704239 Mojalefa Motloutsi March 26, 2018

CHMT 4005: Ethics assignment

Bhopal gas tragedy

During the nights 2-3 December of 1984, the world’s worst chemical disaster took place. A
dreadful event in history that would be called “the Hiroshima of chemical industry”. This
tragedy had adverse effects on human lives. Around 8 000 people lost their lives and more
than 100 000 were left with permanent health issues (Ekerman, 2005). The release of a lethal
gas clouds into the atmosphere containing about 40 tonnes of methyl isocyanate (MIC) from
Union Carbide’s pesticides plant in Bhopal, India, was the cause of this terror (Broughton,
2005).

The principal cause of the gas leak was believed to be the entering of large volumes of water
into one of MIC storage tanks, tank 610. This water then reacted with the phosgene, that was
present within MIC, and methyl carbamyl chloride to form hydrochloric acid (Ekerman,
2005). This initial reaction would go on to cause a set of chain reactions that would results in
an increased temperature and pressure of the system. As a results the storage tanks safety
valve burst open releasing the plume of toxic gas into the atmosphere (Ekerman, 2005).
The question of the direct cause of the event, that is, how did water enter MIC storage tank in
the first place, roused a conflict of interest between the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC)
and the Indian government as both supported different theories that attempted to answer that
water-entry question (Kalelkar, 1985). The UCC investigation team was initially in favour of
the sabotage theory, that water was deliberately introduced into tank 610 by a disgruntled
employee (Ekerman, 2005). The Indian government and the general public believed in the
water-washing theory, that the cause was probably due to accident that was a consequence of
technical negligence (Kalelkar, 1985).
Engineering Council of South Africa (ECSA) is a statutory body that was established by
Engineering Profession act (ECSA, 2017). Its goal is to govern the regulation of engineering
practices in the country. Any professional practising engineer has to be registered by ECSA
(ECSA, 2017), thus there are regulations and rules in terms of code of conduct for such a
registered persons. In the discussion of this paper I wish to evaluate how the code of conduct
presented by ECSA about the engineer’s responsibilities were violated in the wake of the
Bhopal tragedy.
The Union Carbide (Indian) limited pesticide plant initially operated as small operation
manufacturing fertilizers and pesticides which were packaged and sold to costumers
(Peterson, 2009).The UCIL and the government made plans to make a full production of
Union Carbide’s carbaryl pesticides (Peterson, 2009). This meant that MIC had to be
produced within the plant as an intermediate product. After the completion of the MIC unit
both UCIL and UCC discovered that the plant was not profitable (Peterson, 2009). This
realization put the management under financial constraints that would eventually limit the
overall performance of the plant.
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Both the Union Carbide Corporation and the Indian government violated ECSA regulations
in their planning of choosing the location of the plant. The plant was situated close to a
densely populated area of an estimate of 800 000 people. With this knowledge, they still
chose to produce MIC which has high toxic chemical properties (Ekerman, 2005). According
to ECSA’s rules of conduct section 3.3 on public interest, which emphasizes priority to
health, safety and interest of the public (ECSA, 2017), was violated.
The unethical conduct of operations at Union Carbide (India) limited were the root of the
problem. By all standards, the conditions at the plant failed to comply with any industrial
guidelines for a well-operating plant available. The decision that Union Carbide and the
Indian government took to manufacture and store large amounts of MIC were unethical, they
neglected to assess the risk of incorporating such a high-risk technology within an
infrastructure that was not fully developed (Cassels, 1991). This is also unethical according to
ECSA standards, section 3.1(c) on competency says that when carrying out any work, you
must comply with norms of the profession (ECSA, 2017).
The technical and operational failures of the plant were preceded by lack of risk evaluations
and hazard communication (Cassels, 1991).Since the plant was running on a low production
profit, employees who were well trained left for better jobs, as a result the plant had to be
operated by less skilled employees and thus the operating procedures became negligent
(Peterson, 2009).. The plant facilities were poorly maintained including safety equipment
which were inadequate during the night of the gas leak disaster. (Cassels, 1991). This is a
direct violation of ECSA’s code of conduct. According to section 3.1(b) only employees with
relevant education, training and experience may undertake professional engineering
operations (ECSA, 2017). Investigation revealed that Union Carbide have neglected to
emphasize that their operations conformed to regulatory standards because it needed to
reduce costs to improve their profit (Cassels, 1991).
Another major unethical behaviour by the UCC management, which could have prevented
the disaster, is that there had been previous warnings. In 1974 a contaminated well was found
by residents, toxic chemicals were found in this wells (Ekerman, 2005). During the years of
1981 to 1984 there were many incidents of gas leaks within the plant where a lot workers got
injured and some died even (Ekerman, 2005). The UCC deliberately chose to neglect this
warnings. ECSA’s code of conduct on integrity (section 3.2) were not taken into
consideration by the UC management (ECSA, 2017).
Regardless of the direct of the leak, the only parties responsible for this disaster are the Union
Carbide Corporation and the Indian government (Morehouse, 1993). It is their joint
inconsideration during the planning stages of the plant that people lost their lives. Union
Carbide motivated by financial greed, neglected all the safety precautions. The Indian
government on the blinded by its ambition for industrial development. Hence it was required
that both parties play a role in offering help to the affected.
The damaged caused by the disaster adverse effects on the victims. Financial compensation
was required from both perpetrators to aid the victims with medical expenses (Peterson,
2009). After the Indian Supreme Court ruling, an agreement of $470 million was reached
even though the amount advocated for was $3 billion (Peterson, 2009). Further funding was
required to rehabilitate the plant side and the surrounding environment which were damaged.
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In conclusion, the lessons learned from this Bhopal gas tragedy are imperative on today’s
society that relies heavily on chemical industries. It is very important that in every country
there be regulatory bodies like ECSA that should insist that every operating industrial plant
and its personnel adhere to its rules of regulations. Such tragedies could be adverted by
professional ethics training.

References
Broughton, E. (2005). The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review. Environmental Health.

Cassels, J. (1991). The Uncertain Promise of Law: Lessons from Bhopal. Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 1-
6.

ECSA. (2017). Code of Conduct for Registered Persons: Engineering Profession Act, 2000.
Government Gazette, 1-6.

Ekerman, I. (2005). The bhopal saga - Causes and consequences of world's largest industrial disaster.
Bhopal: University Press (India) private limited.

Kalelkar, s. S. (1985). INVESTIGATION OF LARGE-MAGNITUDE INCIDENTS: BHOPAL AS A CASE STUDY.

I.CHEM.E. SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO. 110, 1-23.

Morehouse, W. (1993). The Ethics of Industrial Disasters in a Transnational World: The Elusive Quest
for Justiceand Accountability in Bhopal. Sage Publications, Inc, 475-504.

Peterson, M. (2009). Bhopal Plant Disaster – Situation Summary. International Dimensions of Ethics
Education in Science and Engineering, 1-8.
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