Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2)
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration
of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological
incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does
not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal
laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding
the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, VeronicoTenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the
City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and
without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he
had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro
showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking
this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared
with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, 3 Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, VeronicoTenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The
Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
5 Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously
united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has
all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988,
with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly
married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their
union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the
allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. 8 He further testified
that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was
any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a
decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under
months of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS
CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED
AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO
AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.12
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the
existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an
alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity,
retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. 13 Hence, petitioner
argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his
acquittal.14
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove
the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary
evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro
and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was
solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and
certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; 15 and (2) a handwritten letter
from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and
Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification
issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification
issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. 18 Both these
documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the
marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the
existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of
Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the
marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original
of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof
(Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer
in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage
contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes
on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National
Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on
February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that
there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing
offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a
record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage
ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage,
especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no
evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of
the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’
testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and
petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all
the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the
first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-
existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics
Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3,
1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to
his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution
to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial
declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to
Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not
committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What
petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal
laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the
law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during
the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a
subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal
laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of
this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of
the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified
by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their
consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of
the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties
personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence
of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles
3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were
satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they
voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo
B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two
witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not
without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. 28 There is
therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for the
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital crime of bigamy.
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or subsequent marriage
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
and commitment. been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a subsequent marriage,
this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. contracted during the subsistence of the prior union, which would have been binding were
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted it not for its being bigamous.
marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial
subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a
the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is party or both parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so
a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual hereinafter explained), the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s basic social inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their
institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in. nullity.2 As early as the case of People vs. Aragon3 this Court has underscored the fact that
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of the Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by way of a
(12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the
be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Court, " an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law,
shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of
i.e., prisioncorreccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially
years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were
sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) contracted prior to the decree of annulment)4 the complete nullity, however, of a
months of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly
mayor, as maximum. be defense in an indictment of bigamy.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at
VeronicoTenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate the time the second marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to eight nullity of the prior marriage.5 I maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto. Family Code reads:
SO ORDERED. "Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Azcuna, remarriage on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage
JJ., concur. void."
Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug. It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity
Vitug, J., see separate opinion. of the previous marriage may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment
Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia. declaring such previous marriage void." It may not be amiss to state that under the
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion. regime of the Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio. Diy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior void marriage is
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio. itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio. nullity of the previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in a
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent. later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals,7 the Family Code, however has seen
it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say that
the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to
SEPARATE OPINION> conclude that the Family Code has amended or intended to amend the Revised penal Code
VITUG, J.: or to abandon the settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.8
VeronicoTenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being married A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has
to Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro been from Canon law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil
argues that since his second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab law with those of church laws.9 The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential
marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity
which are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal
capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a
marriage license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties
thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage,
remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the
Family Code considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage before its
judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a voidable marriage. It
is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume, that the spouses’ rights and obligations,
property regime and successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable
marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared void for basically two
reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage
under the Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a valid
marriages;10 and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e.,
relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties)
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an
infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid
marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to
that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for
bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate
the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity
dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the
perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the
offender who had entered into it.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.
Footnotes
1 TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 4-11.

which are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, 2 Record, p. 78.

being a mental state, may not so readily be as evident.11 It would have been logical for 3 Record, p. 84.

the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were 4 TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 11-12; TSN, 13 September 1995, pp. 6-9.

not for apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and 5 Record, pp. 1-2.

nomenclature. 6 Id., p. 66.

Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a 7 TSN, 11 December 1996, p. 6.

voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or 8 Id., pp. 6-7.

prescription. It might be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the 9 Id., pp. 7-8.

Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article 36, 10 Penned by Judge Rumoldo F. Fernandez, Rollo, pp. 156-162.

celebrated before the effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the 11 Rollo, p. 7.

effectivity of the Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription 12 Reyes, L.B., THE REVISED PENAL CODE. Book Two, 14th ed., 1998, p. 907.

seems to betray a real consciousness by the framers that marriages falling under Article 13 Rollo, pp. 7-16.

36 are truly meant to be inexistent. 14 Id., pp. 16-18.

Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage 15 Record, p. 85.

due to psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and 16 Record, p. 84.

efficacious until judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been 17 Record, p. 148.

declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute 18 Record, p. 149.

bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of the first marriage would not be a 19 Mariategui v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57062, 24 January 1992, 205 SCRA

prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior "voidable" 337, 343, citing People v. Borromeo, 218 Phil. 122, 126.
marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the prosecution 20 Decision dated November 20, 1995, penned by Judge Epifanio C. Llano of the

of a criminal offense for bigamy. Regional Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. AV-885 (Annex
In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the "C", Rollo, p. 43).
21
first marriage, this Court has declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is Record, pp. 16-18.
committed.12 The Court has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it 22 Family Code, Art. 41.

must, even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential 23 Family Code, Art. 2.

elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is 24 Family Code, Art. 3; Vitug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, pp. 119-

established that the second marriage has been contracted without the necessary license 120, citing the Family Code, Articles 2 and 3.
and thus void,13 or that the accused is merely forced to enter into the second (voidable) 25 Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the

marriage,14 no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like
instances, however, the lapses refers to the elements required for contracting a valid
marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and
voluntarily entered into, are shown to be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can
unassailably arise.
beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full — or half-blood.
26 Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of

public policy:
 (1) Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or illegitimate, A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the
up to the fourth civil degree; marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
(2) Between step-parents and stepchildren; civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; 11 One might observe that insanity, which could be worse than psychological

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; incapacity merely renders a marriage voidable, not void.
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted 12 De la cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, G.R. No. L-40895, 6 November 1975, 68 SCRA 1;

child; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, et. Al., 109 Phil 155; Zapanta vs. hon. Montessa, et. al.,
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; 144 Phil. 1227; People vs. Mora Dumpo, 62 Phil 246; People vs. Lara, 51 O. G.
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; 4079.
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and 13 People vs. Lara, supra.

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, 14 De la Cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, supra; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, supra.

killed that other person’s spouse or his or her own spouse.

27 Valdez v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, G.R. No. 122749, 31

July 1996.
28 Family Code, Art. 54.

VITUG,
1 Article 349, Revised Penal Code.
2 Odayat vs. Amante, 77 SCRA 338; see also People vs Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033.
3 100 Phil 1033.
4 See People vs. Mendoza, 50 O.G. 4767.
5 Mercado vs. Tan, 337 SCRA 122; Te vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 327.
6 143 SCRA 499.
7 145 SCRA 229.
8 I might add, parenthetically, that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity

of a void marriage even for purposes of remarriage should refer merely to cases
when it can be said that the marriage, at least ostensibly, has taken place. For
instance, no such judicial declaration of nullity would yet be required when either
or both parties have not at all given consent thereto that verily results in a "no"
marriage situation or when the prior "marriage" is between persons of the same
sex.
9 Deliberations of the family Code Revision Committee, 9 August 1996.
10 Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of
the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take other as husband and wife in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a,
55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
THIRD DIVISION Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity
of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by
a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, G.R. No. 167746 petitioners representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose
Petitioner, Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel
Present: Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.[7] Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three
children.[8] Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., for concubinage.[9] Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner
Chairperson, before the Metropolitan Trial Court ofMandaluyong City, Branch 60.[10] Respondent prays
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing
REYES, JJ. as follows:

ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. Promulgated: The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents. August 28, 2007 1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand
DECISION pesos (P20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2) children on the
first five (5) days of each month; and
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
3. To pay the costs.[11]

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by

petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30
September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioners appeal and affirming the
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No.
97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage[3] was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita
A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the
required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a
person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee,
arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of
the CDCC BR Chapel.[4] They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner
and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose
de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license,
procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither
party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license
with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth
to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate
lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their
marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage
contract[5] and its entry on file.[6]
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioners
appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 6 April 2005.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be
regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the
presumption. Moreover, the parties marriage contract being a public document is a prima
facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.[13]
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis
despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license
at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
gave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact
that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during
the trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing on
the face of the marriage contract.
 c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
failed to apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the
case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April
2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
failed to relax the observance of procedural rules to protect and
promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.[14]
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was
celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to
the Manila City Halland dealt with a fixer who arranged everything for them. [15] The
wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where
Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.[16] He and respondent did not
go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license
from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident
of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot
be given weight because the certification states that Marriage License number 7054133
was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their
marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[18] in
relation to Article 58 of the same Code.[19]
Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of
the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested.[21]
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his
marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a
ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local Civil Registrar issued a
certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage
License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of due
search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued
by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on
said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would
render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal
that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license
number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office
has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the
local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their
marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the
petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974,
almost one year after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that
the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage
license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the
marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license
must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the
parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects
a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil
registrar of Carmona, Cavite.[25]The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued,
namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license
was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
 This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this
office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita
A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.[26]
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed
and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official
business.[27]The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails
until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus,
unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment
will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers act
being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. [28] Significantly,
apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed,
issued in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than
one year utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the
second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything
was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San
Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding
ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as follows
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document
prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am
referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, WITNESS
claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still
hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents I dont remember your honor.
marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of
either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of COURT
publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered
mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. [30] An irregularity in any Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.[31] WITNESS

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued Contract and I dont know if it is good enough for the marriage and
to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license they accepted it your honor.
number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is
not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer COURT
scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such
that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that
detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license you have with you already a Marriage Contract?
to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,[32] petitioner WITNESS
cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which
he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that Yes your honor.
the civil marriage took place because he initiated it. [33] Petitioner is an educated
person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to COURT
the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage
ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage
marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or License in the Marriage Contract issued which Marriage License is
suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a Number 7054033.
mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.[34]
WITNESS
 MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO
Yes your honor.[35] EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that
took place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil
marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. [36] RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a fixer who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain
Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not ATTESTATION
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed
a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
contrary.[37] Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All
the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent
official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has
fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
of law.[38] Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of
the marriage.[39] Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be
lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
CERTIFICATION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A.
Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo, p. 25-32.
[2] Penned by Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos; CA rollo, pp. 257-258.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO [3] Docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1325.
Associate Justice [4] Crusade of the Divine Church of Christ.
Chairperson [5] Annex A, Records, p. 5; Annexes B to C, Records, pp. 6-7.
[6] Rollo, pp. 33-36.
[7] Id. at 185.
[8] TSN, 14 October 1999, p. 34.
[9] Rollo, p. 39.
[10] Id. at 46. [32] Abacus Securities Corporation v. Ampil, G.R. No. 160016, 27 February 2006, 483 SCRA
[11] Id. at 68-69. 315, 337.
[12] Id. at 21. [33] TSN, 1 October 1998, p. 96.
[13] Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance [34] Atienza v. Judge Brilliantes, Jr., 312 Phil. 939, 944 (1995).
of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance [35] TSN, 1 October 1998, pp. 33-35.
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein [36] Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 662 2003).
stated. [37] Goshen v. New Orleans, 18 US 950.
[14] Rollo, p. 206. [38] People v. Janssen, 54 Phil. 176, 180 (1929).
[15] Id. at 209. [39] Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422,
[16] Records p. 1. 436; Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, 31 July 2006, 497 SCRA 428, 443.
[17] Id. at 15-a.
[18] (3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

character.
[19] Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this

Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
[20] Now Article 3 of the Family Code.

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35.
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45.
[21] Nial v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 667-668 (2000).
[22] G.R. No.103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.
[23] G.R. No.132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133.
[24] 386 Phil. 760, 769 (2000).
[25] Article 70 of the Civil Code, now Article 25 Family Code, provides:

The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed
with him in a register book strictly in the order in which the same shall be
received. He shall enter in said register the names of the applicants, the dates on
which the marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary.
[26] Records, p. 15-a.
[27] Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. x x x

xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed. (Rule 131, Rules of Court.)
[28] Magsucang v. Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224-225 (2003).
[29] TSN. 23 November 1999, p. 4.
[30] Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, p. 125.
[31] Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, p. 8; Moreno v. Bernabe, 316 Phil. 161,

168 (1995).
SECOND DIVISION exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as shown by the following
circumstances: the respondent failed and refused to cohabit and make love with him; did
not love and respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give him emotional,
spiritual, physical, and psychological help and support; failed and refused to have a family
RENATO REYES SO, G.R. No. 150677 domicile; and failed and refused to enter into a permanent union and establish conjugal
Petitioner, and family life with him.[9]
Present:
The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his
QUISUMBING, Chairperson, charges.
*YNARES-SANTIAGO,

VELASCO, JR., The petitioner testified that he and the respondent eloped two (2) months after
- versus - **LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
meeting at a party.[10] Thereafter, they lived at the house of his mothers friend in Bulacan,
BRION, JJ. and then transferred to his parents house in Caloocan City. They stayed there for two (2)
months before transferring to Muntinlupa City.[11]

Promulgated:
LORNA VALERA, June 5, 2009
Respondent.
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
For our review is the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Renato Reyes So
(petitioner) against the Decision dated July 4, 2001[2] and the Resolution dated October
18, 2001[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 65273. The challenged
decision reversed the decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
143, Makati City declaring the marriage of the petitioner and respondent Lorna Valera
(respondent) null and void on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The assailed resolution denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The petitioner likewise related that respondent asked him to sign a blank marriage
application form and marriage contract sometime in 1986. He signed these documents on
the condition that these documents would only be used if they decide to get married. He
admitted not knowing what happened to these documents, and maintained that no
marriage ceremony took place in 1991.[12] As noted below, the petitioner, however,
submitted a certified true copy of their marriage contract as part of his documentary
evidence.
The petitioner further alleged that the respondent did not want to practice her
profession after passing the dental board exam; and that she sold the dental equipment
he bought for her.[13] He also claimed that when he started his own communication
company, the respondent disagreed with many of his business decisions; her interference
eventually led to many failed transactions with prospective clients.[14]
The petitioner narrated that he often slept in the car because the respondent
locked him out of the house when he came home late. He felt embarrassed when his
employees would wake him up inside the car. When he confronted the respondent the
next morning, she simply ignored him. He also claimed that respondent did not care for
their children, and was very strict with clients. Moreover, the respondent went out with his
employees to gamble whenever there were no clients.

ANTECEDENT FACTS
The petitioner and the respondent first met at a party in 1973 after being
introduced to each other by a common friend. The petitioner at that time was a 17-year
old high school student; the respondent was a 21-year old college student. Their meeting
led to courtship and to a 19-year common-law relationship,[5] culminating in the exchange
of marital vows at the Caloocan City Hall on December 10, 1991.[6] They had three (3)
children (Jeffrey, Renelee, and Loni)[7] in their relationship and subsequent marriage.
On May 14, 1996, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of the
nullity of his marriage with the respondent.[8] The case was docketed as JDRC Case No.
96-674. He alleged that their marriage was null and void for want of the essential and
formal requisites. He also claimed that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
Lastly, he testified that sometime in 1990, he found all his things outside their
house when he came home late after closing a deal with a client. He left their house and
stayed at a friends house for two (2) months. He tried to go back to their house, but the
respondent prevented him from entering. The respondent also told him she did not love
him anymore. He attempted to reconcile with her for the sake of their children, but she
refused to accept him back.[15]
Summons was served on the respondent on July 17, 1996, but she failed to file an
answer. The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to investigate if there had been collusion
between the parties and to intervene for the State to see to it that evidence was not
fabricated. Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos manifested that he was unable to make a ruling
on the issue of collusion since the respondent failed to appear before him. [16]
 Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented certified true copies of the
birth certificate of their three children;[17] certified true copy of their marriage
contract;[18] and the testimony, original curriculum vitae,[19] and psychological report[20] of
clinical psychologist Dr. Cristina Rosello-Gates (Dr. Gates).
In her Psychological Report, Dr. Gates noted as follows:
x xx
PARTICULARS
- Parties met in a party when Petitioner was 17 years and
Respondent was 21 years old; both were studying but
Petitioner was also working in his fathers business;
- During the first time they met, Respondent hugged
Petitioner and stayed close to him; she also taught him how to
smoke marijuana; after their first meeting, Respondent would
fetch petitioner from school, and they would go out together;
- Within the next two months, Respondent dropped out of
school without informing her parents; she applied for a job and
was purportedly raped by her employer;
- When Respondents parents found out that she quit school,
she sought petitioners help to look for a place to stay; Renato
brought her to his friends house in Bulacan but her hosts did
not like her frequent outings and parties; Respondent then
asked Petitioner to live with her in a rented apartment; she
told him to execute an Affidavit of Loss so he can withdraw his
savings with a new bankbook without the knowledge of his
father;
- Parties were fetched by Petitioners parents to live with
them in Caloocan; petitioner sent Respondent to school to
wean her away from her friends; when she passed the
Dentistry Board Examinations, he put up a dental clinic for
her; after 2 months, she quit her dental practice and joined
Petitioner in his communications business;
- Respondent had problems dealing with Petitioners clients;
she interfered with his decisions, and resented his dealings
with clients which would, at times, last till late at night; one
incident in 1990, Respondent locked Petitioner out of house
prompting the latter to sleep in the car; other similar incidents
followed where employees would wake up Petitioner when they
report for work; one night, Petitioner found all his things
thrown out of the house by Respondent;
- Respondent was not the one who took care of their
children; the second child, for instance, cries whenever said
child sees Respondent as the latter is not familiar with the
former;
- While parties lived together since 1973, they applied for a
marriage license only in 1986; Respondent asked Petitioner to
sign both license and marriage contract without any public
appearance at City Hall; their marriage was registered in 1991
after the couple separated.[21]
and concluded that:
An examination of the parties respective family
background and upbringing, as well as the events prior to their
marriage point to psychological impairment on the part of
Respondent Lorna Valera.
From a simple existence in the province, Lorna Valera was
thrust in the big city for her college education. It was in
Sampaloc, Manila where she lived and groped, and eventually
found herself in bad company. Thus, her so-called culture shock
was abated by pot sessions lasting several days at a time making
her temporarily forget the harsh reality in the metropolis. Her
escapist and regressive tendencies stunted her psychological
growth and prevented her from fully functioning as a responsible
adult.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM
IV), the international standards of psychological disorders,
Respondent Lorna Valera is plagued with an Adjustment
Disorder as manifested in her impulsiveness, lack of restraint,
lack of civility and a sense of decency in the conduct of her
life. Compulsive Behavior Patterns are also evident in her
marijuana habit, gambling and habitual squandering of Petitioners
money. Lorna Valeras Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive
Behavior Patterns were already existing prior to her marriage to
Petitioner Renato So. Continuing up to the present, the same
appears to be irreversible.[22]
The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the marriage of petitioner and respondent in its decision of November 8,
1999. The decision, a relatively short one at four (4) pages, single-spaced, including the
heading and the signature pages, made a short summary of the testimonies of the witness
with the statements that
Petitioner and respondent became common law husband and wife from
1973 to 1991. Out of this relationship were born three children, namely
Jeffrey, Renelee and Lino all surnamed Varela.
Sometime in 1987 petitioner was induced by respondent to sign a blank
Marriage Contract and a blank application for marriage license. The
petitioner freely signed the documents with the belief that the documents
will be signed only when they get married.[23]
Thereafter, the RTC decision wholly dwelt on the question of the respondents psychological
incapacity based on the testimony of the petitioner and Dr.
Gates, his expert witness. The decisions concluding
paragraphs stated:
Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that respondent Lorna
Valera is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligation of marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the celebration
thereof (Art. 36 F.C.).
It should be borne in mind that marriage is a special contract of permanent
union and the foundation of the Family. The husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual help and support (Art. 68 F.C.). It includes the giving
of love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding (Art.
230 F.C.). Respondent failed to observe all these things.[24]
The dispositive portion of the decision that immediately followed reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner and
against respondent:
1. Declaring respondent psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations under Art.
36 of the Family Code;
2. Declaring the marriage contracted by Renato Reyes So
and Lorna Valero on December 10, 1991, null and
void ab initio;
3. Dissolving the conjugal partnership between the spouses in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code;
4. Awarding the custody of the minor children to petitioner.
x xx
SO ORDERED.[25]
The CA Decision
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65273. The
CA, in its Decision dated July 4, 2001, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.[26]
The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to prove the respondents psychological incapacity.
According to the CA, the respondents character, faults, and defects did not constitute
psychological incapacity warranting the nullity of the parties marriage. The CA reasoned
out that while respondent appears to be a less than ideal mother to her children, and
loving wife to her husband, these flaws were not physical manifestations of psychological
illness. The CA further added that although the respondents condition was clinically
identified by an expert witness to be an Adjustment Disorder, it was not established that
such disorder was the root cause of her incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The prosecution also failed to establish that respondents disorder was
incurable and permanent in such a way as to disable and/or incapacitate respondent from
complying with obligations essential to marriage.
The CA likewise held that the respondents hostile attitude towards the petitioner when the
latter came home late was a normal reaction of an ordinary housewife under a similar
situation; and her subsequent refusal to cohabit with him was not due to any psychological
condition, but due to the fact that she no longer loved him.
Finally, the CA concluded that the declaration of nullity of a marriage was not proper when
the psychological disorder does not meet the guidelines set forth in the case of Molina.
The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied his motion in its
resolution[27] dated October 18, 2001.
The Petition and Issues
The petitioner argues in the present petition that the CA seriously
erred[28]
 1. in reversing the RTC decision without ruling on the trial courts factual and
conclusive finding that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was
null and void ab initio;
2. in departing from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings that
factual findings of the trial courts are entitled to great weight and respect and
are not disturbed on appeal; and
3. in totally disregarding the undisputed fact that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.[29]
The Republic, as intervenor-appellee, alleged in its comment that: (a) the trial
court never made a definitive ruling on the issue of the absence of the formal and
essential requisites of the parties marriage; and (b) petitioner was not able to discharge
the burden of evidence required in Molina.[30]
The petitioner filed a reply;[31] thereafter, both parties filed their respective
memoranda reiterating their arguments. Other than the issue of the absence of the essential and
formal requisites of marriage, the basic issue before us is whether there exists sufficient ground to
declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent null and void.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. No case of lack of essential and formal requisites of
marriage has been proven or validly ruled upon by the trial court.
1. The CA did not err in not ruling on the alleged lack
of the essential and formal requisites of marriage
The petitioner cites as ground for this appeal the position that the CA reversed and set aside
the RTC decision without touching on the trial courts ruling that there was absence of the essential
and formal requisites of marriage.
We find this argument baseless and misplaced for three basic reasons.
First. The argument stems from the mistaken premise that the RTC definitively ruled that
petitioners marriage to respondent was null and void due to the absence of the essential and formal
requisites of marriage.
A careful examination of the RTC decision shows that the trial court did not discuss, much
less rule on, the absence of the formal and essential requisites of marriage; it simply recited the claim
that[S]ometime in 1987 petitioner was induced by respondent to sign a blank Marriage
Contract and a blank application for marriage license. The petitioner freely signed the
documents with the belief that the documents will be signed only when they get
married. The trial court did not even mention the certified true copy of the Marriage
Contract signed by the officiating minister and registered in the Civil Registry of Kalookan
City. The petitioner introduced and marked this copy as his Exhibit D to prove that there is
a marriage contract registered in the Civil Registry of Kalookan City between petitioner
and respondent.[32]
Out of this void came the dispositive portion [D]eclaring the marriage contracted
by Renato Reyes So and Lorna Valera on December 10, 1991 null and void.[33] Faced with
an RTC decision of this tenor, the CA could not have ruled on the validity of the marriage
for essential and formal deficiencies, since there was no evidence and no RTC ruling on
this point to evaluate and rule upon on appeal. Even if it had been a valid issue before the
CA, the RTCs declaration of nullity should be void for violation of the constitutional rule
that [No] decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.[34]
Second. The same examination of the RTC decision shows that it concerned itself
wholly with the declaration of the nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code. After its recital of the testimonies of witnesses, part of which are the facts relied
upon to support the claimed psychological incapacity, the decision dwelt on the evidence
of Dr. Gates, the expert witness, and, from there, proceeded to its conclusion that
psychological incapacity existed. In this light, the dispositive portion declaring the
marriage...on December 10, 1991, [is] null and void, must be based on psychological
incapacity as found by the trial court, not on the absence of the essential and formal
requisites of marriage.
Third. We note that the petitioner himself offered the Marriage Contract as
evidence that it is registered with the Civil Registry of Kalookan City.[35] As a duly
registered document, it is a public document, and is prima facie evidence of the facts it
contains, namely, the marriage of the petitioner with the respondent. To contradict these
facts and the presumption of regularity in the documents favor, the petitioners contrary
evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.[36] To be sure, a
married couple cannot simply nullify their marriage through the non-appearance of one
spouse and the uncorroborated declaration by the other spouse that the marriage did not
really take place. If the biased and interested testimony of a witness is deemed sufficient
to overcome a public instrument, drawn up with all the formalities prescribed by the law,
then there will have been established a very dangerous doctrine that would throw the door
wide open to fraud.[37] At the very least, the declaration that the marriage did not take
place must be supported by independent evidence showing a physical impossibility, a
forgery, or the disavowal by the supposed participants, to name a few possible reasons.
2. Petitioner failed to establish
respondents psychological incapacity
 As the CA did, we hold that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed
to establish the respondents psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the
Family Code which provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[38] the Court first declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence;
and (c) incurability. It should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[39]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of
Appeals[40] (the Molina case) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x xx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensorvinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[41] further clarified that there is no requirement
that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion
in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability can be duly established.[42]
The factual background of this case covers at least 18 years. The petitioner and
the respondent first met in 1973 and lived together as husband and wife, without the
benefit of marriage, before they got married in 1991. In the course of their relationship,
they had three (3) children; established a business, and even incurred indebtedness
amounting to P4 million; had differences due to what the CA described as character faults
and defects; and had a well-described quarrel which the CA observed to be the common
reaction of an ordinary housewife in a similar situation. Thus, unlike the usual Article 36
cases this Court encountered in the past, where marriage, cohabitation, and perception of
psychological incapacity took place in that order, the present case poses a situation where
there had been a lengthy period of cohabitation before the marriage took place. To be
sure, this factual unique situation does not change the requirement that psychological
incapacity must be present at the time of the celebration of the marriage. It does,
however, raise novel and unavoidable questions because of the lapse of time the couple
has been together and their intimate knowledge of each other at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Specifically, how do these factors affect the claim of
psychological incapacity that should exist at the time of the marriage, considering that
marriage came near or at the end of the parties relationship?
Ideally, the best results in the determination of psychological incapacity are
achieved if the respondent herself is actually examined. This opportunity, however, did not
arise in the present case because the respondent simply failed to respond to the court
summons and to cooperate in the proceedings. Thus, only an indirect psychological
examination took place through the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings and
clinical interviews of the petitioner which lasted for about three (3) hours.[43] In light of the
differences in the appreciation of the psychologists testimony and conclusions between the
trial court and the appellate court, we deem it necessary to examine the records
ourselves, as the factual allegations and the expert opinion vitally affect the issues
submitted for resolution.
Our own examination of the psychologists testimony and conclusions leads us to
conclude that they are not sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In the first place, the facts on
which the psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from statements by the
petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. It does not appear to us
that the psychologist read and interpreted the facts related to her with the awareness that
these facts could be slanted. In this sense, we say her reading may not at all be
completely fair in its assessment. We say this while fully aware that the psychologist
appeared at the petitioners bidding and the arrangement between them was not pro
bono.[44] While this circumstance does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias,
her reading of the facts, her testimony, and her conclusions must be read carefully with
this circumstance and the source of the facts in mind.
In examining the psychologists Report, we find the Particulars and the
Psychological Conclusions disproportionate with one another; the conclusions appear to be
exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are from isolated incidents, rather than from
continuing patterns. The particulars are, as it were, snapshots, rather than a running
account of the respondents life from which her whole life is totally judged. Thus, we do not
see her psychological assessment to be comprehensive enough to be reliable.
For example, the psychologists statements about the parties sexual relationship
appear to us to be rash, given that no parallel examination of the petitioners own pattern
of sexual behavior has been made. Sex with a partner is a two-way affair and while one
partner can be more aggressive than the other, aggressiveness is not per se an aberrant
behavior and may depend on the dynamics of the partners relationship. To infer prior
sexual experience because the respondent allegedly initiated intimate behavior, and to
cite an unverified incident of a previous rape to characterize the respondents sexual
behavior, are totally uncalled for. That the respondent did pass her Dental Board Exam
was glossed over and unverified unsavory incidents related to her exam were highlighted.
Her alleged failure to practice was stressed, without emphasizing, however, that she quit
her dental practice and joined petitioner in his communications business.
The respondents business behavior is a matter that needed full inquiry, as there
could be reasons for her interference. With respect to employees, while the petitioner
charged the respondent with being strict, he, at the same time, alleged that she gambled
with the employees when there were no clients. The psychologist did not pursue these
lines and, significantly, the petitioners testimonies on this point are uncorroborated. The
respondents reaction to her husbands nights out was singled out and slanted to indicate
negative traits. It took the CA to observe that her hostile attitude when the petitioner
stayed out late at night is merely a usual common reaction of an ordinary housewife in a
similar situation. To further quote the CA citing the transcripts, [I]n fact, petitioner-
appellee admitted that the reason respondent got angry and threw his things outside is
because he came home late and drunk, which petitioner-appellee had done several times
already on the pretext of closing business deals, which sometimes included going out
night-clubbing with clients.[45] Why and how the couple incurred indebtedness of about P4
million may be usual in the communications business, but is certainly a matter that the
psychologist should have further inquired into in relation with her alleged strictness in
business affairs.
As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she lived with
the petitioner for 18 years and begot children with him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984
developments that show a fair level of stability in the relationship and a healthy degree of
intimacy between the parties for some eleven (11) years. She finished her Dentistry and
joined her husband in the communications business traits that do not at all indicate an
irresponsible attitude, especially when read with the comment that she had been strict
with employees and in business affairs. The petitioners Memorandum[46] itself is very
revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage Contract was a sham, the petitioner
interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) [S]ince at that time, the relationship between
the petitioner and respondent was going well, and future marriage between the two was
not an impossibility, the petitioner signed these documents.
More than all these, the psychologists testimony itself glaringly failed to show that
the respondents behavioral disorder was medically or clinically permanent or
incurable as established jurisprudence requires. Neither did the psychologist testify that
the disorder was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. RODOLFO BRITANICO
 Q: All right, what was basically your conclusion in your qualitative
research with regards to the psychological incapacity of the
respondent to comply with the marital obligation?
DR. CRISTINA R. GATES
A: There is a strong indication that the respondent was not able to
carry out her marital obligation her marital duties and
responsibilities. And going through the TSN, it is evident
that in their conjugal relation, it was petitioner who was
responsible, but he in fact gave her opportunity to develop
and to become responsible herself. [sic]
For instance, he sent her back to school to take Dentistry,
he supported her during that time and during the exam
and after that he built her a clinic. In all these, the
respondent proved to be irresponsible. [sic]
When she was taking pre-dental, most of the time she was
out of the house, and in one instance petitioner discovered
that respondent was having an extra-marital affair with
her classmate. And in her board exam she failed the first
time. And even if it is questionable, petitioner approached
one of the commissioners and through his efforts the
respondent was able to pass the second time around. [sic]
And in the matter of dental clinic, after merely two months
respondent refused to practice, she not only refused and
without the knowledge of the petitioner sold all the dental
equipments at a loss. [sic]
Q: How about their relationship?
A: From the start respondent is older, she had, like, prior sexual
experience, and she was the one who introduced to him
the use of marijuana. x xxx
Q: How about respondent. How would the respondent compliment
the responsibility?
A: There is no mutuality, because if she run away and asked for
petitioner to rent an apartment for them to live together,
petitioner continued to work and study and went home to
her in the evening, but respondent on the other hand she
quit schooling and she did push through with working, and
worst she allowed her friend to live with them, allegedly in
that apartment, and respondent and friend would engage
in pot sessions. [sic]
Q: What did you find out with regards to the duty of respondent to
live together with the petitioner? [sic]
A: She was frequently out, in [sic] her friends. .
Q: How about love and respect?
A: Love is rather complicated. Because she made love to him in
her own will. [sic]
Q: But did they show respect?
A: No, because she had extra-marital affair, and demanding lot of
money.
Q: How about to render emotional, spiritual and physical help?
How would respondent comply?
A: She was not able to comply, except maybe for the sexual
obligation, but in terms of physical and emotional support
she was not there for him. When she quit, she hang out
with him on their business, but instead of helping him, she
would quarrel him, interfere in his decisions, she would
embarrass petitioner in front of his clients and employees,
and if petitioner would have a deal with his clients and
sometimes would come home late, she would refuse to
listen to his explanation and would lock him out and shout
at him. [sic]
Q: And in your Psychological findings, when did this [incapacity] of
the respondent start, her incapacity to comply with the
marriage obligation?
A: In the testimony of the petitioner, I think he did mention that
she came to Manila for her studies, and during the
interview I found out that upon arrival in Manila she was
alone, by herself, she had difficulty adjusting to city life,
because all her life were spent in the province with her
parents and siblings, and she lived in Sampaloc where she
got herself in the company of bad friends like going into
marijuana and frequent parties and pot sessions, [which]
would last for 3 to 4 days, and in effect disallowed her
from going to school regularly.
Q: In clinical psychologist [sic], what is the effect?
A: It is traumatic for her, because there is a separation of her
parents, and not only that she was thrown to a situation of
her being alone, at that time she had no guidance, it would
assume that she would just study[sic]
Q: In your conclusion of your Psychological Report, you stated
here and I quote: Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM IV), the international standards of
psychological disorders, Respondent Lorna is plagued with
an Adjustment Disorder as manifested in her
impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of civility and a sense
of decency in the conduct of her life. Can you please
explain to us.
A: Lorna Valera is like a person who is not in control of herself,
impulsive. x xx
Q: How about lack of restraint?
A: Impulses. Like for example, when the husband comes home
late, instead of looking means and ways to rationalize, she
would just shout and lock him out.
Q: And what about lack of civility, what is your basis?
A: She did not consider the welfare of her children, her frequent
outings, like she would conduct her extra marital affairs
through phone calls. When they separated, I understand
that she was always out of the house, gambling at night.
 In fact, petitioner in one of his visits to respondent and
children intercepted the letter of a younger child asking for
an appointment to see the mother because the childs
report is that he hardly sees the mother.
x xxx
Q: You mentioned also in your psychological conclusion that
Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive Behavior of Lorna
Valera existed prior and continuous up to the present, can
you please explain?
A: If Lorna Valera somewhere in her life changes all of a sudden,
then the psychological incapacity is not obtaining but in
mal-adopting behavior, like you remove the stimulus of the
petitioner in her life. Then the same behavior pattern as I
learned from the children, then the incapacity is
irreversible because it is there.[47] [sic]
These statements, lopsided as they are as we observed above, merely testify to the
respondents impulsiveness, lack of restraint, and lack of civility and decency in the
conduct of her life. The psychologist, however, failed to sufficiently prove that all these
emanated from a behavioral disorder so grave and serious that the respondent would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; that it was rooted in
the respondents medical or psychological history before her marriage; and that a cure was
beyond the respondents capacity to achieve.
Speaking of the root of the alleged disorder, the psychologist could only trace this
to the time the respondent came to Manila; the psychologist concluded that the disorder
was due to her separation from her parents and lack of guidance. Will common human
experience, available through the thousands of students who over the years trooped from
the provinces to Manila, accept the conclusion that this experience alone can lead to a
disorder that can affect their capacity to marry?
In terms of incurability, the psychologist could only cryptically say -
A. If Lorna Valera somewhere in her life changes all of a sudden, then the
psychological incapacity is not obtaining but in mal-adopting behavior, like
you remove the stimulus of the petitioner in her life. Then the same
behavior pattern as I learned from the children, then the incapacity is
irreversible because it is there.[48]
Does this convoluted statement mean that Lorna Valera can still change, and that change
can happen if the stimulus of the petitioner is removed from her life? In other words, is
the incapacity relative and reversible?
In Molina, we ruled that mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological
incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be
a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. In the present case, the
psychologist simply narrated adverse snapshots of the respondents life showing her
alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but did not convincingly prove
her permanent incapacity to meet her marital duties and responsibilities; the root or
psychological illness that gave rise to this incapacity; and that this psychological illness
and consequent incapacity existed at the time the marriage was celebrated.
In light of the wide gaps in the facts the psychologist considered and of the patent
deficiencies of her testimony tested under the standards of established jurisprudence, we
cannot accord full credence and accept the psychologists Report as basis for the
declaration of annulment of the parties marriage under Article 36. In the absence of any
contradictory statements from the respondent, the fairer approach is to read between the
lines of this Report and discern what indeed happened between the parties based on
common human experience between married couples who have lived together in the way
the parties did. From this perspective, we have no problem in accepting the CA decision as
a fairer assessment of the respondents alleged psychological incapacity, and for being a
more realistic appreciation of the evidence adduced in light of the requirements of Article
36:
Such character faults and defects, We believe, do not constitute
psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of marriage
between petitioner-appellee and respondent. While she appears to be less
than ideal mother to her children and loving wife to her husband, herein
petitioner-appellee, the same are not physical manifestations of a
psychological illness as described in Molina. Although the expert witness
had clinically identified respondents condition as Adjustment Disorder,
allegedly resulting from respondents separation from her parents when
she studied in Manila before she met petitioner-appellee, it was not
established that such disorder or illness allegedly manifested in her
carefree and outgoing behavior as a means of coping with her emotional
and psychological stresses, was the root cause of her incapacity to fulfill
the essential marital obligations. Moreover, such alleged disorder was not
shown to be of a serious nature, a supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effective incapacitates the respondent from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. The clinical findings
on respondents alleged Adjustment Disorder have not established such
illness to be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. And, as pointed out by the
Solicitor General, although the Psychological Report stated that
respondents condition appears to be irreversible, the expert witness did
not substantiate her conclusion that respondents condition was indeed
incurable or permanent. Nowhere in the testimony of petitioner-appellee
was it shown that respondents allegedly carefree ways (and smoking of
marijuana) while she was younger and had no children yet, continued
throughout their marriage until their separation in 1990. On the contrary,
her strict attitude towards the clients and employees is a clear indication
that she takes their business concerns seriously, such attitude being a
reflection of a mature and responsible personality.[49]
 Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case here of
parties who have very human faults and frailties; who have been together for some time;
and who are now tired of each other. If in fact the respondent does not want to provide
the support expected of a wife, the cause is not necessarily a grave and incurable TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
psychological malady whose effects go as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital Associate Justice
support promised and expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired and to give up
on ones situation and on ones husband are not necessarily signs of psychological illness;
neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is
to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy,
however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is still a limited remedy that
addresses only a very specific situation a relationship where no marriage could have
validly been concluded because the parties, or one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not ATTESTATION
appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a
marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless to provide any permanent I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
remedy. To use the words of Navales v. Navales:[50] the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional Associate Justice
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a Chairperson
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be
due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated
by said rule.[51] [Emphasis ours] CERTIFICATION

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition

and AFFIRM the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 4, Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
2001 and October 18, 2001, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 65273. Costs against the Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
petitioner. were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896 : January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated
October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA
Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA
Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed
alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of
Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a
ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No.
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the
solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in
Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in
Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at
around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676
F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified
that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements
for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the
ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go
to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that
area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to
check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract
wherein the marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar,
Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the
marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage
License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain
ArlindoGetalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:cralawlibrary
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:cralawlibrary
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA
MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and
MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or
intents it may serve.7?r?l1
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in
2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his
counsel.8?r?l1
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to
Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to ArlindoGetalado and Myra Mabilangan
on January 20, 1993.9?r?l1
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the
numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11,
2003, was issued and signed by LeodivinaEncarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of
Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for
ArlindoGetalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not
issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other
person.11?r?l1
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty.
Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a
barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the
Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria
Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. 13 He stated that the witnesses were
Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had
been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the
requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage
license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by
his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the
marriage license with that office.17?r?l1
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas
and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a
certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured
the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he
did not know where the marriage license was obtained.20He attended the wedding
ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the
signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other
witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21?r?l1
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-
law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her
house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in
securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a
male person went to their house with the application for marriage license. 23 Three days
later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license before
returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. 24 She
further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that
she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified
that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before
Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26?r?l1
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is
one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b)
she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said
photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage
contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty.
Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A
certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them,
and after several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign,
which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the
license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified
that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28?r?l1
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29?r?l1
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain
Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30?r?l1
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan,
but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites,
because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at
the time were Chinese.31?r?l1
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license
was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed,
as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to ArlindoGetalado and Myra
Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no
marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact
that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License
No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. 33 As the marriage
was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid
marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the
respondent declaring as follows:cralawlibrary
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the
nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics
Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage
contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January
9, 1993 in Manila. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
SO ORDERED.34?r?l1
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the
same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:cralawlibrary
I The petition is meritorious.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER
AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE
DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID
MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY
TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE
SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH
OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES
OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON
THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT
BELOW.35?r?l1 ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent
search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly
married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. 37?r?l1
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract.
The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife,
and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
bigamy.38?r?l1
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05
October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic]
Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and
subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39?r?l1
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the same was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41?r?l1
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING
ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.42?r?l1
The Ruling of this Court
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order
No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent
provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read
as follows:cralawlibrary
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:cralawlibrary
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:cralawlibrary
x xx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with
the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the
marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a
valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this
case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the
couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that
there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the
office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said
license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec.
29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:cralawlibrary
SEC. 28.Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry
of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove
the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:cralawlibrary
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register
book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data.44?r?l1
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed
probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and
Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license
for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license
pertained to another couple, ArlindoGetalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine
copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona,
Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did
not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the
certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to
have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could
not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is
worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower
court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be
located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it
categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to
apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an
official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does
exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was
indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not
correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a
location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the
license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said
license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the
marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother,
Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to
not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and
Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing
where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a
certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus
impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her
representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy
of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy
of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to
the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that
there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license
was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held
that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it
became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was
valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to
discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the
marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was
presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to
Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and
Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:cralawlibrary
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant
and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites
marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid
marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure
the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly
absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is
hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
1 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate
Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.
2 Penned by Judge Tingaraan U. Guiling.

laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal 3 Rollo, p. 13.

capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties 4 Id. at 47.

herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in 5 Id.

the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant and 6 Id. at 12.

appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellants 7 Id. at 10.

family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch 8 Id. at 48.

was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows 9 Id. at 49, "January 19, 1993" in some parts of the records.

appellee signing the Marriage Contract. 10 Id.

x xx 11 Id. at 49-50.

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, 12 Id. at 50.

Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten 13 Id.

(10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of 14 Id.

Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition 15 Id.

appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") 16 Id. at 51.

dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent 17 Id.

marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward 18 Id.

(appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the 19 Id.

process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50?r?l1 20 Id. at 52.
21
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a Id.
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage 22 Id. at 53.

license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the 23 Id. at 54.

essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in 24 Id.

Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized 25 Id.

without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license 26 Id.

requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. 51 Again, this 27 Id. at 55.

marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been 28 Id.

solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio. 29 Id. at 56.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his 30 Id. at 57.

motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the 31 Id.

same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid 32 Id. at 58.
33 Article 9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the city or impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing
no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title. officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
34 Rollo, pp. 58-59. parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
35 Id. at 122.
36 Id. at 128.
37 Id. at 129.
38 Id. at 130.
39 Id. at 131.
40 Id. at 135-146.
41 Id. at 173-174.
42 Id. at 31.
43 G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257.
44 Id. at 262.
45 Supra note 43.
46 Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746.August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 446, 456.
47 403 Phil. 861, 869 (2001).
48 Supra note 43.
49 Supra note 47, at 870.
50 Rollo, pp. 129-130.
51 Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the

marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain
valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives.
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the
marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer
shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person
legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis
or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that
there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the
local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and
relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the
marriage.
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with a
legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the
marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the
period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be
solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the
plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have
authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of
military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians.
Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities
may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage licenses, provided they arc
solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices.
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo
challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No.
31028 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac,
Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to
marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest,
Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed
to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong
tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and
guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the
Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a
ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they
had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date.
He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the
principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,
was filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos
Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the
wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the
couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6She heard the
petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they
went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also
identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the
ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she
went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R.
Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the
couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of
blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated
by law.10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and
imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the
petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official
church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled
that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the
petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act
No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which
pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized
or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the discretion
of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of
the latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount
of ₱200.00.12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding
the act of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage
ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution
witnesses deserve more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC,
however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of
the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides
minimum standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted,
viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and
(2) they should declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
at least two witnesses of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved
these requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a
requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found
guilty under Article 350 of the same Code.16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44
of the Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the
proper authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage
ceremony." Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in
Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the
verbal declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage
certificate containing the declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting
parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer. 17 The petitioner likewise maintains that
the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties personally declared that they
take each other as husband and wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of church
and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of
matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into a "marriage
ceremony."19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for
purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the
RPC, as amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him.21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present
case is not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found
violating its provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.22
THE COURT’S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were
proven by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as
follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal
marriage ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to
solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged
"blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage
ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage
ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family
Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 55 23 of the New
Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 24 of the Marriage Law with no
substantial amendments. Article 625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be
necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age
that they take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article
6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes
place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule
was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements
constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the
contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the
presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him
and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that,
contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony
of Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as
husband and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida
fails to persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound
clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He
may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against
him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to
destroy the theory of one party.28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its
failure to timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission
regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had
indeed been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife.
The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome
these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the
prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the
petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and
State precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony.
Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6
of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the
freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the
requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is
not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The
State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the
preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws
and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the
commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a
marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While
the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of
the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage
ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage
ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the
presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that
he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their
relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage
ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these
requirements negates his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his
criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony
has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by
Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal
liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an
element of the crime. The penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this
provision clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the
Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which ANTONIO T. CARPIO
provide as follows: Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that: Associate Justice
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing Chairperson, Second Division
marriage without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or CERTIFICATION
who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
upon to do so by the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
regulations and practices whereof require banns or publications previous to the Division.
solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or Chief Justice
minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment
for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two
hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours] Footnotes
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that: 1 Rollo, pp. 3-26.

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not 2 Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate

specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.; id. at 28-55.
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for 3 From the testimonies of Joseph Yere, id. at 89-90; Mary Anne Yere, id. at 182-

not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours] 183; the petitioner, id. at 118-123, 129 and 133-136; Joey Umadac, id. at 145-
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the 153; and DominadorUmadac, id. at 166-167.
MTC that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and 4 Id. at 30.

not Section 39, of the Marriage Law. 5 Id. at 29.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present 6 Id. at 35.

case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the 7 Id. at 36-37.

provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the 8 Id. at 85-86 (TSN dated August 5, 2004 of Florida Umadac, p. 14).

imposition of the penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the 9 Id. at 31.

Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of 10 Id. at 49-50.

Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be 11 Id. at 60-61.

promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was 12 Id. at 62-63.

enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations. 13 Id. at 68.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to 14 Id. at 46.

Section 44 of the Marriage Law. 15 Id. at 51.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16 Ibid.

April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028. 17 Id. at 12-14.

SO ORDERED. 18 Id. at 15.

ARTURO D. BRION 19 Id. at 15-16.

Associate Justice 20 Id. at 18.

WE CONCUR: 21 Ibid.
22
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Id. at 19.
Associate Justice 23 Art. 55. No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the

Chairperson parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they
Associate Justice Associate Justice take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an
instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
said two witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage.
Associate Justice 24 Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required,
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before but the parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal
age, that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set
forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the contracting
parties and said two witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing the
marriage.
25 Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage

is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear

personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.
This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed
by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing
officer.
26 This provision was taken from Article 55 of the New Civil Code which was, in

turn, a reproduction of Section 3 of the Marriage Law.

27

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2
of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
28 People v. ZhengBaiHui, 393 Phil. 68, 115 (2000).
29 Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the

nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Section 2. Marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No.MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C.
DOMAGTOY, respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa,
Surigaodel Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two
specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between
Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between
FlorianoDadorSumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on
October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigaodel Norte. The wedding was solemnized
at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within
his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to
45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge
avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by
someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both
as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter
No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and
Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C.
Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his
act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated
from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued
by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his
first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.[1] With respect to the second
charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario,
he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage
may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings
submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.[2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant
have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and
respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by
themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and
ArlynBorga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the
wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint
affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before
Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.[3] The affidavit
was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar
Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after
thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of
for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is
sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed
with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the
law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory
requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage
subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he
remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error
on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore
void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void
from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x xx marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the
court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
x xx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or
vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article
29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by
them in a sworn statement to that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his
having solemnized the marriage between FlorianoSumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside
of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held
outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the
point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of
both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either
Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the
written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one
party, Gemma del Rosario.[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority
of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the
"authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by,
among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction."
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony
and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the
preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful,
is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his
Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of
the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions,
may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica
and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality
of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for
the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the
law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary
and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is
due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should
be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they
be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.[6] It is not
too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. [7] Otherwise, the system
of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by
those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment,
for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorga is considered bigamous and
void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court,
a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question
resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary
authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is
advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 7-8.
[2] Uy v. Dizon-Capulong, A.M. No. RTJ-91-766, April 7, 1993; Montemayor v. Collado,
A.M. No. 2519-MTJ, September 10, 1981; Ubongon v. Mayo, A.M. No. 1255-CTJ, August 6,
1980, 99 SCRA 30.
[3] Rollo, p. 12.
[4] Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[5] Article 4, Family Code.
[6] Lim v. Domogas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-899, October 15, 1993, 227 SCRA 258, 263 citing
Ubongan v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 and Ajeno v. Inserto, 71 SCRA 166.
[7] Galan Realty Co. v. Arranz, A.M. No. MTJ-93-978, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 771.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
PepitoNial was married to TeodulfaBellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April
24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof,
Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After
their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of
this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
 (3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and
void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47
of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an
action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this Court
grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus
treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of
the 1997 Rules.[3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7]in relation to Article 58.[8] The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the
State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a
basic "autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage
as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special
contract of permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, [14] referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants
name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising
from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating
that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other."[16] The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation
is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year
period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it
be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-
year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being
lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime
during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-
year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years,
then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with
their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived
escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are
about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17] The
Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x xx. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof.
x xx."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation,
examining persons under oath. x xx" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x xx. This notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local
civil registrar thereof. x xx."
Article 18 reads in part: "x xx. In case of any impediment known to the
local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. x xx."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent
had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage
at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with
any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Scsdaad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code [20] cannot be applied
even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to
file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article
47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage
that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place[21]and cannot be the
source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not
after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to
a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning
the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution,[23] and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided
in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family
Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup
rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from
a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It
should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at
all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree
to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct
or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after
the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the
courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in
direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of
either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26]But Article 40 of
the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that
effect.[28] For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if the death of
either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same
cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare
a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Scjuris
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
[1] The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by Judge Ferdinand J.
Marcos of Regional Trial Court (RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo City, reads: "WHEREFORE,
premises considered, defendants motion to dismiss is hereby granted and this instant case
is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p. 6; Rollo, p. 21).
[2] Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.
[3] Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.
[4] Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.
[5] Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).
[6] Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all the
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely given;
(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
[7] Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
x xx xxx xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.
x xx xxx xxx
[8] Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who had
no knowledge of the others insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person
having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or
by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within
five years after the discovery of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within
five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or
ceased;
For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five
years after the marriage.
[21] Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v. Retirement Board, 272

Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license Ill. App. 59 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting [22] In re Conzas Estate, 176 Ill. 192; Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 cited in I

party habitually resides. Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.

[9] Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975). [23] Article 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.
[10] Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G. R. No. 126010, [24] Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986);

December 8, 1999; See also Tuason v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996). People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in People v. Aragon, 100
[11] Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution. Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.
[12] Article 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract of permanent union [25] 35 Am. Jur. 219-220.

between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of [26] 18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.

conjugal or family life. x xx. [27] Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v. Judge
[13] Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995). Brillantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939 (1995).
[14] Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a [28] Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).

man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have [29] Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s. 1987 and further amended

lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The by R.A. No. 8533 dated February 23, 1998.
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
[15] Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
[16] Rollo, p. 29.
[17] Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18, Family Code.
[18] Article 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person

during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years."
Article 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years"
[19] Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.
[20] Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons

and within the periods indicated herein:

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or
guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age
of twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the
minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;