May the Labor Arbiter rule upon the following: May the Labor Arbiter rule upon the
on the merits of
claims for overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th
month pay, sick leave pay, which are all
included in the complaint for illegal dismissal
but not proven because no evidence is given is
given for non-payment?
The answer is in a 1994 case. Seaborne Carriers
Corporation v. NLRC. The Supreme Court says
yes. The burden of proving that payment of said
benefits has been made rests upon the party
who would suffer if no evidence at all is
presented by either party. That is the employer.
It is the employer that is required to maintain
payroll records. And for how long must he
maintain it? At least three years under the Labor
Code. Under the NIRC, he must maintain it for at
least five years.
Since it is the employer who has the payroll
records, he has the evidence to prove payment
or non-payment. He just has to produce it. If he
does not produce it, then what is the assumption
of law? The party who is the only one that has
evidence and he does not present that evidence,
then that evidence must be inimical to his cause.
The employee can allege anything, especially
when it comes to salary and benefits. Suppose he
alleges and he was not there. You produce the
payroll. “This payroll is complete. He’s not there
because he’s not employed.”
May the Labor Arbiter rule upon claims not
alleged in the complaint but made in the
complainant’s position paper?
The answer is yes, provided the claims are made
in the complainant’s position paper. The claims
for wage differentials not made either in the
complaint or in the position paper cannot be
passed upon. If the employer does not provide
evidence to refute that claim, the employer
loses.
the case simply on the basis of the position
papers filed by the parties?
The answer is yes. It is entirely within the bounds
of the Labor Arbiter’s authority to decide a case
based on mere position papers and supporting
document, without a formal trial or hearing. It is
well-settled that the holding of a hearing is
discretionary and not a matter of right.
Consolidated Rural Bank v. NLRC, 301 SCRA 223.
May the Labor Arbiter rule upon the merits of
the case on the basis of a supplemental position
paper and memorandum submitted by one of
the parties after the parties have filed their
position papers and agreed to consider the case
submitted for decision?
What if one party submits a supplemental
position paper and he does not give a copy to the
other party? And the Labor Arbiter receives and
takes note of the supplemental position paper?
And on the basis of the additional arguments and
evidence submitted, he decides?
That is foul. The other party must have the same
ambit of opportunity as the other party. So that
is not allowed.
May the Labor Arbiter rule on an illegal
dismissal complaint filed by a pastor against the
Seventh Day Adventist Mission Corporation, in
view of the principle of the separation of church
and State?
In Austria v. NLRC, a 1999 decision, the Supreme
Court said yes. What is involved here is the
relationship of the church as an employer, and
the minister as an employee, because they have
a written contract. The minister was not
excommunicated or expelled from membership
of the church, but was terminated from
employment. The case does not concern an
ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar
the State from taking cognizance of the case.

Can the Labor Arbiter rule upon a complaint
filed by two union members for illegal and
exorbitant deduction, and illegal expulsion,
against their union?
The answer of the Supreme Court is no. Clearly,
this is an intra-union dispute, which falls under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the BLR
and the Labor Relations Division of the Regional
Office. That is Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa
v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 586.
When is an appeal to the NLRC from the Labor
Arbiter deemed perfected?
It is deemed perfected upon the filing of a cash
or surety bond in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
So if you cannot perfect the bond, then your
appeal is deemed incomplete, and the time
lapses for you to appeal, in which case you have
not perfected your appeal on time.
Suppose you appeal but you do not question
the monetary award. What you question is the
award for moral damages. Do you have to file a
bond?
No, because moral damages is not a monetary
award.
If you have an objection to the magnitude of the
bond – you claim that the bond is too much and
your right to appeal is rendered nugatory –
what do you do?
You file a motion for reduction of the bond. But
what is the rule now in remedial law when you
file a motion for reduction of the bond? The rule
is when you question, you must make a counter-
proposal, and you must at least deposit 10% of
the counter-proposal. Otherwise, your
questioning the amount of the bond is just
dilatory.
When is the late filing of the bond allowed?
Exceptions to the rule:
1. When the appealed decision did not
state the exact amount of the monetary
award.
“Wherefore, respondent is ordered to
pay just overtime to the complainant.”
Just overtime? Wala may numero
gibutang so how can you put up a bond?
You file a motion to clarify the
dispositive portion by specifying the
amount.
2. When the employer perfected his appeal
before the decision of the court fell
under RA 6715, or where the employer
only appeals the award for damages and
not the money claims.
CASE: Nestle v. NLRC, 195 SCRA 340, 1991.
Nestle found its salespersons of the Infant
Formula Division as selling their samples. So they
were dismissed. You know very well that
salespersons have car plans – the company buys
the car and puts it in the name of the employee,
but the employee executes a chattel mortgage
to the company, and so he owes the balance of
the loan taken out to purchase that car.
After it was announced that they were
dismissed, the company also writes them a
letter, saying: “The car in your possession is
actually under the car plan. You have two
choices: pay the balance or return the car.”
The salespersons filed an illegal dismissal
complaint. The moment they filled the illegal
dismissal complaint, they were able to resist the
civil case filed by the employer Nestle. Nestle
filed a separate civil case of replevin to recover
the vehicles because the salespersons did not
turn over the vehicles or pay the balance.
Their defense in the replevin: (1) It is not yet
settled that they have to return it because the
illegal dismissal case that is filed is a prejudicial
question; and (2) the regular courts have no
jurisdiction over the replevin because this car is
given to us by virtue of our employment.
According to the Supreme Court, the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its
jurisdiction by issuing the writ of injunction to
stop the company from enforcing the civil
obligation of the private respondents under the
car loan agreements, and from protecting its
interest in the cars which, by the terms of those
agreements, belong to the company until their
purchase price shall have been fully paid by the
employee. The terms of the car loan agreements
are not in issue in the labor case. The rights and
obligations of the parties under those contracts
may be enforced by a separate civil action in the
regular courts, not the NLRC.
Chattel mortgage, nominate contract – Civil
Code man na. That’s a sign that the Labor Arbiter
has no jurisdiction.
CASE: Smart Communications v. Astorga, 542
SCRA 434
Same issue. This one is a supervisor of Smart. She
was separated from service after ample
opportunity to be heard. She had a car under car
plan. Then the letter of Smart: “Return the car or
pay the balance.”
The only difference between this and the Nestle
case is that there is no chattel mortgage because
she was an executive. There was just a simple
memorandum. The defense of the supervisor is
that the precedent of the Nestle case does not
apply. Is she correct?
The Supreme Court said that Nestle still applies.
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which
is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The
question of whether or not a party has a right of
possession over the property involved, and if so,
whether or not adverse party has wrongfully
taken and detain said property as to require its
return to the plaintiff, is outside the pale of
competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the
field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.
The labor dispute involved is not intertwined
with the issue in the replevin case. The
respective issues raised in each forum can be
resolved independently from the other. The
determination of the question of who has the
better right to take possession is addressed to
the competence of the civil courts, not the Labor
Arbiter.
So whether or not there is chattel mortgage, it
does not matter. Rightful possession of personal
property is a civil law question, and therefore,
replevin is still proper.
CASE: A personal loan from a company president
to an employee is not within the ambit of the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Moreover, the
NLRC cannot have appellate jurisdiction over the
case.
The Supreme Court said that the personal loan
to the manager is mutuum – that is Civil Code,
that is not covered and not arising from
employer-employee relationship.
CASE: Here is a manager that is given privileges
in the place where he works. He works in a body
repair shop and vehicle motor services. He is
allowed to have his own car repaired on loan.
After he had his car repaired, he resigned. The
employer files a money claims complaint against
this former manager to recover the amount of
the repair on his vehicle.
The Supreme Court says that is not a labor
question. That is a civil law question. That is
mutuum.

CASE: Claim for notarial fees of a lawyer
employed by a company is within the jurisdiction
of the Labor Arbiter, where the engagement of
the lawyer as in-house legal counsel includes the
stipulation of “not counting notarial fees.”
In-house counsel so he is an employee of the
company. He receives a regular salary. Over and
above that, the engagement says he is also paid
notarial fees. So he can claim notarial fees upon
his severance from the company.
CASE: Manila Electric Co. v. Rosario Gopez Lim,
October 5, 2010
En banc decision. Ponente is Justice Carpio-
Morales.
She is a manager of Meralco in one district, and
she has been receiving threats according to
management. So the management, after
investigating, said “It is better for you to be
transferred.” When she was transferred, it was
much farther than where she lived. So she was
forced to resign. She filed a case of constructive
dismissal against the employer. Together with
her complaint, she files with the courts a petition
for habeas data – that she should be informed of
what these threats are.
The Supreme Court that she is not entitled to
habeas data. There is no showing from the facts
presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
respondent’s right to privacy vis-à-vis the right to
life, liberty, or security. To argue that petitioners’
refusal to disclose the contents of reports
allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s
safety amounts to a violation of her privacy is, at
best, speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes
these threats and accusations from unknown
individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her
July 10, 2008 letter as “highly suspicious,
doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at
all.” And she even suspects that her transfer to
another place of work “betrays the real intent of
management” and could be a “punitive move.”
Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue
is labor-related, and not related to her right to
privacy.
CASE: Marino Jr. and UST Faculty Union v.
Gamilla et al., January 31, 2005
Third Division. Penned by Justice Tinga.
Two sets of officers of the union fought each
other. Ang gibuhat sa incumbent, gi-trangkahan
nila ang office sa union. Dili makasulod ang new
set of officers. Kautang-utang sila ug kwarta to
run the union’s activities. So they filed a case
against the former set of officers before the BLR
because that is intra-union dispute. In the
complaint, they have a prayer for damages
because of the money, the trouble, etc. The BLR
ordered the payment of damages.
Kasab-an sila sa Supreme Court. There is nothing
in the Labor Code which says that you can award
damages.
That’s why it needs amendment. Before, the
Labor Arbiter could not award damages. That’s
why if you were asking damages because of your
illegal dismissal, you had to file another case with
the civil courts. That was ended when RA 6715
amended the Labor Code. Now, the Labor
Arbiter can award damages. So far, though, the
BLR is not given powers to award damages.