Hilary

 Putnam  
For  the  
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition

 
Maria  Baghramian  
School  of  Philosophy  
University  College  Dublin  
Dublin  4,  Ireland  
   

1
  
Keywords  
Conceptual  Relativity,  Ethics,  Externalism,  Functionalism,  Language,  Logical  
Positivism,  Mathematics,  Mind,  Putnam,  Quine,  Realism,  Science,  Value  
 
Abstract    
American  philosopher,  Hilary  Whitehall  Putnam  (1929-­‐)  is  one  of  the  most  
influential  analytic  philosophers  of  our  time.  He  is  particularly  well-­‐known  for  
his  contributions  to  philosophy  of  science,  philosophy  of  mind,  and  philosophy  of  
language.  His  work  is  also  marked  by  a  criticial  engagement  with  his  earlier  
views  and  several  changes  of  key  philosophical  posititions.  The  present  article  
distinguishes  between  early,  middle  and  late  periods  in  Putnam’s  writing    and  
discusses  the  most  seminal  ideas  of  each  period.  Particular  attention  is  paid  to  
Putnam’s  treatment  of  the  question  of  realism  over  the  three  periods.  
   

2
Life  
Hilary  Whitehall  Putnam  is  one  the  most  influential  and  prolific  analytic  
philosophers  of  our  time.  He  has  written  extensively  on  a  wide  array  of  
philosophical  topics  but  is  particularly  well  known  for  his  contributions  to  
philosophy  of  science,  philosophy  of  mind,  and  philosophy  of  language.  Putnam  
was  born  in  Chicago  in  1929  but  the  family  soon  moved  to  Paris  where  his  father,  
the  eminent  translator  and  literary  editor  Samuel  Putnam,  was  to  translate  the  
complete  works  of  Rabelais  and  edit  the  Paris  Review.  In  1933,  the  family  
returned  to  the  United  States  and  eventually  settled  in  Philadelphia  where  
Putnam  lived  until  his  graduation  from  the  University  of  Pennsylvania  in  1948  
with  a  degree  in  Philosophy,  Linguistics  and  German.  After  a  year  in  Harvard,  
Putnam  moved  to  UCLA  in  1949  to  do  a  PhD  under  the  supervision  of  the  
eminent  logical  positivist  Hans  Reichenbach.  Reichenbach’s  profound  influence  
led  to  a  life-­‐long  preoccupation  with  philosophy  of  physics,  mathematics  and  an  
increasingly  critical  engagement  with  logical  positivism.    
 
Putnam’s  early  academic  career  was  at  Northwestern    (1952–1953)  and  
Princeton  University  (1953–1961)  followed  by  four  years  in    MIT  (1961–1965),  
where  he  was  Professor  of  the  Philosophy  of  Science  and  instrumental  in  setting  
up  a  new  department  of  Philosophy.  From  1962  until  his  retirement,  Putnam  has  
been  a  member  of  the  Department  of  Philosophy  in  Harvard,  first  as  Walter  
Beverly  Pearson  Professor  of  Modern  Mathematics  and  Mathematical  Logic  and  
later  as  the  Cogan  University  Professor.  He  is  a  Fellow  of  the  American  Academy  
of  Arts  and  Sciences,  a  Corresponding  Fellow  of  the  British  Academy,  and  was  a  
president  of  the  American  Philosophical  Association  (Eastern  Division).  His  
numerous  awards  include  the  Rolf  Schock  Prize  in  Logic  and  Philosophy  from  the  
Royal  Swedish  Academy  and  The  Ulysses  Medal  from  University  College  Dublin,  
Ireland.  He  is  married  to  the  philosopher  Ruth-­‐Anna  Putnam.  
 

Work  
 

3
The  sheer  breadth  and  variety  of  Putnam’s  writing,  accompanied  by  a  radical  
practice  of  rejecting  or  reformulating  his  earlier  positions,  make  the  task  of  
summarizing  and  evaluating  the  full  span  of  his  work  difficult,  if  not  impossible.  
The  present  article  distinguishes  between  the  early,  middle  and  late  periods  in  
Putnam’s  writing  -­‐  what  I  call  Putnam  1,  2  and  3  -­‐  and  discusses  the  most  seminal  
ideas  of  each  period.  Despite  frequent  changes  of  views  and  philosophical  
orientations,  however,  a  number  of  prominent  themes  are  evident  in  Putnam’s  
writing,  among  them  are  the  questions  of  realism  and  its  discontents,  a  
preoccupation  with  questions  of  the  status  of  science,  a  continuous  concern  with  
questions  of  norms  and  values,  and  a  general  aversion  to  dichotomized  thinking.    
 
Early  Putnam  
 
Putnam’s  early  publications  have  the  imprint  of  his  encounter  with  Rudolf  
Carnap,  the  most  important  of  the  logical  positivists,  whom  he  came  to  know  
during  his  Princeton  years.  Two  topics  were  central.  The  first  was  on  questions  
of  synonymy  and  analyticity,  the  topic  of  W.V.O.  Quine’s  seminal  ‘Two  Dogmas  of  
Empiricism”  (Quine  1951),  where  Quine  had  argued,  against  Carnap,  that  the  
distinction  between  analytic  and  synthetic  statements,  or  sentences  true  by  
virtue  of  their  meaning  only  vs.  those  true  by    virtue  of  facts  is  untenable.      
Putnam’s  “The  Analytic  and  the  Synthetic”  (1962)  is  where  he  establishes  his  
own  distinct  philosophical  voice.  The  article  is  also  the  first  clear  example  of  
Putnam’s  aversion  to  philosophical  dichotomies  and  beginnings  of  a  life-­‐long  
critique  of  logical  positivism.  Putnam  agrees  with  Carnap  that  there  is  an  obvious  
and  ‘gross  distinction  between  “All  bachelors  are  unmarried”  and  “There  is  a  
book  on  this  table”’  (1975a:  36).  However,  he  is  also  in  agreement  with  Quine  
that  ‘overworking  the  analytic–synthetic  distinction’  distorts  our  views  of  its  
significance  for  science  or  Philosophy”  (1975a:  33).  The  distinction,  he  argues,  
could  have  a  role  provided  that  we  do  not  treat  it  as  a  sharp  dichotomy  but  as  a  
continuum.  There  is  a  small  group  of  concepts,  he  calls  them  ‘one-­‐criterion  
concepts’,  which  have  a  single  criterion  for  application.  For  instance,  the  only  
criterion  for  the  application  of  ‘bachelor’  is  that  of  being  an  unmarried  man  and  
we  cannot  abandon  this  criterion  without  depriving  ‘bachelor’  of  its  use,  hence  

4
the  analyticity  of  ‘all  bachelors  are  unmarried  men’.  A  majority  of  concepts,  on  
the  other  hand,  are  ‘law  cluster’  concepts  where  ‘any  one  law  can  be  abandoned  
without  destroying  the  identity  of  the  .  .  .  concept  involved’  (Putnam  1975a:  52).    
He  thus  shows  a  way  of  thinking  about  the  Quine  -­‐  Carnap  debate  that  retains  the  
initial  insight  of  the  defenders  of  analyticity  while  avoiding  its  philosophical  
pitfalls.    
 
The  second  area  of  focus  in  this  early  period  was  mathematics  and  its  
philosophy.  Putnam‘s  co-­‐publication  of  the  proof  of  Hilbert’s  Tenth  Problem  
(1961),  in  collaboration  with  Martin  Davis,  established  his  reputation  as  a  
mathematician.  A  collection  of  articles  on  philosophy  of  mathematics,  edited  with  
Paul  Benacerraf  in  1964,  was  his  first  book-­‐length  publication.  Putnam,  in  that  
early  period,  was  a  realist  about  both  mathematics  and  science  but  his  realism  
about  mathematics  piggy-­‐backs  on  realism  about  science.  In  what  has  become  
known  as  the    ‘Quine-­‐Putnam  Indispensability  Argument’,  Putnam,  in  similar  
lines  of  thought  put  forward  by  Quine  (e.g.  Quine  1960),    argues  that  much  of  
science  is  either  expressed  in  mathematical  terms  or  uses  mathematics  as  an  
indispensable  component.  And  to  the  extent  that  scientific  hypotheses  are  true,  
in  the  sense  of  corresponding  with  a  mind-­‐independent  reality,  then  so  are  the  
mathematical  theorems  that  underpin  it.    He  says,  ‘quantification  over  
mathematical  entities  is  indispensable  for  science,  both  formal  and  physical:  
therefore  we  should  accept  such  quantification;  but  this  commits  us  to  accepting  
the  existence  of  mathematical  entities  in  question’  (Putnam  1972:    57).  A  realist  
interpretation  of  science,  thus,  supports  realism  about  mathematics.    
 
Science  
 
Putnam’s  key  idea  on  realism  about  science  is  known  as  the  ‘no  miracle’  or  
Putnam-­‐Boyd  argument  to  the  best  explanation.  Using  an  abductive  format  and  
taking  a  similar  approach  to  the  indispensability  argument  for  mathematics,  
Putnam  and  Boyd  argued  that  the  best  explanation  for  the  predictive  and  
explanatory  success  of  a  scientific  theory  is  its  truth  or  approximation  to  truth.  
Their  argument,  in  a  nutshell,  states:  

5
(1)  Mature,  that  is  well-­‐supported  and  long-­‐established  scientific  theories  result  
in  successful  predictions.  
(2)  The  best  explanation  for  these  predictive  successes  is  that  such  theories  are  
true  or  approximately  true,  i.e.  they  reflect  what’s  going  on  in  the  natural  world.  
(3)  Non-­‐realist  arguments,  such  as  instrumentalism,  cannot  explain  the  success  
of  science.  
Therefore,  mature  scientific  theories  are  (approximately)  true.  
Scientific  realism  is  the  claim  that  mature  scientific  theories  are  true.  
Therefore,  scientific  realism  is  true.  

Putnam  explains:  
The  positive  argument  for  realism  is  that  it  is  the  only  philosophy  that  
does  not  make  the  success  of  science  a  miracle.  That  terms  in  mature  
scientific  theories  typically  refer  (this  formulation  is  due  to  Richard  
Boyd),  that  the  theories  accepted  in  a  mature  science  are  typically  
approximately  true,  that  the  same  term  can  refer  to  the  same  thing  
even  when  they  occurs  in  different  theories  -­‐  these  statements  are  
viewed  not  as  necessary  truths  but  as  part  of  the  only  scientific  
explanation  of  the  success  of  science,  and  hence  as  part  of  any  adequate  
description  of  science  and  its  relations  to  its  object  (Putnam  1975a:73).  
 
Mind  
 
Putnam’s  other  major  contribution  in  this  period  was  to  philosophy  of  mind.  The  
two  dominant  theories  of  the  mind  in  the  second  half  of  twentieth  century  were  
logical  behaviorism,  which  reduced  the  mind  to  dispositions  to  behavior  and  
patterns  of  stimulus  and  response,  and  Mind–Brain  identity  theory  that  claimed  
that  mental  states  are  identical  with  states  of  the  central  nervous  system.  
Putnam,  starting  in  the  1962  article  ‘Brain  and  Behavior’,  republished  in  Putnam  
1975,  argued  that  the  view  that  a  mental  state,  such  as  experiencing  pain,  can  be  
reduced  to  certain  types  of  behavioral  states  is  untenable  because  it  ignores  the  
fact  that  pain  is  a  private  sensation.  Identity  theory  is  also  defective  because  it  
disallows  the  possibility  of  ascribing  mental  states,  such  as  pain,  to  creatures  

6
with  a  physical  makeup  different  from  that  of  humans.  If  pain  is  identical  with  
certain  neuronal  activities  in  the  human  brain,  then  creatures  with  no  such  
neurons  won’t  be  capable  of  experiencing  pain.    
 
Functionalism  was  Putnam’s  positive  contribution  to  philosophy  of  mind.  His  
version  of  the  theory  is  known  as  Machine  Functionalism  because  of  the  parallels  
he  draws  between  mental  states  and  the  functional  states  of  universal  Turing  
machines  or  computers.  A  mental  state  is  characterized  by  its  causal  relations  
with  external  stimuli,  or  imput  from  the  senses,  behavioral  responses,  and  
relations  with  other  mental  states,  e.g.  beliefs  and  desires.  Mental  states  are  the  
causes  of  our  actions  within  the  background  of  our  beliefs  and  desires  about  the  
world  but  are  not  reducible  to  behavior.  Even  sensations,  such  as  pain  could  be  
explained  functionally.  Things  that  feel  pain  do  so  not  because  of  the  particular  
brain  state  they  are  in,  but  because  they  are  in  a  certain  functional  state.  One  
strength  of  Functionalism  is  that  it  ensures  the  autonomy  of  the  mind    and  shows  
that  ‘The  question  of  the  autonomy  of  our  mental  life  does  not  hinge  on  and  has  
nothing  to  do  with  that  all  too  popular…  question  about  matter  or  soul-­‐stuff.  We  
could  be  made  of  Swiss  cheese  and  it  wouldn’t  matter’  (Putnam,  1975:  302).  Just  
as  different  machines  need  not  share  the  same  hardware  to  carry  out  the  same  
computation,    mental  states,  including  sensations  and  emotional  states,  could  be  
functionally  alike  but  physically  different.  What  matters,  Putnam  argued,  is  
functional  organization  which  realizable  in  very  different  hardware,  be  it  by  
silicon  based  robots  or  by  Martians  with  a  different  evolutionary  history  and  
biological  make-­‐up.  The  “multiple  realizability”  of  mental  states  became  
orthodoxy  of  cognitive  science.    
 
Decades  later,  Putnam  would  repudiate  functionalism  for  reasons  that  are  quite  
similar  to  his  rejection  of  behaviorism  and  identity  theory  (Putnam  1987  and  
1992).  Earlier  Putnam  had  rejected  a  reductionist  account  of  the  relationship  
between  the  mind  and  the  brain,  he  now  warns  against  the  reduction  of  mental  
states  to  machine  states  or  brain  software.  In  the  same  way  that  mental  states  
cannot  readily  be  identified  or  co-­‐related  with  behavioral  or  brain  states,  mental  
and  psychological  states,  such  as  hoping,  desiring,  fearing  etc.,  also  cannot  be  co-­‐

7
related  software  in  a  straightforward  singular  manner.  In  arguing  against  mind-­‐
brain  identity  theory,  Putnam  had  maintained  that  mental  states  are  multiply  
realizable  because  they  are  ‘compositionally  plastic’.  He  now  believes  that  mental  
states  are  also  ‘computationally  plastic’  because  a  propositional  attitude,  such  as  
a  belief  can  be  realized  by  many  different  computational  states  (Putnam  1994:  
47).  The  morale  is  that  intentional  mental  states  cannot  be  reduced  to  either  
physical  of  computational  states.    
 
Language    
 
Putnam’s  contribution  to  philosophy  of  language  has  been  momentous.  For  much  
of  the  twentieth  century,  philosophy  of  language  was  dominated  by  what  is  
commonly  known  as  ‘descriptivism’  –  the  approach  to  meaning  adopted  by  the  
founders  of  analytic  philosophy,  Gottlob  Frege  and  Bertrand  Russell.  According  
to  descriptivism,  names  refer  to  what  they  stand  for  via  what  Frege  calls  ‘sense’  
or  conceptual  content  and  what  Russell  calls  ‘Definite  Descriptions’.  For  Russell,  
for  instance,  what  defines  “gold”  is  a  conjunction  of  properties  such  as  its  color,  
texture,  weight,  etc.;    “gold”,  thus,  is  a  shorthand  term  standing  for  a  longer  list  of  
the  properties  we  associate  with  that  substance.  Meaning,  thus,  is  distinct  from  
reference  and  is  mediated  by  descriptions  of  that  reference.  Putnam  and  Saul  
Kripke,  in  his  Naming  and  Necessity  (1980),  turned  this  position  on  its  head.    
 
In  ‘The  Meaning  of    ‘’Meaning’’’  Putnam  sets  out  to  refute  what  he  sees  as  a    
‘grotesquely  mistaken’  view  of  language  (1975:21)  arising  from  the  tendency  to  
ignore  the  role  of  the  natural  and  social  environment  in  establishing  the  meaning  
of  words  in  general  and  names  in  particular.  Two  incompatible  assumptions  are  
at  fault,  he  says.  First,  that  to  know  the  meaning  of  a  term  is  to  be  in  an  
appropriate  psychological  state  and  second  that  meaning  determines  reference.  
Traditional  theories  of  meaning  are  unsatisfactory  because  they  are  
individualistic  rather  than  social  and  neglect  the  contribution  of  external  reality  
to  meaning.  The  crucial  point  missed  by  descriptivism  was  that  both  the  
reference  and  the  meaning  of  natural  kind  terms,  ‘water’,  ‘gold’,  ‘brain’  for  

8
instance,  are  determined  by  causal  interactions  between  these  physical  entities  
and  referring  minds,  i.e.  language  users.    

Putnam’s  argument  proceeds  through  several  thought  experiments,  the  best  

known  of  which  is  the  Twin-­‐Earth  thought  experiment,  where  he  asks  us  to  
imagine  a  distant  planet  identical  in  most  respects  to  our  planet.  Twin-­‐Earth  has  
the  same  geographical  features  as  earth  -­‐  seas,  lakes,  mountains,  etc-­‐,    it  has  a  
climate  similar  to  earth,  and  its  inhabitants  seem  to  speak  the  same  languages  
that  the  earth  people  do.  The  one  major  difference  with  earth  is  that  the  stuff  in  
their  lakes  and  oceans,  used  for  drinking,  bathing  and  swimming,  does  not  have  
the  chemical  constitution    H20  but  is  XYZ.  Except  for  having  a  different  
underlying  chemical  composition,  XYZ  resembles  earth  water  in  all  respects,  
Moreover,  the  word  used  by  twin  earthians  to  refer  to  XYZ  is  ‘water’.  However,  
according  to  Putnam,  when  the  inhabitant  of  TE  utter  a  sentence  such  as  ‘bring  
me  a  glass  of  water’,  they  are  referring  to  XYZ,  while  when  an  earthling  utters  the  
same  request  she  is  talking  about  H20.  So,  the  two  seemingly  identical  sentences  
are  about  two  very  different  things,  and  hence  they  have  different  meanings.  The  
twin  earth  person  is  in  effect  talking  about  twin  earth  water  or  twater  and  not  
water.    

According  to  Putnam,  natural  kind  words  have  an  ‘unnoticed  indexical  
component:  water  is  stuff  that  bears  a  certain  similarity  relation  to  the  water  
around  here’  (1975:234).  The  reference  of  the  term  ‘’water”,  has  been  fixed  by  
pointing  out  to  a  stuff  and  saying  something  like  ‘this  is  water’  (Putnam  1975:  
231).  This  initial  baptism  and  the  continuity  of  usage  have  established  causal  
relation  between  the  speakers  and  what  they  are  talking  about.  People  on  earth  
and  twin  earth  may  have  the  same  kind  of  mental  images  running  through  their  
head  when  they]  think,  respectively,  of  water  and  twater.  Yet  ‘water’  in  English  
has  a  different  meaning  from  ‘water’  in  Twin  Earth  English.  Thus  meaning  is  
independent  of  the  ‘inner’  mental  states  that  people  possess,  rather,  it  depends  
on  external,  natural  and  social  factors.  As  he  famously  puts  it  ‘cut  the  pie  any  way  
you  like,  ‘meanings’  just  ain’t  in  the  head!’  (Putnam  1975:  227).    
 

9
Not  all  language  users  would  have  knowledge  of  the  underlying  composition  of  
natural  kinds.  Or  even  be  able  to  always  identify  such  kinds  accurately.    Putnam  
introduces  the  idea  division  of  linguistic  labor  to  explain  such  cases  (1975:  227).  
Words,  he  argues,  have  producers  and  consumers,  the  experts  and  the  ordinary  
users  of  language.  The  users  often  know  only  the  stereotypical  descriptions  
associated  with  a  natural  kind  term  and  sometimes  they  get  even  those  wrong.  
One  role  of  stereotypes  is  to  facilitate  communication  between  speakers  who  
ordinarily  have  very  little  knowledge  of  the  underlying  structure  of  natural  
kinds.  To  find  out  whether  a  particular  object  falls  under  a  natural  kind  term  
users  have  to  defer  to  the  knowledge  of  the  experts.  For  instance,  ordinary  
speakers  know  gold  through  the  stereotypical  properties  (shiny,  yellowish,  
precious  metal),  but  in  order  to  authenticate  whether  a  piece  of  metal  is  gold  
they  defer  to  the  superior  knowledge  of  the  relevant  experts.    
 
The  Twin-­‐Earth  thought  experiment  has  become  a  paradigm  of  philosophical  
methodology  in  the  analytic  tradition  and  its  use  has  been  extended  beyond  the  
semantics  of  natural  kind  terms  to  other  areas,  including  ethics,  philosophy  of  
mind,  and  theories  of  content  and  Putnam  has  remained  constant  in  defending  
the  view.    
 
Middle  Putnam  
 
A  preoccupation  with  what  Putnam  calls  the    ‘great  question  of  realism’  (Putnam,  
1994:  295)  or  the  question  of  how  language  connects  with  the  world,  is  a  
unifying  thread  in  Putnam’s  work,  but  the  issue  takes  center  stage  in  Putnam  2.  
The  early  Putnam  was  a  realist  not  only  about  the  existence  of  material  objects  
but  also  about  mathematical  and  purely  theoretical  entities  such  as  numbers,  
fields  and  physical  magnitudes.  The  most  striking  feature  of  Putnam’s  work  in  
the  middle  period  is  the  rejection  of  some  of  the  core  assumptions  of  realism  that  
he  had  previously  embraced.      
 
The  emergence  of  Putnam  2  can  be  dated  back  to  the  presidential  address  he  
gave  at  the  Eastern  Division  of  the  American  Philosophical  Association  in  

10
December  1976,  subsequently  published  as  ‘Realism  and  Reason’  (1977).  
Putnam  used  the  occasion,  rather  dramatically,  to  repudiate  his  earlier  views,  a  
position  he  came  to  call  ‘metaphysical  realism’.  Metaphysical  realism,  he  argued,  
is  committed  to  the  views:  
a-­‐The  world  consist  of  fixed  totality  of  all  objects.    
b-­‐The  world  has  a  fixed  totality  of  properties.  
c-­‐There  is  a  fixed  set  of  ‘language-­‐independent’  objects  (some  of  which  are  
abstract  and  others  are  concrete)  and  a  fixed  ‘relation’  between  terms  and  their  
extensions.    
d-­‐There  is  a  sharp  distinction  between  properties  we  discover,  the  factual,  and  
the  properties  we  project  onto  the  world  (i.e.  the  evaluative).  
e-­‐There  is  a  fixed  relation  of    correspondence  in  terms  of  which  truth  can  be  
defined  (Putnam  1990:  27).  
 
Putnam  offers  several  arguments  to  show  the  incoherence  of  metaphysical,  the  
earliest  and  most  controversial  of  which  is  the  Model  Theoretic  Argument.  The  
argument  was  presented  in  at  least  three  different  formulations  and,  at  least  
initially,  relied  on  the  Löwenheim–Skolem  theorem  in  mathematics  (Putnam  
1977).  The  most  influential  version  is  the  Permutation  Argument  (Putnam  1981)  
where  it  is  claimed  that  it  is  possible  to  systematically  permute  the  way  singular  
terms  and  predicates  refer  without  changing  the  truth-­‐values  of  the  sentences  
containing  these  terms.  The  argument  particularly  targets  the  Metaphysical  
Realist’s  assumption  that  there  is  a  fixed  ‘relation’  between  terms  and  their  
extensions  (c  above)  and,  that  there  is  a  fixed  relation  of    correspondence  
between  propositions  and  states  of  affairs  (e  above  list).    Take  any  epistemically  
ideal  theory,  one  that  meets  all  operational  and  theoretical  constraints  possible,  for  
instance  it  is  consistent,  complete,  well-­‐formulated.  According  to  the  Metaphysical  
Realists,  for  such  a  theory  to  be  true  then  it  also  should  satisfy  a  unique  word-­‐world  
relationship,  i.e.  its  terms  should  refer  determinately  to  objects  and  entities  (or  
classes  of  objects)  in  the  world.  However,  Putnam  contends  that  there  could  be  no  
such  thing  as  determinate  reference  as  required  by  the  realists.  Any  assignment  
of  truth,  by  envisaging  a  relationship  of  reference,  presupposes  an  interpretation  
of  the  referring  language;  the  model-­‐theoretic  argument  shows  that  for  any  given  

11
language  there  could  be  many  such  interpretations  and  consequently  many  
different  ways  of  assigning  (correct)  reference.  Consider  Putnam’s  example  of  ‘the  
cat  is  on  the  mat’.    The  sentence  comes  out  true  in  an  interpretation  where    ‘cat’  
refers  to  the  animal  cat  and  ‘mat’  to  an  object  we  put  on  the  floor,  but  it  also  comes  
out  true  if  we  use  an  alternative  interpretation  where  ‘cat’  refers  to  leaves  and  ‘mat’  
refers  to  trees.  Thus  metaphysical  realism  is  shown  to  be  based  on  an  incoherent  
demand.  It  may  be  argued,  using  Putnam’s  own  externalist  theory  of  meaning,  that  
‘cat’  refers  to  cats  not  to  leaves  because  it  stands  in  the  appropriate  causal  relation  
to  cats  and  not  to  leaves.      Putnam  responds:  ‘’How  ‘causes’  can  uniquely  refer  is  as  
much  of  a  puzzle  as  how  ‘cat’  can  on  the  metaphysical  realist  picture”  (1978:  126).  
To  think  that  there  is  metaphysical  glue  binding  ‘cat’  to  the  animal  cat  is  to  
subscribe  to  ‘a  magical  theory  of  reference’  (1981:  47).    

Putnam’s    second  major  argument  against  metaphysical  realism  is  (Putnam  

1981).  The  structure    of  the  argument  is  quite  simple.  To  believe  that  the  world  is  
mind-­‐independent,  as  the  metaphysical  realist  does,  is  to  allow  for  the  possiblity  
of  being  radically  mistaken  in  our  beleifs  about  that  world.  Relying  on  a  
technologically  updated  retelling  of  Descartes’  Evil  Demon  argument,  Putnam  
proposes    a    Matrix  type  scenario,  where  the  sceptic  challenges  us    to  prove  that  
we  are  not    brains  kept  alive  by  mad  scientists  dreaming    of  what  we  call  ‘reality’.  
He  draws  of  arguments  from  semantic  externalism  to  prove  that  such  a  scenario  
is  incoherent  and  therefore  so  is  metaphysical  realism.  As  we  saw,  according  to  
semantic  externalism,  the  reference  of  words  is  at  least  partially  determined  by  
relations  between  language  users  and  the  natural  and  social  world  they  inhabit.  
The  word  ‘tree’,  in  a  speaker’s  mouth,    referes  to  the  object  tree  because  of  a  
variety  of  social  and  physical  connections  with  trees  in  the  world.  The  same  is  
true  of  the  words  ‘brain’,  ‘vats’  etc.  But  if  we  were  brains  in  a  vat,  we  could  not  
possibly  be  using  the  word  ‘brain’  the  way  unenvatted  people  use  for  there  are  
no  actual  connections  between  the  brains  in  vats  and  their  brains  or  vats  .  The  
words  ‘brain’,  ‘vat’  etc.,  as  uttered  or  thought  by  brains  in  vats,  would  be  
connected  only  to  neural  impulses  or  images  of  brains  and  not  to  real  brains  in  
real-­‐life  vats.  The  sceptical  hypotheis  therefore  is  either  false  or  cannot  be  

12
coherently  stated.  But  if  the  scetpcical  hypothesis  is  incoheren,  then  so  is  
metaphysical  realism.    

Internal  Realism  
 
‘Internal  realism’  is  Putnam  2’s  proposed  alternative  to  metaphysical  realism,  
where,  under  the  influence  of  Michael  Dummett,  in  place  of  his  earlier  
correspondence  theory,  he  advocates  an  epistemic  view  of  truth.  Internal  realism  
is  committed  to  three  core  doctrines:    
1)  There  is  more  than  one  true  theory  or  description  of  the  world.  
2)  There  is  no  “ready  made  world”.  
3′)  “truth  is  an  idealization  of  rational  acceptability  –  some  sort  of  ideal  
coherence  of  our  beliefs  with  each  other  and  with  our  experiences  as  those  
experiences  are  themselves  represented  in  our  belief  system  –  and  not  
correspondence  with  mind-­‐independent  or  discourse-­‐independent  ‘state  of  
affairs’.”  (Putnam  1981:  49-­‐50)  
 
A  crucial  feature  of  internal  realism  was  its  commitment  to  an  epistemic  view  of  
truth.  Truth,  Putnam  2  argued,  is  not  independent  from  knowledge,  but  at  the  
same  time,  it  should  not  be  identified  with  contingent  and  changeable  epistemic  
achievements  of  a  single  time  and  a  place,  but  with  what  we  can  know  and  justify  
under  ideal  epistemic  conditions.  The  assumption  is  that  if  there  were  such  
things  as  epistemically  ideal  conditions,  then  statements  that  were  justified  
under  such  conditions  would  be  true.    As  Putnam  puts  it,  truth  is  independent  of  
justification  here  and  now,  but  not  independent  of  all  justification.  (Putnam  
1981).  The  view  aimed  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  access  by  minded-­‐beings,  
such  as  us,  to  a  mind-­‐independent  world.  We  cannot  step  outside  our  language,  
our  mind-­‐set  or  perspective  and  compare  our  beliefs  about  the  world  to  the  
world  as  it  is  in  itself.  To  give  any  substance  to  such  a  view  we  need  to  postulate  
a  God’s-­‐  eye  view  of  reality,  a  view  not  accessible  to  us  mere  mortals.  The  
epistemic  view  of  truth  bypasses  the  need  for  a  God’s  eye  perspective  while  
allowing  for  the  possibility  of  objectivity  in  truth  and  knowledge.    
 

13
The  second  important  component  of  internal  realism  is  conceptual  relativity,  the  
view  that  there  could  be  alternative,  non-­‐compatible  descriptions  of  objects  and  
their  properties.  The  key  motivation  for  conceptual  relativity  is  the  conviction  
that  the  very  idea  of  an  unconceptualized  world  is  incoherent.  All  our  
experiences  of  the  world  are  shaped  by  our  concepts,  here  too  we  cannot  have  a  
God’s  Eye  point  of  view,  but  only  “the  various  points  of  view  of  actual  persons  
reflecting  various  interests  and  purposes  that  their  descriptions  and  theories  
subserve’  (Putnam1981:  50).    
 
To  show  the  force  of  the  argument  Putnam  proposes  a  scenario  where  one  and  
the  same  situation  can  be  described  as  involving  very  different  numbers  and  
kinds  of  objects  (Putnam  1987,  1989,  1990).  Let  us  take  a  world  containing  
objects  a,  b,  c.  Our  usual  way  of  counting  tells  us  that  there  are  three  objects  in  
that  world.  However,  according  to  ‘mereology’,  a  theory  of  part/whole  
relationship  first  formalized  by  the  Polish  logician  Stanislaw  Leśniewski  in  the  
early  twentieth  century,  for  every  two  particulars  there  is  an  object  that  is  their  
sum.  Given  this  basic  mereological  starting-­‐point,  the  world  just  described  will  
contain  not  three  but  seven  objects.  Putnam  asks:  faced  with  a  world  with  three  
individuals,  does  the  question  how  many  objects  are  there  in  this  world  have  a  
determinate  reply?  The  answer  is  no,  because  any  reply  would  depend  on  how  
we  interpret  the  word  ‘object’.  From  an  atomist  perspective,  the  perspective  
most  of  us  take  for  granted,  there  would  be  three  independent,  unrelated  objects  
a,  b,  c  in  this  world.  While,  according  to  the  mereological  conceptual  scheme  the  
world  will  consist  of  seven  objects,  a,  b,  c,  a+b,  a+c,  b+c,  a+b+c.  The  example  
makes  the  internal  realist’s  point  that  we  cannot  coherently  talk  of  a  world  
consisting  of  language-­‐independent    objects  or  properties  for  the  very  idea  of  
object  is  mediated  by  the  concepts  we  use.  
 
In  the  late  1980s,  Putnam  reached  the  conclusion  that  internal  realism,  and  its  
epistemic  view  of  truth  in  particular,  faced  problems  similar  to  those  besetting  
metaphysical  realism  and  its  concomitant  correspondence  theory  of  truth.  The  
metaphysical  realist  needs  to  explain  how  access  to  the  external  world  is  
possible,  how  the  human  mind  could  reach  out,  so  to  speak,  and  epistemically  

14
touch  the  world.    Putnam  came  to  believe  that  there  was  a  similar  problem  in  
explaining  our  ‘referential  access  to  “sufficiently  good  epistemic  conditions”’  
(Putnam  1994:  462).    The  growing  concern  with  this  question  led  to  the  
emergence  of  a  third  phase  in  Putnam’s  philosophical  journey.    
 
The  Later  Putnam    
 
The  emergence  of  Putnam   3 can  be  dated  to  his  1990  Gifford  lectures  in  St.  
Andrews  University.  The  still  ongoing  change  of  position,  however,  particularly  
in   c omparison   w ith  the  more  radical  break  between  Putnam  1  and  2,  has  been  
more  nuanced  and   gradual.  Putnam  3  defends  what  he  variously  calls  ‘common  
sense’,  ‘natural’,   or   ‘ pragmatic  realism’  and  rejects  both  his  early  metaphysical  
realism  and  the  later  epistemic  view  of  truth.  While  internal  realism,  at  least  in  its  
inception,  had  a  Kantian  flavor;  Putnam’s  work  in  the  1990’s  was  influenced  by  
Wittgenstein  and  by  Pragmatism.  The most crucial feature of this latest
philosophical project is ‘a recovery of the natural realism of the common man’
(Putnam 1999: 24).

In earlier work, Putnam had treated sensations as the interface between the human
mind and the external world. By early 1990s, however, he came to find this option
unworkable - a realization that set the scene for the gradual emergence of his third
reply to the big question of realism. Natural  realism  emphasizes  the  role  of  our  
direct  unencumbered,  contact  with  the  world,  unhampered  by  sense  data  or  any  
other  intermediaries.  We  can  be  natural  realists  because  we  perceive  the  world  
itself,  and  not  the  sense  data  caused  by  that  world.  Natural  realism,  Putnam  
claims,  reflects  our  common  sense  ‘that  “external”  things,  cabbages  and  kings,  
can  be  experienced.’  (Putnam  1999:  20).    

One  important  feature  of  his  thinking  in  this  phase,  and  a  carry  over  from  
Putnam  2,  concerns  the  role  and  status  of  values  in  a  world  of  facts.  Putnam  first  
questioned  the  intelligibility  of  the  in  a  sharp  division  between  factual  
statements  and  normative  judgments,  so  popular  among  the  logical  positivists,  in  
1986.  Some  of  his  more  recent  publications  (Putnam  2002,  2004,  2011)  deal  in  

15
greater  detail  with  the  same  theme.    Putnam’s  aim  is  to  dispel  the  wide-­‐spread  
beliefs  that  while  science  deals  with  objective  facts  moral  values  are  purely  
subjective.  
 
Since  Hume  the  fact/value  division  has  been  a  cornerstone  of  naturalist  or  
scientific  world-­‐view.  Putnam  argues  that  this  orthodoxy  is  the  wrong  starting  
point  for  understanding  both  science  and  ethics.    It  is  often  claimed  that  scientific  
statements  have  a  representational  content,  they  represent  states  of  affairs,  
while  value  judgments  express  our  attitudes  and  emotions  and  give  
prescriptions  and  commands.  For  this  reason,  factual  judgments  are  objectively  
true  or  false  while  ethical  positions  are  projections  and  expressions  of  our  
subjective  preferences.  Putnam’s  key  argument  against  this  popular  position  is  
that  the  distinction  is  unsustainable  because  factual  statements,  as  well  as  the  
practices  of  science  which  enables  us  to  decide  what  counts  as  a  fact,  are  always  
value  laden,  in  the  sense  that  they  presuppose  some  epistemic  values  (Putnam  
1981:  128).    In  other  words,  the  very  act  of  theorizing  about  the  factual  world  is  a  
value-­‐laden  activity.  Here,  once  again,  we  see  Putnam’s  desire  “to  break  the  grip  
that  a  certain  picture  has  on  our  thinking;  the  picture  of  a  dualism,  a  
dichotomous  division  of  our  thought”  (Putnam  1990:  71).    
 
Conclusion  
Philosophy  for  Hilary  Putnam  is  an  ongoing  project  involving  a  critical  but  
generous  engagement  with  numerous  philosophical  ideas  and  perspectives,  
including  those  of  his  older  self.  It  is  a  never-­‐ending  attempt  at  renewing  the  
subject  matter  and  acknowledging  our  fallibility  in  the  face  of  the  formidable  task  
of  addressing  some  of  the  most  fundamental  questions  facing  us.  The  best  
summary  of  Putnam’s  approach  to  philosophy  is  by  Paul  Franks,  one  of  his  many  
students  to  have  become  prominent  philosophers  in  their  own  right.  Franks  says:  
“Putnam  is  not  best  understood  in  terms  of  his  “position”  or  “positions”  but  in  
terms  of  the  dialectical  tensions  and  complexity  that  expresses  themselves  
through  his  positions”  (quoted  in  Putnam  2012:2).  This  article  has  been  a  
summary  of  both  his  various  influential  positions  and  the  dialectical  relations  
between  them.  

16
  

Selected  Works  

1951  (1990).  The  Meaning  of  the  Concept  of  Probability  in  Application  to  Finite  
Sequences.  Ph.D.  dissertation,  University  of  California,  Los  Angeles,  1951.  New  
York:  Garland,  1990.  
1972.  Philosophy  of  Logic.  New  York:  Harper  and  Row,  1971.  London:  George  
Allen  and  Unwin.  
1975a.  Mathematics,  Matter  and  Method,  Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press    
1975.  Mind,  Language  and  Reality,  Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press    
1977.    ‘Realism  and  Reason’,  Proceedings  and  Addresses  of  the  American  
Philosophical  Association,  Vol.  50,  No.  6,    pp.  483-­‐498.    
1978.  Meaning  and  the  Moral  Sciences.  Boston:  Routledge  &  Kegan  Paul.    
1981.  Reason,  Truth,  and  History.  Cambridge  University  Press    
1983.  Realism  and  Reason.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press.  
1987.  Representation  and  Reality.  Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press.  
1990.  Realism  with  a  Human  Face.  Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press    
1992.  Renewing  Philosophy.  Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press.  
1992.  Pragmatism.  An  Open  Question.  Oxford:  Blackwell.    
1994.  Words  and  Life.  Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press    
1999.  The  Threefold  Cord.  New  York:  Columbia  University  Press  
2002.  The  Collapse  of  the  Fact/Value  Dichotomy  and  Other  Essays.  Cambridge,  
Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press.  
2004.    Ethics  Without  Ontology.  Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press.  
2012.  Philosophy  in  an  Age  of  Science:  Physics,  Mathematics  and  Skepticism,  edited  
by  Mario  De  Caro  and  David  Macarthur,  Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  University  
Press  
M.  Davis,  H.  Putnam,  J.  Robinson,  (1961).  "The  decision  problem  for  exponential  
Diophantine  equations",  Annals  of  Mathematics  74:3,  425–436.
Putnam.  H.  and  Benacerraf,  P.  1964.  (eds.)  Philosophy  of  Mathematics:  Selected  
Readings.  Englewood  Cliffs,  N.J.:  Prentice-­‐Hall.  2nd  ed.,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  
University  Press,  1983.  

17
Putnam,  H.    and    Walsh,  V.  (Eds.),  The  End  of  Value-­‐Free  Economics,  Londong,  
New-­‐York:  Routledge  

Selected Books on Putnam

Baghramian,  M    (2015).  Hilary  Putnam:  Mind,  Language  and  the  World,    London:  
Polity  Press  
Baghramian,  M.  (ed.)  (2012).  Reading  Putnam.  London/New  York:  Routledge.  
Yemima  Ben-­‐Menahem  (2005).  Hilary  Putnam.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  
Press.  
Maximilian  De  Gaynesford  (2004).  Hilary  Putnam.  Chesham,  UK:  Acumen  Publishing.  
Christopher  Norris  (2002).  Hilary  Putnam:  Realism,  Reason  and  the  Uses  of  
Uncertainty.  Manchester:  Manchester  University  Press.  
Urszula  M.  Zeglen  &  James  Conant  (eds.)  (2002).  Hilary  Putnam:  Pragmatism  and  
Realism.  London  &  New  York:  Routledge.  
Andrew  Pessin  &  Sanford  Goldberg  (1996).  The  Twin  Earth  Chronicles:  Twenty  Years  
of  Reflection  on  Hilary  Putnam's  "The  Meaning  of  'Meaning'".  New  York:  M.E.  Sharpe.  
Peter  Clark  &  Bob  Hale  (eds.)  (1994).  Reading  Putnam.  Oxford:  Blackwell.    
Goerge  Boolos  (ed.)  (1990).  Meaning  and  Method:  Essays  in  Honour  of  Hilary  Putnam.  
Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press.  
 
Other  works  cited  
Kripke,  Saul,  (1980).  Naming  and  Necessity.  Cambridge,  Mass:  Harvard  University  
Press  
Quine,  W.V.  (1951).  “Two  Dogmas  of  Empiricism”.  The  Philosophical  Review  60,  
20-­‐43.    
Quine,  W.V.  (1960),  Word  and  Object.  Cambridge:  M.I.T.  Press.  
 

18