Global Society

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Challenging a theoretical paradox: The lacuna of

integration policy theory

Lykke Friis

To cite this article: Lykke Friis (1997) Challenging a theoretical paradox: The lacuna of
integration policy theory , Global Society, 11:3, 359-381, DOI: 10.1080/13600829708443141

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600829708443141

Published online: 06 Mar 2008.

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 Global Society, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1997 359

Challenging a Theoretical Paradox:

The Lacuna of Integration Policy Theory1

LYKKE FRIIS
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Since the crumbling of the Berlin wall, Europe has witnessed a domino-effect.
More or less all European countries have either applied for membership of the
European Union (EU) or are seriously considering it. Parallel to this domino-
effect, the insiders of the EU club have embarked on a process of deepening their
internal cooperation, reaching a temporary climax at the Maastricht summit in
December 1991. Only a few years after the final ratification of this climax,
member states once again found themselves poring over the EU reform drawing
board at an intergovernmental conference.
Considering that more and more states are on the brink of joining the EU and,
in particular, that almost every domestic law initiative of a member state is
becoming entangled in the web of already existing EU regulations, we seem to
be in great need of a theoretical understanding of states' integration policies.
How can we explain the domino-effect theoretically? Why do states pursue the
integration policy they do? And how can we explain the clear differences
between, for instance, the integration policy of Belgium and Denmark?
When we look upon the existing integration theories, we are met immediately
by a great paradox. The theory market is devoid of theories which try to
conceptualise how and why states pursue integration. The main reason behind
this must be sought in the overestimation of the withering away of the nation-
state, which dominated the field of integration theory immediately after the war.
Precisely because the pioneers of integration theory were convinced that the
integration process would put on weight more or less automatically, it seemed
more worth their time and effort to dedicate themselves to an understanding of
the integration process than to fiddle with the actors of the past. After all, it was
the integration phenomenon itself which was the new "Great Beast", not the
centuries-old states. The most pressing task was therefore to gain a clear
understanding of why and when the entire integration process accelerated or
stagnated—a process, which could hardly be determined by the "overtaken"
nation-states.
The negligible role attributed to the state resulted in a substantial bifurcation
between theory and practice. Time after time various member states raised their
heads and put a spoke into the integration wheel—a wheel which, due to the

1. A first draft of this paper was presented at the Second European Consortium for Political Research
(ECPR) Pan-European Conference in International Relations, held in Paris, September 1995. It appears
here only with minor revisions. The paper is part of the Copenhagen Research Project on European
Integration (CORE). I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.
1360-0826/97/030359-23 © University of Kent at Canterbury
 360 L. Friis

so-called functional "spill-over" mechanisms, was supposed to keep on rolling

almost automatically.2
In light of the fact that classical integration theories are suffering from the
above bifurcation, together with the increasing need to comprehend the inte-
gration policies of states, a change of perspective seems fruitful. Rather than a
reformulation of an overall integration process theory, this article argues for the
development of an integration policy theory; a theory which aims at understand-
ing the integration policies of states. By abandoning the traditional "from the
centre" approach we may also shed a different light on the overall integration
process.
The purpose of this article is to take some of the first steps in this theory-
construction process. This is accomplished mainly by synthesising some of the
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existing building blocks, which are present on the theory market. The article
concludes with a preliminary theoretical macro-model which provides some
guidelines for analysing states' integration policies.

Exploring a Lacuna
For the first couple of decades after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the focal
point of integration theory was anything but the state. In fact, the integration
phenomenon was seen largely as an antithesis to the nation-state, undermining
and taking over the nation-state's former dominant position. Or to quote Leon
Lindberg, one of the fathers of the "classical" integration theory, neofunctional-
ism:
The Europe that gave birth to the idea of the nation-state appears to be
well on the way to rejecting it in practice. The Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community ... represents the latest in a series of
steps designed to break down the bastions of European national sepa-
ratism.3
The result of this logic was that the state suddenly found itself in a "Sleeping
Beauty" position. Not only did integration theorists assign most of their time to
the creation of a process theory, but they also failed to carve out any substantial
role for the state in the process.
In the 1960s, General de Gaulle's indisputable impact on the integration
process (which for a neofunctionalist must have looked like a spooky resurrec-
tion attempt by the state) triggered a chain of innumerable reformulation
attempts of the neofunctionalist paradigm. Although these attempts did indeed
make some room for the state—as a partial blockade runner of the now not so
automatic spill-over processes—the focus remained on the supranational actors.

2. E.B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).
3. L. Lindberg, "Political Integration: Definition and Hypotheses", in B.F. Nelsen and A. Stubb (eds.),
The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 1994), pp. 99-109 (originally published in 1963). In principle one could argue that it is a
misrepresentation of facts to characterise neofunctionalism as the classical integration theory. One only
has to bear in mind that parts and pieces of functionalism and federalism saw the light of day before
neofunctionalism. The characterisation is, however, justified simply because neofunctionalism was
endowed with a far more explicit theoretical core than its predecessors. The result was that
neofunctionalism remained on the "theory market" whereas the others quickly receded into the
background.
 Challenging a Theoretical Paradox 361

Quite characteristically, the theory continued to sophisticate its typology of the

different strategies which the supranational actors could apply to secure the
progress of the integration endeavour.4 However, the development of a specific
typology for state strategies was still not looked upon as a pressing task and
thus left the analyst without the proper research tools to grasp the different
integration approaches/strategies of member states. The consequences of this de
facto continuation of the "Sleeping Beauty" position did not stop here. Precisely
by continuing to focus too much on supranational actors, neofunctionalism also
failed to achieve its main aim, which was to explain the dynamics behind the
integration process. Or to quote Alan Milward:
Neofunctionalism failed the test of history, because it did not ask the
crucial question about where the power lay in the post-war period, and
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its enthusiasm for a theory with predictive value practically did away
with the nation-state as the central unit of political organisation.5
Inspired and vindicated by the neofunctionalist crisis, "state-centric" scholars
left their sideline positions. In the late 1960s, the intergovernmentalist school of
regional integration emerged. Its premise was taken from the classical Inter-
national Relations theories, which assume that sovereign nation-states are the
only significant actors in an anarchic international system. Integration, according
to Stanley Hoffmann and his followers, was primarily the result of interaction
between states in a bargaining process, based on the pursuit of national inter-
ests.6
Despite attempts to bring the state back into the integration discourse,
intergovernmentalist scholars did not develop a clear integration policy theory
either. In fact, their power of penetration was highly limited by the following
three essential problems.
1. How is it possible to comprehend the integration policies of states, when we
are not given any kind of clue as to how national interests are actually
formed? (The problem of taking national interests as "given".)
2. How is it possible to look upon the integration process as a continuous
bargaining process when the theory is silent on how this process functions
and influences the state? (The problem of the interstate bargaining process.)
3. And how is it possible to understand the actions of states, when one is left
searching in vain for any kind of integration strategy typology? (The problem
of integration strategy typology.)
Considering the weakness of the intergovernmental school, it was not until the
1990s that the state truly stepped onto the theory stage. During the past few
years, one has been able to observe a new axis of debate in integration theory
which stretches between two poles—state and process.7 Is it most promising to

4. For an overview of the development of neo-functionalism, see J. Tranholm-Mikkelsen,

"Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the
EC", Millennium, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 1-22.
5. A. Milward et al., The Frontiers of National Sovereignty (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 3.
6. S. Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete: The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western
Europe", Daedalus (Summer 1966), pp. 862-915.
7. It should be said that the debate was partly kick-started in 1983 by Simon Bulmer. He
strengthened the intergovernmental paradigm considerably by replacing the black box of the state with
 362 L. Friis

State Process
variables variables

State State
strengthened weakened

Figure 1. A New Axis of Debate.

look upon integration as the result of state action or as a process as a whole?

Shall progress or stagnation be seen as the result of the states' willingness to
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accept integration or, rather, some process variables such as spill-over and the
agenda-setting power of supranational actors?
The new axis is also characterised by a fluctuating debate on the fate of the
nation-state. Neofunctionalist-inspired scholars are here arguing that, due to
transfers of sovereignty and the emergence of strong transnational alliances, the
state has been weakened substantially by the EU.8 As of late, this view has been
strengthened by theorists who have applied network theories to European
integration. They argue that due to the complexity of many regulation subjects,
and the need to secure implementation, states—also at the EU level—have been
forced to create non-hierarchic networks, where public and private actors in
close cooperation search for policy solutions.9
The new "state-centric" scholars, conversely, make the opposite case: the EU
has strengthened the states, allowing them to monopolise, or even "cartelise",
formerly domestic politics issues in an interstate bargaining process.
The "fathers" of the new state-centric approach are Alan Milward and
Andrew Moravcsik.10 Both scholars take great care in removing the blind-spot
position of the state and both look upon the integration process as the result
of interstate bargaining. In other words, they argue that the key to unlocking
the many mysteries of European integration is not some process vari-
ables, but rather the states' actions in the interstate bargaining process. Both
theorists also develop a clear understanding of why states want to participate in

footnote continued.
a theory of domestic policy: S. Bulmer, "Domestic Politics and European Community Policy Making",
in B.F. Nelsen and A. Stubb, op. cit., pp. 141-152.
8. See for instance A.M. Sbragia, "Thinking about the European Future: The Uses of Comparisons",
in A. Sbragia (ed.), Euro-Politics (Washington, DC: Brooking, 1992), pp. 239-278; and G. Marks,
L. Hooghe and K. Blank, "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-level
Governance", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1996), pp. 341-377.
9. J. Peterson, "Decision-Making in the EU: Towards a Framework for Analysis", Journal of European
Public Policy, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1995), pp. 69-93; and J. Richardson, "Policy-Making in the EU: Interests, Ideas
and Garbage Cans of Primeval Soup", in J. Richardson (ed.), European Union: Power and Policy-Making
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 3-24.
10. A. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992); Milward, op. cit.;
A. Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental
Approach", in S. Bulmer and A. Scott (eds.), Economic and Political Integration in Europe (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 29-80; A. Moravcsik, "Why the Community Strengthens the State:
Domestic Politics and International Co-operation", Center for European Studies (Working Papers Series
#52, Harvard University, 1994).
 Challenging a Theoretical Paradox 363

the integration process in the first place. Heavily inspired by liberal theory, the
explanation is rooted in interdependence. In an interdependent international
system with increasing transborder flows of goods, services, factors and pollu-
tants, states will find themselves constantly subjected to international policy-
externalities. Policy-externalities are defined as situations where the policy of
one government creates costs and benefits for socially significant groups outside
its national jurisdiction. The wish to avoid these externalities provides the main
incentive for cooperation. Only by coordinating their policies can states solve
their national problems.11
Unlike the traditional interdependence school,12 the two scholars do not draw
a direct line from interdependence to integration. Whether or not we actually
experience integration will to a large extent depend on domestic politics. Each
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time a state finds itself confronted by a negative externality, it must conse-

quently decide whether it is more cost effective to remove it or maintain it. Thus,
in this sense, a state's integration policy is a big cost-benefit analysis.
In contrast to Alan Milward, Moravcsik manages to fill the "black box" of the
state. By drawing extensively on public choice theory, one actually gets an idea
of how state preferences are formed. Unlike Milward, Moravcsik also manages
to remove a second "left over" from their intergovernmentalist parentage, a
conceptualisation of the interstate bargaining process.
Furthermore, in a rather audacious move, the new theories attempt to leave
behind the antithesis between the EU and the nation-state.13 According to
Moravcsik and Milward, there simply is not any antithesis because the nation-
state constantly has used the EU as a tool to solve its own national problems. In
fact, both claim that the EU has strengthened the nation-state. To quote Alan
Milward:
The historical evidence shows that the real argument has never been
about whether it is desirable that a supranational Europe should
supersede the nation-state, but about whether the state can find a
political and economic base for survival. The surrenders of national
sovereignty after 1950 were one aspect of the successful reassertion of
the nation-state as the basic organisational entity of Europe. The Com-
munity was the European rescue of the nation-state.14
In some of his latest work, Moravcsik has added a new facet to the
"strengthening-weakening" debate.15 Here the focus is on internal streng-
thening, i.e. towards the domestic constituency of the state. According to
Moravcsik, the state has been strengthened greatly, since the EU has reallocated

11. Unlike Moravcsik, Milward assumes that the interdependence crisis is aggravated by the ever
increasing demands of citizens upon the nation-states. The public keeps demanding more and more
welfare, security, etc.—demands which due to interdependence cannot be fulfilled at the national level.
As a consequence states seek integration.
12. R.O. Keohane, and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1977).
13. A great step was already taken in 1982 by the key intergovernmentalist Stanley Hoffmann: "The
EEC regime has strengthened the nation-state's capacity to act at home and abroad": S. Hoffmann,
"Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 21,
No. 1-2 (1982), p. 35.
14. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nations State, op. cit., p. 437.
15. Moravcsik, "Why the Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International
Co-operation", op. cit.
 364 L. Friis

political resources in changing the domestic institutional, informational and

ideological context of domestic policy largely in favour of the state/national
executives. Thus, executives have monopolised the initiative over many policy
areas which used to be the domain of domestic politics, have gained an
information power position due to the exclusiveness of the interstate bargaining
process, and have catapulted parliament into a "take-it-or-leave-it position",
almost excluding any kind of influence once the executive has given its go-ahead
to an initiative in Brussels. Finally, the EU has also bolstered the domestic power
of executives by providing them with additional sources of ideological legiti-
macy, thus enabling them to frame unpopular policies in European terms.
In contrast to network theorist and the "weakening school" in general, the EU
has not "domesticated" international politics and, hence, enabled (formerly)
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domestic actors to participate and bypass the state. The EU has resulted in the
complete opposite: domestic politics has become "internationalised".16
At this point, the reader might start wondering whether the title of this article
is appropriate. Is it not the case that Milward and Moravcsik have been able to
remove the lacuna of integration policy theory? The answer, unfortunately, is
negative. Despite their impressive path-breaking attempts, we are faced with
such a long road ahead before we reach a trenchant integration policy theory
that it seems fair to argue that we are, indeed, confronted by a lacuna. The
reasons for this can be summed up in the following four points.

No News on the Strategy Front

Despite the fact that both theorists attribute a key role to the state, they fail to
develop any kind of strategy typology. What kind of integration (bargaining)
strategies can a state pursue? In a sense, we are still left empty-handed when we
try to conceptualise the differences between states' integration policies.17

Same Problem in Reverse Order

The greatest weakness of neofunctionalism was its almost complete neglect of
the state. Unfortunately, Milward and Moravcsik commit a mistake of similar
magnitude, only in reverse. Other integration actors apart from the state are not
attributed influential roles. Moravcsik and Milward fail to acknowledge that
once a decision to delegate power to solve collective problems has been reached,
the evolving institution starts developing its own interests. Institutions thus
transform themselves into corporate actors, fulfilling their function as both
institutional rule systems and defending their own autonomous interests. Two
leading theorists on this matter, Volker Schneider and Raymund Werle, put it as
follows:

16. Ibid., p. 3.
17. It should be stressed that Moravcsik, elsewhere, has taken a very promising leap forward on the
strategy-question—even though he here concentrates on foreign policy in general: A. Moravcsik,
"Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories and International Co-operation",
in P.E. Evans et al., Double-Edged Diplomacy (California: University of California Press, 1993), pp.
 Challenging a Theoretical Paradox 365

The institutionalisation of collective action is not without consequences.

Corporate actors do not stay in a position as pure aggregates of its
members, which only bundle the individual interests and convert them
at the next level. If anything the autonomous interest of the corporate
actor to maintain its existence emerges next to the corporate sum-
marised interest.18
In other words, states cannot keep the institutions which they have created,
completely under control. They have strategy capacity and consequently, their
actions can run against the interests of some of its member states. This is even
more prevalent in the case of European integration. After all, the integration
process was from the outset endowed with institutions which legally were
obliged to go "beyond" the nation-state, i.e. defend a supranational interest. A
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priori, we must therefore anticipate that the institutional level will affect the
integration process, and also affect the integration strategies of states.

The "Snapshot Trap"

The third point of criticism is found in Milward and Moravcsik's snapshot
approach. Both scholars "cut" into the present level of integration without taking
into account that states' participation in the integration process over a period of
time creates a number of norms and habits, which act as constraints upon the
strategic possibilities of states. Instead of looking at a moving picture, as Paul
Pierson notes, Moravcsik and Milward merely examine a snapshot.19
To expose fully the role of the state, we will have to incorporate an historical
element. Paul Pierson's attempt to adapt the historical institutionalist perspec-
tive to the integration discourse seems to be a good starting point.20 The term
"historical institutionalism", which covers a diverse range of scholarship,
stresses that political development must be understood as a process that unfolds
over time. It is institutionalist because many of the contemporary implications of
these temporal processes are embedded in institutions—whether these be formal
rules, policy structures or norms.
By applying Pierson's historical institutionalist perspective, one also adds an
interesting new facet to the "strengthening-weakening" debate: states may very
well have been strong at the beginning of the integration process, but today they
are caught up in a web of their past actions. To quote Pierson directly:
The crucial claim ... from historical institutionalism is that actors may
be in a strong initial position, seeking to maximise their interests and
nevertheless carry out institutional reforms that fundamentally trans-
18. V. Schneider and R. Werle, "Vom Regime zum korporativen Akteur", in Beate Kohler-Koch (ed.),
Regime in den intemationalen Beziehungen (Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag, 1989), p. 415 [Author's
translation], pp. 409-434.
19. P. Pierson, "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective", Center
for European Studies (Working Paper Series #58, Harvard University, 1995), p. 6. Admittedly, this
criticism of Milward seems ironic, as he is one of the few historians who has approached European
integration from a theoretical angle. Nevertheless, his "rescue of the nation-state" is weakened by his
failure to acknowledge—as another historian has put it—that "such rescues alter those who are saved".
K. Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe: The Informal Politics of European Union 1973-1995 (Glasgow: Fontana
Press, 1995), p. 697.
20. Pierson, "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective", op. cit.
 366 L. Friis

form their own positions (or those of their successors) in ways that are
unanticipated and/or undesired. Institutional evolution is rarely sub-
ject to tight control.21
Pierson's paper contains a whole catalogue of undesired effects. Of key exam-
ples, one can point to the fact that states, in their strategy-formulation process,
are affected by their own deadweight, i.e. integration decisions which have been
made at an earlier stage in the integration process. To a large extent, states will
find it very difficult to change their position without untying a former package
deal or weakening their bargaining power. Secondly, states are constrained by
the fact that social actors have adapted to an integration decision they have
already made. If, for instance, one removes custom duties between countries,
one will certainly be met by an outcry from the beneficiaries should the attempt
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be made to reinstate them. Finally, one should not overestimate the capacity of
states to tackle the ever increasing complexity of the integration process. As
states increasingly transfer new issues to the EU, it can hardly be possible to
remain in the driver's seat under all circumstances. If states try to monopolise
the driver's seat, they are bound to be subjected to a number of unintended
consequences due to the impossibility of constantly being in the picture when it
comes to all the EU technical matters. Hence, states are forced to delegate even
more power, for instance to issue networks, combining private and public actors.

Neglecting the By-pass Possibility

Our last point is a more empirically derived criticism. One of Moravcsik's
greatest achievements must be that he opens the black box of interest formation:
societal actors influence state behaviour. The problem is that he (as well as
Milward) does not take yet another step: social groups can also influence the
overall integration process in the sense that they can team up and go directly to
the supranational institution with their demands. It is exactly this bypassing of
the state which, as we will see, distinguishes integration policy from traditional
foreign policy.

Summary
In our journey towards a trenchant integration policy theory, we should aim to
side-step the above four pitfalls. In attempting to construct a theory, we should
aim to bridge the present axis poles of the integration discourse.
1. The EU can best be understood by applying both state and process variables.
In other words, the EU represents an interstate-bargaining process which is
influenced by institutions and other process variables.
2. The EU has both strengthened and weakened the state—strengthened it by
increasing its power position towards its own constituency, and weakened it
by transforming it into the victim of its own previous sensible actions, thus
endangering it with being by-passed by institutions and societal actors.

21. Ibid., p. 6.
 Challenging a Theoretical Paradox 367

Old Wine...?
Before we take the plunge into the difficult task of contributing to the theory
construction process, some might feel tempted to pose the following (sensible)
question: Is not integration policy just the other side of the foreign policy coin?
To claim that integration policy is something completely different from foreign
policy would indeed amount to a considerable exaggeration. After all, the two
policy "categories" can both be characterised as state interaction. Without any
doubt, integration policy is a kind of foreign policy. However, it differs to such
an extent from ordinary foreign policy that it must be assigned a separate foreign
policy subcategory.
The overriding explanation of this must (not surprisingly) be found in the
integration phenomenon as such. Without unravelling the voluminous different
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definition attempts of regional integration, the phenomenon can, in our opinion,

best be defined as:
a process whereby a group of people organised at the outset in two or
more independent political systems (in a region) come to constitute a
political whole, which can be described as a political system and a
political community.22
In other words, unlike ordinary foreign policy, integration policy triggers the
creation of a partly independent authority; a political system "in which there are
authorities and a decision-making system, which lead to authoritative decisions
for a society".23 Integration is also the result of a far more elaborate mobilisation
process at the societal level—a process which results in a political community
"based upon shared values and mutual trust out of previously separate and
mistrustful groups".24 As an offshoot of this definition, we can develop the
following ideal contrast between ordinary foreign policy and integration policy;
a contrast which also explains why we cannot "just" apply foreign policy
theory.25

Integration Policy is More Binding for the States

Integration involves the formation of a political system, which can make authori-
tative decisions for the states. This is in stark contrast with traditional foreign
policy, where the ground rule is quite the opposite. For the state, integration

22. This definition is a slight reformulation of Charles Pentland's original definition, who defined
integration as "a process whereby a group of people organized at the outset in two or more independent
states come to constitute a political whole, which can in some sense be described as a community":
C. Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (New York: Free Press, 1973), p. 21. The
incorporation of the political system concept is inspired by Morten Kelstrup, see M. Kelstrup (ed.),
European Integration and Denmark's Participation (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press,
1992), p. 31.
23. Ibid., p. 31.
24. W. Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe (London: Pinter, 1990), p. 55.
25. The usefulness of foreign policy theory is weakened further by its tendency to view foreign policy
as an "either-or phenomenon": either the policy is determined by external pressures from the
international system, or from the everyday life of domestic politics. Recently this bias as been rectified
by work on foreign policy theory which has followed in the wake of Robert Putnam's seminal work:
R. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", International
Organisation, Vol. 42 (1988), pp. 427-460; and P.E. Evans et al., op. cit.
 368 L. Friis

policy raises a different question to foreign policy: Do the benefits of the

integration process outweigh the costs of having the legal room for manoeuvre
restricted in the nearest future?

Integration Polio/ can Create a New Opponent

Precisely because states participate in the formation of a new political entity,
integration policy also involves the risk of suddenly finding oneself in disagree-
ment with this new entity. Again, we must assume that this will cause greater
concern among states than ordinary foreign policy. The question the state will
have to answer can be summed up as follows: Do the benefits of integration
outweigh the risk of suddenly being opposed by the political system?
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Integration Policy Interferes More with Domestic Policy

Traditional foreign policy is concerned mainly with the regulation of interaction
between states. Interstate—and not intra-state—regulation is thus the code word.
This is very much in contrast with integration policy, where, because decisions
are binding, states are obligated to transform them into domestic politics. And
just as importantly, since—as Moravcsik and Milward have argued—states
pursue integration because they cannot solve their national problems unilater-
ally, integration policy can, to a large extent, be described as domestic politics
pursued with foreign policy instruments. To a far greater extent in conducting an
integration policy, states will therefore have to ask themselves what conse-
quences a decision will have for the interests of certain groups in their society.

Integration Policy Involves the Danger of Being By-passed

As previously alluded, integration policy also involves the risk of being by-
passed. Domestic groups in one country can go directly to the newly created
political entity and through this put pressure on their own state. Even "worse",
social groups in all the member countries can attempt to form an alliance with
the supranational level. In an integration policy, states must therefore ask
themselves: are we willing to run the risk of being bypassed and, consequently,
lose some of our control over state policy?

A Theoretical Attempt—A Macro-model of Regional Integration Policy

As emphasised in the introduction, the purpose of this article is not to solve the
theoretical puzzle of a new, trenchant integration policy theory, but merely to
contribute to the process of constructing such a theory. Any other objective
would be naive, particularly when we consider our problems in constructing a
consistent foreign policy theory.
Parenthetically, it should be stressed that the following model only contains
an overall theoretical understanding of why states pursue or reject integration,
i.e. the interest formation phase. How they do it, i.e. what different strategies
 Challenging a Theoretical Paradox 369

they pursue and largely also how the subsequent inter-state bargaining process
influences them, must be subject of another work.26
It should also be noted that we are dealing with a highly abstract macro-model,
or pre-theory, which calls out for further specification in terms of issue-area
models. The purpose here is to develop an overall model which shows which
variables to take into account when attempting to understand a state's inte-
gration policy. Under what circumstances the different variables play a larger or
smaller role should be dealt with in sub-models. Precisely because of this overall
purpose, the model is a reflection of the almost overwhelming complexity of a
state's integration policy rather than an attempt to simplify it—a simplification
which hopefully will emerge at the sub-model level.
The explanation for the above approach must be sought in the patchwork-like
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character of the integration process. State interaction inside the EU is character-

ised by such a high degree of variance—not least in terms of decision-making
rules—that it is impossible.to grasp all kinds of integration policies on the basis
of one, single model. In a certain sense, this realisation also defuses the
"strengthening vs. weakening" debate on the state. Although the integration
policy theory dedicates itself to an understanding of why and how states pursue
integration, it has not, except for the remarks made above, taken a clear stance
in the "strengthening-weakening debate". Whether a state has been strength-
ened or weakened will depend on the issue area involved. In some areas, the
state might very well remain in the driver's seat; in others it may have
surrendered this position to the supranational institutions, assisted by trans-
national interest groups.
Finally, a few remarks on the height of the theory-crossbar seem in order.
Should the new theory be able to predict the integration policy of, for instance,
Germany? It is in itself a major question in social sciences whether we can
construct theories with predictive power at all. In our view, the ambition should
be phrased in more hermeneutic terms: to create a framework which can enable
us to understand the integration policy of a state and thereby render a clear
picture of what variables to take into account, when figuring out which way a
country is turning on an European issue.

A Theoretical Macro-model—Why States Pursue or Reject Integration

Any integration policy theory should start with a short expose on its key
explanation object—the state. This is important since attempts to define the state
are quite often "forgotten" in International Relations. To quote Fred Halliday:
It is indeed paradoxical that a concept so central to the whole discipline
should escape explication as this one has. One can find many discus-
sions of war, sovereignty, institutions so forth, but one can search in
vain in the textbooks for comparable discussions of the state.27
Once again, we are not left completely without potential building blocks. In
examining International Relations theory, two opposing schools can be derived:

26. For a first attempt, see L. Friis, When Europe Negotiates: From Europe Agreements to Eastern
Enlargement? (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1997).
27. F. Halliday, "State and Society in International Relations", in M. Banks and M. Shaw (eds.), State
and Society in International Relations (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 194.
 370 L. Friis

(1) the school of Second Image theories and (2) Second Image Reversed.28 The
core difference between the schools can be summed up by the following
questions: is state action in foreign policy mainly the result of external or internal
pressures; and are national executives taken "hostage" by international or
domestic politics? The Second Image school takes the internationalist view:
states and their chief executives must respond to manifest dictates of the
international system. In order to understand the foreign policy of a state, one
must therefore look mainly upon the pressures deriving from the international
system. Consequently, Kenneth Waltz and other advocates do not leave much
room for societal input.29 In fact, they fail to develop a definition of the state
which differentiates between society and state.
By contrast, the Second Image Reversed school, takes the opposite view. Here
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state leaders are portrayed as "passive political registers, summing the franchise-
weighted vectors of domestic interests and moving in the indicated direction".30
What this school argues is that foreign/integration policy action should be
understood by looking at domestic politics.
Despite their disagreement, the schools do indeed have an important point in
common: states are not endowed with any kind of autonomous action capacity,
which could allow them to develop interests of their own. States, for the most
part, are simply cash-registers which total up external or internal pressures.
The great problem arises when one wants to combine the two schools: is it
completely unthinkable that a state can be taken into a pincer movement where
it becomes exposed to equally strong internal and external pressures? In our
view, this is actually what happens every day in the European integration
process. Or, to apply Robert Putnam's original metaphor to European matters:
states are playing a two-level game, where the essential goal is to find a balance
between its two pressuring "constituencies", the EU and its society.31 By taking
this stand, one assaults the logical parsimony of the two schools. How do we
know to which of the two pressures the state will succumb?
This crucial question can only be answered by taking a closer look at the state
itself. How do we actually define it? The first essential step is to deconstruct
Kenneth Waltz's all-encompassing politico-territorial billiard ball. By lumping
everything together under the "state" (society and state), it becomes logically
impossible to open up for societal pressure. A quick look into the arsenal of
definition attempts inside political theory provides us with an escape route.
According to Eric Nordlinger, the state can be defined in Weberian terms as
"individuals who occupy offices that authorise them and them alone to make
and apply decisions that are binding upon all segments of a specific society".32
To put it more directly, the state can be separated from society in terms of its

28. The term "Second Image" was developed by Kenneth N. Waltz as early as 1959: K.N. Waltz, Man,
The State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). Peter Gourevitch in 1978 turned
Waltz's concept around and wrote an article on "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources
of Domestic Politics", International Organisation, Vol. 32 (1978), pp. 881-911.
29. K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
30. Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories and International
Integration", op. cit., p. 15.
31. Putnam, op. cit.
32. E.A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press,
1981), p. 11.
 Challenging a Theoretical Paradox 371

power to make authoritative decisions, i.e. the "state" refers to the executive
machinery of government, which includes its legislative, administrative and
judicial branches.
Although this definition combines government, bureaucracy, parliament and
judicial branches into one actor, it does not imply that the state is a unitary actor,
only that possible conflicts between these institutions should be seen as conflicts
within the state. Its main representative and mouthpiece is the chief of govern-
ment (COG), supported by his/her closest ministers and advisors.
In order to avoid what Kenneth Dyson has called a "category error", namely
a complete conflation of the idea of the state with its apparatus,33 our definition
should not stop here. States are also characterised by a kind of distinctive idea
(the idea of the state), which lies at the heart of the state's political identity—an
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idea which holds the state together and acts as "legitimacy-glue" between itself
and its society. Without such a "glue", there would, in reality, be no barriers for
the society to seek membership in a different state.
Kenneth Dyson's insertion does not alter Nordlinger's "individualisation-
point": states, including their distinctive idea, are represented by human beings
of flesh and blood. It is exactly this "individualisation" which brings us one step
closer to the solution of our key question: How do we know which pressure a
state will succumb to when it is taken into a pincer movement? The main answer
is actually found in a repudiation of the cash-register assumption. Like any kind
of institution (as was pointed out by Schneider and Werle) the state does not
keep its position as a pure aggregator; it develops its own interests. This is even
more the case with state institutions, because they are made up of national
executives and civil servants who, as a minimum goal, want to keep their
positions. Locked up in a pincer movement, the policy of a state will, in the last
resort, depend on how the COG and his/her government evaluates the different
pressures. In certain situations the COG will also attempt to pursue its own
interests—even if they run against the views of either the external or internal
level.34 Drawing upon the foreign policy work of Andrew Moravcsik for our
macro-model, we will assume that the evaluation is based on the following three
factors, which together resemble a government's acceptability-set-?5
1. a government's interest in enhancing its domestic position, by perhaps
pursuing the median domestic interest;
2. an effort to mobilise an optimal response to international imperatives, regard-
less of domestic factors;
3. individual policy preferences about the issues in question, e.g. being derived
from idiosyncratic factors such as political idealism.
Unfortunately for parsimonious theory-building, it does not seem possible to
put these factors into an exact ranking. Sometimes, for instance, a COG will
believe so much in pursuing integration that he/she is willing to risk his/her

33. B. Buzan, Peoples, States and Fear (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 70.
34. In principle, the COG can also act against the idea of the state. Gary Marks et al. have put this
as follows: "One cannot assume that those serving in national governments give priority to sustaining
the state as an institution", G. Marks et al., op. cit., p. 348.
35. A. Moravcsik, "Introduction", in P.B. Evans, H.K. Jacobson, R.D. Putman (eds.), Double-edged
Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
 372 L. Friis

International system

The maturity of the

anarchy/interdependence
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Political system
Balance-of-power-behaviour/
International
non-integration —
institution

State
1STATEt State

1 t /
Sub-state Sub-state Sub-state
actors actors actors

Figure 2. Integration Policy Macro-model—an Overview.

position of power. At other times, a COG will definitely give priority to his/her
wish to remain in power. In other words, by constructing deterministic if-then
hypotheses over human beings' evaluation of contradictory goals/values is a
Sisyphean task.
After this expose on the state, we can turn more concretely to the macro-
model. What kinds of pressures is it that the state is subjected to on the
integration issue? An overview is provided by Figure 2. At the core of the
(complex) model stands its key explanation-object, the state. As can be seen from
the model it is subjected to a number of cross-pressures, which can be labelled
chiefly external and internal.
From above, the state is mainly confronted by the constraints and possibilities
of the international system and its region. From below, it is confronted by its own
society which sends its demands to the state in the hope that they will be met.
Unlike traditional foreign policy, the state is also subjected to a mixture between
external and internal pressures. Because integration policy involves domestic
politics to a far greater degree, domestic interest groups have a greater incentive
to make cross-border alliances with each other. And precisely because inte-
gration policy involves the creation of a new authoritative political system,
 Challenging a Theoretical Paradox 373

domestic groups have the opportunity to form alliances with the supranational
level and thereby put pressure on their state.
In view of these cross-pressures, any integration policy must be seen as a
state's attempt to strike a balance between the external and internal level, the
combination of external-internal pressures and the "personal" interests of the
COG/government. Since it is highly unlikely that these pressures will coincide,
integration policy is largely a strategic enterprise. How is it possible for the state
to keep as many actors satisfied at the same time without jeopardising its own
interests?
A closer look at the different pressures gives us a clearer picture of this
strategic task. As can be seen from the model, states are subjected to four
different pressures from the external environment: (1) the overall international
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system; (2) its immediate surroundings (region); (3) the institutional level; and
(4) the state-state level, i.e. the policy views of the other states.
The first variable, the international system, is surrounded by a separate (black)
box. This is to indicate that we are dealing with a kind of super-variable which
plays a key role when states decide whether they want to create or join an
integration forum in the first place. After this, it slips into the background and
only re-emerges in the case of major system changes. Whether or not a state is
supportive of a certain directive concerning, for instance, small and medium
sized enterprises, will hardly depend on this "high politics" variable.36
The model does not look upon the international system as a constant phenom-
enon, but rather as a variable which can take on different forms. Phrased
differently, the model is not based on the original neorealist theory but on Barry
Buzan's modified version,37 where the effects of the international system depend
on the maturity of its anarchy. In an immature anarchy, i.e. where the ethic is
survival of the fittest and where states have not developed any kind of
international society to moderate the effects of political fragmentation, we will
expect that states will not dare to solve their problems multilaterally. In an
immature anarchy, states will fear that one state will gain relatively more from
cooperation and, in the worst case scenario, use this relative advantage to
destroy the other. In more theoretical terms, states will not pursue integration
since they are confronted by a security dilemma.38
However, as can be seen from the model integration, is not entirely precluded
in an immature anarchy. In this instance Kenneth Waltz's theory is a fruitful
inspiration. Particularly helpful is his concept of consumers of security, i.e. a
situation where the security policy of a group of states is looked after by an actor
outside the region, for instance a superpower in a bipolar system.39 In such
situations states can actually behave as if they operated in a mature international
system. Since security policy is decoupled from the region, states—as in a
mature anarchy characterised by an international society with clear rules and

36. Acknowledging that system changes are not an everyday occurrence, one could argue for the
removal of the super-variable. However, this would turn our theory into a partial one, repeating the
mistake of the "classical" integration theories; that is, the assumption that integration takes place in a
vacuum, unaffected by the international system.
37. Buzan, op. cit.
38. This dilemma was originally developed by John H. Herz: see J. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism
and the Security Dilemma", World Politics, Vol. 2 (1950), pp. 157-180.
39. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op. cit., p. 70.
 374 L. Friis

norms for state interaction—will no longer have to fear that their partners will
use a possible relative gain aggressively.40
Unlike in the immature system/region states will have a great incentive to
cooperate in the mature system. This incentive is closely linked to the maturity
of the system/region: since states create links, such as trade, they become
increasingly caught up in each other's actions. Or, as pointed out earlier in this
article, they become exposed to international policy externalities where one
country's policy attempt undermines the policy of its neighbours. This results in
the states' inability to solve their national problems unilaterally. It is exactly in
the individual non-solution to problems that we find the main incentive to
cooperate. By cooperating, states can limit the negative externalities, for instance
sudden competitive devaluations, by creating a common monetary system.
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This incentive to cooperate is strengthened further by the fact that non-coop-

eration not only leads to negative externalities, but also to a competitive
situation where states attempt to shift the costs of externalities onto each other.
This exercise results in policy-clashes. As has been pointed out by Robert O.
Keohane, the wish to avoid such policy-clashes can also act as a cooperation-
incentive.41
Despite the incentive to cooperate, we cannot draw a direct line from interde-
pendence to integration. Sometimes states can prefer broader international
solutions to their interdependence problem, i.e. ordinary state-to-state cooper-
ation. Although states will sometimes prefer international cooperation to re-
gional integration, due to a genuine conviction that the former is more effective
than the latter, our starting point is that the choice between cooperation and
integration is largely determined by states' evaluation of what we prefer to call
the autonomy dilemma.
Just like in an immature anarchy, states are confronted by a major dilemma
inside the mature anarchy pillar. Due to the high number of negative externali-
ties caused by interdependence, states, to a large extent, can only solve their
policy problems multilaterally. Multilateral solutions, however, lead to a further
erosion of the autonomy of the state since it restricts the state's room for
manoeuvre. The state will thus have to abide by the common rules agreed upon,
at the same time that it becomes even more entangled with the other states.42 The
core question in a mature system/region is, therefore, not whether one state will
gain relatively more from cooperation, but whether a state judges a national
policy solution as so important that it is willing to accept a further erosion of its
autonomy. More specifically, the state will have to choose between two evils: the
non-solution of national problems and a further erosion of state autonomy.
Putting it less negatively, the state will have to consider whether the tabled
interdependence issue is so vital that it is willing to pay the autonomy bill.

40. As can be seen from the model, this argument also works the other way around: if states operate
within a mature international system, but in an immature region, states will not dare to cooperate. The
states will fear that their negotiation-partners will gain more. Since states almost by definition are
particularly concerned with the capabilities of their neighbours, the fact that states are operating in an
overall mature international system will not outweigh this concern.
41. R.O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 243.
42. The above definition is "borrowed" from James Rosenau: see J. Rosenau, Turbulence in World
Politics (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), p. 216.
 Challenging a Theoretical Paradox 375

For states outside the EU, the autonomy dilemma might look a bit different.
Here states will ask themselves whether or not the influence of the EU on their
domestic policies is so dominating that membership would actually increase
their autonomy and sovereignty by granting them a place at the negotiation
table.
As a ground rule, we will expect that the autonomy bill is substantially higher
when a state chooses an "integration solution" rather than an ordinary
"cooperation solution". The reasons for this must be found in some of the core
differences between integration and cooperation: integration results in the cre-
ation of an authoritative political system in which decisions are legally binding.
Since the institutions are partly independent, states also run the risk of suddenly
finding themselves opposed by them. Whether a state chooses integration or
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cooperation will depend primarily on how high an autonomy bill it is willing to

pay. A key to this evaluation process can be found in the penetration-effect of the
interdependence issue. If a state is truly penetrated, i.e. highly vulnerable to
sudden interdependence-burden shifting of other states, it may prefer inte-
gration, because it implies the setting up of a system of law which precludes
sudden burden shifting. If, on the other hand, the state is able to relieve the
interdependence problem unilaterally, or together with some other states {alterna-
tive coalition), it might prefer cooperation.43
Whether or not a state opts for an integrative solution when confronted by the
autonomy dilemma will also depend on the following, remaining four pressures.

The state-state level. The opinion of the other states can pressure a COG into
accepting initiatives which he/she otherwise would have rejected. In more
precise terms, the opinions of other states can change a state's evaluation of the
autonomy dilemma. The core reason for this is quite simple: the integration
process is not a one-shot bargaining game, but rather a highly iterated process
where one negotiation follows the other and where bargaining activities on
completely different issues take place simultaneously. The result is that states
cannot afford to look upon bargaining-issues as detached cases. Instead, they
must be aware of possible spill-over effects on future or parallel negotiations.
As examples of these spill-over effects, one can refer to two key mechanisms—
the boomerang effect and the snowball effect. The first mechanism refers to a
situation where too obstinate a bargaining strategy on a specific issue will have
a negative spill-over effect on the bargaining position of the state on parallel or
future issues. By digging themselves into a hole over an issue, ignoring the
willingness of the majority of its partners to pursue integration, states may lose
reputation and thereby lose out on other issues as well. In the worse-case
scenario, the state may even run the risk of being "abandoned" by its integration
partners. Because of this effect, states, despite the fact that they judge a specific
integration issue as being too costly in terms of autonomy loss, may still opt for
integration, acknowledging that the "spill-over costs" on its entire position in the
overall integration process might outweigh the costs on the specific issue. This
is even more prevalent in situations where the integration process is on the brink

43. Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental
Approach", op.cit.,pp. 53-63.
 376 L. Friis

of a major crisis. If states have an overall interest in keeping up the steam of

the integration process, they will have to give in on specific issues.44
The "snowball effect" refers to the opposite. In principle, a state agrees to
pursue integration on a specific issue yet pulls the emergency brake, simply
out of fear of being dragged into other issues or becoming involved in a
"giving an inch-taking a yard" scenario. Simply put, despite accepting the
autonomy bill on a specific issue, a state—out of fear of its spill-over conse-
quences—rejects integration. It should be quite obvious that this behaviour will
be furthered in situations where a state has a different outlook to the majority
of the member states on the goals of the integration process.
It should be stressed that states outside the integration process can also be
highly affected by the state-state level. If for instance, all the other states flock
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towards the integration forum, a state will have to evaluate whether its auton-
omy loss outweighs its isolation loss.

The institutional level. As stressed previously, integration can largely be

defined as the creation of a political system empowered to take authoritative
decisions. As a consequence, institutions are also in a position where they can
affect state strategies.
Firstly, one has to stress that institutions, by their mere existence, can affect
states' willingness to seek integration. By providing a continuous, clearly regu-
lated negotiation forum, institutions will reduce the transaction costs of cooper-
ation and clarify the intentions of the negotiation partners.
In an integration forum, institutions will also be able to play a larger role. By
using their strategy capacity, institutions can try to provide the interstate
bargaining process with a certain degree of leadership—one which can affect
state strategy formulation. If we combine the insights of the neofunctionalist
paradigm with the recent work of Raino Malnes, one is able to distinguish
between two kinds of leadership: -problem-solving and directional.45
Problem-solving leadership refers to actions which try to change the
constraints and opportunities of a negotiation. By changing the structural
conditions which surround the strategy formulation of states, new incentives
and consequent strategies can be created. One can distinguish between
efforts which target the institutional setting or substance of a negotiation.
Under the heading institutional setting, reference is made to a broad range of
actions, such as the change of physical location or the method of decision-
making. The "change of substance strategy" can best be illustrated by drawing
upon the neofunctionalist theory. Institutions can change the substance of a
negotiation by splitting the difference, i.e. by pointing to a solution which lies
between the final bargaining position of the parties or by upgrading the common
interests by means of redefining the problem, by for instance drawing up a

44. The above can also be put in the following way: states are not just endowed with issue-interests
but also an overall system-interest, i.e. an interest in the continuation of the integration forum. This point
is quite similar to Wayne Sandholtz's "membership matters argument": see W. Sandholtz,
"Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions", Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1996), pp. 403-427.
45. R. Malnes, "'Leader' and 'Entrepreneur' in International Negotiations: A Conceptual Analysis",
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995), pp. 87-112.
 Challenging a Theoretical Paradox 377

package-deal.46 By splitting the difference, or by finding a more suitable de-

cision-making procedure in the Treaty, the supranational actor can make the
integration solution more "palatable" for the state and consequently overcome
its "autonomy headache".47
Whereas problem-solving leadership can be defined as a very direct attempt
to influence the structure of the negotiation and therefore also the interest
formation phase, directional leadership is of a far more indirect nature. Here the
target is the attitude of the state. By, for instance, embarking on a consciousness-
raising strategy, institutions may change the attitudes of the actors and conse-
quently either raise or lower their autonomy bill.

The policy views of society. A major potential determinant for a state's policy is
the societal input, comprising, among others, public opinion, interest groups,
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and political parties. It is thus society, which in the last resort determines
whether a COG can fulfil one of his/her main goals, to remain in office.
It is important to point out, however, that societal input to governments are
highly biased. In its policy, the state will not simply "average" the interests of all
societal groups. Rather, it will "average" the interest of those groups which are
active on the specific integration issue. Using public choice theory as a stepping-
stone we can formulate the hypothesis that those interest groups which either
have much to gain or lose will be more active in the "government-pressuring
game" than interest groups which are affected only marginally. It should be
stressed that gains and losses are not only a "bread-and-butter" question.
Interest groups can also mobilise out of the conviction that a certain integration
proposal will be too costly in terms of identity values, i.e. it undermines the
identity of the state.

The internal-external level. The last level which can influence the state's evalu-
ation is the internal-external level. Here, one can imagine a situation where states
are not only pressured by their own society, but by a joint-venture of cross-bor-
der interest groups. If the societies succeed in building an alliance with the
European Commission, for instance, they will make up a force which could
pressure the state into accepting integration.
On the basis of the above model, one should hopefully be able to get a picture
of the complexity of a state's integration policy. For the clarity of the model, it
would be premature to end our endeavour here. By doing so, we would
completely neglect the fact that a state's interest formation does not take place
in a vacuum. Subsequently, we would fall into Milward's and Moravcsik's
snapshot trap. The point is that states, precisely by participating in an iterated
bargaining process, become constrained by feedback-loops of their former actions.
We should therefore take care not to look upon integration decisions as indepen-
dent variables. In an iterated bargaining game, decisions tend to be dependent
variables, and they will transform themselves into deadweight for future deci-
sions.

46. E.B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process", International
Organisation, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1966), pp. 881-911.
47. The above one-sided view must be completed by the following remark: institutions can also
hamper a state's willingness to pursue integration if a state feels that the institution's proposals and
general actions go against its interests.
 378 L. Friis

In more concrete terms, we can come up with the following three process
variables which affect the interest formation process:
1. Deadweight (The Shadow of the Past)
Every time a state is forced to develop a policy on a specific issue area, it is
enveloped in its own shadow of the past. Decisions taken years ago are thus
limiting its room to manoeuvre today, because a dramatic change of policy
can lead to loss of reputation. Secondly, as was argued by Paul Pierson,
policy changes are also impeded by the adaptation of social actors to
decisions taken previously. Lastly, former package deals can also re-emerge
as deadweight, e.g. a state wishing to change a specific policy might suddenly
discover that the policy is part and parcel of a major package deal which can
be very costly to untie.
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2. Constitution Policy (The Shadow of the Future)

States are not only constrained by the shadow of the past, but also of the
future. Since integration is a very dynamic process, which both bears a
tremendous impact on the domestic policy of the various member states and
takes into account the great "survival-need" of the supranational institutions,
the everyday life of the process can be characterised by a constant jockeying
to move the entire integration endeavour in the way one wishes. Because of
the stakes at play, constitution politics48 is an ever present phenomenon. To
rephrase the same point: because of the many potential spill-over processes,
together with the importance of integration in general, even the most inno-
cent subject can suddenly take on constitutional features and threaten to
undermine or improve the present constitution. When evaluating the auton-
omy dilemma, states will constantly consider the constitutional consequences.
3. Problem-Solving Philosophy
The last process variable of substantial importance can be termed problem-
solving philosophy.49 A state's room to manoeuvre is also determined by the
rules and norms on how to solve the bargaining disputes which have
crystallised slowly over time on the various issue areas. A priori, one can
distinguish between a competitive and consensual philosophy.
To avoid misunderstandings, it seems essential to point out that philosophy
should not confused with formal, treaty-based decision-making rules. One
can argue that the former is more important for state strategies than the latter.
Even with a clear-cut decision-making rule as bargaining luggage, negotia-
tions (and therefore also interest formation) can still centre around a different
problem-solving philosophy, because these are the "rules" which states prefer
today due to practical experiences and possible changes inside the various
issue areas since the original treaty was signed.

After the insertion of the last point, we can now approach the bottom line of
the model. We can argue that a state's/COG's decision to pursue integration is

48. This section is heavily inspired by Wolfgang Schumann: see W. Schumann, "Die EG als neuer
Anwendungsbereich für die Policy-Analyse: Möglichkeiten und Perspektiven der konzeptionellen
Weiterentwicklung", in Policy-Analyse (PVS-Sonderheft, 24/1993), p. 411.
49. A. Heritier, "Policy-Netzwerkanalyse als Untersuchungsinstrument in europäischen Kontext:
Folgerungen aus einer empirischen Studie regulativer Politik", in Policy-Analyse (PSV-Sonderheft,
24/1993), p. 438.
 Challenging a Theoretical Paradox 379

a very complicated equation, where many variables must balance. To a greater

or lesser extent the state/COG will have to keep the following variables in mind:
• pressures and constraints of the international system;
• pressures and constraints of its region, in particular the penetration effect of
interdependence;
• possible independent opinion of the institutional level;
• views of the other states;
• dominant view of its society on a specific integration issue and the overall
institutional process of integration;
• opinion of possible internal/external alliances;
• "interference" of process variables (derived from the iterated bargaining
game).
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Because of its multidimensionality, the above integration policy model was kept
at a highly general level. Hopefully, the development of issue area models will
allow us to take a couple of steps down the generalisation ladder. Therefore, by
looking at specific issue areas, there is a great likelihood of not only being able
to clarify what variables we should be looking at, but also how the different
variables weigh against each other.50
Although issue area models will undoubtedly strengthen our analytical capa-
bilities, our theory will still be characterised by a certain voluntaristic element.
After all, by using issue area models we can only hope to narrow down the most
likely behaviour of states. How a state actually will behave will, in the last resort,
depend on how the national executives evaluate the different pressures, com-
bined with his/her own personal wishes. This is especially so in situations
where a state is subjected to conflicting pressures.
Instead of deploring that we cannot do the impossible, we should concentrate
on the possible. We should realise that integration policy, almost by definition,
is a strategic endeavour characterised by dilemmas. The research task can there-
fore be summed up in the following way: to develop a clear strategy typology for
states' integration bargaining strategies. The core of this strategy typology should
be a clear realisation that states/national executives are not just helplessly
constrained actors, but actors endowed with a far ranging strategic tool-kit—a
tool-kit, which actually empowers the state with the opportunity to change/modify
the preferences of its "pressurisers". A good strategist can thus carve out a much
greater room for manoeuvre for himself. Hence, a state's strategic capability, to
a certain extent, is a major determinant for a state's integration policy.

Conclusion ^
The purpose of this paper was to contribute to the process of constructing an
integration policy theory—a theory which can redress or erase the present
paradox characterising the integration discourse. Despite the fact that more and
more states are applying for EU membership (not to mention that the European
newspaper columns are almost flooded with articles on states' European strate-

50. For a first attempt, see Friis, op. cit.

 380 L. Friis

. What kind of international system is the state operating in? (mature-immature?)

2. What kind of region is the state operating in? (mature-immature?)
Is the interdepenence so penetrating that states are subjected to an autonomy
dilemma?
3. How penetrating is the interdependence for the state?
- to what extent can the state fulfil its national goals despite
interdependence?
- to what extent has the state alternative policy-options other
than integration?
4. What are the views of the other states?
5. What is the independent input of the institutions?
Splitting the difference?
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6. How is the opinion-climate in the state's society?;

7. Are there any external/internal pressures?
8. In what ways do the process variables
(from the iterated bargaining game)
interfere?

y^" COG
Wtriple acceptability set)

Integration bargaining strategy

1
Interstate bargaining process

Figure 3. An Operational Integration Policy Model.

gies) we are still searching for a theoretical understanding of states' integration

policy.
The "paradox-erasure" was pursued mainly by bridging the present dominant
axis of debate: integration cannot be understood by either applying process or
state variables. We will have to conceptualise how the process as such (institu-
tions, deadweight, etc.) can influence the formulation of state strategies. Even if
we argue that integration is mainly the result of an interstate bargaining process,
this is not the same as opening up for a power-monopoly of the state. All kinds
of different actors and processes influence the bargaining process; sometimes
even transforming the state into a marginal actor.
This bridging process has resulted in a preliminary theoretical macro-model.
On the basis of this model, we now have at least some guidelines of which
variables we should look at when attempting to understand why, for instance,
Denmark conducts a reluctant European policy. If we synthesise the rather
abstract and not very operational model, we can come up with the analytical
course of action shown in Figure 3.
This theoretical attempt needs to be elaborated. As already stressed, we need
to develop issue area models, which (hopefully) can take us a few steps down
the generalisation ladder. And, just as importantly, we need to develop a
 Challenging a Theoretical Paradox 381

typology of what kind of different integration bargaining strategies a state can

pursue. However, in order fully to get a grip on the dynamics of integration
policy this would still not be enough. We also need to develop a far more
specific understanding of how state strategies are affected by the interstate
bargaining process. It is precisely in the confrontation between a national inte-
gration strategy and the interstate bargaining process where some of the most
challenging aspects of integration policy can be found. Thus, discovering a
lacuna is one thing; removing it quite another.
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