Tapucar vs Tapucar

Facts:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of
her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a
certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous circumstances.
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct unbecoming an
officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the
Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension without pay, while in Administrative Matter
Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation
from service of respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated canon 1 of the code of professional responsibility

Ruling:
Yes.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. Exacted from him, as a member of the profession
charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of
decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as “moral character.” To achieve
such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus
improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.
Acejas vs People
Paguia vs Molina
Facts:
The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a 4 -unit compound named "Times Square" at Times Street,
Quezon City. The neighbors are the following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Abreu, clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr. And Mrs. Lim,
clients of Molina; 3) Dr. and Mrs. Yap; and Dr. San Juan.

The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit owners save for Mr. Abreu. The agreement,
covered by a document titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set of internal rules for the neighbors on
matters such as the use of the common right of way to the exit gate, assignment of parking areas, and security. Mr.
Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the contract since the former did not agree with
the terms concerning the parking arrangements.

On 2/4/2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty with the IBP CBD against Atty. Molina for allegedly
giving legal advice to the latter's clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu,
who was never a party to the contract.

Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among neighbors. He maintained that the Times Square
Preamble was entered into for purposes of maintaining order in the residential compound. All homeowners,
except Mr. Abreu, signed the document.

Respondent further stated in his Answer that Sps. Abreu filed two cases against his clients, Sps. Lim, on the belief
that Mr. Abreu was not bound by the Times Square Preamble. The first case, was filed with the HLURB, which was
an action to declare the Times Square Preamble invalid. The second suit was an action for declaratory relief. Both
cases, according to respondent, were dismissed.

Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in court, this time by his client, the Lims. They were
prompted to file a suit since Mr. Abreu had allegedly taken matters into his own hands by placing two vehicles
directly in front of the gate of the Lims, thus blocking the latter's egress to Times Street. The Lims filed with the
RTC, Br. 96, QC, a Complaint for Injunction and Damages, coupled with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a
TRO and/or PI. The RTC granted the relief prayed for.

Atty. Molina concluded that the above facts sufficiently served as his answer to the Complaint.

On 3 August 2010, Investigating Commissioner Fernandez rendered a Report and Recommendation. He

recommended dismissal for lack of merit, based on the following grounds: 1) the complaint consisted only of bare
allegations; and 2) even assuming that respondent Molina gave an erroneous legal advice, he could not be held
accountable in the absence of proof of malice or bad faith. This was approved by the IBP Board of Governors. Atty.
Paguia filed a MR but was denied. No petition for review has been filed with this Court.

It is worth noting that a case is deemed terminated if the complainant does not file a petition with the Supreme
Court within 15 days from notice of the Board's resolution. This rule is derived from Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B,
which states:

(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension
or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or
imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other
interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the
Supreme Court orders otherwise. (Underscoring supplied)

In this case, Atty. Paguia received notice of the Board's resolution on 21 March 2013, as evidenced by a registry
return receipt. To this date, this Court has yet to receive a petition for review from Atty. Paguia. Thus, for his
failure to file a petition for review with the Court within 15 days, this case is deemed terminated pursuant to the
above mentioned Section 12(c).

Held:
Nevertheless, we have gone over the records but we have no reason to deviate from the findings of the IBP Board
of Governors.

When it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum of proof, which
requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the complainant.

In the present case, we find that the Complaint is without factual basis. Complainant Atty. Paguia charges Atty.
Molina with providing legal advice to the latter's clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble is binding on
complainant's client, Mr. Abreu, who was not a signatory to the agreement. The allegation of giving legal advice,
however, was not substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Nowhere do
the records state that Atty. Paguia saw respondent giving the legal advice to the clients of the latter. Bare
allegations are not proof.

Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held administratively
liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The rule on mistakes committed by
lawyers in the exercise of their profession is as follows:

An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest mistake or error, an attorney is not liable.
Chief Justice Abbott said that, no attorney is bound to know all the law; God forbid that it should be imagined that
an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law. The default rule is presumption of good
faith. On the other hand, bad faith is never presumed. It is a conclusion to be drawn from facts. Its determination is
thus a question of fact and is evidentiary. There is no evidence, though, to show that the legal advice, assuming it
was indeed given, was coupled with bad faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of good faith, therefore, stands
in this case.

The foregoing considered, complainant failed to prove his case by clear preponderance of evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the Decision of the
Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Donton vs Tasingco

The Facts

Donton stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document against Stier,
Maggay and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement. The disbarment complaint
arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-
complaint, stated that:

The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was prepared and notarized by me under the following circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy.
San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his
name – agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would guarantee
recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and
undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied
up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.

Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier,
being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a
deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do
something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme. Respondent claimed that
complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty.
Alentajan, because respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal case against Stier and
Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its
genuineness and due execution.

The Court referred the matter to the IBP which found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent
the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan
recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his
commission as Notary Public. On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP.
Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his
pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family and his six minor
children. The IBP denied the MR because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already
been referred to the Court.

Held:

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code. A lawyer should not render
any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and
obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act
which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property.
Yet, in his MR, respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier.
Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant’s
name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several documents, including the Occupancy
Agreement, that would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in
complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and
notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his
knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he
may be suspended.

In Balinon v. De Leon, respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for 3 years for preparing
an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago, respondent Atty. Santiago was
suspended from the practice of law for 1 year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single
again after 9 years of separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Velez vs De Vera
Facts: Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. de Vera based on the following
grounds: 1) Atty. De Veras alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by
the State Bar of California. 2) That the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was
found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then
forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in said State in order to evade the recommended 3 year
suspension. Atty. De Vera stated in his reply that the issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very
issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him and prayed that the
instant complaint be dismissed due to res judicata. Complainant maintained that there is substantial evidence
showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment.

Issue: W/N ATTY. DE VERA committed malpractice which amounted to moral turpitude in the State Bar of
California and should such be an applicable basis for disbarment in the Philippines

Held: Yes. Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states: Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation that he received US$12,000 intended for his client
and that he deposited said amount in his personal account and that he spent the amount for personal purposes.
Atty. De Vera insists that Julius’ father authorized him to use the money, and has repayed the full amount even
before the administrative case was filed against him. However, aside from these self-serving statements, the SC
cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the
funds of his client. Atty. De Vera’s actions caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to
which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished
whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence.
Linsangan vs Tolentino
Facts:

A complaint for disbarment was filed by Linsangan against Atty. Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services. Complaint alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Labiano,
convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance and
expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent
them text messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of Gregorio attesting
that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50, 000. Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling
card. Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said
calling card.

Issue:

Whether or not Tolentino’s actions warrants disbarment.

Held:

Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 1.03 of
the CPR provides that lawyer, shall not for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man’s cause. This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” as a measure to protect the community from
barratry and champerty. In the case at bar, complainant presented substantial evidence to prove that respondent
indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits. Any act of solicitations constitutes
malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statues
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
employment.
Vitriolo vs Dasig
Facts: This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Dasig, an official of the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath
for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the
CHED. Complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, demanded from
Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application
for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. She demanded from Dela Torre, a
student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then
pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED and also various amounts from others.

Issue: Whether the Respondent violated her Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Yes, Atty. Dasig is liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as the
CPR. Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office
are violative of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of
Canon 6of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests.
Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers,
especially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from
any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must
also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.
De Ysasi III vs NLRC
Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The elder Ysasi owns a hacienda in Negros
Occidental. De Ysasi III is employed in the hacienda as the farm administrator. In November 1982, De Ysasi III
underwent surgery and so he missed work. He was confined and while he’s nursing from his infections he was
terminated, without due process, by his father. De Ysasi III filed against his father for illegal dismissal before the
NLRC. His father invoked that his son actually abandoned his work.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Ysasi III abandoned his work.
HELD: No. His absence from work does not constitute abandonment. To constitute abandonment, there must be
a.) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and b.) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested
by some overt acts. No such intent was proven in this case. In this case, lawyers for both camps failed to exert all
reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the
direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. This case may have never reached the courts had
there been an earnest effort by the lawyers to have both parties find an off court settlement but records show that
no such effort was made. Rule 1.04 of the CPR provides that “(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or
settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.” Both counsel fell short of what was expected of them,
despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. In the same manner, the labor arbiter who handled this
regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter
“shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction.”
Santiago vs. Atty. Rafanan

Facts:

Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology filed for the disbarment of Atty. Rafanan.
The Complaint was filed with the IBP CBD. The petition stated that respondent, in notarizing several documents on
different dates failed and/or refused to: a) make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax
certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and
execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of
the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent
executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively
representing his client. The IBP Board of Governors modified the disbarment proposal and instead imposed a
penalty of P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.

Issue:

Whether the penalty imposed by the IBP is proper

Held:

Yes. Atty. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the CPR. The Notarial Law is explicit
on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document
acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax);
and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. They are also required to maintain
and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to “give to each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before them a number corresponding to the one in their register and to
state therein the page or pages of their register, on which the same is recorded.” Failure to perform these duties
would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public. Canon 5 is also violated because the canon
states the obligation of lawyers to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence which the respondent failed to satisfy by not. With regard to
the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, the Supreme Court held that it was clearly necessary
for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his
clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in
his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.
Hence, the penalty imposed by the IBP is proper.
Khan vs Simbillo

FACTS:
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads: “Annulment of Marriage
Specialist”. A staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims
that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree
within 4-6mos provided the case will not involve separation of property and custody of children. An administrative
complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to
suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1 year.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD:

Yes. Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read: Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit
to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use
of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding
his qualifications or legal services. The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary
duty is public service and money. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest. Worse, advertising himself as
an “annulment of marriage specialist” he erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as
sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond. Solicitation of
business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s name appears must be a reputable law list only for that
purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name
to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.
BR Sebastian vs CA
FACTS:
Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages against the Director of Public Works and BR Sebastian. RTC
found B.R. Sebastian liable for damages but absolved other defendants. B.R. Sebastian, thru its counsel, the law
firm of Baizas, Alberto and Associates, timely appealed the adverse decision to the CA. During the pendency of the
appeal, Reyes died and was substituted by his heirs. On February 1974, B.R Sebastian, thru its counsel of record,
received notice to file Appellant’s Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof; however, it failed to comply. CA issued
a Resolution requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the
Appellant’s Brief within the reglementary period. On September 1974, CA dismissed the appeal.
On September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a MR of the resolution dismissing its
appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. Baizas, senior partner in the law firm. Atty. Espiritu, the lawyer
who handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the
Appellant’s Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm. Court denied
the MR. No action was taken by petitioner from within the period to file a petition for review, the same became
final and executory, and the records of the case were remanded. Trial court issued a writ of execution. But on
November 1975, petitioner filed with CA a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of PI but
was subsequently denied. Petitioner filed prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary injunction with
the SC to CA’s denial of petitioner’s motion. SC required them to comment and soon after, some amendments
were made. Ultimately, the petition was denied. But on May 1976, petitioner filed a MR claiming that since it was
deprived of the right to appeal without fault on its part, the petition should be given due course. SC reconsidered
and required both parties to submit simultaneously their respective Memoranda.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent CA gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reinstate its
appeal, previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant’s Brief

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that no fraud is involved in the present case. What was present was simple negligence
on the part of petitioner’s counsel, which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to
demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea. Granting that the power or discretion to
reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed is included in or implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an
appeal, still such power or discretion must be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause, in like
manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate court to allow extensions of time for the filing of briefs.
There must be such a showing which would call for, prompt and justify its exercise. Otherwise, it cannot and must
not be upheld. The “confusion” in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid
justification for its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas’ death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his Associates
to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided
by the Rules of Court. The law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have
withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the
services of a new lawyer. The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client. Moreover, petitioner itself
was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from counsel regarding its case.
Petition DISMISSED.
RAMOS vs. ATTY. IMBANG

In 1992, the complainant sought the assistance of respondent in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses
Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only. The
complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanos. Oddly, respondent never
allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several
hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each
"appearance" in court, respondent charged her P350. After six consecutive postponements, the complainant
became suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro,
Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in
fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed a violation of the CPR.

RULING:

Yes. Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically, lawyers in
government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public
scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. Thus, lawyers in
government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work
of their respective offices. Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character
required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office.
Huyssen vs. Gutierrez

A.C. No. 6707

March 24, 2006

FACTS: Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under
Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa applications will be
favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year which
could be withdrawn after one year. Believing respondent, complainant deposited with respondent on six different
occasions the total amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the
amounts deposited by the complainant but refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her demands.
After one year, complainant demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured her that said
amount would be returned. When respondent failed to return the sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of
which complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to respondent for the immediate return of the money. In
a letter dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to release the amount not later than 9 March 1999. Failing to
comply, the World Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. Respondent sent complainant a letter dated 19
March 1999 explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited amount. He enclosed two
blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the amounts. When
complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due dates, the same were dishonored because respondent
had stopped payment on the same. Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999,
explained the reasons for stopping payment on the checks, and gave complainant five postdated checks with the
assurance that said checks would be honored. Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates
but they were all dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered
stopped by respondent. After respondent made several unfulfilled promises, complainant referred the matter to a
lawyer who sent two demand letters to respondent. The demand letters remained unheeded. Thus, a complaint
for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required respondent to submit his answer within
15 days from receipt thereof. Respondent denied the allegations in the complaint claiming that having never
physically received the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not have appropriated or pocketed the same.
He said the amount was used as payment for services rendered for obtaining the permanent visas in the
Philippines. He alleged that through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the
complainant, the latter was introduced to him at his office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem
concerning their stay in the Philippines. Their problem was the fact that since they have been staying in the
Philippines for almost ten (10) years as holders of missionary visas (9G) they could no longer extend their said
status as under the law and related policies of the government. He advised them that they better secure a
permanent visa under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota. Complainant further
requested him to refer to her to a lawyer to work for their application, which he did and contacted the late Atty.
Mendoza, an Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the complainant and her family. The application was filed,
processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until the same was finished and the corresponding
permanent visa were obtained by the complainant and her family. He became the intermediary between
complainant and their counsel so much that every amount that the latter would request for whatever purpose was
coursed through him which request were then transmitted to the complainant and every amount of money given
by the complainant to their counsel were coursed thru him which is the very reason why his signature appears in
the vouchers attached in the complaint-affidavit. On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of
respondent’s evidence but the scheduled hearings (11 settings) were all reset at the instance of the respondent
who was allegedly out of the country to attend to his client’s needs. Reception of respondent’s evidence was
scheduled for the last time on 28 September 2004 and again respondent failed to appear, despite due notice and
without just cause.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER: Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
submitted her report5 recommending the disbarment of respondent. There is no question that respondent
received the amount of US$20,000 from complainant, as respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers
(Annexes A to F of complainant) showing his receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however
claims that he did not appropriate the same for himself but that he delivered the said amount to a certain Atty.
Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is untenable considering the documentary evidence submitted by
complainant. respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by
respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official receipts therefore were never issued by
the said Bureau? Also, whywould respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return of the money to
complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of
respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and
appropriated the same for his personal use. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. RULING OF THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS: Approved the Investigating
Commissioner’s report with modification. Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and
ordered to return the amount with legal interest from receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be
referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and
to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent should
be disbarred. RULING: It is undisputed that respondent admitted having received the US$20,000 from complainant
as shown by his signatures in the petty cash vouchers and receipts he prepared, on the false representation that
that it was needed in complainant’s application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated the
said amount and interposed the defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant
and children in their application for visa in the BID. Such defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit
evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate
of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has been naturally
silenced by fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. Records show that even though he was given the opportunity to answer the charges and
controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation, he failed, without any plausible reason, to appear
several times whenever the case was set for reception of his evidence despite due notice. The defense of denial
proffered by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense. When
respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. In a desperate
attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing another by issuing several
worthless checks, thereby compounding his case. In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless
checks constitutes gross misconduct, as the effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved
in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. Respondent’s acts constitute gross
misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of
the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers. Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.