165. Dizon and Dizon v.
Galang
FACTS: Rufina Dizon, who was married to Vicente
Galang and by whom she had a son named Francisco,
inherited from her parents the three parcels of land
described in the complaint. On October 4, 1904,
Rufina Dizon and her son Francisco inherited from
her the said three parcels of land. Francisco Galang
died on December 8, 1904, and his father Vicente
Galang, by operation of law, inherited from him the
said land. In accordance with article 811 of the Civil
Code these three parcels of land are considered as
reservable property although they do not appear as
such in the registry of deeds. In 1913, Vicente
Galang sold the first two parcels to Juan Medina and
in 1909 the third to Teodoro Jurado, without
informing them that they were reservable property.
The plaintiffs Pedro and Severino Dizon, brother and
sister of the deceased Rufina Dizon, being related to
her within the third degree, brought this action
against Vicente Galang, Juan Medina and Teodoro
Jurado. The complaint prays that the sales of this land
by Vicente Galang to Juan Medina and Teodoro
Jurado be ordered to return the said parcels of land;
that Vicente Galang be compelled to record in the
registry of deeds the reservable character of this land
and to execute a mortgage to secure its value.
ISSUE:
Whether or not reservation by the widowed spouse
constitutes reserve troncal.
RULING: The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant,
or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law
for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came.
166. Rosales v. Rosales
FACTS: On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales
died intestate. She was survived by her husband
Fortunato Rosales and their two
children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio
Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario,
predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C.
Rosales, the herein petitioner. Magna Rosales
Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased. The trial court
ordered that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and
Antonio be entitled each to ¼ share in the estate of
decedent. Irenea, on the other hand, insisted
in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the
surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of
the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir
of her mother-in-law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Irenea is entitled
to inherit from her mother-in-law.
RULING: No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs
are classified into two groups, namely, those
who inherit by their own right, and those
who inherit by the right of representation. There is
no provision in the Civil Code which states that a
widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her
mother-in-law. The law has already meticulously
enumerated the intestate heirs of a decedent. The
Court held that Irenea misinterpreted
the provision of Article 887 because
the provision refers to the estate of the deceased
spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of
a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is
considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law.
167. ABELLANA DE BACAYO V.
FERRARIS DE BORROMEO
FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was declared
presumptively dead for purposes of opening
her succession and distributing her estate among her
heirs. She left properties in Cebu City, consisting of
one-third share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa
Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving
direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was
survived only by collateral relatives, namely,
Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister
of decedent’s father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by
Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all
surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were
the children of Melodia’s only brother of
full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceasedher.
These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest
intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of
said Melodia Ferraris.
ISSUE: WON a decedent’s uncles and aunts may
succeed ab intestato while nephews and nieces of the
decedent survive and are willing and qualified to
succeed.
RULING: No. in case of intestacy, nephews and
nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals
from the succession. This is readily apparent from
articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. Under Art. 1009, the absence of
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent
is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles,
cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. The last
of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or
sisters or children of brothers or sisters. They are,
however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree.
Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any
affection to merit the succession of collaterals.
Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the
fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for
successional purposes. Article 1009 does not state
any order of preference. However, this article should
be understood in connection with the general rule
that the nearest relatives exclude the farther.
Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts,
there being no right of representation. They succeed
without distinction of lines or preference among
them on account of the whole blood relationship.
168. BICOMONG V. ALMANZA
FACTS: Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda
Barcenas on June 8, 1859. Of this marriage there
were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic,
Igmedia Bagsic, and Ignacio Bagsic. Sisenanda
Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra
Glorioso . Of this second marriage were born two
children, Felipa Bagsic and Maura Bagsic. Simeon
Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso
also died. Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939
leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only
heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944
survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria
Tolentino and Petra Tolentino. Perpetua Bagsic died
on July 1, 1945 . Surviving her are her heirs, the
plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad
Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio
Bicomong. Of the children of the second marriage,
Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952 leaving no
heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic,
the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza
and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5)
months before the present suit was filed or on July
23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her
husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese and
her father Geronimo Almanza. The subject matter of
the complaint concerns the one-half undivided share
of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5)
parcels of land which she inherited from her
deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso. Three sets of
plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959,
namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua
Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia
Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of
Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants
Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the
recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left
by Maura Bagsic. The trial court rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs. From the aforesaid decision of the trial
court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute defendant
for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The other defendant, Engracio Manese, did
not appeal and execution was issued with respect to
the parcels of land in his possession. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been
duly established in the trial court and that the only
issue left for determination is a purely legal question
involving the correct application of the law and
jurisprudence on the matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to
their shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
HELD: Yes. We hold that the provisions of Art. 975,
1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable
to the admitted facts of the case at bar. It appearing
that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue,
and her husband and all her ascendants had died
ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving
collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister
of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother
and two (2) sisters of half-blood in accordance with
the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code. By
virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews
and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. In
Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382,
August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that
"nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring
with brothers or sisters of the deceased. Under the
same provision, Art. 975, which makes no
qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are
on the maternal or paternal line and without
preference as to whether their relationship to the
deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of
whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten
nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in
their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008,
NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil
Code, which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole
niece of full blood to a share double that of the
nephews and nieces of half-blood.
169. ISABEL DE LA PUERTA vs. CA
and CARMELITA DE LA PUERTA
FACTS: Dominga Revuelta died with a will leaving
her properties to her three surviving children,
namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, petitioner
herein. Isabel was given the free portion in addition
to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the
will.
The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel
was opposed by her brothers, who averred that their
mother was already senile at the time of the
execution of the will and did not fully comprehend
its meaning. Notwithstanding, Isabel was appointed
special administratrix by the probate court. Alfredo
subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone
oppositor.
Later, Vicente filed with the CFI of Quezon a petition
to adopt Carmelita, private respondent herein. After
hearing, the petition was granted. However, the
decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of
Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente
died, prompting her to move for the dismissal of the
case.
Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the
probate proceedings, filed a motion for the payment
to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged
natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. The probate
court granted the motion, declaring that it was
satisfied from the evidence at hand that Carmelita
was a natural child of Vicente and was entitled to the
amounts claimed for her support. On appeal, the
order of the lower court was affirmed by the
respondent court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON adopted child Carmelita, through
representation, can claims support and successional
rights to the estate of her alleged grandmother
Dominga.
RULING: NO. According to Art. 970 of the Civil
Code, representation is a right created by fiction of
law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to
the place and the degree of the person represented,
and acquires the rights which the latter would have if
he were living or if he could have inherited.
In the case at bar, Vicente did not predecease his
mother and that Carmelita is a spurious child. It is
settled that in testamentary succession, the right of
representation can take place only in the following
cases: first, when the person represented predeceased
the testator; second, when the person represented is
incapacitated; and third, when the person represented
is disinherited.
Not having predeceased Dominga, her son Vicente
had the right to inherit from her directly or in his own
right. No right of representation was involved, nor
could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father's
death, which came after his own mother's death.
Furthermore, as a spurious child of Vicente,
Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga
because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays
down the barrier between the legitimate and
illegitimate families.
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would
still be barred from inheriting from Dominga for
there would be no natural kindred ties between them
and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either.
If the adopting parent should die before the
adopted child, the latter cannot represent the
former in the inheritance from the parents or
ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is
not related to the deceased in that case, because
the filiation created by fiction of law is exclusively
between the adopter and the adopted. By
adoption, the adopters can make for themselves
an heir, but they cannot thus make one for their
kindred. (page 286 of Atty. Claridades’ book)
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter
of Vicente, has successional rights to the intestate
estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga.
Her claims for support and inheritance should
therefore be filed in the proceedings for the
settlement of her own father's estate and cannot be
considered in the probate of Dominga's Will.
170. DIAZ V. IAC
FACTS: Trial Court declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin
as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero. The real issue in this case may be briefly
stated as follows — who are the legal heirs of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti
Jardin (respondent) or her grandchildren (the natural
children of Pablo Santero)? The dispute at bar refers
only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-
appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children
of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their
father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of
Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero. Pablo Santero is a
legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On
the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are
the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
ISSUE: WON ILLEGITIMATE CHILD CAN
INHERIT SUCCESSION AB INTESTATO FROM
THE LEGITIMATE CHILDRED
RULING: NO. Article 992 of the New Civil Code
provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this
is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which
it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law
does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment. Thus, petitioners
herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in
the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of
his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, because of the barrier provided for under
Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
171. Corpus v. Corpus
FACTS: Teodoro R. Yangco died His will was
probated.Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of
his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half
brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz
Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia
Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus,
the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and
(4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half
brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died. Teodoro R.
Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and
Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus.
Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona
had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two
of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and
Jose Corpus. Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of
Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in
Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint
that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing
perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it
void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that
the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the
decedent's estate should be distributed according to
the rules on intestacy. Teodoro R. Yangco was an
acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and
since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose
Corpus, himself a legitimate child, appellant Tomas
Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the
supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita
Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita
Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there
is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT LEGITIMATE
CHILD CAN SUCCEED THE ESTATE OF AN
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
RULING: NO. Under articles 944 and 945 of the
Spanish Civil Code, “if an acknowledged natural or
legitimated child should die without issue, either
legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother
who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its
entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are
alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike.
In default of natural ascendants, natural and
legitimated children shall be succeeded by their
natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the
rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters”.
Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco’shalf brothers on the
Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to
succeed to his estate under the rules of in-testacy.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article
943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of the
mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. x xx By
reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot
represent his natural father in the succession to the
estate of the legitimate grandparent.
172. CACHO VS. UDAN
FACTS: Silvina Udan, single, died leaving a will
naming her son Francisco and one Wencesla Cacho
as her sole heirs, share and share alike. Cacho then
filed a petition to probate the said Will which was
opposed by the testator’s legitimate brother, Rustico.
Therafter, Francisco filed his opposition to the
probate of the Will while Rustico withdrew his
opposition. After Francisco’s death, another
legitimate brother of the testator, John, together with
Rustico, filed their respective oppositions.
Consequently, Cacho filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Oppositions filed by John and Rustico. CFI issued an
order disallowing the two oppositions for lack of
interest in the estate. The subsequent Motions for
Reconsiderations were denied hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not John and Rustico Udan may
claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister,
Silvina.
RULING: It is clear from Article 988 and 1003 of
the governing Civil Code of the Philippines, in force
at the time of the death of the testatrix that the
oppositor brothers may not claim to be heirs intestate
of their legitimate sister, Silvina.
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or
ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives
of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence
of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children.
Albeit the brothers and sister can concur with the
widow or widower, they do not concur, but are
excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or
illegitimate.
Further, the death of Francisco does not improve the
situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the
former are only transmitted by his death to his own
heirs at law not to the appellants, who are legitimate
brothers of his mother, pursuant to Article 992.
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
However, the hearing on the probate must still
proceed to ascertain the rights of Cacho as
testamentary heir.
173. (a.) ROSA LLORENTE vs. CEFERINO
RODRIGUEZ
FACTS: Martina Avalle widow of Llorente, had 4
legitimate children and executed a will dated 31
December 1900, naming Jacinta one of her legitimate
children also held as one of her sole and general
heirs. However, Jacinta died prior her mother leaving
several legitimate children and a natural daughter
named Rosa Llorente herein petitioner. The
petitioner wanted to become a party in the
proceedings for the probate of the will of Martina.
But the legitimate children of Jacinta, objected for
petitioner be a party thereto. CFI of Cebu ruled in
favor of the former. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the hereditary portion of Jacinta
Llorente Rodriguez from the will of Martina Avelle
Llorente should also pass to her natural daughter as
representative, herein petitioner?
HELD: NO. The court agrees with the findings of
CFI Cebu. The court finds that the petitioner might
and should inherit from her natural mother, if Jacinta
survived her mother she would have inherited from
her, and in what she inherited from her mother, the
natural daughter, petitioner may inherit and have
participated, in conjunction with legitimate children,
from the day in which the succession became
operative. In relation with 758 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which reads:
When a devise or a legacy is made to a child or other
relation to the testator, and the devisee or legatee dies
before the testator, leaving issue ..., such issue shall
take the estate so given as the devisee or legatee
would have done, if he had survived the testator,
unless a different disposition is required by law.
However, the doctrine site in this case held by the
Supreme Court of Spain in 1903, according to the
same a natural child has not the right to represent his
natural father or mother in the succession to the
legitimate ascendants of the latter.
From the fact that a natural son has the right to inherit
from the father or mother who acknowledged him,
conjointly with the other legitimate children of either
of them, it does not follow that he has the right to
represent either of them in the succession to their
legitimate ascendants; his right is direct and
immediate in relation to the father or mother who
acknowledged him, but it cannot be indirect by
representing them in the succession to their
ascendants to whom he is not related in any manner,
because he does not appear among the legitimate
family of which said ascendants are the head.
Therefore, petitioner’s right to inherit from her
natural grandmother, representing her natural
mother, is quite another thing. Such right is not
recognized by the law in force.
173. (b) VICTOR ALLARDE ET AL., v.
VALENTIN ABAYA
FACTS: Bibiano Abaya and Juliana Rebullido were
husband and wife which blessed with 2 children
named Adriano and Cornelia. Petitioner, Victor
herein married Inocencia Abaya, the natural daughter
of Adriano Abaya who died a bachelor in 1889.
Inocencia, live with her grandmother, Juliana who
died in 1909 when his father died. The subject of the
complaint is an 80 parcel of land located in Ilocos
Sur. When Juliana died the said property was
inherited by her daughter Cornelia which managed
by its husband Dionisio Abaya. The defendants in
herein case that they are the sole and exclusive
owners of said real property.
ISSUE: 1. WON, Inocencia was acknowledge by
Adriano Abaya as her natural daughter?
2.WON, Incocencia the wife of one of the petitioners
is entitled to inherit from her natural grandmother by
representation?
HELD: 1. YES. The fact of her acknowledgment as
a natural child must therefore be determined by the
law in force not only at the time of the birth of the
alleged natural child, but also of the alleged
acknowledgment by her alleged father and of the
latter’s death, which is Law 11 of the Laws of Toro,
reading as follows:
"And for the purpose of avoiding doubt as to who are
natural children, we order and decree that natural
children are those, who, at the time of their birth or
conception were of fathers who could have married
their mothers properly and justly and without
dispensation; provided that the father acknowledged
such issue as his child, although he would not have
had the woman with whom he had had such relations
in his house, or any other one. We decree that the
child having the qualifications above mentioned is a
natural child."
According to the foregoing legal provisions, two
requisites must be present in order that a child may
be considered natural: (1) that at the time of its birth,
the father acknowledging it must have had capacity
to contract marriage without dispensation; and (2)
that it be acknowledged by the father as his own
child. The fact that a father has written to his mother
so that she would send for his daughter from Manila
to Candon is sufficient proof of acknowledgment of
such daughter under the Law of Toro and died as a
bachelor which mean he can marry without
dispensation.
2. NO. She's only entitled to the 1/6 share of the said
property. In the case of Centeno v. Centeno
Articles 843 and 941 specifically provide that the
portion corresponding to natural children in the
hereditary estate of the parents who acknowledged
them, is transmitted upon the death of these children
to their legitimate or natural descendants. The latter’s
right, however, to represent their natural father in the
hereditary estate of their grandfather is not admitted,
because they are not called by law to participate in
their grandfather’s estate. Although she is an
acknowledged natural child of Adriano Abaya, has
no right to inherit from her grandmother Juliana
Rebullido by representation.
Acknowledged natural children born before the Civil
Code went into effect, of parents who died while the
former law was in force without leaving any
legitimate descendants or ascendants, are only
entitled to inherit one-sixth of the estate of such
parents (Mijares v. Nery, 3 Phil., 195); and that
acknowledged natural children, born before or after
the Civil Code went into effect, have no right to
inherit by representation of their natural parents.
174. FLORENCIA ANURANvs. ANA AQUINO
and RUFINA ORTIZ
FACTS: Ambrosio Aquino was married to Florencia
Anuran without any children. When the former died
intestate, leaving no heirs other his widowed and Ana
Aquino, a daughter of his deceased sister. The issue
in this case arises when Ana Aquino and Norberto
Capiña then appointed administrator fraudulently
procured the entry of an order in the administration
proceedings dated March 12, 1912, authorizing and
approving the delivery by the administrator of all
property of the estate to the former an alleged sole
heir, without notice to the widow.
The widow, did not discover that this order had been
entered until about the 14th day of February, 1914
when she promptly entered her appearance in the
administration proceedings and moved that the order
be set aside, and that she be declared the sole heir of
the deceased, who, as she alleged, had died without
leaving either ascendants, or descendants, or
collateral relatives entitled to share in the estate.
However, he court declined to entertain this motion
on the ground that the alleged fraudulent order had
been entered more than six months prior to the date
of the motion. Thereafter the widow promptly
instituted this separate action declaring the order null
and void. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether, Ana Aquino as the natural
daughter of the deceased sister has the right to inherit
from the said estate?
HELD: NO. The court affirmed the previous
judgment on the grounds that Articles 943 and 952
of the Civil Code provides that:
A natural or legitimized child has no right to succeed
ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor
shall such children or relatives inherit from the
natural or legitimated child.
In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews,
children, whether of the whole blood or not, of the
same surviving spouse, if not separated by a final
decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased.
Also, the court stated that in such case wherein
motion therefore not having been submitted during
the six months' period, the court had no jurisdiction
to grant relief from the order upon a motion in the
original proceedings as prescribed in Section 113 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. A motion submitted
more than "six months after the order was taken, the
court may still act upon and render judgment and
such orders may be vacated or set aside on the
grounds of fraud. As it will vitiate a judgment, and a
court of equity may declare it a nullity. Equity has so
great an abhorrence of fraud that it will set aside its
own decrees if founded thereupon.
175. LEONARDO VS CA (2004)
FACTS: Petitioner Restituta Leonardo is the
only legitimate child of the late Sps.
Tomasina Paul and Balbino Leonardo.
Private respondents Teodoro, Victor,
Corazon, Piedad, et. al, all surnamed
Sebastian, are the illegitimate children of
Tomasina with Jose Sebastian after she
separated from Balbino Leonardo. In 1988,
private respondent Corazon Sebastian with
her niece and a certain Bitang, came to
Restituta’s house to persuade her to sign a
deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of
Tomasina Paul and Jose Sebastian. Before
signing the document, Restituta allegedly
insisted that they wait for her husband Jose
Ramos so he could translate the document
which was written in English. Subsequently,
she proceeded to sign the document even
without her husband and without reading the
document, on the assurance of private
respondent Corazon that she will get her
share as a legitimate daughter. Petitioner then
asked private respondent Corazon and her
companions to wait for her husband so he
could read the document. When petitioner’s
husband arrived, however, private
respondent Corazon and her companions had
left without leaving a copy of the document.
It was only when petitioner hired a lawyer
that they were able to secure a copy and read
the contents thereof.
Petitioner refuted private respondents’ claim
that they were the legitimate children and
sole heirs of Jose Sebastian and Tomasina
Paul since the latter were never married to
each other, thus, the extrajudicial partition
was therefore unlawful and illegal. Petitioner
also claimed that her consent was vitiated
because she was deceived into signing the
extrajudicial settlement. She further denied
having appeared before a Judge of MTC of
Urbiztondo, Pangasinan to acknowledge the
execution of the extrajudicial partition.
ISSUE: Whether the consent given by
petitioner to the extrajudicial settlement of
estate was given voluntarily.
HELD: No. Contracts where consent is given
by mistake or because of violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud are
voidable. These circumstances are defects of
the will, the existence of which impairs the
freedom, intelligence, spontaneity and
voluntariness of the party in giving consent to
the agreement. In determining whether
consent is vitiated, Courts are given a wide
latitude in weighing the facts considering the
age, physical infirmity, intelligence,
relationship and the conduct of the parties at
the time of making the contract and
subsequent thereto, irrespective of whether
the contract is in a public or private writing.
In this case, private respondents failed to
offer any evidence to prove that the
extrajudicial settlement of estate was
explained in a language known to the
petitioner, i.e. the Pangasinan dialect.
Clearly, petitioner, who only finished Grade
3, was not in a position to give her free,
voluntary and spontaneous consent without
having the document, which was in English,
explained to her in the Pangasinan dialect.
176. Rosales vs Rosales
FACTS: It appears from the record of the case that
on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a
resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was
survived by her husband Fortunato T. Rosales and
their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and
Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales,
predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C.
Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the
deceased has an estimated gross value of about
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the
estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the
late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming
that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law
together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
ISSUE: First — is a widow (surviving spouse) an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law?
Second — are the Orders of the trial court which
excluded the widow from getting a share of the
estate in question final as against the said widow?
RULING: The answer to the first question is in the
negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2)
groups, namely, those who inherit by their own
right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only
inherit either by his own right, as in the order of
intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code,
2 or by the right of representation provided for in
Article 981 of the same law.
We find it unnecessary to rule the second question
posed by the petitioner.
177. PEDRO SANTILLON v. PERFECTA
MIRANDA,
FACTS: November 21, 1953, Pedro Santillon died
without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his
residence, leaving one son, Claro Santillon, and his
wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro
acquired several parcels of land located in that
province.
Four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a
petition for letters of administration. Opposition to
said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta
Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and
Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that
the properties enumerated in the petition were all
conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta
Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b)
that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents
had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of
the properties enumerated in the petition to said
spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration
of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for
partition pending; and (d) that if administration was
necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and
not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It
appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta
Miranda was appointed administrator of the estate.
March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners
to draft within sixty days, a project of partition and
distribution of all the properties of the deceased
Pedro Santillon.
April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare
Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting claims
of the parties with respect to their respective rights in
the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code,
he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal
properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the
remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her
and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other
hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was
entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to
another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words,
Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while
Perfecta claimed 1/2.
June 28, 1961, the court issued an order, the
dispositive portion of which is hereby ruled and
ordered that in the intestate succession of the
deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse
Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2)
share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for
the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after
deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the
conjugal properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the word “children” in Art.
996 can also be interpreted as “child” in accordance
with Art. 892?
HELD: Yes, it is a maxim of statutory construction
that words in plural include the singular. So Art. 996
could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the
widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the
surviving spouse has the same share as that of the
child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this
case on the ground that "child" is not included in
"children," the consequences would be tremendous,
because "children" will not include "child".
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical
inference from the circumstance that whereas Article
834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996
was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two
contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower
survives with legitimate children (general rule), and
the second, where the widow or widower survives
with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to
provide for the second situation, thereby indicating
the legislator's desire to promulgate just one general
rule applicable to both situations.
178. HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI AND
ROSARIO CUARIO V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario,
and Lourdes Sampayo were co-owners of the539-
square meter lot with improvements, covered
by TCT No. T15374. On March 1986,Sampayo
died intestate. On April 1987, the private
respondents, all claiming to be collateral relatives of
the deceased Sampayo, filed an action for
partition and damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena. Sps. Conti refused partition
because of failure by the respondents to
produce documents that will prove that they
were the rightful heirs of the deceased. On
August 30, 1987, Conti died and was
substituted by his children as party defendant.At
the trial, private respondents presented evidence to
prove that they were the collateral heirs of the
deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to
her rights as co-owner of thesubject lot. On the other
hand, petitioner Rosario alleged that the subject
property was co-owned in equal shares by her
husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and
that her family had been staying in the property
in question since 1937. She also testified that
her late husband paid for the real estate taxes and
spent for the necessary repairs and improvements
thereon because there had been an agreement that
Lourdes would leave her share of propertyto them.
Since no will, either testamentary or holographic,
was presented by the petitioners, the trial court
declared that private respondents were the rightful
heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and ordered both parties
to submit a project partition of the residential house
and lot for confirmation by the court. Petitioners
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending
that the trial court erred in finding the private
respondents were the heirs of Sampayo and that they
were entitled to the partition of the lot and
improvements in question. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUES:1. Whether or not the complaint for
partition to claim a supposed share of the deceased
co-owner should not prosper without prior settlement
of the latter’s estate and compliance with all legal
requirements, especially publication; and 2. Whether
or not private respondents were able to prove by
competent evidence their relationship with the
deceased.
RULING:1. The Supreme Court ruled that a prior
settlement of the estate is not essential before the
heirs can commence any action pertaining to the
deceased. As it was ruled in Quison v.Salud:“x x x
As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Civil
Procedure, the title to the property owned by a person
who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such
transmission is, under the present law, subject to the
claims of administration and the property may be
taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts
and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate
passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate,
from himself to his heirs. Without some showing that
a judicial administrator had been appointed in
proceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison,
the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this
action is established.” It was further elucidated:
“Conformably with the foregoing and taken in
conjunction with Art. 777 and 494of the Civil Code,
from the death of Lourdes Sampayo, her rights as a
co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for
partition at any time or to terminate theco-ownership,
were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so
demanding partition, private respondents merely
exercised the right originally pertaining to the
decedent, their predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners'
theory as to the requirement of publication would
have been correct had the action been for the
partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we
were dealing with extrajudicial settlement by
agreement between heirs and the summary
settlement of estates of small value. But what private
respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of
Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited from
her through intestate succession. This is a simple
case of ordinary partition between co-owners. The
applicable law in point is Sec. 1 of Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court. Sec. 1. Complaint in an action
for partition of real estate. - A person having the
right to compel the partition of real estate may do so
as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his
complaint the nature and extent of histitle and an
adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded and joining as defendants all
the other persons interested in the property.A
cursory reading of the aforecited rule shows
that publication is not required as erroneously
maintained by petitioners.”
2. The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. It was
held that: “Altogether, the documentary and
testimonial evidence submitted are competent and
adequate proofs that private respondents are
collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. Private
respondents assert that they are co-owners of one-
half (1/2)pro-indiviso share of the subject property
by way of legal or intestate succession. Succession is
a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of
the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of
law. Legal or intestate succession takes place
if a person dies without a will, or with a void will,
or one which has subsequently lost its validity. If
there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the decedent. It was established during the trial
that Lourdes died intestate and without issue. Private
respondents as sister, nephews and nieces now claim
to be the collateral relatives of Lourdes.
Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of
legitimate children shall be proved by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parents
admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or
private document duly signed by the parent. Such
other proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds
of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation
may also be utilized in the instant case. Public
documents are the written official acts, or records of
the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of
the Philippines, or of a foreign country. The
baptismal certificates presented in evidence by
private respondents are public documents.
Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of
the parish records and are authorized to issue true
copies, in the form of certificates, of the entries
contained therein. Petitioners' objection to the
photocopy of the certificate of birth of Manuel
Sampayo was properly discarded by the court a quo
and respondent Court of Appeals. According to Sec.
3, par. (1), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself except when the original has been
lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror. The loss
or destruction of the original certificate of birth of
Manuel J.Sampayo was duly established by the
certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Lucena City to the effect that its office
was completely destroyed by fire on 27 November
1974 and 30 August 1983, respectively, and as a
consequence thereof, all civil registration records
were totally burned.”
179) Carlos vs Sandoval
Facts: Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia
died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos. During the lifetime of Felix Carlos,
he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. Eventually,
the first three parcels of land were transferred and
registered in the name of Teofilo. Parcel No. 4 was
registered in the name of petitioner. Teofilo died
intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad
and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilos death,
Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of
respondents. Petitioner commenced an action against
respondent with the following causes of action: a)
declaration of nullity of marriage; b) status of a child;
c) recovery of property; d) reconveyance; and e) sum
of money and damages. Petitioner asserted that the
marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the
absence of the required marriage license. He likewise
maintained that his deceased brother was neither the
natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II. Respondent denied the material averments
of petitioner complaint. Respondents contended that
the dearth regarding the requisite marriage license
did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to Teofilo.
Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the
illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with
another woman.
Issue: Whether or not the brother of one of the
spouse has a right to succeed to the estate.
Ruling: Yes. A brother is not among those
considered as compulsory heirs. But although a
collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall
within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a
right to succeed to the estate.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by
his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner.
Thus, if Teofilo II is finally and proven to be not a
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of
his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow
pursuant to Art. 1001 of the New Civil Code. This
makes petitioner a real – party – interest to seek the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the
subject marriage is found to be void ab initio,
petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
180. Gonzales v. Court of Appeals
FACTS: On 18 April1972, petitioners Carolina
Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate
estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad. In
their petition, petitioners claimed that they were the
only heirs of their brother as he had allegedly died a
bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. Petitioners
amended their petition by alleging that the real
properties listed as belonging to the decedent were
actually only administered by him and that the true
owner was their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. The
trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as
administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de
Mesa Abad. Petitioners executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of their late mother Lucila de
Mesa in their favor. On 07 July 1972, private
respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad
Empaynado, and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a
motion to set aside proceedings. In their motion, they
alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the
common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven
(27) years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971,
and that during this period, their union had produced
two (2) children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and
Marian Abad Empaynado. They also disclosed the
existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly
fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman,
Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate
to the surviving children to the exclusion of collateral
relatives, they charged petitioners with eliberately
concealing the existence of said children in order to
deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of
Ricardo Abad.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three (3) children were
entitled to inherit
RULING: Yes. Evidence presented by private
respondents overwhelmingly proved that they are the
acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad.
They were able to prove that he stated in his
individual income tax returns as his legitimate
dependent children, Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie
Abad. He insured his daughters on a 20 year
endowment plan. He opened a trust fund account for
his daughters. Finding that private respondents are
the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners
should have been precluded from inheriting the
estate of their brother on the basis of the following
Civil Code provisions:
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or
ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003. If there are no illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
Petitioners contested the filiation of the children by
submitting that the husband of Honoria Empaynado,
Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and
Marian Abad were born. It was undisputed that prior
to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria
Empaynado was married to Jose Libunao. But while
private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in
1943, petitioners claim that the latter died sometime
in 1971. The evidence presented by petitioners to
prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 was
inconclusive. The evidence presented was an
enrolment form wherein there was failure to indicate
that Jose was “deceased”. Such proof did not
necessarily prove that said parent was still living
during the time the form was being accomplished.
The records of Loyola Memorial Park also showed
that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed
buried there in 1971. Such person was different from
the husband whose full name was Jose Santos
Libunao.
181. CACHO Vs. UDAN
FACTS: Silvina Udan, single, died leaving a will
naming her son Francisco and one Wencesla Cacho
as her sole heirs, share and share alike. Cacho then
filed a petition to probate the said Will which was
opposed by the testator’s legitimate brother, Rustico.
Therafter, Francisco filed his opposition to the
probate of the Will while Rustico withdrew his
opposition. After Francisco’s death, another
legitimate brother of the testator, John, together with
Rustico, filed their respective oppositions.
Consequently, Cacho filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Oppositions filed by John and Rustico. CFI issued an
order disallowing the two oppositions for lack of
interest in the estate. The subsequent Motions for
Reconsiderations were denied hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not John and Rustico Udan may
claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister,
Silvina.
RULING: It is clear from Article 988 and 1003 of
the governing Civil Code of the Philippines, in force
at the time of the death of the testatrix that the
oppositor brothers may not claim to be heirs intestate
of their legitimate sister, Silvina.
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or
ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives
of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence
of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children.
Albeit the brothers and sister can concur with the
widow or widower, they do not concur, but are
excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or
illegitimate.
Further, the death of Francisco does not improve the
situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the
former are only transmitted by his death to his own
heirs at law not to the appellants, who are legitimate
brothers of his mother, pursuant to Article 992.
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
However, the hearing on the probate must still
proceed to ascertain the rights of Cacho as
testamentary heir.
182. DIONISIA PADURA, ET AL. VERSUS
MELANIA BALDOVINO, ET AL.
FACTS: Agustin Padura died on April 26, 1908
leaving a last will and testament wherein he
bequeathed his properties among his children,
Manuel (child on his first wife), Candelaria and
Fortunato (children on his second wife), and his
surviving spouse, Benita Garing. Fortunate was
adjudicated four parcels of land. Fortunato died
unmarried without having executed a will; and not
having any issue, the said parcels of land were
inherited exclusively by her mother.
On August 26, 1934, Candelaria died leaving as her
only heirs, her four legitimate children, Cristeta,
Melania, Anicia and Pablo, all surnamed Baldovino.
Years later Manuel Padura also died. Surviving him
are his legitimate children, Dionisia, Felisa, Flora,
Gornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino, all
surnamed Padura. Upon the death of Benita Garing
(the reservista), the question on the distribution of the
said parcels became a dispute between the nephews
and nieces of Fortunato by half-blood (Paduras) and
the nephew and nieces by full-blood (Baldovinos).
ISSUE: How should the four parcels of land be
divided among the nephews and nieces of Fortunato?
RULING: Proximity of degree and right of
representation are basic principles of ordinary
intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood
brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double
that of brothers and nephews of half-blood. In other
words, the reserva troncal merely determines the
group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the
property should be returned; but within that group,
the individual right to the property should be decided
by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate
succession, since Art. 891 does not specify
otherwise. The reservatarios who are nephews of the
whole blood are declared entitled to a share twice as
large as that of the nephews of the half-blood.
183. ALVIAR VS ALVIAR
FACTS: Clemente Alviar, the original plaintiff
herein, and Belen Alviar were legitimate children of
Florentino Alviar and Bibiana Carillo. Sometime
after the latter’s death, Florentino Alviar married
Flora Erasga, who begot him five (5) children.
These six (6) brothers and sisters executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition adjudicating to Clemente
Alviar the two (2) parcels of agricultural land in
Calamba, Laguna, and to the five (5) half brothers
and sisters of the deceased the residential lot in Pasay
City. In pursuance of said deed, the parties took
possession of their respective shares.
Over five (5) years later, Clemente Alviar
commenced the present action, against his half
brother and sisters and his step-mother to annul the
deed of extrajudicial partition as well as to recover
the possession thereof and the title thereto, upon the
ground that, acting in bad faiths and conspiring,
confederating and conniving with each other, as well
as "taking advantage of plaintiff’s lack of education,
illiteracy and ignorance, and knowing full well that"
the "children by second marriage of Florentino
Alviar had no rights, participation and interest over"
the three (3) lots left by Belen Alviar, the defendants
had "misled" the plaintiff "into signing" said deed.
Issue: Whether the half brothers and sisters are he
excluded from the succession to her estate.
Ruling: "ART. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of
the full blood survive together with brothers and
sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled
to a share double that of the latter." lThese
provisions, particularly the last, leave no room for
doubt that brothers and sisters of full blood do not
exclude those of half blood, for, otherwise, there
would be no occasion for the concurrence of both
classes and the application of said Art. 1006.
More important that this, however, is the fact that
Clemente Alviar had entered into a contract with his
half brothers and sisters for the extrajudicial partition
of the properties of the deceased Belen Alviar and
that there is nothing in the stipulation of facts
submitted by the parties to warrant the annulment of
rescission of said agreement. The validity thereof
thus being indubitable, there is absolutely no reason
why the same should be disturbed.
184. ABELLANO – BACAYO vs. FERRARIS -
BORROMEO
Facts: More than ten (10) years having elapsed since
the last time Melodia Ferraris was known to be alive,
she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of
opening her succession and distributing her estate
among her heirs. Melodia Ferraris left properties in
Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the
estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00,
more or less, and which was adjudicated to her in
Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court. The
deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct
descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived
only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of
decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by her four
nephews and nieces, all surnamed Ferraris, , who
were the children of Melodia's only brother of full
blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the
decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the
nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the
estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
Issue: Whether who should inherit the intestate
estate of a deceased person when he or she is
survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt
and the children of a brother who predeceased him or
her.
Held: Under article 1009, the absence of brothers,
sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a
precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins,
etc.) being called to the succession. Article 1009 does
not state any order of preference. However, this
article should be understood in connection with the
general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the
farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in
equal parts, there being no right of representation.
They succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them on account of the whole
blood relationship. We, therefore, hold, and so rule,
that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles
and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as
nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are
willing and qualified to succeed.