COPYRIGHT CASES
"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music (92-1292), 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
FACTS: Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. sued 2 Live Crew and their record company,
claiming that 2 Live Crew's song "Pretty Woman" infringed Acuff-Rose's
copyright in Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman." The District Court granted
summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, holding that its song was a parody that
made fair use of the original song. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held
that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair.
Issue: Is Live Crew's commercial parody of Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty
Woman" be a fair use?
Ruling: Yes. The Court held that a parody's commercial character is only one
element to be weighed in a fair use enquiry and that insufficient
consideration was given to the nature of parody in weighing the degree of
copying. The Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the
presumption that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it
presumptively unfair, as no such evidentiary presumption was available to
address either the character and purpose of the use or the market harm.
The appellate court "erred in holding that 2 Live Crew had necessarily
copied excessively from the Orbison original, considering the parodic
purpose of the use."
Parody, like other comment and criticism, may claim fair use. Under the first
of the four factors, "the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature…” the enquiry focuses on
whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original
creation, or whether and to what extent it is "transformative," altering the
original with new expression, meaning, or message. The more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use. The
heart of any parodist's claim to quote from existing material is the use of
some elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at
least in part, comments on that author's work. But that tells courts little
about where to draw the line. Thus, like other uses, parody has to work its
way through the relevant factors.
ADDITIONAL: case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
"The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors."
Castle Rock Entertainment vs Carol Publishing Group
Facts: Castle Rock Entertainment is the copyright holder and producer of
each episode of the sitcom, Seinfeld television series. The series revolves
around the petty tribulations in the lives of four single adult friends in New
York. Defendants are Beth Golub who wrote SAT or The Seinfeld Aptitude
Test a 132-page book containing 643 trivia questions and answers about the
events and characters depicted in Seinfeld, and her publisher, Carol
Publishing Group. The book contained 211 multiple choice questions, in
which only one out of three to five answers were correct; 93 matching
questions; and a number of short-answer questions. The questions were
divided into five levels of difficulty, labeled (in increasing order of difficulty)
"Wuss Questions," "This, That, and the Other Questions," "Tough Monkey
Questions," "Atomic Wedgie Questions," and "Master of Your
Domain Questions." The book drew from 84 Seinfeld episodes that had been
broadcast as of the time that the Carol Group published The SAT. While
Golub had created the incorrect answers, the questions and correct answers
were grounded in some part to a Seinfeld episode. A significant number of
questions contained dialogue from the show. The name "Seinfeld" was
displayed prominently throughout the book, and it contained pictures of the
show's actors on several pages. The back cover contained a disclaimer which
read, "This book has not been approved or licensed by any entity involved in
creating or producing Seinfeld." In November 1994, Castle Rock contacted
Carol Publishing Group concerning its copyright and trademark infringement
claims. Carol Publishing continued to publish The SAT and in February 1995,
Castle Rock filed an action in Federal District Court alleging federal copyright
and trademark infringement and state law unfair competition.
Issue: Is there copyright infringement?
Ruling: YES. The appeals court noted that there was no dispute as to
whether Castle Rock owned a valid copyright in Seinfeld nor was it disputed
that Carol Publishing copied material from the shows. The question was
only of misappropriation of protectable material.
The appeals court employed both a "qualitative vs. quantitative" method
and a "total concept and feel" approach in determining if Carol Publishing
had misappropriated Seinfeld.
The qualitative vs. quantitative approach sought to determine if the quality
of the copied work was actionable in an infringement lawsuit and if the
quantity of the copied work was enough to stake a claim. The court chose to
take the Seinfeld series as a whole, rather than compare the quantity of
copied work from each of the 84 episodes individually. Altogether, The
SAT contained 643 fragments from the entire series. The court held that this
was a sufficient quantity of copying to overcome the de minimis threshold
alleged by Carol Publishing. When analyzing the quality of the copied
material, the court rejected the defendant's position that Seinfeld trivia
constituted facts and was therefore not covered by copyright protection. It
reasoned that the "facts" portrayed in Seinfeld originated in the fictitious
expression by the writers of the show. The court noted that the book did
not quiz readers on such facts as the location of the Seinfeld set or the
biographies of the actors, but on characters and events springing from the
imagination of the show's authors. Normally, the court would have
eliminated those elements that did not meet the quality requirements
through the subtraction method in misappropriation analysis, but in finding
nothing to subtract the court held that the plaintiffs had established a prima
facie case.
Issue: Does the infringement constitutes fair use?
Ruling: No. The court held that the more critical inquiry was whether The
SAT merely supplanted the Seinfeld episodes or rather if it added something
new, providing new insights, new aesthetics in the manner that the fair use
doctrine was meant to enrich society.
The defendants claimed two arguments of transformative qualities in The
SAT: first that the subject matter of the work did not bar a finding of fair
use, and second that the book was a critique of the show. Specifically, the
defendants stylized The SAT as a work "decoding the obsession with and
mystique that surrounds Seinfeld by critically restructuring Seinfeld's
mystique into a system complete with varying levels of 'mastery' that relate
the reader's control of the show's trivia to knowledge of and identification
with their hero, Jerry Seinfeld. In response, Castle Rock retorted that "had
defendants been half as creative in creating The SAT as were their lawyers in
crafting these arguments about transformation, defendants might have a
colorable fair use claim.
The court rejected the defendants' arguments holding that any
transformative purpose posed by the book was slight or non-existent. It
concluded that the purpose of the book was to entertain
the Seinfeld audience with a book about Seinfeld, much the same purpose
as the television show. Finally, the court noted a potential source of
confusion between the "transformative use" doctrine and derivative works.
The court emphasized that derivative works were based upon preexisting
works. They transformed an original work into a new mode of expression,
but unlike a work of fair use expression, a derivative work's purpose was not
transformed. In addition, when a derivative work transformed an original
work into a new mode of expression such that little similarity remained, it
would not infringe the copyright of the original work.
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation (2014)
Facts: Paul Soglin was a regular at the Miflin Street Block Party when the
latter was still student. For the 2012 Block party, Sconnie Nation made some
t-shirts and tank tops dispaying an image of Soglin’s face and the phrase
“Sorry for Partying”. Photographer Kienitz accuses Sconnie Nation and its
vendor of copyright infringement. Sconnie Nation concedes staring with a
photograph Kienitz took at Soglin’s inauguration. Such picture was
downloaded from the City’s website.
Issue: Did the use of Soglin’s picture constitute fair use?
Ruling: Yes. Taking into consideration the market effect, we ask whether the
contested use is a complement to the protected work (allowed) rather than
a substitute for it (prohibited). A tshirt or tanktop is no substitute for the
original photograph. Kienitz does not argue that defendant’s products have
reduced the demand for the original work or any use of it that he is
contemplating.
Defendants removed so much of the original that, only the smile of Soglin
remains. The original’s background is gone; its colors and shading are gone;
the expression in Soglin’s eyes can no longer be read. What is left, besides a
hint of Soglin’s smile, is the outline of his face, which cannot be copyrighted.
BMG v. GONZALEZ
Facts: Plaintiffs, recording companies including BMG Music, alleged that
defendant Gonzalez infringed their copyrights in several audio recordings
when she used a “file-sharing network” to download and retain
unauthorized copies on her home computer. Defendant asserted a fair use
defense, claiming she intended to sample the works on a “try-before-you-
buy basis.” Defendant appealed the district court’s ruling in plaintiffs’ favor.
Issue: Whether defendant’s unauthorized downloading and retention of
plaintiffs’ copyright-protected works to purportedly sample the works
before buying was fair use?
Ruling: No. The court held that defendant’s unauthorized downloading and
retention of copyright protected works was not fair use. In reaching its
conclusion, the court first determined that defendant was not engaged in a
nonprofit use due to her downloading and retention of whole copyrighted
songs that “often are sold per song as well as per album.” The court then
focused on the negative effect of the use on the potential market, finding
that “[m]usic downloaded for free from the Internet is a close substitute for
purchased music.” The court discounted defendant’s assertion that she was
trying music before buying by pointing out that the market for methods of
introducing potential consumers to music, for example radio, was negatively
impacted by competition from peer-to-peer networks. Finally, the court
noted that there existed myriad authorized means for customers to listen to
music before purchasing, and concluded that defendant’s downloading was
not a fair use.
Leibovtiz vs Paramount Pictures, Docket No. 97-7063,
February 19, 1998
Super quick doctrine of the case:
In applying fair use in parodies, most important factors are:
1) The parody must “comment” on the original work (i.e. ridicule
the original)
2) The parody does not affect the market value of the original
Reasonableness and amount of the copying is not essential because
the nature of a parody necessarily copies a lot from the original.
Facts: Leibovitz is a well known photographer and one of her work is the
photograph of Demi Moore that appeared on the cover of the August 1991
issue of Vanity Fair magazine. The appearance of the photograph attracted
widespread attention, and that issue became one of Vanity Fair’s best
selling issues of all time.
In August 1993, Paramount released an advertising ad for its movie
Naked Gun 33 1/3: The Final Insult. Paramount selected the composite of
Moore's body and Nielsen's face. However, rather than mechanically
copying the portion of the original Leibovitz photograph depicting Moore's
body, Paramount commissioned another photograph to be taken of a nude,
pregnant woman, similarly posed. Great effort was made to ensure that
the photograph resembled in meticulous detail the one taken by Leibovitz.
The model was carefully posed so that her posture and hands precisely
matched those of Moore in the Leibovitz photograph. A large ring was
placed on the same finger as the one appearing on Moore's hand. The
photograph was digitally enhanced by a computer to make the skin tone
and shape of the body more closely match those of Moore in the Leibovitz
photograph. The final step was to superimpose on the model's body a
photograph of Nielsen's face, with his jaw and eyes positioned roughly at
the same angle as Moore's, but with her serious look replaced by Nielsen's
mischievous smirk.
 Lower court ruled that Paramount was entitled to the defense of
fair use.
Issue: What is fair use rule in parodies?
Ruling: The fair use doctrine “permits other people to use copyrighted
material without the owner's consent in a reasonable manner for certain
purposes.”
Fair use doctrine factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the work used, and
(4) the effect of the use on the market for the original.
In parodies, on the proper application of the first fair use factor, the
purpose and character of the use, the important requirement is the use of
some elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at
least in part, comments on that author's works and the comment must have
some critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition.
Second factor is not very helpful in parodies, court disregarded this.
Third factor, what is reasonable amount of work used will depend,
on the extent to which the [copying work's] overriding purpose and
character is to parody the original or, in contrast, the likelihood that the
parody may serve as a market substitute for the original. Third factor is not
much of help because parodies require major use of the original work.
On the fourth factor, it is more likely that the new work (parody)
will not affect the market for the original in a way cognizable under this
factor because the parody and the original usually serve different market
functions.
Issue: Is there Fair use in this case?
Ruling: Yes.
First factor, plainly, the ad adds something new and qualifies as a
“transformative” work because the smirking face of Nielsen contrasts so
strikingly with the serious expression on the face of Moore, the ad may
reasonably be perceived as commenting on the seriousness, even the
pretentiousness, of the original. The ad is not merely different;  it differs in a
way that may reasonably be perceived as commenting, through ridicule, on
what a viewer might reasonably think is the undue self-importance
conveyed by the subject of the Leibovitz photograph.
Second Factor, not much help, ignored.
Third Factor, in assessing the amount and substantiality of the
portion used, we must focus only on the protected elements of the original.
The basic pose of a nude pregnant body and the position of hands were
already placed in the public domain and not copyright-protected. However,
Leibovitz is entitled to protection for such artistic elements as the particular
lighting, the resulting skin tone of the subject, and the camera angle that
she selected. Even if there is substantial work copied from the original,
parodies by their nature require copying of substantial amount of the work.
Thus, 3rd factor not much help.
Fourth factor, Leibovitz all but concedes that the Paramount
photograph did not interfere with any potential market for her photograph
or for derivative works based upon it. Her only argument for actual market
harm is that the defendant has deprived her of a licensing fee by using the
work as an advertisement. But she is not entitled to a licensing fee for a
work that otherwise qualifies for the fair use defense as a parody.
TIME INC. v. BERNARD GEIS ASSOCS., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
Facts: Defendant Bernard Geis Associates (Associates) published the book
"Six Seconds in Dallas" written by Defendant Thompson. The Book contains
a number of what are called "sketches" but which are in fact copies of parts
of the Zapruder film. The Zapruder film contains about 480 frames showing
the shooting of US Pres. John F. Kennedy. Life, a division of Time Inc, bought
the original and all three copies of the film. Plaintiff Time Inc. publishes Life
magazines. Having failed to secure permission from Life to use the Zapruder
pictures, Thompson and the other defendants copied certain frames by
employing an "artist" to make copies in charcoal by means of a "rendering"
or "sketch".
Issue 1: Are pictures subject of copyright?
Held: Yes. The Zapruder pictures are "photographs" of an event. The
Copyright Act provides that "Photographs" may be the subject matter of
copyright.
"It undoubtedly requires originality to determine just when to take the
photograph, so as to bring to it the proper setting for both animate and
inanimate objects, with the adjunctive features of light, shade, position,
etc." Thus, if Zapruder had made his pictures at a point in time before the
shooting, he would clearly have been entitled to copyright.
Any photograph reflects "the personal influence of the author, and no two
will be absolutely alike". The Zapruder pictures in fact have many elements
of creativity. Among other things, Zapruder selected the kind of camera
(movies, not snapshots), the kind of film (color), the kind of lens (telephoto),
the area in which the pictures were to be taken, the time they were to be
taken, and (after testing several sites) the spot on which the camera would
be operated.
Issue 2: Does the event the Zapruder pictures recorded make them no
longer subject of copyright?
Held: No. The defendants argue that "news cannot be copyrighted". A news
event may not be copyrighted. But Life claims no copyright in the news
element of the event but only in the particular form of record made by
Zapruder.
Issue 3: Was there unauthorized copying when the book merely contains
“sketches”?
Held: Yes. That they were done in charcoal by an "artist" is of no moment. “
[C]opyright in a work protects against unauthorized copying not only in the
original medium in which the work was produced, but also in any other
medium as well. Thus copyright in a photograph will preclude unauthorized
copying by drawing or in any other form, as well as by photographic
reproduction."
Issue 4: Was the use by defendants of the Zapruder pictures a “fair use”?
Held: Yes.
The four standards to consider are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work
In determining the issue of fair use, the balance seems to be in favor of
defendants. There is a public interest in having the fullest information
available on the murder of President Kennedy. Thompson did serious work
on the subject and has a theory entitled to public consideration. The Book is
not bought because it contained the Zapruder Pictures; the Book is bought
because of the theory of Thompson and its explanation, supported by
Zapruder pictures.
There seems little, if any, injury to plaintiff, the copyright owner. There is no
competition between plaintiff and defendants. No market for the
copyrighted work appears to be affected. The effect of the use of certain
frames in the Book on plaintiff’s future motion picture projects and book
projects is speculative. It seems more reasonable to speculate that the Book
would, if anything, enhance the value of the copyrighted work; it is difficult
to see any decrease in its value.
NBI Microsoft vs. Judy Hwang
FACTS: In May 1993, Microsoft Corporation and Beltron Computer
Philippines, Inc. entered into a Licensing Agreement. Under Section 2(a) of
the Agreement, Microsoft authorized Beltron, for a fee, to:
1. Reproduce and install no more than one copy of Windows on each
Customer System hard disk;
2. Distribute directly or indirectly and license copies of Windows
(reproduced as per Section 2 of the Agreement and/or acquired from an
Authorized Replicator or Authorized Distributor.
Their agreement allowed either party to terminate if one fails to comply
with their respective obligations. Microsoft terminated the Agreement in
June 1995 by reason of Beltron’s non-payment of royalties. Later, Microsoft
learned that Beltron was illegally copying and selling copies of Windows.
Microsoft then sought the assistance of the National Bureau of
Investigation. NBI agents made some purchase from Beltron where they
acquired a computer unit pre-installed with Windows, 12 windows installer
CDs packed as Microsoft products. The agents were not given the end-user
license agreements, user manuals, and certificates of authenticity for the
products purchased. They were given a receipt which has a header of
“T.M.T.C. (Phils) Inc. BELTRON COMPUTER”. TMTC stands for Taiwan
Machinery Display and Trade Center.
A search warrant was subsequently issued where 2,831 CDs of Windows
installers, among others, were seized. Based on the items seized from
Beltron, Microsoft filed a case of copyright infringement against Beltron and
TMTC as well as their officers (Judy Hwang et al) before the Department of
Justice (DOJ). Beltron, in its counter-affidavit, argued the following:
1. That Microsoft’s issue with Beltron was really just to have leverage in
forcing Beltron to pay the unpaid royalties; and that Microsoft should have
filed a collection suit.
2. That the computer unit allegedly purchased by the NBI agents from them
cannot be decisively traced as coming from Beltron because the receipt
issued to the agents did not list the computer unit as one of the items
bought.
3. That the 12 installers purchased by the agents which are actually listed in
the receipt were not manufactured by Beltron but rather they were genuine
copies purchased by TMTC from an authorized Microsoft seller in Singapore.
4. That the 2,831 installers seized from them were not a property of Beltron
but rather they were left to them by someone for safekeeping.
The DOJ secretary agreed with Beltron and dismissed the case. The
Secretary ruled that the issue of the authority of Beltron to copy and sell
Microsoft products should first be resolved in a civil suit. Microsoft appealed
the decision of the DOJ secretary before the Supreme Court. Meanwhile,
Beltron filed a motion to quash the search warrant before the RTC that
issued the same. The RTC partially granted the quashal. The Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC. Hwang et al did not appeal the CA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ Secretary is correct.
RULING: No. Section 5 of Presidential Decree 49 enumerates the rights
vested exclusively on the copyright owner. Contrary to the DOJ’s ruling, the
gravamen of copyright infringement is not merely the unauthorized
“manufacturing” of intellectual works but rather the unauthorized
performance of any of the acts covered by Section 5. Hence, any person
who performs any of the acts under Section 5 without obtaining the
copyright owner’s prior consent renders himself civilly and criminally liable
for copyright infringement.
Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and
occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law,
and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this
connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the
owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred
by statute on the owner of the copyright.
Being the copyright and trademark owner of Microsoft software, Microsoft
acted well within its rights in filing the complaint before DOJ on the
incriminating evidence obtained from Beltron. Hence, it was highly irregular
for the DOJ to hold that Microsoft sought the issuance of the search
warrants and the filing of the complaint merely to pressure Beltron to pay
its overdue royalties to Microsoft.
There is no basis for the DOJ to rule that Microsoft must await a prior
“resolution from the proper court of whether or not the Agreement is still
binding between the parties.” Beltron has not filed any suit to question
Microsoft’s termination of the Agreement. Microsoft can neither be
expected nor compelled to wait until Beltron decides to sue before
Microsoft can seek remedies for violation of its intellectual property rights.
Furthermore, the articles seized from Beltron are counterfeit per se because
Microsoft does not (and could not have authorized anyone to) produce such
CD installers The copying of the genuine Microsoft software to produce
these fake CDs and their distribution are illegal even if the copier or
distributor is a Microsoft licensee. As far as these installer CD-ROMs are
concerned, the Agreement (and the alleged question on the validity of its
termination) is immaterial to the determination of Beltron’s liability for
copyright infringement and unfair competition. Beltron’s defense that the
box of CD installers found in their possession was only left to them for
safekeeping is not tenable.
MANLY SPORTWEAR MANUFACTURING V. DADODETTE ENTERPRISES (G.R.
NO. 165306)
Facts:
On the basis of information that respondent Dadodette Enterprises were in
possession of sporting goods or articles, the copyright of which belonged to
petitioner Manly, the NBI applied for search warrant before the trial court
which ruled on its issuance. Thereafter, respondent moved to quash the
warrant on the ground that petitioner’s goods are ordinary and not among
the works protected under the IP Code. The trial court annulled the warrant
holding that there were certificates of registration over the same goods
issued earlier than that of petitioner negating its claim that the goods were
original works entitled to copyright protection. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the certificates of registration issued to petitioner is
proof of its ownership.
Ruling:
No. Besides, no copyright accrues in favor of MANLY despite issuance of the
certificates of registration and deposit pursuant to Section 2, Rule 7 of the
Copyrights Safeguards and Regulations which states:
Sec. 2 Effects of Registration and Deposit of Work. The registration and
deposit of the work is purely for recording the date of registration and
deposit of the work and shall not be conclusive as to copyright ownership or
the term of the copyrights or the rights of the copyright owner, including
neighboring rights.
At most, the certificates of registration and deposit issued by the National
Library and the Supreme Court Library serve merely as a notice of recording
and registration of the work but do not confer any right or title upon the
registered copyright owner or automatically put his work under the
protective mantle of the copyright law. It is not a conclusive proof of
copyright ownership. As it is, non-registration and deposit of the work
within the prescribed period only makes the copyright owner liable to pay a
fine.
Monster Communications V. Turner
Facts: Plaintiff Monster Communications, Inc. owned the film rights for the
movie When We Were Kings (Kings) that contained historic footage
documenting the 1974 title boxing match, often called the “Rumble in the
Jungle,” between Mohammed Ali and George Foreman. Defendant Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. made the documentary Ali—The Whole Story
(Story), which contained “a number of film clips, aggregating approximately
between forty-one seconds and two minutes, that appear in Kings and
allegedly are owned by Monster.” Plaintiff sued Turner for infringing its
copyright in the historic film footage, seeking to enjoin the company from
exhibiting the documentary.
Issue: Whether defendant would be likely to establish that its use of
plaintiff’s historic film footage in a documentary constituted fair use?
Ruling: Yes. The court denied plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief because
it concluded that defendant was likely to prevail on its argument that use of
the historic footage in its documentary was a fair use. In reaching that
conclusion, the court found that defendant’s work, while commercial in
nature, “undeniably constitute[d] a combination of comment, criticism,
scholarship and research.” The court also determined that the amount used
weighed in favor of finding fair use because the footage used was not the
focus of defendant’s documentary. Additionally, the court found that
defendant’s use of the footage was unlikely to harm the market for
plaintiff’s work because the use was “too few, too short, and too small in
relation to the whole. If the broadcast of [Story] impacts [Kings’] reception,
it almost surely will be as a result of their common subject, not the minute
or so of common footage.” Finally, the historic nature of the allegedly
infringed films clips also supported a finding of fair use.
Sony v. Universal City Studios (1984)
Sony manufactures home videotape recorders (VTR's), and markets them
through retail establishments,. Respondents own the copyrights on some of
the television programs that are broadcast on the public airwaves.
Respondents brought an action against petitioners, alleging that VTR
consumers had been recording some of respondents' copyrighted works
that had been exhibited on commercially sponsored television, and thereby
infringed respondents' copyrights, and further that petitioners were liable
for such copyright infringement because of their marketing of the VTR's. The
VTR’s were used to record tv programs for later viewing (time-shifting).
Respondents sought money damages, an equitable accounting of profits,
and an injunction against the manufacture and marketing of the VTR's. The
District Court denied respondents all relief, holding that noncommercial
home use recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was a
fair use of copyrighted works, and did not constitute copyright
infringement, and that petitioners could not be held liable as contributory
infringers even if the home use of a VTR was considered an infringing use.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding petitioners liable for contributory
infringement and ordering the District Court to fashion appropriate relief
Issue: Does the sale of the VTR’s to the general public constitute
contributory infringement?
Held: No. The sale of the VTR's to the general public does not constitute
contributory infringement of respondents' copyrights. This case does not fall
in the category of those in which it is manifestly just to impose vicarious
liability because the "contributory" infringer was in a position to control the
use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without
permission from the copyright owner. Here, the only contact between
petitioners and the users of the VTR's occurred at the moment of sale. And
there is no precedent for imposing vicarious liability on the theory that
petitioners sold the VTR's with constructive knowledge that their customers
might use the equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted
material. The sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is
widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes, or, indeed, is merely
capable of substantial noninfringing uses. There is no likelihood that time-
shifting would cause nonminimal harm to the potential market for, or the
value of, respondents' copyrighted works. The VTR's are therefore capable
of substantial noninfringing uses. Private, noncommercial time-shifting in
the home satisfies this standard of noninfringing uses both because
respondents have no right to prevent other copyright holders from
authorizing such time-shifting for their programs and because the District
Court's findings reveal that even the unauthorized home time-shifting of
respondents' programs is legitimate fair use.
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY vs BEARDSLEY
No. 174, Docket 24752, March 24, 1958
Facts: In the late 1930's, Beardsley was an insurance broker who allegedly
developed a blanket bond to cover replacement of lost securities. He
published a book or a pamphlet, consisting of sex pages, less the three of
them explanatory matter and the rest are insurance forms designed to
provide blanket indemnity protection.
 He contended that Pullman Insurance company copied and
infringed his forms then Continental copied and infringed the Pullman
forms. Thus, Continental indirectly infringed his forms.
Issue: Are forms and insurance instruments copyrightable?
Beardsley wanted to reap the business which might be expected from the
use of the plan and this first publication was made to further that objective.
In legal contemplation it was a general publication which forfeited
Beardsley's right to a copyright .

Ruling: Yes by US Constitution and statutory provisions.

Issue: Was there copyright infringement?

Ruling: No. Beardsley failed to prove infringement. He merely proved that

there is similarity between Continental and Pullman forms. However,
evidence showed that as to the affidavit of loss form, although the
Continental and Pullman forms are very similar, the Beardsley form is
sufficiently different from both to negate infringement. And as to the other
documents/forms none are close enough to the Beardsley forms to require
the reversal of the trial court's holding of non-infringement.

To constitute infringement in such cases, a showing of appropriation

in the exact form or substantially so of the copyrighted material should be
required. To prohibit others to use similarity of language would have the
effect of giving the copyright owner a monopoly on his idea.

In the fields of insurance and commerce the use of specific language in

forms and documents may be so essential to accomplish a desired result
and so integrated with the use of a legal or commercial conception that the
proper standard of infringement is one which will protect as far as possible
the copyrighted language and yet allow free use of the thought beneath the
language. The evidence here shows that Continental in so far as it has used
the language of Beardsley's forms has done so only as incidental to its use of
the underlying idea.

Furthermore, Beardsley claimed that the first publication without

copyright notice was a limited publication to a limited group of people.
Court ruled otherwise. The distribution was not limited by Beardsley as to
persons or as to purpose. The only limitation was that attributable to a lack
of general interest in the highly specialized subject-matter of the plan.