1

AGRARIAN LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION

Republic Act No. 6657 June 10, 1988

AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM

TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE
MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

CHAPTER I
Preliminary Chapter

Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988.

Section 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies. — It is the policy of the State to pursue a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The welfare of the landless farmers and
farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the
nation toward sound rural development and industrialization, and the establishment of owner
cultivatorship of economic-size farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture.

To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership of land, with due regard to the rights
of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation, shall be
undertaken to provide farmers and farmworkers with the opportunity to enhance their dignity
and improve the quality of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural lands.

The agrarian reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who
are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm
workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to the priorities and retention
limits set forth in this Act, having taken into account ecological, developmental, and equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. The State shall respect the
right of small landowners, and shall provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers and landowners, as well as
cooperatives and other independent farmers' organizations, to participate in the planning,
organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture
through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial production, marketing
and other support services.

The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform, or stewardship, whenever applicable, in
accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands
of the public domain, under lease or concession, suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small settlers and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral
lands.

The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates, which
shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.

By means of appropriate incentives, the State shall encourage the formation and maintenance of
economic-size family farms to be constituted by individual beneficiaries and small landowners.
 2

The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to
the preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore.t shall
provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate
financial, production and marketing assistance and other services. The State shall also protect,
develop and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from
their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

The State shall be guided by the principles that land has a social function and land ownership
has a social responsibility. Owners of agricultural lands have the obligation to cultivate directly
or through labor administration the lands they own and thereby make the land productive.

The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform
program to promote industrialization, employment and privatization of public sector
enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for lands shall contain features that shall
enhance negotiability and acceptability in the marketplace.

The State may lease undeveloped lands of the public domain to qualified entities for the
development of capital-intensive farms, and traditional and pioneering crops especially those
for exports subject to the prior rights of the beneficiaries under this Act.

Section 3. Definitions. — For the purpose of this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise:

(a) Agrarian Reform means redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced, to
farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement, to
include the totality of factors and support services designed to lift the economic status of the
beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the physical redistribution of lands, such
as production or profit-sharing, labor administration, and the distribution of shares of stocks,
which will allow beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the lands they work.

(b) Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the
soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a
farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by person whether natural or
juridical.

(c) Agricultural Land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and
not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.

(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
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(e) Idle or Abandoned Land refers to any agricultural land not cultivated, tilled or developed to
produce any crop nor devoted to any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of
three (3) years immediately prior to the receipt of notice of acquisition by the government as
provided under this Act, but does not include land that has become permanently or regularly
devoted to non-agricultural purposes.t does not include land which has become unproductive by
reason of force majeure or any other fortuitous event, provided that prior to such event, such
land was previously used for agricultural or other economic purpose.

(f) Farmer refers to a natural person whose primary livelihood is cultivation of land or the
production of agricultural crops, either by himself, or primarily with the assistance of his
immediate farm household, whether the land is owned by him, or by another person under a
leasehold or share tenancy agreement or arrangement with the owner thereof.

(g) Farmworker is a natural person who renders service for value as an employee or laborer in
an agricultural enterprise or farm regardless of whether his compensation is paid on a daily,
weekly, monthly or "pakyaw" basis. The term includes an individual whose work has ceased as
a consequence of, or in connection with, a pending agrarian dispute and who has not obtained a
substantially equivalent and regular farm employment.

(h) Regular Farmworker is a natural person who is employed on a permanent basis by an

agricultural enterprise or farm.

(i) Seasonal Farmworker is a natural person who is employed on a recurrent, periodic or

intermittent basis by an agricultural enterprise or farm, whether as a permanent or a
non-permanent laborer, such as "dumaan", "sacada", and the like.

(j) Other Farmworker is a farmworker who does not fall under paragraphs (g), (h) and (i).

(k) Cooperatives shall refer to organizations composed primarily of small agricultural

producers, farmers, farmworkers, or other agrarian reform beneficiaries who voluntarily
organize themselves for the purpose of pooling land, human, technological, financial or other
economic resources, and operated on the principle of one member, one vote. A juridical person
may be a member of a cooperative, with the same rights and duties as a natural person.

1. AGRARIAN CONFLICT

(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.

2. AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY

(b) Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the
soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a
 4

farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by person whether natural or
juridical.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.

3. LOTS COVERED BY AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM

CHAPTER II
Coverage

Section 4. Scope. — The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1989 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands, as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain.

(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by
Congress in the preceding paragraph;

(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural
products raised or that can be raised thereon.

4. LOTS EXEMPTED UNDER THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM

Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. — Lands actually, directly and exclusively used
and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish
sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds, and mangroves, national defense, school
sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production
centers, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic
centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies
 5

and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and
quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except
those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of the Act.

5. LEADING CASES ON AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM

[G.R. No. 154112. September 23, 2004] DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, petitioner,
vs. ROBERTO J. CUENCA and Hon. ALFONSO B. COMBONG JR., in His Capacity as the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, La Carlota City, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are
also legal or constitutional in nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has
granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 15, 2002
[1]

Decision and the June 18, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 58536. In the
[2] [3]

challenged Decision, the CA disposed as follows:

As previously stated, the principal issue raised in the court below involves a pure question of law. Thus, it being
clear that the court a quo has jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the case below, it did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed order denying petitioners motion to dismiss and granting
private respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied due course and is accordingly DISMISSED. [4]

The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The CA narrated the facts as follows:

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Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 816-A
and covered by TCT No. 1084, containing an area of 81.6117 hectares, situated in Brgy. Haguimit, La Carlota
City and devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane.

On 21 September 1999, Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of La Carlota City issued
and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the above-described landholding
under the compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). The NOTICE OF COVERAGE also stated that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) will
determine the value of the subject land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990.

On 29 September 1999, private respondent Cuenca filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, La Carlota
City, a complaint against Noe Fortunado and Land Bank of the Philippines for Annulment of Notice of
Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405, Series of 1990, With Preliminary Injunction
and Restraining Order. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 713.

In his complaint, Cuenca alleged, inter alia, that the implementation of CARP in his landholding is no longer
with authority of law considering that, if at all, the implementation should have commenced and should have
been completed between June 1988 to June 1992, as provided in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL); that the placing of the subject landholding under CARP is without the imprimatur of the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCOM) as
required by R.A. 7905; that Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990 amends, modifies and/or repeals
CARL and, therefore, it is unconstitutional considering that on 14 June 1990, then President Corazon Aquino no
longer had law-making powers; that the NOTICE OF COVERAGE is a gross violation of PD 399 dated 28
February 1974.

Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab initio and Executive
Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990 be declared unconstitutional.

On 05 October 1999, MARO Noe Fortunado filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
court a quo has no jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the action, pursuant to R.A. 6657.

On 12 January 2000, the respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing MARO and LBP to
cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage. In the same order, the respondent Judge set the
hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on January 17 and 18, 2000.

On 14 January 2000, MARO Fortunado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order granting the TRO
contending inter alia that the DAR, through the MARO, in the course of implementing the Notice of Coverage
under CARP cannot be enjoined through a Temporary Restraining Order in the light of Sections 55 and 68 of
R.A. 6657.

In an order dated 16 February 2000, the respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunados motion to dismiss and
issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and
desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding with the determination of the
value of the subject land.

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) [thereafter filed before the CA] a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It is the submission of the petitioner that the assailed order is in direct defiance of Republic Act 6657,
particularly Section 55 and 68 thereof, which read:

SECTION 55. NO RESTRAINING ORDERS OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS No court in the Philippines

shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the PARC or any
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of its duly authorized or designated agencies in any case, dispute or controversy arising from, necessary to, or in
connection with the application, implementation, or enforcement or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent
laws on agrarian reform.

SECTION 68 IMMUNITY OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FROM COURTS INTERFERENCE No

injunction, Restraining Order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower court against the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in the implementation of their program.

Petitioner contends that by virtue of the above provisions, all lower courts, such as the court presided over by
respondent Judge, are barred if not prohibited by law to issue orders of injunctions against the Department of
Agrarian Reform in the full implementation of the Notice of Coverage which is the initial step of acquiring
lands under R.A. 6657.

Petitioner also contends that the nature and subject matter of the case below is purely agrarian in character over
which the court a quo has no jurisdiction and that therefore, it had no authority to issue the assailed injunction
order.[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage, but was mainly
the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405, the CA ruled that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had
jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority, the court a quo also had the power to issue writs and
processes to enforce or protect the rights of the parties.
The appellate court likewise held that petitioners reliance on Sections 55 and 68 of RA 6657 had been
misplaced, because the case was not about a purely agrarian matter. It opined that the prohibition in certain
statutes against such writs pertained only to injunctions against administrative acts, to controversies involving
facts, or to the exercise of discretion in technical cases. But on issues involving pure questions of law, courts
were not prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
Hence, this Petition. [6]

Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error by not taking into cognizance that the issues raised
in the complaint filed by the private respondent, which seeks to exclude his land from the coverage of the CARP,
is an agrarian reform matter and within the jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court.

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, gravely abused its discretion by sustaining the writ of
injunction issued by the trial court, which is a violation of Sections 55 and 68 of Republic Act No. 6657. [7]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has merit.

First Issue:
Jurisdiction
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In its bare essentials, petitioners argument is that private respondent, in his Complaint for Annulment of
the Notice of Coverage, is asking for the exclusion of his landholding from the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). According to the DAR, the issue involves the implementation of agrarian
reform, a matter over which the DAR has original and exclusive jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 50 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657).
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that his Complaint assails mainly the constitutionality of
EO 405. He contends that since the Complaint raises a purely legal issue, it thus falls within the jurisdiction of
the RTC. We do not agree.
Conflicts involving jurisdiction over agrarian disputes are as tortuous as the history of Philippine agrarian
reform laws. The changing jurisdictional landscape is matched only by the tumultuous struggle for, and
resistance to, the breaking up and distribution of large landholdings.

Two Basic Rules

Two basic rules have guided this Court in determining jurisdiction in these cases. First, jurisdiction is
conferred by law. And second, the nature of the action and the issue of jurisdiction are shaped by the material
[8]

averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. The defenses resorted to in the answer or
[9]

motion to dismiss are disregarded; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend entirely upon the whim
of the defendant.[10]

Grant of Jurisdiction

Ever since agrarian reform legislations began, litigants have invariably sought the aid of the courts. Courts
of Agrarian Relations (CARs) were organized under RA 1267 [f]or the enforcement of all laws and regulations
[11]

governing the relation of capital and labor on all agricultural lands under any system of cultivation. The
jurisdiction of these courts was spelled out in Section 7 of the said law as follows:

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction of the Court. - The Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, matters, controversies or disputes involving
all those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and
use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land, and shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of First Instance over employer and farm employee or labor under Republic Act Numbered six hundred
two and over landlord and tenant involving violations of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655, as amended) and of
inflicting the penalties provided therefor.

All the powers and prerogatives inherent in or belonging to the then Courts of First Instance (now the[12]

RTCs) were granted to the CARs. The latter were further vested by the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA
3844) with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the following matters:

(1) All cases or actions involving matters, controversies, disputes, or money claims arising from agrarian
relations: x x x

(2) All cases or actions involving violations of Chapters I and II of this Code and Republic Act Number eight
hundred and nine; and

(3) Expropriations to be instituted by the Land Authority: x x x. [13]

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 946 thereafter reorganized the CARs, streamlined their operations, and
expanded their jurisdiction as follows:
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Sec. 12. Jurisdiction over Subject Matter. - The Courts of Agrarian Relations shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over:

a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land except
those cognizable by the National Labor Relations Commission; x x x ;

b) Questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders,
Instructions, Rules and Regulations issued and promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program; Provided,
however, That matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of the land to the
tenant-farmer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and amendatory and related decrees, orders, instructions, rules
and regulations, shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, namely:

(1) classification and identification of landholdings;

(2) x x x;
(3) parcellary mapping;
(4) x x x;

xxxxxxxxx

m) Cases involving expropriation of all kinds of land in furtherance of the agrarian reform program;

xxxxxxxxx

p) Ejectment proceedings instituted by the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank involving lands
under their administration and disposition, except urban properties belonging to the Land Bank;

q) Cases involving violations of the penal provisions of Republic Act Numbered eleven hundred and ninety-nine,
as amended, Republic Act Numbered thirty eight hundred and forty-four, as amended, Presidential Decrees and
laws relating to agrarian reform; Provided, however, That violations of the said penal provisions committed by
any Judge shall be tried by the courts of general jurisdiction; and

r) Violations of Presidential Decrees Nos. 815 and 816.

The CARs were abolished, however, pursuant to Section 44 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (approved
[14] [15]

August 14, 1981), which had fully been implemented on February 14, 1983. Jurisdiction over cases theretofore
given to the CARs was vested in the RTCs. [16]

Then came Executive Order No. 229. Under Section 17 thereof, the DAR shall exercise quasi-judicial
[17]

powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture [DA]. The DAR shall also have the powers to
punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or decisions.
In Quismundo v. CA, this provision was deemed to have repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential
[18]

Decree No. 946, which vested the then Courts of Agrarian Relations with original exclusive jurisdiction over
cases and questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in
relation to the agrarian reform program.
Under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DAR was also made responsible for implementing the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. In accordance with Section 5 of the same EO, it possessed the
following powers and functions:

(b) Implement all agrarian laws, and for this purpose, punish for contempt and issue subpoena, subpoena duces
tecum, writs of execution of its decisions, and other legal processes to ensure successful and expeditious
program implementation; the decisions of the Department may in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional
Trial Courts but shall be immediately executory notwithstanding such appeal;
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xxxxxxxxx

(h) Provide free legal services to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian conflicts and land-tenure
related problems as may be provided for by law;

xxxxxxxxx

(l) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential,
commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be provided x x x."

The above grant of jurisdiction to the DAR covers these areas:

(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;

(b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and

(c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential,
commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.

The foregoing provision was as broad as those theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Court by
Presidential Decree No. 946, as the Court ruled in Vda. de Tangub v. CA, which we quote:
[19]

x x x. The intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform, a
proposition stressed by the rules formulated and promulgated by the Department for the implementation of the
executive orders just quoted. The rules included the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
designed to exercise the adjudicatory functions of the Department, and the allocation to it of

x x x [O]riginal and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter vested upon it by law, and all cases, disputes,
controversies and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Executive Order No. 229, Executive Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6289, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations.

The implementing rules also declare that (s)pecifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to
x x x (that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Courts, i.e.) (c)ases involving the rights and obligations of
persons engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws x x x. [20]

In the same case, the Court also held that the jurisdictional competence of the DAR had further been
clarified by RA 6657 thus:

x x x. The Act [RA 6657] makes references to and explicitly recognizes the effectivity and applicability of
Presidential Decree No. 229. More particularly, the Act echoes the provisions of Section 17 of Presidential
Decree No. 229, supra, investing the Department of Agrarian Reform with original jurisdiction, generally, over
all cases involving agrarian laws, although, as shall shortly be pointed out, it restores to the Regional Trial Court,
limited jurisdiction over two groups of cases. Section 50 reads as follows:

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture [DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].

xxxxxxxxx
 11

It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports,
compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise have the
power to punish direct and indirect contempt in the same manner and subject to the same penalties as provided
in the Rules of Court.[21]

Nonetheless, we have held that the RTCs have not been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian
reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657 confers special jurisdiction on Special Agrarian Courts, which are
actually RTCs designated as such by the Supreme Court. Under Section 57 of the same law, these Special
[22]

Agrarian Courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the following matters:

1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners, and

2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under x x x [the] Act.

The above delineation of jurisdiction remains in place to this date. Administrative Circular No.
29-2002 of this Court stresses the distinction between the quasi-judicial powers of the DAR under Sections 50
[23]

and 55 of RA 6657 and the jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Courts referred to by Sections 56 and 57 of the
same law.

Allegations of the Complaint

A careful perusal of respondents Complaint shows that the principal averments and reliefs prayed for
[24]

refer -- not to the pure question of law spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 -- but to the
annulment of the DARs Notice of Coverage. Clearly, the main thrust of the allegations is the propriety of the
Notice of Coverage, as may be gleaned from the following averments, among others:

6. This implementation of CARP in the landholding of the [respondent] is contrary to law and, therefore,
violates [respondents] constitutional right not to be deprived of his property without due process of law. The
coverage of [respondents] landholding under CARP is NO longer with authority of law. If at all, the
implementation of CARP in the landholding of [respondent] should have commenced and [been] completed
between June 1988 to June 1992 as provided for in CARL, to wit: x x x;

7. Moreover, the placing of [respondents] landholding under CARP as of 21 September 1999 is without the
imprimatur of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) and the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Coordinating Committee (PARCOM) as mandated and required by law pursuant to R.A. 7905 x x x;

xxxxxxxxx

9. Under the provisions of CARL, it is the PARC and/or the DAR, and not x x x Land Bank, which is authorized
to preliminarily determine the value of the lands as compensation therefor, thus x x x;

xxxxxxxxx

12. That the aforementioned NOTICE OF COVERAGE with intendment and purpose of acquiring [respondents]
aforementioned land is a gross violation of law (PD 399 dated 28 February 1974 which is still effective up to
now) inasmuch as [respondents] land is traversed by and a road frontage as admitted by the DARs technician
and defendant FORTUNADO (MARO) x x x;

13. That as reflected in said Pre-Ocular Inspection Report, copy of which is hereto attached as annex D forming
part hereof, [respondents] land is above eighteen percent (18%) slope and therefore, automatically exempted and
excluded from the operation of Rep. Act 6657, x x x. (Italics supplied)
[25]
 12

In contrast, the 14-page Complaint touches on the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 by merely making
these two allegations:

10. Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990 (issued by the then President Corazon Aquino) is
unconstitutional for it plainly amends, modifies and/or repeals CARL. On 14 June 1990, then President Corazon
Aquino had no longer law-making powers as the Philippine Congress was by then already organized, existing
and operational pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. A copy of the said Executive Order is hereto attached as
Annex B forming part hereof.

11. Our constitutional system of separation of powers renders the said Executive Order No. 405 unconstitutional
and all valuations made, and to be made, by the defendant Land Bank pursuant thereto are null and void and
without force and effect. Indispensably and ineludibly, all related rules, regulations, orders and other issuances
issued or promulgated pursuant to said Executive Order No. 405 are also null and void ab initio and without
force and effect.
[26]

We stress that the main subject matter raised by private respondent before the trial court was not the issue
of compensation (the subject matter of EO 405 ). Note that no amount had yet been determined nor proposed by
[27]

the DAR. Hence, there was no occasion to invoke the courts function of determining just compensation. [28]

To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage constitutes the first necessary step towards the
[29]

acquisition of private land under the CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of the Notice relates to the
implementation of the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could
not be ousted from its authority by the simple expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal
dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.
In view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points pleaded by respondent in relation to
the jurisdictional issue. We need only to point that in case of doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to
refrain from resolving a controversy involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative
agencies, even if the question[s] involved [are] also judicial in character, as in this case.
[30]

Second Issue:
Preliminary Injunction

Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows that the RTC of La
Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That Writ
must perforce be stricken down as a nullity. Such nullity is particularly true in the light of the express
prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Courts Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002. These
Circulars enjoin all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657, which reads:

Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. No injunction, restraining order,
prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Decision and
Resolution REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the February 16, 2000 Order of
the RegionalTrial Court of La Carlota City (Branch 63) is ANNULLED and a new one entered, DISMISSING the
Complaint in Civil Case 713. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein is also expressly VOIDED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
 13

G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989

GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE
and ROLANDO SALAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M.
REYES,respondents.

Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for petitioners.

Leonardo N. Zulueta for Enrique Reyes, et al. Adolfo S. Azcuna for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Before us is a petition seeking the reversal of the decision rendered by the respondent Court of Appeals**on
March 3, 1987 affirming the judgment of the court a quo dated April 29, 1986, the dispositive portion of the trial
court’s decision reading as follows;

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by this Court on November 5, 1982 is hereby reconsidered and a new
judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring that Presidential Decree No. 27 is inapplicable to lands obtained thru the homestead law,

2. Declaring that the four registered co-owners will cultivate and operate the farmholding themselves as owners
thereof; and

3. Ejecting from the land the so-called tenants, namely; Gabino Alita, Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro
Ricalde, Vicente Ricalde and Rolando Salamar, as the owners would want to cultivate the farmholding
themselves.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (p. 31, Rollo)

The facts are undisputed. The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
141. Said lands are situated at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur.

Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate,
relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).

On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella as
then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein
petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and
General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.
 14

Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses of July 8, 1981.

Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands
in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates to which the
defendants filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.

On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City
(now Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing the said
complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.

On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their
opposition on January 10, 1983.

Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision prompting defendants to move
for a reconsideration but the same was denied in its Order dated June 6, 1986.

On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment rendered on March 3, 1987,
thus:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error thereof, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. (p. 34, Rollo)

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

The pivotal issue is whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform
under P.D. 27.

The question certainly calls for a negative answer.

We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the
soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure
promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be
invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,

The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a
piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for
subsistence and for the satisfaction of life’s other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things
necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of
comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people’s happiness is under a
duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45)

In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders’ rights over the
rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which provides:

Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in
accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain
 15

under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the
rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or
Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by
homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading,

Section 6. Retention Limits. …

… Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate
said homestead.’

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the decision of
the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

6. ELEMENTS OF TENANCY AND THE LEADING CASES

The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are:

(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
 16

G.R. No. 185669

JUAN GALOPE, Petitioner,

- versus -

CRESENCIA BUGARIN, Represented by CELSO RABANG,

Respondent.

Promulgated: February 1, 2012

The main issue to be resolved is whether there exists a tenancy relationship between the parties.
Petitioner submits that substantial evidence proves the tenancy relationship between him and
respondent. Specifically, he points out that (1) his possession of the land is undisputed; (2) the DAR
certified that he is the registered farmer of the land; and (3) receipts prove his payment of irrigation
fees. On the absence of receipts as proof of rental payments, he urges us to take judicial notice of an
alleged practice in the provinces that payments between relatives are not supported by receipts. He
also calls our attention to the affidavits of Jose Allingag, Rolando Alejo and Angelito dela Cruz
attesting that he pays 15 cavans of palay to respondent.[11]
In her comment, respondent says that no new issues and substantial matters are raised in the petition.
She thus prays that we deny the petition for lack of merit.[12]
We find the petition impressed with merit and we hold that the CA and DARAB erred in ruling that
there is no tenancy relationship between the parties.
The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3)
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.[13]
The CA and DARAB ruling that there is no sharing of harvest is based on the absence of receipts to
show petitioner’s payment of rentals. We are constrained to reverse them on this point. The matter of
rental receipts is not an issue given respondent’s admission that she receives rentals from petitioner.
To recall, respondent’s complaint inBarangay Case No. 99-6 was that the rental or the amount she
receives from petitioner is not much.[14] This fact is evident on the record[15] of said case which is
signed by respondent and was even attached as Annex “D” of her DARAB petition. Consequently, we
are thus unable to agree with DARAB’s ruling that the affidavits[16] of witnesses that petitioner pays
15 cavans of palay or the equivalent thereof in pesos as rent are not concrete proof to rebut the
allegation of nonpayment of rentals. Indeed, respondent’s admission confirms their statement that
rentals are in fact being paid. Such admission belies the claim of respondent’s representative, Celso
Rabang, that petitioner paid nothing for the use of the land.
 17

Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondent’s act of allowing the petitioner to
cultivate her land and receiving rentals therefor indubitably show her consent to an unwritten tenancy
agreement. An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit provisions of a written
contract alone.[17] Section 5[18] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as
the Agricultural Land Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon
an oral agreement.
Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are present. Respondent is the landowner;
petitioner is her tenant. The subject matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a farm
land.[19] They mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by petitioner and share in the harvest.
The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring about agricultural production. After the harvest,
petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in cash. Respondent’s motion[20] to
superviseharvesting and threshing, processes in palay farming, further confirms the purpose of their
agreement. Lastly, petitioner’s personal cultivation of the land[21] is conceded by respondent who
likewise never denied the fact that they share in the harvest.
Petitioner’s status as a de jure tenant having been established, we now address the issue of whether
there is a valid ground to eject petitioner from the land.
Respondent, as landowner/agricultural lessor, has the burden to prove the existence of a lawful cause
for the ejectment of petitioner, the tenant/agricultural lessee.[22] This rule proceeds from the principle
that a tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a security of tenure.[23] The tenant
can only be ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law.[24]
Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844 enumerates these grounds, to wit:
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.– Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of
his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is
final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or
school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes:Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to
his rights under Sections [25] and [34], except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural
lessor is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee
may be entitled to an advance notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are
filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three
years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the
tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand
possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossession;
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the
contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force
majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what had
been previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of
Section [29];
 18

(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or
destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the
non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a
result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the
obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of
Section [27].
Through Rabang, respondent alleged (1) nonpayment of any consideration, (2) lack of tenancy
relationship, (3) petitioner mortgaged the land to Allingag who allegedly possesses the land, and (4)
she will manage/cultivate the land.[25] None of these grounds were proven by the respondent.
As aforesaid, respondent herself admitted petitioner’s payment of rentals. We also found that a
tenancy relationship exists between the parties.
On the supposed mortgage, Allingag himself denied it in his affidavit.[26] No such a deed of
mortgage was submitted in evidence. Rabang’s claim is based on a hearsay statement of Cesar Andres
that he came to know the mortgage from residents of the place where the land is located.[27]
That Allingag possesses the land is also based on Andres’s hearsay statement. On the contrary,
Allingag stated in his affidavit that he is merely petitioner’s farm helper.[28] We have held that the
employment of farm laborers to perform some aspects of work does not preclude the existence of an
agricultural leasehold relationship, provided that an agricultural lessee does not leave the entire
process of cultivation in the hands of hired helpers. Indeed, while the law explicitly requires the
agricultural lessee and his immediate family to work on the land, we have nevertheless declared that
the hiring of farm laborers by the tenant on a temporary, occasional, or emergency basis does not
negate the existence of the element of “personal cultivation” essential in a tenancy or agricultural
leasehold relationship.[29] There is no showing that petitioner has left the entire process of cultivating
the land to Allingag. In fact, respondent has admitted that petitioner still farms the land.[30]
On respondent’s claim that she will cultivate the land, it is no longer a valid ground to eject petitioner.
The original provision of Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844 has been removed from the statute
books[31] after its amendment by Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389[32] on September 10, 1971, to wit:
SEC. 7. Section 36 (1) of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National
Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five
preceding calendar years.
Since respondent failed to prove nonpayment of rentals, petitioner may not be ejected from the
landholding. We emphasize, however, that as long as the tenancy relationship subsists, petitioner must
continue paying rentals. For the law provides that nonpayment of lease rental, if proven, is a valid
ground to dispossess him of respondent’s land. Henceforth, petitioner should see to it that his rental
payments are properly covered by receipts.
Finally, the records show that Allingag, petitioner’s co-respondent in DARAB Case No. 9378, did not
join petitioner’s appeal to the CA. If Allingag did not file a separate appeal, the DARAB decision had
become final as to him. We cannot grant him any relief.
 19

“WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Decision dated September 26,
2008 and Resolution dated December 12, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
97143. The petition filed by respondent Cresencia Bugarin in DARAB Case No. 9378 is
hereby DISMISSED insofar as petitioner Juan Galope is concerned. No pronouncement as to
costs.”

G.R. No. 108941 July 6, 2000

REYNALDO BEJASA AND ERLINDA BEJASA, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Special Sixteenth Division, ISABEL CANDELARIA and
JAMIE DINGLASAN, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

This is a petition assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
1 2

Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro and ordering petitioners Reynaldo and Erlinda Bejasa (hereinafter referred to
3

as "the Bejasas") to surrender the possession of the disputed landholdings to respondent Isabel Candelaria
("hereinafter referred to as Candelaria") and to pay her annual rental from 1986, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs. 4

Inescapably, the appeal involves the determination of a factual issue. Whether a person is a tenant is a factual
question. The factual conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are contradictory and we are
5

constrained to review the same.6

We state the undisputed incidents.

This case involves two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-58191 and TCT No. T-59172, measuring 16
7 8

hectares and 6 hectares more or less, situated in Barangay Del Pilar, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. The parcels of
land are indisputably owned by Isabel Candelaria.

On October 20, 1974, Candelaria entered into a three-year lease agreement over the land with Pio Malabanan
(hereinafter referred to as "Malabanan"). In the contract, Malabanan agreed among other things: "to clear, clean
and cultivate the land, to purchase or procure calamansi, citrus and rambutan seeds or seedlings, to attend and
care for whatever plants are thereon existing, to make the necessary harvest of fruits, etc."
9

Sometime in 1973, Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear it. The Bejasas claim that they
planted citrus, calamansi, rambutan and banana trees on the land and shouldered all expenses of production.

On May 3, 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the land, modifying their first agreement.
As per the agreement, Malabanan was under no obligation to share the harvests with Candelaria. 10

Sometime in 1983, Malabanan died.

On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan (hereinafter referred to as "Jaime)
as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the disputed land.
11
 20

On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan,
Jaime's wife (hereinafter referred to as "Victoria"). The contract had a term of one year.12

On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in consideration of an
"aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term of one year. The agreement is below quoted:
13 14

"Ako si Victoria Dinglasan bilang tagapamahala ni Isabel Candelaria ay ipinaaryendo kay

Reynaldo Bejasa ang lupang dating aryendo ni Pio Malabanan sa nasabing Ginang Buhat sa
ika-30 ng Disyembre 1984 hanggang Ika-30 ng Disyembre 1985. Ako ay tumanggap sa kanya
ng pitong libong piso at ito ay daragdagan pa niya ng walong libong piso (P8,000) dito sa
katapusan ng buwan ng Disyembre 1984.

(signed) (signed)
Reynaldo Bejasa Victoria Dinglasan

"Witness

"(unintelligible)

"(unintelligible)"

During the first week of December 1984, the Bejasas paid Victoria P7,000.00 as agreed. The balance of
P8,000.00 was not fully paid. Only the amount of P4,000.00 was paid on January 11, 1985. 15

After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victoria's demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the
land and did not give any consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or a shared harvest. 16

On April 7, 1987, Candelaria and the Dinglasans again entered into a three-year lease agreement over the
land. The special power of attorney in favor of Jaime was also renewed by Candelaria on the same date.
17 18

On April 30, 1987, Jaime filed a complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
("COSLAP"), Calapan, Oriental Mindoro seeking ejectment of the Bejasas.

On May 26, 1987, COSLAP dismissed the complaint.

Sometime in June 1987, Jaime filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Calapan Oriental, Mindoro 19

against the Bejasas for "Recovery of possession with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages." The case
was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR").

On December 28, 1987, the DAR certified that the case was not proper for trial before the civil courts. 20

The trial court dismissed Jaime's complaint, including the Bejasas' counterclaim for leasehold, home lot and
damages. 1awphi1

On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint
for "confirmation of leasehold and home lot with recovery of damages." against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime
21

Dinglasan. 22

On February 20, 1991, after trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the Bejasas. First, they reasoned that a tenancy
23

relationship was established. This relationship can be created by and between a "person who furnishes the
24

landholding as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor and the person who personally cultivates
the same."25 Second, as bona-fide tenant-tillers, the Bejasas have security of tenure.26 The lower court ruled: 27
 21

"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:

"(1) Ordering the defendants to maintain plaintiffs in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the lands in
question and to respect plaintiff's security of tenure on the landholdings of Isabel Candelaria and the home lot
presently occupied by them;

"(2) Confirming the leasehold tenancy system between the plaintiffs as the lawful tenant-tillers and the
landholder, Isabel Candelaria, with the same lease rental of P20,000.00 per calendar year for the use of the lands
in question and thereafter, same landholdings be placed under the operation land transfer pursuant to Republic
Act No. 6657;

"(3) Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the amount of P115,500.00 representing
the sale of calamansi which were unlawfully gathered by Jaime Dinglasan and his men for the period July to
December, 1987 and which were supported by receipts and duly proven, with formal written accounting, plus
the sum of P346,500.00 representing the would-be harvests on citrus, calamansi, rambutan and bananas for the
years 1988, 1989 and 1990, with legal rate of interest thereon from the date of the filing of the instant complaint
until fully paid;

"(4) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P30,000.00 as attorney's fee
and expenses of litigation; and

"(5) Authorizing the plaintiffs as tenant-farmers to litigate as pauper not only in this Court but up to the
appellate courts in accordance with Section 16 of P. D. No. 946.

"SO ORDERED."

On February 20, 1991, respondents filed their notice of appeal. 28

On February 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the trial court's ruling. 29

Reasoning: First, not all requisites necessary for a leasehold tenancy relationship were met. There was no
30

consent given by the landowner. The consent of former civil law lessee, Malabanan, was not enough to create a
tenancy relationship. Second, when Malabanan engaged the services of the Bejasas, he only constituted them as
31

mere overseers and did not make them "permanent tenants". Verily, even Malabanan knew that his contract with
Candelaria prohibited sublease. Third, the contract ("aryenduhan") between the Bejasas and Victoria, by its
32

very terms, expired after one year. The contract did not provide for sharing of harvests, means of production,
personal cultivation and the like. Fourth, sharing of harvest was not proven. The testimony of Reynaldo Bejasa
33

on this point is self-serving. Fifth, the element of personal cultivation was not proven. Reynaldo Bejasa himself
admitted that he hired laborers to clear and cultivate the land. The Court of Appeals disposed of the case, thus:
34 35

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The interlocutory order issued on September 5, 1988 is DISSOLVED and the appellees are hereby ordered to
surrender possession of the disputed landholdings to appellant Isabel Candelaria and pay her the amount of
P15,000.00 in annual rents commencing from 1986 plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P35,000.00
and costs.

"SO ORDERED."

Hence, this appeal filed on March 3, 1993. 36

The issue raised is whether there is a tenancy relationship in favor of the Bejasas.

The elements of a tenancy relationship are: 37

(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

 22

(2) the subject is agricultural land;

(3) there is consent;

(4) the purpose is agricultural production;

(5) there is personal cultivation; and

(6) there is sharing of harvests.

After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that there is no tenancy relationship
between the parties.

Malabanan and the Bejasas. True, Malabanan (as Candelaria's usufructuary) allowed the Bejasas to stay on and
cultivate the land. 1avvphi1

However, even if we assume that he had the authority to give consent to the creation of a tenancy relation, still,
no such relation existed.

There was no proof that they shared the harvests.

Reynaldo Bejasa testified that as consideration for the possession of the land, he agreed to deliver the
landowner's share (1/5 of the harvest) to Malabanan. Only Reynaldo Bejasa's word was presented to prove this.
38

Even this is cast into suspicion. At one time Reynaldo categorically stated that 25% of the harvest went to him,
that 25% was for Malabanan and 50% went to the landowner, Candelaria. Later on he stated that the
39

landowner's share was merely one fifth. 40

In Chico v. Court of Appeals, we faulted private respondents for failing to prove sharing of harvests since "no
41

receipt, or any other evidence was presented." We added that "Self serving statements ... are inadequate; proof
42

must be adduced." 43

Candelaria and the Bejasas. Between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as landowner never gave
her consent.

The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria. They acknowledge that Candelaria
44

could argue that she did not know of Malabanan's arrangement with them. True enough Candelaria disavowed
45

any knowledge that the Bejasas during Malabanan's lease possessed the land. However, the Bejasas claim that
46

this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to the Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when
Malabanan died in 1983. We do not agree. In a tenancy agreement, consideration should be in the form of
47

harvest sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year, such
48

agreement did not create a tenancy relationship, but a mere civil law lease.

Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of the land
to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did.

Again, there was no agreement as to harvest sharing. The only agreement between them is the
"aryenduhan", which states in no uncertain terms the monetary consideration to be paid, and the term of the
49

contract.

Not all the elements of tenancy being met, we deny the petition.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals of February 9, 1993, in toto.

No costs.
 23

SO ORDERED.

EPITACIO SIALANA, G.R. No. 143598

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

(Chairperson)
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
MARY Y. AVILA (deceased) AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
substituted by her heirs, JAMES AVILA, CALLEJO, SR. and
EDWARD AVILA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
JEORGE AVILA and
MILAGROS AVILA,
Respondents. Promulgated:

July 20, 2006

x----------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Annexed to the great and sacred charge of protecting the weak is the diametric and functional
approach to weigh all considerations of social advantage,[1] to inquire into the overlapping social
interests in the adjustment of conflicting demands and expectations of the people,[2] and to recognize
the social interdependence of these interests,[3] ultimately with a view to arrive at an equitable
solution for all parties concerned. The resolution over the tragedies of social unrest that have no doubt
checkered the past bears significantly upon the social order.[4] In the adjudication of agrarian disputes,
this Court has always been mindful of the jural postulates of social justice especially where doubts
arise in the interpretation of the law. But the same edicts cannot oblige the Court to shield illegal acts,
 24

nor do they sanction false sympathy towards a certain class, nor yet should they deny justice to the
landowners who, under the Constitution and laws, are also entitled to protection.[5]
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 questioning the Decision[6] dated July 22,
1999 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 49323 which reversed the
Decision dated June 10, 1998 of the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DARAB).

The antecedents of the case follow:

On September 18, 1991, Epitacio Sialana (petitioner) and his spouse, now deceased, filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region VII, Cebu City (Regional DARAB), a
complaint against the respondents for the declaration of tenancy status. Petitioner alleged that he and
his spouse are tenants over a parcel of land owned by respondents located at South Poblacion, San
Fernando, Cebu; that they had occupied the property since 1958 and built a house thereon; that they
cultivated the land and harvested its produce; that they gave definite shares in the produce to
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest; and that, as tenants, they enjoy security of tenure.

In their Answer, Mary, James, Edward, Jeorge and Milagros, all surnamed Avila (respondents), the
successors-in-interest of Rafael Avila, then the naked owner of the landholding in question and who
allegedly instituted petitioner and his spouse as tenants on the landholding, averred that the latter are
mere usurpers; that they never consented to the alleged tenancy; that they never received any share in
the produce; and that, in view of these reasons, petitioner and his spouse should be ejected.

On October 13, 1993, the Regional DARAB rendered a decision in favor of respondents, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing reasons, the instant suit is hereby DISMISSED for want
of merit.

Accordingly, [petitioner and his spouse] are directed to give the amounts of P6,094.29, P859.00 and
the undeposited amount of P238.60, and P360.65 to the respondents to whom it is rightfully due for
the mere use of the land in question.[7]

The Regional DARAB found that although the petitioner and his spouse occupied the property in
question, they failed to prove by substantial evidence that the landowners had given their prior
consent; that the self-serving statements of petitioner cannot establish the tenancy relationship; and
that the petitioner and his spouse delivered the shares of the produce not to respondents but to Alfonso
Canoy and her mother, a certain Diosdada Nang Daday Canoy, the overseers appointed by
respondents; that Alfonso Canoy turned over the shares to his mother and no other.
 25

Aggrieved, petitioner and his spouse appealed to the DARAB. On June 10, 1998, the DARAB
promulgated its Decision reversing the Regional DARAB, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and a new
judgment rendered:

1. Declaring [petitioner and his spouse] as de jure tenants in the questioned landholding; and
2. Ordering [respondents] to refrain from committing any act/acts that will disturb the peaceful
possession of the [petitioner and his spouse] over the landholding in controversy or dispossess them
from the same.

SO ORDERED.[8]

In brief, the DARAB held that Rafael Avila constituted the petitioner and his spouse as tenants
sometime in 1958; and that the doctrine enunciated in Santos v. Vda. De Cerdenola[9] which
supposedly provides that an implied contract of tenancy is created if a landholder, represented by his
overseer, permits the tilling of the land by another for a period of at least six years, applies in the
instant case.

Respondents appealed to the CA. On July 22, 1999, the CA rendered a Decision which reversed the
DARAB Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed
decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the DARAB, Region
VII, Cebu City is hereby REINSTATED.

Costs against [the petitioner and his spouse].

SO ORDERED.[10]

In affirming the Decision of the Regional DARAB, the CA, in addition, held that although
the Santos case may provide the basis for the institution of the tenancy relationship by implication
through the overseer of the landlord, there was no showing that the overseer, Diosdada Canoy, or her
son and grandson who succeeded her, were ever duly authorized to represent respondents or their
predecessors-in-interest; that, instead, the overseers acted in their own names; that the juridical
relationship between respondents or their predecessors-in-interest and the overseers is a lease of
 26

services and not one of agency; that the fact that the overseers were allowed to gather fruits for their
livelihood does not mean that they possessed any special power of attorney for purposes of carrying
out acts of dominion or creating real rights over immovable property, the authority of which petitioner
failed to show; that petitioner failed to ascertain the extent and limits of the authority of the overseers;
and that respondents cannot be estopped from alleging lack of authority of the overseers since there
was no evidence to indicate any notice or knowledge on their part over the occupancy of petitioner
and his spouse, nor did respondents ratify the transaction entered into by the overseers.
Petitioner is now before this Court via Rule 45 and assigns the following errors:

I. The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, Seventeenth Division, erred in applying the law on
lease of services on the status of Diosdada Canoy and Alfonso Canoy, Jr., as overseers.

II. The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, Seventeenth Division, erred in not applying the law
on Security of Tenure of agricultural tenant [sic] and the law on Succession in agrarian matters.

III. The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, Seventeenth Division, erred in not applying the
equitable doctrine in agrarian matters that any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the tenant-farmer,
agricultural lessee, etc.[11]

The petition has no merit.

The principal question is whether the petitioner is an agricultural tenant in the landholding owned by
respondents. The corollary issue is whether the tenancy was deemed to have been impliedly instituted.
Petitioner insists that Rafael Avila, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents, gave his express
consent in the establishment of the tenancy, and, as a consequence, petitioner is entitled to security of
tenure which respondents are bound to respect. But this Court in the case of Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,[12] the doctrine of which has been affirmed in a long line of cases, held that
self-serving statements regarding tenancy relations cannot establish the claimed
relationship. There must be substantial evidence on the record adequate enough to
prove all the elements of tenancy,[13] to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the
subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests.[14] The principal
factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship.[15] Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to
security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws.[16] We agree with the findings of the CA and the Regional DARAB that aside from his
testimony that he was expressly instituted as tenant by Rafael Avila, petitioner was unable to buttress
that claim with other evidence which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.[17]

Nor could this Court agree with the holding of the DARAB that an implied contract of tenancy had
been established. As stated above, the DARAB, ostensibly borrowing the language of Santos v. Vda.
 27

De Cerdenola,[18] held that [a]n implied contract of tenancy is created if a landholder, represented by
his overseer, permits the tilling of the land by another for a period of six years.[19] Since petitioner
and his spouse had been tilling the farmholding for over six years, or from 1958 up to the filing of the
case, then it follows, the DARAB reasons, that an implied contract of tenancy is created.

This Court must underscore that the aforequoted excerpt does not accurately reflect the ratio of
the Santos decision. The DARAB quoted only a portion of the digest found in the syllabus of
the Santos case which customarily precedes the decision proper, but which because of its condensed
format may not fairly echo the doctrinal force of the ratio. To clarify the matter, we quote in verbatim
the relevant dicta of the Court:

x x x x The main contention of petitioner as may be gleaned from the records of this case is that the
relationship of landholder and tenant terminated upon the death of respondent Cerdenola's husband in
November, 1952. While this may be true, the fact that respondent, assisted by members of her
immediate farm household, was allowed to continue to cultivate the land under the same terms of
tenancy from 1952 up to 1958 when she was ejected, made her, in her own right, a tenant by virtue of
Section 7 of Republic Act 1199 which provides that tenancy relationship may be established either
expressly or impliedly. In this case, such tenancy relationship resulted from the conduct of both the
tenant and the landholder represented by his overseer in permitting the tilling of the soil for a period
of 6 years. Hence an implied contract of tenancy was created. And the law provides that once such
relationship is established, the tenant shall be entitled to security of tenure as provided in the law.
Therefore, the respondent's ouster in 1958 for no reason other than the supposed termination of the
tenancy relationship as a result of the death of her husband, is contrary to the provisions of the
tenancy law x x x x[20] (Emphasis supplied)

It is evident from the foregoing declarations in Santos that, for an implied tenancy to come
about,[21] the actuations of the parties taken in their entirety must be demonstrative of an intent to
continue a prior lease established by the landholder, and the conduct of the overseer in permitting the
lease, whose representative capacity to enter or continue the leasehold had not at all been questioned
or put squarely in issue in that case, must be taken into account. Additionally, the Court must note that
the pronouncement in Santos relating to the six-year period is not to be construed as an inflexible or
dogmatic condition for an implied tenancy to arise, since that pronouncement had been fashioned to
accommodate the factual circumstances peculiar to that case alone. The CA is correct in its
construction of the Santos doctrine:

In this case, no evidence was submitted to prove that Diosdada Canoy or her son and grandson, who
took over the overseeing the farmholding, were ever authorized by [respondents] or their
predecessor[s]-in-interest to represent the [respondents].

xxxx
 28

Since the overseers were merely appointed to take care of the farmholding, the overseers cannot act in
behalf of the [respondents]. The acts of the overseers cannot be considered as the acts of
[respondents].

Hence, when the overseers allowed [petitioner and his spouse] to occupy the land and when the
overseers received the share in the produce of the land from [petitioner and his spouse], the overseers
acted on their own and not in representation of the [respondents] x x x

xxxx

Assuming arguendo that the overseers were indeed appointed as agents of [respondents] and were
capable of representing the latter, [petitioner and his spouse] cannot still be considered as tenants in
the farmholding.

xxxx

The authority given to the overseers to gather fruits for their livelihood does not include the authority
to create a real right over the immovable owned by the [respondents] x x x.[22]

To do acts which are strictly acts of dominion, as in this case, in order that the tenancy over the
farmholding is created, the agent must possess a special power of attorney showing his authority to do
such act x x x.

It was not shown that the overseers of [respondents] have this special power of attorney to create a
real right in favor of [the petitioner or his spouse] over the farmholding x x x.

xxxx

The fact that [petitioner and his spouse] were allowed to occupy and till the land for years does not
estop [respondents] from alleging lack of authority of the overseers.
 29

[Petitioner and his spouse] have not shown any evidence that will indicate notice or knowledge on the
part of the [respondents or their predecessors] and the latters consequent ratification of the transaction
entered into with the overseers.

In fact, it was established that overseer Alfonso Canoy never delivered the supposed share of the
landlord to the [respondents]. Admittedly by Alfonso Canoy, the share[s] were delivered to Diosdada
Canoy.[23]

The factual background of the instant case is also markedly similar to the recent case of Reyes v.
Reyes,[24] the relevant discussion of which this Court reaffirms:
Respondents aver that an implied tenancy existed in view of the fact that Duran was undisputedly the
overseer of the landowner. They add that Duran, as overseer, accepted 20 cavans of palay as rentals
on October 17, 1990 and another 20 cavans on April 1, 1991 from Ricardo x x x Duran then delivered
the rentals to Elena Castro, sister of Ramon, who in turn delivered the rentals to the latter. An implied
tenancy was created between respondents and Ramon, said the respondents, since Duran as overseer
of the landholding was the extension of the personality of the landowner. They aver that in effect, a
delivery of rentals to Duran was a delivery to an agent of the landowner. They argue that having
accepted the rental payments made to his agent, Ramon is now estopped from denying the existence
of an implied tenancy between him and respondents.

We find respondents contentions far from persuasive.

xxxx

Respondents reasoning is flawed. While undoubtedly Duran was an agent of Ramon, he was not a
general agent of the latter with respect to the landholding. The record shows that as overseer, Durans
duties and responsibilities were limited to issu(ing) receipt(s), selling mangoes and bamboo trees and
all other things saleable. Thus, by his own admission, Duran was a special agent under Article 1876 of
the Civil Code. Durans duties and responsibilities as a special agent do not include the acceptance of
rentals from persons other than the tenant so designated by the landowner. Durans authority as a
special agent likewise excludes the power to appoint tenants or successor-tenants. Clearly, Duran
acted beyond the limits of his authority as an agent. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals [ ]
that since Duran had been the overseer of the Castros for 16 years, he thereby made respondents
believe he had full authority from the Castro family relative to the administration of the subject
property. Regardless of the number of years that Duran had been the overseer of the Castros, there is
absolutely no showing that he was ever authorized to appoint tenants or successor-tenants for the
Castros, nor to accept rentals from the persons he would appoint. Absent substantial evidence to show
Durans authority from the Castros to give consent to the creation of a tenancy relationship, his actions
could not give rise to an implied tenancy x x x.
 30

Respondents contend, however, that Ramon Castro, having received the 40 cavans from Duran, is
now estopped to deny the existence of an implied tenancy. We find nothing in the records, however,
to support respondents stance. Duran testified that he did not deliver the palay rentals to Ramon, but
to his sister, who in turn told him that she had forwarded the palay to Ramon. Duran had no personal
knowledge that Ramon received the rentals which the former had allegedly delivered to the latters
sister. His testimony with respect to the receipt by Ramon of the rentals is hearsay and has no
probative value. The receipts issued to respondents do not bear the name and signature of Ramon
Castro. Given these circumstances, Ramon Castro cannot be deemed estopped from denying the
existence of a tenancy relationship between him and respondents.[25]

There being no proof that the landowners, herein respondents and their predecessor-in-interest, Rafael
Avila, expressly or impliedly created the tenancy relationship with the petitioner, the latter therefore
cannot be considered a de jure tenant, nor can petitioner claim, with more reason, any entitlement to
security of tenure under agrarian reform laws.
Petitioner, furthermore, contends that he was directly and actually giving shares of harvests to Mrs.
Avila at her residence; and that he also turned over the proceeds of the shares of the harvests to the
household helper of respondent Mary Y. Avila (now deceased) as evidenced by receipts which,
petitioner argues, had not been controverted.

His contentions are factual in nature. In agrarian cases, when the appellate courts confirm that the
findings of fact of the agrarian courts are based on substantial evidence as borne out by the record,
such findings are conclusive and binding on the appellate courts.[26] Accordingly, this Court will not
disturb the factual findings of the Regional DARAB, as affirmed by the CA, that the shares were
delivered to the overseers only, and who, as stated, lacked the requisite authority to bind their
principals, considering that this conclusion was supported by substantial evidence.

And last, petitioner theorizes that the overseers had been granted usufructuary rights. While it is established in civil law that
a usufructuary may in certain cases lease the property under his stewardship to another,[27] suffice it to say that this is a
matter which was raised for the first time on appeal[28] and cannot be considered for reviewto consider questions belatedly
raised tramples on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.[29]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

LAND, TITLES AND DEEDS

 31

1. MODES OF ACQUIRING TITLES

1. Title by public grant – conveyance of public land by government to a private individual

2. Title by acquisitive prescription – open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of a property

3. Title by accretion – alluvion
4. Title by reclamation – filling of submerged land by deliberate act and reclaiming title thereto;
government
5. Title by voluntary transfer – private grant; voluntary execution of deed of conveyance
6. Title by involuntary alienation – no consent from owner of land; forcible acquisition by state

7. Title by descent or devise – hereditary succession to the estate of deceased owner 8. Title by
emancipation patent or grant – for purpose of ameliorating sad plight of tenant-farmers; not transferable
except by hereditary succession

2. TORRENS SYSTEM ( ADVANTAGES AND PURPOSE)

BACKGROUND OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION

 In this system, title by registration takes the place of “title by deeds” of the system under the
“general” law.
 A sale of land for example is effected by a registered transfer, upon which a certificate of title is
issued:
o Certificate is guaranteed by statute, and with certain exceptions, constitutes indefeasible title
to the land mentioned therein

o Under old system, the same sale would be effected through conveyance, depending on its
validity, apart from intrinsic flaws, on the correctness of a long series of prior deeds, wills, etc.
 Object of the Torrens system: to do away with the delay, uncertainty, and expense of the old
conveyancing system.
 Generally, “Torrens” systems meant those systems of registration of transactions with interest in land
whose declared object is, under governmental authority, to establish and certify to the ownership of an
absolute and indefeasible title to realty, and to simplify its transfer.

ADVANTAGES

1. Abolishes endless fees

2. Eliminates repeated examination of titles
3. Reduces records enormously
 32

4. Instantly reveals ownership

5. Protects against encumbrances not noted on the Torrens certificate
6. Makes fraud almost impossible

7. It assures
8. Keeps up the system without adding to burden of taxation; beneficiaries of the system pay the fees
9. Eliminates tax titles
10. Gives eternal title as state ensures perpetuity
11. Furnishes state title insurance rather than private title insurance
12. Makes possible the transfer of titles or of loans within the compass of hours instead of a matter of days

PURPOSE OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM

1. To quiet the title to land

2. To put a stop forever to any question of legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time
of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto :
 Once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, to avoid the possibility of losing his land
 All the world are parties, including the government

 After the registration is complete and final, and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third
parties who may claim any interest.
 Aims to decree land titles shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable, and to relieve the land of the
burden of known as well as unknown claims
 The registration either relieves the land of all known as well as unknown claims absolutely, or it
compels the claimants to come unto court and to make there a record, so that thereafter, there may be
no uncertainty concerning either the character or the extent of such claims

3. BASIC LAWS TO BRING LANDS UNDER THE OPERATION OF TORRENS

SYSTEM

 LAND REGISTRATION ACT OR ACT No. 496

 Grants of public land were brought under the operation of a Torrens system
 Placed all public and private land under the Torrens system
 33

 Torrens system requires that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact
that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and
encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves

 PD 1529 Section 2
 Confers matters involving the registration of lands and lands registered under the Torrens system
 Provides that RTC has exclusive jurisdiction for original registration of titles to lands, including
improvements and interest therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with
power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions

 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 892 February 16, 1976

DISCONTINUANCE OF THE SPANISH MORTGAGE SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION AND OF THE
USE OF SPANISH TITLES AS EVIDENCE IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of large tracts of public and
private lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers appear to have been perpetrated by unscrupulous persons
claiming ownership under Spanish titles or grants of dubious origin;
WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in conflicting claims and litigations between
legitimate title holders, bona fide occupants or applicants of public lands, on the one hand, and the holders
of, or persons claiming rights under, the said Spanish titles or grants, on the other, thus creating confusion
and instability in property ownership and threatening the peace and order conditions in the areas affected;
WHEREAS, statistic in the Land Registration Commission show that recording in the system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is practically nil and that this system has become obsolete;
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens
system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof
of actual possession;

WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the system of registration under the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish titles as evidence in registration proceedings under the Torrens
system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order;
Section 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all lands
recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered
lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree.
Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings
under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may
be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344;