievous or disastrous abuse of power on his part is not entirely without any remedy
at all. The presidential power of control over executive departments and the existence of
judicial remedies may afford effective check or redress. In the instant case, there is no
showing that the Secretary of the Interior has abused, or even intended to abuse the
power of suspension. If a capricious and whimsical use of such power presents itself to
us for determination in some future time, then and there must we declare where one
power begins and the other ends.

As the law, therefore, is not unconstitutional, we would be ignoring it clear provision if not
applied in this case.