CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
Wright/Cracker Matter — Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Properties
WRIGHT V CA (1994) – CASE ON EXTRADITION/EX POST FACTO LAW
A paramount principle of the law of extradition provides that a State may
not surrender any individual for any offense not included in a treaty of
extradition. This principle arises from the reality of extradition as a
derogation of sovereignty. Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial
integrity of the host State and a delimitation of the sovereign power of the
State within its own territory.
The principles of international law recognize no right of extradition apart
from that arising from treaty.
Desiring to make more effective cooperation between Australia and the
Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, 6 the two
countries entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988.
The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section
21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the
Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective thirty (30) days
after both States notified each other in writing that the respective
requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied
with.
The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which
provides for broader coverage of extraditable offenses between the two
countries and (which) embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for
at least one (1) year. Additionally, the Treaty allows extradition for crimes
committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these
crimes were in the statute books of the requesting State at the time of
their commission.
Facts: On March 1993, DFA indorsed to the DOJ Diplomatic Note No.
080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the
Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said
Diplomatic Note was a formal request for the extradition of Petitioner Paul
Joseph Wright who is wanted for the following indictable crimes:
1. Wright/Orr Matter — one count of Obtaining Property by Deception
contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and
2.
by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of
1958; one count of attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary
to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and one count of
Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958
Extradition proceeding was initiated on April 6, 1993 and on June 14
1993, the petition for extradition requested by the Government of
Australia was granted concluding that the documents submitted by the
Australian Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of
Extradition and that the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in
his country are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty.
This was later on affirmed by CA. On appeal, Wright averred two
assignments of errors. First, that the order violates the Constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws since the offenses allegedly
committed prior to the effectivity of the Treaty. Second, He avers that for
the extradition order to be valid, the Australian government should show
that he "has a criminal case pending before a competent court" in that
country "which can legally pass judgment or acquittal or conviction upon
him."
Issue: W/N the assignment of errors raised by Wright tenable?
Ruling: No. First, the concept of ex post facto law is only limited to penal
and criminal statutes. "Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court)
has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which
affects the substantial rights of the accused." This being so, there is no
absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower
court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to
offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect,
violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the
Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of
criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute.
Second, The petitioner's contention that a person sought to be extradited
should have a "criminal case pending before a competent court in the
Requesting State which can legally pass judgement of acquittal or
conviction" stretches the meaning of the phrase "wanted for prosecution"
beyond the intended by the treaty provisions because the relevant
provisions merely require "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the
warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be extradited."
REPUBLIC V EUGENIO (2008) – AMLA/EX POST FACTO
Facts: After the Agan v. PIATCO ruling, a series of investigations
concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were
undertaken by theOmbudsman and the Compliance and Investigation
Staff (“CIS”) of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (“AMLC”)
The AMLC issued a resolution authorizing its Executive Director to sign
and verify an application to inquire into the deposits or investments of
Alvarez et al. and to authorize the AMLC Secretariat to conduct an
inquiry once the RTC grants the application. The rationale for the
resolution was founded on the findings of the CIS that amounts were
transferred from a Hong Kong bank account to bank accounts in the
Philippines maintained by respondents. The Resolution also noted that
by awarding the contract to PIATCO (despite its lack of financial capacity)
Alvarez violated Section 3(E) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.2 The MAKATI RTC rendered an Order granting the AMLC the
authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez et
al.
In response to a letter of Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, AMLC issued a
Resolution authorizing its Executive Director to inquire into and examine
the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved in
the nullified contract. AMLC filed an application before the MANILA RTC
to inquire into the accounts alleged as having been used to facilitate
corruption in the NAIA 3 Project. The ex parte application was granted
and the MANILA RTC issued a bank inquiry order. Alvarez alleged that
he fortuitously learned of the bank inquiry order, which was issued
following an ex parte application, and he argued that nothing in the Anti-
Money Laundering Act (“AMLA”) authorized the AMLC to seek the
authority to inquire into bank accounts ex parte.
Meanwhile, after several motions, manifestations and orders, respondent
Lilia Cheng filed Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
Application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction arguing that the
orders violated her constitutional right to due process and that the bank
inquiry order under the AMLA can only be granted in connection with
violations of the AMLA and that the AMLA cannot apply to bank accounts
opened and transactions entered into prior to the effectivity of the AMLA
or to bank accounts located outside the Philippines.
.
Issue: W/N the proscription against ex post facto laws applies to Section
11 of the AMLA (a provision which does not provide a penal sanction
BUT which merely authorizes the inspection of suspect accounts and
deposits)?
Ruling: First, The Courts construction of Section 11 of the AMLA is
undoubtedly influenced by right to privacy considerations. Thus, ex parte
proceeding about which the depositor would know nothing would have
significant implications on the right to privacy, a right innately cherished
by all notwithstanding the legally recognized exceptions thereto. The
notion that the government could be so empowered is cause for concern
of any individual who values the right to privacy which, after all, embodies
even the right to be let alone, the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized people.
To the main issue, the Court recognizes that if this argument were to be
affirmed, it would create a horrible loophole in the AMLA that would in
turn supply the means to fearlessly engage in money laundering in the
Philippines; all that the criminal has to do is to make sure that the money
laundering activity is facilitated through a bank account opened prior to
2001. Lilia Cheng admits that actual money launderers could utilize
the ex post facto provision of the Constitution as a shield but that the
remedy lay with Congress to amend the law. We can hardly presume that
Congress intended to enact a self-defeating law in the first place, and the
courts are inhibited from such a construction by the cardinal rule that a
law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying
it.
Besides, nowhere in the legislative record cited by Lilia Cheng does it
appear that there was an unequivocal intent to exempt from the bank
inquiry order all bank accounts opened prior to the passage of the AMLA.
LIANG V PEOPLE (2000) – GOOD FAITH/MISTAKE OF FACT
Facts: Petitioner is an economist working in ADB. For allegedly uttering
defamatory words against a fellow worker, he was charged before the
MTC with defamation. He was later on arrested. The next day, the MTC
received n "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process
under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country.
Based on this, the MeTC judge w/out notice to the prosecution dismissed
the case. RTC ruled otherwise which prompted petitioner to elevate the
case to the SC arguing that he is immune from suit and there was no PI
investigation.
Issue: W/N the contentions by Liang tenable?
Ruling: No. First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the
communication from DFA that petitioner is covered by immunity from suit.
Even if he is, it has been ruled that mere invocation of the immunity
clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges. Further,
under the Agreement, immunity is subject to the exception that the act
done was done in official capacity. Slandering a person could not be
possibly be covered by the immunity agreement. The imputation of theft
is ultra vires and cannot be considered as part of official functions. This is
also supported under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations on
diplomatic agents. Lastly, PI is not a matter of right in cases cognizable
by MeTC but merely a statutory right and can be invoked only when
specifically granted by law.
US vs CHONG (1910)
Facts: On the night of August 14, 1908, at 10 o’clock, the defendant was
suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the
room. The defendant inquired who was at the door but he heard no
answer. Fearing that the intruder was a thief, he called out that "If you
enter the room, I will kill you." When he was struck by the chair which had
been placed against the door, in the darkness and confusion, he thought
that the blow came from the supposed to be intruder. With a knife, he
wildly struck at the intruded who turned out to be his roommate, Pascual.
He later died due to the wound inflicted by the defendant. Defendant and
the deceased were on a friendly and amicable terms. At the trial,
defendant admitted that he killed his roommate but insisted that he struck
him without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful
right of self-defense.
Issue: W/N the defense of good faith or mistake of fact by defendant
tenable?
Ruling: To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we
hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided
always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or
mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the
law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in
larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the
presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases
where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions
touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of
Article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him,
even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar
convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged
in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the
door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in
imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they
must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted
in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was
doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that
had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly
exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he cannot be
said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he
believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his
charge.
BENEDICTO V CA (2001) effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our
Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.

Facts:

PEOPLE VS CHENG (1922)

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection

with International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes
committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted
in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the
territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and
followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated
under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the
country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last
one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and
jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority
in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.

Facts: In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the

order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer
presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case and
in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium,
aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said
vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores
of the city.

Issue: Whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime,
like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels
anchored in our jurisdiction waters?

Ruling: We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a

foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts,
because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by
the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being
used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those
effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere
possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a
foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here
established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious