mouvements

 des idées et des luttes

A story of "conquest" in Turkey: From the Hope of
Democracy to Authoritarian Drift1
By  Cem  Özatalay

The accession of the AKP to power in Turkey in 2002 generated big hopes in
various segments of society towards the development of democracy. The
AKP was then considered by liberal-left, as well as –liberal-right, intellectuals
to represent the peripheral forces that made up the majority of the country, but
which had been dominated by the Turkish civil and military bureaucracy,
inherited from the Ottoman Empire. This interpretation is inspired by the
conceptual duality center/periphery formulated four decades ago by Şerif
Mardin (1973). In the same vein, continuing the reasoning of İdris Küçükömer,
author of the thesis that "in Turkey, the left is the right and the right is the left"
(Küçükömer, 1969), some even sees the AKP’s election victories as "leftist"
expression of popular classes.

The AKP raised, one last time, a wind of hope in 2010 during the
constitutional referendum around the campaign "Not enough but yes!"
However, since this referendum, which was concluded by the overwhelming
victory of the defenders of constitutional reform, initiated by the AKP – in
implicit collaboration with the Gülen movement2 -- the expectations raised by
this political party and its leader among liberals are gradually extinguished.
Today, almost no one sees the AKP as the "bearer of democracy." On the

1
For the original version of this article, see Özatalay, C. (2017). Une histoire de “conquête” en
Turquie  : De l’espoir de la démocratie à la dérive autoritaire. Retrieved from
http://mouvements.info/une-histoire-de-conquete-en-turquie-de-lespoir-de-la-democratie-a-la-derive-
autoritaire/

2  The  emergence  of  the  Gülen  movement  dates  back  to  the  Cold  War  when  Islamism  was  tolerated,  and  even  
supported,  by  representatives  of  the  capitalist  world  to  counter  the  Soviet  threat.  As  the  founder  of  the  
movement,  Muslim  preacher  Fetullah  Gülen  was  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  Association  for  the  Fight  Against  
Communism.  After  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  Wall,  Gülen  focused  on  education  and  the  emergence  of  a  seemingly  
apolitical  counter-­‐elite,  with  the  aim  of  becoming  an  entrepreneur  or  executive  in  the  civil  service  
(especially  in  the  army,  the  police  the  judicial  system  or  education).  The  Gülen  movement  gained  power  in  
the  state,  which  allowed  it  to  form  an  alliance  with  the  AKP  in  2002,  an  alliance  that  lasted  until  the  
referendum  of  2010.
contrary, the consensus among the intellectual circles is that the AKP and its
leader Tayyip Erdoğan are leading the country towards an authoritarian
political regime.

But does this process not refute the idea that center and periphery tension, or
state bureaucracy and civil society duality, is at the root of the democratic
question in Turkey? Why and how has Erdoğan, who saw "the oligarchic
bureaucracy" as the source of all evil 3 , has gradually been won over by
authoritarianism?

This article aims to show that the answers to these questions are closely
related to certain characteristics of Turkey's social structure. For this, we will
first address the social science debates around the specificities of the
country's social structure, and secondly, the class dynamics that underlie the
coming to power of the AKP.

Fluidity: A Founding Characteristic of the Social Structure of

Turkey

Until the 1980s, the main themes of social science studies included the
inefficiency of class organizations in political life in Turkey, the weakness of
the bourgeoisie, a small working class, and the social and political effects of
this social structure. The dissimilarity of social structures between Western
countries and Turkey was the starting point for such social science research
programs at various historical periods.

Before the 1960s, these dissimilarities had been interpreted, mainly by

sociologists, from two perspectives: on one hand, the interpretation of the
sociologists mostly in post at Ankara University and inspired by American
institutionalism; on the other, that of Istanbul University pursuing a research
program derived from German historicism.

The first interpretation adopted by authors such as Behice Boran, Niyazi

Berkes and subsequently Mübeccel Kıray (all State Fellows who have
completed their PhD in the United States) focuses on the delay of Turkey in
terms of socio-economic development in relation to Western countries, and on
the adaptation of the country's traditional values to the evolution of modern
capitalism. At that time, four-fifths of the labor force has been employed in
rural areas4. The working class in germ of the Ottoman Empire, composed
mostly of non-Muslims, mainly Greeks and Armenians, had been largely

                                                                                                               
3  A  parallel  can  be  drawn  with  Adnan  Menderes  who  had  characterized  his  party  during  the  1950s  as  the  
"People's  Party"  as  opposed  to  the  "Party  of  Bureaucracy"  
 
4  In  1927,  the  industrial  labor  force  constituted  only  0.02%  of  the  total  population  in  Turkey.  Statistically,  
81%  of  the  labor  force  was  employed  in  agriculture,  and  its  share  could  only  be  reduced  to  78%  in  1951.  
(See  Yavuz,  E.  (1998)  Sanayideki  İşgücünün  Durumu,  1923-­‐  40.  In  D.  Quataert  &  EJ  Zürcher  (Eds.),  
Osmanlı'dan  Cumhuriyet  Türkiye'sine  işçiler-­‐  1839-­‐1950  -­‐  Workers  and  the  Working  Class  in  the  Ottoman  
Empire  and  the  Turkish  Republic  1839-­‐1950,  (pp.  155-­‐196  İstanbul:  İletişim  Yayınları.  
eliminated as a result of the ethnic massacres during the war years (1914-
1922) and the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey (1923).

Based on the results of a field study conducted in 1941-1942 in the western

towns of Manisa, Behice Boran showed that factors such as social capital,
ethnicity, age and gender are as important as land ownership in the formation
of social stratification in rural Turkey (Boran, 1945). As for the urban social
stratification of this period, Mübeccel Kıray revealed some characteristics in
his first doctoral research directed by Behice Boran and defended in 1946. In
her research focused on the relationship between the norms of consumption
and social stratification in Ankara (Kıray, 2005), she found the existence of
"conspicuous consumption" as a tool of social distinction, especially among
the members of the middle classes, besides a strong desire for upward social
mobility. In other words, at that time, the Western-style of life was adopted by
urban middle classes as a sign of social distinction, and in rural areas, a
social hierarchy was set up under the domination of those who constitute
bridges with developed cities thanks to their gender identity (men) and
ethnicity (Turkish and Sunni-Muslim), as well as those who are landlords.

Starting from the analyzes of these authors, and given that the social structure
inherited from the Ottoman Empire was not as closed as that of Western order
societies and that private property did not exist until the decline of the empire,
it is possible to advance the following idea: the more that social mobility
seems possible in modern Turkey, the more that culturally-motivated
struggles for status and classification5 in order to be placed in a higher social
position prevail over the socioeconomically motivated collective struggles for
redistribution.

Unlike the first interpretation mentioned above, which explains the social
tensions of this period by the late transition from feudalism to capitalism,
Amiran Kurtkan, a sociologist at Istanbul University, analyzes the 1950s social
structure of Turkey in a perspective aimed at distinguishing its historical
specificity. In an article entitled "Türkiye’de İçtimai Sınıflar” (i.e., “The Social
Classes in Turkey"), Kurtkan (1960) starts from the idea that a social class
can only exist if the social group with an economic power is more or less
equivalent, having a similar life style and cultural values, as well as a
collective consciousness. After examining members of different social groups,
she concludes that those in Turkey who have equivalent economic power do
not pursue similar lifestyles and those who share the same cultural and moral
values have no equivalent income. As a fervent defender of a capitalism "from

                                                                                                               
5  The  notion  of  "struggles  for  classification"  is  used  by  Robert  Castel  in  Les  métamorphoses  de  la  question  
sociale  (The  Transformations  of  the  Social  Question)  (1995)  to  define  a  type  of  conflictuality  peculiar  to  post-­‐
war  wage  societies  in  which  the  majority  wage  earners  systematically  compete  with  each  other  to  reach  
"higher"  positions  in  the  social  hierarchy.  To  this  definition  we  can  also  add,  with  Pierre  Bourdieu  
(Classement,  déclassement,  reclassement  (1978)),  that  this  type  of  struggle  also  contains  a  symbolic  
dimension  that  shapes  the  classification  of  social  positions  in  a  given  society.  In  late  industrialized  countries,  
such  as  Turkey,  where  socioeconomically  motivated  collective  struggles  for  redistribution  were  historically  
very  weak,  the  process  of  modernization  is  frequently  accompanied  by  status  and  classification  struggles  on  
both  material  and  symbolic  levels.  During  these  conflicts,  competition  often  takes  place  between  individuals,  
but  also,  especially  in  conjunctures  with  economic  crisis,  between  cultural  groups  to  reach  and  to  define  the  
positions  of  domination  in  terms  of  culture.  
below" to the detriment of a bureaucratic capitalism, Amiran Kurtkan
described this situation as "classless society". In other words, attesting also to
the existence of a high mobility in Turkish society, Kurtkan accentuates the
contradictions that arise from the different lifestyles and cultures that vertically
cross the various layers of society.

If we think of the interpretations proposed by the authors of the various

schools, at this stage, we can conclude that in this society, which does not
have a rigid and closed social structure, cultural conflicts have emerged in
favor of "struggles for classification " aimed at social distinction.

Unequal corporatism and dual social structure

The period that began with the military coup of 1960 differs from the previous
period in several ways: the first rural exodus of the country of the 1950s
inaugurated a change in the composition of the population in favor of the
urban population. The principle of a social state was included for the first time
in the 1961 constitution, and urban workers were covered by social protection.
The capital accumulation regime based on an import substitution strategy has
imposed its own regulation institutions. The post-coup bloc in power has
created an inegalitarian corporatism with a limited range that is peculiar to the
countries of the Global South (See Seekings, 2010). This power bloc, as Taha
Parla points out throughout the OYAK case, had been grounded on the
interests of the armed forces and the upper civilian bureaucracy and the big
business (Parla, 1998). Therefore, three contradictions emerged: (1) between
the big industrial capital, in full expansion, and the SMEs, in the
embarrassment; (2) between the urban but minority population, protected by
the "limited" social state, and the largely majority and rural population who
were totally excluded from protection regime; (3) between the state
bureaucracy and civil society.

Unlike the representations of social structure of the 1950s, those of the post-
coup period accorded great importance to the effects of the social structure on
the political configuration of the country. Two perspectives stand out in this
respect: the first perspective assumes that there is a certain continuity
between the social structure – and consequently the political configuration –
of the Ottoman Empire and that of modern Turkey, and the second
emphasizes the fact that the social structure of Turkey evolves towards
capitalist power relations, but belatedly in comparison with the West.

Proponents of the first position belonged to two streams of thought: Weberian

writers, whose forerunners were Sabri Ülgener and Şerif Mardin, and Marxist
writers such as İdris Küçükömer and Sencer Divitçioğlu. Despite the
difference in their methodologies, they agreed that the social structure of the
Ottoman Empire did not allow capitalism to develop from below, as it did in
the West. Although there are significant differences of perspective between
the Weberian line of Ülgener / Mardin and the Marxian line of Küçükömer /
Divitçioğlu, these authors agree on the fact that state bureaucracy blocked the
development of “from below” capitalism, especially the development of the
bourgeoisie and consequently the proletariat, and on the fact that the Turkish
state is a centralized patrimonial bureaucracy that prevents democracy to
consolidate itself. In this perspective, pushing back the power bloc composed
of the alliance of the armed forces and the high bureaucracy, and freeing the
industrial bourgeoisie from the yoke of the civil and military bureaucracy would
have been synonymous with the strengthening of market dynamics, civil
society and democracy.

The other approach, in turn, focuses on Turkey's backwardness in terms of

capitalist development and social and political issues related to
underdevelopment. For example, after she was sacked from the university
and became leader of the "Workers’ Party of Turkey" ( Türkiye İşçi Partisi-TİP)
in her book entitled Turkey and Socialist Questions (Türkiye ve Sosyalizm
Sorunları), (1968), Behice Boran noted that the efforts of the pro-Western
ruling elite trying to modernize the country from above have often failed
because of the specificities of the country's social structure. This finding was
based on two arguments: (1) the social classes that would normally support
the capitalist transformation could not develop sufficiently because of the
dependence of the economy, and (2) the large landowners who increase their
power and strengthen the Feudal order could not be totally liquidated. They
were an obstacle to capitalist transformation, generating also a reactionary
tendency in society and sometimes a conflictual relationship with the ruling
elite. This social structure was qualified as "dual" by Cavit Orhan Tütengil, a
sociologist teaching at the Faculty of Economics of Istanbul University who
was assassinated in 1979 by right-wing activists. Tütengil focused his work on
the issue of underdevelopment by defining it as "a social fact engendered by
tensions, crises and conflicts arising from the confrontation of a duality (or
plurality) of social structures in the same society, each of which is based on a
distinct worldview, a separate and closed system of values " (Tütengil, 1970,
p. 171).

But unlike the defenders of the first approach – according to whom the state
bureaucracy is an obstacle to capitalist and democratic progress – for the
proponents of the second approach, it is because the bourgeoisie was not
strong enough to assume the task of modernize and industrialize the country
that the state bureaucracy has assumed this role. This resulted in a specific
social structure, based less on a market logic than on interventionist logic.

It should also be noted that in the 1960s, when the strategy of import
substitution industrialization (ISI) was in effect, an industrial bourgeoisie
emerged, whose members had strong links with the bureaucracy since the
proclamation of the republic in 1923. This led to the emergence of a working
class, hired with social and trade union rights mainly in the industrial sector,
even though the working class remained a minority in the labor force. In 1980,
57% of the population lived in rural areas and did not benefit from social
protection.

The transformation of this social structure – which had become more and
more dual under the domination of the civil and military bureaucracy, and
which produced inequalities between the big industrial bourgeoisie and the
employers of SMEs, between the urban population and the rural population,
between industrial workers and farm workers, etc. – took place after the
process of neoliberalization that began after the 1980 military coup.

From Democratization to "Mediocratization": Justice of the AKP

The process of neoliberalization was set up in Turkey, as in General

Pinochet's Chile, in parallel with a military coup taking the pretext of putting an
end to the political instabilities that existed since the beginning of the 1970s.
And this process continued, as in Thatcher's Great Britain, by attacks on labor
unions and social benefits, accompanied by an ideological struggle led by
liberal columnists, who occupied an increasingly dominant place in the media.
The result of these attacks was significant: taking 1963 as the base 100 of the
real wage, this had fallen in 1980 to 85.7 and in 1986 to 57.2(Çetik & Akkaya,
1999, p. 58).

Following the Economic Decisions of 24 January 1980, the abandonment of

the import-substitution industrialization strategy had two major consequences:
first, the flourishing of highly labor-intensive industrial activities, which is
transforming Turkey into a paradise of cheap labor; second, because of the
cessation of agricultural subsidies, a great migratory wave towards the big
cities, especially towards Istanbul. The rate of the urban population, which
was 43.7% in 1980, increased to 53% in 1985, to 59% in 1990, to 64.9% in
2000. Today, three-quarters of the population live in the big cities.

New proletarians without professional qualifications were generally introduced

into the labor market through labor-intensive sectors. In other words, this
dynamic of massive proletarianization occurred under conditions of
precariousness characterized by low wage levels, as well as by the lack of
social protection, engendering the development of the informal sector to the
detriment of formal employment. In their work which draws on the theory of
labor market segmentation, Michael J. Piore and Sean Safford (2007)
emphasized how the functioning of the second segment of the labor market
reinforces the dynamics of "ghettoisation" of the world of work. Alejandro
Portes and Kelly Hoffman have shown its political consequences through the
cases of Latin American countries by highlighting the fact that class
polarization stemming from the expansion of the second segment of the labor
market and the emergence of the informal proletariat hardly reinforces the
workers' parties and the class organizations, but rather the populist political
parties seeking to rely on multi-class alliances (Portes & Hoffman, 2003).

In fact, these two dynamics – namely, the identity ghettoisation and the rise of
political populism, which feed each other – were observed for the first time in
the case of Turkey by Korkut Boratav, during his investigation on class
profiles at the turn of the 90s (Boratav, 1995). He noted that in Istanbul, the
newcomer blue-collar vote was divided between two parties: the Refah Partisi
(Prosperity Party, of which one of the prominent members was R Tayyip
Erdoğan), an Islamist party that promised the working classes to establish a
"just order", and the DSP (Demokratik Sol Party / Democratic Party of the Left
of Bülent Ecevit), who is the successor of the populist and nationalist left-wing
line that appeared in the 1970s. Unlike these two parties, which had almost
total support of the working classes of the second segment of the labor
market, skilled and protected employees had overwhelmingly voted for SHP
(Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Party / Social Democratic People's Party), which
was a leftist party affiliated with the Socialist International. After the dissolution
of the DSP and the splitting of the Refah Partisi, the AKP (Justice and
Development Party) of R. Tayyip Erdoğan has won the support of the Turkish-
Sunni majority of the working classes, and this social category still represents
the base of the AKP vote.

The other component of the multi-class alliance created around the AKP was
the "Islamic bourgeoisie" which will gradually integrate the employers of SMEs
(For a detailed analysis: See Yankaya, 2013). The development of SMEs had
been limited until the beginning of the neoliberalisation process by the
monopolistic and oligopolistic structure of the markets dominated by public
and private conglomerates since the implementation of the ISI strategy. That
is why the AKP fashioned a speech aimed at the working classes, as well as
the SME business community, which had not hesitated to engage in the
neoliberal transformation to get rid of the constraints it had faced since the
1960s.

Specifically, the class fractions that found themselves disadvantaged as a

result of capital accumulation plan based on the ISI gathered around the AKP
had promised the upward social mobility and power. This multi-class alliance
corresponded to the regrouping of the peripheral forces supposed to be under
the domination of the civil and military bureaucracy until then, and at the
beginning of the 2000s the uniting speech of this alliance was the
democratization of the society. This speech also resonated with members of
the big bourgeoisie and multinational institutions. But as the course of events
shows, the democratization of discourse has paved the way for a process of
"mediocratization"6, and the desire to suppress the dual structure of society
has led to aggressive clientelism, preparing the authoritarian drift.

In conclusion: The Spirit of Conquest, Authoritarianism and

Neoliberalism

The authoritarian drift that Turkey is experiencing today could be understood

as an effect of the overlapping of generic factors that could be similarly
observed in different countries of the world having reached the same level of
industrialization, with more specific factors being the results of historical-
political struggles of Turkey.
                                                                                                               
6  Mediocracization  could  be  defined  as  a  search  for  justice,  or  as  an  antidote,  against  the  inequalities  of  the  
meritocratic  justice  disposition.  More  specifically,  as  a  post-­‐war  elite  basing  their  legitimacy  on  their  skills  
and  knowledge,  meritocracy  emerged  as  a  social  justice  conception  based  on  academic  success.  But  in  fact,  
for  the  majority  of  individuals,  school  has  never  been  a  sanctuary  of  equal  opportunities.  Moreover,  as  
François  Dubet  points  out,  "when  we  were  not  deserving  at  school,  we  almost  missed  everything".  The  
mediocracy  is  thus  developed  and  supported  in  a  market  economy  by  those  who  find  the  inequalities  caused  
by  the  diploma  unjust  and  consequently  the  higher  positions  occupied  by  cultivated  elites.  But  this  
conception  of  justice  is  not  attached  to  an  egalitarian  ideal  and  it  only  results  in  modifying  the  criteria  of  
"just  inequality".  
Regarding generic factors, first of all, the features of the social structure of the
country have been mentioned in broad lines above. Social fluidity in Turkey,
contrary to expectations, could not reduce the duality of social structure. On
the contrary, during the period following the 1980s, when there was an
unprecedented wave of migration towards the big cities, the inequalities
between urban and rural areas and the cultural differences linked to them
extended to the urban space resulting in the segmentation of the labor market
and consequently a "ghettoization" not only among workers, but also among
employers.

The newcomers of big cities, if we refer to Robert Castel's concepts, deprived

of private property as well as social property (Castel & Haroche, 2001), in
order not to fall into the zone of disaffiliation, cling to the "identity property".
This enables them to access work, housing and assistance by building
relationships of trust. The functionality of the "identity property" is observed
equally within the SME business, which are mainly weak in terms of
innovation, application of R & D and product development, and therefore in
search of a cheap workforce without qualification and cut-price suppliers
through interpersonal and clientele networks.

As for specific factors, the success of the AKP and its leader R. Tayyip
Erdoğan in symbolic struggles to revive the "spirit of conquest" was
paramount. The social categories that were in a disadvantaged position
during the ISI regime, such as SME employers, small merchants and
newcomer proletarians suddenly became part of the neoliberal reforms
targeting Keynesian institutions. Moreover, desires for upward social mobility
and desires for consumption as a sign of social status were as much excited
by the neoliberal discourse as by the tendency to compete with the agents
who benefited from the instruments of the social state during the period of the
ISI. They were easily assimilated by the discourse of "conquest" intrinsic to
the Islamist ideology.

In fact, the concept of conquest replacing the concept of "jihad" has always
had a major weight in the Turkish-Islamic ideology. By referring directly to the
capture of Constantinople by the Turks, this concept intrinsically evokes all
kinds of policies conducted in Anatolia for the purposes of "turquification of
capital." Suat Çetinoğlu emphasizes the existence of continuity between the
last period of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey, with regard to
the policies of appropriation of the possessions of non-Turks (Çetinoğlu,
2009). The discourse of conquest, revitalized by Islamists, especially after the
1990s, is an effort to create a historiography distinct from Kemalist
historiography, which was adopted by the high civil and military bureaucracy
between 1960 and 1980. And this discourse could be seen as an ideological
tool that serves as legitimator to whom having a strong desire to rise social
status. To achieve this goal, the secular middle classes living in urban areas
for more than a generation had to become the "other". The substitution of
"sunnification" for "turquification" as the target of the conquest offered the
possibility of doing so7.

The authoritarian drift in Turkey is nothing but a phase of this process of

"conquest". Triggered by the dynamics of neoliberalization and legitimized by
the "sunnification" discourse, the conquest can no longer evolve in democratic
ways in the face of changes in the political and economic situation both
nationally and internationally after the years 2007-2008, when the global
economic crisis broke out. The gradual shift to authoritarianism in Turkey has
gained deep ground after the Arab Spring succeeded a jihadist winter –and
Kurdish quest for independence or even autonomy- then the emergence of
Trumpism in the West. Its future will therefore be linked, on the one hand, to
the evolution of the global economic and political crisis linked to neoliberal
capitalism, and on the other, to Erdoğan's ability to prolong the social
conquest whose dynamics – such as the results of the constitutional
referendum of April 16, 2017 indicate – seems to have lost power.

Bilbliography

Boran, B. (1945). Toplumsal Yapı Araştırmaları, İki Köy Çeşidinin Mukayeseli

Tetkiki. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.
Boran, B. (1968). Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları. İstanbul: Gün Yayınları.
Boratav, K. (1995). İstanbul ve Anadolu’dan Sınıf Profilleri. İstanbul: Tarih
Vakfı Yayınları.
Bourdieu, P. (1978). Classement, déclassement, reclassement, 24, 2–22.
Castel, R. (1995). Les métamorphoses de la question sociale. Une chronique
du salariat. Paris: Fayard.
Castel, R., & Haroche, C. (2001). Propriété privée, propriété sociale, propriété
de soi  : entretiens sur la construction de l’individu moderne. Fayard.
Retrieved from
https://books.google.com.tr/books/about/Propriété_privée_propriété_soci
ale.html?id=vv-LQgAACAAJ&redir_esc=y
Çetik, M., & Akkaya, Y. (1999). 1990’lı yıllarda Türkiye’de Endüstri İlişkileri –
Araştırma Raporu. İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı.
Çetinoğlu, S. (2009). Sermayenin “Türk”leştirilmesi. In F. Başkaya (Ed.),
Resmi Tarih Tartışmaları 2 (pp. 79–152). İstanbul: Özgür Üniversite
Kitaplığı.
Kıray, M. (2005). Tüketim Normları Üzerine Karşılaştırmalı Bir Araştırma.
İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık.
Kurtkan, A. (1960). Türkiye’de İçtimai Sınıflar. Sosyoloji Konferansları, (1),
62–80. Retrieved from
http://www.journals.istanbul.edu.tr/iusoskon/article/view/1023006667

                                                                                                               
7  It  is  clear  that  "turquification"  has  never  been  totally  isolated  from  a  certain  religiosity.  In  the  same  way,  
"sunnification"  always  includes  a  certain  "turkishness".  Nevertheless,  it  obvious  that  these  two  discourses  
are  distinguished  from  each  other  by  the  proportions  of  the  elements  combined  in  the  formula  of  the  
national  identity.  More  specifically,  there  is  a  clear  distinction  between  the  answers  that  each  brings  to  the  
question  of  the  main  element  of  national  identity.  
Küçükömer, İ. (1969). Düzenin Yabancılaşması. İstanbul: Ant Yayınları.
Mardin, Ş. (1973). Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?
Daedalus, 102(1), 169–190.
Parla, T. (1998). Mercantile Militarism in Turkey, 1960-1998. New
Perspectives on Turkey, 19, 29–52.
http://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600003010
Piore, M. J., & Safford, S. (2007). Preliminary Thoughts on Identity and
Segmentation in Primary Sector Labor Markets. Socio-Economie Du
Travail, 41(6), 925–940.
Portes, A., & Hoffman, K. (2003). Latin American Class Structures: Their
Composition and Change during the Neoliberal Era. Latin American
Research Review, 38(1), 41–82.
Seekings, J. (2010). Welfare Regimes and Redistribution in the South. In
Divide and Deal: The Politics of Distribution in Democracies (pp. 19–42).
New York: New York University Press.
Tütengil, C. O. (1970). Az Gelişmenin Sosyolojisi. İstanbul: İstanbul
Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Yayınları.
Yankaya, D. (2013). La nouvelle bourgeoisie islamique  : le modèle turc. Paris:
Presses universitaires de France.
Yavuz, E. (1998). Sanayideki İşgücünün Durumu, 1923-40. In D. Quataert &
E. J. Zürcher (Eds.), Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet Türkiye’sine işçiler- 1839-
1950 (pp. 155–196). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.