I’m The U.S. Ambassador to Israel is David Friedma.

Israel proclaimed Jerusalem as its

capital in 1950. President Trump recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel on December 6,
2017, and the U.S. Embassy to Israel moved from Tel Aviv to an interim facility in Jerusalem on
May 14, 2018. The United States maintains a large Embassy Branch Office in Tel Aviv. Israel
maintains an embassy in the United States at 3514 International Drive NW, Washington DC

Israel–United States relations refers to the bilateral relationship between the State of Israel
and the United States of America. The relations are a very important factor in the United States
government's overall policy in the Middle East, and Congress has placed considerable importance
on the maintenance of a close and supportive relationship.

The main expression of Congressional support for Israel has been foreign aid. Since 1985,
it has provided nearly US$3 billion in grants annually to Israel, with Israel being the largest annual
recipient of American aid from 1976 to 2004 and the largest cumulative recipient of aid ($121
billion, not inflation-adjusted) since World War II.Seventy-four percent of these funds must be
spent purchasing US goods and services. More recently, in fiscal year 2014, the US provided $3.1
billion in foreign military aid to Israel.Israel also benefits from about $8 billion of loan guarantees.

Congress has monitored the aid issue closely along with other issues in bilateral relations,
and its concerns have affected Administrations' policies.Almost all US aid to Israel is now in the
form of military assistance, while in the past it also received significant economic assistance.
Strong congressional support for Israel has resulted in Israel receiving benefits not available to
other countries.

In addition to financial and military aid, the United States also provides political support
to Israel, having used its United Nations Security Council veto power 42 times with respect to
resolutions relating to Israel, out of a total 83 times in which its veto has ever been used. Between
1991 and 2011, 15 vetos were used to protect Israel out of 24 in total.

Bilateral relations have evolved from an initial US policy of sympathy and support for
the creation of a Jewish homeland in 1948 to an unusual partnership that links a small but militarily
powerful Israel, dependent on the United States for its economic and military strength, with the
American superpower trying to balance other competing interests in the region, including Russia's
intentions. Others maintain that Israel is a strategic ally, and that US relations with Israel strengthen
the US presence in the Middle East. Israel is one of the United States' two original major non-
NATO allies in the Middle East. Late Republican Senator Jesse Helms used to call Israel
"America's aircraft carrier in the Middle East", when explaining why the United States viewed
Israel as such a strategic ally, saying that the military foothold in the region offered by the Jewish
State alone justified the military aid that the United States grants Israel every year. Currently, there
are seven major non-NATO allies in the Greater Middle East.

The United States was the first country to recognize Israel as a state in 1948, and the first
to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2017. Israel has long been, and remains, America’s
most reliable partner in the Middle East. Israel and the United States are bound closely by historic
and cultural ties as well as by mutual interests.

The United States is committed to supporting the parties in efforts to reach a lasting,
comprehensive peace agreement that offers a brighter future to both Israel and the Palestinians.

Israel and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations,
including the United Nations, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. Israel also is a Partner
for Cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and an observer to
the Organization of American States.

he United States has long defined Israel’s survival and security as important to its own
national interests. As part of the strategic partnership, America provides Israel—the Middle East’s
sole democracy—with security assistance so that it can defend itself, by itself, against mounting
security threats. In turn, Israel works with the U.S. government sharing technologies and
techniques that greatly benefit both nations in the realms of defense technology, homeland
security, counterterrorism and cybersecurity.

Together, America and Israel face numerous shared challenges. But close strategic,
economic, political and diplomatic ties between them ultimately further U.S. interests, promote
regional peace and enhance the security and safety of both nations.
 Israel is the partner to the oldest U.S. free trade agreement—30 years. Since the signing
of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement 30 years ago, two-way trade has multiplied tenfold to
over $40 billion per year with shared economic benefits for both countries.

Israel is a major U.S. economic partner in the Middle East. Israel is the top importer of
U.S. goods in its region, despite representing a mere 2 percent of the population. There are more
companies listed on the NASDAQ exchange from Israel than from any country besides the U.S.
and China. And nearly half of all investment into the U.S. from the Middle East comes from Israeli
companies. The commercial relationship, while often glossed over given the focus on security
matters, is not only sparking new technologies but supports thousands of good jobs in both
countries. Israel is an innovation hub. In a country as small as Israel, it is amazing that over 250
multinational companies have R&D centers there. And underscoring the importance of our
relationship, two-thirds of them are U.S. companies. Intel, Microsoft, IBM, and Cisco have been
in Israel for decades, and just days ago, Apple CEO Tim Cook visited Israel to inaugurate the
company’s largest innovation center outside of California.

Israel is also rich in start-ups, like Tel Aviv-based Insights, a “crowd-consulting platform”
for governments and Aquanos, a company using algae to treat wastewater.

Because of trade and innovation, future economic prospects between the U.S. and Israel
are bright. Last year, in a piece on the maturing economic relationship between the two countries,
the U.S. Chamber’s Josh Kram wrote, “Much of what will define the relationship in the coming
five years was unthinkable a decade ago, let alone three decades ago when the FTA was signed.”

As public support for Israel remains strong, much will be gained for both countries—and
the Middle East--as commercial ties deepen. The US and Israel are engaged in extensive strategic,
political and military cooperation. This cooperation is broad and includes American aid,
intelligence sharing, and joint military exercises. American military aid to Israel comes in different
forms, including grants, special project allocations, and loans.

President Obama has pledged to maintain Israel's "Qualitative Military Edge" over the
other countries in the region.

Israel applied to join the US government's Visa Waiver Program in 2005. Under this
program, citizens of selected countries can enter the United States for up to 90 days for tourism
and business purposes without having to apply for an entry visa. The House of Representatives
approved the bid, but the Senate rejected it. Israel failed to fulfill two basic requirements; not all
citizens owning a biometric passport, and the entry visa rejection rate for Israelis exceeded 3%. In
addition, the United States insisted that Palestinian Americans entering Israel not be subjected to
any more security checks than other US citizens. In January 2013, a new bill was submitted to the
House calling for Israel's inclusion, with its supporters saying Israel now meets the program's
current criteria. As of 2014, Israel regularly bars the entry of American citizens.

So why does the United States stay in the relationship? Surely domestic politics accounts
for a good deal of the explanation. But there is another, strategic, reason that is seldom mentioned
publicly. It was expounded clearly by Ariel Roth, a professor at Johns Hopkins University and an
Israeli army veteran. In an essay in International Studies Perspectives, Roth argued that the key
U.S. interest in the Middle East is stability and unfettered access to the region’s oil. This is
indisputable; it is the point James Forrestal made to President Truman more than 60 years ago.
And what is the greatest threat to stability? Well, says Roth, it is Israel itself. Because of its unique
history and the heavy weight of the Holocaust in the consciousness of Israeli leaders, Israel is
uniquely terrified of being “alone” in the international arena. As a result, any suspicion on the part
of its leaders that the United States is backing away from it might incite Israel to behave more
aggressively than it already does. Those who decry the special relationship “are blinded to how
Israel’s sense of vulnerability causes. . . behaviors that have the potential to undermine American
interests.” Israel needs constant “reassurance” that it “does not stand alone.” Supporting Israel
through “constant affirmation” and generous arms shipments is the best way to pursue American
interests “without the fear of a panicked and unrestrained Israel bringing a cataclysm to the Middle
East.”20

This claim is at once alarming and compelling. Roth is asserting that the principal ally of
the United States in the twenty-first century — its main source of strategic advice, the nation whose
leaders have an unequaled access to American political leadership — is not a rational actor. The
United States is in the position of a wife whose spouse is acting erratically. A “panicked and
unrestrained Israel,” armed with an estimated 200 nuclear weapons, could do an extraordinary
amount of damage. The only conclusion one can draw is that the special relationship would now
be very difficult to exit, even if Israel had no clout whatsoever within the American political
system, even if the United States desired emphatically to pursue a more independent course.

I submit that this argument has long been internalized by those U.S. officials who
recognize that the special relationship brings the United States far more trouble than benefits. It is
the principal reason no major American figure has ever advocated simply walking away from
Israel. Even those who argue that America should make its aid conditional on a more forthcoming
Israeli attitude towards peace with the Arabs invariably recommend that the necessary Israeli
territorial withdrawals be rewarded by iron-clad American defense guarantees and other
sweeteners. Most intelligent people understand there is something uniquely evil about the
Holocaust and the circumstances under which Israel came into existence, even as they are uneasy
with the current special relationship. For those who recommend a U.S. security guarantee
following a peace settlement, the overture made by the Arab League — offering full recognition
and normalized relations with an Israel that relinquished its 1967 conquests and allowed a viable
Palestinian state — is a development of enormous promise. Regrettably Israel has ignored this
opening.

Can the costs of America’s special relationship with Israel be quantified? Is it, as A.F.K.
Organski put it in his 1990 book, the “$36 billion dollar bargain?” That figure, derived from
military and financial assistance to Israel form 1951 to 1983, led Organski to conclude, not
surprisingly, that Israel’s net value as a Cold War ally is blindingly obvious. Or is the figure closer
to $3 trillion, as economist Thomas Stauffer estimated after factoring in the rise in the price of oil,
the financial assistance to neighboring states, the cost of the agreements to guarantee Israel’s oil
supplies and myriad other factors?21 I believe the answer is nearer to Stauffer’s figures, but it is
plainly a judgment call. The essence of the relationship is not its dollar cost, but the fact that the
United States has come to perceive its interests in the Middle East through Israel’s eyes. This is
what renders it special. One can debate how important Israel was in encouraging the United States
to invade Iraq, but there is no doubt that, if Israel had opposed the invasion, no American politician
would have supported it. The same can be said about the possibility of an attack on Iran.

This is also the case with the outbreak of Islamophobia in the United States. The editor
of a major liberal magazine — a high-profile intellectual — has written that he doesn’t feel First
Amendment protections should apply to Muslims. Would Martin Peretz have arrived at this
independently of his feelings for Israel? It would be hard to find a knowledgeable person who
believes so. Peretz is hardly alone. Thus, one can likely chalk up a portion of America’s retreat
from its own liberal principles to Israel.

In the coming years, as the prospect of a two-state solution disappears, it is likely that
Israel will continue its inexorable march toward becoming a state between the Jordan River and
the sea, with one set of laws for Jews, who will have the rights of citizens, and another for Arabs,
who will be denied full citizenship. What will it cost America’s broader relationship with the
Muslim world to maintain a special bond with a state based on this kind of ethnic discrimination?
That also would be difficult to quantify. And yet this scenario may be impossible to escape. The
threat of Israel’s turning itself into a nuclear-armed desperado striking at will at the oil states in
the Gulf cannot, alas, be entirely dismissed. That may be, as Ariel Roth argues, a compelling reason
to maintain the special relationship pretty much unchanged.

If this is what the future holds, it would make the “wise men” who advised Roosevelt and
Truman in the post-war era — the top officials in the Pentagon, the State Department and the CIA
who opposed American support for the Zionist project — seem not overly pessimistic so much as
woefully limited in their imaginations.