THIRD DIVISION

March 22, 2017

G.R. No. 225599

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
CHRISTOPHER MEJARO ROA, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

VELASCO. JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision1 promulgated on August 27, 2015, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06456,
which affirmed accused-appellant's conviction for the offense of murder, punished under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, in its
Decision in Criminal Case No. P-4100, promulgated on September 3, 2013.

The present case stems from an Information filed against accused-appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa
(Roa) on June 5, 2007, charging him for the murder of Eliseo Delmiguez (Delmiguez), committed as
follows:

That on or about 16 March 2007 at around 3:30 in the afternoon at Barangay San Miguel, Municipality
of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously attack, assault, and stab Eliseo Delmiguez with the use of a bladed weapon, locally
known as "ginunting," hitting and injuring the body of the latter, inflicting multiple mortal hack wound[s]
thereon, which were the immediate and direct cause of his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount that may be proven in court.

That the killing was committed 1) with treachery, as the qualifying circumstance or which qualified the
killing to murder, and 2) [w]ith taking advantage of superior strength, as aggravating circumstance.2

The Facts

The facts surrounding the incident, as succinctly put by the RTC, are as follows:

A resident of Brgy. San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur, accused [Roa] is known to have suffered mental
disorder prior to his commission of the crime charged. While his uncle, Issac [Mejaro ], attributes said
condition to an incident in the year 2000 when accused was reportedly struck in the head by some
teenagers, SPOl [Nelson] Ballebar claimed to have learned from others and the mother of the accused
that the ailment is due to his use of illegal drugs when he was working in Manila. When accused
returned from Manila in 2001 , Issac recalled that, in marked contrast to the silent and formal
deportment with which he normally associated his nephew, the latter became talkative and was
observed to be "always talking to himself' and "complaining of a headache."

On September 27, 2001, accused had a psychotic episode and was brought to the [Don Susana J.
Rodriguez Mental Hospital] DSJRM by his mother and Mrs. Sombrero. Per the October 10, 2005
certification issued by Dr. Benedicto Aguirre, accused consulted and underwent treatment for
schizophrenia at the [Bi col Medical Center] BMC in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. In
her Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. [Edessa Padre-]Laguidao also stated that accused was

1
prescribed antipsychotic medication which he was, however, not able to continue taking due to
financial constraints. Edgar [Sapinoso] and Rico [Ballebar], who. knew accused since childhood,
admitted hearing about the latter's mental health issues and/or his treatment therefor. Throughout the
wake of an unnamed aunt sometime in March 2007, it was likewise disclosed by Issac that accused
neither slept nor ate and was known to have walked by himself all the way to Bagumbayan, Bula.

On March 16, 2007, Issac claimed that accused was unusually silent, refused to take a bath and even
quarreled with his mother when prompted to do so. At about 3 :30 p.m. of the same day, it appears
that Eliseo, then 50 years old, was walking with Edgar on the street in front of the store of Marieta
Ballecer at Zone 3, San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur. From a distance of about 3 meters, the pair was
spotted by Rico who, while waiting for someone at the roadside, also saw accused sitting on the
sidecar of a trimobile parked nearby. When Eliseo passed by the trimobile, he was approached from
behind by accused who suddenly stabbed him on the left lower back with a bolo locally known as
ginunting of an approximate length of 8 to 12 inches. Taken aback, Eliseo exclaimed "Tara man, "
before falling to the ground. Chased by both Edgar and Rico and spotted running by Mrs. Sombrero
who went out of the Barangay Hall upon hearing the resultant din, accused immediately fled and took
refuge inside the house of his uncle, Camilo Mejaro.

With the incident already attracting people's attention, Barangay Captain Herminion Ballebar called
for police assistance even as Isaac tried to appease Eliseo's relatives. Entering Camilo's house, Issac
saw accused who said nothing when queried about what he did. Shortly thereafter, SPO 1 Hermilando
Manzano arrived on board a motorcycle with SPO 1 Ballebar who called on accused to surrender.
Upon his voluntary surrender and tum over of the jungle knife he was holding to the police officers,
accused was brought to the Bula Municipal Police Station for investigation and detention. In the
meantime, Eliseo was brought to the Bula Municipal Health Center where he was pronounced dead
on arrival and, after the necropsy examination, later certified by Dr. Consolacion to have died of
Hypovolemia secondary to multiple stab wounds.3 (citations omitted)

When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty," but in the certificate of arraignment, he signed
his name as "Amado M. Tetangco." Trial on the merits ensued. There was no contest over the fact
that accused-appellant, indeed, stabbed the victim, but he interposed the defense of insanity.

The Ruling of the RTC

In its Decision promulgated on September 3, 2013, the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur found that accused-
appellant is guilty of the offense of Murder. The RTC ruled that the defense of insanity was not
sufficiently proven as to exculpate accused-appellant from the offense charged. The RIC noted that
as an exempting circumstance, insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of
reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. Thus, the RTC
said, the accused must be shown to be deprived of reason or that he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total
deprivation of the will. It is the accused who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity that has
the burden of proving the same with clear and convincing evidence. This entails, the RTC added,
opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the
accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.4

In the case of accused-appellant, the RTC ruled, he failed to discharge the burden of proving the claim
of insanity. First, while Isaac Mejaro's testimony was able to sufficiently prove that accused-appellant
started having mental health issues as early as 2001 , the trial court ruled that his past medical history
does not suffice to support a finding that he was likewise insane at the time that he perpetrated the
killing of Delmiguez in 2007. To the trial court, the lack of showing of any psychotic incidents from the
time of his discharge in 2002 until March 2007 suggests that his insanity is only occasional or
intermittent and, thus, precludes the presumption of continuity.5

Second, the trial court acknowledged that accused-appellant exhibited abnormal behavior after the
incident, particularly in writing the name of Amado M. Tetangco in his certificate of arraignment. It also
noted that midway through the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, accused-appellant's mental
condition worsened, prompting his counsel to file another motion for psychiatric evaluation and
treatment, and that he was subsequently diagnosed again to be suffering from schizophrenia of an
undifferentiated type. The trial court, however, cited the rule that the evidence of insanity after the fact
of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior
immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. The trial court then ruled that the
witnesses' account of the incident provides no clue regarding the state of mind of the accused, and all

2
that was established was that he approached Delmiguez from behind and stabbed him on his lower
back. To the trial court, this actuation of the accused, together with his immediate flight and subsequent
surrender to the police authorities, is not indicative of insanity.

Finally, while the accused was reputed to be "crazy" in his community, the trial court ruled that such is
of little consequence to his cause. It said:

The popular conception of the word "crazy" is to describe a person or act that is unnatural or out of
the ordinary. A man may, therefore, behave in a crazy manner but it does not necessarily or
conclusively prove that he is legally so. The legal standard requires that the accused must be so
insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent.6

Hence, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced him as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered finding accused Christopher Mejaro Roa
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Accused is ordered to pay the Heirs of Eliseo Delmiguez the following sums: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of said victim; (b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed his conviction to the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In its presently assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the finding of conviction by the trial court. The CA
first noted that all the elements of the crime of murder had been sufficiently established by the evidence
on record. On the other hand, the defense of insanity was not sufficiently proven by clear and
convincing evidence. The CA said:

Record shows that the accused-appellant has miserably failed to prove that he was insane when he
fatally stabbed the victim on March 16, 2007. To prove his defense, accused-appellant's witnesses
including Dr. Edessa Padre-Laguidao testified that they knew him to be insane because he was
brought and confined to the Bicol Medical Center, Department of Psychiatry for treatment in the year
2001 . However, such fact does not necessarily follow that he still suffered from schizophrenia during
the time he fatally attacked and stabbed the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez. No convincing evidence was
presented by the defense to show that he was not in his right mind, or that he had acted under the
influence of a sudden attack of insanity, or that he had generally been regarded as insane around the
time of the commission of the acts attributed to him.

An inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the
very moment the act under prosecution was committed. Mere prior confinement in a mental institution
does not prove that a person was deprived of reason at the time the crime was committed. It must be
noted that accused-appllant was discharged from the mental hospital in 2002, or long before he
committed the crime charged. He who relies on such plea of insanity (proved at another time) must
prove its existence also at the time of the commission of the offense. This, accused-appellant failed to
do.7 (citations ommitted)

Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of the defense witnesses that purport to support the claim
of insanity are based on assumptions, and are too speculative, presumptive, and conjectural to be
convincing. To the CA, their observation that accused-appellant exhibited unusual behavior is not
sufficient proof of his insanity, because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency
constitutes insanity.8 On the contrary, the CA found that the circumstances of the attack bear indicia
that the killing was done voluntarily, to wit: (1) the use of a long bolo locally known as ginunting, (2)
the location of the stab wounds, (3) the attempt of accused-appellant to flee from the scene of the
crime, and (4) his subsequent surrender upon being called by the police authorities.

Thus, the CA dismissed the claim of insanity, and affirmed the conviction of the RTC for the offense
charged. The CA merely modified the award of damages, and dispositively held, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Judgment dated September 3, 2013 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-

3
appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder as defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez, the
amount of: (1) P7 5, 000. 00 as civil indemnity for the death of the said victim, (b) P50,000 .00 as moral
damages, and (c) P30,000 .00 as exemplary damages as provided by the Civil Code in line with recent
jurisprudence, with costs. In addition, all awards for damages shall bear legal interest at the rate of six
[percent] (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.9

Aggrieved by the ruling of the CA, accused-appellant elevated the case before this Court by way of a
Notice of Appeal.10

The Issue

The sole issue presented in the case before the Court is: whether there is sufficient evidence to uphold
the conviction of accused-appellant for the offense of Murder, punishable under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, there being no contest that accused-appellant perpetrated the
stabbing of the victim, which caused the latter's death, the resolution of the present issue hinges on
the pleaded defense of insanity.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no reversible error in the findings of fact and law by the CA. Hence, the assailed
Decision affirming the conviction of accused-appellant for murder must be upheld.

Insanity as an exempting circumstance is provided for in Article 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code:

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The following are exempt from criminal
liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito),
the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same
court.

In People v. Fernando Madarang,11 the Court had the opportunity to discuss the nature of the defense
of insanity as an exempting circumstance. The Court there said:

In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense.
The insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally
endowed with the faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders
human actions laudable or culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can
be no free act of the will. An insane accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally
punished. No purpose of criminal law is served by punishing an insane accused because by reason
of his mental state, he would have no control over his behavior and cannot be deterred from similar
behavior in the future.

xxxx

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting
as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the
accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the
mental faculties will not exclude imputability.

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the
usual means of proof As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or
condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the
insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with the accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was
insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an
expert, such as a psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time

4
preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. (citations
omitted)

In this jurisdiction, it had been consistently and uniformly held that the plea of insanity is in the nature
of confession and avoidance.12 Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found
to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt, because the
accused had already admitted committing the crime.13 This Court had also consistently ruled that for
the plea of insanity to prosper, the accused must present clear and convincing evidence to support
the claim.

Insanity as an exempting circumstance is not easily available to the accused as a successful defense.
It is an exception rather than the rule on the human condition. Anyone who pleads insanity as an
exempting circumstance bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. The
testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged.14

In the case at bar, the defense of insanity of accused-appellant Roa was supported by the testimony
of the following witnesses: (1) his uncle, Isaac Mejaro (Mejaro), (2) municipal health worker Mrs.
Lourdes Padregon Sombrero (Sombrero), and (3) Dr. Edessa Padre-Laguidao (Dr. Laguidao).

Dr. Laguidao testified that in 2001, accused-appellant was admitted at the Bicol Medical Center, and
was discharged in 2002. She examined accused-appellant on March 15, 2012 and August 15, 2012.
She evaluated his mental condition and found out that his answers to her queries were unresponsive,
and yielding a meaningless conversation. She then diagnosed him as having undifferentiated type of
Schizophrenia, characterized by manifest illusions and auditory hallucinations which are commanding
in nature. She also recommended anti-psychotic drug maintenance.15

Mejaro testified that accused-appellant's mental illness could be attributed to an incident way back in
May 8, 2000, when he was struck on the head by some teenager. After that incident, accused-
appellant, who used to be silent and very formal, became very talkative and always talked to himself
and complained of headaches. On September 27, 2001, accused-appellant had a psychotic episode,
prompting his mother to confine him at Don Suzano Rodriguez Mental Hospital (DSRMH). He was
observed to be well after his confinement. The illness recurred, however, when he failed to maintain
his medications. The symptoms became worse in March 2007, when his aunt died. He neither slept
nor ate, and kept walking by himself in the morning until evening. He did not want to take a bath, and
even quarreled with his mother when told to do so.16

The foregoing testimonies must be examined in light of the quantum of proof required, which is that of
clear and convincing evidence to prove that the insanity existed immediately preceding or
simultaneous to the commission of the offense.

Taken against this standard, the testimonies presented by accused-appellant unfortunately fail to pass
muster. First, the testimony of Dr. Laguidao to the effect that accused-appellant was suffering from
undifferentiated schizophrenia stems from her psychiatric evaluation of the accused in 2012, or about
five years after the crime was committed. His mental condition five years after the crime was committed
is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether he was also insane when he committed the offense.
While it may be said that the 2012 diagnosis of Dr. Laguidao must be taken with her testimony that
the accused was also diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2001, it is worth noting that the testimony of
Dr. Laguidao as to the 2001 diagnosis of the accused is pure hearsay, as she had no personal
participation in such diagnosis. Even assuming that that portion of her testimony is admissible, and
even assuming that it is credible, her testimony merely provides basis for accused-appellant's mental
condition in 2001 and in 2012, and not immediately prior to or simultaneous to the commission of the
offense in 2007.

Second, the testimony of Mejaro also cannot be used as a basis to find that accused-appellant was
insane during the commission of the offense in 2007. His testimony merely demonstrated the possible
underlying reasons behind accused-appellant's mental condition, but similar to Dr. Laguidao's
testimony, it failed to shed light on accused-appellant's mental condition immediately prior to, during,
and immediately after accused-appellant stabbed the victim without any apparent provocation.

Accused-appellant further argues that the presumption of sanity must not be applied in his case,
because of the rule that a person who has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the insane
is presumed to continue to be insane. In this case, however, it is noteworthy that while accused-
appellant was confined in a mental institution in 2001, he was properly discharged therefrom in 2002.

5
This proper discharge from his confinement clearly indicates an improvement in his mental condition;
otherwise, his doctors would not have allowed his discharge from confinement. Absent any contrary
evidence, then, the presumption of sanity resumes and must prevail.

In fine, therefore, the defense failed to present any convincing evidence of accused-appellant's mental
condition when he committed the crime in March 2007. While there is evidence on record of his mental
condition in 2001 and in 2012, the dates of these two diagnoses are too far away from the date of the
commission of the offense in 2007, as to altogether preclude the possibility that accused-appellant
was conscious of his actions in 2007. Absent any supporting evidence, this Court cannot sweepingly
conclude that accused-appellant was mentally insane for the whole 11-year period from 2001 to 2012,
as to exempt him criminal liability for an act committed in 2007. It was the defense's duty to fill in the
gap in accused-appellant's state of mind between the 2001 diagnosis and the 2012 diagnosis, and
unfortunately, it failed to introduce evidence to paint a full picture of accused-appellant's mental
condition when he committed the crime in 2007. With that, the Court has no other option but to adhere
to the presumption of sanity, and conclude that when accused-appellant attacked the victim, he was
conscious of what he was doing, and was not suffering from an insanity.

This conclusion is based not merely on the presumption of sanity, but bolstered by the circumstances
surrounding the incident. As the prosecution correctly argued in its Appellee's Brief, there are
1âw phi1

circumstances surrounding the incident that negate a complete absence of intelligence on the part of
accused-appellant when he attacked the victim. First, he surprised the victim when he attacked from
behind. This is supported by the companion of the victim, who testified that while they were walking,
they did not notice any danger when they saw accused-appellant standing near the trimobile. Second,
accused-appellant's attempt to flee from the scene of the crime after stabbing the victim indicates that
he knew that what he just committed was wrong. And third, when the police officers called out to
accused-appellant to surrender, he voluntarily came out of the house where he was hiding and
voluntarily turned himself over to them.

The foregoing actions of accused-appellant immediately before, during, and immediately after he
committed the offense indicate that he was conscious of his actions, that he intentionally committed
the act of stabbing, knowing the natural consequence of such act, and finally, that such act of stabbing
is a morally reprehensible wrong. His actions and reactions immediately preceding and succeeding
the act of stabbing are similar if not the same as that expected of a fully sane person.

Therefore, the Court finds no reasonable basis to reverse the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, that accused-appellant's culpability had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

As to the award of damages, however, the Court finds the need to modify the same, in line with the
rule enunciated in People v. Jugueta, where the Court laid down the rule that in cases where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the proper amounts of awarded damages should be ₱75,000
as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 as moral damages and ₱75,000 as exemplary damages, regardless of the
number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals, promulgated on August 27, 2015, in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 06456, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, the fallo of the Decision must read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Judgment dated September 3, 2013 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder as defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. Accusedappellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez, the amount
of: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the said victim, (b) ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,
and (c) ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages as provided by the Civil Code in line with recent
jurisprudence, with costs. In addition, all awards for damages shall bear legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

6
 SECOND DIVISION

September 4, 2017

G.R. No. 224886

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ROGER RACAL @ RAMBO, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant, Roger Racal @ Rambo (Racal),
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 27, 2015, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01450, which affirmed, with modification, the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77654, finding herein appellant guilty of the crime of murder
and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The antecedents are as follows:

In an Information filed by the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office on August 15, 2006, Racal was charged
with the crime of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
as amended. The accusatory portion of the Information reads, thus:

That on or about the 19th day of April 2006, at about 4:20 A.M., more or less, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a knife,
with deliberate intent, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and
there, suddenly and unexpectedly, attack, assault, and use personal violence upon the person of one
Jose "Joe" Francisco by stabbing the latter, at his body, thereby inflicting a fatal wound and as a
consequence of which he died.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Upon arraignment, Racal entered a plea of not guilty.4 Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution established that around 4 o'clock in the morning of April 19, 2006,
"trisikad" drivers were lining up to pick passengers along Lopez St. at Sitio Alseca in Cebu City. Among
the "trisikad" drivers was Jose Francisco (Francisco). Also present at that place during that time was
Racal, who was then standing near Francisco. While the "trisikad" drivers were waiting for passengers,
Racal spoke in a loud voice, telling the group of drivers not to trust Francisco because he is a traitor.
Francisco, who was then holding a plastic container in one hand and a bread in another, and was
eating, retorted and asked Racal why the latter called him a traitor. Without warning, Racal approached
Francisco and stabbed him several times with a knife, hitting him in the chest and other parts of his
body. Francisco, then, fell to the pavement. Immediately thereafter, Racal stepped backwards and
upon reaching a dark portion of the street, he hailed a "trisikad" and sped away. Thereafter, one of the
"trisikad" drivers called the barangay tanod, but by the time they arrived, Francisco was already dead.

Racal, on his part, did not deny having stabbed Francisco. However, he raised the defense of insanity.
He presented expert witnesses who contended that he has a predisposition to snap into an episode
where he loses his reason and thereby acts compulsively, involuntarily and outside his conscious
control. Under this state, the defense argued that Racal could not distinguish right from wrong and,
thus was not capable of forming a mental intent at the time that he stabbed Francisco.

7
After Trial, the RTC rendered judgment convicting Racal as charged. The dispositive portion of the
RTC Decision, dated September 14, 2011, read as follows:

WHEREFORE, on the following considerations, the court renders judgment finding accused ROGER
RACAL @ RAMBO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentences him to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties. He is likewise directed to pay the heirs of the late
Jose "Joe" Francisco the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as actual damages,
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(PS0,000.00) as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.5

The RTC ruled that the evidence for the defense is insufficient to convince the court that Racal was
indeed deprived of his mind and reason at the time when he committed the crime as to exempt him
from criminal liability becaµse his depression and psychotic features are not the kind of insanity
contemplated by law. The trial court found the circumstance of treachery to be present, but ruled out
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.

Racal filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 contending that the trial court failed to appreciate the
mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and voluntary
confession of guilt on the part of Racal. However, the RTC denied the Motion for

Reconsideration in its Order7 dated December 15, 2011. Aggrieved by the ruling of the RTC, Racal
appealed to the CA. In his Appellant's Brief, Racal reiterated his defense of insanity contending that,
at the time he stabbed the victim, he snapped into a fatal episode of temporary loss of rational
judgment and that such a predisposition to "snap" was testified upon by his expert witnesses.

In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of Racal but modified the judgment of the RTC
by imposing interest on the damages awarded. The CA disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, the September 14, 2011 Judgment in Criminal Case No. CBU-77654, convicting
accused-appellant Roger Racal @ Rambo of Murder and sentencing him with reclusion perpetua and
its accessory penalties is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accusedappellant is also ORDERED to
pay the heirs of Jose "Joe" Francisco, interest on damages awarded, the amount of 6% from the date
of finality of the judgment until fully paid, and to pay costs.

SO ORDERED. 8

The CA held that the prosecution proved all the elements of the crime necessary to convict Racal for
the murder of Francisco. The CA gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It
also affirmed the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and affirmed the trial court in
ruling out the presence of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. As to Racal's
defense of insanity, the CA held that he failed to rebut the presumption the he was sane at the time of
his commission of the crime. The CA, nonetheless, appreciated the mitigating circumstance which is
analogous to an illness of the offender that would diminish the exercise of his will-power.

Racal filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 questioning the penalty imposed upon him, but the CA
denied it in its Resolution 10 of October 22, 2015.

Thus, on November 23, 2015, Racal, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal 11
manifesting his
intention to appeal the CA Decision to this Court.

In its Resolution 12 dated March 16, 2016, the CA gave due course to Racal's Notice of Appeal and
directed its Archives Section to transmit the records of the case to this Court.

Hence, this appeal was instituted.

In a Resolution13 dated July 20, 2016, this Court, among others, notified the parties that they may file
their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire.

In its Manifestation and Motion, 14 filed on September 23, 2016, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) manifested that it will no longer file a supplemental brief because it had already adequately

8
addressed in its brief filed before the CA all the issues and arguments raised by accused-appellant in
his brief.

On the other hand, Racal filed a Supplemental Brief15 dated October 21, 2016, reiterating his defense
of insanity by contending that at the time of the commission of the crime, expert evidence
demonstrates that he had, within him, predisposing factors that cause insanity. He also argues that
the lower courts failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part
of the victim and voluntary confession of guilt on his part.

The basic issue for the Court's resolution in the present appeal is whether or not the CA correctly
upheld the conviction of herein appellant, Racal, for murder.

The Court rules in the affirmative.

At the outset, it bears to reiterate that in the review of a case, the Court is guided by the long-standing
principle that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve great
weight and respect.16 These factual findings should not be disturbed on appeal, unless there are facts
of weight and substance that were overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect the
disposition of the case.17

In the present case, after a careful rading of the records and pleadings, this Court finds no cogent
reason to deviate from the RTC’s factual findings. There is no indication that the trial court, overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. Moreover, the
factual findings of the RTC are affirmed by the CA. Hence, the Court defers to the trial court in this
respect, especially considering that it was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility
of the witnesses presented by both parties.

In any case, the Court will proceed to resolve the present appeal on points of law.

The Information in the instant case charged appellant with the crime of murder, for stabbing the victim,
Francisco, which offense was alleged to have been attended by treachery and evident premeditation.

Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, to
wit:

Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;

xxx

2. With evident premeditation;

xxx

To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide
or infanticide.18

In the present case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Francisco was stabbed and
killed; (2) appellant stabbed and killed him; (3) Francisco's killing was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery as testified to by prosecution eyewitnesses; and, (4) the killing of Francisco
was neither parricide nor infanticide.

Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods,
or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and
unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or

9
escape. 19 In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.20 These
elements are extant in the facts of this case and as testified to by the prosecution witnesses. To
emphasize, the victim, Francisco, was caught off guard when appellant attacked him. As testified to
by a prosecution witness, Francisco was then holding a plastic container containing bread and was
eating. The stealth, swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack was carried out gave the
victim no chance at all to evade when appellant thrust the knife to his torso. Thus, there is no denying
that appellant's sudden and unexpected onslaught upon the victim, and the fact that the former did not
sustain any injury, evidences treachery. Also, the fact that appellant was facing Francisco when he
stabbed the latter is of no consequence. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected
and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it,21 as in this case.
Undoubtedly, the RTC and the CA correctly held that the crime committed was murder under Article
248 of the RPC by reason of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Appellant, nonetheless, insists on his defense of insanity. In this regard, the Court's pronouncement
in the case of People v. Estrada22 is instructive, to wit:

The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by
him. Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability
is human free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between
good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to
have been done voluntarily, i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be
adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind and
that all acts are voluntary. The moral and legal presumption under our law is that freedom and
intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. This presumption, however, may be
overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the actor from criminal liability.

The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:

ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt frorri criminal
liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito),
the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same
court.

An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. If the
court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted
but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment until he may be released
without danger. An acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright release, but rather in a
verdict which is followed by commitment of the accused to a mental institution.

In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be
"so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." He must be deprived of reason and act
without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total
deprivation of freedor~/ of the will.

Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this point must refer
to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.

To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of
the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony
is not required. Neither are specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense.
Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be

10
known by overt acts. A person's thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward
acts to determine whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind.23

In the present case, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The testimonies of Dr.
Preciliana Lee Gilboy (Dr. Gilboy) and Dr. Andres Suan Gerong (Dr. Gerong), as the defense's
qualified expert witnesses, failed to support appellant's claim of insanity. As correctly observed by the
CA, the separate psychiatric evaluations of appellant were taken in June 2009 and July 2010, which
are three and four years after the crime was committed on April 19, 2006. In People v. So,24 which is
a case of recent vintage, this Court ruled that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should
relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed.25 Hence, the
results of the psychiatric tests done on appellant and testified to by the defense witnesses, may not
be relied upon to prove appellant's mental condition at the time of his commission of the crime.

In any case, during cross-examination, Dr. Gilboy testified that for a number of years up to the time
that appellant killed Francisco, he had custody of and served as the guardian of his sister's children.26
He took care of their welfare and safety, and he was the one who sends them to and brings them
home from school. Certainly, these acts are not manifestations of an insane mind. On his part, Dr.
Gerong testified, on direct examination, that he found appellant to have "diminish[ ed] capacity to
discern what was wrong or right at the time of the commission of the crime."27 "Diminished capacity" is
not the same as "complete deprivation of intelligence or discernment." Mere abnormality of mental
faculties does not exclude imputability. 28 Thus, on the basis of these examinations, it is clearly evident
that the defense failed to prove that appellant acted without the least discernment or that he was
suffering from a complete absence of intelligence or the power to discern at the time of the commission
of the crime.

Furthermore, appellant's act of treachery, that is by employing means and methods to ensure the
killing of Francisco without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make, as
well as his subsequent reaction of immediately fleeing after his commission of the crime and,
thereafter, evading arrest, is not the product of a completely aberrant mind. In other words, evidence
points to the fact that appellant was not suffering from insanity immediately before, simultaneous to,
and even right after the commission of the crime.

In his Supplemental Brief, appellant cites the "Durham Rule" which was used in criminal courts in the
United States of America. This rule postulated that an accused is not criminally responsible if his
unlawful act was the result of a mental disease or defect at the time of the incident.29 However, in
subsequent rulings, US Federal Courts and State Courts, even by the court which originally adopted
it, rejected and abandoned this rule for being too broad and for lacking a clear legal standard for
criminal responsibility. 30 As earlier discussed, in the Philippines, the courts have established a clearer
and more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted
without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that
there is a total deprivation of the will.31 Thus, appellant's reliance on the Durham Rule is misplaced
and, thus, may not be given credit.

Having been shown beyond doubt that the prosecution was able to prove with certainty all the
elements of the crime charged, the Court will now proceed to determine the correctness of the penalty
and the civil liabilities imposed upon appellant.

As to the penalty, the crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized under Article 248 of the RPC,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, with reclusion perpetua to death. As to the alleged aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation, this Court has ruled that for it to be considered as an
aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must prove (a) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and
(c) a sufficient lapse of time between the detennination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.32 In the
instant case, no proof has been adduced to establish that appellant had previously planned the killing
of Francisco. There is no evidence when and how he planned and prepared for the same, nor was
there a showing that sufficient time had lapsed between his determination and execution. In this
respect, the Court quotes with approval the disquisition of the CA, to wit:

The circumstances that transpired immediately before and after the stabbing negate evident
premeditation. The time when accused-appellant conceived the crime cannot be determined. Even
assuming that there was an altercation that arose between the accused-appellant and the victim due
to the remarks made by the former to the latter, this is not the overt act indicative of his criminal intent.

11
Simply put, the prosecution failed to establish that there was a sufficient lapse of time for accused-
appellant to reflect on his decision to kill the victim and the actual execution thereof. 33

Thus, the RTC and the CA are correct in not considering the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation.

The Court likewise agrees with the RTC and the CA in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances
of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and voluntary plea of guilt on the part of
appellant.

With respect to the alleged mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of Francisco,
the rule is that, as a mitigating circumstance, sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper conduct
or act of the victim adequate enough to ~xcite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly
proportionate in gravity.34 In the present case, appellant asserts that several days before he stabbed
the victim, the latter teased appellant to be "gay" and taunted him that the girl whom appellant courted
rejected him. However, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the RTC on this
matter, to wit:

For sufficient provocation under Article 13, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines
to apply, three requisites must be present:

a) provocation must be sufficient;

b) it must be immediate to the commission of the crime; and

c) it must originate from the offended party.

"Sufficient" according to jurisprudence means adequate to excite a person to commit the crime and
must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. In Bautista v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-46025,
September 2, 1992], the mitigating circumstance did not apply since it is not enough that the
provocating act be unreasonable or annoying. Certainly, calling a person gay as in this case is not the
sufficient provocation contemplated by law that would lessen the liability of the accused.

"Immediate" on the other hand means that there is no interval of time between the provocation and
the commission of the crime. Hence, in one case [People v. Co, 67 O.G. 7451] the Supreme Court
ruled that provocation occurring more than one hour before the stabbing incident is not immediate and
in People v. Benito [62 SCRA 351] 24 hours before the commission of the crime. Per admission of the
defense witnesses, the taunting done by the victim occurred days before the stabbing incident hence
the immediacy required by law was absent. The lapse of time would have given the accused [chance]
to contemplate and to recover his serenity enough to refrain from pushing through with his evil plan. 35

Anent the supposed voluntary plea of guilt on appellant's part, it is settled that a plea of guilty made
after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered
as a mitigating circumstance.36 Again, the Court quotes with approval the RTC's disquisition, thus:

The second mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilt. claimed by the accused could likewise
not be considered. The voluntary plea of guilt entered by the accused is not spontaneous because it
1âwphi 1

was made after his arraignment and only to support his claim of the exempting circumstance of
insanity. The voluntary plea of guilt required by law is one that is made by the accused in cognizance
of the grievous wrong he has committed and must be done as an act of repentance and respect for
the law. It is mitigating because it indicated a moral disposition in the accused favorable to his reform.
It may be recalled that accused in the case at bar did not change his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty".
In a last ditch effort to elude liability, however, accused claimed the defense of admitting the act of
[stabbing].37

The Court, however, agrees with the CA in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of illness as would
diminish the exercise of willpower of appellant without, however, depriving him of the consciousness
of his acts, pursuant to Article 13, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the RPC, as he was found by his examining
doctors to have "diminish[ ed] capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the time of the commission
of the crime."38 Thus, on the basis of the foregoing, appellant was correctly meted the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article 63, paragraph 3 of the RPC.

12
With respect to appellant's civil liability, the prevailing rule is that when the circumstances surrounding
the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating
circumstance, as in this case, the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00
as moral damages and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying
aggravating circumstances present.39 In conformity with the foregoing rule, the awards granted by the
lower courts must, therefore, be modified. Thus, the award of moral damages should be increased
from ₱50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Appellant should also pay the victim's heirs exemplary damages in
the amount of P75,000.00. The award of ₱75,000.00, as civil indemnity, is sustained.

As regards the trial court's award of actual damages in the amount of P30,000.00, the same must,
likewise, be modified. The settled rule is that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than the sum allowed by the Court as temperate damages, 40 the award of temperate
damages is justified in lieu of actual damages which is of a lesser amount.41 Conversely, ifthe amount
of actual damages proven exceeds, then temperate damages may no longer be awarded; actual
damages based on the receipts presented during trial should instead be granted.42 The rationale for
this rule is that it would be anomalous and unfair for the victim's heirs, who tried and succeeded in
presenting receipts and other evidence to prove actual damages, to receive an amount which is less
than that given as temperate damages to those who are not able to present any evidence at all.43 In
the present case, Francisco's heirs were able to prove, and were awarded, actual damages in the
amount of ₱30,000.00. Since, prevailing jurisprudence now fixes the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
temperate damages in murder cases, the Court finds it proper to award temperate damages to
Francisco's heirs, in lieu of actual damages.

The imposition of six percent (6%) interest per annum on all damages awarded from the time of finality
of this decision until fully paid, as well as the payment of costs, is likewise sustained.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated February 27, 2015,
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, finding accused-appellant Roger Racal @ Rambo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) The award of moral damages is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00);

(2) Accused-appellant is DIRECTED TO PAY the heirs of the victim Jose "Joe" Francisco exemplary
damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00); and (3) The award of actual
damages is DELETED and, in lieu thereof, temperate damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (₱50,000.00) is awarded to the heirs of the victim.

SO ORDERED.

13
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12462 December 20, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMEON GUENDIA, defendant-appellant.

STREET, J.:

This case is brought to this court by appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Iloilo convicting the defendant upon the charge of frustrated murder.

There is no doubt that an assault with intent to kill was committed by the defendant at the time and
place mentioned in the record upon the person of his querida; but the proof shows, in our opinion, that
the defendant was crazy at the time and has remained so since. He has now been committed by order
of the Governor-General to the San Lazaro Hospital for confinement and treatment. The trial judge
says, "I really believe that this man is crazy; or appeared so, at least, during his trial in this court;" and
the action of the trial judge in passing sentence upon the defendant must have been in part due to a
desire to keep a dangerous insane person in confinement until proper disposition might be made of
him. It is clear from the evidence submitted at the trial that the defendant was insane at the time of the
perpetration of the act, and he therefore exempt from criminal liability under subsection 1 of article 8
of the Penal Code. It results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed and the defendant
acquitted.

It has been suggested in this case that inasmuch as it appears from the evidence that the accused
was insane at the time of the trial in the court below it was improper for the court to proceed to hear
the case and furthermore that it is now improper for this court to reverse judgment and acquit the
accused of the offense with which he is charged. This court by no means concurs in this suggestion.

Undoubtedly the rule is well established that no person afflicted with imbecility or insanity in such a
degree as to disable him from making his defense should ever be put upon his trial for an alleged
crime or made to suffer the judgment of the law.

In Blackstone's Commentaries we find the following Passage:

Also if a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before arraignment
for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able to
plead to it with that advice and caution that ought; and if after he has pleaded, the
prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his defence? If,
after he be tried; and found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall
be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he becomes of non-sane memory, execution
shall be stayed; for peradventure says the humanity of the English law, had the
prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment
or execution.

There were good reasons for this tenderness or "humanity" of the English law, as the reader will
appreciate when reminded of the fact that until modern times no prisoner arraigned before the bar of
an English court was ever permitted to have counsel to assist him in his defense; that until within the
memory of living man no accused person was ever permitted to give testimony in his own behalf; and
finally that it was only in our own day that a person convicted of a crime in an English court has been
allowed an appeal for a review of the facts.

When Blackstone here speaks of madness he refers to a general perversion and obliteration of the
mental powers much more pronounced than that which is considered sufficient to exempt from criminal
responsibility. This is apparent from the fact that the courts have always treated a person as sane for

14
the purposes of being tried if he has sufficient powers to comprehend the nature of the proceedings in
which he is involved and to conduct his defense.

In the State of New York, as appears from the case of Freeman vs. People (4 Denio, 9; 47 Am. Dec.,
216), there was in force in 1847 a statute expressly declaring that no insane person could be tried,
sentenced, or punished for any crime. In discussing this provision, the court said:

In its terms the provision is broad enough to reach every possible state of insanity, so
that, if the words are to be taken literally, no person while laboring under insanity in
any form, however partial and limited it may be, can be put upon trial. But this the
legislature could not have intended; for although a person totally bereft of reason can
not be fit subject for trial or punishment, it by no means follows that one whose insanity
is limited to some particular object or conceit, his mind in other respects being free
from disease, can justly claim the like exemption. This clause of the statute should
receive a reasonable interpretation, avoiding on the one hand what would tend to give
impunity to crime, and on the other seeking to attain the humane object of the
legislature in its enactment. The common law, equally with this statute, forbids the trial
of any person in a state of insanity. This is clearly shown by authorities which have
been referred to, and which also show the reason for the rule, to wit, the incapacity of
one who is insane to make a rational defense. The statute is in affirmance of this
common law principle, and the reason on which the rule rests furnishes a key to what
must have been the intention of the legislature. If, therefore, a person arraigned for a
crime, is capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings going on
against him; if he rightly comprehends his own condition in reference to such
proceedings, and can conduct his defense in a rational manner, he is, for the purpose
of being tried, to be deemed sane, although on some other subjects his mind may be
deranged or unsound. This, as it seems to me, is the true meaning of the statute; and
such is the construction put by the English courts, on a similar clause in an act of
parliament.

For the purpose of securing these unfortunate persons from the danger of being improperly arraigned
and tried, statutes have been enacted in many jurisdiction requiring the court, where the issue of
present insanity is raised, or where the present insanity of the accused is otherwise brought to the
attention of the court, to submit to the jury a preliminary issue to determine whether the accused is so
far insane as to require a suspension of the proceedings; and even in States where no such statute
has been enacted it is recognized that the issue of present insanity ought properly to be tried, either
by the court itself or by the jury, as a separate issue. law phi 1.net

It is, however, entirely clear that, in a jurisdiction like this, where there is no controlling statute, the trial
court has a discretion as to whether a preliminary investigation into the prisoner's sanity shall be made.
In Jones vs. State (13 Ala., 153), it was said:

But in the case before us the judge did not see proper to test the prisoner's sanity by
any preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether he was capable of pleading to the
indictment — he did plead, and a trial and conviction was the result, although we are
of opinion that the facts disclosed in the bill of exceptions might well have warranted
the preliminary inquiry as to the prisoner's mental condition, yet this must be left to the
sound discretion of the court below.

In State vs. Peacock (50 N. J. L., 34), it was held that it rests in the sound discretion of the court
whether a preliminary examination shall be had to ascertain the mental condition of the prisoner at the
time of trial, and that where no exception is taken at the trial to the failure of the court to order such
examination, it is not available upon appeal. Said the court:

The method of settling this preliminary question, where it is not subject of statutory
regulation is within the discretion of the trial court. The court can itself enter upon the
inquiry, we submit the question to another jury empaneled for that purpose. Whether
the action of the court is the subject of exception it is not now necessary to decide, for
in the present case no objection was made to the action of the court in respect to a
suspension of the proceedings, nor was there any request made by the counsel who
defended him that such an inquiry should be instituted. There was nothing proved that
displayed such a condition of mental derangement that the court, of its own motion,
was called upon to direct a further inquiry into the matter. No court would be bound to
stop or justified in arresting the progress of a trial by a mere suggestion of, but in the

15
 absence of any substantial evidence of the existence of a degree of mental disorder
which would unfit the defendant from conducting his cause or instructing his counsel.

In Webber vs. Commonwealth (119 Pa. St. Rep., 223; 4 Am. St. Rep., 634), it was likewise held that
the making of a preliminary inquiry into the sanity of the prisoner before the trial upon the criminal
charge is begun is discretionary with the court. It was there said:

The existence of the doubt as the prisoner's present insanity is a matter which, by the
very necessity of the case, could only be determined by the court itself. Up to the time
of pleading there is no other tribunal which has the prisoner in charge, and there is no
other which can say whether there is a doubt upon that subject. It is one of the functions
which must be intrusted to the court, and it is not to be presumed that it will in any case
be abused.

Where the court examines into the mental condition of the accused and discovers that he is laboring
under a condition of insanity such that he ought not to be brought to trial, it is of course the duty of the
court to hold the criminal proceedings in abeyance and commit him to an asylum or hospital for the
insane, as the case may require. If, on the other hand, no preliminary investigation into the mental
condition of the accused is considered necessary by the trial court, and the accused is brought to trial
on the complaint, the question whether he was mentally responsible at the time of the commission of
the alleged offense is an open one and if it be found that he was insane when the alleged crime was
committed, he will be acquitted. We have found no reported decision in which it has been held or even
suggested that an accused person should not be acquitted when it appears at the trial that by reason
of lunacy or imbecility he was exempt from criminal responsibility. And the circumstance that he may
still be an imbecile or lunatic at the time of the trial does not by any means destroy the power of the
court to declare him not guilty. In Queen vs. Berry (1 Q. B. Div., 447, 451), it was said by Baron Kelly:

I believe it to have been the law from the earliest times, that if it is found at the trial of
a prisoner that he cannot understand the proceedings, the judge ought to discharge
the jury and put an end to the trial, or order a verdict of not guilty.

It is very general practice in England and the United States, where a person acquitted on the ground
of insanity, for the court to order his detention in a lunatic asylum. (People vs. Chandler, 196 N. Y.
525; 25 L. R. A. [N. S.], 946; Caffey vs. State, 78 Miss., 645; Peabody vs. Baker, 59 Misc. [N. Y.], 359;
People vs. Lamb, 118 N. Y. Supp., 389; Ex parte Brown, 1 L. R. A. [N. S.], 540.) Indeed there is a
presumption that a person once shown to have been afflicted with insanity or lunacy of a permanent
character has remained so, and this presumption prevails, even in the absence of a special finding of
the court, until the contrary is shown. (State ex rel. Thompson vs. Snell, 46 Wash., 327; 9 L. R. A. [N.
S.], 1191; 89 Pac., 931; In re Thomas Brown, 39 Wash., 160; 2 Ann. Cas., 492.) This idea is at the
basis of numerous decision holding that the statutes providing for the confinement of such persons,
without further trial of the issue of insanity, are valid.
itc-a1f

In Rex vs. Little, Russ and R. C. C. 430, the defendant was found to have been insane at the time of
the commission of the offense, and also at the time of the trial, and was acquitted on account of such
insanity. The trial judge ordered him to be kept in strict custody in jail till His Majesty's pleasure should
be known.

In U. S. vs. Lawrence (4 Cranch, C. C., 518; Fed. Cas. No. 15,577) it was proved that the defendant
had not shot at the President of the United States under the insane delusion that he himself was King
of England and of the United States as an appendage to England, and that the President stood in his
way in the enjoyment of his right, and that the shooting was done under such delusion. The jury found
him not guilty by reason of insanity, and the court remanded him, being of opinion that it would be
extremely dangerous to permit him to be at large while under such delusion.

The conclusion to which we arrive is that when a judge of first instance is informed or discovers that
an accused person is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion
to investigate the matter, and if it be found that by reason of any such affliction the accused could not,
with the aid of his counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the
proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered.
If, however, such investigation is considered unnecessary, and the trial proceeds, the court will acquit
the accused if he be found exempt from criminal responsibility by reason of imbecility or lunacy. In
such case an order for his commitment to an asylum should be made pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph 2 of article 8 (1) of the Penal Code. In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending
the proceedings against an accused person on the ground of present insanity, the judges should bear

16
in mind that not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to justify
such suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the accused would have a fair trial,
with the assistance which the law secures or give; and it is obvious that under a system of procedure
like ours where every accused person has legal counsel, it is not necessary to be so particular as it
used to be in England where the accused had no advocate but himself.

Judgment reversed and defendant acquitted, with costs of both instances de officio. But the defendant
shall be kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital, or such other hospital for the insane as the
Director of Health may direct, and shall not be permitted to depart therefrom without the prior approval
of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo. So ordered.

17
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-32978 October 30, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANDRES MAGALLANO, defendant-appellant.

TEEHANKEE, Acting, C.J.:

The Court sustains the conviction for parricide of the accused-appellant, Andres Magallano, on his
own admission that he strangled his wife to death. The defense of insanity as an exempting
circumstance was not established and did not overcome the legal presumption that a person's acts
are of his own free will and intelligence. The settled rule is that the onus probandi rests upon him who
invokes insanity as a defense and the defense failed to discharge this burden.

The accused was charged before the Court of First Instance of Davao City with parricide for having
killed his lawful wife, Exequiela Costa, on September 29, 1968.

Upon motion by the counsel de oficio for the accused asserting the accused's insanity, the latter was
referred to the Chief of the Davao General Hospital for examination. The Director was ordered to file
the necessary petition for hospitalization of the accused if in his opinion it served the public welfare or
the welfare of the person concerned.

Pursuant thereto, after psychiatric examination of the accused conducted by Dr. Corazon San Pedro
as attending physician, the officer-in-charge of the Davao Regional Mental Hospital submitted a report
to the effect that the accused was quiet, no bizarre behavior noted. He was in good contact with his
environment, recognized his companions and was aware of the place where he was being examined.
He answered questions coherently and was relevant." She recommended however that the subject be
further examined in the Regional Mental Hospital at least once a week for further evaluation.

Hence, the office of the City Fiscal moved that the regional hospital be given more time to complete
its examination and to submit a medical report on the accused's state of mind.

Acting on the motion, the trial court on March 29, 1969 ordered that accused be again sent to the
regional mental hospital to be examined by an internist of that institution in collaboration with Dr.
Corazon San Pedro to determine once and for all the mental condition of the accused and to find out
whether he was fit for arraignment .

Subsequently, the officer-in-charge of the Regional Mental Hospital on May 15,1969 furnished the
Court with a resume of the psychiatric examination conducted on the accused, to wit:

In the three interviews done, 1 subject was observed to be in good contact with
his environment. No odd behavior was observed. He answered questions
coherently and relevantly. No hallucinations or delusions elicited. He is well
oriented to the date, place and person. He can give his personal data and other
circumstances in his life. He can relate the event that led to his confinement in
jail.

Having been satisfied that the accused was fit and ready for trial on the basis of the two medical
reports, the trial court proceeded to arraign him. With the assistance of his counsel de oficio, the
accused entered a plea of not guilty.

After trial wherein the main issue was the sanity or insanity of the accused during the commission of
the crime, the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.

18
The record shows that on October 1, 1968, the accused companied by his father voluntarily informed,
and surrendered to, the Davao City Police Department that he had killed his wife. The accused
declared upon investigation conducted by policy officers that he strangled his wife 2 to death in the
early morning of September 29, 1968 after an exchange of heated words between them stemming
over his suspicion that she had been unfaithful to him; that the following day, he went to a nearby
house owned by one Peping Orais to whom he confided the killing. The accused described to the
police the scene of the crime and true enough, when the police went there, they found the victim's
cadaver. Post- mortem findings showed that she died of "asphyxia due to choking" and that she had
been dead for more than 30 hours but less than 50 hours at the time of discovery. 3

Crispin Orais confirmed the accused's declaration in a sworn statement before the Asst. City Attorney
that the accused confided to him that he had killed his wife by choking her with his bare hands. In his
testimony in court 4 as first witness for the prosecution, Crispin Orais declared he knew the accused
who went to him on October 1, 1968 at his house in Cabantian, Davao City and inquired about his
father's whereabouts. The witness then sent his son to fetch the father, Diego Magallano. The accused
was then sweating and his face was covered with blood. When asked about his appearance, the
accused replied that he had smashed his head against a tree as if he had lost his mind because he
had killed his wife by choking her to death. The accused pointed to a place about 50 meters away
from the house of Crispin Orais as the place where the killing took place. As to his observation on the
accused's demeanor as the latter related this gruesome story, the witness remarked that the accused
was all right although there were times when he appeared out of his mind for he could not easily
answer the questions.

Patrolman Noe Baita of the Davao City Police Department testified that during the investigation on
October 1, 1968 the accused confessed that he killed his wife in the manner he related it to Crispin
Orais and that all the answers to his question given in the course of the examination were spontaneous
and voluntary. 5

Lt. Exequeil Untalan declared that while he was in charge of the commando unit at Agdao, Davao City
on October 1, 1968, the accused accompanied by his father came to his office to confirm reports that
the accused had strangled his wife; that this surrender was registered in the police blotter after which
the accused was indorsed to the Homicide Section of the City Policy Department. 6

Lt. Rafael Panal of the Homicide Section who repaired to the scene of the crime found the cadaver of
the victim in the bushes and they brought it to the Davao City morgue where it was examined and
autopsied by Dr. Abear, Medical Officer of the Davao City Health Office. The investigation was
conducted in his precinct by Noe Baita. He observed that although the investigator had to repeat some
questions for the accused to understand, the latter was remorseful and he could talk coherently. 7

Juan Abear, a medicolegal expert connected with the Davao City Health Department was presented
as witness to confirm that he was the one who conducted the autopsy of the victim on October 2, 1968
and that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation. 8

Fiscal Josefino Fuentes, Asst. City Fiscal of Davao City testified that he was the one before whom the
accused swore to the truth of the latter's extra-judicial confession; that he himself translated to the
accused all the contents of the confession from English to Visayan, and that the accused admitted to
him that he (the accused) signed it voluntarily. 9

The defense in its attempt to prove mental disorder on the part of the accused presented evidence
consisting of the testimonies of the accused's father, his son and three neighbors.

Arturo Magallano, a son of the accused who attained 6th grade, testified that during the month of April,
1968 he observed that his father kept saying words that were not pro- per or correct; that his father
even tried to commit suicide by almost typing his neck with a rope; that in Cabacan-Bucana, Davao
after they transferred in 1968, his father worked for a living by going fishing three times a week and
that the witness himself sold the fish at a price dictated by his farther. 10

Luisa Bacala, a 64 year old vegetable vendor and neighbor of the accused, declared that the latter
used to accuse his wife of having a paramour, that one time she saw Exequiela, the wife of the
accused, selling fish in the market when the accused arrived saying that the paramour was already
around; that the accused used to run towards the pier and his family would follow him. 11

19
Crispin Orais, under the same oath testified that one morning he met the accused telling him that his
(accused's) father was at Cabantian in the company of some policemen and he kept saying this many
times although he had already been assured that his father was not seen around there. 12

Diego Magallano, the father of the accused testified thus: Sometime in 1968 in the first week of April,
this witness received a telegram from the wife of the accused stating that the latter was sickly; he went
to stay with his son in Maasin, Leyte for one month during which time he observed that the latter was
somewhat insane for he kept on saying that his wife had a paramour although this statement had no
basis. He had his son treated by a quack doctor. Upon hearing about the incident that his son killed
his wife, the witness went to Cabantian where he saw his son near the dead body of his wife. The
accused said he killed her for she no longer loved him. The witness corroborated the declaration of
Crispin Orais that the face of the accused was all covered with blood for the reason, according to the
accused, that he bumped his head against a tree for he wanted to kill himself. 13

Ricardo Dayala, a 64 year old vegetable vendor who claimed to be another neighbor of the accused
at Davao City stated that he was acquainted with the accused for a long time; that he used to see the
accused peeping from his house everytime the accused's wife went downstairs to get some pieces of
wood for fuel and he observed that the accused was insane, because at one time when asked some
questions, the accused would talk and laugh at the same time although sometimes the accused acted
sanely. 14

After a review and analysis of the evidence on record, this Court agrees with the State's contention
that the defense has failed to prove that the accused was legally insane at the commission of the
crime.

Indeed, the evidence presented by the defense does not outweigh the certifications submitted by
government psychiatric doctors who had closely observed the accused for a month and a half, 15 and
found that the accused was in good contact with his environment; that he did not manifest any odd
behavior for in fact he could even relate the circumstances that led to his confinement.

Apart from these certifications, statements in court by witnesses for both the prosecution and the
defense have pictured a mental condition on the part of the accused that is not inconsistent with sanity.
The fact that a few days after the killing incident the accused was seen sweating with his face covered
with blood, as testified to by his own father and Crispin Orais, for the reason according to accused
himself that he struck his head against a tree to end his life in atonement for his guilt in killing his wife
16
is a manifestation of remorse or self-reproach which is but a rational feeling experienced by normal
persons. As correctly observed by the prosecution, it revealed an awareness of a wrongdoing.

Coupled with this manifestation or remorse is the appellant appellant's voluntary surrender to the
police headquarters where he executed a statement confessing his misdeed. The police officer and
the City Fiscal who separately conducted investigation of the accused observed that he was normal
for he could answer their questions coherently and intelligently and that there was no indication of
abnormality on his part. The observation of these public officials is entitled to full credence, for they
have not been shown nor alleged to have any improper or ulterior motive to misrepresent or not tell
the truth about the mental condition and behavior of the accused.

Again from accused's own evidence is the testimony of his son, that before the killing for which he
stands charged, he was working for a living through fishing three times a week and that he himself
prescribed the prices for his catch which his son brought to the market for sale. 17

While there is evidence tending to show that the accused in some instances had displayed some
unusual behavior, at most these could only be eccentricities which do not mean complete deprivation
of intelligence or discernment. The presumption of sanity is not overcome by mere abnormality of
behavior. 18

"In the eyes of the law," as held in the case of People vs. Renegado, 19 "insanity exists when there is
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason,
he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern,
or that there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will; mere abnormality of the mental faculties will
not exclude imputability. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance and he must prove it by clear and positive evidence."

Over and above these is the trial judge's "keen observation of [the accused's] conduct, appearance,
demeanor and behavior in the courtroom everytime he appeared at the trial. He did not find any

20
symptoms of insanity in his acts or behavior for he behaved better than some of his neighbors who
were around him." 20

The defense attempted to adduce expert testimony to prove the alleged insanity. The expert however
was properly excluded by the Court when he was made to answer by hypothetical questions in relation
to allegations of fact which have not been proven but were in fact disputed by the prosecution. No
contribution could be made by him since he did actually examine the accused and was being made to
testify only on the contents of a book or modern psychiatry without particular reference to the actual
and proven facts regarding the mental condition of the accused.

As to the formal offer of proof by the defense which according to counsel was denied by the trial Court,
we find from the transcript 21 that the trial Court did not in fact deny the verbal motion but made the
suggestion that if defense counsel wanted to state anything else, he could incorporate it in a
memorandum. At any rate, we find that the trial Court did make a thorough consideration of the
evidence submitted by the defense.

As to the question raised by accused of the admissibility of the government doctors' medical reports
as being hearsay since their contents were not testified to in court by the said doctors, suffice it to
state that these formed part of the records, and that at the resting of the case, the defense failed to
register any objection thereon when the prosecution specifically invited the court to take judicial notice
of its records.

Authorities hold that whenever evidence of acts, conduct or declarations are introduced to prove the
defendant insane, the prosecution may offer evidence of other acts, conduct and declarations during
the same period to show that he was sane — more so, at the time of the commission of the crime
charged and thereafter — and that the irrational acts testified to were mere lapses into which humans
occasionally fall.

Premises considered, this Court finds the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide.

Accordingly, this Court affirms in toto the appealed decision sentencing the accused Andres Magallano
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua as defined and provided for in Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.

21
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 176102 November 26, 2014

ROSAL HUBILLA y CARILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006) to protect the best interest of the child in conflict with the law through measures that will ensure
the observance of international standards of child protection,1 and to apply the principles of restorative
justice in all laws, policies and programs applicable to children in conflict with the law.2 The mandate
notwithstanding, the Court will not hesitate or halt to impose the penalty of imprisonment whenever
warranted on a child in conflict with the law.

Antecedents

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the petitioner with homicide under
the following information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2000-0275 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 20, in Naga City, to wit:

That on or about the 30th day of March, 2000 at about 7:30 P.M., in Barangay Dalupaon, Pasacao,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
intent to kill, and without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and stab one JAYSON ESPINOLA Y BANTA with a knife , inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds in his body, thus, directly causing his death, per Death Certification hereto attached as
annex "A" and made an integral part hereof, to the damage and prejudice of the deceased’s heirs in
such amount as may be proven in court.

Acts Contrary to Law.3

The CA summarized the facts established by the Prosecution and the Defense as follows: Alejandro
Dequito testified that around seven in the evening or so of March 30, 2000, he, together with his
compadre Nicasio, was at the gate of Dalupaon Elementary School watching the graduation ceremony
if the high school students. While watching, his cousin Jason Espinola, herein victim, arrived. Later,
however, appellant approached the victim and stabbed the latter. When asked to demonstrate in open
court how the appellant stabbed the victim, this witness demonstrated that with the appellant’s left arm
around the neck of the victim, appellant stabbed the victim using a bladed weapon.

He aided the victim as the latter was already struggling to his feet and later brought him to the hospital.

Nicasio Ligadia, witness Dequito’s companion at the time of the incident, corroborated the testimony
of Dequito on all material points.

Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified that her son was stabbed in front of the
[elementary] school and later brought to the Bicol Medical Center. She stated that her son stayed for
more than a month in the hospital. Thereafter, her son was discharged. Later, however, when her son
went back to the hospital for a check-up, it was discovered that her son’s stab wound had a
complication. Her son was subjected to another operation, but died the day after. She, further, stated
that the stabbing incident was reported to the police authorities. She, likewise, stated the amounts she
incurred for the wake and burial of her son.

Robert Casin, the medico legal expert, testified that the cause of death of the victim, as stated by Dr.
Bichara, his co-admitting physician, was organ failure overwhelming infection. He, further, stated that
the underlined cause of death was a stab wound.

22
The appellant, in his testimony, narrates his statement of facts in this manner:

He testified that around seven inthe evening or so of March 30, 2000, he was at the Dalupaon High
School campus watching the high school graduation rites. At half past seven, while walking towards
the gate of Dalupaon High School on his way home, he was ganged up by a group of four (4) men.

The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he felt dizzy and fell to the ground. He was
not able to see or even recognize who attacked him, so he proceeded home. Shortly after leaving the
campus, however, he met somebody whom he thought was one of the four men who ganged up on
him. He stabbed the person with the knife he was, then, carrying. When asked why he was in
possession of a knife, he stated that he used it in preparing food for his friend, Richard Candelaria,
who was graduating that day. He went home after the incident.

While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took him and brought him to the barangay hall, and
later to the Pasacao PNP. On his way to the town proper, he came to know that the person he stabbed
was Jason Espinola. He felt sad after hearing it.4

Judgment of the RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guilty of homicide as charged, and
sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay to
the heirs of the victim ₱81,890.04 as actual damages for medical and funeral expenses, and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages.5

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but modified the penalty and
the civil liability through the decision promulgated on July 19, 2006,6 disposing thus: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in Criminal
Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellants (sic) sentence is reduced to six
months and one day to six years of prision correccionalas minimum, to six years and one day to twelve
years of prision mayor as maximum.

The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the amount of Php
81,890.04, representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php 16,300.00. A
civil indemnity, in the amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the victim Jason
Espinola. Weaffirm in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA promulgated its amended decision on
December 7, 2006, decreeing as follows:7

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our decision
promulgated on July 16, 2006, which is the subject of the instant motion is, hereby AMENDED such
that the judgment shall now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch
20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.

The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the amount of Php
81,890.04, representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php 16,300.00. A
civil indemnity, in the amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the victim Jason
Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.

The case is, hereby, remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Naga, Branch 20, for appropriate action
on the application for probation of, herein, appellant.

23
SO ORDERED.

Issues

The petitioner has come to the Court imputing grave error to the CA for not correctly imposing the
penalty, and for not suspending his sentence as a juvenile in conflict with the law pursuant to the
mandate of Republic Act No. 9344. In fine, he no longer assails the findings of fact by the lower courts
as well as his conviction, and limits his appeal to the following issues, namely: (1) whether or not the
CA imposed the correct penalty imposable on him taking into consideration the pertinent provisions of
Republic Act No. 9344, the Revised Penal Codeand Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law); (2)
whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of sentence under Republic
Act No. 9344; and (3) whether or not imposing the penalty of imprisonment contravened the provisions
of Republic Act No. 9344 and other international agreements.

Ruling of the Court

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporalfor homicide.
Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17
years, four months and 28 days old when he committed the homicide on March 30, 2000,8 such
minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.9

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within
the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional (i.e., six
months and one day to six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision mayor in
its medium period – eight years and one day to 10 years – was proper because there were no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years
and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years and
one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him to
apply for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968.

The petitioner’s insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act
No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum
of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and
would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law.

A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC10 (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding principles
in the trial and judging in cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One of them is that found in
Section 46 (2), in conjunction with Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the personal liberty of the
child shall be limited to the minimum.11 Consistent with this principle, the amended decision of the CA
imposed the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for homicide under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. On its part, Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the
discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with
the law to qualify for probation.

Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968,12 which disqualifies from probation an
offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years, the petitioner
could not qualify for probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA to remand the case
to the trial court to determine if he was qualified for probation.

Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in
conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the child
offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:

Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.– If the court finds that the objective
of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or
if the child in conflict with the law has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition
or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution
of judgment.

24
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for homicide by
the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer legally feasible or
permissible.

Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation of his rights as a child
inconflict with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and international agreements. A review
1avvphi1

of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of children in conflict
with the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on
children in conflict with the law the rightnot to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty;
imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on
the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort,
and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time.Thereby, the
trial and appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the
penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed as a last recourse
after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the
term of his imprisonment was for the shortestduration permitted by the law.

A survey of relevant international agreements13 supports the course of action taken herein. The United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines), 14 the
United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and the
United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty15 are consistent in recognizing
that imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided it is imposed asa last resort and for the
minimum necessary period.

Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve his
sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent with the offender child’s best interest. Such service
of sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the amended
decision promulgated on December 7, 2006 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 29295, but DELETING the order to
remand the judgment to the trial court for implementation; and DIRECTS the Bureau of Corrections to
commit the petitioner for the service of his sentence in an agricultural camp or other training facilities
under its control, supervision and management, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare
and Development.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

25
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 151085 : August 20, 2008]

JOEMAR ORTEGA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated October 26,
2000 which affirmed in toto the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
City, Branch 50, dated May 13, 1999, convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega 4 (petitioner)
of the crime of Rape.

The Facts

Petitioner, then about 14 years old,5 was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate
informations both dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA,6 then about eight (8)
years of age. The accusatory portions thereof respectively state:

Criminal Case No. 98-19083

That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a
minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Criminal Case No. 98-19084

That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of
YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with
the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.9 Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions
arose.

Version of the Prosecution

On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM.10 Among her siblings
CCC, BBB, DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these disturbing
events, AAA's family members were close friends of petitioner's family, aside from the
fact that they were good neighbors. However, BBB caught petitioner raping his younger
sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then informed their mother MMM who in turn
asked AAA.11 There, AAA confessed that petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3)
different occasions.

The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then
6 years old and son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda Ortega 12
(Luzviminda), mother of petitioner, for two (2) nights because MMM had to stay in a
hospital to attend to her other son who was sick.13 During the first night at petitioner's

26
residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA slept together with Luzviminda and
her daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner raped AAA.
The second occasion occurred the following day, again at the petitioner's residence.
Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to their comfort room and
raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and she
felt pain. In all of these instances, petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents,
otherwise, he would spank her.14 AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal.

The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner
went to the house of AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered
television. At that time, Luzviminda was conversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were
busy watching, petitioner called AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed.
While inside the said room which was lighted by a kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA
behind the door, removed his pants and brief, removed AAA's shorts and panty, and in a
standing position inserted his penis into the vagina of AAA.15 AAA described petitioner's
penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens. She, likewise,
narrated that she saw pubic hair on the base of his penis.16

This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to
drink water in their kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see
petitioner and AAA both naked from their waist down in the act of sexual intercourse.
BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told
petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter, BBB reported the incident
to his mother, MMM.17

MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that petitioner
inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM learned that this was not the only
incident that petitioner molested AAA as there were two previous occasions. MMM also
learned that AAA did not report her ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner would spank
her. MMM testified that when BBB reported the matter to her, petitioner and Luzviminda
already left her house. After waiting for AAA's brothers to go to sleep, MMM, with a heavy
heart, examined AAA's vagina and she noticed that the same was reddish and a whitish
fluid was coming out from it. Spouses FFF and MMM were not able to sleep that night.
The following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM called Luzviminda and petitioner to
come to their house. MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to her
daughter, and consequently, she demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for
examination.18

MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas19 (Dr. Katalbas),
the Rural Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no indication that
she was molested.20 Refusing to accept such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM went
to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office.
Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written report21 showing that there were "abrasions on both
right and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at the posterior fourchette." She
also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals were relatively fresh; and
that such abrasions were superficial and could disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days.
Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her findings required the
confirmation of the Municipal Health Officer of the locality.

Subsequently, an amicable settlement22 was reached between the two families through
the DAWN Foundation, an organization that helps abused women and children. Part of
the settlement required petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA.23
As such, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality. However, a few months
later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in order to bring his dirty clothes for
laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated and confrontations
occurred. At this instance, AAA's parents went to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape. However, the prosecutor's
office only filed the two (2) instant cases.

Version of the Defense

27
Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda
Ortega.24 He is the second child of three siblings ― an elder brother and a younger sister.
Petitioner denied the accusations made against him. He testified that: his parents and
AAA's parents were good friends; when MMM left AAA and her brothers to the care of his
mother, petitioner slept in a separate room together with BBB and CCC while AAA slept
together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he never touched or raped AAA or
showed his private parts to her; petitioner did not threaten AAA in any instance; he did
not rape AAA in the former's comfort room, but he merely accompanied and helped AAA
clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in the process of washing, he may
have accidentally touched AAA's anus; on December 1, 1996, petitioner together with his
parents, went to AAA's house;25 they were dancing and playing together with all the other
children at the time; while they were dancing, petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a
playful act, at the instance of which BBB ran and reported the matter to MMM, who at
the time was with Luzviminda, saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual
intercourse;26 petitioner explained to MMM that they were only playing, and that he could
not have done to AAA what he was accused of doing, as they were together with her
brothers, and he treated AAA like a younger sister;27 BBB was lying; AAA's parents and
his parents did not get angry at him nor did they quarrel with each other; petitioner and
his parents peacefully left AAA's house at about nine o'clock in the evening; however, at
about four o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his parents were summoned by MMM to
go to the latter's house; upon arriving there they saw BBB being maltreated by his father
as AAA pointed to BBB as the one who molested her; and MMM and Luzviminda agreed
to bring AAA to a doctor for examination.28

Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a minor
at the time of the incident; CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in her first marriage,
while AAA and the rest of her siblings were of the second marriage; CCC and BBB are
half-brothers of AAA; when MMM entrusted AAA and her brothers to her sometime in
August of 1996, she slept with AAA and her youngest daughter in a separate room from
petitioner; on December 1, 1996, she was at AAA's house watching television and
conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were having a drinking spree in the kitchen;
from where they were seated, she could clearly see all the children, including petitioner
and AAA, playing and dancing in the dining area; she did not hear any unusual cry or
noise at the time; while they were conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner
and AAA were having sexual intercourse; upon hearing such statement, Luzviminda and
MMM immediately stood up and looked for them, but both mothers did not find anything
unusual as all the children were playing and dancing in the dining area; Luzviminda and
MMM just laughed at BBB's statement; the parents of AAA, at that time, did not examine
her in order to verify BBB's statement nor did they get angry at petitioner or at them;
and they peacefully left AAA's house. However, the following day, MMM woke Luzviminda
up, saying that FFF was spanking BBB with a belt as AAA was pointing to BBB nor to
petitioner as the one who molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda intervened, telling
FFF not to spank BBB but instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for examination. Luzviminda
accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas who found no indication that AAA was molested. She
also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After getting the results of the examination
conducted by Dr. Jocson, they went to the police and at this instance only did Luzviminda
learn that MMM accused petitioner of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied to
Luzviminda that he raped AAA. Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer
who recommended that they should seek advice from the Women's Center. At the said
Center, both agreed on an amicable settlement wherein petitioner would stay away from
AAA. Thus, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality for almost two (2) years.
But almost every Saturday, petitioner would come home to visit his parents and to bring
his dirty clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner came home, FFF bad-mouthed
petitioner, calling him a rapist. Confrontations occurred until an altercation erupted
wherein FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda. Subsequently, AAA's parents filed the instant
cases.29

The RTC's Ruling

On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over
the positive identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB,

28
who testified with honesty and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not
perceive any motive for AAA's family to impute a serious crime of Rape to petitioner,
considering the close relations of both families. Thus, the RTC disposed of this case in
this wise:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE as
charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion
Temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused
shall be imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years and One (1) day of Prision
Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The
accused is condemned to pay the offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as
indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.30

Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail
bond for his provisional liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the
petitioner's release pending appeal.31

The CA's Ruling

On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the
petitioner's defense of denial could not prevail over the positive identification of the
petitioner by the victim AAA and her brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent and
without any showing of ill motive. The CA also held that the respective medical
examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is established that the
slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ consummates rape; thus, hymenal
laceration is not an element of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that petitioner acted with
discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded great weight and
respect to the factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the evaluation of the testimonies
of witnesses.

Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration32 of the assailed Decision which the CA
denied in its Resolution33 dated November 7, 2001.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF

SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE
CASE.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO

APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE KATALBAS.

III.

THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT, THAT
PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE
ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE
ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE PRESENT
IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.

IV.

29
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH BY
THE ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE COMMISSION
OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.34

Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive
on this Court, we are not prevented from overturning such findings if the CA had
manifestly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if considered might
affect the result of the case. Petitioner stresses that from the testimonies of AAA and
BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved; thus, AAA felt pain. Petitioner
contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are true that petitioner inserted his fingers
and his penis into her vagina, certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions, wounds
and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking into consideration her age at the time
and the alleged size of petitioner's penis. However, such allegation is completely belied
by the medical report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day after the alleged rape, conducted a
medical examination on AAA and found that there were no signs or indications that AAA
was raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the CA committed a grave error when it
disregarded such medical report since it disproves the allegation of the existence of rape
and, consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its case; thus, the presumption of
innocence in favor of the petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA,
petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual
experience. As such, it is incredible and contrary to human reason that a 13 - year-old
boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the
age of six, could not be controlled or subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM's
motive in filing the instant case, as she wanted to extort money from the parents of the
petitioner. Petitioner points out that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that the
abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were relatively fresh and the same
could disappear within a period of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the
medical examination on December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11) days after
the alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed the instant case after almost
a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case of slander by deed against FFF, it
is not inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to
depart from the initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally,
petitioner submits that AAA and BBB were merely coached by MMM to fabricate these
stories.35

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) contends that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are mere
reiterations of his disquisitions before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not
rely on the testimonies of both doctors since despite the absence of abrasions, rape is
consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ; what
is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped her in August
and December of 1996; even in the absence of force, rape was committed considering
AAA's age at that time; as such, AAA did not have any ill motive in accusing petitioner;
and it is established that the crime of rape could be committed even in the presence of
other people nearby. Moreover, the OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made
by a trial court is accorded the highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe
directly the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether said witness was telling the
truth or not. Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner acted with discernment when he
committed the said crime, as manifested in his covert acts.36

However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,37 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006.38 The law
establishes a comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law39 (CICL)
and children at risk40 with child-appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs
and services such as prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and
after-care programs geared towards their development. In order to ensure its
implementation, the law, particularly Section 841 thereof, has created the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with certain duties and functions42 such as the
formulation of policies and strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to enhance the
administration of juvenile justice as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of the CICL.
The law also

30
provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66,
67 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.43

The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:

Title VIII
Transitory Provisions

SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. - Upon
effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the
commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred
to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Such officer, upon
thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether to release the child to the
custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention programs, as provided under
this Act. Those with suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at the youth
rehabilitation center shall likewise be released, unless it is contrary to the best interest
of the child.

SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. - If the child is detained pending trial, the
Family Court shall also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary and,
if not, determine appropriate alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary and
he/she is detained with adults, the court shall immediately order the transfer of the child
to a youth detention home.

SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. -
The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC, within
ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict
with the law under their custody.

SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and
Court Proceedings. - If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion
and court proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in consultation with the local
social welfare and development officer or the Family Court in consultation with the Social
Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall
determine the appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate court executes the
judgment of conviction, and unless the child in conflict with the law has already availed
of probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may apply
for probation if qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law.

SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. - Persons
who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this
Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission
of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise
benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly.
They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other
applicable laws.

Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the
CA. However, with the advent of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before
this Court, a new issue arises, namely, whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344
apply to petitioner's case, considering that at the time he committed the alleged rape, he
was merely 13 years old.

In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a
prosecution for rape, the complainant's candor is the single most important factor. If the
complainant's testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted solely
on that basis.44 The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility, and found
no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the heinous crime of rape and to positively
identify him as the malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that

31
he saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While petitioner
asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the imputation of the crime, we discard
such assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject
their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that
such a traumatic experience would damage their daughter's psyche and mar her life if
the charge is not true.45 We find petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found
by Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from petitioner's parents,
highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most cases of rape committed against
young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total penetration of the victim's organ
is improbable due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that actual
penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of the hymen is not required.46 Therefore, it
is not necessary for conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having full penetration,
because the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the
pudendum constitutes rape.47

However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he
commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free
will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises.48 Therefore, while there is a
crime committed, no criminal liability attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar,49 we
held:

[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting
circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the
part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus,
Albert has stated:

"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine
the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and
because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal
liability."

It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable
of performing a criminal act.

In its Comment50 dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer
covered by the provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner
was convicted by the RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No.
9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with the petitioner now approximately 25 years
old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344. Moreover, the OSG
claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is applicable only if the
child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof.
The OSG also asserted that petitioner may avail himself of the provisions of Section 3851
of R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic suspension of sentence if finally found guilty.
Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a recognized principle that laws favorable to the
accused may be given retroactive application, such principle does not apply if the law
itself provides for conditions for its application.

We are not persuaded.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:

SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age
or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she
has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

32
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old
and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed
and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development
officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from
criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the promulgation of
judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by
virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15
years old.52

Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive
application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-
entrenched principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal
laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.53 This principle is
embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication
of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded application
in certain instances involving special laws.54 R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception.

In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the
deliberations on the bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:

Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions

Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I

humbly propose that we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the following provision:

ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW PENDING THE
CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE
LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE
IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE
DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15
YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.

The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these adult offenders?
lawlibra ry
cra

Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not have the
capability at the moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.

Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever the facilities
are ready.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak here of
children who do not have criminal liability under this law, we are referring here to those
who currently have criminal liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this
measure, will now be exempt. It is quite confusing.

Senator Santiago. That is correct.

Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their parents or
through a diversion program, Mr. President. That is my understanding.

33
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of sifting before
that. That is why I was proposing that they should be given to the DSWD, which will
conduct the sifting process, except that apparently, the DSWD does not have the physical
facilities.

Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We will now have
to just craft it to ensure that the input raised earlier by the good Senator is included and
the capacity of the DSWD to be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the issue
should also be incorporated in the amendment.

The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law becomes
effective, all those children in conflict with the law, who were convicted in the
present Penal Code, for example, who will now not be subject to incarceration
under this law, will be immediately released. Is that the understanding?

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .

Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.

Senator Santiago. Yes.

The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen to them? cra lawlibra ry

Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been settled . . . . .
provides, for example, for conferencing family mediation, negotiation, apologies,
censure, et cetera. These methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to
remain in detention.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require some sort
of infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel from the DSWD will have to
address the counseling. So, there must be a transition in terms of building the capacity
and absorbing those who will benefit from this measure.

The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an amendment.

Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.

The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the Santiago
amendment is accepted.55

xxx

PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS

Senator Pimentel.

xxx

Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their application,
I would like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could incorporate some kind of a
transitory provision that would make this law apply also to those who might
already have been convicted but are awaiting, let us say, execution of their
penalties as adults when, in fact, they are juveniles.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the Transitory
Provisions wherein we address the issue raised by the good Senator,
specifically, Section 67. For example, "Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of
children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission of the

34
crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officer." So that would be
giving retroactive effect.

Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes.

Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I was trying to
cite the instance of juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as adults awaiting execution.

Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an additional

amendment, subject to style.

Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality that we have
to address, otherwise injustice will really be . . .

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a separate
provision.

The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able
to prove that at the time of the commission of the offense he is a minor under this law,
he should be given the benefit of the law.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment.56

The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in
interpreting a statute. Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that
intent is the soul of the law, viz.:

The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the
purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law,
and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The
intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts
will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose
of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.
Intent is the spirit which gives life to

a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow
the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the
context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the
legislature.57

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.58 In this case, the
plain meaning of R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers'
intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the
simple language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the
CICL.

It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission
of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's
own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner's age was
never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably,
petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under
R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.

35
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts
of rape committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no
concomitant exemption from civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of
the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of actual or compensatory
damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.

The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the
civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code,
without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral
damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the
odious crime of rape.59

A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended
to protect our children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of
the growing number of CICL and children at risk in our country, has been enacted by
Congress. However, it has not escaped us that major concerns have been raised on the
effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale for the Proposed Rule on
Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, it was found that:

The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006
raising the age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has
compounded the problem of employment of children in the drug trade several times over.
Law enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police, most particularly,
complain that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in using children 15 years
old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic Act
No. 9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in that
they are proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old or below who openly
flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit drugs, simply because their
age exempts them from criminal liability under the new law.60

The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates
petitioner of rape, a heinous crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the
tender age of six (6) when she was raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the
law's greater protection. However, this consequence is inevitable because of the language
of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to review by this Court. 61 Any
perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed
to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached
from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our task is constitutionally
confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have
done so in this case.62

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed
against petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred
to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate
intervention program. Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private
complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00). No costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC).

SO ORDERED.

36
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 177751 January 7, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
FLORENCIO AGACER,* EDDIE AGACER, ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN AGACER and
ERIC*** AGACER, Accused-Appellants.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

For resolution is appellants' Motion for Reconsideration1 of our December 14, 2011 Decision2 affirming
their conviction for the murder of Cesario Agacer, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the November 17, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01543 which affirmed the August 7, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan, finding appellants Florencio, Franklin, Elynor, Eddie and Eric, all surnamed
Agacer. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with the following modifications:

(1) actual damages is DELETED;

(2) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer ₱25,000.0 as
temperate damages; and

(3) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer h interest at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the amounts of damages awarded,
commencing from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.3

Appellants assert that their mere presence at the scene of the crime is not evidence of conspiracy;4
that there was no treachery since a heated argument preceded the killing of the victim;5 and that even
assuming that their guilt was duly established, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should
have been appreciated in favor of appellant Franklin Agacer (Franklin) who was only 16 years and 106
days old at the time of the incident, having been born on December 21, 1981.6

In our February 13, 2012 Resolution,7 we required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
comment on the Motion for Reconsideration particularly on the issue of Franklin’s minority.

Meanwhile, in a letter8 dated June 8, 2012, the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prison, informed
us that appellant Florencio Agacer (Florencio) died on February 17, 2007, as evidenced by the
attached Certificate of Death indicating cardio pulmonary arrest secondary to status asthmaticus as
the cause of death.9

The OSG, in its Comment,10 asserts that there exists no cogent reason to disturb our findings and
conclusions as to the guilt of the appellants since the facts and evidence clearly established conspiracy
and treachery. However, it did not oppose and even agreed with appellants’ argument that minority
should have been appreciated as a privileged mitigating circumstance in favor of Franklin, the same
being duly supported by a copy of Franklin’s Certificate of Live Birth secured from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) Document Management Division.11

Issues

Hence, the following issues for our resolution:

37
 1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish the existence of conspiracy and treachery
in the commission of the crime charged?

2. Should the mitigating circumstance of minority be appreciated in favor of appellant

Franklin?

3. Does the death of appellant Florencio extinguish his criminal and civil liabilities?

Our Ruling

There is partial merit in appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration.

Reiterated Arguments in a Motion for Reconsideration Do Not Need a New Judicial Determination.

Appellants’ contention that the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to prove conspiracy and treachery
is a mere rehash of their argument set forth in their brief, "which we already considered, weighed and
resolved before we rendered the Decision sought to be reconsidered."12 It is not a new issue that
needs further judicial determination.13 There is therefore no necessity to discuss and rule again on this
ground since "this would be a useless formality of ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the
reasons already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the
movant."14

As a Minor, Franklin is Entitled to the Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Minority.

Nevertheless, we agree with appellants that Franklin is entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. Franklin’s Certificate of Live Birth shows that he was born on December 20,
1981, hence, was merely 16 years old at the time of the commission of the crime on April 2, 1998. He
is therefore entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68(2) of
the Revised Penal Code. It provides that when the offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years,
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed on the accused but always in the
proper period. The rationale of the law in extending such leniency and compassion is that because of
his age, the accused is presumed to have acted with less discernment.15 This is regardless of the fact
that his minority was not proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly presented
for our consideration, since to rule accordingly will not adversely affect the rights of the state, the victim
and his heirs.

Penalty to be Imposed Upon Franklin.

Pursuant to the above discussion, the penalty imposed upon Franklin must be accordingly modified.
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. A degree lower is reclusion temporal. 16 There
being no aggravating and ordinary mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on Franklin
should be reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, which ranges from fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.17 Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor, the medium period of
which ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Due to the seriousness of the
crime and the manner it was committed, the penalty must be imposed at its most severe range.

The Death of Florencio Prior to Our Final Judgment Extinguishes His Criminal Liability and Civil
Liability Ex Delicto.

On the effect of the death of appellant Florencio on his criminal liability, Article 89(1) of the Revised
Penal Code provides that:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished.

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxxx

It is also settled that "upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil

38
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as
it is on the criminal."18

While Florencio died way back on February 7, 2007, the said information was not timely relayed to the
Court, such that we were unaware of the same when we rendered our December 14, 2011 Decision.
It was only later that we were informed of Florencio’s death through the June 8, 2012 letter of the
Officer-in- Charge of the New Bilibid Prison. Due to this development, it therefore becomes necessary
for us to declare Florencio 's criminal liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto to have been
extinguished by his death prior to final judgment. The judgment or conviction is thus set aside insofar
as Florencio is concerned.

WHEREFORE, appellants' Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our Decision 1âwphi 1

dated December 14, 2011 is MODIFIED as follows: (a) appellant Franklin Agacer is sentenced to
suffer the penalty often (10) years of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four ( 4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, and (b) the
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto of appellant Florencio Agacer are declared EXTINGUISHED
by his death prior to final judgment. The judgment or conviction against him is therefore SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

39
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 199735 October 24, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ASIA MUSA y PINASALO, ARA MONONGAN y PAPAO, FAISAH ABAS y MAMA, and MIKE
SOLALO y MILOK, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR.,J.:

This is an appeal seeking to nullify the February 28, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03758, which affirmed the October 7, 2008 Decision2 in Criminal Case No.
13536-D of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 163 in Taguig City. The RTC convicted accused-
appellants of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for selling dangerous drugs.

The Facts

An Information charged the accused Aisa Musa y Pinasilo (Musa), Ara Monongan y Papao, Faisah
Abas y Mama (Abas), and Mike Solano y Mlok (Solano) with the following:

That, on or about the 1st day of June, 2004 in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with one
another and acting as an organized or syndicated crime group, without being authorized by law, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell and give away to one PO1 Rey Memoracion one
(1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 4.05 grams of white crystalline substance, which
was found positive for Methamphetamine hydrochloride also known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, in
violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution’s version of facts was anchored heavily on the testimony of Police Officer 1 Rey
Memoracion (PO1 Memoracion). From the findings of the trial and appellate courts, We synthesize his
testimony, as follows:

On June 1, 2004, at or about 9:00 p.m., the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operating Task Force
of the Taguig City Police received a report from an informant about the selling of prohibited drugs by
Musa and her cohorts at Maharlika Village, Taguig City. The police immediately organized a buy-bust
operation which included PO1 Danilo Arago (PO1 Arago) and PO1 Memoracion as team members.
The police agreed that PO1 Memoracion was the designated poseur-buyer; that five one-thousand
peso (PhP 1000) bills with Memoracion’s initials were to be used as marked money; and that
Memoracion’s lighting of the cigarette was the pre-arranged signal to signify the consummation of the
transaction. The buy-bust team submitted a pre-operation report to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency and entered it in the police blotter. Thereafter, the buy-bust team, along with the informant,
proceeded to a nearby shopping mall (Sunshine Mall) where the police had arranged PO1 Memoracion
and the informant to meet with the alleged drug dealers.

The buy-bust team arrived at the mall at around 9:45 p.m. The informant and Memoracion alighted
from the vehicle while the rest of the buy-bust team waited at the parking lot. The informant then
introduced Memoracion, as a potential buyer, to Abas and Solano. PO1 Memoracion then told Abas
and Solano that he wanted to score shabu worth five-thousandpesos (PhP 5,000) but the two replied
that they do not have available stocks on hand. Abas and Solano offered to accompany PO1
Memoracion to Musa who was at a nearby condominium unit at Building II, Maharlika Village.
Memoracion agreed and pretended to go to the comfort room in order to inform PO1 Arago regarding

40
the change of venue. PO1 Memoracion also changed the pre-arranged signal from lighting a cigarette
to a phone ring or "missed call" and asked the rest of the buy-bust team to follow them.

Thereafter, the informant, Memoracion, Abas and Solano boarded a tricycle to Musa’s place. They
arrived at the condominium at around 10:30 in the evening and went to the 4th floor of the building
while the rest of the buy-bust team remained at the ground floor while waiting for

Memoracions’s call. The four met Musa at the hallway outside Unit 403. Abas introduced Memoracion
to Musa as the buyer. Musa then ordered Ara Monongan (Monongan) to count the money. Afterwards,
Musa took from her pocket one (1) heat sealed plastic sachet of shabu and gave it to PO1 Memoracion.
The latter immediately made the call to PO1 Arago who, together with two (2) other police officers,4
proceeded right away to PO1 Memoracion’s location, which was about 15 meters away from the
ground floor.5

Upon seeing accused-appellants, the police officers made the arrest. PO1 Arago confiscated from
Monongan the marked money of five PhP 1000 bills with Memoracion’s initials. PO1 Memoracion, on
the other hand, marked the seized sachet of shabu with "APM" or the initials of accused Aisa Pinasilo
Musa. He then delivered the confiscated item to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City and requested an examination of the substance. The PNP
Crime Lab Report showed that the indicated substance weighing 4.05 grams tested positive for shabu.6

The prosecution likewise presented PO1 Arago, who stood as PO1 Memoracion’s back-up during the
buy-bust operation,7 to corroborate the foregoing version of events.

Version of the Defense

In defense, each of accused-appellants denied the accusations against them and submitted their
respective alibis, as follows:

Accused Aiza Musa claimed that on June 1, 2004, she and her husband, Bakar Musa, went to their
friend Sonny Sagayno’s house, located at Unit 512, Building 2, Maharlika Village, Taguig City, to
discuss their forthcoming travel to Saudi Arabia and that while they were inside Sonny’s house, two
police officers barged into the house, while their companions stood outside, and searched for
prohibited drugs, but found no shabu. Aside from saying that Ara Monongan was her neighbor, she
denied knowing her and Faisah Abas that well.

Accused Ara Monongan averred that from the morning up to 12:00 noon of June 1, 2004, she was
with her aunt Habiba’s house at Unit 403, Building 2, Maharlika Village, Taguig City, washing clothes
and looking over her aunt’s children; that at about 12:00 noon of the same day, a visitor, whose name
was Norma, arrived and that at around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sonny Sagayno, Faisah Abas
and the latter’s textmate, Angie, arrived; that at about 3:00 or 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, policemen
in civilian clothes barged into the house, searched for illegal drugs, but found none, and arrested her;
that she went to stay in her aunt’s place only for a vacation; and that it was the first time she saw
Faisah and Angie. She testified that Aiza was her neighbor but disclaimed knowing her; that she was
17 years old at the time of the complained incident; and that her real name was Ara Nonongan and
not Ara Monongan.

Accused Mike Solano alleged that on June 1, 2004 at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, his cousin
Faisah Abas requested him to accompany to Sunshine Mall to meet her textmate, Angie; that while
Faisah waited for Angie, Mike went to the 2nd floor of the mall for window shopping; that Angie arrived
together with two pregnant women but left at 12:00 o’clock noon to go to a condominium in Maharlika
Village; that after he and the two pregnant women had eaten in Jollibee, a big man sat beside him,
introduced himself as a policeman and ordered him to come with him peacefully and to just explain in
his office. He claimed not knowing Aiza Musa and Ara Monongan and that he saw them for the first
time only when they boarded in the same vehicle.

And, finally, accused Faisah Abas claimed that on that particular day, she and her cousin Mike Solano
proceeded to Sunshine Mall to meet Angie; that she accompanied Angie to Building 2 of Maharlika
Village where they met Angie’s cousin, Sonny Sagayno, at the 5th floor and that they all proceeded to
the 4th floor; that when they were inside Sonny’s house, she saw Ara Monongan, another female
person and three children; that after they had eaten their lunch, she heard a gunshot and discovered
that Sonny was not there anymore; that shortly thereafter, three persons in civilian clothes barged into
the house, introduced themselves as policemen, poked a gun at her and frightened and handcuffed

41
her; that two of the operatives went inside the room and ransacked some of Ara’s belongings; that the
policemen accused her of selling illegal drugs; that no shabu was found in her possession.8

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC found all the accused guilty as charged, to wit:

WHEREFORE, accused Aiza Musa y Pinasilo, Faisah Abas y Mama and Mike Solano y Mlok, are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5, 1st paragraph Article
II, RA 9165 in relation to Article 62, 2nd paragraph of the Revised Penal Code and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Ten Million Pesos (PhP 10, 000, 000.00) and to
pay the costs.

Accused Ara Monongan y Papao is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
PhP 500, 000.00 and to pay the costs. The period of preventive suspension is credited in her favor.9

The RTC gave credence to the testimony of PO1 Memoracion. It found his testimony as "candid,
straightforward, firm, unwavering, nay credible," since it was not shown that PO1 Memoracion was "ill-
motivated in testifying as he did in Court against all accused."10 On the other hand, the RTC rejected
accused-appellants’ defenses of alibi and denial because they failed to present clear and convincing
evidence to establish that it was impossible for them to be at the locus criminis at the time of the buy-
bust operation.11

As regards the penalty imposed, the RTC declared each of the accused liable as principal because it
found the presence of conspiracy among all four accused.12 Citing Article 62 of the Revised Penal
Code,13 it likewise imposed the maximum penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of PhP 10 million
because of its finding that the offense was committed by an organized/syndicated crime group.
However, it reduced the penalty imposed against Monongan because she was a minor at the time of
the commission of the offense.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, all of the accused assailed their conviction and faulted the RTC in finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the sale of dangerous drugs. In their Brief, accused-appellants raised
doubts on the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, and questioned the ruling of
RTC for rejecting their alibis. They also averred that the prosecution failed to establish the corpus
delicti of the offense and that the chain of custody rule under RA 9165 was not complied with since no
physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in their presence or in the presence
of their counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice and an elective official.
Furthermore, they refuted the findings of the RTC that conspiracy existed among them, and that they
were members of an organized/ syndicated crime group.14

Notwithstanding, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC but modified the penalty imposed on
Monongan, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated October 7, 2008 of the trial is affirmed, with modification
that the penalty meted upon accused-appellant Ara Monongan is life imprisonment and fine of
P10,000,000, but the case is hereby remanded to trial court for appropriate disposition under Section
51, RA No. 9344 with respect to said accused – appellant.

The Decision is affirmed in all other respects.15

The CA ruled that the RTC erred in reducing the penalty of reclusion temporal in favor of Monongan.
It reasoned that the penalty of life imprisonment as provided in RA 9165 cannot be lowered because
only the penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code, and not in special laws, may be lowered by
one or two degrees.16

The Issues

42
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses?

II

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the ruling of the RTC in rejecting accused-appellants
denials and alibis?

III

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was compliance with the chain of custody rule
as required by RA 9165?

IV

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in imposing the maximum penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of ten million pesos (Php 10,000,000) against ALL of the accused?

The Ruling of this Court

We sustain the conviction of accused-appellants.

In determining the guilt of the accused for the sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution is obliged to
establish the following essential elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the
sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. There must be proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place and that the corpus delicti be presented in court as
evidence.17

In finding the existence of these elements, the trial and appellate courts in the present case upheld
the credibility of the testimony of PO1 Memoracion, as supported by the testimony of PO1 Arago. In
this regard, We find no sufficient reason to interfere with the findings of the RTC on the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses pursuant to the principle that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility
of a witness is entitled to great weight and sometimes, even with finality.18 Where there is no showing
that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its
discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of the facts and the credibility of the
witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during
trial.19 The rationale behind this principle was explained by the Court in People v. Dinglasan,20 to wit:

In the matter of credibility of witnesses, we reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the
factual findings of the trial court should be respected. The judge a quo was in a better position to pass
judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when they testified and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying. It is doctrinally settled that the evaluation of the
testimony of the witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect, because it
had the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the
truth. This assessment is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it
was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value
that if considered might affect the result of the case. (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, the factual findings of the RTC are strengthened by an affirmatory ruling of the CA. Settled
is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are binding
on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness,
capriciousness or palpable error.21 Absent any indication that the courts a quo committed
misinterpretation of antecedents or grave abuse of discretion, the facts as established by the trial and
appellate courts deserve full weight and credit, and are deemed conclusive.22

As regards accused-appellants’ denial and claim of frame-up, the trial and appellate courts correctly
ruled that these defenses cannot stand unless the defense could show with clear and convincing
evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired with ill motives or that they were not
properly performing their duties. The defenses of denial and frame-up are invariably viewed with
disfavor because such defenses can easily be fabricated and are common ploy in prosecutions for the
illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs.23 Here, in the absence of evidence showing ill motives
on the part of the members of the buy-bust team, accused-appellants’ denials and plea of frame-up

43
deserve scant consideration in light of the positive identification made by PO1 Memoracion and PO1
Arago.

Similarly, accused-appellants’ alibis failed to fortify their claim of innocence because, while they insist
on their own version of events, they failed to demonstrate compliance with the requisites of the defense
of alibi. In People v. Apattad,24 the Court reiterated the jurisprudential rules and precepts in assessing
the defense of alibi:

One, alibis and denials are generally disfavored by the courts for being weak. Two, they cannot prevail
1âwphi 1

over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. Three, for alibi to
prosper, the accused must prove not only that they were somewhere else when the crime was
committed, but also that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission. Fourth, alibi assumes significance or strength only when it is amply
corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses. Fifth, alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the
credibility of witnesses, and the assessment made by the trial court — unless patently and clearly
inconsistent — must be accepted.

It is clear, therefore, that in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused should demonstrate,
by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she was somewhere else when the buy-bust operation
was conducted, and that it was physically impossible for him or her to be present at the scene of the
crime either before, during, or after the offense was committed.25 It is on this thrust that the alibis made
by accused-appellants failed to convince since all of them admitted that they were within the vicinity
of Building 2, Maharlika Village, Taguig City, which, apparently, was the locus criminis of the offense.
Furthermore, considering that alibi as evidence is negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain
more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive
evidence.26

Anent the third issue, accused-appellants demand their acquittal on the ground that the chain of
custody rule under Section 21 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was
not complied with. The said section states:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,

Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory

Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Corollarily, the law’s Implementing Rules and Regulations provides:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and

44
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied.)

At this juncture, We reiterate that the essence of the chain of custody rule is to ensure that the
dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same dangerous drug
recovered from his or her possession.27 As explained in Castro v. People:28

As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the presentation and
admission of the seized prohibited drug as an exhibit be preceded by evidence to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent clams it to be. This requirement is essential to obviate
the possibility of substitution as well as to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence
are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements and custody of the seized
prohibited item, from the accused, to the police, to the forensic laboratory for examination, and to its
presentation in evidence in court. Ideally, the custodial chain would include testimony about every link
in the chain or movements of the illegal drug, from the moment of seizure until it is finally adduced in
evidence. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that a testimony about a perfect chain is almost
always impossible to obtain. (Emphasis supplied.)

Since the "perfect chain" is almost always impossible to obtain, non-compliance with Sec. 21 of RA
9165, as stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations, does not, without more, automatically
render the seizure of the dangerous drug void, and evidence is admissible as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.29

In the present case, accused-appellants insist on the police officer’s non-compliance with the chain of
custody rule since there was "no physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in
their presence or in the presence of their counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice and an elective official."

We, however, find these observations insignificant since a review of the evidence on record shows
that the chain of custody rule has been sufficiently observed by the apprehending officers. Thru the
testimonies of the PO1 Memoracion and PO1 Arago, the prosecution was able to prove that the shabu
seized from Musa was the very same shabu presented in evidence as part of the corpus delicti. The
factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are elucidating:

Here, the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution showed that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the "shabu" was preserved. Contrary to the accused-appellants
allegations, the shabu specimen presented in court by the prosecution was the same item received
from accused-appellant Aiza Musa by PO1 Memoracion. The buy-bust operation was conducted about
10:30 in the evening of June 1, 2004. Immediately thereafter, PO1 Memoracion marked the seized
sachet of shabu with his initials "APM" at the masking tape, and the accused-appellants were turned
over to the police station for investigation. At 1:55H of June 2, 2004, PO1 Memoracion delivered to
the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, SPD Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, a Request for Laboratory Examination
dated June 2, 2004, together with the sachet of shabu seized form accused-appellant Aiza Musa.
Stamped on the right portion of the Request for Examination shows the time and date of delivery at
"01:55H 02 June 04", "RECEIVED BY: Nup Bacayan" and "DELIVERED BY: PO1 Memoracion." Thus:

e) Evidence Submitted

One (1) transparent plastic sachet (heat sealed) containing white crystalline substance suspected to
be Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu marked "APM". (item purchased from Aiza Musa)

At 0300H 02 June 2004, the PNP Crime Laboratory Southern Police District Crime Laboratory, Fort
A. Bonifacio, Taguig Metro Manila issued Physical Science Report No. D-439-04S stating that the heat
salad plastic sachet with markings "APM" containing 4.05 grams of crystalline substance yielded
positive for shabu.

Also it bears stressing that during the hearing on May 28, 2007, accused-appellants, thru their counsel,
stipulated on the testimony of the forensic chemist, Police Inspector Richard Allan Manganib, with
respect to his forensic examination of the subject sachet of shabu. Clearly, the integrity of the sachet
of "shabu" was duly preserved as it was duly marked by PO1 Rey Memoracion and it was the very
same item transmitted to and examined by the PNP Crime Laboratory.30 (Emphasis supplied.)

45
It is likewise significant to note that a similar conclusion was reached in People v. Presas 31 where the
Court disposed, as follows:

In this case, the failure on the part of the MADAC operatives to take photographs and make an
inventory of the drugs seized from the appellant was not fatal because the prosecution was able to
preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the said illegal drugs. The concurrence of all elements
of the illegal sale of shabu was proven by the prosecution. The chain of custody did not appear to be
broken. The recovery and handling of the seized drugs were satisfactorily established. Fariñas was
able to put the necessary markings on the plastic sachet of shabu bought from appellant immediately
after the consummation of the drug sale. This was done in the presence of appellant and the other
operatives, and while in the crime scene. The seized items were then brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination on the same day. Both prosecution witnesses were able to identify and
explain said markings in court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, the fact that the PO1 Memoracion and PO1 Arago did not make an inventory of the seized
items or that they did not take photographs of them is not fatal considering that the prosecution in this
case was able to establish, with moral certainty, that the identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the
shabu was not jeopardized from the time of its seizure until the time it was presented in court.

Furthermore, We find enlightenment in People v. Vicente, Jr.:32

Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation. Oft-repeated is the rule that in cases involving violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police
officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is
evidence to the contrary. Absent any indication that the police officers were ill-motivated in testifying
against the accused, full credence should be given to their testimonies.33 (Emphasis supplied.)

As stated, the records are bereft of any showing that PO1 Memoracion and PO1 Arago were ill
motivated in testifying against accused-appellants. Neither was there any indication that they were in
bad faith nor had digressed from their ordinary tour of duty. There is, therefore, no cogent basis to
taint their testimonies with disbelief. Hence, We submit to the presumption that both of them and the
other police officers involved in the buy-bust operation had performed faithfully the matters with which
they are charged, and that they acted within the sphere of their authority. Omnia praesumumtur rite
esse acta (All things are presumed to have been done regularly).

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the RTC and
CA in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating of Sec. 5, RA 9165 for
selling dangerous drugs.

Notwithstanding, We rule that the penalty imposed against the accused-appellants must be modified.

With reference to accused-appellant Monongan, the RTC found her to be a minor or 17 years old at
the time of the commission of the offense.34 Accordingly, it imposed the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.35 On appeal, the CA increased the
penalty of Monongan to life imprisonment.36

However, We find these impositions contrary to prevailing jurisprudence. In the recent People v.
Mantalaba,37 where the accused was likewise 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense,
the Court held, inter alia, that: (a) pursuant to Sec. 98 of RA 9165, the penalty for acts punishable by
life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death when the
offender is a minor; and (b) that the penalty should be graduated since the said provision adopted the
technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code.38 The Court in the said
case established the rules as follows:

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in fixing the
penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the
proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium
period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating

46
circumstance. The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been
originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a
divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be
the proper imposable penalty. (Emphasis supplied.)

Therefore, the penalty of imprisonment imposed against Monongan should mirror the ruling of the
Court in Mantalaba in the absence of any mitigating circumstance or aggravating circumstance other
than the minority of Monongan. Consequently, the penalty of imprisonment imposed on Monongan
should be six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

As regards the fine imposed, the RTC sentenced accused-appellants the maximum fine of PhP 10
million on the ground that accused-appellants sold shabu as members of an organized crime group39
or a drug syndicate. It ruled that Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 23 of RA
7659, mandates that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any
person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.40 These findings were eventually affirmed
by CA.41

The records, however, are bereft of any proof that accused-appellants operated as members of a drug
syndicate. By definition, a drug syndicate is any organized group of two (2) or more persons forming
or joining together with the intention of committing any offense prescribed under RA 9165.42 In
determining whether or not the offense was committed by any person belonging to an
organized/syndicated crime group, We are guided by the ruling in People v. Alberca43 where the Court,
after scrutinizing the deliberations held by Congress on what is now Art. 62, paragraph 1(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, held:

We hold that the trial court erred in finding that accused-appellant and his companions constituted a
syndicated or an organized crime group within the meaning of Article 62, as amended. While it is true
they confederated and mutually helped one another for the purpose of gain, there is no proof that they
were a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence
of a syndicated or organized crime group.

xxxx

What emerges from this discussion is the idea of a group of persons; at least two in number, which is
organized for the purpose of committing crimes for gain." (Emphasis supplied.)

Applying this principle in Alberca, the Court held in People v. Santiago:44

Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7659, mandates
that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs
to an organized/syndicated crime group. The same article defines an organized/syndicated crime
group as a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating, or mutually helping one another
for the purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.

xxxx

While the existence of conspiracy among appellants in selling shabu was duly established, there was
no proof that appellants were a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain,
which is the essence of the aggravating circumstance of organized/syndicated group under Article 62
of the Revised Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

We find the present case similar to Santiago. The existence of conspiracy among accused-appellants
in selling shabu was duly established, but the prosecution failed to provide proof that they operated as
an organized group or as a drug syndicate. Consequently, the aggravating circumstance that "the
offense was committed by an organized/syndicated group" cannot

be appreciated. Thus, the maximum PhP 10 million imposed by the trial and appellate courts upon
each of accused-appellants should be modified accordingly.

47
This is in consonance with the dictum in Criminal Law that the existence of aggravating circumstances
must be based on positive and conclusive proof, and not merely on hypothetical facts no matter how
truthful the suppositions and presumptions may seem45 Aggravating circumstances which are taken
into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty imposed must be proved
with equal certainty as the commission of the act charged as criminal offense.46

Incidentally, a survey of recent jurisprudence47 shows that the Court has consistently imposed a fine of
five hundred thousand pesos (PhP 500,000) for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II RA 9165 in the absence of
any aggravating circumstance.

WHEREFORE, The February 28, 2011 CA Decision CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03758 finding accused-
appellants guilty of violating Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS
that: (a) accused-appellant Ara Monongan y Papao is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (b) each of the
accused-appellants shall pay a fine in the amount of five hundred thousand pesos (PhP 500,000).

SO ORDERED.

48
 THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 186128

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,

BERSAMIN,

ABAD, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

SUSAN LATOSA y CHICO, Promulgated:

Accused-Appellant. June 23, 2010

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated April 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02192 which affirmed the April 12, 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 159, convicting appellant Susan Latosa y Chico of parricide.

49
 Appellant was charged with parricide in an information3 which reads,

That, on or about the 5th of February 2002, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the legitimate wife of
one Felixberto Latosa y Jaudalso, armed with and using an unlicensed gun, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot her husband, Felixberto Latosa y Jaudalso, hitting him on the head,
thereby causing the latter to sustain gunshot wound which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment on June 25, 2002, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial
thereafter ensued.

The prosecutions evidence established the following version:

On February 5, 2002, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, appellant and her husband Major Felixberto
Latosa, Sr. (Felixberto) together with two (2) of their children, Sassymae Latosa (Sassymae) and Michael Latosa
(Michael), were at their house in Fort Bonifacio. Felixberto, Sr. was then asleep4 when Sassymae saw appellant
take Felixberto Sr.s gun from the cabinet and leave. She asked her mother where she was going and if she could
come along, but appellant refused.5

Moments later, appellant returned and told Sassymae to buy ice cream at the commissary. Appellant
gave her money and asked her to leave.6 After Sassymae left, appellant instructed Michael to follow his sister,
but he refused as he was hungry. Appellant insisted and further told Michael not to make any noise as his father
was sleeping. Nevertheless, appellant went back inside the house and turned up the volume of the television and
the radio to full.7 Shortly after that, she came out again and gave Michael some money to buy food at the grocery.

Instead of buying food, Michael bought ice candy and returned to the barracks located at the back of
their house. Michael thereupon saw his friend Mac-Mac Nisperos who told him that he saw appellant running
away from their house. Michael did not pay any attention to his friends comment, and simply continued eating
his ice candy. Moments later, a certain Sgt. Ramos arrived and asked if something had happened in their house.

50
Michael replied in the negative then entered their house. At that point, he saw his father lying on the bed with a
hole in the left portion of his head and a gun at his left hand.

Michael immediately went outside and informed Sgt. Ramos about what happened. Sgt. Ramos told
him that appellant had reported the shooting incident to the Provost Marshall office.8 Then, Sassymae arrived
and saw her father with a bullet wound on his head and a gun near his left hand.9

Felixberto Latosa, Jr., one (1) of the legitimate sons of appellant and the victim, also testified that
sometime in December 2001, their father told him and his siblings over dinner about a threat to their lives by a
certain Efren Sta. Inez.10

Appellant, testifying on her own behalf, on the other hand claimed that when Felixberto, Sr. woke up,
he asked her to get his service pistol from the cabinet adjacent to their bed. As she was handing the pistol to him
it suddenly fired, hitting Felixberto, Sr. who was still lying down. Shocked, she ran quickly to Felixberto, Sr.s
office and asked for help.11 She also claimed that when Felixberto, Sr. asked her for his gun, she was on her
way out of the house to follow her children who left for the market on an errand she had earlier given Sassymae.
She claimed that she wanted to drive for them because it was hot. She ran after them but after a few minutes,
when she realized that she did not have with her the keys to their jeep, she went back to their house. Felixberto,
Sr. then asked again for his gun, and it was then that it fired as she was handing it to him.12

Appellant further described herself as a good mother and a good provider for their six (6) children whom
she raised by herself while Felixberto, Sr. was in Mindanao. She claimed that they testified against her because
they were manipulated by her brother-in-law, Francisco Latosa.13 She denied that Sassymae saw her holding a
gun when she asked her to buy ice cream, alleging that Michael and Sassymae saw her holding the gun only
when she placed it inside the cabinet before they proceeded to the hospital.14

51
 Appellant also denied her childrens testimony15 that she was having an affair with a certain Col. Efren
Sta. Inez (Sta. Inez), a policeman. She claimed that she first met Sta. Inez when her youngest brother was killed
on June 6, 2001 by unidentified men. Sta. Inez was the one (1) who assisted her. She was alone at that time since
her husband informed her that he could not leave his post in Mindanao for he had to rush some papers. She
allegedly only saw Sta. Inez twice but admitted that Sta. Inez went to the precinct when he learned of the shooting
incident.16 She also denied that she was terminated from her job at the Philippine Public Safety College due to
immorality for having said affair. She claimed that she was terminated because she had incurred numerous
absences from her work as she grieved the death of her youngest brother and had lost interest in her work after
his death.17

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for killing her husband Felixberto, Sr. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused SUSAN
LATOSA Y CHICO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide under Art.
246 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 in rel. to Sec. 1[,] 3rd par. PD 1866 as
amended by RA 8294 and Sec. 5, RA 8294 and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to further indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000 as
civil indemnity[,] P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.18

The RTC held that the claim of accidental shooting was inconsistent with the evidence considering the
location of the gunshot wound, which was at the left temple of Felixberto, Sr., and the fact that the gun was
found near Felixberto, Sr.s left hand despite his being right-handed. The trial court found that appellant planned
the killing by asking her two (2) children to leave the house and, after the shooting, placing the gun near the
victims left hand to suggest that the death was suicide. But appellant overlooked the fact that Felixberto, Sr. was
right-handed. The trial court noted that despite the grueling cross-examination of the defense counsel, the Latosa
children never wavered in their testimonies about what they knew regarding the circumstances surrounding the
shooting incident. Their testimonies bore the hallmarks of truth as they were consistent on material points. The
RTC found it inconceivable that the children would testify against their own mother or concoct a story of
parricide unless they were impelled by their passion to condemn an injustice done to their father.19

52
 The RTC, in finding appellant guilty, considered the following circumstantial evidence established by
the prosecution: (1) shortly before the shooting, appellant asked her two (2) children to do errands for her which
were not usually asked of them; (2) at the time of the shooting, only the appellant and Felixberto, Sr. were in the
house; (3) appellant was seen running away from the house immediately after the shooting; (4) when Michael
went inside their house, he found his father with a hole in the head and a gun in his left hand; (5) the medico-
legal report showed that the cause of death was intracranial hemorrhage due to the gunshot wound on the head
with the point of entry at the left temporal region; (6) the Firearms Identification Report concluded that appellant
fired two (2) shots; (7) Felixberto, Sr. was right-handed and the gun was found near his left hand; (8) Sassymae
testified that she heard Sta. Inez tell appellant bakit mo inamin. Sana pinahawak mo kay Major iyong baril saka
mo pinutok; (9) appellants children testified that they were informed by Felixberto, Sr. regarding the threat of
appellants paramour, Sta. Inez, to the whole family; and (10) Francisco Latosa presented a memorandum
showing that appellant was terminated from her teaching job by reason of immorality.20

On appeal, the CA upheld the decision of the RTC. The CA held that since appellant admitted having
killed her husband albeit allegedly by accident, she has the burden of proving the presence of the exempting
circumstance of accident to relieve herself of criminal responsibility. She must rely on the strength of her own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the
appellant has admitted the killing.21

The CA, however, found appellants version of accidental shooting not credible. Citing the case of
People v. Reyes,22 the CA held that appellants claim of accidental shooting was negated by the following facts:
(1) a revolver is not prone to accidental firing as pressure on the trigger is necessary to make the gun fire, cocked
or uncocked; and (2) when handing a gun to a person, the barrel or muzzle is never pointed to that person. In this
case, appellant held the gun in one (1) hand and extended it towards her husband who was still lying in bed.
Assuming that appellant was not aware of the basic firearm safety rule that the firearms muzzle is never pointed
to a person, she failed to explain why the gun would accidentally fire, when it should not have fired unless there
was pressure on the trigger. The location of Felixberto, Sr.s wound also showed that the shooting was not
accidental. Appellant did not dispute that Felixberto, Sr. was lying down during the shooting and that after the
incident, the gun was found near his left hand. The CA found that it was contrary to human nature that a newly
awakened military man would suddenly ask his wife, who was busy doing other things, to bring his firearm, and
patiently wait for her to come back to their house, when the gun was just inside an adjacent cabinet only two (2)
meters away from his bed.23

53
 The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 159, in Criminal Case No. 122621-H finding SUSAN LATOSA y
CHICO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering
her to pay the heirs of Felixberto Latosa the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.24

Undaunted, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on May 12, 2008.25

Appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to prove
that she intentionally killed her husband. She insists that the gun fired accidentally while she was giving it to
Felixberto, Sr. Since she had no experience in handling firearms, she was not able to foresee that it would fire
accidentally and hit her husband. After her husband was hit, she immediately rushed to his office and asked for
assistance.26

The only issue the Court has to resolve in this case is whether the exempting circumstance of accident
was established by appellant.

The basis of appellants defense of accidental shooting is Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, which provides:

ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are
exempt from criminal liability:

xxxx

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.

Thus, it was incumbent upon appellant to prove with clear and convincing evidence, the following
essential requisites for the exempting circumstance of accident, to wit:

1. She was performing a lawful act;

2. With due care;
3. She caused the injury to her husband by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.27

54
 To prove the circumstance she must rely on the strength of her own evidence and not on the weakness
of that of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the
killing.28

However, by no stretch of imagination could the pointing of the gun towards her husbands head and
pulling the trigger be considered as performing a lawful act with due care. As correctly found by the CA, which
we quote in full:

Appellants version that she accidentally shot her husband is not credible. Appellants
manner of carrying the caliber .45 pistol negates her claim of due care in the performance of an
act. The location of the wound sustained by the victim shows that the shooting was not merely
accidental. The victim was lying down and the fact that the gun was found near his left hand
was not directly disputed by her. We find it contrary to human nature that a newly awakened
military man would suddenly ask his wife for his firearm, and even patiently wait for her return
to the house, when the said firearm was just inside the cabinet which, according to appellant,
was just about two meters away from his bed.

xxxx

In the case at bench, appellant held the gun in one hand and extended it towards her
husband who was still lying in bed. Assuming arguendo that appellant has never learned how
to fire a gun and was merely handing the firearm over to the deceased, the muzzle is never
pointed to a person, a basic firearms safety rule which appellant is deemed to have already
known since she admitted, during trial, that she sometimes handed over the gun to her husband.
Assuming further that she was not aware of this basic rule, it needed explaining why the gun
would accidentally fire, when it should not, unless there was pressure on the trigger.29

There is no merit in appellants contention that the prosecution failed to prove by circumstantial evidence
her motive in killing her husband. Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element of the offense on which
her conviction rests. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the
means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct
of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under
which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act
of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.30

In the instant case, the following circumstantial evidence considered by the RTC and affirmed by the
CA satisfactorily established appellants intent to kill her husband and sustained her conviction for the crime, to
wit:

The prosecution established the following circumstantial evidence:

(1) Susan Latosa, the accused, asked her twins to do errands for her. She first asked
Sassymae to go to Commissary to buy ice cream, thereafter, she asked Michael to follow his sister

55
 at the Commissary which according to the prosecution witnesses was not the usual thing the
accused would do;

(2) Thereafter, it was only the accused and the victim who were left alone in the house;

(3) After the witness Michael, son of the accused and the victim left and proceeded at
the barracks located at the back of their house, Susan Latosa was seen running away from the
house by Michaels friend named Macmac;

(4) Immediately thereafter, Michael Latosa went inside the room of their barracks and
saw his father with sort of a hole in the head, blood on the nose and had a gun in his left hand
(TSN, May 5, 2003, pp. 7-8, 12-13);

(5) The cause of death of the victim Felixberto Latosa was intracranial hemorrhage
due to gunshot wound of the head (per Medico-legal Report No. M-052-2002, Exh. P);

(6) Susan Latosas paraffin test yielded positive result for the presence of gunpowder
nitrate in her right hand;

xxx

(8) The point of entry of the gunshot wound found on the victim was located at the left
temporal region as evidenced by Medico Legal Report No. M-052-2002 (Exhibit P);

(9) The victim was a right-handed and the gun was found on the latters left hand;

(10) Sassymae Latosa [testified] that she heard Col. Sta. Inez [tell] her mother, bakit
mo inamin. Sana pinahawak mo kay Major iyong baril saka mo pinutok. (TSN, May 19, 2002,
p. 13); and

(11) The children testified that they were informed by the victim regarding the threat
of Sta. Inez to the whole family who alleged[ly] has an amorous relationship with their mother.
Francisco Latosa presented a memorandum that accused was terminated from her teaching job
by reason of immorality.31

Moreover, the Court finds no cogent reason to review much less depart now from the findings of the
RTC as affirmed by the CA that appellants version is undeserving of credence. It is doctrinally settled that the
assessments of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court,
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude under grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses
and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the
entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to
accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on
appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted
so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.32 We find none in this case.

One last note. On the matter of damages, the CA awarded exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00. We increase the award to P30,000.00 in light of prevailing jurisprudence33 fixing the award of
exemplary damages to said amount.

56
 WHEREFORE, the appeal of Susan Latosa y Chico is DISMISSED. The April 23, 2008 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02192 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
amount of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

57
 THIRD DIVISION

October 4, 2017

G.R. No. 200026

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ARMANDO DELECTOR, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This case involves a brother fatally shooting his own brother. In his defense, the accused pleaded
accident as an exempting circumstance. The trial and intermediate appellate courts rejected his plea
and found him guilty of murder qualified by treachery. Hence, he has come to us to air his final appeal
for absolution.

The Case

Under review is the decision promulgated on September 22, 2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision rendered on March 17, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, in
Gandara, Samar convicting the accused of murder for the killing of the late Vicente Delector, and
penalizing him with reclusion perpetua, with modification by increasing moral damages to ₱50,000.00.2

Antecedents

At about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 8, 1997, the late Vicente Delector was talking with his
brother, Antolin, near his residence in Barangay Diaz in Gandara, Samar when the accused, another
brother, shot him twice. Vicente was rushed to the Gandara District Hospital where he was attended
to by Dr. Leonida Taningco, but he was later on transferred to the Samar Provincial Hospital where he
succumbed to his gunshot wounds at about 1:00 a.m. of the next day.3

Vicente's son, Amel, identified his uncle, the accused, as his father's assailant. Amel attested that the
accused had fired his gun at his father from their mother's house,4 and had hit his father who was then
talking with Antolin. Corroborating Amel's identification was Raymond Reyes, who had happened to
be along after having come from his school. Raymond also said that Vicente had been only conversing
with Antolin when the accused shot him twice.5

On October 2, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar charged the accused with murder
in the RTC through the following information, viz.:

That on or about the 8th day of August, 1997, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at Barangay Diaz,
Municipality of Gandara, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
VICENTE DELECTOR alias TINGTING with the use of a firearm (revolver), which the accused had
conveniently provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the
different parts of his body, which caused the untimely death of said Vicente Delector.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

58
In his defense, the accused insisted during the trial that the shooting of Vicente had been by accident.
His own son corroborated his insistence. According to them, Vicente had gone to their house looking
for him, but he had earlier left to go to their mother's house nearby in order to avoid a confrontation
with Vicente; however, Vicente followed him to their mother's house and dared him to come out,
compelling Antolin to intervene and attempt to pacify Vicente. Instead, Vicente attacked Antolin, which
forced the accused to go out of their mother's house. Seeing Vicente to be carrying his gun, he tried
to wrest the gun from Vicente, and they then grappled with each other for control of the gun. At that
point, the gun accidentally fired, and Vicente was hit.7

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered its decision,8 finding the accused guilty of murder, and disposing:

WHEREFORE, accused Armando Delector is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and is hereby meted a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Accused shall likewise indemnify the heirs of Vicente Delector the sum of Php50,000.00, actual
damages of Phpl2,000.00, moral damages of Php30,000.00 and costs.

In line with Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Warden of the Sub-Provincial
Jail, Calbayog City, is hereby directed to immediately transmit the living body of the accused Armando
Delector to the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila where he may remain to be
detained. The accused shall be credited for the period he was under preventive detention provided he
has previously expressed his written conformity to comply with the discipline, rules and regulations by
the detention center, otherwise he shall be entitled to only 4/5 thereof pursuant to Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED.9

Decision of the CA

Aggrieved, the accused appealed, contending that:

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED GIVING FULL FAITH AND CEREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES; and

II

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.

Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the conviction for murder subject to an increase of the moral damages
to ₱50,000.00,10 to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the
appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court in Criminal Case No. 3403
with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is increased to ₱50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

The CA opined that the exempting circumstance of accident was highly improbable, stating:

Indeed, given the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim, it is highly improbable that the
same was due to an accident. It is unlikely that the accused-appellant would purposely set out and
grapple with the victim who, if he is to be believed, was already armed with a gun while he (accused-
appellant) was totally unarmed. Such actuation is utterly inconsistent with the ordinary and normal
behavior of one who is facing imminent danger to one's life, considering the primary instinct of self-
preservation. But then, even granting that the accused-appellant merely acted in defense of his other

59
brother, Antolin, his failure to help or show concern to the victim, who was also his brother, casts
serious doubts to his defense of accident.

Furthermore, a revolver, the gun involved in this case, is not one that is prone to accidental firing
because of the nature of its mechanism. Considerable pressure on the trigger must have been applied
for it to have fired.11

Hence, this appeal, in which the accused insists that:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES. 1âwphi1

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.12

On its part, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted its appellee’s brief
maintaining that the evidence of guilt was sufficient, but recommending that the crime for which the
accused should be held guilty of was homicide, not murder, considering that the records did not
support the holding that he had deliberately and consciously adopted a method of attack that would
insure the death of the victim; and that evident premeditation was not also shown to be attendant.13

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the decision of the CA that accident could not be appreciated in favor of the accused, but
we must find and declare that, indeed, the crime committed was homicide, not murder.

To start with, the lower courts did not err in giving more credence to the testimonies of the
Prosecution's witnesses instead of to the testimony of the accused and his son. Arnel and Raymond
positively identified the accused as the assailant. Their identification constituted direct evidence of the
commission of the crime, and was fully corroborated by the recollection of a disinterested witness in
the person of Dr. Taningco, the attending physician of the victim at the Gandara District Hospital, to
the effect that the victim had declared to the police investigator interviewing him that it was the accused
who had shot him.14 The testimonies of Raymond and Dr. Taningco are preferred to the self-serving
and exculpatory declarations of the accused and his son.

The factual findings of the RTC are accorded the highest degree of respect, especially if, as now, the
CA adopted and confirmed them. Unlike the appellate courts, including ours, the trial judge had the
unique firsthand opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses when they testified
at the trial, which were factors in the proper appreciation of evidence of past events. Such factual
findings should be final and conclusive on appeal unless there is a demonstrable error in appreciation,
or a misapprehension of the facts.15

Secondly, the RTC and the CA both observed that the exempting circumstance of accident was highly
improbable because the accused grappled with the victim for control of the gun. We see no reason to
overturn the observations of the lower courts.

Article 12, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability "(a)ny person who,
while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention
of causing it." The elements of this exempting circumstance are, therefore, that the accused: (1) is
performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) causes injury to another by mere accident; and (4)
without fault or intention of causing it.

Accident could not be appreciated herein as an exempting circumstance simply because the accused
did not establish that he had acted with due care, and without fault or intention of causing the injuries
to the victim. The gun was a revolver that would not fire unless there was considerable pressure
applied on its trigger, or its hammer was pulled back and released. The assertion of accident could
have been accorded greater credence had there been only a single shot fired, for such a happenstance
could have been attributed to the unintentional pulling of the hammer during the forceful grappling for
control of the gun. Yet, the revolver fired twice, which we think eliminated accident. Verily, the CA itself

60
pointedly debunked the story of the accused as to how the accident had occurred by characterizing
such story not only incomprehensible but also contrary to human experience and behavior.16 We adopt
and reiterate the following observations by the CA:

... had the accused really been grappling and twisting the victim's right hand which was holding a gun,
the latter would not have sustained the wounds. It was improbable that the gun would fire not only
once but twice and both times hitting the victim, had its trigger not been pulled. Further, the location
of the gunshot wounds belies and negate(d) accused (appellant's) claim of accident.

Also, the Court finds incredible [the] accused (appellant's) allegation that he did not know that the
victim was hit. He admitted there were two gun reports. The natural tendency of (a) man in his situation
would (be to) investigate what was hit. He surely must have known his brother was hit as he even said
he let go of the gun. Then he said his brother went home so he also went home. It is odd that he did
not attempt to help or show concern for the victim, his brother, had his intention (been) really merely
to pacify.17

We reiterate that issues concerning the credibility of the witnesses and their account of the events are
best resolved by the trial court whose calibration of testimonies, and assessment of and conclusion
about their testimonies are generally given conclusive effect. This settled rule acknowledges that,
indeed, the trial court had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the
witnesses, and is thus in the best position to discern whether they were telling or distorting the truth.18

Nonetheless, the Court cannot uphold the judgments of the CA and the RTC and convict the accused
for murder. A reading of the information indicates that murder had not been charged against him. The
allegation of the information that:-

x x x the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one VICENTE
DELECTOR alias TING TING with the use of a firearm (revolver), which the accused had conveniently
provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the different parts
of his body, which caused the untimely death of said Vicente Delector.

did not sufficiently aver acts constituting either or both treachery and evident premeditation. The usage
of the terms treachery and evident premeditation, without anything more, did not suffice considering
that such terms were in the nature of conclusions of law, not factual averments.

The sufficiency of the information is to be judged by the rule under which the information against the
accused was filed. In this case, that rule was Section 9, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provided thusly:

Section 9. Cause of accusation. - The acts or om1ss1ons complained of as constituting the offense
must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the
statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. (8)

Section 9 required that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated
"in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining
the offense." As such, the nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the
specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated but by the facts alleged in the
indictment, that is, the actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of the information, and not the
caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated, they being conclusions of law.19 The facts alleged in the body of the information,
not the technical name given by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information, determine the
character of the crime.20

To enable "a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged," as
Section 9 further required, the courts should be mindful that the accused should be presumed innocent
of wrongdoing, and was thus completely unaware of having done anything wrong in relation to the
accusation. The information must then sufficiently give him or her the knowledge of what he or she
allegedly committed. To achieve this, the courts should assiduously take note of what Justice Moreland
appropriately suggested in United States v. Lim San,21and enforce compliance therewith by the State,
to wit:

61
xxxx Notwithstanding apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we ought to
say and hold that the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is
immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts stated in the body of the pleading must determine the
crime of which the defendant stands charged and for which he must be tried. The establishment of
this doctrine is permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common
sense and with the requirements of plain justice.

xxxx

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. xxx. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else,
should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given
in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter
of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute.
The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the
body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the
accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need
not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his
substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the
manner alleged?" If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the
name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the
crime is or what it is named. x x x.

In People v. Dimaano,22the Court has reiterated the foregoing guideline thuswise:

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being
mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as
is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element
of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused
of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
(Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

If the standards of sufficiency defined and set by the applicable rule of procedure were not followed,
the consequences would be dire for the State, for the accused could be found and declared guilty only
of the crime properly charged in the information. As declared in People v. Manalili:23

x x x an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or

information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would
be violative of this constitutional right. Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly
proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him.

Article 14, paragraph 16, of the Revised Penal Code states that "[t]here is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which offended party might make." For treachery to be appreciated, therefore, two elements
must concur, namely: (1) that the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or herself, or retaliate; and (2) that the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted,24 that is, the means, method or form of execution must be shown
to be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender.25

62
Treachery, which the CA and the RTC ruled to be attendant, always included basic constitutive
elements whose existence could not be assumed. Yet, the information nowhere made any factual
averment about the accused having deliberately employed means, methods or forms in the execution
of the act - setting forth such means, methods or forms in a manner that would enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense was intended to be charged - that tended directly and
specially to insure its execution without risk to the accused arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. To reiterate what was earlier indicated, it was not enough for the information to
merely state treachery as attendant because the term was not a factual averment but a conclusion of
law.

The submission of the Office of the Solicitor General that neither treachery nor evident premeditation
had been established against the accused is also notable. A review reveals that the record did not
include any showing of the presence of the elements of either circumstance.

As a consequence, the accused could not be properly convicted of murder, but only of homicide, as
defined and penalized under Article 249, Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another
without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be
deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

The accused is entitled to the benefits under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Thus, the minimum of
his indeterminate sentence should come from prision mayor, and the maximum from the medium
period of reclusion temporal due to the absence of any modifying circumstance. Accordingly, the
indeterminate sentence is nine years of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 14 years, eight months and
one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum.

Conformably with People v. Jugueta,26the Court grants to the heirs of the late Vicente Delector
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages
(in lieu of actual damages for burial expenses), plus interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
decision until the full satisfaction.

The records show that the accused was first detained at the SubProvincial Jail in Calbayog City on
November 19, 1997,27 and was transferred by the RTC on July 18, 2003 following his conviction for
murder to the custody of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.28 Under the terms
of this decision, the period of his actual imprisonment has exceeded his maximum sentence, and now
warrants his immediate release from his place of confinement.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 22, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals subject to the MODIFICATION that accused ARMANDO DELECTOR is found and
pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and, ACCORDINGLY, sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate sentence of NINE YEARS OF PRIS/ON MAYOR, AS THE MINIMUM, TO 14
YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, AS THE MAXIMUM; and
ORDERS him to pay to the heirs of the late Vicente Delector ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00
as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from the
finality of this decision until the full satisfaction, and the costs of suit.

Considering that accused ARMANDO DELECTOR appears to have been in continuous detention
since November 19, 1997, his immediate release from the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa City, Metro
Manila is ordered unless there are other lawful causes warranting his continuing detention.

The Court DIRECTS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to immediately implement this decision,
and to render a report on his compliance within 10 days from notice.

SO ORDERED.

63
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 150647 September 29, 2004

ROWENO POMOY, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Well-established is the principle that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, are binding on the highest court of the land. However, when facts are misinterpreted and
the innocence of the accused depends on a proper appreciation of the factual conclusions, the
Supreme Court may conduct a review thereof. In the present case, a careful reexamination
convinces this Court that an "accident" caused the victim’s death. At the very least, the testimonies
of the credible witnesses create a reasonable doubt on appellant’s guilt. Hence, the Court must
uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
February 28, 2001 Decision2 and the October 30, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA–GR CR No. 18759. The CA affirmed, with modifications, the March 8, 1995 judgment4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)5 of Iloilo City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case No. 36921, finding Roweno
Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide. The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, MODIFIED as to penalty in the sense that the

[Petitioner] ROWENO POMOY is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of
six (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor minimum, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in
all other respects."6

The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged in an Information worded thus:

"That on or about the 4th day of January 1990, in the Municipality of Sara, Province
of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with his .45 service pistol, with deliberate intent and decided
purpose to kill, and without any justifiable cause or motive, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one TOMAS BALBOA
with the service pistol he was then provided, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds
on the vital parts of his body, which directly caused the death of said victim
thereafter."7

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented respondent’s version of the facts as follows:

64
"Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the Concepcion College of Science and
Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo.

"On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at the
Concepcion College to arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery which
took place in the municipality in December 1989. With the arrest effected, Balboa
and the policemen passed by the Concepcion Elementary School where his wife,
Jessica, was in a get-together party with other School Administrators. When his wife
asked him, ‘Why will you be arrested?’ [H]e answered ‘[Even I] do not know why I am
arrested. That is why I am even going there in order to find out the reason for my
arrest.’

"Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321st Philippine
Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained in the jail
thereat, along with Edgar Samudio, another suspect in the robbery case.

"Later that day, about a little past 2 o’clock in the afternoon, petitioner, who is a
police sergeant, went near the door of the jail where Balboa was detained and
directed the latter to come out, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the
investigation room, as he told Balboa: ‘Let’s go to the investigation room.’ The
investigation room is at the main building of the compound where the jail is located.
The jail guard on duty, Nicostrado Estepar, opened the jail door and walked towards
the investigation room.

"At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which was
hanging by the side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster, with only
the handle of the gun protruding from the holster.

"When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were near the
investigation room, two (2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots was
verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was
lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. When the Commanding Officer of
the Headquarters arrived, he disarmed petitioner and directed that Balboa be brought
to the hospital. Dr. Palma (first name not provided) happened to be at the crime
scene as he was visiting his brother in the Philippine Constabulary. When Dr. Palma
examined Balboa, he (Dr. Palma) said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to the
hospital for he was dead.

"Upon the request of Mrs. Jessica Balboa, the wife of the deceased, Dr. Ricardo
Jabonete, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Region VI,
Iloilo City, conducted an autopsy on the remains of Tomas Balboa. The following
were his findings:

‘Pallor, integumens and nailbeds.

‘Wound, gunshot: (1) ENTRANCE, downwards and medially, edges, modified

by sutures, surrounded by abrasion collar, 0.6 cm. In its chest, left side, 10.0
cms. from anterior midline, 121.0 cms. From left heel, directed medially
backwards from left to right, penetrating chest wall thru 5th intercostals space
into thoracic cavity, perforating thru and thru, upper lobe, left lung, lacerating
left ventricular wall causing punched out fracture, 8th thoracic vertebra and
make an EXIT, stallate in shape, 1.0 x 0.8 cm. Edges, modified by sutures,
back, right side, 8.0 cms. From posterior midline, 117.0 cms. From right heel
(2) ENTRANCE, ovaloid, oriented medially downwards, edges sutured, 0.7
cm. on its widest portion, at infero-medial border, hypochondriac region, left
side, 4.0 cms. From anterior midline, 105.0 cms. From left heel, directed
backwards, laterally wall into penetrating abdominal cavity, perforating thru
and thru, stomach, head of the pancreas and mesentery, make an exit,
ovalid, 1.0 x 0.8 cm., oriented medially upwards, edges, sutured, back, left
side, level of 9th intercostal space, 4.5 cms. From posterior midline, 110.0
cms. From left heel. x x x.

‘CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, massive secondary to gunshot wounds

on chest and abdomen.

65
 ‘REMARKS: Body previously embalmed and autopsied.’

"Dr. Jaboneta testified that the two (2) wounds he found on x x x Balboa’s body were
gunshot wounds. The entrance of [W]ound No. 1 was to the left side of the chest
about the left nipple and exited to the right side of the back. Its trajectory was
backwards then downwards from left to right. As to the possible position of the
assailant, Dr. Jaboneta opined that the nozzle of the gun was probably in front of the
victim and was more to the left side, and the gun must have been a little bit higher
than the entrance wound. Wound No. 2 was located immediately below the arch of
the ribs, left side. Its direction was backwards and laterally upwards. Dr. Jaboneta
estimated that when it was inflicted, the assailant must have pointed the gun’s nozzle
to the right side front of the victim. The distance between the entrance points of
wounds No. 1 and No. 2 was found to be about 16.0 centimeters."8

Version of the Defense

The Petition adopted the narration of facts in the assailed CA Decision, which in turn culled them
from the trial court. The RTC summarized the testimonies of Defense Witnesses Erna Basa, the lone
eyewitness to the incident; Eden Legaspi; Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.; and petitioner himself, as follows:

"Erna Basa:

"x x x [O]n January 4, 1990, she was working in their office in the camp up to the
afternoon; at about past 2 o’clock that afternoon while working on the backlogs, she
heard some noise and exchange of words which were not clear, but it seemed there
was growing trouble; she opened the door to verify and saw Roweno Pomoy and
Tomas Balboa grappling for the possession of the gun; she was inside the room and
one meter away from the door; Pomoy and Balboa while grappling were two to three
meters away from the door; the grappling happened so fast and the gun of Pomoy
was suddenly pulled out from its holster and then there was explosion; she was not
certain who pulled the gun. x x x.

"Eden Legaspi:

"x x x [A]s early as 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon of January 4, 1990 she was inside
the investigation room of the PC at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo; at about 2 o’clock
that same afternoon while there inside, she heard a commotion outside and she
remained seated on the bench; when the commotion started they were seated on the
bench and after the commotion that woman soldier (referring to Erna Basa) stood up
and opened the door and she saw two persons grappling for the possession of a gun
and immediately two successive shots rang out; she did not leave the place where
she was seated but she just stood up; after the shots, one of the two men fall down x
x x.

"Accused-petitioner Roweno Pomoy:

"He is 30 years old and a PNP member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company then attached to the defunct 321st PC Company; he was one of the
investigators of their outfit; about 2 o’clock or past that time of January 4, 1990 he got
Tomas Balboa from their stockade for tactical interrogation; as he was already
holding the door knob of their investigation room and about to open and enter it, all of
a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa approach him and take hold or grab the handle of
his gun; Tomas Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case who was apprehended by
the police of Concepcion and then turned over to them (PC) and placed in their
stockade; he asked the sergeant of the guard to let Balboa out of the stockade for
interrogation; from the stockade with Balboa walking with him, he had his .45 caliber
pistol placed in his holster attached to his belt on his waist; then as he was holding
the doorknob with his right hand to open the door, the victim, who was two meters
away from him, suddenly approached him and grabbed his gun, but all of a sudden
he held the handle of his gun with his left hand; he released his right hand from the
doorknob and, with that right hand, he held the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was
not able to take actual hold of the gun because of his efforts in preventing him
(Balboa) from holding the handle of his gun; he used his left hand to parry the move
of Balboa; after he held the handle of his gun with his right hand, in a matter of

66
 seconds, he felt somebody was holding his right hand; he and Balboa grappled and
in two or three seconds the gun was drawn from its holster as both of them held the
gun; more grappling followed and five seconds after the gun was taken from its
holster it fired, the victim was to his right side when the attempt to grab his gun
began and was still to his right when the gun was drawn from its holster until it fired,
as they were still grappling or wrestling; his gun was already loaded in its chamber
and cocked when he left his house, and it was locked when it fired; during the
grappling he used his left hand to prevent Balboa from holding his gun, while the
victim used his right hand in trying to reach the gun; after the gun fired, they were
separated from each other and Balboa fell; he is taller than Balboa though the latter
was bigger in build; he cannot say nor determine who of them was stronger; after
Balboa fell, Sgt. Alag shouted saying ‘stop that’ and he saw Sgt. Alag approaching;
sometime after, Capt. Rolando Maclang, their commanding officer, came, got his
gun, and said that the case be investigated as to what really happened. He said that
when his gun was put in its holster only its handle protrudes or comes out from it.

"Upon cross-examination, he said that Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case that
happened during the first week of December, 1989; he was the one who filed that
case in the town of San Dionisio and that case involves other persons who were also
detained; before January 4, 1990 he had also the chance to invite and interrogate
Balboa but who denied any robbery case; x x x [I]t was after he took his lunch that
day when Capt. Maclang called him to conduct the interrogation; when he took
Balboa from the stockade he did not tell him that he (Balboa) was to be investigated
in the investigation room which was housed in the main building which is fifty meters,
more or less, from the stockade, likewise houses the administrative office, the office
of the commanding officer, officer of the operations division and that of the signal
division; his gun was in its holster when the victim tried to grab it (gun); from the time
he sensed that the victim tried to grab his gun, he locked the victim; the hand of the
victim was on top of his hand and he felt the victim was attempting to get his gun;
that the entire handle of his gun was exposed when placed inside its holster; he
cannot tell whether the victim, while struggling with him, was able to hold any portion
of his gun from the tip of its barrel to the point where its hammer is located; during
the incident his gun was fully loaded and cocked; Sgt. Alag did not approach, but just
viewed them and probably reported the incident to their commanding officer; he was
not able to talk to Sgt. Alag as he (Pomoy) was not in his right sense; when his
commanding officer came some five to ten minutes later and took away his gun he
did not tell him anything.

"Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.

"He is the Rural Health Physician of Sara who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver
of Tomas Balboa that afternoon of January 4, 1990; in his autopsy findings
respecting which he made an autopsy report he said he found two entrance wounds
on the victim, the first on the left chest with trajectory medially downward, while the
second one is on the left side of the stomach with trajectory somewhat going upward;
at the same time of his examination he saw this victim to be wearing a light-colored
T-shirt and a jacket; other than the T-shirt worn by the victim, he did not see or find
any powder burns and marks and that those dotted marks in the T-shirt were
believed by him to be powder burns as they look like one; he also found a deformed
slug in the pocket of the jacket of the victim."9

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA anchored its Decision on the following factual findings: 1) the victim was not successful in
his attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been in control of the weapon when the shots were
fired; 2) the gun had been locked prior to the alleged grabbing incident and immediately before it
went off; it was petitioner who released the safety lock before he deliberately fired the fatal shots;
and 3) the location of the wounds found on the body of the deceased did not support the assertion of
petitioner that there had been a grappling for the gun.

To the appellate court, all the foregoing facts discredited the claim of petitioner that the death of
Balboa resulted from an accident. Citing People v. Reyes,10 the CA maintained that "a revolver is not
prone to accidental firing if it were simply handed over to the deceased as appellant claims because
of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure was exerted on the

67
trigger in the process of allegedly handing it over. If it were uncocked, then considerable pressure
had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver. Either way, the shooting of the deceased must
have been intentional because pressure on the trigger was necessary to make the gun fire."11

Moreover, the appellate court obviously concurred with this observation of the OSG:

"[Petitioner’s] theory of accident would have been easier to believe had the victim
been shot only once. In this case, however, [petitioner] shot the victim not only once
but twice, thereby establishing [petitioner’s] determined effort to kill the victim. By any
stretch of the imagination, even assuming without admitting that the first shot was
accidental, then it should not have been followed by another shot on another vital
part of the body. The fact that [petitioner] shot the victim two (2) times and was hit on
two different and distant parts of the body, inflicted from two different locations or
angles, means that there was an intent to cause the victim’s death, contrary to
[petitioner’s] pretensions of the alleged accidental firing. It is an oft-repeated principle
that the location, number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the victim have a
more revealing tale of what actually happened during the incident. x x x.12

Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of self-defense. It held that petitioner had
miserably failed to prove the attendance of unlawful aggression, an indispensable element of this
justifying circumstance.

While substantially affirming the factual findings of the RTC, the CA disagreed with the conclusion of
the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position had attended the
commission of the crime. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the RTC was modified by the
appellate court in this manner:

"x x x [F]or public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the

public official must use his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his office gives
him in realizing his purpose. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without
occupying his position, then there is no abuse of public position.’ (People vs. Joyno,
304 SCRA 655, 670). In the instant case, there is no showing that the [petitioner] had
a premeditated plan to kill the victim when the former fetched the latter from the
stockade, thus, it cannot be concluded that the public position of the [petitioner]
facilitated the commission of the crime. Therefore, the trial court’s finding that the
said aggravating circumstance that [petitioner] took advantage of his public position
to commit the crime cannot be sustained. Hence, there being no aggravating and no
mitigating circumstance proved, the maximum of the penalty shall be taken from the
medium period of reclusion temporal, a penalty imposable for the crime of homicide.
x x x."13

Hence, this Petition.14

Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues for the Court’s consideration:

"I. The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in affirming
petitioner’s conviction despite the insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to
convict the petitioner, in contrast to petitioner’s overwhelming evidence to support his
theory/defense of accident.

"II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in affirming the
conviction of the petitioner on a manifestly mistaken inference that when the gun
fired, the petitioner was in full control of the handle of the gun, because what the
testimonies of disinterested witnesses and the petitioner reveal was that the gun fired
while petitioner and Balboa were both holding the gun in forceful efforts to wrest the
gun from each other.

"III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the solicitor general’s observation
that the fact that petitioner shot the victim twice establishes petitioner’s determined
effort to kill the victim.

68
 "IV. The appellate court committed serious misapprehension of the evidence
presented when it ruled that the trajectory of the wounds was front-to-back belying
the allegation of petitioner that he and the victim were side-by-side each other when
the grappling ensued.

"V. The Court of Appeals failed to discern the real import of petitioner’s reaction to
the incident when it stated that the dumbfounded reaction of petitioner after the
incident strongly argues against his claim of accidental shooting.

"VI. The appellate court committed grave error when it disregarded motive or lack of
it in determining the existence of voluntariness and intent on the part of petitioner to
shoot at the victim when the same was put in serious doubt by the evidence
presented.

"VII. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that the defense of accident and
self-defense are inconsistent.

"VIII. The Court of Appeals obviously erred in the imposition of the penalties and
damages."15

In sum, the foregoing issues can be narrowed down to two: First, whether the shooting of Tomas
Balboa was the result of an accident; and second, whether petitioner was able to prove self-defense.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:

Accidental Shooting

Timeless is the legal adage that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate
court, are conclusive.16 Both courts possess time-honored expertise in the field of fact finding. But
where some facts are misinterpreted or some details overlooked, the Supreme Court may overturn
the erroneous conclusions drawn by the courts a quo. Where, as in this case, the facts in dispute are
crucial to the question of innocence or guilt of the accused, a careful factual reexamination is
imperative.

Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code:

"Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The following are
exempt from criminal liability:

xxx xxx xxx

‘4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury by mere accident without fault or intent of causing it.’"

Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not due to
the fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been foreseen or
controlled.17 Thus, in determining whether an "accident" attended the incident, courts must take into
account the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This
determination inevitably brings to the fore the main question in the present case: was petitioner in
control of the .45 caliber pistol at the very moment the shots were fired?

Petitioner Not in Control

of the Gun When It Fired

The records show that, other than petitioner himself, it was Erna Basa who witnessed the incident
firsthand. Her account, narrated during cross-examination, detailed the events of that fateful
afternoon of January 4, 1990 as follows:

69
"ATTY. TEODOSIO:

Q. You said that while you were inside the investigation room you heard a
commotion. That commotion which you heard, did you hear any shouting as part of
that commotion which you heard?

A. Moderately there was shouting and their dialogue was not clear. It could not be
understood.

Q. Did you hear any voices as part of that commotion?

A. No, sir.

Q. From the time you entered the investigation room you did not hear any voice while
you were inside the investigation room as part of that commotion?

A. There was no loud voice and their conversation could not be clarified. They were
talking somewhat like murmuring or in a low voice but there was a sort of trouble in
their talks.

COURT:

Q. Was there a sort of an exchange of words in their conversation?

A. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. When you opened the door, you saw Sgt. Pomoy and Mr. Balboa the deceased in
this case? Am I correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when you saw Sgt. Pomoy was he holding a gun?

A. Not yet, the gun was still here. (Witness illustrating by pointing to her side) and I
saw both of them grappling for that gun.

Q. Where was the gun at that time?

A. The gun was in its holster. (Witness illustrating by pointing to [her] side.)

Q. When you demonstrated you were according to you saw the hands holding the
gun. It was Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the gun with his right hand?

A. I saw two hands on the handle of the gun in its holster, the hand of Sir
Balboa and Sgt. Pomoy.

COURT:

Q. At that precise moment the gun was still in its holster?

A. When I took a look the gun was still in its holster with both hands grappling for
the possession of the gun.

Q. How many hands did you see?

A. Two.

Q. One hand of Sgt. Pomoy and one hand is that of the victim?

70
A. Yes, sir.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY TEODOSIO:

Q. Which hand of Sgt. Pomoy did you see holding the gun?

A. Right hand of Sgt. Pomoy.

Q. And when you see that right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, was it holding the gun?

A. The right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was here on the gun and Sir Balboa’s hand
was also there. Both of them were holding the gun.

Q. Which part of the gun was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding?

A. The handle.

Q. And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right
hand?

A. At first they were not directly facing each other.

Q. So later, they were facing each other?

A. They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain
steady as they were grappling for the possession of the gun force against
force.

COURT:

Q. What was the position of the victim when the shots were fired?

A. When I saw them they were already facing each other.

Q. What was the distance?

A. Very close to each other.

Q. How close?

A. Very near each other.

Q. Could it be a distance of within one (1) foot?

A. Not exactly. They were close to each other in such a manner that their bodies
would touch each other.

Q. So the distance is less than one (1) foot when the gun fired?

A. One (1) foot or less when the explosions were heard.

Q. And they were directly facing each other?

A. Yes, sir.

COURT:

71
Proceed.

Q. Were you able to see how the gun was taken out from its holster?

A. While they were grappling for the possession of the gun, gradually the gun
was released from its holster and then there was an explosion.

Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?

A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired
because they were grappling for the possession of the gun.

Q. Did you see when the gun fired when they were grappling for its possession?

A. Yes sir, I actually saw the explosion. It came from that very gun.

Q. Did you see the gun fired when it fired for two times?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?

A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed
to because the gun was turning.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Could you tell the court who was holding the gun when the gun fired?

A. When the gun exploded, the gun was already in the possession of Sgt. Pomoy. He
was the one holding the gun.

Q. After the gun went off, you saw the gun was already in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How soon after the gun went off when you saw the gun in the hand of Sgt.
Pomoy?

A. After Balboa had fallen and after they had separated themselves with each other,
it was then that I saw Sgt. Pomoy holding the gun.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. TEODOSIO:

Q. When the gun was taken out from its holster, Sgt. Pomoy was the one
holding the handle of the gun? Am I correct?

A. Both of them were holding the handle of the gun.

Q. So when the gun was still in its holster, two of them were holding the gun?

A. Yes sir, they were actually holding the gun, Sgt. Pomoy and Sir Balboa.

Q. It was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun as you
testified?

A. Yes, sir.

72
Q. Which hand of Balboa was holding the handle of the gun?

A. Left hand.

Q. At the time Balboa was holding the handle of the gun with his left hand, was he in
front of Sgt. Pomoy?

A. They had a sort of having their sides towards each other. Pomoy’s right and
Balboa’s left sides [were] towards each other. They were side by side at a closer
distance towards each other.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. It was actually Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun during that
time?

A. When I looked out it was when they were grappling for the possession of the
gun and the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was holding the handle of the gun.

Q. When you saw them did you see what position of the handle of the gun was being
held by Tomas Balboa? The rear portion of the handle of the gun or the portion near
the trigger?

A. When I looked at them it was the hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding the handle of
the gun with his right hand with the hand of Sir Balboa over the hand of
Pomoy, the same hand holding the gun.

Q. It was in that position when the gun was removed from its holster?

A. When the gun pulled out from its holster, I was not able to notice clearly
anymore whose hand was holding the gun when I saw both their hands were
holding the gun.

Q. When you said this in [the] vernacular, ‘Daw duha na sila nagakapot’, what you
really mean?

A. Both of them were holding the gun.

Q. But Sgt. Pomoy still holding the handle of the gun?

A. Still both of them were holding the handle of the gun.

Q. With the hand of Balboa still on the top of the hand of Sgt. Pomoy as what you
have previously said when the gun was in the holster of Sgt. Pomoy?

A. When the gun was pulled from its holster, I saw that Sgt. Pomoy’s right hand
was still on the handle of the gun with the left hand of Sir Balboa over his right
hand of Sgt. Pomoy, like this (witness illustrating by showing his right hand with
her left hand over her right hand as if holding something. The thumb of the left hand
is somewhat over the index finger of the right hand.)

COURT:

Which hand of the victim was used by him when the gun was already pulled out form
its holster and while the accused was holding the handle of the gun?

A. Left hand.

Q. So, he was still using the same left hand in holding a portion of the handle of the
gun up to the time when the gun was pulled out from its holster?

73
 A. Yes sir, the same left hand and that of Pomoy his right hand because the left hand
of Pomoy was used by him in parrying the right hand of Sir Balboa which is about to
grab the handle of the gun.

COURT:

Q. So in the process of grappling he was using his left hand in pushing the victim
away from him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What about the right hand of the victim, what was he doing with his right hand?

A. The victim was trying to reach the gun with his right hand and Pomoy was
using his left hand to protect the victim from reaching the gun with his right
hand.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. TEODOSIO:

Q. Did you say a while ago that Mr. Balboa was able to hold the barrel of the
gun of Sgt. Pomoy?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that was at the time before the shots were fired?

A. Yes, he was able to hold the tip of the barrel of the gun using his right hand.

COURT:

Q. That was before the gun fired?

A. Yes, sir."18

The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner did not have control of the gun during the scuffle.
The deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to
thwart those attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and the victim were all over the weapon was
categorically asserted by the eyewitness. In the course of grappling for the gun, both hands of
petitioner were fully engaged -- his right hand was trying to maintain possession of the weapon,
while his left was warding off the victim. It would be difficult to imagine how, under such
circumstances, petitioner would coolly and effectively be able to release the safety lock of the gun
and deliberately aim and fire it at the victim.

It would therefore appear that there was no firm factual basis for the following declaration of the
appellate court: "[Petitioner] admitted that his right hand was holding the handle of the gun while the
left hand of the victim was over his right hand when the gun was fired. This declaration would safely
lead us to the conclusion that when the gun went off herein [petitioner] was in full control of the
gun."19

Release of the Gun’s Safety Lock and

Firing of the Gun Both Accidental

Petitioner testified that the .45 caliber service pistol was equipped with a safety lock that, unless
released, would prevent the firing of the gun. Despite this safety feature, however, the evidence
showed that the weapon fired and hit the victim -- not just once, but twice. To the appellate court,
this fact could only mean that petitioner had deliberately unlocked the gun and shot at the victim.
This conclusion appears to be non sequitur.

74
It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. This frenzied
grappling for the weapon -- though brief, having been finished in a matter of seconds -- was fierce
and vicious. The eyewitness account amply illustrated the logical conclusion that could not be
dismissed: that in the course of the scuffle, the safety lock could have been accidentally released
and the shots accidentally fired.

That there was not just one but two shots fired does not necessarily and conclusively negate the
claim that the shooting was accidental, as the same circumstance can easily be attributed to the
mechanism of the .45 caliber service gun. Petitioner, in his technical description of the weapon in
question, explained how the disputed second shot may have been brought about:

"x x x Petitioner also testified on cross-examination that a caliber .45 semi-automatic

pistol, when fired, immediately slides backward throwing away the empty shell and
returns immediately carrying again a live bullet in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as
it did, fire in succession. Verily, the location of, and distance between the wounds
and the trajectories of the bullets jibe perfectly with the claim of the petitioner: the
trajectory of the first shot going downward from left to right thus pushing Balboa’s
upper body, tilting it to the left while Balboa was still clutching petitioner’s hand over
the gun; the second shot hitting him in the stomach with the bullet going upward of
Balboa’s body as he was falling down and releasing his hold on petitioner’s hand x x
x."20

Thus, the appellate court’s reliance on People v. Reyes41 was misplaced. In that case, the Court
disbelieved the accused who described how his gun had exploded while he was simply handing it
over to the victim. Here, no similar claim is being made; petitioner has consistently maintained that
the gun accidentally fired in the course of his struggle with the victim. More significantly, the present
case involves a semi-automatic pistol, the mechanism of which is very different from that of a
revolver, the gun used in Reyes.22 Unlike a revolver, a semi-automatic pistol, as sufficiently
described by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing when possession thereof becomes the object of
a struggle.

Alleged Grappling Not Negated

by Frontal Location of Wounds

On the basis of the findings of Dr. Jaboneta showing that the wounds of the deceased were all
frontal, the appellate court rejected petitioner’s claim that a grappling for the weapon ever occurred.
It held that "if there was indeed a grappling between the two, and that they had been side [by] side x
x x each other, the wounds thus inflicted could not have had a front-to-back trajectory which would
lead to an inference that the victim was shot frontally, as observed by Dr. Jaboneta."23

Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of the parties at the precise
moment when the gun was fired. Their positions would in turn be relevant to a determination of the
existence of variables such as treachery, aggression and so on.

In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of the wounds becomes
inconsequential. Where, as in this case, both the victim and the accused were grappling for
possession of a gun, the direction of its nozzle may continuously change in the process, such that
the trajectory of the bullet when the weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this case,
the eyewitness account of that aspect of the tragic scuffle shows that the parties’ positions were
unsteady, and that the nozzle of the gun was neither definitely aimed nor pointed at any particular
target. We quote the eyewitness testimony as follows:

"Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?

A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired
because they were grappling for the possession of the gun.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?

75
 A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed
to because the gun was turning."24

xxx xxx xxx

"Q And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right
hand?

A At first, they were not directly facing each other.

Q So later, they were facing each other?

A They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady
as they were grappling for the possession of the gun force against force."25

In his Petition, this explanation is given by petitioner:

"x x x. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Balboa was shot frontally. First,
because the position of the gun does not necessarily indicate the position of the
person or persons holding the gun when it fired. This is especially true when two
persons were grappling for the possession of the gun when it fired, as what exactly
transpired in this case. x x x.

"[The] testimony clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was on the left side of the
victim during the grappling when the gun fired. The second wound was thus inflicted
this wise: when the first shot hit Balboa, his upper body was pushed downward owing
to the knocking power of the caliber .45 pistol. But he did not let go of his grip of the
hand of petitioner and the gun, Balboa pulling the gun down as he was going down.
When the gun went off the second time hitting Balboa, the trajectory of the bullet in
Balboa’s body was going upward because his upper body was pushed downward
twisting to the left. It was then that Balboa let go of his grip. On cross-examination,
petitioner testified, what I noticed was that after successive shots we separated from
each other. This sequence of events is logical because the protagonists were
grappling over the gun and were moving very fast. x x x."26

Presence of All the

Elements of Accident

The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with
due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused,
there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury.27 From the facts, it is clear that all these elements
were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member -- specifically, one of the
investigators -- of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the
instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell for a routine interrogation.

Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an
enforcer of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by
anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to
facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.

Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent
his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously maintained, he
had kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times,
especially within the premises of his working area.

At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the
deceased, much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the guard in charge of the detention
of Balboa, did not testify to any behavior on the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to
harm the victim while being fetched from the detention cell.

76
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only to acts committed in the
course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from
its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led
to the death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of
circumstances beyond the control of petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances create
serious doubt on the latter’s culpability.

Petitioner’s Subsequent Conduct

Not Conclusive of Guilt

To both the trial and the appellate courts, the conduct of petitioner immediately after the incident was
indicative of remorse. Allegedly, his guilt was evident from the fact that he was "dumbfounded,"
according to the CA; was "mum, pale and trembling," according to the trial court. These behavioral
reactions supposedly point to his guilt. Not necessarily so. His behavior was understandable. After
all, a minute earlier he had been calmly escorting a person from the detention cell to the
investigating room; and, in the next breath, he was looking at his companion’s bloodied body. His
reaction was to be expected of one in a state of shock at events that had transpired so swiftly and
ended so regrettably.

Second Issue:

Self-Defense

Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo that he intentionally shot

Balboa, he claims he did so to protect his life and limb from real and immediate danger.

Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent
to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order
to defend oneself from imminent danger.28 Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not
occur out of any conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the victim for the
purpose of self-defense against any aggression; rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and
accidental result of both parties’ attempts to possess the firearm.

Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun of petitioner --
an exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code -- a further
discussion of whether the assailed acts of the latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner is
ACQUITTED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

77
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 157933. August 10, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESMER MONTENEGRO;

FREDDIE MACA (At Large); KIKING SALAHAY (At Large); BADIL SALAHAY
(At Large); MAMA MONTENEGRO (At Large); and FLORIE MEDRANO (At
Large), accused;
ESMER MONTENEGRO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

Appellant Esmer Montenegro was charged together with Freddie Maca, Kiking Salahay, Badil
Salahay, Mama Montenegro and Florie Medrano before the Regional Trial Court of Tandag,
Surigao del Sur, Branch 27, for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention on October 22, 2001.
Inasmuch as all the other accused were at large, the trial proceeded only with respect to herein
appellant Esmer Montenegro who had surrendered and who has been detained by the authorities.
After trial, he was found guilty by the lower court and sentenced to death.
The case is before us on automatic review.

The Information

Appellant and his co-accused were charged under an information that reads, as follows:
The undersigned prosecutor hereby accuses KIKING SALAHAY, alias ENRIQUE
MENDOZA, FREDDIE MACA, BADIL SALAHAY, ESMER MONTENEGRO, MAMA
MONTENEGRO, and FLORIE MEDRANO, with the crime of KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS
ILLEGAL DETENTION, committed as follows:
That on the 23rd day of August 2001, about 7:30 in the morning, more or less, at Umalag,
San Miguel, Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and forcibly bring one Gerardo Mag-isa, 42
years old, to an undisclosed place for the purpose of extorting ransom, wherein the latter was
detained and deprived of his liberty for a period of seven (7) days, to the damage and prejudice
of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (In violation of Article 267 as amended by R.A. 7659).[1]
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.[2]

Pre-Trial

On July 5, 2002 a pre-trial hearing was conducted and terminated on the same day, where
the following admissions were made by appellant and recorded in a Pre-Trial Order:[3]
1. His identity as Esmer Montenegro;
2. the date and place of the incident, namely, August 23, 2001 at about 7:30 in the morning at
Umalag, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur;
3. that with him were his co-accused Kiking Salahay, alias Enrique Mendoza, Freddie Maca,
Badil Salahay, Mama Montenegro and Florie Montenegro;
4. the existence of the four-page letter of the victim addressed to his wife Rose;

78
 5. that the victim Gerry Mag-isa was kidnapped and detained for seven days; appellant however
alleged that he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force;
6. the one-page letter also dated August 23, 2001 by the victim addressed to Rose.
Appellant, however, proposed for admission by the prosecution the defense of having acted
under the compulsion of an irresistible force. The prosecution rejected the proposal.

The Prosecutions Evidence

The prosecution offered the following as its exhibits:

Exhibit A - 4-page letter dated August 23, 2001
signed by Gerry Mag-isa and addressed
to his wife Rose;
Exhibit B - 1-page letter signed by Gerry and
addressed to his wife Rose.
The prosecution did not present any witness nor any other evidence and relied mainly on the
admissions made by appellant during the pre-trial hearing and on Exhibits A and B which it
formally offered in evidence.
On July 5, 2002, the trial court issued the following Order:[4]
After the pre-trial and considering the admission of the defense in so far as the accused
Esmer Montenegro is concerned, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Elpidio I. Digaum moved to be
allowed to formally offer his evidence and rest his case. Granted. Formally offered in evidence
are the following exhibits namely: the 4-page letter dated August 23, 2001 signed by Gerry the
victim in this case addressed to his wife Rose marked as Exhibit A and the 1-page letter also
dated August 23, 2001 signed by the same victim Gerry addressed to his wife Rose. The alleged
purpose is to prove demand for money by the alleged kidnappers. The defense admitted the
existence of Exhibits A and B and denied the purposes for which the same are offered.
Considering the admission of the existence of Exhibits A and B, the same are ordered
admitted. The purpose of the offer and objection thereto will be evaluated in the appreciation of
the evidence. The prosecution having rested its case, the reception of defense is set for August
13, 2002 at 8:30 in the morning. x x x

Evidence For The Defense

Appellant, in his defense, testified that in the early morning of August 23, 2001, he was
fetched from his house located at Barangay Caromata, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur, by his uncle
Freddie Maca, who asked him to accompany him to collect money from a certain person and who
told him that he will give him P500. They proceeded to Barangay Umalag and when they reached
the place, he was made to wait at the waiting shed while his uncle went to the house of a certain
councilor to fetch a relative by the name of Mama Montenegro. When Freddie Maca came back,
he was accompanied by Mama Montenegro and Kiking Salahay and Badil Salahay whom he
noticed to be all armed with .45 and .38 caliber guns. Then they all proceeded to the mountain of
Umalag.
They proceeded to the mountain of Umalag because the person who was indebted to Freddie
Maca was invited to that area. When they reached their destination, Kiking Salahay pointed his
gun at a person who later turned out to be Gerry Mag-isa.
Appellant asked Freddie Maca for permission to go home because he was afraid of what the
group did. Freddie Maca relayed his request to Kiking Salahay. Fearing that he would report the
matter to the police, Kiking Salahay said that it would be better for all of them if they just killed
appellant. Appellant then begged for his life and stayed with the group.
The group proceeded to Barangay Bitaugan and stayed there for one day and two nights. On
the second night, however, at about 11:00 oclock in the evening, they discovered that Gerry Mag-

79
isa had escaped. Seizing the opportunity to leave the group, he asked permission to go home to
which the group agreed.[5]
Upon reaching Barangay Caromata, he immediately reported the incident to Barangay
Captain Felicula Gran who promised to assist him. She accompanied him in surrendering to Sgt.
Nacional of the Philippine Army who picked him up and brought him to the Municipal Hall of San
Miguel where he was detained until the case was filed.[6]

The Trial Courts Decision

After trial, the lower court, finding that the prosecution had established the crime charged,
rendered its decision on November 20, 2002 convicting appellant of the crime of Kidnapping with
Serious Illegal Detention and sentencing him to death.[7]
In its decision, the trial court presented the following facts:[8]
Evidence for the prosecution show[s] that on August 23, 2001, at about 7:30 in the morning,
at Umalag, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur, the victim Gerry Mag-isa was at the mining site together
with Arsenio L. Darasan, Ricardo P. Cabangbang, and Joseph C. Flores. At that moment, a man
arrived who said that he was instructed by the Barangay Captain of Umalag, San Miguel, Surigao
del Sur, by the name of Kapitan Piling, to invite Gerry Mag-isa and to bring him to her residence
because it was the fiesta of her Barangay. Because they were so busy at that time, Gerry Mag-
isa refused to go with him and instead handed him an amount of P200.00 when he left. Not long
after fifteen minutes had passed, after said person left, three men arrived with the same intention
of inviting him to the house of Kapitan Piling. However, when the three men were at the makeshift
hut they suddenly pulled out their .45 and .38 caliber handguns and ordered Gerry Mag-isa,
Arsenio L. Darasan, Ricardo P. Cabangbang and Joseph C. Flores to drop to the ground. That
while still lying face on the ground, they saw Kiking Salahay, the leader of the group, hand over
a piece of paper to Gerry Mag-isa and [Kiking Salahay] ordered him to write a note to his wife,
telling her to give the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) for the release of her
husband. That soon after the note was written, they instructed Arsenio Darasan, Joseph C. Flores
and Ricardo P. Cabangbang to bring said note to the wife of the victim. That after they left with
Gerry Mag-isa, they immediately went to Tandag, Surigao del Sur (See Joint Affidavit of Arsenio
L. Darasan, et al. in page 24 of the record).
The allegation of the victim Gerry Mag-isa (See Affidavit on page 23 of the record) shows
that he was forcibly abducted and kidnapped about 7:00 in the morning of August 23, 2001, at
Barangay Umalag, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. He stated, that he was treated well by the
kidnappers, except that when he answered to the call of nature, he was watched closely and they
were asking money from his family. The kidnappers also took from him the amount of P320.00
which was spent for their food in the mountains and his chainsaw amounting to P18,000.00. After
spending 7 days at the hands of the captors, specifically on August 30, 2001, at about 1:00 oclock
in the morning, while they were asleep, he was able to escape and reached Barangay Bagyang,
San Miguel. He was able to know the leader of the kidnappers by the name of Kiking Salahay,
alias Enrique Mendoza because they called him kumander. They were armed with a .45 caliber,
two .38 caliber handguns and sharp bladed military knives.
Appellant in his brief assigns a single error, to wit;
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED.
In support of his sole assignment of error, appellant seeks exemption from criminal liability
under Article 12, Paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that any person who
acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force is exempt from criminal liability. He cites the
following circumstances which would place him under the umbrella of this exemption:
1. He was forced to join the kidnappers because he was threatened with bodily harm and death.
2. He did not attempt to escape because the leader Kiking Salahay and his companions carried
with them .45 and .38 caliber firearms.
3. He was not allowed to leave the group because Salahay feared that the accused would report
the matter to the police.[9]
The specific act which allegedly constitutes this irresistible force is the statement of Kiking
Salahay that it would be better for the group if they just killed appellant in response to his request

80
to be allowed to go home. Appellant thus begged for his life and was left with no choice but to
stay with the group.[10]
As a result, appellant argues that he was reduced to a mere instrument. He did not act of his
own volition and the fear of being killed and the fact that his uncle Freddie Maca had moral
ascendancy over him forced him to stay with the group. These circumstances, therefore, he
contends, exempt him from criminal liability. In support, appellant cites the ruling in People v. Del
Rosario.[11]

The Solicitor Generals Recommendation

The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Brief),[12] recommending the
acquittal of appellant on the ground that the exacting proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was
not met, thus:
xxx
13. The appeal is meritorious
14. Under the criminal justice system, the burden of proof lies with the prosecution. (Rule
115, Section 1, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). That burden must be discharged on
the strength of the prosecutions own evidence, without relying on the weakness of the defense.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty
that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who are to act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence (People v. Batocoy,
G.R. Nos. 137458-59, prom. April 24, 2003).
15. Such proof is lacking in this case.
16. The prosecution merely offered in evidence the following documents:
1. A 4-page letter dated August 23, 2001 signed by Gerry Mag-isa, addressed to his
wife. The letter contained a demand of P150,000.00 ransom instead of P2M;
2. A 1-page letter dated August 23, 2001 signed by Gerry Mag-isa, This letter was
addressed to Rose informing her that he was a hostage and that the kidnappers
were demanding a P2M ransom.
17. Sadly, the prosecution did not present testimonial evidence to prove the guilt of appellant
of the crime charged. The evidence of the prosecution does not measure up to the requisite moral
certainty, notwithstanding the admission by the defense of the existence of the four-page letter of
the victim Gerry Mag-isa addressed to his wife (Exh. A). Furthermore, the admissions of appellant
were not reduced into writing and signed by him and his counsel in violation of Section 2, Rule
118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This means that the admissions, assuming that
these are incriminating, cannot be used against appellant.
18. Even as appellant testified that he was with the other accused, there is no evidence that
he conspired with them to kidnap the victim, detain him for more than three (3) days, and demand
for ransom in exchange for his release.
19. In view of the abject failure of the prosecution to present witnesses to prove the guilt of
appellant, his testimony, therefore, remains undisturbed.
xxx
20. From [appellants] declaration, it appears that appellant had no idea of the kidnapping
scheme because he was just invited by his uncle to accompany him in collecting an obligation
from a certain person. Likewise, significant are the acts of appellant in reporting the incident to
the authorities and turning himself in. These were not disputed by the prosecution.
21. Absent any overt act of appellant which would be construed as necessary or essential to
the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, mere presence at the
locus criminis cannot by itself be a valid basis for conviction. Mere knowledge, acquiescence to
or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose. Conspiracy transcends companionship (People v. James Patano, et al.,
G.R. No. 129306, prom. March 14, 2003). Conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the
criminal act itself, which may be deducted from the acts of appellant pointing to a joint purpose,
concerted action and community of interest (People v. Guittap, G.R. No. 144621, prom. May 9,
2003). It is hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing evidence

81
 (People v. Patano, G.R. No. 129306, prom. March 14, 2003), the same quantum of evidence
as the crime itself, that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Caballero, G.R. Nos.
149028-30, prom. April 2, 2003; People v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 153781, prom. September 24,
2003).
22. To be sure, the trial court could not rely on the affidavits not affirmed by the affiants court
testimony. The admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision
that the accused shall enjoy the right to confront and cross-examine the witness testifying against
him (People v. Feliciano Ulit, G.R. Nos. 131799-801, prom. February 23, 2004).
23. Consequently, it was egregious error for the trial court to consider the joint affidavit of
Arsenio Darasin, Ricardo Cabanbang and Joseph Flores, as well as the affidavit of the victim.
Affidavits of persons who are not presented to testify on the truth of the contents thereof are
hearsay evidence (Vallarta v. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 587 [1989]).
x x x.[13]

The Courts Decision

We have reviewed the entire records of this case and we fully agree with the position taken
by the Solicitor General. As the Solicitor General recognizes, we operate under a system that
unshakeably puts the burden of proof on the prosecution.[14]
This burden has not been discharged, and was hardly even attempted to be discharged, by
the prosecution in this case. It was content to rely on the admissions made at the pre-trial hearing
and the introduction and offer in evidence of the two letters allegedly written by the victim to his
wife.
The admissions at the pre-trial hearing, however, showed only that:
1. Gerry Mag-isa was kidnapped and detained for seven days;
2. appellant Esmer Montenegro was among the group at the mountains of Umalag where the
victim was brought, which consisted of Kiking Salahay, alias Enrique Mendoza, Freddie
Maca, Badil Salahay, Mama Montenegro and Florie Montenegro;
3. the letters informed the victims wife of his kidnapping and detention and the amount demanded
for his release;
The pre-trial admissions do not show that appellant participated in the kidnapping of Gerry
Mag-isa.
The evidence on record of appellants participation is his own narration of how he found
himself with the group without knowing that a kidnapping had transpired and, in his defense, he
insists that he stayed with the group because of the compulsion of an irresistible force exerted on
him when Kiking Salahay stated in reply to his request to be allowed to go home, that it would be
better for all of them if they just killed appellant.
If the prosecution had proved conspiracy as alleged in the information, these admissions
would be relevant and material in determining the guilt of appellant. However, no proof to this
effect was presented. Hence, it cannot be determined what the specific role of appellant was in
the commission of the crime. No conspiracy having been proved, appellant cannot be convicted
for a crime where his participation is not established. As noted by the Solicitor General in his brief,
absent any overt act of appellant which would be construed as necessary or essential to the
perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, mere presence at the
locus criminis cannot by itself be a valid basis for conviction. Mere knowledge, acquiescence to
or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime.[15]
The trial court utilized the affidavit of the victim Gerry Mag-isa as well as the joint affidavit of
Arsenio L. Darasin, Ricardo P. Cabangbang, Joseph C. Flores and Roy I. Tante to support its
findings of appellants participation and culpability.
The record is bereft of any evidence to show that these affidavits were ever presented or
offered as evidence for the prosecution, nor were the persons who executed them ever presented
to affirm what was in the affidavits nor to offer oral testimony on the circumstances of the alleged
kidnapping. Hence, they are of no value in the determination of the guilt of appellant. As we said

82
in Osias v. Court of Appeals,[16] allegations in an affidavit not testified upon in the trial are mere
hearsay evidence and have no substantial evidential value. In People v. Santos,[17] we ruled:
Indeed it appears that the only source of the above findings of fact of the trial court is Exhibit
C, the sworn statement of Romeo Fernandez. Since the affiant himself never took the stand
during the trial, his sworn statement is absolutely inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. The
admission of such hearsay evidence and the conviction of the accused on the basis thereof
gravely violated their constitutional right to meet their witnesses face to face and to subject them
to the rigid test of cross-examination. As we said in an earlier case, the constitutional right to
confrontation precludes reliance on such affidavits. Such a constitutional safeguard cannot be
satisfied unless the opportunity is given the accused to test the credibility of any person, who, by
affidavit or deposition would impute the commission of an offense to him.
Furthermore, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the court
shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
Again, we find nothing in the record that would show that these affidavits were offered in
evidence.
Lastly, without going into the validity of appellants defense of having acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force, the fact established by his own testimony which was not
rebutted by the prosecution, was that he had no idea that a kidnapping had been committed as
he was just invited by his uncle to go with him to collect money from someone. When he tried to
leave the group, he was threatened with death. Nowhere in all the evidence of the prosecution
does it show that appellant performed any overt act that would implicate him as an accomplice or
participant in the crime.
The trial court brushed away this defense as not sufficiently proved. It also refused to believe
the testimonies of appellant and of the Barangay Captain of Caromate, Felicula Gran, that he
reported the incident after he was released, as mere afterthought. Yet what the trial court failed
to perceive was that the evidence for the prosecution was weak, if not nil. Consequently, the trial
court, in an untenable lapse of judgment, decided to consider only the alleged weaknesses of the
defense to arrive at the conclusion that appellant is guilty and not the strength or weaknesses of
the prosecutions case. From our review of the records, we find that the prosecution in this case
has utterly failed in its duty to overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt the presumption of
innocence of appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, Branch
27, dated November 20, 2002, in Criminal Case No. 4306, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
appellant Esmer Montenegro is hereby ACQUITTED.
The National Bureau of Investigation is DIRECTED to assist in the arrest of the other accused
in this case who are at large, for them to undergo arraignment and trial. Let a copy of this Decision
be furnished its Director.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

83
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 203961 July 29, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RODERICK LICAYAN, ROBERTO LARA AND ROGELIO "NOEL" DELOS REYES, Accused-
Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On August 15, 2001, this Court affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Marikina
City convicting two of herein accused-appellants, Roderick Licayan (Licayan) and Roberto Lara (Lara),
of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing them to death. The dispositive portion of this
Court's August 15, 2001 Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272, Marikina City finding accused-
appellant RODERICK LICA YAN and ROBERTO LARA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing each of them to death is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that each of the accused-appellants is ORDERED to pay ₱50,000.00 as moral damages to each of
the complainants. The award of ₱20,000.00 as actual damages made in favor of complainant Joseph
Co is deleted. Costs against accused-appellants.

In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the
finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.1

The Motion for Reconsideration of Licayan and Lara was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated
October 9, 2001. The Decision became final and executory on November 9, 2001. On November 18,
2003, the trial court issued a Writ of Execution ordering the execution of Licayan and Lara on January
30, 2004 at 3 :00 p.m.

Before the date of Licayan and Lara's scheduled execution, and with the torrent of initiatives sparked
by the passionate national debate on the morality of capital punishment, two of their co-accused in the
original Information were arrested. On January 9, 2004, Pedro Mabansag (Mabansag), a double arm
amputee and suspected mastermind of the kidnapping of Joseph Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay,
was arrested at Sitio Lanipga, Barangay Magsaysay, Escalante City. On January 12, 2004, Rogelio
Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes) was arrested at Barangay Bayang Marihatag, Agusan del Sur.

In light of these arrests, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) filed with this Court on January 15, 2004
(which was 15 days before the scheduled execution of Licayan and Lara) an Urgent Motion to Reopen
the Case with Leave of Court. Pending resolution of the Urgent Motion, this Court, by a vote of 7-6,
issued a Resolution on January 26, 2004 ordering the temporary suspension of the execution of
Licayan and Lara for a period of 30 calendar days.2 On February 17, 2004, this Court, voting 8-6,
issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court resolves to GRANT pro hac vice the Urgent Motion to Re-
Open the Case with Leave of Court. Accordingly, the execution of the Decision of this Court dated
August 15, 2001 is suspended. The records of the case are hereby REMANDED to the lower court for
further reception of evidence pursuant to Section 2 (b), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, together with
the trial of accused Rogelio delos Reyes and Pedro Mabansag. In accordance with Section 6(b) and
(c), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, insofar as the accused Roberto Lara and Roderick Licayan is
concerned, the evidence already taken shall stand and the additional evidence as the trial court may,
in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered with the evidence already
in record. Towards this end, the Court directs Hon. Reuben P. dela Cruz, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Marikina City, Branch 272, to hear the case of the accused Roberto Lara and
Roderick Licayan, and thereafter report to this Court with deliberate dispatch.

84
Let copies of this Resolution be personally served on the Office of the President and the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections.3

On April 19, 2005, Mabansag and Delos Reyes were finally arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged in the Informations under which their co-accused Lara and Licayan were previously
indicted. We quote the material portions of said Informations here:

Crim. Case No. 98-2605-MK

That on or about August 10, 1998 at around 1:45 a.m., the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with a handgun and with evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of force and
intimidation kidnap JOSEPH TOMAS CO and LINDA MANA YSA Y for the purpose of extorting ransom
in the amount of P 10 million at Goodies Pares Marni House located at Loyola cor. Constancia St.,
Sampaloc, Manila, owned and managed by the aforementioned victim Co and thereafter took them
with the use of Toyota Tamaraw FX likewise owned by Co as getaway vehicle to a house in Daang
Bakal, Parang, Marikina and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court where they were kept under
detention against their will until they were able to escape the following day at around 4:30 in the
afternoon on August 11, 1998.4

Crim. Case No. 98-2606-MK

That on or about August 10 and 11, 1998 at Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a handgun and with intent
to gain, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and divested (sic) JOSEPH TOMAS CO
and LINDA MANA YSA Y of the following personal properties after forcibly taking them as hostages
for ransom, to wit:

1. Wallet of Co containing his driver's license, original copy of official receipt (OR),
certificate of registration (CR) of his two (2) L-300 vans;

2. Bank time deposit certificate at Metrobank, Valenzuela Branch;

3. Casio G-Shock watch;

4. Necklace and earrings of Manaysay; and

5. ₱10,000.00 cash
to the damage and prejudice of said victims as owners thereof against their will.5

Lara, Licayan, Mabansag and Delos Reyes had five other co-accused in said Informations, namely
Alex Placio, Jojo Sajorgo, Allan Placio, Dodong Adolfo and Benjie Mabansag, all of whom remain at-
large.

On November 15, 2005, Mabansag died while detained at the Marikina City Jail. The trial against
Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes proceeded. On February 17, 2009, the RTC of Marikina City rendered
its Decision finding Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes guilty of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RODERICK
LICA YAN, ROBERTO LARA and ROGELIO 'NOEL' DELOS REYES in Criminal Case No. 98-2605-
MK, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM as defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences them to reclusion
perpetua and each of them is also ordered to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages to
each of the complainants.

The period during which the herein accused were in detention during the pendency of this case shall
be credited to them in full provided that they agree to abide by and comply with the rules of the City
Jail of Marikina.

85
However, in Criminal Case No. 98-2606-MK of the crime of ROBBERY, for lack of sufficient evidence
presented by the Prosecution to prove the guilt of the said accused beyond reasonable doubt,
judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING them of the said offense charged in the Information.

These two (2) cases against the other accused, ALEX PLACIO @ "Tata Pandak," JOJO SAJORGO,
ALLAN PLACIO, DODONG ADOLFO and BENJIE MABANSAG who remain at-large up to the present
are ordered archived and let an (sic) alias warrants of arrests be issued.6

The RTC Decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on July 4, 2012, affirmed the
conviction of Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes in toto.7 Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes filed a Notice of
Appeal,8 thus allowing this Court another hard look into the events surrounding the captivity of Joseph
Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay on August 10-11, 1998.

In this Court's February 17, 2004 Resolution granting accused-appellants' Motion to Reopen the Case,
we held that insofar as the accused Lara and Licayan are concerned, the evidence already taken shall
stand, although additional evidence may be introduced to be taken and considered with the evidence
already in record. This Court summarized said evidence in its August 15, 2001 Decision, thus:6

Complainant Joseph Tomas Co owns a restaurant called Goodies Pares Marni House with branches
in Valenzuela, Cubao, and Sampaloc. Co's regular routine was for him and the other complainant,
Linda Manaysay, the restaurant's cashier and accounting officer, to make the rounds of the three
branches for inspection and collection of left-over food and cash sales. The rounds would normally
begin late in the evening and last until early in the morning of the next day.

The prosecution evidence shows that on August 9, 1998, complainants went to the Goodies
Valenzuela branch where they stayed until midnight. From there, they proceeded to the Cubao branch
where they stayed until about 12:45 a.m., August 10, 1998. Their last stop was at the Sampaloc branch
which they visited at 1:30 a.m.

While Co was at the Sampaloc branch, supervising the loading of left-over food into the back of his
Tamaraw FX. service vehicle, three men approached him from behind. When Co saw the men, he
asked what they wanted. The men were armed with two caliber .45 pistols and a .38 revolver. None
of the men wore any mask.

Co told the men that if they wanted money, they could get it from the store. The men refused to get
money from the store. Without any warning, one of the men's guns went off. When Manaysay heard
the shot, she came out and asked the men what they wanted. She· told them that they could get
money from the store, but they refused to do so. Instead, complainants were made to board the rear
of the Tamaraw FX. Two of the men's companions were already seated in the front seat. The man in
the driver's seat asked Co for the key to the vehicle. The three other men also boarded the vehicle
with the complainants. Co identified accused-appellant Roderick Licayan as one of his five abductors.

Co said their hands were tied and their eyes taped, and that they were made to wear caps over their
heads as the vehicle reached Quezon Avenue in Quezon City. After 45 minutes, Co said he felt the
vehicle stop. The rear door was opened and he heard the voices of people approaching the vehicle.

Complainants were brought inside a room of a house made of light materials and which had no ceiling.
They were made to sit on the floor. Then, they were transferred to another room where the covers of
their eyes were removed and their feet were tied. Manaysay testified that she saw accused-appellants
in the house after the masking tape was removed from their eyes. Co's wallet which contained
₱5,000.00 in cash and his watch and Manaysay's necklace and earrings were taken from them. A
person was left to guard them inside the room, whom both complainants identified as accused-
appellant Roberto Lara.

After about two hours, Manaysay told Co that she wanted to urinate. Hence, Co asked their guard if
Manaysay could go outside to do it. The guard left and came back with a half-gallon container which
he gave Manaysay to urinate in.

Co tried talking to the guard9 and pleaded with him to let them go. But the guard replied that he was
just following orders. Co offered him some money which he had, but the guard did not accept the
money and instead threw it away.

86
[On August 11, 1998, at around 4:30 p.m., Licayan10 who was guarding them at that time] fell asleep
and Co and Manaysay somehow managed to escape without being noticed by the look-out outside
their room. After running for several meters, complainants took refuge in a house. An old woman living
in the house allowed them to use the telephone from which Co was able to call the Marikina Police
Headquarters. The woman told them that they were in Kaolin St., Twinriver Subdivision, Parang,
Marikina. Two police officers from the Marikina police arrived, followed by a police SWAT team.
Complainants' case was later turned over to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF) for investigation.

On August 11, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., members of the PAOCTF raided the safehouse at Daang
Bakal, Parang, Marikina where Co and Manaysay had been held captive. A man seen running away
was arrested by SPO3 Ismael Fajardo Jr. Upon being questioned, the man identified himself as
accused-appellant Roberto Lara. SP03 Fajardo identified accused-appellant Lara from photographs
shown to him in court as the man he arrested. Lara pointed to accused-appellant Licayan as one of
his companions and told the PAOCTF members that Lara was hiding in his (Lara's) uncle's house at
the back of the San Mateo Rizal Municipal Hall. The P AOCTF members thereafter proceeded to the
house and were able to arrest accused-appellant Licayan.

Lara and Licayan were thereafter brought to the PAOCTF headquarters in Camp Crame where they
were identified by Co and Manaysay in a line-up consisting of Lara, Licayan, and eight PAOCTF
members.

Benjamin Co, complainant Joseph Tomas Co's brother, testified that he was twice called in his office
by unidentified persons who demanded P 10 million for the release of complainants. The kidnappers
were of course frustrated as complainants were able to escape.

Accused-appellants' defense is alibi. Accused-appellant Licayan claimed that on August 11, 1998, at
around 7:00 p.m., he was at home in Sta. Cecilia Village, San Mateo Rizal, having dinner with Nicolas
Salvivia, a dump truck driver; that on the next day, August 12, 1998, he was arrested by members of
the PAOCTF while he was having drinks with Salvivia and Salvivia's father at the latter's residence in
Sta. Cecilia Village; and that when he was arrested, he was not informed of the charges against him.
He said he only learned that he was arrested for the kidnapping of complainants after he had been
brought to Camp Crame.

In Camp Crame, he and his co-accused were handcuffed and made to stand in a police-line up. They
were not assisted by counsel. The complainants pointed to him and Lara as part of the group who
kidnapped complainants. Licayan claimed he only saw complainant Co for the first time when he
(Licayan) was brought to Camp Crame.

On the other hand, accused-appellant Lara, a construction worker, testified that from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. of August 10, 1998, he was in his place of work in Antipolo. At 7:00 a.m. of August 11, 1999, he
went home to Novaliches, stopping by the house of his uncle, Pedro Mabansag, in Parang, Marikina.
Mabansag had driven Lara's family out of his house and Lara had gone there to get his child's
belongings. However, before he could do so, he was arrested by the Marikina Police at Greenheights.

Lara wanted to ask his cousin Nicolas Salvivia for help. The police beat him up and told him that they
would go to Salvivia's house.

He was made to board a van where his head was covered with a plastic bag and he was again beaten
up. The police found Salvivia and Licayan in Salvivia's house and ordered the two to drop to the
ground. The police poked a gun to Lara's head and told him to identify his companions, otherwise he
would be killed. Thus, according to Lara, he pointed to Licayan.

Lara claimed that at Camp Crame, after he and Licayan were identified by complainants in a police
line-up, they were forced to sign a statement. They were not informed of their right to remain silent
and to be assisted by counsel. Lara denied that Atty. Confesor B. Sansano, who appeared to have
assisted him in making his statement, actually assisted him.11

In subsequent proceedings, the prosecution presented as rebuttal witness Confessor Sansano, the
lawyer whom Lara had claimed did not really assist him. Sansano testified that as IBP governor and
chairman, he gave free legal assistance to all persons who could not afford the services of a lawyer.
On August 12, 1998, Police Chief Inspector Trampe brought Lara to Sansano's office at the Justice
Hall of Quezon City. Sansano required the police agents to step out of the room when he personally
interviewed Lara for 10 minutes. He apprised Lara of his constitutional rights. He was assured that

87
Lara will tell the truth, and that La1:"a was not harmed. He even examined the upper torso of Lara and
found no signs of maltreatment. He was present throughout the investigation held in his office, until
Lara affixed his signature in the sworn statement. On cross-examination, Sansano admitted that he
cannot remember the number of persons brought to him by Trampe for legal assistance. He testified
that he warned Lara about the implication of the statement that he will give to the police.12

During the second trial, Prosecutor Nestor Gapuzan stated that the prosecution is adopting the direct
testimony given by the prosecution witnesses during the first trial. Co, however, was recalled for
additional direct examination on the alleged participation of Delos Reyes.

Joseph Tomas Co testified that Delos Reyes was one of the five men who abducted him and
Manaysay. Delos Reyes was the person who sat at the middle portion of the Tamaraw FX at the back
of the driver, while Co and Manaysay were forced to sit in the rear portion of the Tamaraw FX with two
of their abductors, who later tied their hands. Co identified Delos Reyes in court. He was not sure
whether Licayan was one of the five men who abducted them. Delos Reyes, while seated at the middle
portion of the Tamaraw FX, faced Co and demanded from him with a forceful voice, "Nasaan ang
susi?" and "Akina ang susi." He did not notice any hint of Manilefio or regional accent in the voice of
Delos Reyes and was not aware of said accents. He did not immediately give the key to Delos Reyes,
but the latter repeated "Akina ang susi." The man beside him pointed a gun at him, so he gave the key
to Delos Reyes, who then handed the key to the man seated at the driver's seat.13

During the time Co and Manaysay were detained in the safehouse, Co identified Licayan and Lara on
different occasions but was not able to see Delos Reyes.14 He reiterated that he tried to bribe Lara to
get the remaining money inside his pocket but Lara said that he could not do it because he will be
killed. Co explained that he did not identify Licayan and Lara by their feet. Even before he pointed to
their feet, he had already identified them by their faces which he was positive about and he was just
even more assured of their identities when he saw their feet.15 The defense presented Radio Veritas
reporter Corazon Zony Esguerra, New Bilibid Prison Chaplain Msgr. Roberto Olaguer, Lara's co-
worker Abelardo Ramirez, Lara's employer Florencia Lavarro Salvador, and accused-appellant Delos
Reyes. Licayan was likewise recalled to the witness stand.

Radio Veritas reporter Zony Esguerra testified that she was able to interview Mabansag at the airport
after he was arrested. Mabansag told her that his nephew, Lara, had nothing to do with the incident.
Esguerra also interviewed Delos Reyes at the PACER Office in Camp Crame around two hours after
he arrived from the airport. Delos Reyes told her that "talaga wala akong kasalanan pinilit lang nila
akong tagabantay sa victim." According to Delos Reyes, the real culprits are "Tata Placio and Allan
Placio."16

New Bilibid Prison Chaplain Msgr. Roberto Olaguer, knowing that Licayan and Lara were scheduled
for execution in January 2004, told them before Christmas in December 2003 that he will personally
attend to their case more intensely. When he learned from .Lara that his relatives did not know the
schedule of his execution, he told Lara that he will personally inform his parents. On January 6, 2004,
Lara finally gave Msgr. Olaguer the address of his parents, but warned him about his uncle Pedro
Mabansag: there was a warrant for the arrest of Mabansag at the Marikina Police Station. It occurred
to Msgr. Olaguer that if Mabansag would be arrested, the execution of Lara and Licayan may be
postponed. He immediately called Mayor Marides Fernando of Marikina City and told her about the
possibility of helping him get a copy of the warrant. He was able to secure a copy of the warrant at
around 8:00 p.m. of January 7, 2004. He called the station manager of Radio Veritas, who told him to
go to the station as he will contact the chief of the PAO. He asked PAO Chief Atty. Acosta if there is a
possibility that the lives of Lara and Licayan would be saved if Mabansag is arrested, and she told him
about the possibility of reopening the case and suspending the execution.17

Before going to Bacolod, he told Lara about having secured the warrant. Lara warned him that even
though his uncle "Putol" (Mabansag) had both arms a,mputated, he can still drive a car, fire a shotgun,
and ride a horse. He relayed this warning to Col. A venido,. who organized two to three teams to arrest
Mabansag.18

In Bacolod on January 8, 2004, Msgr. Olaguer, Col Avenido and his group of around 20 men went to
the house of Lara's mother, and told her that her son will be executed on January 30, 2004. He invited
her to go to Manila and offered to shoulder her travel costs. She told him that BOMBO Radyo and
ABS-CBN already offered to pay for her expenses. During this time, the police were searching the
area and conducting interviews. The police told him that they have to go to a certain sugar plantation
to look for Mabansag. They arrived at the sugar plantation at 2:00 p.m. The people at the plantation,
however, were not cooperative and appeared to be afraid of Mabansag, except for a little child who

88
gave them a lead. Msgr. Olaguer was regularly updated as regards the search for Mabansag. At
around 2:00 a.m. the following day, January 9, 2004, CoL Inocentes Capuno called him and said that
they were able to apprehend Mabansag.19

At the police station, Msgr. Olaguer introduced himself to Mabansag. They were allowed to talk in
private, wherein Msgr. Olaguer told Mabansag that his nephew, Lara, will be executed by lethal
injection on January 30, 2004. Mabansag cried and said many things in Ilonggo. Msgr. Olaguer asked
his companion to translate what Mabansag was saying. He understood Mabansag saying "inosente
man si Tungkoy," referring to Lara. When he informed Mabansag about Licayan, Mabansag was so
surprised and told him that he had not seen Licayan for a long time. Mabansag said that he knew that
he was one of the accused in the case, but he was innocent. Mabansag denied that the house where
the kidnap victims were brought was his, but clarified that it was his daughter's house. The kidnappers
offered money if he could lend the house to them. He accepted because he needed money at that
time. Mabansag told him that he somehow participated in the safekeeping of the victims.20

Upon their arrival in the airport in Manila, they were brought to the VIP room. When Mabansag was
interviewed by reporter Gus Abelgas, Msgr. Olaguer was surprised to hear Mabansag say that he did
not know anything about the kidnapping. Mabansag also said that he was being threatened by the
police and the media people in Bacolod by telling him "lkaw ang ipapalit kay Roberto Lara."21

On cross-examination, Msgr. Olaguer testified that Lara told him exactly "Kung pupunta po kayo sa
Nanay ko, mag-ingat po kayo sa tiyo ko. Yung uncle ko, putol po ang dalawang kamay niyan pero
kaya pa na bumaril." Lara further told him that Mabansag was one of the masterminds in the
kidnapping of Co and Manaysay. Msgr. Olaguer observed that the people at the sugar plantation in
Bacolod seemed to be afraid of Mabansag as they told him that Mabansag had a close connection
with the rebels who were somehow controlling the sugar plantation.22 Abelardo Ramirez testified that
he had known Lara for five years since 1995 because they were neighbors at Daang Bakal, Bagong
Silang, Parang, Marikina. Lara's house was two houses away from his. Everytime he gets a job, he
gets Lara as his co-worker. Lara worked as a ''piyon," who mixes cement.23

On August 10, 1998, he was in his house in Daang Bakal at 6:00 a.m., waiting for Lara. At 7:00 a.m.,
Lara arrived. They took two jeepney rides to their place of work in Antipolo where they were
constructing a residential house. They arrived at the construction site at 8:00 a.m. and worked there
until 5 :00 p.m. They parted ways on Kaolin Street because Lara said he would go to his grandparent's
house in Novaliches. Ramirez arrived home at 6:30 p.m.24

On August 11, 1998, Lara arrived at Ramirez's house past 8:00 a.m. They proceeded to the same
construction site where they worked until 5 :00 p.m. They left the site at 6:00 p.m. and they parted
ways at Kaolin.25

On August 21, 1998, Ramirez secured a certification from their employer Florencia Lavarro Salvador
to prove that during the kidnapping, Lara was with him. He placed the certification in a small brown
envelope and kept it for five years. He retrieved the certification in 2003 when he saw on television
that Lara will be executed.26

Florencia Lavarro Salvador testified that Ramirez, whom she calls "Mang Bado," recommended Lara
to work in the construction of her house. On August 9, 1998, she supervised the work of Ramirez and
Lara, who both arrived at 7:00 a.m. and worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. On August 10, 1998,
Ramirez and Lara arrived at 7:30 a.m., worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and left at around 5:30
p.m. On August 11, 1998, Ramirez and Lara arrived past 8:00 a.m., worked until 5:00 p.m., and left at
around 6:00 p.m.

On August 12, 1998, Ramirez told her that Lara was arrested, and requested for a certification to prove
the whereabouts of Lara during the kidnapping incident. Salvador executed such certification.27

PAO lawyer Howard Areza testified that he assisted in the execution of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Delos Reyes and Mabansag. The latter was already deceased at the time of Atty. Areza's testimony.
Since Mabansag had no arms, he stamped his right toe on the document.28

Atty. Areza confirmed Mabansag's answers in Questions 17 and 18 of the Sinumpaang Salaysay
wherein he narrated that a TV reporter interviewed him upon arrival at the airport in Manila. He said in
the interview that Lara is not liable ("walang kasalanan") because Lara was working in a construction
in Cavite and Antipolo. Atty. Areza also confirmed Mabansag's answers in Question 30 and 31 wherein

89
he stated that he drove away (''pinalayas") Joy, Lara's wife, from Daang Bakal one week before August
10, 1998. Mabansag did not know whether Joy and Lara lived in Novaliches after he drove Joy away.29

Atty. Areza likewise confirmed Delos Reyes's answers in Questions 36 and 37 of the Sinumpaang
Salaysay wherein he stated that, on August 10, 1998, he saw Mabansag in the safehouse. According
to a certain Tata Alex Placio, Mabansag was the financier of the operation as he was the owner of the
house. Atty. Areza also confirmed the answers of Delos Reyes in Questions 15, 16, 18 and 20 that
Delos Reyes was interviewed by reporter Zony Esguerra when he was in the PACER Office. He stated
in said interview that Lara is not liable ("walang kasalanan"). Delos Reyes also stated that he guarded
the victims and did not report the matter to the police because of his fear of Tata Alex Placio, Allan
Placio, Jojo Sajorgo and Benjie.30 Recalled to the witness stand, Roderick Licayan testified that, in the
police line-up, he was at first identified by Co by pointing at his and Lara's feet. Co did not mention
any specific identifying mark on their feet. Licayan heard Co say that whenever anybody enters the
room in the safehouse, he looks at their feet. Licayan cannot recall how many of his companions in
the line-up were wearing shoes and how many were wearing slippers. Licayan testified that a police
officer in civilian clothes instructed Co to point to his face. It took a few minutes before the victims
pointed to their faces. Co identified him and Lara from among several persons (more than five; not
sure if 10) who were in the line-up.31

At the time he and Lara were arrested, Licayan already knew Delos Reyes because the latter was his
townmate. . Delos Reyes was not in the police line-up.32

Accused-appellant Rogelio "Noel" delos Reyes was arrested on January 12, 2004 in Barangay Bayang
Marihatag, Surigao del Sur, and was taken to Camp Crame where he was detained. Delos Reyes
confirmed the radio interview he had with Zony Esguerra, and that he said therein that he was forced
to guard the victims (''pinilit na magbantay") by Tata Placio, which the latter did by pointing a gun at
him.33

Delos Reyes testified that on August 10, 1998, he went to the house of Mabansag to accompany a
friend who wanted to buy a fighting cock. He had previously met Mabansag at the "manukan"
sometime that same year, 1998. Delos Reyes stated that he met Tata and Alex for the first time in
Mabansag's house. The sale of the two fighting cocks was done outside Mabansag's house but, with
Mabansag's permission, he entered said house to drink water. Inside the house, Tata and Jojo pointed
a gun at him. He then saw a man and a woman seated near the kitchen. The couple saw him through
the curtain. Mabansag told him, "Noel, magmadali ka lumabas, may mangungupahan na mag-asawa."
Tata, however, said "Dito ka Zang, huwag kang aalis." Delos Reyes answered that he will leave and
that he does not want to stay any longer.34

The court noted at this point of Delos Reyes's testimony that he mentioned Tata as if he knew him
prior to the time he entered the house. Delos Reyes then admitted that he already knew Tata and Jojo
two months before the incident and that his earlier statement that he did not know Tata and Jojo when
he entered the house was not true.35

Delos Reyes did not ask Tata and Jojo why they were pointing a gun at him.36 He saw the hands of
the woman were tied, and suspected that Tata and Jojo were engaged in bad activities. He stayed in
the place from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. He did not help the victims because he was afraid that Allan,
Jojo, Tata and Benjie might shoot him. After leaving the place, he stayed in the house of his godmother,
Emelita Alcober, in Concepcion for two weeks.37

Delos Reyes knows both Licayan and Lara. He visited Lara in his residence every Sunday. Licayan
was his neighbor in the province. Delos Reyes affirmed his statement in the Sinumpaang Salaysay
that Licayan and Lara were not liable ("walang kasalanan"). Lara was not in the safehouse, while
Licayan just happened to pass by. When Delos Reyes entered Mabansag's house, Mabansag told
him that there were kidnap victims inside.38

During cross-examination, Delos Reyes stated that the friend he accompanied to buy fighting cocks
was named Luisito. He did not know Luisito' s surname because he had known him for only two weeks.
He had known Tata for around two months because Tata accompanied Mabansag when the latter
went to Delos Reyes' s residence three times to bring fighting cocks to sell. Delos Reyes learned from
a neighbor about Mabansag's trade of selling fighting cocks. Mabansag usually brings the fighting
cocks to Delos Reyes, at the latter's godmother's house. Delos Reyes did not know why this changed
on August 10, 1998, when. Mabansag told him to get the fighting cocks at the latter's house. When
Delos Reyes entered the safehouse, his companion, Luisito, had already left to drive a tricycle; Delos

90
Reyes will just give Luisito the fighting cocks they bought at a later time. Answering a query from the
court, Delos Reyes affirmed that after he and Luisito arrived. at the place, Luisito immediately left.39

Delos Reyes asked permission from Benjie Mabansag to go inside the house. He did not ask
permission from Pedro Mabansag to go inside the house since he had already gone to the place four
times.40 When asked by the court for clarification, Delos Reyes said he did not ask for permission from
Benjie.41 He asked Tata why he was pointing a gun at him, to which Tata replied that he should stay
and that Tata will kill him if he reports the matter to the police.42 When Delos Reyes went near the
kitchen, he saw a man and a woman. He noticed that the woman's hands were tied, but it did not occur
to him that their captivity was the matter that Tata warned him not to tell the police. Delos Reyes did
not consider it unusual to see a woman's hands tied.43 Despite what was happening, he stayed in the
house for one hour and merely sat on the floor near the door where the man and the woman were
kept. He was also allowed to leave after one hour. He did not notice the persons inside the room
except for the man and the woman. Even after Tata pointed a gun at him and he saw a woman tied, it
did not occur to him after he left the place that something was wrong.44

In the appeal now before the Court, accused-appellant Delos Reyes reiterates his defense that the
exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear was present in his case while accused-appellants
Licayan and Lara seek to overturn their conviction on the basis of the newly discovered evidence
presented during their retrial.

Whether or not the exempting

circumstance of uncontrollable fear
should be considered in favor of
Delos Reyes

Delos Reyes, who was still at-large during the first trial, was found guilty at the conclusion of the retrial.
The trial court held:

With respect to accused DELOS REYES, he did not refute the testimony of MR. CO that he was one
(1) of his abductors who [was] seated at the middle portion of the Tamaraw FX and who demanded
from him the key of said vehicle. Instead he admitted going to the house of Pedro Mabansag on August
10, 1998 accompanying a friend who would buy a fighting cock. According to DELOS REYES, after
he asked permission from Pedro Mabansag, he entered his house to drink water, but he was met by
a certain "TATA" and "JOJO" and they pointed a gun at him and he was told not to leave. He claimed
that Tata Placio and his companion after poking a gun at him threatened him that they would kill him
if he reports the matter to the police. He admitted that he saw two (2) persons inside the house near
the kitchen and the woman was hand tied. After he arrived at the said safehouse at 3 :00 p.m., of
August 10, 1998, he was allowed to leave at 4:00 p.m., of said date. And after he left the safehouse,
he admitted that he feels not anymore being threatened by the group of Tata Placio, but still he did not
report what he witnessed in the house of Pedro Mabansag to the police authorities. Said accused also
claimed that when "TAT A" and "JOJO" poked a gun at him and was told not to leave and not to report
to the police, he acted under the "compulsion of an irresistible force, hence, one of the exempting
circumstances under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court begs to disagree.
DELOS REYES testified that even before August 10, 1998, he knows already TATA and JOJO
because they went to the house of his Ninang together with Pedro Mabansag for three (3) times. Since
they all know each other, then the court cannot comprehend why TATA and JOJO still need to poke a
gun at DELOS REYES and threatened him. This is only a last ditch effort of said accused to deny any
participation in the conspiracy in kidnapping the two (2) victims. As could clearly be gleaned from the
testimony, DELOS REYES made inconsistent and improbable statements. The Court also observed
the demeanor of said accused when he testified and he is obviously lying [through] his teeth. Manifest
falsehood and discrepancies in the witnesses' testimony seriously impair their probative value and
cast serious doubts on their credibility.45

The Court of Appeals affirmed these findings, adding that the testimony of Delos Reyes was self-
serving and could not stand on its own to prove the elements of the exempting circumstance relied
upon.46 Before this Court, Delos Reyes again pursues that he is exempt from criminal liability based
on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. -The following are exempt from criminal
liability:

xxxx

91
5. A.ny person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.

Delos Reyes claims exemption from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised
Penal Code, because he allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force, specifically the
fact that a co-accused, who is still at-large up to this date, pointed a gun at him. Delos Reyes has been
invoking practically the same defense even before the trial: in his Radio Veritas interview by reporter
Zony Esguerra, he insisted that "wala akong kasalanan" and that he was merely forced to guard the
victims.47

In People v. Dansal,48 this Court held that a person invoking the exempting circumstance of compulsion
due to irresistible force admits in effect the commission of a punishable act, and must therefore prove
the exempting circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically: He must show that the
irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but also against his
will. The compulsion must be of such character as . to leave the accused no opportunity to defend
himself or to escape.

The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and it must be of
such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is
not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. A speculative, fanciful or remote fear, even fear of
future injury, is insufficient.49

The appellate court did not err when it relied on the doctrine that the matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had
the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various
indicia available but not reflected on the record. It is the trial judge that can capture the truth from the
"forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or
the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch."50 In the case at bar, the trial court even
expressly stated that it observed the demeanor of Delos Reyes when he testified and found that he is
obviously lying through his teeth.51 This is in contrast to the testimony of Co which the trial court
described as very clear, positive and straightforward.52 Even without the advantage of being able to
observe the demeanor of Delos Reyes, however, a mere examination of the transcript of his testimony
convinces us of the hesitation and untruthfulness of his testimony. Delos Reyes kept on changing
details and correcting himself even without inducement from opposing counsel. The content of the
testimony was itself incredible. This Court finds it hard to believe that a person who accidentally
discovers kidnap victims would be held at gunpoint by the kidnappers to guard said victims; or that a
mastermind of a kidnapping syndicate, instead of conducting his fighting cock selling activities in the
regular meeting place, would invite a recent affiliate to the place where he is holding prisoners; or that
Delos Reyes did not find it unusual to see a woman with her hands tied.

In all, we find no reason to doubt that Delos Reyes was part of the plan to abduct and detain Co and
Manaysay.

Whether or not Licayan and Lara

should be acquitted based on
purportedly newly discovered
evidence

The pro hac vice resolution of this Court on January 15, 2004 allows this Court an unusual, though not
unprecedented,53 task to revisit our own final and executory Decision. It should be stressed that a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence may only be granted by the court on motion of the accused,
or motu proprio with the consent of the accused "(a)t any time before a judgment of conviction
becomes final.54 Furthermore, the affidavits of Mabansag and Delos Reyes cannot be considered
newly discovered in that the affiants are the movants' co-accused who were already identified as such
during the trial.55 Nevertheless, the Court, alluding to its power to suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operations whenever the purposes of justice require it,56 and noting the support
of the Office of the Solicitor General to Licayan and Lara's motion, voted 8-6 to order the suspension
of the Rules of Court itself and remand the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence.57

On June 24, 2006, more than two years after the pro hac vice Resolution of this Court, Republic Act
No. 934658 was approved, irrevocably sparing Licayan and Lara from the severest and most permanent
of penalties. In the meantime, both the R TC and the Court of Appeals were unmoved by the new
evidence presented for the accused-appellants. Thus, for the second time, Licayan and Lara were
convicted by the trial court and their appeals denied by the Court of Appeals.

92
To put things in perspective, the pro hac vice Resolution expressly granted the effects of Rule 121,
Section 6(b} of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. – The effects of granting a new trial or
reconsideration are the following:

xxxx

(b) when a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence already
adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in .the
interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together with

the evidence already in the record.

In general, the "new" evidence adduced in the second trial consists in (1) allegations that the
identification of Licayan and Lara by Co and Manaysay was unreliable; (2) testimonies and affidavits
of the recently apprehended Mabansag and Delos Reyes, both of whom allege that Licayan and Lara
were not involved in the crime; and (3) testimonies purporting to establish that Lara was at work in
Antipolo during the kidnapping incident.

While the second trial was meant to give Licayan and Lara the opportunity to present newly-discovered
evidence that were not available during the first trial, the focus of their defense was to show that the
identification made by the victims was unreliable. Licayan was recalled to the witness stand to testify
that in the police line-up, he was identified by Co by pointing at his and Lara's feet. Licayan emphasizes
that Co did not mention any specific identifying mark on their feet, and that he heard Co say that
whenever anybody enters the room in the safehouse, he looks at their feet. Likewise, when Co was
recalled to the witness stand to testify as regards the participation of Delos Reyes in the crime, the
cross-examination concentrated on trying to establish that Co was not certain about the identity of
Licayan and Lara. This Court observes that the defense was not successful in doing so as borne out
by the following portions of the transcript:

ATTY AREZA

Q But the reason why you were pointing to the feet of the accused was to assure yourself about the
footwear they were wearing, that was the reason you were pointing to their feet and not to their faces?

A I was positive with their faces, sir. The feet I was more assured of their identities when I saw their
feet.

COURT

Q You already identified them through their faces?

A Yes, your honor.

Q You told the investigator?

A Yes, your honor.

Q As a support to their identification you pointed to their feet?

A Can I say something Your Honor. On the second day, there was a time that they would come and
enter the room with their faces covered, but there are times that they would forget to cover their faces
so I was able to identify them, that is the reason why I took an extra effort in remembering their feet
and what they were wearing. Your Honor.

ATTY AREZA:

Q What you are trying to say is that you are 100% sure of their identities and you were more assured
by looking at their feet?

PROSECUTOR GAPUZAN:

93
Misleading. There was no testimony that the witness ...

COURT

Witness may answer.

A I am sure with their faces. I was able to talk to them face to face, sir. I was more assured when I
saw their feet, sir.59

Even though Co was able to positively identify Licayan and Lara through their faces, prudence requires
that he at least check on the other details from his captivity to identify his abductors. His certainty is
not negated by his meticulosity.

The defense brings up several instances of supposed inconsistencies in Co's testimony, apparently to
prove that Co's memory was unreliable: (1) that Co was uncertain as to whether or not Licayan was
among the armed men who abducted them; (2) that Co was inconsistent as to who asked for the keys
to his Tamaraw FX, which was used to transport them; (3) that Co inaccurately described in his affidavit
what Mabansag looks like and omitted that he was a double arm amputee; ( 4) that Co saw a family
picture of Lara in the safehouse which might have been the basis of his identification of Lara; and (5)
that Co corrected himself about whether there was light in the room where he and Manaysay were
held captive.

We have, on numerous occasions, held that discrepancies in testimonies concerning minor details
and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair their credibility. Instead of
weakening the testimonies, these inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility, because they
discount the possibility of their being rehearsed.60

While Co may have been uncertain as to whether Licayan was among the armed men who abducted
him and Manaysay, he nevertheless positively identified Licayan as the person with medium built, fair
complexion and thin hairline whom he talked with regarding the ransom, and who fell asleep in the
afternoon of August 11, 1998, allowing them to escape.61 Manaysay also identified Licayan as one of
the persons she saw upon arriving at the safehouse,62 as the person who removed the masking tape
from her eyes,63 and the person guarding them who fell asleep, allowing them to escape.64

Co and Manaysay had no reason to lie. We find it hard to believe that Co and Manaysay, the victims
of a heinous crime, would use the picture of Lara at the safehouse and make up the following
statements just to pin an innocent person for an offense he did not commit. Co identified Lara as the
short, tiny black man who guarded them shortly after they arrived at the safehouse and brought the
plastic container for Manaysay,65 the guard with whom he tried to plead with for their lives but who told
them that he was just following orders, and refused the money that Manaysay managed to keep to
herself during their captivity.66 Manaysay identified Lara as one of the persons she saw upon arriving
at the safehouse,67 and as the one who guarded them shortly after they arrived at the safehouse, who
gave her a plastic container, and with whom Co pleaded with to help them escape.68

It bears to stress that both Co and Manaysay had several opportunities to see the faces of Lara and
Licayan. Co and Manaysay each identified Lara and Licayan in both the police line-up and the trial
1avvphi1

proper in open court. In the line-up, they were chosen from a group of 10 persons, the other members
of which have appearances that do not offer any clue that differentiate them from Lara and Licayan.69

As regards Co's allegedly faulty identification of Mabansag in his affidavit,70 wherein he described
Mabansag as "matangkad at medyo matanda na ang tawag nila ay Putol"71 it was clear that Co was
merely being asked to describe in general the persons he saw during his captivity: "Doon sa bahay na
sinabi mong pinagdalhan sa inyo mayroon ka bang napansin na ibang tao doon maliban sa limang
tao na tumangay sa inyo?"72 We examined Mabansag's picture in the records73 and observe that even
in said picture, Mabansag's allegedly short stature and his being an amputee was not immediately
apparent because of what appears to be a jacket he was wearing. If he was wearing similar clothes at
the time Co saw him, it is very possible that he simply did not notice Mabansag's handicap.

The new evidence alluded to by this Court in its pro hac vice resolution to grant a new trial was
supposed to be the testimonies of the then recently captured Mabansag and Delos Reyes, who both
denied that Licayan and Lara participated in the crime. The statements of Mabansag and Delos Reyes,
however, would have been given more weight had they personally admitted their own involvement in
the crime. As testified by Msgr. Olaguer, witness for the defense, Mabansag stated in his interview

94
with Gus Abelgas that he (Mabansag) does not know anything about the kidnapping.74 We cannot give
weight to his denial that Licayan and Lara participated in the crime if he, himself, claims that he does
not know anything about the kidnapping. On the other hand, Delos Reyes swears that he was merely
forced at gunpoint to guard the victims, and was at the scene of the crime only from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00
p.m. of August 10, 1998.75 Delos Reyes claims that Lara was not in the safehouse, while Licayan just
happened to pass by.76 Co and Manaysay, however, placed Lara at the scene of the crime in the early
morning of August 10, 1998,77 making the testimony as regards his absence from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00
p.m. of same day irrelevant. Licayan, on the other hand, denies having been in the safehouse on
August 10 and 11, 1999, and claims that he was at home in San Mateo, Rizal.78 The testimony of Delos
Reyes that Licayan passed by the safehouse sometime from 3 :00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. was therefore
even unintentionally inculpating as to Licayan.

Finally, with respect to Lara's witnesses, namely co-worker Abelardo Ramirez and employer Florencia
Lavarro Salvador, their combined testimonies account for Lara's whereabouts during the following
dates and times:

August 9, 1998 (Sunday)-from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

August 10, 1998 (Monday)-from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

August 11, 1998 (Tuesday)-from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.

Co79 and Manaysay,80 however, testified that Lara was at the scene of the crime during the early
morning of August 10, 1998, which was shortly after they were abducted at 1 :30 a.m. of the same
day. We have repeatedly held that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.81 Ramirez's
house, where he was fetched by Lara at 7:00 a.m. on August 10, 1998 is at Daang Bakal, Bagong
Silang, Parang, Marikina - the very same area where the safehouse was located. It was certainly not
physically impossible for Lara to have been at the scene of the crime at around 2:00 a.m. of August
10, 1998 and still be able to arrive. at Ramirez's house within the same vicinity at 7:00 a.m.
Furthermore, on both August 10 and 11, Ramirez testified that he and Lara parted ways on Kaolin
Street, which was the very same street Co and Manaysay ran to when they escaped from the
safehouse.82

In sum, the new evidence presented by Licayan and Lara not only failed to prove that either of them
was in another place during their alleged participation in the kidnapping of Co and Manaysay, but
likewise failed to discredit the positive identification made by both Co and Manaysay.

Criminal and Civil Liability for

Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara

The guilt of Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, having been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. With the passage, however, of Republic Act No. 9346, the
imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited. The RTC thus correctly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua on Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara.

Nevertheless, we have to modify the amount of damages to be awarded to conform to recent

jurisprudence. In the similar case of People v. Gambao83 for Kidnapping for Ransom, the Court set the
minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty if not for
prohibition thereof by Republic Act No. 9346, to wit: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2)
₱100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no
proof; and (3) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.

Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes are jointly and severally liable for these amounts awarded in favor of
each of the victims. These amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of the finality of the Court's Resolution until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03797 dated July 4,
2012, which affirmed in toto the disposition of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina in Criminal Case

95
No. 98-2605-MK and 98-2606-MK dated February 17, 2009, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

(1) Roderick Licayan, Roberto Lara and Rogelio Delos Reyes are hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also ordered to jointly and
severally indemnify each of the victims in the following amounts:

(a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

(b) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and

(c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages,

(2) All of these amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of the finality of the Court's Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

96
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 148518 April 15, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
NARCISO SALDAÑA (At Large), ELMER ESGUERRA (At Large), FERNANDO MORALES, and
ARTURO MALIT, accused,
FERNANDO MORALES and ARTURO MALIT, appellants.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On automatic review is the decision1 dated February 2, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 47, in Criminal Case No. 8371, finding appellants Fernando Morales
and Arturo Malit, and their co-accused Narciso Saldaña and Elmer Esguerra guilty of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and imposing on them the penalty of death.

The crime was allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 9th day of November, 1994, in the municipality of Bacolor, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, abduct and kidnap Jefferson C. Tan, Joanna C. Tan, Jessie Anthony C. Tan, Malou
Ocampo and Cesar Quiroz, while the latter were on board a L-300 van with Plate No. CKW-785 at
San Vicente, Bacolor, Pampanga, for the purpose of extorting ransom money from the parents of the
said victims with threat to kill the said victims if their parents failed to deliver the ransom money, that
said victims were brought and detained in Bataan until the father of victims, Feliciano Tan, paid and
delivered to the aforesaid accused the amount of ₱92,000.00, Philippine Currency.

All contrary to law.2

Upon arraignment, all four accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. On October 9, 1995,
three (3) of the accused, namely, Narciso Saldaña, Elmer Esguerra and appellant Fernando Morales,
escaped from the Provincial Jail of Pampanga. However, appellant Morales appeared a month later
and was arrested. Narciso Saldaña and Elmer Esguerra remained at large. As to both, the trial
proceeded in absentia.3

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Jefferson Tan, Feliciano Tan, Senior Police Officer
Antonio Dizon, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Roman Razon, and Atty. Eligio Mallari.

JEFFERSON TAN, one of the victims, testified that the kidnapping happened on November 9, 1994,
around 6:30 a.m. He was then on his way to Don Bosco Academy in Bacolor, Pampanga, on board
their family L-300 van with plate no. CKW-785.4 With him were his brother, Jessie Anthony, his sister,
Joanna, his cousin, Malou Ocampo, and their driver, Cesar Quiroz.5 Jefferson narrated that along the
highway in San Vicente, Bacolor, Pampanga, the veh icle slowed down to steer clear of a damaged
portion of the road. Suddenly a man-later identified as appellant Arturo Malit-poked a gun at their
driver.6 Simultaneously, three other men entered the van. These three were later identified as appellant
Fernando Morales, Elmer Esguerra, and Narciso Saldaña.7

While appellant Arturo Malit trained his gun at the driver, Elmer Esguerra took the driver's seat. The
other two malefactors blindfolded the five victims.8 The vehicle then sped off and later stopped for fuel
at a gasoline station.9 At that point, one Romeo10 Bautista joined the group.11 After one hour and thirty

97
minutes of driving, they arrived at their destination. The blindfolds of the victims were removed, and
Narciso Saldaña ushered them into a small house located in a hilly area.12

Sensing that their kidnappers would talk to his father, Jefferson Tan decided to write a note to his
father.13 Romeo Bautista and Narciso Saldaña then left to see his father. An hour later, three of their
kidnappers-appellant Arturo Malit, appellant Fernando Morales, and Elmer Esguerra-ushered the five
of them back into the vehicle.14 They proceeded to a beach littered with big rocks. Subsequently, two
women came and fed them lunch.15

At 7:30 p.m., Saldaña and Bautista arrived at the beach and took the victims to a small house in Orani,
Bataan, where they spent the night.16 They left Orani around 4:00 a.m. the following day and
proceeded to an uninhabited place full of trees and grass.17

Jefferson further testified that he requested Bautista to allow him to speak with his father and so later
that morning, Bautista and Saldaña escorted him to Balanga, Bataan, to a PLDT office.18 He told his
father that their abductors planned to send him home to get the ₱2 million ransom.19 His father then
negotiated with Romeo Bautista who agreed to reduce the ransom to ₱ 1.5 million.20 Subsequently,
Bautista and Saldaña took Jefferson to Guagua, Pampanga, aboard a minibus.21 Bautista alighted at
Cleluz, Lubao, while Saldaña remained with him until they reached Sta. Cruz, Lubao. At Sta. Cruz,
Saldaña transferred him onto a jeepney going to the town proper of Guagua.22 Before disembarking
at San Pablo in Guagua, Saldaña instructed Jefferson to bring the ransom to the St. Peter and Paul
Snack Center at 1:00 p.m. later that day.23

According to Jefferson, he arrived home about 10:30 a.m. and lost no time relaying to his father,
Feliciano Tan, and the police the directives the kidnappers gave him.24 Upon the advice of the police,
however, his father no longer allowed him leave to deliver the ransom money.25 Later, around 3:00
p.m., the kidnappers called and demanded an explanation from Feliciano Tan why the money was not
delivered.26 He heard his father request for a lower ransom. The amount finally agreed upon was only
₱92,000.27

FELICIANO TAN, the father of the victims Jessie, Joanna, and Jefferson, testified that on November
9, 1994 while he was tending to their grocery store at Sto. Niño, Guagua, Pampanga, an unknown
person handed to him a handwritten letter from Jefferson.28 The letter informed him that his children
had been kidnapped. He immediately called his wife, Nenita Co-Tan, and a family friend, Dr. Ernesto
Santos, and all three of them went to Camp Crame to report the incident.29 Colonel Asel Tor was
assigned by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) to handle the case. Col. Tor then
dispatched a unit headed by Maj. Rey Aquino to investigate.30

At 8:05 the next morning, Feliciano received a long distance call from Jefferson in Bataan.31 Jefferson
said that the kidnappers planned to use him to get the ransom money.32 Feliciano added that he talked
with one of the kidnappers to negotiate a lower ransom.33 At 10:00 a.m. of November 10, 1994,
Jefferson arrived and narrated their ordeal.34

Since Feliciano could not afford the ransom demanded, he did not let Jefferson go anymore.35 At 3:00
p.m. on November 10, 1994, the kidnappers called asking for an explanation why Jefferson was not
at the pickup site. He explained that Jefferson was in shock and could not return. When asked about
the ransom money, he told the caller that he could only give ₱92,000. The caller agreed.36 He was
then instructed to bring the ransom to Cleluz, Sta. Cruz, Lubao, Pampanga, at 7:00 p.m. of the same
day.37

Later, their driver, Cesar Quiroz, arrived and relayed new instructions from the kidnappers that the
meeting was no longer going to be at Cleluz but at the bridge of Sta. Cruz, Lubao. 38 According to
Feliciano, they proceeded to Sta. Cruz as instructed, arriving thirty minutes early.39 He asked Cesar to
look for the kidnappers. A few minutes later, Cesar returned to tell him to proceed to Gumi, Lubao,
which was on the other side of the bridge.40 There, appellant Malit boarded the vehicle followed by
appellant Morales.41 The two told him that his children were in Gumi, about a kilometer away. When
they reached Gumi, Malit asked for the money. Before showing the money, however, Feliciano asked
about the whereabouts of his children. Appellant Malit replied they were inside the L-300 van parked
in front of them.42

The exchange took place and Elmer Esguerra handed him the keys to the L-300 van.43 When Feliciano
got home, he called Maj. Rey Aquino of the PACC and told him that the children were already safe. 44
After that, he reported the incident to the police authorities in Guagua who took his sworn statement.45

98
SPO4 ANTONIO DIZON, PNP Provincial Command, Brgy. Sto. Niño, San Fernando, Pampanga,
testified that at 10:00 a.m. of November 18, 1994, he investigated the kidnapping for ransom of
Jefferson C. Tan, Joanna C. Tan, Jessie Anthony C. Tan, Malou Ocampo, and Cesar Quiroz.46 During
said investigation, Narciso Saldaña, one of the suspects in the case, admitted participation in the
kidnapping and revealed the identities of his cohorts.47 SPO4 Dizon averred that because there was
no available lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office at the time, he requested a certain Atty. Eligio
Mallari, who was then following up on a case at the office, to assist Narciso Saldaña.48 Saldaña's
sister-in-law was also present.49 After Saldaña signed the sworn statement, it was sworn and
subscribed to before Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Roman Razon.50

ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR ROMAN S. RAZON testified that he was with SPO4 Dizon when
Narciso Saldaña's confession was taken and that he apprised Saldaña of the consequences of his
confession.51 After Saldaña admitted the signature in the confession as his own and that it was signed
with the assistance of Atty. Eligio Mallari, he administered the oath and affixed his signature thereon
as administering officer.52

ATTY. ELIGIO P. MALLARI, a practicing lawyer who later became a Commissioner of Human Rights,
testified that in the morning of November 18, 1994, while he was in the PNP Investigation Unit office
located at Capitol Compound, San Fernando, Pampanga, following up a personal case, Sgt. Antonio
Dizon approached him and informed him that Narciso Saldaña, a suspect in a kidnapping case, wanted
the assistance of counsel.53 He requested an opportunity to confer with Saldaña, and after hearing
that Saldaña wanted his assistance during the investigation, he advised Saldaña of his constitutional
rights in the Tagalog dialect.54 He also testified that after he signed under the notation "Kaantabay ni"
or "Assisted by," they went to the office of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Roman Razon.55

Appellant FERNANDO MORALES testified for the defense. He denied under oath that he willingly
participated in the kidnapping. He interposed the defense of having acted under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear. He averred that a day before the incident, his brother-in-law, Elmer Esguerra,
offered to help him secure a construction job at Floridablanca with a daily wage of ₱150.00.56 He and
Elmer Esguerra planned to go together to ask permission from the contractor to start working. They
agreed to meet at 6:00 a.m. on November 9, 1994, at Plaza Guagua, Pampanga.57

At the appointed time and place, Elmer Esguerra arrived with another person, whom appellant Morales
later came to know as Arturo Malit, now his co-appellant.58 They waited some more until two (2) more
persons arrived. Appellant Morales identified these two as Narciso Saldaña and Romeo Bautista. 59
Shortly afterwards, they all took a jeepney to San Vicente, Bacolor, Pampanga. When they got there,
Saldaña ordered the driver to stop. Esguerra then told appellants Morales and Malit to alight and wait
at the corner of the street for the contractor.60

A few minutes later, Narciso Saldaña flagged an L-300 van and poked a gun at its driver.61 He and
appellant Malit got scared so they tried to walk away but they didn't get very far because Elmer
Esguerra, Romeo Bautista, and Narciso Saldaña, after taking over said vehicle, chased them. 62
Bautista threatened to shoot them both if they didn't board the vehicle, so they did.63

On the way to Mariveles, Bataan, according to Morales, they pleaded to be released because they did
not want any involvement with the crime. However, Narciso Saldaña and his companions responded
with more threats.64

They stayed in Mariveles for an hour and a half before proceeding to Orani, Bataan, where they spent
the night in a house belonging to Saldaña's brother.65 According to appellant Morales, both he and
appellant Malit were allowed to sleep in the same room as the children and the driver.66 He added that
he and Malit cooked food for and attended to the needs of the children.67 The next morning, they left
for Lubao, Pampanga. In the afternoon of November 10, 1994, he and Malit alighted at Lubao because
Narciso Saldaña and Romeo Bautista told them to go home.68

Appellant Morales stated that prior to November 8, 1994, he did not know his co-accused Arturo Malit,
Narciso Saldaña, and Romeo Bautista.69 Neither did he know Feliciano Tan or any of his children
before the incident.70 He testified to knowing Elmer Esguerra since the latter is his brother-in-law.71

On cross-examination, appellant Morales declared that on November 22, 1994, he surrendered to the
police after his parents came to inform him that the police were looking for him.72 Later, he learned
that Romeo Bautista was killed in an encounter with PACC agents.

99
Appellant ARTURO MALIT testified also for the defense. He interposed the defense of uncontrollable
fear of an equal or greater injury. He testified that on November 8, 1994, Romeo Bautista went to his
house and invited him to work in a construction job the next day in Floridablanca, Pampanga. Having
known Romeo Bautista for almost a month since they had occasion to work together on a construction
job at his sister's house in Sta. Cruz, Lubao, Pampanga, he accepted the offer. At 5:00 a.m. the next
day, both of them went to Guagua, Pampanga, to fetch some more companions.73

At Guagua, they met three persons whom he came to know as Elmer Esguerra, Narciso Saldaña, and
appellant Fernando Morales.74 They proceeded to a waiting shed near Cabalantian supposedly to wait
for their additional companions.75 Thirty (30) minutes had barely gone by when Narciso Saldaña then
flagged down a passing L-300 van and poked a gun at its driver.76 That caused him and Morales to
get so scared that they started walking away. Hardly reaching a distance of twenty (20) meters, they
were noticed by Saldaña, Esguerra and Bautista. The three chased them by using the van. Bautista
then forced both of them into the van at gunpoint.77

According to appellant Malit, when he saw that the children were scared, he talked to them and asked
them to pray.78 He did not try to stop or tell his companions not to pursue their nefarious plan because
he could not overcome his fear brought by the threats earlier made on him by Esguerra, Saldaña, and
Bautista.79

Appellant Malit further testified that they were transported to Mariveles, Bataan, where they had lunch
in a small house.80 Later, they were taken to Orani, Bataan, to a house owned by Saldaña's in-laws
arriving there early in the evening of that same day.81 He tried to escape, but he saw Saldaña and
Bautista posted at the door.82 He did not talk to any of the three who abducted them because he was
mad at them.83 He also did nothing to tell Saldaña's in-laws that he was not a willing participant in the
kidnapping.84 But when he heard Saldaña say something about killing the driver and one of the
children, he interceded and pleaded with Bautista not to proceed with the killing.85

Appellant Malit also testified that in the afternoon of the following day, Saldaña and Bautista brought
him and appellant Morales back to Lubao, Pampanga, where they were allowed to alight at Sta. Cruz
and go home.86 Then, Saldaña threatened to kill him if he reported the incident to the police.87 Since
then, he had seen neither appellant Morales nor Romeo Bautista.

Appellant Malit asserted that he was not with the group that went back to Lubao to receive the ransom
money from Mr. Tan.88 He denied that he knew Jefferson or his father, Feliciano Tan, before November
9, 1994.89 He claimed that the only reason he and Morales were implicated in the kidnapping was
because Bautista brought him along.90 He also denied poking a gun at Cesar Quiroz, insisting that it
was Saldaña who did.91

On cross-examination, appellant Malit reiterated that prior to November 9, 1994 he did not know Elmer
Esguerra, Fernando Morales, or Narciso Saldaña.92

On February 2, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, and in the light of all the foregoing discussions, the Court renders judgment finding the
accused Narciso Saldaña, Elmer Esguerra, Arturo Malit and Fernando Morales guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and imposes upon the aforenamed accused the penalty of
DEATH. The said accused are likewise ordered to indemnify the complainant the amount of
₱92,000.00, which represents the ransom money the latter parted with. No other civil indemnification
may be made as no other evidence on this aspect was adduced.

SO ORDERED.93

On February 17, 1999, appellant Malit filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial.94 Appellant Malit
contended that the trial court's decision did not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law upon
which it is based, and that the trial court overlooked facts and circumstances which if considered would
alter the result. In his supplemental motion for new trial, appellant Malit further sought to introduce
Cesar Quiroz's testimony.

On July 20, 1999, the trial court denied the motion.95 The trial court ruled that appellant Malit's motion
was simply asking the trial court to give a second look on the evidence it has passed upon and clearly
contained in its decision. It further found that the grounds invoked do not justify a new trial as it did not
require the presentation of newly discovered evidence.

100
Before this Court for automatic review of the death sentence imposed on each of them, appellants
Arturo Malit and Fernando Morales filed separate briefs.

Appellant Malit submits the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ABUSED ITS POWER AND DISCRETION

WHEN IT TOTALLY DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONY OF ARTURO MALIT WHICH
WAS NOT REBUTTED BY THE PROSECUTION.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ABUSED ITS POWER AND DISCRETION
WHEN IT DEPRIVED ACCUSED ARTURO MALIT THE RIGHT TO A NEW TRIAL.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SHOULD NOT HAVE GIVEN WEIGHT TO
THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF NARCISO SALDAÑA SINCE IT VIOLATED
THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF
CHOICE.

IV. THE PROSECUTION DID NOT PERFORM ITS DUTY FAIRLY AND
IMPARTIALLY BY SUPPRESSING IMPORTANT AND VITAL EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES IN ORDER TO ATTAIN A FAIR TRIAL AND
DISPENSATION OF JUSTICE.96

Appellant Fernando Morales assigns two errors, contending that the trial court erred-

I. …IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES OF

IRRESISTIBLE FORCE AND/OR UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF AN EQUAL OR
GREATER INJURY.

II. …IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WHEN CONSPIRACY WAS

NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.97

Briefly put, in our view, the main issues for resolution are (1) whether the trial court erred in not
appreciating in appellants' favor the defense of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury; (2)
whether conspiracy was adequately proven; and (3) whether appellants' guilt has been established
beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellant Arturo Malit contends that the trial court erred in giving weight and value to the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses particularly Jefferson Tan and his father, Feliciano Tan. He insists that the
evidence sufficiently proves that he was merely forced to join the group at gunpoint.

He also contends that the trial court committed a grave error in relying on the extrajudicial confession
of Narciso Saldaña to prove conspiracy. According to him, the testimonies of Atty. Eligio Mallari, the
counsel who assisted Saldaña, and Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Roman Razon, before whom the
extrajudicial confession was acknowledged, reveal that at no time was Narciso Saldaña informed of
his constitutional right to counsel of choice. Therefore, the confession was inadmissible in evidence.

Appellant Fernando Morales similarly maintains that he acted due to an uncontrollable fear of an equal
or greater injury. He argues that Romeo Bautista's threat against him and appellant Malit constituted
a clear and imminent danger to their lives and instilled fear in them which made them incapable of
acting with deliberate or criminal intent. This fear existed even at the time they received the ransom
from Feliciano Tan because at that time, accused Narciso Saldaña, Elmer Esguerra, and Romeo
Bautista were only one (1) kilometer away. Had he not joined the group that met Feliciano Tan to get
the ransom money as instructed, or had anything gone wrong at that time, their lives or the lives of
their families would have been endangered.

In addition, appellant Morales submits that conspiracy has not been adequately proven. Narciso
Saldaña's confession, not having been identified in open court, is inadmissible in evidence. The
testimonies of Jefferson Tan and his father, Feliciano Tan, likewise do not prove conspiracy. These
two prosecution witnesses did not know that he and appellant Malit were subjected to uncontrollable
fear by Saldaña, Esguerra and Bautista.

Appellants' pleas are without sufficient merit. We find no reason to reverse the trial court's judgment
of conviction. A thorough review of the evidence presented in this case leads to no other conclusion

101
than that the crime of kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized in Article 26798 of the Revised
Penal Code has been committed beyond reasonable doubt against the victims Jefferson C. Tan,
Jessie C. Tan, Joanna C. Tan, Malou Ocampo, and Cesar Quiroz.

To begin with, we are not persuaded to overturn the sworn statement of accused Narciso Saldaña,
who admitted his participation in the kidnapping of the victims. Extrajudicial confessions are presumed
to be voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that the declarant's consent in
executing the same has been vitiated, the confession will be sustained.99 The fact that it was the
investigating officer, SPO4 Antonio Dizon, who requested Atty. Eligio Mallari to assist Saldaña does
not cast doubt on Atty. Mallari's impartiality during the custodial investigation. Since there was no
available lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office and Saldaña had expressed his inability to procure
the services of a lawyer, it was incumbent upon the government, particularly the investigating officer,
to provide Saldaña with a lawyer. Moreover, appellants do not cite bias or incompetence on the part
of Atty. Mallari to assist as counsel for the accused Saldaña. In fact, it clearly appears that Atty. Mallari
duly performed his duty to advise Saldaña on his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel. But
Saldaña insisted on making the extrajudicial confession in the presence of his sister-in-law, voluntarily.
His conviction is in order.

As for accused Elmer Esguerra, we find that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Jefferson Tan
and Feliciano Tan on his criminal participation in the kidnapping were fully corroborated by the
testimonies of appellants Malit and Morales. There is no doubt, in our mind, as to his culpability for the
crime charged.

As to herein appellants Morales and Malit, we find here a fit occasion to reiterate our ruling in the case
of People v. Del Rosario.100 Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, 101 a person is exempt from
criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom.102 In
Del Rosario,103 however, we held that for such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation
must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not
enough.104

In this case, the evidence on record shows that at the time the ransom money was to be delivered,
appellants Arturo Malit and Fernando Morales, unaccompanied by any of the other accused, entered
the van wherein Feliciano Tan was. At that time Narciso Saldaña, Elmer Esguerra and Romeo Bautista
were waiting for both appellants from a distance of about one (1) kilometer.[105] By not availing of this
chance to escape, appellants' allegation of fear or duress becomes untenable.106 We have held that in
order that the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of
such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.107 Moreover,
the reason for their entry to the van, where the father of the victims was, could be taken as their way
of keeping Feliciano Tan under further surveillance at a most critical time.

Appellant Morales' contention that their families were similarly threatened finds no support in the
evidence. The records are bereft of any showing that such threats to appellants' families were made
at all. We have held in People v. Borja108 that duress as a valid defense should not be speculative or
remote. Even granting arguendo that Saldaña, Bautista, and Esguerra threatened to harm appellants'
families to coerce appellants to receive the ransom money at Gumi, Lubao, such threats were not of
such imminence as to preclude any chance of escape. In fact, as already discussed, appellants had a
real chance to escape when they went to Feliciano's van. Under the circumstances, even if true, the
fear that appellants allegedly suffered would not suffice to exempt them from incurring criminal liability.

Moreover, kidnap victim Jefferson Tan categorically testified that each of the kidnappers acted of his
own accord and that nobody commanded anyone.109 According to Jefferson, while appellant Malit
trained the gun on driver Cesar Quiroz, appellant Morales opened the right-side front door of the van
at the same time that accused Elmer Esguerra took the wheel.110 The trial court found Jefferson's
testimony worthy of credence. It disbelieved appellants' attempts, while on the witness stand, to put
all the blame on co-accused Narciso Saldaña and Elmer Esguerra who, up to now, remain at large.

Based on the evidence at hand, we find no sufficient reason to disturb the trial court's assessment of
the defense presented by appellants. The crime of kidnapping is not committed on impulse. It requires
meticulous planning to determine who would be the prospective victim or victims. Its execution needs
precise timing and coordination among the malefactors. It is improbable that a group of kidnappers
would risk the success of their well-planned criminal scheme by involving unwilling persons, much less
strangers, who could abort the kidnapping by refusing to cooperate in its execution.111 Worse, such

102
unwilling companions could easily expose their plan to the authorities and subsequently even testify
against them in court. Thus, we find the defense claimed by appellants neither logical nor satisfactory,
much less consistent with human experience and knowledge. For this reason, we also agree that
appellants' version of the facts is unworthy of credence, in the light of candid testimonies given by
prosecution witnesses.

Moreover, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court, who had a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude.[112] Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding
and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted.[113] As reiterated in numerous cases, a
witness who testifies in a clear, positive, and convincing manner and remains consistent on cross-
examination is a credible witness.[114] This is especially so in this case, since prosecution witnesses
Jefferson Tan and Feliciano Tan were not shown to have any ill motive to testify against either
appellant. When there is no evidence to indicate that the witness for the prosecution was moved by
improper motive, the presumption is that such motive was absent, and that his testimony is entitled to
full faith and credit.[115]

Appellant Arturo Malit's insistence that the trial court's appreciation of the testimonies by prosecution
witnesses was faulty deserves scant consideration. He failed to specify any reason why the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses are not entitled to full faith and credit. Neither was it shown that
their testimonies materially contradict each other, or that their testimonies were unbelievable and
would not conform to human experience. Against appellant Malit's bare assertions, we find Jefferson
Tan's testimony on the kidnapping straightforward and consistent even on cross-examination. In
contrast, appellants' testimonies are conflicting. Thus, on one hand, appellant Malit testified that their
alleged captors, their own co-accused, had released him and appellant Morales in Lubao, Pampanga.
On the other hand, appellant Morales declared in his brief that both of them were present in the van
with Feliciano Tan to receive the ransom. Considering the manner by which the offense was executed
and the ransom collected, we entertain no doubt that appellants were willing participants in the
kidnapping of Florencio Tan's children.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.116 Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission
of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or common design and
were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established.117 It must be shown that all
participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common
purpose or design to commit the felony.118

In the present case, the evidence shows that all the accused waited near a damaged portion of the
highway in San Vicente, Bacolor, Pampanga. Said spot was chosen deliberately because the van in
which they expected the victims to be would logically slow down to avoid the damaged part of the
road. Appellant Arturo Malit poked a gun at the driver to stop the vehicle and enable appellant
Fernando Morales and their co-accused, Elmer Esguerra and Narciso Saldaña, to board the
vehicle.[119] While appellant Malit had his gun still trained on the driver, Esguerra took over the wheel
while the others including appellant Fernando Morales blindfolded the occupants of the van.

When Romeo Bautista and Narciso Saldaña accompanied Jefferson Tan to Balanga, Bataan, to
arrange for the delivery of the ransom, appellants Arturo Malit and Fernando Morales with their co-
accused Elmer Esguerra, guarded the victims. Appellants attended to the needs of the victims. At the
bridge in Sta. Cruz, Lubao, appellants gave Feliciano Tan additional instructions to proceed to Gumi
where Elmer Esguerra waited with the children. There, appellant Malit received the ransom and
Esguerra handed the keys to the van where the children were. These acts point to a close coordination
indicating a common purpose or design to commit the felony of kidnapping for ransom. The
circumstances under which appellants Malit and Morales participated in the commission of the
kidnapping for ransom would not justify in any way their belated claim that they acted under an
uncontrollable fear of being killed by the other kidnappers. Rather, these circumstances establish the
fact that appellants consciously concurred with the acts of the other malefactors to kidnap the children
of Feliciano Tan.

Appellant Malit stresses that he did not try to escape from jail during the height of the lahar flow in
Pampanga on October 9, 1995. This is proof, according to him, that he was innocent of the crime
charged.120 But this argument is untenable, an obvious non-sequitur. It is true that flight has been held
to be an admission of guilt yet it is also well settled that non-flight is not proof, much less conclusive
proof, of innocence.121

103
Appellant Malit also faults the prosecution for not presenting driver Cesar Quiroz's affidavit, which fails
to name him (appellant Malit) as one of the abductors.122 Similarly, he assails the trial court's order
denying his motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

As held by the trial court, however, appellant Malit's contentions are unfounded. The matter of
presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for appellant or even the trial court to decide.123
Section 5,124 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court expressly vests in the prosecutor the direction and control
over the prosecution of a case. The determination of which evidence to present rests upon him. As
the prosecution had other witnesses who could sufficiently prove the kidnapping for ransom, it could
dispense with the evidence to be provided by Cesar Quiroz.

Appellant Malit's insistence that the trial court erroneously denied him his right to new trial to present
the testimony of Cesar Quiroz is likewise without merit. A motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence may only be granted if the following concur: (a) the evidence is discovered after
trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise
of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching and of such weight that, if admitted, could probably change the judgment.125

In this case, the records show that even before the trial, the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Cesar Quiroz
dated November 18, 1994 was already available to appellant Malit. In fact, during the inquest
investigation, appellant Malit opted for a preliminary investigation. As early as that stage, Cesar Quiroz
as well as his salaysay was already available and by reasonable diligence could have been obtained,
discovered, and produced at the trial. The records are bereft of any showing that appellant Malit
exerted efforts to secure the attendance of Cesar Quiroz for the purpose of using him as defense
witness.

For this Court to allow a motion for new trial on grounds other than those provided in Section 2,126 Rule
121 of the Rules of Court,127 the movant must cite peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case
sufficient to warrant a new trial, if only to give the accused an opportunity to establish his innocence
of the crime charged. Appellant Malit, however, does not cite any exceptional circumstance. In any
case, we scrutinized the contents of Quiroz's affidavit, but nowhere does it categorically declare that
appellant Malit did not participate in the commission of the crime. Under the circumstances, the trial
court properly denied his motion for new trial.

The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused
is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter
of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense,
any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267128 of the Revised Penal Code are present. The
imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom. In the instant case, appellants cannot escape the penalty of death, inasmuch as it
was sufficiently alleged and indubitably proven that the kidnapping had been committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom.129

Three (3) members of this Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinion
expressed in People v. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997, 267 SCRA 682, that R.A.
7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death is unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling
of the majority that the law is constitutional, and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.

As to the award of damages, aside from the ₱92,000 in actual damages which represent the amount
of the ransom money Feliciano Tan paid to appellants and their cohorts, exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱25,000 should be paid by the appellants and their co-accused to the victims, by way of
public example and to serve as a deterrent against malefactors who prey on children and other
defenseless victims.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 2, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, Branch 47, in Criminal Case No. 8371, finding accused NARCISO SALDAÑA and ELMER
ESGUERRA and appellants FERNANDO MORALES and ARTURO MALIT GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentencing each of them to death is
hereby AFFIRMED. They are likewise ordered to pay, jointly and severally, actual damages in the
amount of ₱92,000.00 representing the amount of ransom paid by the victims' father, as well as the
sum of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Let alias warrants issue for the immediate arrest by the NBI and the PNP of accused Narciso Saldaña
and Elmer Esguerra, now at large.

104
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Section 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this decision, to the Office of
the President for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

105